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## **CONTRIBUTION**

From: To:	General Secretariat of the Council Working Party on Energy
Subject:	CY comments on EMD (ST 8918/23)

Delegations will find in the annex the CY comments on EMD (ST 8918/23).

EN

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
2023/0077 (COD)		
Proposal for a		
REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN		- " //
PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL		
amending Regulations (EU) 2019/943 and (EU)		
2019/942 as well as Directives (EU) 2018/2001		
and (EU) 2019/944 to improve the Union's		
electricity market design		
(Text with EEA relevance)		
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE		
COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,		
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning		
of the European Union, and in particular Article		
194(2) thereof,		
Having regard to the proposal from the		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
European Commission,		
After transmission of the draft legislative act to		
the national parliaments,		
Having regard to the opinion of the European		
Economic and Social Committee,		
Having regard to the opinion of the Committee		
of the Regions,		
Acting in accordance with the ordinary		
legislative procedure,		
Whereas:		
	(4) Y 1:1 : 1 1:1::	
(1) Very high prices and volatility in	(1) Very high prices and volatility in	We need to make sure that all the provisions
electricity markets have been observed since	electricity markets have been observed since	apply to the use of both gas and oil for
September 2021. As set out by the European	September 2021. As set out by the European	electricity production. Therefore the appropriate
Agency for the Cooperation of Energy	Agency for the Cooperation of Energy	wording might be fossil fuels as in the rest of

Important: In order to guarantee that your comments appear accurately, please do not modify the table format by adding/removing/adjusting/merging/splitting cells and rows. This would hinder the consolidation of your comments.

Deadline: 12 May 2023

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Regulators ('ACER') in its April 2022	Regulators ('ACER') in its April 2022	the document.
assessment of EU wholesale electricity market	assessment of EU wholesale electricity market	
design <sup>1</sup> , this is mainly a consequence of the high	design <sup>2</sup> , this is mainly a consequence of the high	Some MS still use oil in their energy mix and
price of gas, which is used as an input to	price of gas fossil fuels, which is used as an	they have experienced large increases in
generate electricity.	input to generate electricity.	electricity price, due to the increase in the prices
		of oil (and CO2). Increased fuel switchin in the
		future may also induce further increases in oil
		price.
(2) The escalation of the Russian military		
aggression against Ukraine, a Contracting Party		
of the Energy Community, and related		
international sanctions since February 2022		
have disrupted global energy markets,		
exacerbated the problem of high gas prices, and		
have had significant knock-on impacts on		

European Union Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators, ACER's Final Assessment of the EU Wholesale Electricity Market Design, April 2022.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> European Union Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators, ACER's Final Assessment of the EU Wholesale Electricity Market Design, April 2022.

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
electricity prices. The Russian invasion of		
Ukraine has also caused uncertainty on the		
supply of other commodities, such as hard coal		- "//
and crude oil, used by power-generating		
installations. This has resulted in substantial		
additional increases in the volatility of price		
levels of electricity.		
(3) In response to this situation, the		
Communication on Energy Prices presented by		
the Commission in October 2021 contained a		
toolbox of measures that the EU and its Member		
States may use to address the immediate impact		
of high energy prices on households and		
businesses (including income support, tax		
breaks, gas savings and storage measures) and		
to strengthen resilience against future price		
shocks. In its Communication of 8 March 2022		
entitled 'REPowerEU: Joint European Action		
for more affordable, secure and sustainable		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
energy' <sup>3</sup> the Commission outlined a series of		
additional measures to strengthen the toolbox		
and to respond to rising energy prices. On 23		- "//
March 2022, the Commission also established a		
temporary State Aid regime to allow certain		
subsidies to soften the impact of high energy		
prices.4		
(4) On 18 May 2022 the Commission		
presented the REPowerEU plan <sup>5</sup> that introduced		
additional measures focusing on energy savings,		
diversification of energy supplies and		
accelerated roll-out of renewable energy aiming		
at ending the Union's dependency on Russian		

Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions - REPowerEU: Joint European Action for more affordable, secure and sustainable energy, COM/2022/108 final

Communication from the Commission Temporary Crisis Framework for State Aid measures to support the economy following the aggression against Ukraine by Russia C 131 I/01, C/2022/1890.

Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions - REPowerEU Plan, COM(2022)230.

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
fossil fuels, including a proposal to increase the		
Union's 2030 target for renewables to 45%.		
Furthermore, the Communication on Short-		- "//
Term Energy Market Interventions and Long-		
Term Improvements to the Electricity Market		
Design <sup>6</sup> , in addition to setting out additional		
short-term measures to tackle high energy prices		
identified potential areas for improving the		
electricity market design and announced the		
intention to assess these areas with a view to		
change the legislative framework.		
(5) To address urgently the price crisis and		
security concerns and to tackle the price hikes		
for citizens, and based on a series of		

Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions - Short-Term Energy Market Interventions and Long Term Improvements to the Electricity Market Design – a course for action, COM(2022) 236 final.

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Commission proposals, the Union adopted a		
strong gas storage regime <sup>7</sup> , effective demand		
reduction measures for gas and electricity8,		
price limiting regimes to avoid windfall profits		
in both gas and electricity markets <sup>9</sup> and		
measures to accelerate the permit-granting		
procedures for renewable energy installations <sup>10</sup> .		
(6) A well-integrated market which builds		
on the Clean Energy for all Europeans Package		
adopted in 2018 and 2019 <sup>11</sup> should allow the		

Regulation (EU) 2022/1032 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 June 2022 amending Regulations (EU) 2017/1938 and (EC) No 715/2009 with regard to gas storage (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L 173

Council Regulation (EU) 2022/1369 of 5 August 2022 on coordinated demand-reduction measures for gas, OJ L 206 and Council Regulation (EU) 2022/1854 of 6 October 2022 on an emergency intervention to address high energy prices, OJ L 261

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Council Regulation (EU) 2022/1854 of 6 October 2022 on an emergency intervention to address high energy prices, OJ L 261.

Council Regulation (EU) 2022/2577 of 22 December 2022 laying down a framework to accelerate the deployment of renewable energy, OJ L 335, 29.12.2022.

Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on the Governance of the Energy Union and Climate Action, OJ L 328, 21.12.2018, p. 1; Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources (recast), OJ L 328, 21.12.2018, p. 82; Directive (EU) 2018/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 amending Directive 2012/27/EU on energy efficiency, OJ L 328, 21.12.2018, p. 210; Regulation (EU) 2019/942 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019

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Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
Union to reap the economic benefits of a single		
energy market in normal market circumstances,		
ensuring security of supply and sustaining the		
decarbonisation process. Cross-border		
interconnectivity also ensures safer, more		
reliable and efficient operation of the power		
system.		
(7) The current electricity market design has		
also helped the emergence of new and		
innovative products, services and measures on		
retail electricity markets, supporting energy		
efficiency and renewable energy uptake and		
enhancing choice so as to help consumers		
reduce their energy bills also through small-		
scale generation installations and emerging		

establishing a European Union Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (recast), OJ L 158, 14.6.2019, p. 22; Regulation (EU) 2019/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on the internal market for electricity (recast), OJ L 158, 14.6.2019, p. 54; Directive (EU) 2019/944 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on common rules for the internal market for electricity (recast), OJ L 158, 14.6.2019, p. 125.

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
services for providing demand response.		
Building on and seizing the potential of the		
digitalisation of the energy system, such as		- "//
active participation by consumers, should be a		
key element of our future electricity markets		
and systems. At the same time, there is a need to		
respect consumer choices and allow consumers		
to benefit from a variety of contract offers.		
(8) In the context of the energy crisis, the		
current electricity market design has however		
also revealed a number of important		
shortcomings linked to the impact of high and		
volatile fossil fuel prices on short-term		
electricity markets, which expose households		
and companies to significant price spikes with		
effects on their electricity bills.		
(9) A faster deployment of renewable		
energy and clean flexible technologies		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
constitutes the most sustainable and cost-		
effective way of structurally reducing the		
demand for fossil fuels for electricity generation		- "//
and for direct consumption through		
electrification and energy system integration.		
Thanks to their low operational costs, renewable		
sources can positively impact electricity prices		
across the Union and reduce direct consumption		
of fossil fuels.		
(10) The changes to the electricity market		
design should ensure that the benefits from		
rising renewable power deployment, and the		
energy transition as a whole, are brought to		
consumers, including the most vulnerable ones,		
and ultimately, shield them from energy crises		
and avoid more households falling into energy		
poverty trap. These should mitigate the impact		
of high fossil fuel prices, notably that of gas, on		
electricity prices, aiming to allow households		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
and companies to reap the benefits of affordable		
and secure energy from sustainable renewable		
and low carbon sources in the longer term.		
(11) The reform of the electricity market		
design should benefit not just household		
consumers but also the competitiveness of the		
Union's industries by facilitating their		
possibilities to make the clean tech investments		
they require to meet their net zero transition		
paths. The energy transition in the Union needs		
to be supported by a strong clean technology		
manufacturing basis. These reforms will support		
the affordable electrification of industry and the		
Union's position as a global leader in terms of		
research and innovation in clean energy		
technologies.		
(12) Well-functioning and efficient short-		
term markets are a key tool for the integration of		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
renewable energy and flexibility sources in the		
market and facilitate energy system integration		
in a cost-effective manner.		
(13) Intraday markets are particularly		
important for the integration of variable		
renewable energy sources in the electricity		
system at the least cost as they give the		
possibility to market participants to trade		
shortages or surplus of electricity closer to the		
time of delivery. Since variable renewable		
energy generators are only able to accurately		
estimate their production close to the delivery		
time, it is crucial for them to have a maximum		
of trading opportunities via access to a liquid		
market as close as possible to the time of		
delivery of the electricity.		
(14) It is therefore important for the intraday		
markets to adapt to the participation of variable		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
renewable energy technologies such as solar and		
wind as well as to the participation of demand		
side response and energy storage. The liquidity		• //
of the intraday markets should be improved with		
the sharing of the order books between market		
operators within a bidding zone, also when the		
cross-zonal capacities are set to zero or after the		
gate closure time of the intraday market.		
Furthermore, the gate closure time of the		
intraday market should be set closer to the time		
of delivery to maximize the opportunities for		
market participants to trade shortages and		
surplus of electricity and contribute to better		
integrating variable renewables in the electricity		
system.		
(15) In addition, the short-term electricity		
markets should ensure that small-scale		
flexibility service providers can participate by		
lowering the minimum bid size.		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
(16) To ensure the efficient integration of		
electricity generated from variable renewable		- 1
energy sources and to reduce the need for fossil-		
fuel based electricity generation in times when		
there is high demand for electricity combined		
with low levels of electricity generation from		
variable renewable energy sources, it should be		
possible for transmission system operators to		
design a peak shaving product enabling demand		
response to contribute to decreasing peaks of		
consumption in the electricity system at specific		
hours of the day. In addition, the peak shaving		
product should contribute to ensuring		
security of supply. The peak shaving product		
should contribute to maximize the integration of		
electricity produced from renewable sources		
into the system by shifting the electricity		
consumption to moments of the day with higher		
renewable electricity generation. As the peak		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
shaving product aims to reduce and shift the		
electricity consumption, the scope of this		
product should be limited to demand-side		- " //
response. The procurement of the peak shaving		
product should take place on a short notice so		
as to avoid booking demand response		
capacities that could otherwise participate in		
wholesale electricity markets in normal		
conditions. Its activation should be limited in		
time to limit distortive effects on the		
electricity market. The procurement of the		
peak shaving product should in particular		
avoid any impact on the day-ahead price, and		
its activation should in such a way that it does		
not overlap with the activation of balancing		
products which aim at maintaining the		
frequency of the electricity system stable. In		
order to verify volumes of activated demand		
reduction, the transmission system operator		
should use a baseline reflecting the expected		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
electricity consumption without the activation of		
the peak shaving product.		
		- //
(17) In order to be able to actively participate	-	
in the electricity markets and to provide their		
flexibility, consumers are progressively		
equipped with smart metering systems.		
However, in a number of Member States the		
roll-out of smart metering systems is still slow.		
In those instances where smart metering systems		
are not yet installed and in instances where		
smart metering systems do not provide for the		
sufficient level of data granularity, transmission		
and distribution system operators should be able		
to use data from dedicated		
measurement <i>metering</i> devices for the		
observability and settlement of flexibility		
services such as demand response and energy		
storage. Enabling the use of data from dedicated		
measurement <i>metering</i> devices for observability		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
and settlement should facilitate the active		
participation of the consumers in the market and		
the development of their demand response. The		- " //
use of data from these dedicated		
measurement <i>metering</i> devices should be		
accompanied by quality requirements relating to		
the data.		
(18) This Regulation establishes a legal basis		
for processing of personal data in compliance		
with Article 6(1)(c) GDPR. Member States		
should ensure that all personal data protection		
principles and obligations laid down in the		
GDPR are met, including on data minimisation.		
Where the objective of this Directive can be		
achieved without processing of personal data,		
providers should rely on anonymised and		
aggregated data.		
(19) Consumers and suppliers need effective		

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and efficient forward markets to cover their		
long-term price exposure and decrease the		
dependence on short-term prices. To ensure that		- " //
energy customers all over the EU can fully		
benefit from the advantages of integrated		
electricity markets and competition across the		
Union, the functioning of the Union's electricity		
forward market should be improved via the		
establishment of regional virtual hubs with a		
view to overcome the existing market		
fragmentation and the low liquidity experienced		
in many bidding zones. Regional virtual hubs		
should cover multiple bidding zones while		
ensuring an adequate price correlation. Some		
bidding zones may not be covered by a regional		
virtual hub in terms of contributing to the hub		
reference price. However, market participants		
from these bidding zones should still be able to		
hedge through a hub.		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
(19b) To ensure uniform conditions for the		
implementation of this Regulation, the		
Commission should make use of the		- "//
implementing powers conferred in		
accordance with Article 291 TFEU in		
Regulation (EU) 2019/943 to set out detailed		
rules on the design of the Union's electricity		
forward market as regards the establishment		
of regional virtual hubs. Before adapting that		
implementing act, the Commission should		
carry out an impact assessment.		
(20) Virtual hubs should reflect the		
aggregated price of multiple bidding zones and		
provide a reference price, which should be used		
by market operators to offer forward hedging		
products. To that extent, virtual hubs should not		
be understood as entities arranging or executing		
transactions. The regional virtual hubs, by		
providing a reference price index, should enable		

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the pooling of liquidity and provide better		
hedging opportunities to market participants.		
		<i>* //</i>
(21) To enhance the possibilities of market		J.
participants for hedging, the role of the single		
allocation platform established in accordance		
with Commission Regulation (EU) 2016/1719		
should be expanded. The single allocation		
platform should offer trading of financial long-		
term transmission rights between the different		
bidding zones and the regional virtual hubs. The		
orders submitted by market participants for		
financial transmission rights shouldshall be		
matched by a simultaneous allocation of long		
term cross zonal capacity. Such matching and		
allocation should be performed on a regular		
basis, to ensure enough liquidity and, hence,		
efficient hedging possibilities to market		
participants. The long-term transmission rights		
should be issued with frequent maturities		

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(ranging from month ahead to at least three		
years ahead), in order to be aligned with the		
typical hedging time horizon of market		- "//
participants. The single allocation platform		
should be subject to monitoring and		
enforcement to ensure that it performs its tasks		
properly.		
(22) Network tariffs should incentivise		
transmission and distribution system operators		
to use flexibility services through further		
developing innovative solutions to optimise the		
existing grid and to procure flexibility services,		
in particular demand response or storage. For		
this purpose, network tariffs should be designed		
so as to take into account the operational and		
capital expenditures of system operators or an		
efficient combination of both so that they can		
operate the electricity system cost-efficiently.		
This would further contribute to integrating		

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renewables at the least cost for the electricity		
system and enable final customers to value their		
flexibility solutions.		
(23) Offshore renewable energy sources, such		
as offshore wind, ocean energy and floating		
photovoltaic, will play an instrumental role in		
building a power system largely based on		
renewables and in ensuring climate neutrality by		
2050. There are, however, substantial obstacles		
to their wider and efficient deployment		
preventing the massive scale up needed to		
achieve those objectives. Similar obstacles		
could arise for other offshore technologies in the		
future. These obstacles include investment risks		
associated with the unique topographical		
situation of offshore hybrid projects connected		
to more than one market. In order to reduce		
investment risk for these offshore project		
developers and to ensure that the projects in an		

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offshore bidding zone have full market access to		
the surrounding markets, transmission system		
operators should guarantee access of the		- "//
offshore project to the capacity of the respective		
hybrid interconnector for all market time units.		
If the available transmission capacities are		
reduced to the extent that the full amount of		
electricity generation that the offshore project		
would have otherwise been able to export		
cannot be delivered to the market, the		
transmission system operator or operators		
responsible for the need to limit the capacity		
should, in future, be enabled to compensate the		
offshore project operator commensurately using		
congestion income. This compensation should		
only be related to the production capability		
available to the market, which may be weather		
dependent and excludes the outage and		
maintenance operations of the offshore project.		
The details, including the conditions under		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
which the measure may expire, are intended to		
be defined in an implementing Regulation.		
		- //
(24) In the day-ahead wholesale market, the		J.
power plants with lower marginal costs are		
dispatched first, but the price received by all		
market participants is set by the last plant		
needed to cover the demand, which is the plant		
with the highest marginal costs, when the		
markets clear. In this context, the energy crisis		
has shown that a surge in the price of gas and		
hard coal can translate into exceptional and		
lasting increases of the prices at which the gas		
and coal-fired generation facilities bid in the		
day-ahead wholesale market. That in turn has		
led to exceptionally high prices in the day-ahead		
market across the Union, as gas and coal-fired		
generation facilities are often the plants with the		
highest marginal costs needed to meet the		
demand for electricity.		

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(25) Given the role of the price in the day-		
ahead market as a reference for the price in		- 1
other wholesale electricity markets, and the fact		
that all market participants receive the clearing		
price, the technologies with significantly lower		
marginal costs have consistently recorded high		
revenues.		
(26) To reach the Union's decarbonisation		
targets and the objectives set out in REPowerEU		
to become more energy independent, the Union		
needs to accelerate the deployment of		
renewables at a much faster pace. In view of the		
investment needs required to achieve these		
goals, the market should ensure that a long-term		
price signal is established.		
(27) In this framework, Member States		
should strive to create the right market		

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conditions for long-term market-based		
instruments, such as power purchase agreements		
('PPAs'). PPAs are bilateral purchase		* //
agreements between producers and buyers of		
electricity. They provide long-term price		
stability for the customer and the necessary		
certainty for the producer to take the investment		
decision. Nevertheless, only a handful of		
Member States have active PPA markets and		
buyers are typically limited to large companies,		
not least because PPAs face a set of barriers, in		
particular the difficulty to cover the risk of		
payment default from the buyer in these long-		
term agreements. Member States should take		
into consideration the need to create a dynamic		
PPA market when setting the policies to achieve		
the energy decarbonisation objectives set out in		
their integrated national energy and climate		
plans.		

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(28) According to Article 15(8) of Directive		
(EU) 2018/2001 of the European Parliament and		
of the Council, Member States are to assess the		- "//
regulatory and administrative barriers to long-		
term renewables PPAs, and shall remove		
unjustified barriers to, and promote the uptake		
of, such agreements. In addition, Member States		
are to describe policies and measures facilitating		
the uptake of renewables PPAs in their		
integrated national energy and climate plans.		
Without prejudice to that obligation to report on		
the regulatory context affecting the PPA market,		
Member States should ensure that instruments to		
reduce the financial risks associated to the buyer		
defaulting on its long-term payment obligations		
in the framework of PPAs are accessible to		
companies that face entry barriers to the PPA		
market and are not in financial difficulty-in line		
with Articles 107 and 108 TFEU. Member		
States could decide to set up a guarantee scheme		

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at market prices if private guarantees are not		
accessible or insufficiently accessible. In that		
case, Member States should include provisions		* //
to avoid lowering the liquidity in the electricity		
markets, such as by using financial PPAs.		
Member States could decide to facilitate the		
aggregation of demand for PPAs from		
customers that individually face barriers to		
entry to the PPA market, but collectively may		
provide an attractive offer for PPAs to		
<u>producers.</u> Member States should not provide		
support to PPAs that purchase generation from		
fossil fuels. While the default approach should		
be non-discrimination between consumers,		
Member States could decide to target these		
instruments to specific categories of consumers,		
applying objective and non-discriminatory		
criteria. In this framework, Member States		
should take into account the potential role of		
instruments facilities provided at Union level,		

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for instance by the European Investment Bank		
('EIB').		
(29) Member States have at their disposal		
several instruments to support the development		
of PPA markets when designing and allocating		
public support. Allowing renewable energy		
project developers participating in a public		
support tender to reserve a share of the		
generation for sale through a PPA would		
contribute to nurture and grow PPA markets. In		
addition, as part of these tender evaluation		
Member States should endeavour to apply		
criteria to incentivise the access to the PPA		
market for actors that face entry barriers, such		
as small and medium-sized enterprises		
('SMEs'), giving preference to bidders		
presenting a commitment to sign a PPA for part		
of the project's generation from one or several		
potential buyers that face difficulties to access		

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the PPA market.		
(30) Where Member States decide to support		- //
publicly financed new investments <b>by</b> ("direct		
price support schemes") in low carbon, non-		
fossil fuel electricity generation to achieve the		
Union's decarbonisation objectives, those		
schemes should be structured by way of two-		
way contracts for difference such as to include,		
in addition to a revenue guarantee, an upward		
limitation of the market revenues of the		
generation assets concerned. To protect		
investment certainty, this obligation should		
apply to contracts under direct price support		
schemes for new investments in generation		
concluded as of one year after entry into		
force of this Regulation. New investments for		
the generation of electricity should include		
investments in new power generating facilities,		
investments aimed at repowering existing power		

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generating facilities, and investments aimed at		
substantially repowering extending existing		
power generating facilities, increasing their		- "//
<u>capacity</u> or at prolonging their lifetime.		
(31) Such two-way contracts for difference		
would ensure that revenues of producers		
stemming from new investments in electricity		
generation which benefit from public support		
become more independent from the volatile		
prices of fossil fuels-based generation which		
typically sets the price in the day-ahead market.		
(32) However, to the extent that the		
limitation to set out direct price support schemes		
in the form of two-way contracts for difference		
narrows down the types of direct price support		
schemes that Member States can adopt as		
regards renewable energy sources, it should be		
limited to low carbon, non-fossil fuel		

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technologies, with low and stable operational		
costs and to technologies which typically do not		
provide flexibility to the electricity system,		- "//
while excluding technologies that are at early		
stages of their market deployment. This is		
necessary to ensure that the economic viability		
of generation technologies with high marginal		
costs is not jeopardised and to maintain the		
incentives of the technologies which can offer		
flexibility to the electricity system to bid in the		
electricity market based on their opportunity		
costs. In addition, the limitation to set out direct		
price support schemes in the form of two-way		
contracts for difference should not apply to		
emerging technologies for which other types of		
direct price support schemes may be better		
placed to incentivise their uptake. The limitation		
should be without prejudice to the possible		
exemption for small-scale installations and		
demonstration projects pursuant to Article 4 (3)		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
of (EU) 2018/2001 of the European Parliament		
and of the Council and consider the specificities		
of renewable energy communities in accordance		- "//
with Article 22 (7) of that Directive.		
(22) In view of the good to grow ide good to grow ide		
(33) In view of the need to provide regulatory		
certainty of producers, the obligation for		
Member States to apply direct price support		
schemes for the production of electricity in the		
form of two-way contracts for difference should		
apply only to new investments for the		
generation of electricity from the sources		
specified in the recital above.		
(34) Thanks to the upward limitation of the		
market revenues direct price support schemes in		
the form of two-way contracts for difference		
should provide an additional source of revenues		
for Member States in periods of high energy		
prices. To further mitigate the impact of high		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
electricity prices on the energy bills of		
consumers, Member States should ensure that		
the revenues collected from producers subject to		
direct price support schemes in the form of two-		
way contracts for difference are passed on to all		
final-electricity customers, including		
households, SMEs and industrial		
customers consumers, based on their		
consumption. When distributing the revenues		
to households, Member States should in		
particular be able to favour vulnerable		
customers. Where Member States decide to		
distribute revenues to undertakings, they		
should do so proportionally to the		
consumption of such undertakings. The part		
of the revenues that could be distributed to		
undertakings should not exceed the combined		
share of electricity consumption of all		
<u>undertakings.</u> The redistribution of revenues		
should be done in a way that ensures that		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
consumers are still to some extent exposed to		
the price signal, so that they reduce their		
consumption when the prices are high, or shift it		- "//
to periods of lower prices (which are typically		
periods with a higher share of RES production).		
Member States should ensure that the level		
playing-field and competition between the		
different suppliers is not affected by the		
redistribution of revenues to the final electricity		
consumers.		
(35) Furthermore, Member States should		
ensure that the direct price support schemes,		
irrespective of their form, do not undermine the		
efficient, competitive and liquid functioning of		
the electricity markets, preserving the incentives		
of producers to react to market signals,		
including stop generating when electricity prices		
are below their operational costs, and of final		
customers to reduce consumption when		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
electricity prices are high. Member States		
should ensure that support schemes do not		
constitute a barrier for the development of		- " //
commercial contracts such as PPAs.		
(36) Thus, two-way contracts for difference		
and power purchase agreements play		
complementary roles in advancing the energy		
transition and bringing the benefits of		
renewables and low carbon energy to		
consumers. Subject to the requirements set out		
in the present Regulation, Member States should		
be free to decide which instruments they use to		
achieve their decarbonisation objectives.		
Through PPAs, private investors contribute to		
additional renewable and low carbon energy		
deployment while locking low and stable		
electricity prices over the long-term. Likewise,		
through two-way contracts for difference, the		
same objective is achieved by public entities on		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
behalf of consumers. Both instruments are		
necessary to achieve the Union's		
decarbonisation targets through renewable and		- //
low carbon energy deployment, while bringing		
forward the benefits of low-cost electricity		
generation for consumers.		
(37) The accelerated deployment of		
renewables necessitates a growing availability		
of flexibility solutions to ensure their integration		
to the grid and to enable the electricity system		
and grid to adjust to the variability of electricity		
generation and consumption across different		
time horizons. Regulatory authorities should		
periodically assess the need for flexibility in the		
electricity system based on the input of		
transmission and distribution system operators.		
The assessment of the flexibility needs of the		
electricity system should take into account all		
existing and planned investments (including		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
existing assets that are not yet connected to the		
grid) on sources of flexibility such as flexible		
electricity generation, interconnectors, demand		- "//
side response, energy storage or the production		
of renewable fuels, in view of the need to		
decarbonise the energy system. On this basis,		
Member States should define a national		
objective for non-fossil flexibility such as		
demand-side response and energy storage which		
should also be reflected in their integrated		
national energy and climate plans.		
(38) To achieve the national objective for		
non-fossil flexibility such as demand-side		
response and <b>energy</b> storage investment needs,		
Member States can design or redesign capacity		
mechanisms in order to create a green and		
flexible capacity mechanism. Member States		
that apply a capacity mechanism in line with the		
existing rules should promote the participation		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
of non-fossil flexibility such as demand-side		
response and <b>energy</b> storage by introducing		
additional criteria or features in the design.		- "//
(39) To support environmental protection		
objectives the CO2 emissions' limit, set out in		
Article 22(4) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 of		
the European Parliament and of the Council,		
should be seen as an upper limit. Therefore,		
Member States could set technical performance		
standards and CO2 emissions' limits that restrict		
participation in capacity mechanisms to flexible,		
fossil-free technologies in full alignment with		
the Guidelines on State aid for climate,		
environmental protection and energy <sup>12</sup> which		
encourage Member States to introduce green		
criteria in capacity mechanisms.		

Communication from the Commission – Guidelines on State aid for climate, environmental protection and energy 2022 (OJ C 80, 18.2.2022, p. 1).

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
(40) In addition, if Member States do not		
apply a capacity mechanism or if the additional		- 1
criteria or features in the design of their capacity		
mechanism are insufficient to achieve national		
objective for demand response and <b>energy</b>		
storage investment needs they could apply <b>non-</b>		
fossil_flexibility support schemes consisting of		
payments for the available capacity of non-fossil		
flexibility such as demand side response and		
energy storage.		
(41) The connection of new generation and		
demand installations, in particular renewable		
energy plants, often faces delays in grid		
connection procedures. One of the reasons for		
such delays is the lack of available grid capacity		
at the location chosen by the investor, which		
implies the need for grid extensions or		
reinforcements to connect the installations to the		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
system in a safe manner. A new requirement for		
electricity system operators, both at		
transmission and distribution levels, to publish		-"//
and update information on the grid capacity		
available in their areas of operation would		
contribute to decision-making by investors on		
the basis of information of grid capacity		
availability within the system and thus to the		
required acceleration in the deployment of		
renewable energy.		
(42) Furthermore, to tackle the problem of		
lengthy reply times on requests for connection		
to the grid, transmission and distribution system		
operators should provide clear and transparent		
information to system users about the status and		
treatment of their connection requests.		
Transmission and distribution system operators		
should-endeavour to provide such information		
within a period of three months from the		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
submission of the request.		
(43) During the energy crisis, consumers		- //
have been exposed to extremely volatile		
wholesale energy prices and had limited		
opportunities to engage in the energy market.		
Consequently, many households, have been		
facing difficulties when paying their bills.		
Vulnerable consumers and the energy poor are		
the hardest hit <sup>13</sup> , but middle-income households		
have also been exposed to such difficulties. It is		
therefore important to update consumer rights		
and protections, allowing consumers to benefit		
from the energy transition, decouple their		
electricity bills from short term price		
movements on energy markets and rebalance the		
risk between suppliers and consumers.		

Particular groups are more at risk of being affected by energy poverty or more susceptible to the adverse impacts of energy poverty, such as women, persons with disabilities, older persons, children, and persons with a minority racial or ethnic background.

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
(44) Consumers should have access to a wide		
range of offers so that they can choose a		- 1
contract according to their needs. However,		
suppliers have reduced their offers, fixed-price		
contracts have become scarce, and the choice of		
offers has become limited. Consumers should		
always have the possibility to opt for an		
affordable fixed price and fixed term contract		
and suppliers should not unilaterally modify the		
terms and conditions before such contract		
expires. This does not change the fact that		
dynamic price contracts remain essential and		
with an increasing penetration of renewable		
energy sources can help consumers to reduce		
their energy bills.		
(45) When suppliers' do not ensure that their		
electricity portfolio is sufficiently hedged		
changes in wholesale electricity prices can leave		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
them financially at risk and, result in their		
failure, passing on costs to consumers and other		
network users. Hence, it should be ensured that		• //
suppliers are appropriately hedged when		
offering fixed price contracts. An appropriate		
hedging strategy should take into account the		
suppliers' access to its own generation and its		
capitalisation as well as its exposure to changes		
in wholesale market prices. The existence of		
appropriate hedging strategies can be		
ensured by general rules overseen without		
undertaking a specific review of the positions		
or strategies of individual suppliers.		
(46) Consumers should be able to choose the		
supplier which offers them the price and service		
which best suits their needs. Advances in		
metering and sub-metering technology		
combined with information and communication		
technology mean that it is now technically		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
possible to have multiple suppliers for a single		
premises. If they so wish, customers should be		
able to use these possibilities to choose a		• //
separate supplier notably for electricity to power		
appliances such as heat pumps or electric		
vehicles which have a particularly high		
consumption or which also have the capability		
to shift their electricity consumption		
automatically in response to price signals. For		
this purpose, customers should be allowed to		
have more than one metering and billing		
point covered by the single connection point		
for their premises. The rules for the		
allocation of the associated costs should be		
determined at national level. Some smart		
metering systems may directly cover more		
than one metering point and therefore enable		
customers to have more than one electricity		
supply contract at the same time. Moreover,		
with fast-responding dedicated		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
measurementmetering devices which are		
attached to or embedded in appliances with		
flexible, controllable loads, final customers can		• " //
participate in other incentive-based demand		
response schemes that provide flexibility		
services on the electricity market and to		
transmission and distribution system operators.		
Overall, such arrangements should contribute to		
the increased uptake of demand response and to		
consumer empowerment allowing them to have		
more control over their energy use and bills,		
while providing to the electricity system		
additional flexibility in order to cope with		
demand and supply fluctuations.		
(47) Due to the increasing complexity of		
energy offers and different marketing practices,		
consumers have often difficulties to fully		
understand what they sign up to. In particular,		
there is a lack of clarity on how the price is set,		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
the conditions for the renewal of the contract,		
the consequences of terminating a contract or		
the reasons for changing conditions by the		- "//
supplier. Therefore, the key information on		
energy offers should be provided to consumers		
by suppliers or market participants engaged in		
aggregation in a short and easily understandable		
manner prior to signing the contract.		
(48) To ensure continuity of supply for		
consumers-in particular in cases of supplier		
failure, Member States should be obliged to		
implement a supplier-of-last-resort regime.		
Such a supplier of last resort appoint suppliers		
of last resort which may be treated as the		
provider of universal service. A <i>That</i> -supplier of		
last resort might be the sales division of a		
vertically integrated undertaking which also		
performs distribution -functions, provided that it		
meets the unbundling requirements of Article 35		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
of Directive (EU) 2019/944 of the European		
Parliament and of the Council. However, this		
does not imply an obligation of Member States		• //
to supply at a certain fixed minimum price.		
(49) Energy sharing can create resilience		
against the effects of high and volatile		
wholesale market prices on consumers' energy		
bills, empowers a wider group of consumers that		
do not otherwise have the option of becoming		
an active customer due to financial or spatial		
constraints, such as energy poor and vulnerable		
consumers, and leads to increased uptake of		
renewable energy by mobilising additional		
private capital investments and diversifying		
remuneration pathways. With the integration of		
appropriate price signals and storage facilities,		
electricity sharing can help lay the foundation to		
help tap into the flexibility potential of smaller		
consumers.		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
(50) Active customers that own, lease or rent		
a storage or generation facility should have the		~ *//
right to share excess production at a price or		
free of charge and empower other consumers to		
become active, or to share the renewable energy		
generated or stored by jointly leased, rented or		
owned facilities, either directly or through a		
third-party facilitator. Any payment for		
sharing of excess production for a price can		
either be settled directly between active		
customers or automated through a peer-to-		
peer trading platform. Energy sharing		
arrangement are either based on private		
contractual agreement between active customers		
or organised through a legal entity. A legal		
entity that incorporates the criteria of a		
renewable energy community as defined in		
Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of the European		
Parliament and of the Council or a citizen		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
energy community as defined in Directive (EU)		
2019/944 of the European Parliament and of the		
Council can share with their members electricity		- "//
generated from facilities they have in full		
ownership. The protection and empowerment		
framework for energy sharing should pay		
particular attention to energy poor and		
vulnerable consumers.		
(51) Energy sharing operationalises the		
collective consumption of self-generated or		
stored electricity injected into the grid by more		
than one jointly acting active customers.		
Member States should put in place the		
appropriate IT infrastructure to allow for the		
administrative matching within a certain		
timeframe of consumption with self-generated		
or stored renewable energy for the purpose of		
calculating the energy component of the energy		
bill. The output of these facilities should be		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
distributed among the aggregated consumer load		
profiles based on static, variable or dynamic		
calculation methods that can be pre-defined or		- " //
agreed upon by the active customers. Active		
customers engaged in energy sharing are		
financially responsible for imbalances they		
cause. This should be without prejudice to		
the possibility for active customers to		
delegate their balancing responsibilities to		
other market participants Sshall be shall-All		
consumer rights and obligations in this		
Directive apply to final customers involved in		
energy sharing schemes. However,		
households with an installed capacity up to		
10.8 kW for single households and up to 50		
kW for multi-apartment blocks should not be		
required to comply with the obligations of		
suppliers.		
(52) Vulnerable customers should be		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
adequately protected from electricity		
disconnections and should, as well, not be put in		
a position that forces them to disconnect. The		- "//
role of suppliers and all relevant national		
authorities to identify appropriate measures, in		
both the short and the long-term, which should		
be made available to vulnerable customers to		
manage their energy use and costs remain		
essential, including by means of close		
cooperation with social security systems.		
(53) Public interventions in price setting for		
the supply of electricity constitute, in principle,		
a market-distortive measure. Such interventions		
may therefore only be carried out as public		
service obligations and are subject to specific		
conditions. Under this Directive regulated prices		
are possible for energy poor and vulnerable		
households, including below costs, and, as a		
transition measure, for households and micro-		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
enterprises. In times of crisis, when wholesale		
and retail electricity prices increase		
significantly, and this is having a negative		- "//
impact on the wider economy, Member States		
should be allowed to extend, temporarily, the		
application of regulated prices also to SMEs.		
For both households and SMEs, Member States		
should be temporarily allowed to set regulated		
prices below costs as long as this does not create		
distortion between suppliers and suppliers are		
compensated for the costs of supplying below		
cost. However, it needs to be ensured that such		
price regulation is targeted and does not create		
incentives to increase consumption. Hence, such		
price regulation should be limited to 80% of		
median household consumption for households,		
and 70% of the previous year's consumption for		
SMEs. <i>The Commission should determine when</i>		
such an electricity price crisis exists and		
consequently when this possibility becomes		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
applicable. The Commission should also specify		
the validity of that determination, during which		
the temporary extension of regulated prices		- "//
applies, which may be for up to one year. To the		
extent that any such of the measures envisaged		
by the present Regulation constitute State aid,		
the provisions concerning such measures are		
without prejudice to the application of Articles		
107 and 108 TFEU. The Council, acting on a		
proposal from the Commission, should		
determine by means of an implementing		
decision when an Union-wide electricity price		
crisis exists. The decision should also specify		
the validity of that determination, during		
which the temporary extension of regulated		
prices applies, which may be for up to one		
year. Conferring implementing powers on the		
Council adequately takes into account the		
political nature of the decision to trigger the		
extended possibilities for public interventions		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
in price setting for the supply of electricity,		
which requires a delicate balancing of		
different policy considerations, as well as the		- "//
horizontal implications of such a decision for		
Member States.		
(53a) To the extent that any of the measures		
envisaged by the present Regulation		
constitute State aid, the provisions		
concerning such measures are without		
prejudice to the application of Articles 107		
and 108 TFEU. The Commission is		
competent to assess the compatibility of		
State aid with the internal market.		
(54) The measures envisaged by the present		
Regulation are also without prejudice to the		
application of Directive 2014/65/EU,		
Regulation (EU) 2016/1011 and Regulation		
(EU) 648/2012.		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
(55) Regulation (EU) 2019/942 of the		
European Parliament and of the Council,		- 1
Regulation (EU) 2019/943 of the European		
Parliament and of the Council, Directive (EU)		
2019/944 of the European Parliament and of the		
Council and Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of the		
European Parliament and of the Council should		
be amended accordingly.		
(56) Since the objectives of this Regulation		
cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member		
States, but can rather be better achieved at		
Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in		
accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as		
set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European		
Union. In accordance with the principle of		
proportionality, as set out in that Article, this		
Regulation does not go beyond what is		
necessary to achieve those objectives.		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:		
Article 1		
Amendments to Regulation (EU) 2019/943 of		
the European Parliament and of the Council of 5		
June 2019 on the internal market for electricity		
Regulation (EU) 2019/943 is amended as		
follows:		
(1) Article 1 is amended as follows:		
[a] point (b) is replaced by the following:		
'(b) set fundamental principles for well-		
functioning, integrated electricity markets,		
which allow all resource providers and		
electricity customers non-discriminatory market		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
access, enable the development of forward		
electricity markets to allow suppliers and		
consumers to hedge or protect themselves		• //
against the risk of future volatility in electricity		
prices, empower consumers, ensure		
competitiveness on the global market, enhance		
flexibility through demand response, energy		
storage and other non-fossil flexibility solutions,		
ensure energy efficiency, facilitate aggregation		
of distributed demand and supply, and enable		
market and sectoral integration and market-		
based remuneration of electricity generated		
from renewable sources;'		
[b] the following point is added:		
'(e) support long-term investments in		
renewable energy generation and enable		
consumers' to make their energy bills less		
dependent <b>on</b> fluctuations of short-term		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
electricity market prices, in particular fossil fuel		
prices in the medium to long-term.'		
		- "/"
(2) In Article 2, the following points are added:		
'(72) 'peak hour' means an hour with the		
highest electricity consumption combined with a		
low level of electricity generated from		
renewable energy sources, taking cross-zonal		
exchanges into account;		
(73) 'peak shaving' means the ability of market		
participants to reduce electricity consumption at		
peak hours determined by the transmission		
system operator;		
(74) 'peak shaving product' means a market-		
based product through which market		
participants can provide peak shaving to the		
transmission system operators;		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
(75) 'virtual hub' means a non-physical region		"Index Price" needs to be defined and explained
covering more than one bidding zone for which		vis-a-vis the "Reference Price" mentioned in
an index price is set in application of a		Art. 9.
methodology;		
(76) 'two-way contract for difference' means a		
contract signed between a power generating		
facility operator and a counterpart, usually a		
public entity, that provides both minimum		
remuneration protection and a limit to excess		
remuneration; the contract is designed to		
preserve incentives for the generating facility to		
operate and participate efficiently in the		
electricity markets and complies with the		
principles set out in Article 4(2) and Article		
4(3), first and third subparagraphs, of Directive		
(EU) 2018/2001;		
(77) 'power purchase agreement' or 'PPA'		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
means a contract under which a natural or legal		
person agrees to purchase electricity from an		
electricity producer on a market basis;		
(78) 'market revenue' means realised income an		V
electricity producer receives in exchange for the		
sale and delivery of electricity in the Union,		
regardless of the contractual form in which such		
exchange takes place, and excluding any		
support granted by Member States;		
(79) 'dedicated <b>measurement</b> <i>metering</i> device'		
means a device attached to or embedded in an		
asset that <b>provides</b> sells demand response or		
flexibility services on the electricity market or		
to transmission and distribution system		
operators;		
(80) 'flexibility' means the ability of an		
electricity system to adjust to the variability of		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
generation and consumption patterns and grid		
availability, across relevant market timeframes.'		
(3) Article 7 is amended as follows:		
[a] paragraph 1 is replaced by the following:		
'1. Transmission system operators and		
NEMOs, or an entity designated by them, shall		
jointly organise the management of the		
integrated day-ahead and intraday markets in		
accordance with Regulation (EU) 2015/1222.		
Transmission system operators and NEMOs		
shall cooperate at Union level or, where more		
appropriate, at a regional level in order to		
maximise the efficiency and effectiveness of		
Union electricity day-ahead and intraday		
trading. The obligation to cooperate shall be		
without prejudice to the application of Union		
competition law. In their functions relating to		

Presidency compromise text	<b>Drafting Suggestions</b>	Comments
electricity trading, transmission system		
operators and NEMOs shall be subject to		
regulatory oversight by the regulatory		- "//
authorities pursuant to Article 59 of Directive		
(EU) 2019/944 and ACER pursuant to Articles		
4 and 8 of Regulation (EU) 2019/942.'		
[b] paragraph 2 is amended as follows:		
(i) point (c) is replaced by the following:		
(c) maximise the opportunities for all market		
participants to participate in cross-zonal and		
intra-zonal trade in a non-discriminatory way		
and as close as possible to real time across and		
within all bidding zones;		
(ii) the following point (ca) is inserted:		
'(ca) be organised in such a way as to ensure the		Should be clarified that this provision does not

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
sharing of liquidity between all NEMOs, both		apply to MS with relevant derogations in Article
for cross-zonal and for intra-zonal trade;'		64(2).
		- //
(4) the following Articles 7a and 7b are inserted:		
'Article 7a		
Peak shaving product		
1. Without prejudice to Article 40(5) and		
40(6) of the Electricity Directive, transmission		
system operators may procure peak shaving		
products in order to achieve a reduction of		
electricity demand during peak hours.		
2. Transmission system operators seeking		
to procure a peak shaving product shall submit a		
proposal setting out the dimensioning and		
conditions for the procurement of the peak		
shaving product to the regulatory authority of		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
the Member State concerned. The proposal of		
the transmission system operator shall comply		
with the following requirements:		
(a) the dimensioning of the peak shaving		
product shall be based on an analysis of the		
need for an additional service to ensure security		
of supply. The analysis shall take into account- a		
cost and benefits <i>reliability standard</i> and <i>or</i>		
objective and transparent grid stability criteria		
approved by the regulatory authority. The		
dimensioning shall take into account the		
forecast of demand, the forecast of electricity		
generated from renewable energy sources and		
the forecast of other sources of flexibility in the		
system. The dimensioning of the peak shaving		
product shall be limited to ensure that <i>the</i>		
forcasted costs do not exceed pected the		
<b>expected</b> benefits of the product-do not exceed		
the forecasted costs;		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
(b) the procurement of a peak shaving		
product shall be based on objective, transparent,		- 1
non-discriminatory criteria and be limited to		
demand response;		
(c) the procurement of the peak shaving		
product shall take place using <i>a</i> competitive		
bidding <i>process</i> , with selection based on the		
lowest cost of meeting pre-defined technical and		
environmental criteria;		
(d) contracts for a peak shaving product		
shall not be concluded more than two days		
before its activation and the contracting period		
shall be no longer than one day;		
(e) the activation of the peak shaving		
product shall not reduce cross-zonal capacity;		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
(f) the activation of the peak shaving		
product shall take place after the closure of the		
day-ahead market and before the start of the		
balancing market;		
(g) the peak shaving product shall not imply		
starting generation located behind the metering		
point.		
3. The actual reduction of consumption		
resulting from the activation of a peak shaving		
product shall be measured against a		
baseline, reflecting the expected electricity		
consumption without the activation of the peak		
shaving product. Where a transmission system		
operator decides to procure a peak shaving		
product in accordance with paragraph 1 it		
Transmission system operators shall develop a		
baseline methodology in consultation with		
market participants and submit it to the		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
regulatory authority.		
4. Regulatory authorities shall approve the		- //
proposal of the transmission system operators		
seeking to procure a peak shaving product and		
the baseline methodology submitted in		
accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3 or shall		
request the transmission system operators to		
amend the proposal where it does not meet the		
requirements set out in these paragraphs.		
Article 7b		
Dedicated measurementmetering device		
1. "Member States shall allow		
#Transmission system operators and distribution		
system operators mayto use data from dedicated		
measurementmetering devices for the		
observability and settlement of demand		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
response and flexibility services, including from		
storage systems.		
		- //
2. Member States shall establish		
requirements for a dedicated		
measurement <i>metering</i> device data validation		
process to check and ensure the quality of the		
respective data.';		
(5) Article 8 is amended as follows:		
(a) paragraph 1 is replaced by the following:		
1. 'NEMOs shall allow market participants to		
trade energy as close to real time as possible and		
at least up to the intraday cross-zonal gate		
closure time. By 1 January 2028, the intraday		
cross-zonal gate closure time shall be at the		
earliest 30 minutes ahead of real time.'		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
(b) paragraph 3 is replaced by the following:		
3. 'NEMOs shall provide products for trading in		- //
day-ahead and intraday markets which are		
sufficiently small in size, with minimum bid		
sizes of 100kW or less, to allow for the effective		
participation of demand-side response, energy		
storage and small-scale renewables including		
direct participation by customers.'		
[6] Article 9 is replaced by the following:		
Article 9		
Forward markets		
1. By 1 December 2024 the ENTSO for		
Electricity shall submit to ACER, after having		
consulted ESMA, a proposal for the		
establishment of regional virtual hubs for the		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
forward market. The proposal shall: The design		
of the Union's forward market shall be based		
on regional virtual hubs supported by at least		
long-term transmission rights issued by		
TSOs, allowing price risk hedging across		
bidding zones.		
2. 24 months after [the entry into force		
of this Regulation] the Commission shall,		
after completing an impact assessment, adopt		
an implementing act in accordance with		
Article 59, that establishes the design		
referred to in paragraph 1. This		
implementing act shall in particular:		
(a) <u>include a methodology to define the</u>		
geographical scope of the <u>regional</u> virtual hubs		
for the forward market, including the bidding		
zones constituting these hubs, aiming to		
maximise the price correlation between the		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
reference prices and the prices of the bidding		
zones constituting virtual hubs;		
		- //
(b) include a methodology for the		Reference prices need to be defined in Article 2.
calculation of the reference prices for the		
regional virtual hubs for the forward market,		
aiming to maximise the correlations between the		
reference price and the prices of the bidding		
zones constituting a <b>regional</b> virtual hub; such		
methodology shall be applicable to all virtual		
hubs and based on predefined objective criteria;		
(c) include a definition of financial long-		
term transmission rights <b>between</b> from bidding		
zones and to the regional virtual hubs for the		
forward marketas financial obligations to		
enable market participants to hedge their		
exposure to positive and negative price		
spreads, including as regards to volumes and		
maturities;		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
(d) maximise the trading opportunities for		
hedging products referencing the <u>regional</u>		- 1/
virtual hubs for the forward market as well as		
for long term transmission rights from bidding		
zones to <u>regional</u> virtual hubs; and-		
(e) specify how the single allocation		
platform referred to in paragraph 3 shall		
offer allocation and facilitate trading of long-		
term transmission rights.		
3. The single allocation platform		
established in accordance with Regulation		
(EU) 2016/1719 shall act as an entity		
offering allocation and facilitating trading of		
long-term transmission rights on behalf of		
TSOs. It shall have a legal form as referred to		
in Annex II to Directive (EU) 2017/1132 of		
the European Parliament and of the Council.		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
2. Within six months of receipt of the		
proposal on the establishment of the regional		- "//
virtual hubs for the forward market, ACER shall		
evaluate it and either approve or amend it. In the		
latter case, ACER shall consult the ENTSO for		
Electricity before adopting the amendments.		
The adopted proposal shall be published on		
ACER's website.		
3. The single allocation platform		
established in accordance with Regulation (EU)		
2016/1719 shall have a legal form as referred to		
in Annex II to Directive (EU) 2017/1132 of the		
European Parliament and of the Council.		
4. The single allocation platform shall:		
(a) offer trading of long-term transmission		
rights between each bidding zone and virtual		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
hub; where a bidding zone is not part of a virtual		
hub it may issue financial long-term		
transmission rights to a virtual hub or to other		
bidding zones that are part of the same capacity		
calculation region;		
(b) allocate long term cross-zonal capacity		
on a regular basis and in a transparent, market-		
based and non-discriminatory manner; the		
frequency of allocation of the long-term cross-		
zonal capacity shall support the efficient		
functioning of the forward market;		
(c) offer trading of financial transmission		
rights that shall allow holders of these financial		
transmission rights to remove exposure to		
positive and negative price spreads, and with		
frequent maturities of up to at least three years		
ahead.		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
5. Where a regulatory authority considers		
that there are insufficient hedging opportunities		
available for market participants, and after		- "//
consultation of relevant financial market		
competent authorities in case the forward		
markets concern financial instruments as		
defined under Article 4(1)(15), it may require		
power exchanges or transmission system		
operators to implement additional measures,		
such as market-making activities, to improve the		
liquidity of the forward market.		
6Subject to compliance with Union		
competition law and with Directive (EU)		
2014/65 and Regulations (EU) 648/2012 and		
600/2014, market operators mayshall be free to		
develop forward hedging products, including		
long-term forward hedging products, to provide		
market participants, including owners of power-		
generating facilities using renewable energy		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
sources, with appropriate possibilities for		
hedging financial risks against price		
fluctuations. Member States shall not require		- "//
that such hedging activity may be limited to		
trades within a Member State or bidding zone.		
(7) Article 18 is amended as follows:		
[a] paragraph 2 is replaced by the following:		
(10 m : 00 m : 1 m o m : 1		
"2. Tariff methodologies shall reflect the		
fixed costs of transmission system operators and		
distribution system operators and shall consider		
both capital and operational expenditure to		
provide appropriate incentives to transmission		
system operators and distribution system		
operators over both the short and long run,		
including anticipatory investments, in order to		
increase efficiencies, including energy		
efficiency, to foster market integration and		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
security of supply, to support the use of		
flexibility services, efficient investments		
including solutions to optimise the existing grid		- "//
and facilitate demand response and energy		
storage, related research activities, and to		
facilitate innovation in the interest of consumers		
in areas such as digitalisation, flexibility		
services and interconnection";		
[b] paragraph 8 is replaced by the following:		
"8. Transmission and distribution tariff		
methodologies shall provide incentives to		
transmission and distribution system operators		
for the most cost-efficient operation and		
development of their networks including		
through the procurement of services. For that		
purpose, regulatory authorities shall recognise		
relevant costs as eligible, shall include those		
costs in transmission and distribution tariffs, and		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
shall introduce performance targets in order to		
provide incentives to transmission and		
distribution system operators to increase		- "//
efficiencies in their networks, including through		
energy efficiency, the use of flexibility services		
and the development of smart grids and		
intelligent metering systems."		
[c] in paragraph 9, point (f) is replaced		
by the following:		
'(f) methods to ensure transparency in the		
setting and structure of tariffs, including		
anticipatory investments;'		
[d] in paragraph 9, the following point		
(i) is added:		
'(i) incentives for efficient investments in		Please provide a definition for flexible
networks, including on flexibility resources and		connection agreements.

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
flexible connection agreements.'		
[8] in Article 19, paragraph 2 is amended as		- //
follows:		
[a] point (b) is replaced by the following:		
(b) maintaining or increasing cross-zonal		
capacities through optimisation of the usage of		
existing interconnectors by means of		
coordinated remedial actions, where applicable,		
or covering costs resulting from network		
investments that are relevant to reduce		
interconnector congestion; or		
,		
[b] the following point (c) is added:		
'(c) compensating offshore generation plant		
operators in an offshore bidding zone if access		
to interconnected markets has been reduced in		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
such a way that one or more transmission		
system operators have not made enough		
capacity available on the interconnector or the		- "//
critical network elements affecting the capacity		
of the interconnector, resulting in the offshore		
plant operator not being able to export its		
electricity generation capability to the market.'		
[9] The following chapter IIIa is inserted:		
Chapter IIIa		
Specific investment incentives to achieve the		
Union's decarbonisation objectives		
Article 19a		
Power purchase agreements		
1. Without prejudice to Directive		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
2018/2001, Member States shall facilitate		
promote the uptake of power purchase		
agreements ('PPAs'), including by removing		- "//
unjustified barriers and disproportionate or		
discriminatory procedures or charges, with a		
view to providing price predictability and to		
reaching the objectives set out in their integrated		
national energy and climate plan with respect to		
the dimension decarbonisation dimension		
referred to in point (a) of Article 4 of Regulation		
(EU) 2018/1999, while preserving competitive		
and liquid electricity markets.		
2. Member States shall ensure that		
instruments such as guarantee schemes at		
market prices, to reduce the financial risks		
associated to off-taker payment default in the		
framework of PPAs are in place and accessible		
to customers that face entry barriers to the PPA		
market and are not in financial difficulty-in line		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
with Articles 107 and 108 TFEU. Such		
instruments may_include, but are not limited		
to, state-backed guarantee schemes at market		- " //
prices, private guarantees, or facilities		
pooling demand for PPAs, in compliance		
with relevant Union law. For this purpose,		
Member States <u>may</u> shall take into account		
relevant Union-level facilities instruments.		
Member States <u>may</u> shall determine what		
categories of customers are targeted by these		
instruments, applying non-discriminatory		
criteria.		
	New Paragraph	With the current high prices of the wholesle
	2a. Member States may apply restrictions to	short term markets, there is no motivation to
	generation which producers may sell in the	producers to offer PPAs at prices near cost. If
	short term markets. Such restrictions shall be	regulatory pressure is applied to restrict the
	established based on non-discriminatory	portion of electricity that producers may sell to
	criteria, shall not endanger the project's	the short term markets, then offtakers will have
	viability and may be differentiated according	much higher negotiating power. This would
	to technology and other factors such as	specifically assist emerging PPA markets and

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
	investment maturity and ownership profile of	those limited in size or low interconnectivity.
	producer in relation to suppliers or	The flexibility with regard to technology and
	consumers.	investment maturity is also necessary to adjust
		policy according to profitability and incentivise
		further investments for flexibility and storage.
		The flexibility with regard to ownership profile
		allows adjustment in situations such as
		vertically integrated undertakings.
3. Without prejudice to Articles 107 and		
108 TFEU, Lif a gGuarantee schemes for PPAs		
is_backed by the Member States it shall include		
provisions to avoid lowering the liquidity in		
electricity markets and shall not provide support		
to the purchase of generation from fossil fuels.		
4. <i>In the design of the</i> Ssupport schemes		
for electricity from renewable sources, <i>Member</i>		
States shall allow the participation of projects		
which reserve part of the electricity for sale		
through a PPA or other market-based		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
arrangements.		
5. In the design of such support schemes		- //
Member States -and shall endeavour to make		
use of evaluation criteria to incentivise bidders		
to facilitate the access to the PPA market of for		
customers that face entry barriers to the PPA		
market, provided this does not negatively		
affect competition in the market. In particular,		
such evaluation criteria may give preference to		
bidders presenting a signed PPA or a		
commitment to sign a PPA for part of the		
project's generation from one or several		
potential buyers that face entry barriers to the		
PPA market.		
<u>6</u> 5. PPAs shall specify the bidding zone of		
delivery and the responsibility for securing		
cross-zonal transmission rights in case of a		
change of bidding zone in accordance with		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
Article 14.		
<u>76</u> . PPAs shall specify the conditions under		- //
which customers and producers may exit from		
PPAs, such as any applicable exit fees and		
notice periods, in <b>compliance</b> accordance with		
Union competition law.		
Article 19b		
Direct price support schemes for new		
investments in generation		
1. —Direct price support schemes for		
new investments for the generation of electricity		
from the sources listed in paragraph 2 shall take		
the form of a-two-way contracts for differences.		
New investments for the generation of		
electricity shall include investments in new		
power-generating facilities or, investments		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
aimed at substantially:		
<u>a)</u> repowering existing power-generating		- //
facilities <u>:</u> ,		
b) increasing their capacity; or		
<u>c)</u> <u>investments aimed at extending existing</u>		
power-generating facilities or at prolonging		
their lifetime.		
The first subparagraph shall apply to		
contracts under direct price support schemes		
for new investments in generation concluded		
as of one year after the date of entry into		
force of this Regulation.		
2. Paragraph 1 shall apply to new		
investments in generation of electricity from the		
following sources:		

	Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
(a)	wind energy;		
			-//
(b)	solar energy;		
(c)	geothermal energy;		
(1)			
(d)	hydropower without reservoir;		
(-)	1		
(e)	nuclear energy;		
		New Paragraph	This is necessary to reduce windfall profits in
		2a. Member States may apply two-way	markets where due to lack of interconnection or
		contract for differences at new or existing	other reasons, there are large discrepencies
		investments at regulated strike prices. Such	between levelised costs of different sources of
		scheems shall be established based on non-	electricity. This will also offer better playing
		discriminatory criteria, shall not endanger	field between technologies bound by the terms
		the project's viability and may be	of Article 4 of the Renewable Energy Directive
		differentiated according to technology and	and other technologies. The flexibility with
		other factors such as investment maturity	regard to technology and investment maturity is
		and ownership profile of producer in relation	also necessary to adjust policy according to

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
	to suppliers or consumers.	profitability and incentivise further investments
		for flexibility and storage. The flexibility with
		regard to ownership profile allows adjustment in
		situations such as vertically integrated
		undertakings.
3. Direct price support schemes in the form		
of two-way contracts for difference shall ensure		
that:		
(a) the revenues collected are distributed		
to final customers; be designed so that the		
revenues collected when the market price is		
above the strike price are distributed to all final		
electricity customers based on their share of		
consumption (same cost / refund per MWh		
<del>consumed);</del>		
(b) to the extent that part of the revenues		
is distributed to undertakings, this		
distribution covers all undertakings in		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
proportion to their share of consumption		
(same refund per MWh consumed). The part		
of the revenues that may be distributed to		- "//
undertakings shall not exceed the combined		
share of electricity consumption of all		
undertakings;		
(c) ensure that the distribution of the		
revenues to final-electricity customers is		
designed so as not to maintain remove the		
incentives of consumers to reduce their		
consumption or shift it to periods when		
electricity prices are low and not to undermine		
competition between electricity suppliers.;		
Article 19c		
Assessment of flexibility needs		
1. By 1 January 2025 and every two years		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
thereafter, the regulatory authority of each		
Member State shall assess and draw up a report		
on the need for flexibility in the electricity		• //
system for a period of at least 5 years, in view of		
the need to cost effectively achieve security of		
supply and decarbonise the power system,		
taking into account the integration of different		
sectors. The report may take into account the		
European Resource Adequacy Assessment		
and national adequacy assessments pursuant		
to Article 20 of Regulation 2019/943. The		
report shall be based on the data and analyses		
provided by the transmission and distribution		
system operators of that Member State pursuant		
to paragraph 32 and using the methodology		
pursuant to paragraph 43.		
2. The report shall include an evaluation of		
the need for flexibility to integrate electricity		
generated from renewable sources in the		

Drafting Suggestions	Comments

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
(a) define the type of data and format that		
transmission and distribution system operators		
shall provide to the regulatory authorities;		
(b) develop a methodology for the analysis		
by transmission and distribution system		
operators of the flexibility needs, taking into		
account at least all existing sources of flexibility		
and planned investments at interconnection,		
transmission and distribution level as well as the		
need to decarbonise the electricity system.		
5. The ENTSO for Electricity and the EU		
DSO entity shall closely cooperate with each		
other regarding the coordination of transmission		
and distribution system operators.		
6. By 1 March 2024, the ENTSO for		
Electricity and the EU DSO entity shall jointly		
submit to ACER a proposal regarding the type		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
of data and format to be submitted to regulatory		
authorities and the methodology referred to in		
paragraph 43. Within three months of receipt of		- " //
the proposal, ACER shall either approve the		
proposal or amend it. In the latter case, ACER		
shall consult the ENTSO for Electricity and the		
EU DSO entity before adopting the		
amendments. The adopted proposal shall be		
published on ACER's website.		
7. The regulatory authorities shall submit		
the reports referred to in paragraph 1 to ACER		
and publish them. Within 12 months of receipt		
of the reports, ACER shall issue a report		
analysing them and providing recommendations		
on issues of cross-border relevance regarding		
the findings of the regulatory authorities.		
Article 19d		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
Indicative national objective for demand <i>side</i> response and <b>energy</b> storage  Based on the report of the regulatory authority pursuant to Article 19c(1), each Member State shall define an indicative national objective for demand- <i>side</i> response and <b>energy</b> storage. This indicative national objective shall also be reflected in Member States' integrated national energy and climate plans as regards the dimension 'Internal Energy Market' in accordance with Articles 3, 4 and 7 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 and in their integrated biennial progress reports in accordance with Article 17 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1999.	Based on Taking into account the report of the regulatory authority pursuant to Article 19c(1), each Member State shall define an indicative national objective for demand response and energy storage. This indicative national objective shall also be reflected in Member States' integrated national energy and climate plans as regards the dimension 'Internal Energy Market' in accordance with Articles 3, 4 and 7 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 and in their integrated biennial progress reports in accordance with Article 17 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1999.	It is important for Member States to have the flexibility to define their indicative national objectives for demand side response and energy storage in a manner that takes into account a range of pertinent considerations. While the report of the regulatory authority pursuant to Article 19c(1) provides valuable insights, it is just one of many factors that may influence the decision-making process. By considering a broader range of factors, Member States can ensure that their objectives are well-informed and tailored to their unique circumstances.
Article 19e		
Non-fossil #flexibility support schemes		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
1. <b>A</b> Member States which appliesy a		
capacity mechanism in accordance with Article		- 1
21 shall consider the promotion of the		
participation of non-fossil flexibility, such as		
demand-side response and energy storage by		
introducing additional criteria or features in the		
design of the capacity mechanism.		
2. Where the measures introduced in		
accordance with paragraph 1 to promote the		
participation of non-fossil flexibility such as		
demand response and <b>energy</b> storage in capacity		
mechanisms are insufficient to achieve the		
flexibility needs identified in accordance with		
Article 19d, Member States may apply non-		
fossil flexibility support schemes consisting of		
payments for the available capacity of non-fossil		
flexibility such as demand-side response and		
energy storage.		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
3. Member States which do not apply a	3. Member States which do not apply a	Addition to specify reason for applying non-
capacity mechanism may apply non-fossil	capacity mechanism may apply non-fossil	fossil flexibility schemes, in accordance with
flexibility support schemes consisting of	flexibility support schemes consisting of	wording used in par. 2
payments for the available capacity of non-fossil	payments for the available capacity of non-fossil	
flexibility such as demand side response and	flexibility such as demand side response and	
energy storage.	energy storage, to achieve the flexibility needs	
	identified in accordance with Article 19d.	
Article 19f		
Design principles for <b>non-fossil</b> flexibility		
support schemes		
Non-fossil <i>F</i> flexibility support schemes <i>for non</i> -		
fossil flexibility such as demand response and		
storage applied by Member States in accordance		
with Article 19e(2) and (3) shall:		
(a) mat as howered what is no construct.		
(a) not go beyond what is necessary to		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
address the identified flexibility needs in a cost-		
effective manner;		
(b) be limited to new investments in non-	***	
fossil flexibility such as demand side response		
and energy storage;		
(c) <i>must</i> -not imply starting fossil fuel-based		
generation located behind the metering point;		
(d) select capacity providers by means of an		
open, transparent, competitive, non-		
discriminatory and cost-effective process;		
(e) prevent undue distortions to the efficient		
functioning of the electricity markets including		
preserving efficient operation incentives and		
price signals and the exposure to price variation		
and market risk;		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
(f) provide incentives for the integration in		
the electricity market in a market-based and		
market-responsive way, while avoiding		- "//
unnecessary distortions of electricity markets as		
well as taking into account possible system		
integration costs and grid stability;		
(g) set out a minimum level of participation		
in the market in terms of activated energy,		
which takes into account the technical		
specificities of the asset delivering the		
flexibilitystorage and demand response;		
(h) apply appropriate penalties to capacity		
providers which do not respect the minimum		
level of participation in the market referred to in		
point (g), or which do not follow efficient		
operation incentives and prices signals referred		
to in point (e);		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
(i) be open to cross-border participation.';		Should be clarified that this provision does not
		apply to MS with relevant derogations in Article
		64(2).
(10) in Article 37 (1), point (a) is replaced by		
the following:		
"(a), carrying out the coordinated capacity		
calculation in accordance with the		
methodologies developed pursuant to the		
forward capacity allocation guideline, the		
capacity allocation and congestion management		
guideline and the electricity balancing guideline		
adopted on the basis of Article 18(5) of		
Regulation (EC) No 714/2009;";		
(11) Article 50 is amended as follows:		
(a) the following paragraph 4a is added:		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
"4a. Transmission system operators shall		
publish in a clear and transparent manner,		
information on the capacity available for new		- " //
connections in their respective areas of		
operation, including in congested areas if		
flexible energy storage connections can be		
accommodated, and update that information		
regularly, at least quarterly.		
Transmission system operators shall also		
provide clear and transparent information to		
system users about the status and treatment of		
their connection requests. They shall provide		
such information within a period of three		
months from the submission of the request ";		
(12) in Article 57, the following paragraph 3 is		
added:		
"3. Distribution system operators and		The term "sufficient granular visibility"

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
transmission system operators shall cooperate		warrants further clarification. For instance, it
with each other in publishing information on the		could encompass the provision of detailed data
capacity available for new connections in their		on capacity availability at specific grid nodes
respective areas of operation in a consistent		and/or during particular time intervals. This
manner and giving sufficient granular visibility		would ensure that all parties possess a uniform
to developers of new energy projects and other		understanding of the term and its implications.
potential network users.		
(13) in Article 59 (1), point (b) is replaced by		
the following:		
"(b), capacity-allocation and congestion-		
management rules pursuant to Article 6 of		
Directive (EU) 2019/944 and Articles 7 to 10,		
13 to 17, 19 and 35 to 37 of this Regulation,		
including rules on day-ahead, intraday and		
forward capacity calculation methodologies and		
processes, grid models, bidding zone		
configuration, redispatching and countertrading,		
trading algorithms, single day-ahead and		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
intraday coupling including the possibility of		
being operated by a single entity, the firmness		
of allocated cross-zonal capacity, congestion		- " //
income distribution, the regional virtual hubs		
for the forward market, the allocation and		
facilitation of trading the allocation of		
financial long-term transmission rights by the		
single allocation platform, cross-zonal		
transmission risk hedging, nomination		
procedures, and capacity allocation and		
congestion management cost recovery;";		
(14) The following Article 69a is added:		
Article 69a		
Interaction with Union financial legislation		
Nothing in this Regulation shall derogate from		
the provisions of Directive (EU) 2014/65,		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
Regulation (EU) 648/2012 and Regulation (EU)		
600/2014 when market participants or market		
operators engage in activities related to financial		- " //
instruments in particular as defined under		
Article 4(1)(15) of Directive (EU) 2014/65.		
(15): A I : (12: 1 11 1		
(15) in Annex I point 1.2 is replaced by the		
following:		
(41.2. C. 1) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1		
"1.2. Coordinated capacity calculation shall be		
performed for all allocation timeframes".		
Article 2		
Amendments to Directive (EU) 2019/944 of the		
European Parliament and of the Council of 5		
June 2019 on common rules for the internal		
market for electricity		
Directive (EU) 2019/944 of the European		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on		
common rules for the internal market for		
electricity is amended as follows:		
(1) Article 2 is amended as follows:		
(a) points (8) and (49) are <i>is</i> -replaced by the		
following:		
"(8) 'active customer' means a final		
customer, or a group of jointly acting final		
customers, who consumes or stores electricity		
generated within its premises located within		
confined boundaries or self-generated or shared		
electricity within other premises located within		
the same bidding zone, or who sells self-		
generated electricity or participates in flexibility		
or energy efficiency schemes, provided that		
those activities do not constitute its primary		
commercial or professional activity.";		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
"(49) 'non-frequency ancillary service' means a		
service used by a transmission system operator		- 1
or distribution system operator for steady state		
voltage control, fast reactive current injections,		
inertia for local grid stability, short-circuit		
current, black start capability, island operation		
capability and peak shaving;"		
(b) the following points are added:		
(15a) 'fixed term, fixed price electricity supply		
contract' means an electricity supply contract		
between a supplier and a final customer that		
guarantees the same contractual conditions,		
including the price, while it may, within a fixed		
price, include a flexible element with for		
example peak and off peak price variations;		
(10a) 'energy sharing' means the self-		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
consumption by active customers of renewable		
energy either:		
		- //
(a) generated or stored offsite or on sites		
between them by a facility they own, lease,		
rent in whole or in part; or		
(b) the right to which has been transferred to		
them by another active customer		
whether free of charge or for a price.		
(10b) 'peer-to-peer trading' of renewable		
energy means peer-to-peer trading as defined in		
point (18) of Article 2 of Directive (EU)		
<del>2018/2001.</del>		
(24a) 'supplier of last resort' means a supplier		
who is designated <i>by a Member State</i> to take		
over the supply of electricity to customers of a		
supplier which has ceased to operate;		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
(2) Article 4 is replaced by the following:		
"Article 4		
Free choice of supplier		
Member States shall ensure that all customers		
are free to purchase electricity from the supplier		
of their choice. Member States shall ensure that		
all customers are free to have more than one		
electricity supply contract at the same time, and		
that for this purpose customers are entitled to		
have more than one metering and billing point		
covered by the single connection point for their		
premises."		
(3) Article 11 is amended as follows:		
(a) the title is replaced by the following:		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
'Entitlement to a fixed term, fixed price and		
dynamic electricity price contract';		- 1
(b) paragraph 1 is replaced by the following:		
Member States shall ensure that the national		
regulatory framework enables suppliers to offer		
fixed-term, fixed-price contracts and dynamic		
electricity price contracts. Member States shall		
ensure that final customers who have a smart		
meter installed can request to conclude a		
dynamic electricity price contract and that all		
final customers can request to conclude a fixed-		
term, fixed-price electricity price contract of a		
duration of at least one year, with at least one		
supplier and with every supplier that has more		
than 200 000 final customers.		
(c) the following paragraph 1a is inserted:		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
1a. Prior to the conclusion or extension of any		
contract, final customers shall be provided with		- 1
a summary of the key contractual conditions in a	·	
prominent manner and in concise and simple		
language. This summary shall include at least		
information on total price and its breakdown,		
promotions, additional services, discounts and		
include set out the rights referred to in points		
(a), (b), (d), (e) and (f) of Article 10(3). The		
Commission shall provide guidance in this		
regard.		
(d) paragraph 2 is replaced by the following:		
2. Member States shall ensure that final		
customers are fully informed by the suppliers of		
the opportunities, costs and risks of <b>the</b>		
respective types of dynamic electricity price		
contracts, and shall ensure that suppliers are		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
required to provide information to the final		
customers accordingly, including with regard to		
the need to have an adequate electricity meter		- "//
installed. Regulatory authorities shall monitor		
the market developments and assess the risks		
that the new products and services may entail		
and deal with abusive practices.		
(4) The following Articles are inserted:		
"Article 15a"		
Right to energy sharing		
1. All households, small and medium sized		
enterprises and public bodies shall have the		
right to participate in energy sharing as active		
customers.		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
2. (a)—Active customers shall be entitled to share renewable energy between themselves based on private agreements or through a legal entity.		
a storage or renewable energy generation facility for the purpose of facilitating energy sharing, without that third party being considered an active customer.	Active customers may use a third party that owns or manages for installation, operation, including metering and maintenance a storage or renewable energy generation facility, in the active customer's premise or when permitted by the Member States within other premises, for the purpose of facilitating energy sharing, without that third party being considered an active customer.	The proposed addition of the phrase 'in the active customer's premise or when permitted by the Member States within other premises' provides greater flexibility for active customers to use third parties for the installation, operation, metering and maintenance of storage or renewable energy generation facilities. This measure allows active customers to facilitate energy sharing not only within their own premises but also, when permitted by Member States, within other premises. This promotes greater access to renewable energy and supports the transition to a more sustainable energy system.

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
4.(c) Member States shall ensure that active		
customers participating in energy sharing:		
(ad) are entitled to have the shared electricity		
netted with their total metered consumption		
within a time interval no longer than the		
imbalance settlement period and without		
prejudice to applicable taxes, levies and network		
charges;		
(be) benefit from all consumer rights and	( <b>b</b> e) benefit from all consumer rights and	This type of consumers should not be excluded
obligations as final customers under this	obligations as final customers under this	by their rights on energy sharing. As currently
Directive, except in case of energy sharing	Directive, except of the obligations in case of	worded, it is not clear if exclusion of benefits of
between households with an installed capacity	energy sharing between households with an	consumer rights and obligations applies only to
up to 10.8 kW for single households [as	installed capacity up to 10.8 kW for single	the energy shared, or to the
specified in the reviewed Renewable Energy	households [as specified in the reviewed	household/apartment's entire consumption? It
Directive 2021/557] and up to 50 kW for multi-	Renewable Energy Directive 2021/557] and up	may be worth specifying in (e) that, for the
apartment blocks [as specified in the recast	to 50 kW for multi-apartment blocks [as	purposes of the consumer rights and obligations,
<b>Energy Peformance of Buildings Directive</b>	specified in the recast Energy Peformance of	the installed capacity threshold refers to the

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
2021/802]using peer-to-peer trading	Buildings Directive -2021/802]used for energy	energy used for energy sharing purposes (and
agreements;	sharing purposesusing peer to peer trading	not other consumer consumption that may be
	agreements;	covered by a separate supply contract).
		Also, does this exclusion apply to energy
		sharing between households and to peer-to-peer
		trading agreements for multiple apartments
		blocks (two separate concepts)?
(cf) have access to template contracts with		
fair and transparent terms and conditions for		
peer to peer tradingenergy sharing agreements		
between households, and for agreements on		
leasing, renting or investing in storage and		
renewable energy generation facilities for the		
purpose of energy sharing; in case of conflicts		
arising over such agreements, final customers		
shall have access to out of court dispute		
settlement in accordance with Article 26;		
(dg) are not subject to unfair and		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
discriminatory treatment by market participants		
or their balance responsible parties;		
(e/h) are informed of the possibility for		Article 14 of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 is not
changes in bidding zones in accordance with		applicable to Cyprus.
Article 14 of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 and of		
the fact that the right to share energy is		
restricted to within one and the same bidding		
zone.		
5. (i) —Member States shall ensure that		
relevant transmission or distribution system		
operators or other designated bodies:		
(aj) monitor, collect, validate and		
communicate metering data related to the shared		
electricity with relevant final customers and		
market participants at least every month, and in		
accordance with Article 23;		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
( <b>b</b> k) provide a relevant contact point to		
register energy sharing arrangements, receive		
information on relevant metering points,		- "//
changes in location and participation, and,		
where applicable, validate calculation methods		
in a clear, transparent and timely manner; -		
62. Member States shall take appropriate		
and non-discriminatory measures to ensure that		
energy poor and vulnerable households can		
access energy sharing schemes. Those measures		
may include financial support measures or		
production allocation quota.		
"Article 18a		
Supplier risk management		
1. National Regulatory Aauthorities, or		
where a Member State has designated an		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
alternative independent competent authority		
for that purpose, such designated competent		
authorities,- shall ensure that suppliers have in		- "//
place and implement appropriate hedging		
strategies to limit the risk of changes in		
wholesale electricity supply to the economic		
viability of their contracts with customers, while		
maintaining liquidity on and price signals from		
short-term markets.		
2. Supplier hedging strategies may include		
the use of power purchase agreements. Where		
sufficiently developed markets for power		
purchase agreements exist which allow effective		
competition, Member States may require that a		
share of suppliers' risk exposure to changes in		
wholesale electricity prices is covered using		
power purchase agreements for electricity		
generated from renewable energy sources		
matching the duration of their risk exposure on		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
the consumer side, subject to compliance with		
Union competition law.		
		• //
3. Member States shall endeavour to ensure		
the accessibility of hedging products for citizen		
energy communities and renewable energy		
communities."		
(5) The following Articles are XX is inserted:		
// · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		
"Article 27a		
Supplier of last resort		
1. Member States shall <b>implement a</b>	Member States shall <b>appoint a supplier of last</b>	It is proposed that Member States be given the
supplier of last resort regime to ensure	<u>resort or</u> implement a supplier of last resort	flexibility to either appoint a supplier of last
continuity of supply appoint suppliers of last	regime to ensure continuity of supply at least for	resort as per the existing Article 27 or
resort at least for household customers.	household customers.	implement a supplier of last resort regime
Suppliers of last resort shall be appointed in a		
fair, open, transparent and non-discriminatory		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
procedure.		
2. Final customers who are transferred to		- //
suppliers of last resort shall not lose their rights		
as customers, in particular those rights laid		
down in Articles 4, 10, <del>11,</del> 12, 14, 18 and 26.		
3. Member States shall ensure that	3.(a) Member States shall ensure that	It is proposed that the regulatory authority be
suppliers of last resort promptly communicate	suppliers of last resort promptly communicate	given the option to extend the duration of the
the terms and conditions to transferred	the terms and conditions to transferred	service. This will provide customers with
customers and ensure seamless continuity of	customers and ensure seamless continuity of	additional time to evaluate and identify the most
service for those customers for at least 6	service for those customers for at least 6	suitable offer that caters to their needs
months.	months.	
	(b) The regulatory authority may decide to	
	extend the duration of the service for another	
	6 months.	
4. Member States shall ensure that final		
customers are provided with information and		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
encouragement to switch to a market-based		
offer.		
5. Member States may require athe		Please clarify at which case the household
supplier of last resort to supply electricity to		customers will not be able to receive a market
household customers who do not receive market		based offer since supplier service is not limited
based offers. In such cases, the conditions set		to geographical restrictions and the supplier of
out in Article 5 shall apply."		last resort will be in a position to offer a market
		based contract.
		Article 5 does not apply to Cyprus.
Article 28a		
Protection from disconnections for vulnerable customers		
33233		
Member States shall ensure that vulnerable		We kindly request clarification on the proposed
customers are protected from electricity		changes introduced by the newly added article,
disconnections. This shall be provided as part of		specifically regarding the extent of protection

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
the concept of vulnerable customers pursuant to		from disconnection offered to vulnerable
Article 28 (1) of this Directive and without		customers and the eligibility criteria for such
prejudice to the measures set out in		protection. Additionally, we seek clarification
Article10(11).		on the times during which disconnections will
		not be permitted, currently limited to critical
		times.
		For illustrative purposes, we note that in
		Cyprus, protection from electricity
		disconnections at all times is limited to
		customers with critical dependence on electrical
		equipment for health reasons. As such, we
		request further details on the changes proposed
		in relation to the aforementioned matters, vis-à-
		vis the existing provisions.
(6) in Article 27, paragraph 1 is replaced by the		
following:		
"1. Member States shall ensure that all		
household customers, and, where Member		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
States consider it appropriate, small enterprises,		
enjoy universal service, namely the right to be		
supplied with electricity of a specified quality		• //
within their territory at competitive, easily and		
clearly comparable, transparent and non-		
discriminatory prices. To ensure the provision		
of universal service, Member States shall		
impose on distribution system operators an		
obligation to connect customers to their network		
under terms, conditions and tariffs set in		
accordance with the procedure laid down in		
Article 59(7). This Directive does not prevent		
Member States from strengthening the market		
position of the household customers and small		
and medium-sized non-household customers by		
promoting the possibilities for the voluntary		
aggregation of representation for that class of		
customers."		
(7) In Article 31, paragraph 3 is replaced by the		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
following:		
"3. The distribution system operator shall		- //
provide system users with the information they		
need for efficient access to, including use of, the		
system. In particular, the distribution system		
operator shall publish in a clear and transparent		
manner information on the capacity available		
for new connections in its area of operation,		
including in congested areas if flexible energy		
storage connections can be accommodated, and		
update that information regularly, at least		
quarterly.		
Distribution system operators shall also provide		
clear and transparent information to system		
users about the status and treatment of their		
connection requests. They shall provide such		
information within a period of three months		
from the submission of the request."		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
(8) Article 40 is amended as follows:		
[a] a new paragraph is added after paragraph 6:		<b>*</b>
The requirements in paragraphs 5 and 6 shall		
not apply with regard to the peak shaving		
product procured in accordance with Article 7a		
of Regulation (EU) 2019/943.		
(9) Article 59 is amended as follows:		
[a] In paragraph 1, subparagraph (c) is replaced		
by the following:		
(c), in close coordination with the other		
regulatory authorities, ensuring the compliance		
of the single allocation platform established in		
accordance with Regulation (EU) 2016/1719,		
the ENTSO for Electricity and the EU DSO		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
entity with their obligations under this		
Directive, Regulation (EU) 2019/943, the		
network codes and guidelines adopted pursuant		• //
to Articles 59, 60 and 61 of Regulation (EU)		
2019/943, and other relevant Union law,		
including as regards cross-border issues, as well		
as with ACER's decisions, and jointly		
identifying non-compliance of the single		
allocation platform, the ENTSO for Electricity		
and the EU DSO entity with their respective		
obligations; where the regulatory authorities		
have not been able to reach an agreement within		
a period of four months after the start of		
consultations for the purpose of jointly		
identifying non-compliance, the matter shall be		
referred to the ACER for a decision, pursuant to		
Article 6(10) of Regulation (EU) 2019/942;		
[b] In paragraph 1, subparagraph (z) is replaced		
by the following:		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
(z) The regulatory authority shall have the		
following duties: monitoring the removal of		- 1
unjustified obstacles to and restrictions on the		
development of consumption of self-generated		
electricity and citizen energy communities,		
including obstacles and restrictions		
<b>preventing</b> <i>related to</i> the connection of flexible		
distributed energy generation within a		
reasonable time-in accordance with Article		
<del>58(d)</del> .		
[c] paragraph 4 is replaced by the following:		
4. The regulatory authority located in the		
Member State in which the single allocation		
platform, the ENTSO for Electricity or the EU		
DSO entity has its seat shall have the power to		
impose effective, proportionate and dissuasive		
penalties on those entities where they do not		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
comply with their obligations under this		
Directive, Regulation (EU) 2019/943 or any		
relevant legally binding decisions of the		- " //
regulatory authority or of ACER, or to propose		
that a competent court impose such penalties.		
(10) the following Article 66a is inserted		
"Article 66a		
Access to affordable energy during an electricity price crisis		
price crisis		
1. The Council Commission, on a proposal	1. The Council Commission, on a proposal	
from the Commission, by means of an	from the Commission, by means of an	
implementing may by decision, may declare a	implementing may by decision, may declare a	
regional or Union-wide -electricity price crisis,	regional or Union-wide -electricity price crisis,	
if the following conditions are met:	if the following conditions are met:	
(a) very high <b>average</b> prices in wholesale	(a) very high average prices in wholesale	Activation needs to be based on factual

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
electricity markets at least two and a half times	electricity markets at least two and a half times	observations. Future expectation is by nature
the average price during the previous 5 years	the average price during the previous 5 years.	subjective, vague and may jeopardise the
which is expected to continue for at least 6	which have persisted for a period of two	effectiveness of this article. The suggested
months;	weeks; which is expected to continue for at least	timeframe of two weeks of existing record is
	<del>6 months;</del>	long enough to ensure that price spikes are not
		taken into account, yet short enough to avoid
		and prevent negative effects in the retail market
		through the billing cycles.
(b) sharp increases in electricity retail prices	(b) sharp increases in electricity retail	The term 'sharp' needs to be better defined
of at least 70% occur which are expected to	prices of at least approaching, being equal to,	through an increase over specific time span. A
continue for at least 6 months; and	or exceeding 720% occur over a period of 6	more granular approach is also necessary, which
	months, which have persisted for a period of	enables action when prices are near the
	two weeks: which are expected to continue	threshold. A threshold of 20% is considered
	for at least 6 months; and	more appropriate as a limit to retail level price
		increase for consumer protection. As above, the
		vague and subjective clause of 6-month future
		forecast is replaced by a two week monitoring
		clause to ensure immediate results.
	New subparagraph	This is to ensure that extremely high prices or

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
	For the calculation of the 5 year average	spikes which occure during a crisis period
	referred to in subparagraph (a) and the 6	(statistically considered as outlier values) are
	month price increase referred to in	not accounted for the average calculations for
	subparagraph (b), prices exceeding the 2.5	future crises periods. Otherwise they would
	times and 20% thresholds respectively shall	'artificially' increase the baseline averages, thus
	be excluded. In such cases, the 5 year and 6	limiting the identification of future crises
	month periods shall still be completed by	periods. The period of the current crisis must
	including the immidiately preceeding price	also be excluded from the 5 year average
	periods.	calculation for the next crisis.
(c) the wider economy is being negatively		
affected by the increases in electricity prices.		
2. The <b>decision</b> <i>Commission shall specify in</i>		
its decision declaring a regional or Union-wide		
electricity price crisis <b>shall specify</b> the period of		
validity of that decision which may be for a		
period of up to one year.		
3. The Commission shall present a	3. The Commission shall present a	
proposal for declaring a regional or Union-	proposal for declaring a regional or Union-	

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
wide electricity price crisis, including the	wide electricity price crisis, including the	
proposed period of validity of the decision,	proposed period of validity of the decision,	
where it considers that the conditions in	where it considers that the conditions in	- " //
paragraph 1 are fulfilled.	paragraph 1 are fulfilled, or two months	
	following the request of at least 5 Member	
	States who demonstrate that the conditions of	
	paragraph 1 are fulfilled at Union level, or	
	two months following the request of at least	
	2 Member State(s) who demonstrate that the	
	conditions of paragraph 1 are fulfiled at	
	regional level.	
4. The Council, acting by a qualified		
majority, may amend the Commission		
proposal.		
	New Paragraph:	MS with reduced or lack of interconnection
	4a. Member States or regions with limited or	should be allowed to swiftly respond to national
	no electricity interconnections who	energy price crises or energy crises in their
	demonstrate that the conditions of paragraph	isolated regions.
	1 are met for their region, territory or	

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
	specific bidding zone, may apply the	
	provisions of paragraphs 5 and 6, while the	
	conditions of paragraph 1 occur. In such	- '/
	occations the Member States concerned shall	
	inform the Council and the Commission of	
	their decision and measures taken.	
53. Where the <i>Commission</i> Council has		
adopted a decision pursuant to paragraph 1,		
Member States may <sub>2</sub> for the duration of the		
validity of that decision apply targeted public		
interventions in price setting for the supply of		
electricity to small and medium sized		
enterprises. Such public interventions shall:		
(a) be limited to at most 70% of the		
beneficiary's consumption during the same		
period of the previous year and retain an		
incentive for demand reduction;		
(b) comply with the conditions set out in		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
Article 5(4) and (7);		
(c) where relevant, comply with the		
conditions set out in Paragraph 4.		
64. Where the Council Commission has		
adopted a decision pursuant to paragraph 1,		
Member States may for the duration of the		
validity of that decision, by way of derogation		
from Article 5(7), point (c), when applying		
targeted public interventions in price setting for		
the supply of electricity pursuant to Article 5(6)		
or paragraph 3 of this Article, exceptionally and		
temporarily set a price for the supply of		
electricity which is below cost provided that the		
following conditions are fulfilled:		
(a) the price set for households only applies		
to at most 80% of median household		
consumption and retains an incentive for		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
demand reduction;		
(b) there is no discrimination between		- //
suppliers;		
(c) suppliers are compensated for supplying		
below cost; and		
(d) all suppliers are eligible to provide offers		
for the price for the supply of electricity which		
is below cost on the same basis.		
	New Paragraph	It needs to be understood that the target model
	7. Member States may collect short-term	based on which the whole-sale markets operate
	whole-sale market revenews from capex-	is in itself a regulatory prescription deviating
	intensive technologies, when the revenews of	from the conditions of open competition and
	such technologies in the short-term whole-	thus has both positive and negative
	sale market exceeds by 50% their levelised	concequences. On the one hand it satisfies the
	cost of electricity generation and when such	system's needs, allows players to enter based on
	technologies collectively comprise at least	a merit order and yields a market price that can
	10% of electricity volume trated within the	be used for cross border trade. However, it has

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
	corresponding market settlement period.	failed to ensure that all technologies are
		remunerated competitively based on their
	Member States whose bidding zones have less	levelised costs of generation.
	than 15% of electricity interconnection with	
	other bidding zones, may subsidise opex-	If the wholesale market systimatically yields
	intensive technologies towards achieving the	overdue profits for certain technologies it is a
	revenew restriction of capex-intensive	sigh of a clear market falure. When such
	technologies explained in the first sub-	technologies also comprise large enough
	paragraph, when capex-intensive	electricity volume in the market, there is clear
	technologies collectively comprise at least	negative concequence to the consumers who are
	10% of electricity volume trated within the	forced to pay for this market inefficiency and
	corresponding market settlement period.	are placed under price exploitation. Such
		concequences, need to be rectified in a
		stractured manner, without the need of placing
		EU-wide measures based on Article 122 of the
		Treaty. Care also needs to be taken so that any
		such actions don't have negative spill-over
		effects in price settlement of neighbouring
		bidding zones, hense the interconnectivity limit,
		which also matches the EU electricity 2030

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
		interconnection targets based on the Governance
		Regulation (2018/1999).
		This also ensures the necessary price
		management in case two way contracts for
		difference cannot be applied successfully.
		Capex-intensive technologies are considered
		those whos operational costs are sustantially less
		than the levelised initial expenditure, such as
		wind, solar, wave, nuclear etc. Examples of
		opex-intensive technologies are fossils and
		biomass.
(11) in Article 71, paragraph 1 is replaced by the		
following:		
'1. Member States shall bring into force the		
laws, regulations and administrative provisions		
necessary to comply with Article 2 points 8 and		
49, Articles 3 and 5, Article 6(2) and (3), Article		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
7(1), point (j) and (l) of Article 8(2), Article		
9(2), Article 10(2) to (12), Article 11(3) and (4),		
Articles 12 to 24, Articles 26, 28 and 29, Article		- "//
31(1), (2) and (4) to (10; Articles 32 to 34 and		
36, Article 38(2), Articles 40 and 42, point (d)		
of Article 46(2), Articles 51 and 54, Articles 57		
to 58, Article 59(1) points (a), (b) and (d) to (y),		
Article 59(2) and (3), Article 59(5) to (10),		
Articles 61 to 63, points (1) to (3), (5)(b) and (6)		
of Article 70 and Annexes I and II by 31		
December 2020. They shall immediately		
communicate the text of those provisions to the		
Commission.		
However, Member States shall bring into force		
the laws, regulations and administrative		
provisions necessary to comply with:		
(a) point (5)(a) of Article 70 by 31 December		
2019;		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
(b) point (4) of Article 70 by 25 October 2020.		
		- //
Member States shall bring into force the laws,		
regulations and administrative provisions		
necessary to comply with Article 2 points 10a,		
10b, 15a, 24a, Article 4, Article 11(1), (1a) and		
(2), Article15a, Article 18a, Article 27(1),		
Article 27a, Article 28a, Article 31(3), Article		
40(7), Article 59(1) points (c) and (z), Article		
59(4) and Article 66a by six months after entry		
into force of [this Regulation].		
When Member States adopt those measures,		
they shall contain a reference to this Directive or		
be accompanied by such a reference on the		
occasion of their official publication. They shall		
also include a statement that references in		
existing laws, regulations and administrative		
provisions to the Directive repealed by this		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
Directive shall be construed as references to this		
Directive. Member States shall determine how		
such reference is to be made and how that		- " //
statement is to be formulated.'		
Article 3		
Amendment to Directive (EU) 2018/2001of the		
European Parliament and of the Council of 11		
December 2018 on the promotion of the use of		
energy from renewable sources		
Directive (EU) 2018/2001 is amended as		
follows:		
(1) Article 4(3) is amended as follows:		
(a) the second subparagraph is replaced by the		
following:		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
'To that end, with regard to direct price support		
schemes, support shall be granted in the form of		
a market premium, which could be, inter alia,		- "//
sliding or fixed. The first is sentence shall not		
apply to support for electricity from the		
renewable sources listed in Article 19b(2) of		
Regulation (EU) 2019/943, to which Article		
19b(1) of that Regulation applies.'		
(2) in Article 36, paragraph 1 is replaced by the		
following:		
'1. Member States shall bring into force the		
laws, regulations and administrative provisions		
necessary to comply with Articles 2 to 13, 15 to		
31 and 37 and Annexes II, III and V to IX,		
by 30 June 2021. However, Member States shall		
bring into force the laws, regulations and		
administrative provisions necessary to comply		
with Article 4(3), second subparagraph, by [six		

Presidency compromise text	<b>Drafting Suggestions</b>	Comments
months after entry into force of this Regulation].		
They shall immediately communicate the text of		- //
those measures to the Commission.		
When Member States adopt those measures,		
they shall contain a reference to this Directive or		
be accompanied by such a reference on the		
occasion of their official publication. They shall		
also include a statement that references in		
existing laws, regulations and administrative		
provisions to the Directive repealed by this		
Directive shall be construed as references to this		
Directive. Member States shall determine how		
such reference is to be made and how that		
statement is to be formulated.'		
Article 4		
Amendments to Regulation (EU) 2019/942 of		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
the European Parliament and of the Council of 5		
June 2019 establishing a European Union		
Agency for the Cooperation of Energy		- "//
Regulators		
Regulation (EU) 2019/942 is amended as		
follows:		
(1) Article 2 is amended as follows:		
(a) point (a) is replaced by the following:		
'(a) issue opinions and recommendations		
addressed to transmission system operators, the		
ENTSO for Electricity, the ENTSO for Gas, the		
EU DSO Entity, the single allocation platform		
established in accordance with Regulation (EU)		
2016/1719, regional coordination centres and		
nominated electricity market operators <u>on</u>		
approving the methodologies, terms and		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
conditions in accordance with Article 4(4),		
Article 5(2), (3) and (4); on bidding zones		
reviews as referred to in Article 5(7); on		* //
technical issues as referred to in Article 6(1); on		
arbitration between regulators in accordance		
with Article 6(10); related to regional		
coordination centres as referred to in Article		
7(2), point (a); on approving and amending		
methodologies and calculations and technical		
specifications as referred to in Article 9(1); on		
approving and amending methodologies as		
referred to in Article 9(3); on exemptions as		
referred to in Article 10; on infrastructure as		
referred to in Article 11 point (d); on matters		
related to wholesale market integrity and		
transparency pursuant to Article 12;'		
(b) point (d) is replaced by the following:		
"(d) issue individual decisions on the provision		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
of information in accordance with Article 3(2),		
Article 7(2), point (b), and Article 8, point (c);		
on approving the methodologies, terms and		- " //
conditions in accordance with Article 4(4),		
Article 5(2), (3) and (4); on bidding zones		
reviews as referred to in Article 5(7); on		
technical issues as referred to in Article 6(1); on		
arbitration between regulators in accordance		
with Article 6(10); related to regional		
coordination centres as referred to in Article		
7(2), point (a); on approving and amending		
methodologies and calculations and technical		
specifications as referred to in Article 9(1); on		
approving and amending methodologies as		
referred to in Article 9(3); on exemptions as		
referred to in Article 10; on infrastructure as		
referred to in Article 11, point (d); on matters		
related to wholesale market integrity and		
transparency pursuant to Article 12, on		
approving and amending proposals from the		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
ENTSO for electricity related to the regional		
virtual hubs pursuant to Article 5(9); and on		
approving and amending proposals from the		- "//
ENTSO for electricity and the EU DSO entity		
related to the methodology concerning the data		
and analysis to be provided as regards the		
flexibility needs pursuant to Article 5(10). ";		
(2) in Article 3(2), the following fourth		
subparagraph is added:		
"This paragraph shall also apply to the single		
allocation platform established in accordance		
with Regulation (EU) 2016/1719.";		
(3) in Article 4, the following paragraph 9 is		
added:		
"9. Paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 shall also apply to the		
single allocation platform established in		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
accordance with Regulation (EU) 2016/1719.";		
(4) in Article 5(8), the following second		- //
subparagraph is added:";		
ACER shall monitor the single allocation		
platform established in accordance with		
Regulation (EU) 2016/1719.		
(5) In Article 5, the following paragraph 9 is		
added:		
"9. ACER shall approve and where necessary		
amend the proposal from the ENTSO for		
electricity on the establishment of the regional		
virtual hubs for the forward market pursuant to		
Article 9(2) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943."		
(C) In Anti-1- 5 the Caller 1 10:		
(6) In Article 5. the following paragraph 10 is		
added:		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
"10. ACER shall approve and where necessary		
amend the joint proposal from the ENTSO for		- "//
electricity and the EU DSO entity related to the		
methodology concerning the data and analysis		
to be provided as regards the flexibility needs		
pursuant to Article 19 <u>c</u> e( <u>4</u> 5) of Regulation (EU)		
2019/943."		
(7) in Article 15, the following paragraph 5 is		
added:		
"5. ACER shall issue a report analysing the		
national assessments of the flexibility needs and		
providing recommendations on issues of cross-		
border relevance regarding the findings of the		
regulatory authorities pursuant to Article		
19 <b>ce</b> ( <u>76</u> ) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943.";		
Article 5		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
Entry into force		
This Regulation shall enter into force on the		- //
[xxx] day following that of its publication in the		
Official Journal of the European Union.		
This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety		
and directly applicable in all Member States.		
Done at Strasbourg,		
For the European Parliament For the Council		
The President The President		
	<u>End</u>	<u>End</u>