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INFORMATION

From:	General Secretariat of the Council
To:	Working Party on Shipping
N° prev. doc.:	ST 14889/25
Subject:	34th session of the IMO Assembly (A 34) (London, 24 November-3 December) - Submission by Ukraine

Delegations will find attached document A 34/23/2 and its Corr.1 containing a submission by Ukraine on implementation of Assembly resolution A.1183(33) on the impact of the Russian armed invasion of Ukraine on international shipping.

ASSEMBLY
34th session
Agenda item 23

A 34/23/2
29 September 2025
Original: ENGLISH
Pre-session public release:

**ELECTION OF MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL, AS PROVIDED FOR IN ARTICLES 16
AND 17 OF THE IMO CONVENTION**

**Implementation of Assembly resolution A.1183(33) on The impact of the Russian
armed invasion of Ukraine on international shipping**

Submitted by Ukraine

SUMMARY

Executive summary: This document is submitted pursuant to Assembly resolution A.1183(33) on *The impact of the Russian armed invasion of Ukraine on international shipping* and addresses the Russian Federation's candidacy for election to the IMO Council, setting out updated arguments in support of its non-election, outlining institutional risks that would arise should the Russian Federation be elected, in light of its conduct affecting maritime safety, security, the marine environment and compliance with IMO instruments.

Strategic direction, if applicable: Not applicable

Output: Not applicable

Action to be taken: Paragraph 15

Related documents: Resolutions MSC.495(105) and MSC.519(106); C/ES.35/D; A 33/23/2; CCC 10/2/1; LEG 112/5(a)/1; resolutions A.1000(25), A.1126(31), A.1151(32), A.1183(33) and A.1192(33)

1 On 24 February 2022, the Russian Federation launched its illegal, unprovoked and unjustified full-scale military invasion of Ukraine, marking a major escalation of armed aggression ongoing since 2014. As a consequence, the Russian Federation continues to temporarily occupy parts of the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions, as well as limited adjacent and border areas in the Kharkiv, Mykolaiv and Sumy regions, in addition to its ongoing temporary occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the city of Sevastopol and parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

2 The international community has overwhelmingly condemned the Russian Federation's internationally wrongful acts, inter alia by adopting the United Nations General Assembly resolutions ES-11/1 of 2 March 2022, ES-11/2 of 24 March 2022, ES-11/3 of 7 April 2022, ES-11/4 of 12 October 2022, ES-11/5 of 14 November 2022, ES-11/6 of 23 February 2023, ES-11/7 of 26 April 2023, ES-11/8 of 12 December 2023, 79/184

of 19 December 2024 and ES-11/7 of 24 February 2025, which reaffirmed the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders including territorial sea, and rejected the attempted annexation of Ukrainian territories by the Russian Federation as invalid.

3 The Russian Federation's continued armed aggression constitutes a flagrant violation of the law of the sea, including, but not limited to, the following international legal instruments:

- United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS): general rights of Ukraine as a port and coastal state, status of the Sea of Azov, transit regime in the Kerch Strait, freedom of navigation in the area, obligations to resolve disputes peacefully, issuance of flag, class and statutory certificates in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine (III 9/2/3);
- International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS): breach of Ukrainian closed seaports regime, including withdrawal of port facility security plans and unauthorized conduct of port facility security assessments, AIS and LRIT devices deactivation with no justification related to ensuring the safety of a ship (particularly for illegal operations in the closed seaports of Ukraine in temporarily occupied territories and the Sea of Azov (Circular Letters No.4887 and No.4892)), unauthorized expansion of the service area of Russian national NAVTEX station, dissemination of wrongful maritime safety information (MSI), capture of Berdiansk NAVTEX coastal station, numerous lighthouses and abduction of their personnel (NCSR 10/2/1);
- International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR): attempts to unlawfully extend the maritime search and rescue region of the Russian Federation, denial of performance of Ukrainian coastal State obligations related to maritime search and rescue, seizure of the SAR vessel **Sapfir** and detainment of its crew (C/ES.35/3/2);
- International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW): issuance of seafarers' qualification certificates and identity documents in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine (MSC 107/2/3); and
- Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation and Protocol thereto (SUA): attempts to seize Ukrainian offshore drilling platforms on the continental shelf of Ukraine, and relevant rules of customary international law.

4 Moreover, the International Maritime Organization, through decisions of the thirty-fifth extraordinary session of its Council, Maritime Safety Committee resolutions MSC.419(105) and MSC.519(106), as well as resolution A.1183(33) on *The impact of the Russian armed invasion of Ukraine on international shipping*, adopted by the Assembly at its thirty-third session in 2023, reaffirmed its grave concern over the impacts on the safety and welfare of seafarers and on international shipping caused by the aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine. Namely, resolution A.1183(33) urged all parties to respect their obligations under international law, ensure the protection of seafarers, ships and port facilities, and underlined the need to safeguard the freedom of navigation and the integrity of global supply chains.

5 In December 2023, at the thirty-third regular session of the Assembly, the Russian Federation failed to secure election to the IMO Council under category A. This outcome reflected the broad concerns of the international community regarding the Russian Federation's actions undermining maritime safety and security and demonstrated the determination of Member States to uphold the principles of the Organization.

6 For the upcoming IMO Council elections at the thirty-fourth regular session of the Assembly (24 November – 3 December 2025), the Russian Federation has again submitted its candidature for election in category A, despite its ongoing actions undermining international maritime safety, security and the fundamental principles of the Organization.

7 In light of the above, and with reference to resolution A.1183(33), this submission is presented in the context of the Russian Federation's ongoing unlawful war of aggression against Ukraine, which continues to cause further loss of life and destruction in blatant violation of international law.

8 In the first six months of the year, the Russian army launched over 30,000 guided aerial bombs, over 11,000 Shahed drones, over 9,000 other types of attack drones, and more than 1,000 missiles, including ballistic ones. In June, the Russian Federation launched over 330 missiles, including nearly 80 ballistic missiles as well as over 5,000 attack drones and 5,000 guided aerial bombs at Ukraine's cities and communities. In total, since the beginning of the Russian Federation's full-scale military invasion of Ukraine, more than 15,000 civilians (including 652 children) were killed and 35,056 civilians injured (including 2,142 children).

9 The Ukrainian water sector has been gravely affected by the Russian Federation's full-scale armed aggression. The destruction of inland navigation facilities, pollution of rivers, damage to hydraulic infrastructure and oil spills in the Black Sea have caused severe harm to water resources and the marine environment. Two of Europe's largest irrigation canals – the North Crimean and the Main Kakhovka – were destroyed, while 746 water infrastructure facilities have been damaged or destroyed, with estimated losses amounting to billions of US dollars. On 6 June 2023, the Russian Federation perpetrated one of the largest terrorist acts of the twenty-first century by blowing up the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant dam, causing the flooding of around 80 towns and villages, inflicting catastrophic environmental and humanitarian consequences (such as release of innumerable amounts of unexploded ordnance, plastic and other pollutants into the Black Sea), as well as damage to the Ukrainian Dnipro fleet, inland navigation facilities and foreign-flagged ships stranded in the port of Kherson. This heinous act constitutes an unpunished war crime of ecocide.

10 Following the thirty-third regular session of the IMO Assembly, between 2024 and 2025 the Russian Federation carried out repeated, deliberate and terroristic in the essence armed attacks on merchant ships and port areas within and beyond Ukrainian internal waters and territorial sea, causing loss of life among seafarers, pilots, port workers and port operator employees, as well as inflicting significant damage on security of international shipping. Since the full-scale military invasion began, Russian actions have caused damage or destruction to more than 440 port infrastructure objects and port facilities, more than 38 merchant ships, and at least 118 civilian casualties (killed or injured). A selection of the gravest and most high-profile incidents since the thirty-third regular session of the Assembly has been included in the annex to this document. Such conduct constitutes a flagrant violation of the law of the sea, undermines the freedom of navigation, and amounts to direct armed attacks against civilian maritime actors and the principles upheld by the Organization. Notably:

- in September 2024, general cargo ship **Aya** was hit while transporting Ukrainian grain in the exclusive economic zone of Romania (Circular Letter No.4920);

- in late September and October 2024, a series of ballistic missile strikes damaged four foreign-flagged vessels flying different flags in the ports of Odesa, Chornomorsk and Pivdennyi, resulting in 27 casualties (Circular Letter No.4933);
- in March 2025, a ballistic missile strike against the bulk carrier **MJ Pinar** killed four crew members and one Ukrainian port worker, and damaged the tanker **Arkos**, while a separate attack damaged the bulk carrier **Suoer Sarkas** and the container ship **MSC Levante F**, leaving two port workers injured (Circular Letter No.4990);
- in May 2025, a ballistic missile attack killed two and injured seven port workers amid regular container handling operations in the port of Odesa (Circular Letter No.5030); and
- in July 2025, a ballistic missile targeted the berthing facility at which the general cargo ship **AJ Rose** was being unloaded, inflicting 12 casualties (Circular Letter No.5051).

11 The Russian Federation's withdrawal from the Initiative on the Safe Transportation of Grain and Foodstuffs from Ukrainian Ports (the Black Sea Grain Initiative) in July 2023, combined with its repeated missile and drone attacks against Ukrainian ports and shipping lanes, gravely undermined maritime security and global food stability. In response, Ukraine established the Special Maritime Corridor to and from the ports of Greater Odesa and the Danube, which over two years of operation has enabled the transport of more than 137 million tonnes of cargo on board more than 5,300 vessels. Of this, over 84 million tonnes comprised agricultural products, with metallurgical goods and other critical exports also transported through the corridor. Ukrainian exports have reached 54 countries across Asia, Africa, the Middle East, the Americas and Europe, thereby helping to stabilize food prices and reduce the risk of famine in grain-dependent States. Still, the inclusion of the ports of Mykolaiv, Olvia and Kherson in the Corridor operation is not plausible because of the proximity of Russia-induced hostilities and occupation of the Kinburn Spit, and more than 40 foreign-flagged ships remain stranded in those waters due to drone and missile strikes, with no repairs, retrofits or statutory surveys.

12 In 2024 and 2025, the Russian Federation not only continued its systematic armed attacks on Ukraine's port infrastructure and waterborne sector but also markedly expanded its so-called "shadow fleet", attempting to abuse universally recognized standards of maritime safety and pollution prevention in pursuit of its malicious political objectives. By mid-2025, this clandestine network was estimated to exceed 1,600 tankers amounting to nearly one fifth of the global tanker fleet. Predominantly composed of ageing, substandard vessels operating without adequate insurance, safety and labour oversight, as well as performing unauthorized ship-to-ship transfers, these practices pose acute threats to maritime safety, marine environment, occupational safety of seafarers, their social security, and fair competition in the sector. The catastrophic accident in December 2024 involving two obsolete **Volgoneft**-class oil tankers in the Kerch Strait, which spilled thousands of tonnes of heavy fuel oil into the Black Sea (Circular Letter No.4963, MEPC 83/10), starkly illustrated the scale of these dangers. Additional incidents during this period further underscored the risks associated with Russia's "shadow fleet", including a collision in Danish waters (**Andromeda Star**, March 2024), an engine failure in the Dardanelles (**Hera 1**, May 2024), and a drifting power-loss incident in the Baltic Sea (**Eventin**, January 2025). Such unlawful operations stand in direct contradiction to the fundamental principles of safe, transparent and lawful navigation enshrined in the Organization's instruments, including resolution A.1192(33) on *Urging Member States and all relevant stakeholders to promote actions to prevent illegal operations in the maritime sector by the "dark fleet" or "shadow fleet"*, which explicitly condemns these activities.

13 Returning the Russian Federation to the IMO Council would be inconsistent with the Organization's purposes and would create the following institutional risks:

- .1 rule-of-law signal: it would communicate tolerance of persistent breaches of international law and IMO instruments, attempts to turn entire geographic areas into "grey zones" for maritime law and heinous acts against another Member State in violation of bilateral and regional agreements, weakening incentives for compliance across the sector;
- .2 institutional conflict of interest: a State implicated in unsafe and opaque maritime practices could influence agendas, slow down implementation processes and dilute oversight of key safety and environmental measures;
- .3 heightened safety and environmental exposure: endorsing a candidate associated with ageing, under-insured and poorly supervised tonnage, as well as with lack of respect for international shipping services per se, life and health of maritime workforce, supply chains stability and freedom of navigation, would undercut global efforts to prevent casualties, protect seafarers, safeguard the marine environment and ensure peaceful use of the seas for sustainable development of all;
- .4 market distortion: non-compliant operations erode a level playing field, disadvantaging responsible operators and undermining fair competition; and
- .5 reputational harm: confidence in the IMO Council's integrity – among Member States, industry, insurers, ports and seafarers – would be diminished, impairing the Organization's authority and effectiveness.

14 For these reasons, Member States should withhold support for the Russian Federation's candidature and reaffirm the Assembly's commitment to safe, secure and environmentally sound shipping.

Action requested of the Assembly

15 The Assembly is invited to note the information provided in this document and take action, as it may deem appropriate.

ANNEX

INFORMATION ON SHIPS DAMAGED IN THE BLACK SEA – SEA OF AZOV REGION AS
A RESULT OF SHELLING BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
(January 2024 – July 2025)

No.	Vessel (name, type, IMO number, flag)	Cargo (name, quantity in tons, loaded/unloaded)	Location of the vessel (port, berth)	Time, date, causes, and nature of damage to the vessel (cargo)	Presence and extent of casualties, including among the vessel's crew
February 2024					
1	Diving boat VRD Planet		Mykolaiv Sea port	11:25 1 February 2024 as a result of the shelling, the ship was damaged and sank near an unequipped pier. The upper part of the deck superstructure is visible above the water surface.	No casualties. No fuel or lubricant spills.
2	General Cargo Ship KATHLEEN (IMO 9127980, flag of Türkiye)	Cargo: wheat – 2,832 tons	Seaport checkpoint of mouth of the Bystre area	13:40 22 February 2024 while the pilot was being picked up by the pilot boat Pilot Kohanov , an explosion occurred behind the stern (probably a mine detonation). Due to the explosion, the Kathleen shifted with the fairway and ran aground. No damage to the vessels or environmental pollution was detected.	No casualties or injuries.
3	General Cargo Ship KURUOGLU 3 (IMO 8512047, flag of Türkiye)	Cargo: "Carbamide" fertilizer – 800 tons	Kherson Sea Port	15:30 27 February 2024 As a result of shelling of the port by Russian forces, the ship sustained significant damage to its hull and listed to starboard.	No casualties.

No.	Vessel (name, type, IMO number, flag)	Cargo (name, quantity in tons, loaded/unloaded)	Location of the vessel (port, berth)	Time, date, causes, and nature of damage to the vessel (cargo)	Presence and extent of casualties, including among the vessel's crew
March 2024					
4	Bulk Carrier REK NOBLE (IMO 9229879, flag of Panama)		Kherson Sea Port	17:30 16 March 2024 During the shelling of the Kherson Sea Port by Russian troops, the ship was hit on the starboard side, above the waterline.	No casualties.
June 2024					
5	Bulk Carrier TQ SAMSUN (IMO 9125566, flag of Liberia)	Cargo: 36,000 tons of corn	Odesa Sea Port	11:42 2 June 2024 As a result of hostile shelling of the Odesa Sea Port, the blast wave damaged the ship's porthole windows. The cargo was not damaged.	No casualties among crew members or port workers.
6	General Cargo Ship ARTEY (IMO 8879251, flag of Cameroon)		Chornomorsk Sea Port	From 01:23 to 04:45 10 July 2024 During an air raid, military weapons struck the seaport area, damaging the ship's hull with the starboard side. There was a hydraulic leak, and the hydraulic pipe closing the hold cover was punctured. The ship's hull with the starboard side was damaged by debris.	Three victims: one injured crew member of the vessel; two fatalities (driver of the vehicle and employee of Port-Service LLC).
7	Tanker JULIER (MMSI 264163386, flag of Romania)	Cargo: 2,202 tons of gasoline	Izmail Sea Port	03:00 24 July 2024 During the air raid, a UAV struck the ship, causing an explosion and fire.	No casualties among crew members or port workers.

No.	Vessel (name, type, IMO number, flag)	Cargo (name, quantity in tons, loaded/unloaded)	Location of the vessel (port, berth)	Time, date, causes, and nature of damage to the vessel (cargo)	Presence and extent of casualties, including among the vessel's crew
				Debris from the UAV damaged the pipeline.	
8	Crane vessel SPK-3 (shipowner is unknown)		Ust-Dunaysk Sea Port Bazarchuk	From 00:07 to 02:00 25 July 2024 During an air raid alert, a UAV struck the facility.	No casualties or injuries.
9	Crane vessel PK-209			The SPK-3 and PK-209 floating cranes and the PRP-52 floating dock were damaged.	
10	Boat dock PRP-52				
September 2024					
11	General Cargo Ship Golden Lion (IMO 9363974, flag of Antigua and Barbuda)	Cargo: 3,000 tons of metal (export).	Odesa Sea Port, berth № 47 Port Operator Brooklyn-Kyiv LTD	13:55 20 September 2024 As a result of the ballistic missile strike, the superstructure sustained shrapnel damage.	Three crew members are in critical condition, one port operator employee is hospitalized
12	Oil tanker Volgoneft-25 (IMO 8943985, flag of Ukraine) <i>KE+111; oil tanker (flash point >60°C); year built - 1967 (Rep. of Bulgaria)</i>	Without cargo	Izmail Sea Port	23:41 on 26 September 2024, to 03:55 27 September 2024 During the air raid alert from a UAV struck the vessel. The strike caused the vessel to catch fire	No casualties among crew members.

No.	Vessel (name, type, IMO number, flag)	Cargo (name, quantity in tons, loaded/unloaded)	Location of the vessel (port, berth)	Time, date, causes, and nature of damage to the vessel (cargo)	Presence and extent of casualties, including among the vessel's crew
October 2024					
13	General Cargo Ship PARESA (IMO 9008134, flag of the Federation of Saint Kitts and Nevis)	Corn cargo (export) – 6,000 tons (planned). The actual amount on board was 4,200 tons.	Seaport Pivdennyi, berth №22, port operator DP WORLD TIS PIVDENNYI LTD	02:30. 6 October 2024 As a result of the arrival of the airborne weapon, splinter damage was sustained to the superstructure and inter-tank bulkheads.	No casualties.
14	General Cargo Ship OPTIMA (IMO 9528691, flag of Palau)	Metal load – 5,400 tons (export)	Odesa Sea Port	19:47 7 October 2024. As a result of the ballistic missile strike, the superstructure and hull of the vessel, as well as the ballast water system in the stern, sustained shrapnel damage.	Four crew members are injured. One is in serious condition (coma) in a hospital in Odesa, and one port worker died.
				11:53 14 October 2024 Additional damage to the ship's hull and ballast water system in the bow section was caused by a second ballistic missile strike on the port area.	One person is killed (electrician from MARCO Limited)
15	Container Ship Shui Spirit (IMO 9216729, flag of Panama)	Unloading of 7,000 tons (853 containers), loading of 6,000 tons (653 containers)	Chornomorsk Sea Port	19:01 9 October 2024. As a result of a ballistic missile strike on the port area, the superstructure and hull of the ship sustained shrapnel damage. 20:08 9 October 2024. A second ballistic	One crew member (representative of the shipowner's company) is killed, eight employees of Black Sea Fishing Port LTD and third-party organizations

No.	Vessel (name, type, IMO number, flag)	Cargo (name, quantity in tons, loaded/unloaded)	Location of the vessel (port, berth)	Time, date, causes, and nature of damage to the vessel (cargo)	Presence and extent of casualties, including among the vessel's crew
				missile strike on the port area was recorded.	killed, and seven are injured.
16	General Cargo Ship NS MOON (IMO 8919855, flag of Belize)	Cargo: 3,150 tons of metal (export)	Odesa Sea Port berth №8, port operator Prista Oil-Ukraine LTD	11:53 14 October 2024 As a result of a ballistic missile strike on the port area, damage was caused to the superstructure and hull of the vessel.	One person was killed (an electrician from MARCO Limited who was doing repair work on board the OPTIMA, which was hit in an attack on 7 October 2024) eight people are injured (including two crew members of pilot boats belonging to the Delta-Pilot branch of the USPA)
17	Pilot Boat Capitan Beluha (flag of Ukraine, shipowner – Delta-Pilot Branch of State Enterprise USPA)		Odesa Sea Port, berth №9	By debris from a ballistic missile: the deck and the upper part of the port side were punctured; cable routes and cooling pipes were damaged; portholes in the superstructure and wheelhouse were knocked out.	Sustained minor injuries; assistant captain
18	Pilot Boat Volodymyr Sharabura (flag of Ukraine, shipowner – Delta Pilot Branch of State Enterprise USPA)		Odesa Sea Port, berth №8	By debris from a ballistic missile: the main deck and superstructure were punctured; portholes in the superstructure and wheelhouse were knocked out;	A replacement motorboat operator was wounded and suffered concussion.

No.	Vessel (name, type, IMO number, flag)	Cargo (name, quantity in tons, loaded/unloaded)	Location of the vessel (port, berth)	Time, date, causes, and nature of damage to the vessel (cargo)	Presence and extent of casualties, including among the vessel's crew
January 2025					
19	Tanker Chabeli (flag of Slovakia, MMSA-267131716)	Diesel fuel - 1,500 tons (for unloading)	Izmail Sea Port	From 00.00 to 04.52 30 January 2025 As a result of an air attack, when an airborne weapon exploded, the blast wave shattered the portholes in the hull and superstructure of the ship.	No crew members were injured.
February 2025					
20	General Cargo Ship GOLD LUCKY (IMO 8681410, flag of Cameroon)	Loaded Soybeans (4,578 tons)	Odesa Sea Port	From 18.08 to 18.41 13 February 2025 As a result of a rocket explosion over the water surface of the Quarantine Harbour of the Odesa Port Authority, the blast wave damaged the civilian vessel GOLD LUCKY , knocking out some doors, windows, and partitions on the ship.	No crew members were injured.
March 2025					
21	Cargo Ship SUPER SARK AS (IMO 9221633, flag of Sierra Leone)	Before loading - 24,500 tons of corn. On board - 21,453 tons Loading of the vessel completed. 4,451 kg of soybeans and 22,000 kg of corn taken on board.	Odesa Sea Port	From 17:44 to 18:08 1 March 2025 During an air raid, as a result of an airborne weapon (ballistic missile) explosion, the ship's hull sustained shrapnel damage and portholes were knocked out.	No crew members were injured.

No.	Vessel (name, type, IMO number, flag)	Cargo (name, quantity in tons, loaded/unloaded)	Location of the vessel (port, berth)	Time, date, causes, and nature of damage to the vessel (cargo)	Presence and extent of casualties, including among the vessel's crew
22	Container Ship MSC LEVANT E F (IMO 9330264, flag of Panama)	Unloaded – 3,782 tons; To be loaded – 12,691 tons	Odesa Sea Port	From 17:44 to 18:08 1 March 2025 During an air raid, as a result of an airborne weapon (ballistic missile) explosion, the ship's hull sustained shrapnel damage, portholes were knocked out, and containers were partially damaged.	No crew members were injured.
23	Bulk Carrier MJ PINAR (IMO 9406051, flag of Barbados)	Before loading – 29,500 tons of wheat, On board there were – 13,567 tons. 29,501 tons loaded	Odesa Sea Port	At 20.17 11 March 2025 As a result of a missile attack (ballistic missile), the ship's hull sustained shrapnel damage and the portholes were knocked out.	Four people are killed – all crew members, Syrian citizens, two people are injured (one watchman, one crew member)
24	Chemical/Oil Products Tanker ARKOS (IMO 9286827, flag of Portugal)	Before loading – 12,400 tons of sunflower oil, on board there were – 4,500 tons.	Odesa Sea Port	At 20.17 11 March 2025 As a result of a missile attack (ballistic missile), the portholes were damaged.	No crew members were injured.

No.	Vessel (name, type, IMO number, flag)	Cargo (name, quantity in tons, loaded/unloaded)	Location of the vessel (port, berth)	Time, date, causes, and nature of damage to the vessel (cargo)	Presence and extent of casualties, including among the vessel's crew
25	Chemical Tanker BLACK FUEL (IMO 8407632, flag of Tanzania)	in ballast	Berth Port Ochakiv LTD	At 09:00 17 March 2025 As a result of shelling of the Ochakiv and Kutsurub communities on 10-12 March 2025, it was damaged. The ship is in a flooded state.	No crew members were injured.
May 2025					
26	Chemical/Oil Products Tanker ORIS HELGA (IMO 9483619; flag of Panama)	Cargo – 6,300 tons of oil/load	Chornomorsk Sea Port	From 00.10 to 01.26 24 May 2025 As a result of shelling of the Black Sea port of Chornomorsk, the ship's water pipe was damaged by shrapnel.	No crew members were injured, but during the attack that took place on 23 May 2025 at Odesa Sea Port infrastructure, one person was killed and six others were wounded.
July 2025					
27	General Cargo Ship AJ ROSE (IMO 9217785; flag São Tomé and Príncipe)	Cargo - metal	Odesa Commercial Sea Port	In the afternoon of 3 July 2025 A Russian Iskander ballistic missile damaged berthing facilities in the Odesa Commercial Sea Port.	Two people are killed and six people are injured

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7 November 2025
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Pre-session public release:

ELECTION OF MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL, AS PROVIDED FOR IN ARTICLES 16 AND 17 OF THE IMO CONVENTION

Implementation of Assembly resolution A.1183(33) on the impact of the Russian armed invasion of Ukraine on international shipping

Corrigendum

Submitted by Ukraine

Entry No.2 in the table in the annex to document A 34/23/2, should read as follows:

2	General Cargo Ship «KATHLEEN» (IMO 9127980, flag of Antigua and Barbuda)	Cargo: wheat – 2,832 tons	Seaport checkpoint of mouth of the Bystre area	22.02.2024 13:40 while the pilot was being picked up by the pilot boat “Pilot Kohanov”, an explosion occurred behind the stern (probably a mine detonation). Due to the explosion, the Kathleen shifted with the fairway and ran aground. No damage to the vessels or environmental pollution was detected.	No casualties or injuries.
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