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CONTRIBUTION

From:	General Secretariat of the Council
To:	Working Party on Energy
Subject:	LV comments on Regulation on an emergency intervention to address high energy prices (ST 12405/22)

Delegations will find in the annex the LV comments on Regulation on an emergency intervention to address high energy prices (ST 12405/22).

Important: In order to guarantee that your comments appear accurately, please do not modify the table format by adding/removing/adjusting/merging/splitting cells and rows. This would hinder the consolidation of your comments.

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
2022/0289 (NLE)		
Proposal for a		
COUNCIL REGULATION		
on an emergency intervention to address high		
energy prices		
THE COUNCIL OF THE ELIDODE AN		
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN		
UNION,		
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning		
of the European Union, and in particular Article		
122(1) thereof,		
Having regard to the proposal from the		
European Commission,		
Whereas:		

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Deadline: 21 September 2022

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(1) Very high prices in electricity markets		
have been observed since September 2021. As		
set out by ACER in its assessment of EU		
wholesale electricity market design in April		
2022 ¹ , this is mainly a consequence of the high		
price of gas, which is used as an input to		
generate electricity. Natural gas-fired power		
plants are often needed to satisfy the demand for		
electricity when the demand is at its highest		
during the day or when the volumes of		
electricity generated from other technologies		
such as nuclear, hydro or variable renewable		
energy sources do not suffice to cover demand.		
The escalation of the Russian military		
aggression against Ukraine, a Contracting Party		
of the Energy Community, since February 2022		

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Deadline: 21 September 2022

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has led to gas supplies declining markedly. The		
Russian invasion of Ukraine has also caused		
uncertainty on the supply of other commodities,		
such as hard coal and crude oil, used by power-		
generating installations. This has resulted in		
substantial additional increases in and volatility		
of the price of electricity.		
(2) The recent substantially lower levels of		
gas delivery and increased disruptions of gas		
supply from Russia point to a significant risk		
that a complete halt of Russian gas supplies may		
materialise in the near future. To increase the		
Union's security of energy supply, the Council		
adopted Regulation (EU) 2022/13691 that		
provides for a voluntary reduction of natural gas		
demand by 15% this winter and grants the		

Regulation (EU) 2022/1369 of 5 August 2022 on coordinated demand-reduction measures for gas (OJ L 206, 8.8.2022, p. 1).

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possibility for the Council to declare a Union		
alert on security of supply, in which case the gas		
demand reduction would become mandatory.		
(3) In parallel, the exceptionally high		
temperatures observed during the summer of		
2022 have pushed up demand for electricity for		
cooling, adding pressure on electricity		
generation while, at the same time, electricity		
generation from certain technologies has been		
significantly below historical levels due to		
technical and weather-dependant circumstances.		
This is due mainly to an exceptional drought		
which led to (i) a shortfall in the production of		
electricity by nuclear power plants in different		
Member States caused by the lack of available		
cooling water, (ii) scarce hydropower generation		
and (iii) low water levels in major rivers which		

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have adversely affected the transport of		
commodities used as input fuel for generation.		
This unprecedented situation means that the		
volumes of electricity generated from natural		
gas-fired power plants have stayed persistently		
high, contributing to exceptionally and		
abnormally high wholesale electricity prices.		
Despite the reduced availability of generation		
capacities in some Member States, electricity		
exchanges between Member States have helped		
to avoid security of supply incidents and		
contributed to mitigating price volatility on the		
EU markets, thereby enhancing each Member		
State's resilience to price shocks.		
(4) The price surge in wholesale electricity		
markets has led to sharp increases in electricity		
retail prices, which are expected to continue		

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ahead of the next heating season gradually		
trickling down to most consumer contracts. The		
sharp increase in gas prices and the resulting		
demand for alternative fuels has also led to an		
increase of other commodity prices such as		
<u>crude</u> oil and coal prices.		
(5) All Member States have been negatively		
affected by the current energy crisis, albeit to a		
different extent. The stark increase of energy		
prices is substantially contributing to the general		
inflation in the euro area and slowing down		
economic growth in the Union.		
(6) A rapid and coordinated response is		
therefore needed. The deployment of an		
emergency tool would allow mitigation, on a		
temporary basis, of the risk that electricity		

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prices and the cost of electricity for final		
customers reach even less sustainable levels and		
that Member States adopt uncoordinated		
national measures, which could endanger		
security of supply at Union level and put an		
additional burden on the Union's industry and		
consumers. In a spirit of solidarity between		
Member States, a coordinated effort by Member		
States during the next winter season 2022-23 is		
required to mitigate the impact of high energy		
prices and ensure that the current crisis does not		
lead to lasting harm for consumers and the		
economy, while preserving the sustainability of		
public finances.		
(7) The current disruptions to gas supplies,		
reduced availability of certain power generating		
plants, and the resulting impacts on gas and		

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electricity prices, constitute a severe difficulty		
in the supply of gas and electricity energy		
products within the meaning of Article 122(1)		
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the		
European Union. There is a serious risk that the		
situation could deteriorate further in the coming		
winter season in case of further disruptions of		
gas supplies and a cold winter season driving up		
the demand for gas and electricity. Such further		
deterioration could lead to more upward		
pressure on the price of gas and other energy		
commodities' prices with a resulting impact on		
electricity prices.		
(7a) The disruption of the energy market,		
caused by one of the main market players		
which has artificially reduced the supply of		
gas in the context of the Russian military		

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aggression against Ukraine, and the hybrid		
war which is thereby carried out have		
created a crisis situation which requires the		
adoption of a set of urgent, temporary,		
exceptional measures of economic nature to		
address the unbearable effects on consumers		
and companies. If not addressed rapidly, the		
crisis situation may have severe detrimental		
effects on inflation, the liquidity of market		
operators and on the economy as a whole.		
(8) A united and well-coordinated Union-		
wide response is needed to tackle the stark		
increase of electricity prices and their impact on		
households and industry. Uncoordinated		
national measures could affect the functioning		
of the internal energy market, endangering		
security of supply and leading to further price		

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increases in the Member States most affected by	
the crisis. Safeguarding the integrity of the	
internal electricity market is therefore crucial to	
preserve and enhance the necessary solidarity	
between Member States.	
(9) While some Member States might be	
more exposed to the effects of a disruption of	
Russian gas supplies and the resulting price	
increases, all Member States can contribute to	
limiting the economic harm caused by such	
disruption by appropriate demand reduction	
measures. Reducing electricity demand at	
national level can have a positive, Union-wide	
effect on electricity prices, as electricity markets	
are coupled and savings in one Member State	
thus benefit also other Member States.	

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions Comments	
(10) Uncoordinated caps on revenues from		
electricity produced from generators with lower		
marginal costs such as renewables, nuclear, and		
lignite (inframarginal generators) may lead to		
significant distortions between generators in the		
Union, as generators compete EU-wide on a		
coupled electricity market. A commitment to a		
joint Union-wide cap on surplus revenues will		
avoid such distortions. Furthermore, not all		
Member States can support consumers to the		
same extent due to limited financial resources,		
while at the same time, some electricity		
generators may continue enjoying significant		
surplus revenues. Solidarity between Member		
States, through a uniform cap on the revenues of		
inframarginal generation technologies will		
generate revenues for Member States to finance		
measures in support of electricity final		

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customers, such as households, SMEs and	
energy intensive industries, while at the same	
time preserving the price signals on the markets	
across Europe and preserving cross-border	
trade.	
(11) With a view to the extreme increase of	
retail gas and electricity prices, State	
interventions to protect retail consumers are of	
particular importance. However, the impact of	
the gas supply shortages on electricity prices, as	
well as the possibilities to finance support	
measures from State budget differ between	
Member States. If only some Member States	
with sufficient resources can protect these	
customers and suppliers, this would lead to	
severe distortions of the internal market. A	
uniform obligation to pass on the surplus	

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revenues to final consumers allows all Member		
States to protect their consumers. The positive		
effect on energy prices will have a positive		
impact on the interconnected EU market and		
will also help dampening the inflation rate.		
Therefore, in a spirit of solidarity, national		
measures will, in the interconnected Union		
economy, also have a positive effect in other		
Member States.		
(12) The measure consisting of the solidarity		
contribution for fossil companies with activities		
in the <u>crude</u> oil, gas, coal and refinery sector is		
an exceptional and strictly temporary measure.		
It appears appropriate in the current situation		
that action is taken at Union level is taken to		
mitigate the direct economic effects of the		
soaring energy prices for public authorities'		

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budgets, consumers and companies across the	
Union.	
(13) The solidarity contribution is an	
appropriate means to tackle surplus profits, due	
to unforeseen circumstances. Those profits do	
not correspond to any regular profit that these	
entities would or could have expected to obtain	
in normal circumstances would the	
unpredictable events in the energy markets not	
have taken place. Therefore, the introduction of	
a solidarity contribution constitutes a joint and	
coordinated measure which affords, in a spirit of	
solidarity, generating additional proceeds for	
national authorities to provide financial support	
to households and companies heavily affected	
by the soaring energy prices while ensuring a	
level playing field across the Union and the	

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internal market. It should be applied in parallel	
to the regular corporate taxes levied by each	
Member State on the companies concerned.	
(14) To ensure coherence across energy	
policy areas, the measures should work as an	
interdependent package reinforcing each other.	
All Member States should be able to support	
consumers, in a targeted manner, through	
surplus revenues resulting from the cap on	
market revenues for inframarginal electricity	
generation, through the reduction of electricity	
demand, which contributes to lowering energy	
prices, and through proceeds from a solidarity	
contribution imposed on fossil companies with	
activities in the <u>crude</u> oil, gas, coal and refinery	
sector. At the same time, lower demand should	
have positive effects in terms of reducing the	

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risks to security of supply, in line with the		
objectives of Directive (EU) 2019/944.		
(15) Member States should therefore		
endeavour to reduce their total gross electricity		
consumption from all consumers including		
those who are not yet equipped with smart		
metering systems or devices enabling them to		
monitor their consumption during specific hours		
of the day.		
(16) To preserve fuel stocks for electricity		
generation and to specifically target the most		
expensive hours of electricity consumption,		
when gas-fired power generation has a		
particularly significant impact on the marginal		
price, each Member State should reduce its		
gross electricity consumption during identified		

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peak price -hours.		
(17) Based on the typical electricity		
consumption profile within peak hours, a		
binding target of 5% during peak price hours		
would ensure that Member States address more		
specifically consumers who can deliver		
flexibility through demand reduction offers on		
an hourly basis, including via aggregators.		
Therefore, an active electricity demand		
reduction of at least 5% during selected hours		
should lead to a reduced gas consumption and to		
a smoother repartition of demand across hours,		
impacting hourly market prices.		
(18) Member States should have the		
discretion to choose the appropriate measures to		
achieve the demand reduction targets so that		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
they can reflect national specificities. When		
designing electricity demand reduction		
measures, Member States should ensure that		V
such measures are designed so as not to		
undermine the Union electrification objectives		
as set out in the Communication on Powering a		
climate-neutral economy: An EU Strategy for		
Energy System Integration. Electrification is		
key to reduce EU dependence on fossil fuels and		
ensure long-term strategic autonomy of the		
European Union as this leads to limiting the		
magnitude of this energy crisis and preventing		
future energy crisis. Measures to reduce the		
gross electricity consumption might include		
national awareness-raising campaigns,		
publishing targeted information on the		
forecasted situation in the electricity system,		
regulatory measures limiting non-essential		

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energy consumption, and targeted incentives to	
reduce the electricity consumption.	
(19) When identifying appropriate demand	
reduction measures in the peak price hours,	
Member States should in particular consider	
market-based measures such as auctions or	
tender schemes, by which they could incentivise	
a reduction of consumption in an economically	
efficient manner. To ensure efficiency and fast	
implementation, Member States could use	
existing initiatives and expand existing schemes	
to develop demand response. The measures	
taken at national level could also include	
financial incentives or compensation to market	
participants affected, if a tangible demand	
reduction is achieved in addition to expected	
normal consumption.	

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(20) To assist and provide guidance to		
Member States delivering the necessary demand		
reductions set out in this Regulation, the		
Commission should facilitate the sharing of best		
practices between Member States.		
(21) Given the extraordinary and sudden		
surge in electricity prices and the imminent risk		
of further increases, it is necessary for Member		
States to immediately establish the measures		
needed to achieve reductions of the gross		
electricity consumption in order to facilitate		
rapid price reductions and to minimise the use		
of fossil fuels.		
(22) In the day-ahead wholesale market, the		
least expensive power plants are dispatched first		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions Comments
but the price received by all market participants	
is set by the last plant needed to cover the	
demand, i.e., that with the highest marginal	
costs, when the market clears. The recent surge	
in the price of gas and hard coal has translated	
into an exceptional and lasting increase of the	
prices at which the gas and coal-fired power	
generation facilities bid in the day-ahead	
wholesale market. That in turn has led to	
exceptionally high prices in the day-ahead	
market across the Union, as those are often the	
plants with the highest marginal costs needed to	
meet the demand for electricity.	
(23) Given the role of the price in the day-	
ahead market as a reference for the price in	
other wholesale electricity markets, and the fact	
that all market participants receive the clearing	

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price, the technologies with significantly lower		
marginal costs have consistently recorded high		C* //
revenues since the invasion of Ukraine by		
Russia in February 2022, well above their		
expectations when deciding to invest.		
(24) In a situation where consumers are		
exposed to extremely high prices which also		
harm the Union's economy, it is necessary to		
limit, on a temporary basis, the extraordinary		
market revenues of producers with lower		
marginal costs by way of application of a cap		
for such market revenues achieved through the		
sale of electricity within the Union.		
-		
(25) The level at which the cap on the		
revenues is set should not jeopardise the ability		
of the producers to which it is applied, including		
of the producers to which it is applied, including		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions Comments
renewable energy producers, to recover their	
investment and operating costs and should	
preserve and incentivise future investments in	
the capacity needed for a decarbonised and	
reliable electricity system. A uniform cap on	
revenues across the Union is necessary to	
preserve the functioning of the internal	
electricity market, as it would maintain price-	
based competition between electricity producers	
based on different technologies, in particular for	
renewables.	
(26) While occasional and short-term peaks	
on prices can be considered a normal feature in	
an electricity market and may be useful for	
some investors to recover their generation	
investment, the extreme and lasting price	
increase observed since February 2022 is	

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
markedly different from a normal market		
situation of occasional peak prices. Therefore,		
the cap should not be set below the reasonable		
expectations of market participants as to the		
average level of electricity prices in the hours		
during which the demand for electricity was at		
its highest, before the invasion of Ukraine by		
Russia. Before February 2022, the average peak		
prices in the electricity wholesale market were		
significantly and consistently expected below		
180 Euros per MWh across the Union in the last		
decades, despite the differences in electricity		
prices between regions in the Union. Since the		
initial investment decision of market		
participants was taken based on an expectation		
that, on average, the prices would be lower than		
that level during peak hours, setting a cap at a		
180 EUR per MWh constitutes a level well		

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above those initial market expectations. By	
leaving a margin on the price that investors	
could reasonably have expected, it is necessary	
to ensure that the revenue cap does not	
counteract the initial assessment of investment	
profitability.	
(27) Moreover, the cap of 180 EUR per MWh	
is consistently higher, including a reasonable	
margin, than the current levelised cost of energy	
(LCOE) for all the relevant generation	
technologies, allowing producers to which it	
applies to cover their investments and operating	
costs. Considering that the <u>cap</u> ealeulation	
chosen in this proposal leaves a considerable	
margin between the reasonable LCOE and the	
revenue cap, the cap-it can therefore not be	
expected to impair the investment in new	

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inframarginal capacities. In case Member		
States decide to include power producers		
with current levelised cost of energy above		
the cap of 180 EUR per MWh, they should		
introduce a specific cap to ensure that the		
higher costs of those producers are fully		
taken into account.		
(28) The cap should be set on market		
revenues rather than on total generation		
revenues (including other potential sources of		
revenues such as feed-in premium), to avoid		
significantly impacting the initial expected		
profitability of a project. Regardless of the		
contractual form in which the trade of electricity		
may take place, the cap should apply to realised		
market revenues only. This is necessary to avoid		
harming producers who do not actually benefit		

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from the current high electricity prices due to		
having hedged their revenues against		
fluctuations in the wholesale electricity market.		
Hence, to the extent that existing or future		
contractual obligations, such as renewable		
power purchase agreements and other types of		
power purchase agreements or forward hedges,		
lead to market revenues from the production of		
electricity up to the level of the cap, they would		
such revenues should remain unaffected by		
this Regulation not be caught by its application.		
The measure introducing the cap on revenues		
should therefore not deter market		
participants from entering into such		
contractual obligations.		
(29) The measure introducing the cap on		
revenues should therefore not deter market		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions Comments	
participants from entering into renewables		
power purchase agreements. Given the direct		
benefits that they provide to end-consumers,		
Member States should continue to promote		
them, making use of the Commission		
Recommendation of 18 May 2022 on speeding		
up permit granting procedures for renewable		
energy projects and facilitating Power Purchase		
Agreements as well as practices described in		
Chapter II of the guidance in the Annex to this		
Recommendation.		
(30) Having a uniform cap on revenues		
across the Union is necessary to preserve the		
functioning of the internal electricity market as		
it would maintain price-based competition		
across the Union between electricity producers		
based on different technologies, in particular for		

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renewables.		
(31) While applying the revenue cap at the		
time when transactions are settled may be more		
efficient, it might not always be possible, for		
instance due to differences in the way wholesale		
electricity markets are organised in the Member		
States and across different timeframes. To		
account for national specificities and to facilitate		
the application of the cap on revenues at		
national level, Member States should have the		
discretion to decide whether to apply it either		
when the settlement of the exchange of		
electricity takes place or thereafter.		
(32) Given that the generation mix and the		
cost-structure of power-generating facilities		
differ greatly among Member States, they		

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should retain the possibility to further limit the		
revenues of producers, provided that such		
measures are compatible with Union law.		
(33) The cap on revenues should apply to		
technologies with marginal costs lower than the		
cap, such as for instance wind, solar-or, nuclear		
energy or lignite.		
(34) The cap should not apply to technologies		
with high marginal costs relating to the price of		
the input fuel necessary to produce electricity,		
such as gas and <u>hard</u> coal-fired power plants, as		
their operating costs would be significantly		
above the level of the cap and its application		
would jeopardise their economic viability. To		
maintain the incentives to overall decrease of		
the consumption of gas, the cap on revenues		

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should not apply either to technologies which	
directly compete with gas-fired power plants to	
offer flexibility to the electricity system and bid	
in the electricity market based on their	
opportunity costs, such as demand-response and	
storage. Member States may introduce	
national measures which limit the revenues	
from electricity production from hard coal	
provided that such measures are designed so	
as not to affect the merit order and the price	
formation on the wholesale market.	
(35) The revenue cap should not apply to	
technologies using as input fuels that are	
substitutes for natural gas, such as bio-methane,	
so as not to jeopardise the conversion of existing	
gas-fired power plants in line with the	
REPowerEU objectives.	

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(36) To preserve the incentives for the		
development of innovative technologies, the cap		
on revenues should not apply to demonstration		
projects.		
(37) In some Member States, the revenues		
obtained by some generators are already capped		
by way of State measures such as feed-in-tariffs		
and two-way contracts for difference. These		
generators do not benefit from increased		
revenues resulting from the recent spike of		
electricity prices. Therefore, existing producers		
subject to that type of State measures should be		
excluded from the application of the cap on		
revenues. Any new measure should be in line		
with the principles of the internal market, shall		
not limit cross-border trade and shall not lead to		

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an increase of gas consumption.		
(37a) The increased trade flows across		
bidding zones due to crisis-related high price		
differences between such zones have led to a		
considerable increase of congestion rents in		
some Member States. Congestion income		
revenues should continue to be allocated to		
fulfil the priority objectives set out in Article		
19(2) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943. However,		
Member States should exceptionally, in duly		
justified cases and under the control of		
regulatory authorities, be given the		
possibility to distribute the remaining surplus		
revenues directly to final electricity		
customers instead of using them exclusively		
for the purposes referred to in Article 19(3)		
of that Regulation.		

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(38) Given that by application of the cap on		
revenues not all Member States can support		
their final customers to the same extent due to		
circumstances relating to their dependence on		
imports of electricity from other countries, it is		
necessary for Member States with net imports of		
electricity equal or higher than 100% to have		
access to agreements to share the surplus		
revenues with the main exporting country in a		
spirit of solidarity. Such solidarity agreements		
are also encouraged, in particular, to reflect		
unbalanced trading relationships.		
(39) Commercial and trading practices as		
well as the regulatory framework in the		
electricity sector are markedly different from the		
fossil fuels sector. Given that the cap aims to		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
mimic the market outcome that producers could		
have expected if global supply chains would		
function normally in absence of the gas supply		
disruptions since February 2022, it is necessary		
for the measure concerning electricity producers		
to apply to the revenues resulting from the		
generation of electricity. Conversely, as the		
temporary solidarity contribution targets the		
profitability of undertakings active in the <u>crude</u>		
oil, gas, coal and refinery sectors which has		
significantly increased compared to prior years,		
it is necessary for it to apply to their profits.		
(40) Member States should ensure that the		
surplus revenues resulting from the application		
of the cap in the field of electricity are passed on		
to final electricity customers to mitigate the		
impact of the exceptionally high electricity		

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Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
prices. The surplus revenues should targeted to		
customers, including both households and		
companies, who are particularly strongly		
affected by high electricity prices. Without the		
proposed measures, there is a risk that only		
wealthier Member States will have the resources		
to protect their consumers, leading to severe		
distortions in the internal market.		
(41) The revenues from the cap will help		
Member States to finance measures such as		
income transfers, rebates on bills, compensating		
suppliers for supplying below cost, as well		
investments that would lead to a structural		
reduction of consumption, in particular from		
electricity produced from fossil fuel sources.		
When support is granted to non-household		
customers, these should work towards		

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Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions Comments
undertaking investments in decarbonisation	
technologies, including renewable energies, for	
example through power purchasing agreement	
or direct investments in renewables generation,	
or to undertake investments in energy	
efficiency.	
(42) Public interventions in price setting for	
the supply of electricity constitute, in principle,	
a market-distortive measure. Such interventions	
may therefore only be carried out as public	
service obligations and are subject to specific	
conditions. Currently under Directive (EU)	
944/2019 regulated prices are possible	
households and micro-enterprises and, they are	
also possible including below cost for energy	
poor and vulnerable customers. However, in the	
presence of the current exceptional rise of	

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Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
electricity prices, the toolbox of available		
measures that the Member States have at their		
disposal to support consumers should be		
temporarily extended, by providing the		
possibility to extend regulated prices to SMEs		
and permitting regulated prices below cost.		
Such an extension could be financed by the		
revenue cap.		
(43) It is important that, where below cost,		
regulated retail prices do not discriminate		
between suppliers or impose unfair costs on		
them. Suppliers should therefore be fairly		
compensated for costs they incur supplying at		
regulated prices, without prejudice to the		
application of State aid rules. The cost of below		
cost regulated prices should be financed by the		
revenues stemming from the application of the		

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Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
revenue cap. In order to avoid that these		
measures increase demand for electricity, while		
still meeting the energy needs of consumers,		
below cost regulated prices should cover only a		
limited amount of consumption. Supplier of		
last resort regimes, and the choice by		
Member States of the supplier of last resort,		
should remain unaffected by this Regulation.		
(44) Without substantially changing their cost		
structure and increasing their investments, EU		
companies and permanent establishments		
generating at least 75% of turnover in the crude		
oil, gas, coal and refinery sector, have seen their		
profits spike due to the sudden and		
unpredictable circumstances of the war, reduced		
supply of energy and increasing demand due to		
record high temperatures.		

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Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
(45) The temporary solidarity contribution		
should act as a redistributing measure to ensure		
that the companies concerned which have		
earned surplus profits as a result of the		
unexpected circumstances, contribute in		
proportion to the improvement of the energy		
crisis in the internal market.		
(46) The basis for calculating the temporary		
solidarity contribution is taxable profits of the		
companies and permanent establishments tax		
resident in the EU in crude oil, gas, coal and		
refinery sectors as determined in bilateral		
treaties or Member States national tax laws for		
the fiscal year starting on or after 1 January		
2022. Member States which tax only distributed		
corporate profits should apply the temporary		

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Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
solidarity contribution to the calculated profits		
irrespective of their distribution. The fiscal year		
is determined by reference to the rules in place		
under Member States' national laws.		
(47) Only profits in 2022 above a 20%		
increase of the average taxable profits generated		
in the three fiscal years starting on or after 1		
January 2019 should be subject to the solidarity		
contribution.		
(48) This approach ensures that part of the		
profit margin, which is not due to the		
unpredictable developments in the energy		
markets following the ongoing illegal war in		
Ukraine could be used by the companies and		
permanent establishments concerned for future		
investment or for ensuring their financial		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
stability during the ongoing energy crisis		
including for the energy intense industry. This		
approach to determining the calculation base		
ensures that the solidarity contribution in		
different Member States is proportionate. At the		
same time this approach of setting a minimum		
rate ensures that the solidarity contribution is		
both fair and proportionate. Member States		
remain free to apply a higher rate in case they		
already introduced a solidarity contribution,		
levy or tax on surplus taxable profits of the		
energy undertakings within the scope of this		
Regulation that would exceed this rate of 33%		
before this Regulation entered into force. This		
enables such Member States to maintain their		
preferred rate they deemed acceptable and		
appropriate under their national legal systems.		

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Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
(49) The solidarity contribution should be		
used for i) financial support measures to final		
energy customer, and notably vulnerable		
households, to mitigate the effects of high		
energy prices; ii) financial support measures to		
help reducing the energy consumption; iii)		
financial support measures to support		
companies in energy intensive industries; iv)		
financial support measures to develop the		
energy autonomy of the Union. Member States		
should also be enabled to assign a share of the		
proceeds of the temporary solidarity		
contribution to common financing.		
(50) The use of the proceeds for those		
purposes reflects the solidarity contribution's		
exceptional nature as a measure that intends to		
reduce and mitigate the harmful effects of the		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions Comments
energy crisis for households and companies	
across the Union with the objective of	
protecting the Single Market and preventing the	
risk of further fragmentation. Soaring energy	
prices affect all Member States. However, given	
the differences in energy mix, Member States	
are not all impacted in the same way and do not	
all have the same fiscal space to take the	
necessary measures to protect vulnerable	
households and businesses. In the absence of a	
European measure such as a solidarity	
contribution, there is a high risk of disruption of	
the Single Market and further fragmentation,	
which would be detrimental to all Member	
States, given the integration of energy markets	
and of value chains. Tackling energy poverty	
and addressing the social consequences of the	
crisis, in particular to protect workers in	

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Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions Comments
exposed industries, are also a matter of	
solidarity between Member States in the Union.	
To maximise its impact, the use of the proceeds	
of the solidarity contribution should be done in a	
coordinated way and/or via EU financing	
instruments in a spirit of solidarity.	
(51) In particular, Member States should	
target financial support measures to the most	
vulnerable households and companies, which	
are most affected from the soaring energy	
prices. This would preserve the price incentive	
to reduce energy demand and save energy. In	
addition, targeting most vulnerable and	
liquidity-constrained households would have a	
positive effect on overall consumption (by	
averting excessive crowding out of spending on	
non-energy goods) given the high-income	

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
propensity to consume for this group of		
households. Moreover, proceeds should be used		
for fostering the reduction of energy		
consumption. In this respect, proceeds should be		
used, for instance, for the purpose of demand		
reduction auctions or tender schemes, lowering		
the energy purchase costs of final energy		
customers for certain volumes of consumption,		
or promoting investments by final energy		
customers, both vulnerable households and		
companies, into renewables, energy efficiency		
investments or other decarbonisation		
technologies. Proceeds of the solidarity		
contribution should also be used for supporting		
financially companies in energy intensive		
industries, and in regions relying on these		
industries.Costs in energy intensive industries		
due to soaring energy price developments are		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
skyrocketing, such as in the fertiliser industry.		
Financial support measures are to be made		
conditional upon investments into renewable		
energies, energy efficiency, or other		
decarbonisation technologies. Furthermore,		
measures which help making the Union more		
autonomous in the energy field should be		
supported with investments in accordance with		
the objectives set forth in the REPowerEU		
Communication, notably for projects with a		
cross-border dimension.		
(52) Member States could also decide to		
assign part of the proceeds of the solidarity		
contribution to the common financing of		
measures that are intended to reduce the harmful		
effects of the energy crisis, including support for		
protecting employment and the re- and		

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Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
upskilling of the workforce, or to promote		
investments in energy efficiency and renewable		
energy, including in cross-border projects. The		
common financing aspect covers both project-		
based cost-sharing between Member States and		
channelling via an EU instrument on the basis of		
Member States voluntarily assigning revenues		
to the EU budget in a spirit of solidarity.		
(53) Regular and effective monitoring and		
reporting to the Commission are essential for		
the assessment of progress made by the Member		
States in the achievement of the demand		
reduction targets, the implementation of the cap		
on revenues, the use of the surplus revenues,		
and the application of regulated prices.		
(54) Member States should report to the		

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Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
Commission on the application of the solidarity		
contribution in their respective territories, as		
well as on any amendments they make to their		
national legal frameworks for this purpose.		
such contribution.		
(55) Member States should also report on the		
use of the proceeds arising from the solidarity		
contribution. In particular, this is to ensure that		
Member States use the proceeds in line with the		
usage provided for in this Regulation.		
(56) The solidarity contribution and the EU		
legal framework governing it should be of a		
temporary nature to address the exceptional and		
urgent situation that has emerged in the Union		
with respect to the soaring energy prices. The		
solidarity contribution should be applicable to		

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Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions Comments	
cover surplus profits generated in 2022 to		
address and mitigate the harmful effects of the		
current ongoing energy crisis for households		
and companies The application of the solidarity		
contribution to the full fisca l tax year will allow		
to use excess profits for the relevant period, in		
the public interest of mitigating the		
consequences of the energy crises, while leaving		
an appropriate measure of profits to the		
companies concerned.		
(57) The solidarity contribution should apply		
only to the fiscal year 2022. By 15 October		
2023, when national authorities have a view on		
the collection of solidarity contribution, the		
Commission will review the situation and		
present a report to the Council.		

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Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions Comments
(58) Should a Member State experience	
difficulties in the application of the Regulation	
and, in particular, of the temporary solidarity	
contribution, it should consult, where	
appropriate, the European Commission in line	
with article 4 of the Treaty on European Union.	
(59) The volatility in underlying gas prices is	
creating difficulties for energy firms active on	
electricity futures markets, in particular in	
accessing suitable collateral. The European	
Commission, in cooperation with the European	
Securities Markets Authority and the European	
Banking Authority, is assessing issues related to	
the eligibility of collateral and margins, and	
possible ways to limit excessive intra-day	
volatility.	

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
(60) Moreover, the measures in this		
Regulation are consistent with the		
complementary and ongoing work of the		
European Commission concerning the long-term		
market design as announced in the		
Communication on Short-Term Energy Market		
Interventions and Long-Term Improvements to		
the Electricity Market Design that was issued		
alongside the Repower EU Plan of 18 May		
2022.		
(61) Considering the scale of the energy		
crisis, the level of its social, economic and		
financial impact and the need to act as soon as		
possible, this Regulation should enter into force		
as a matter of urgency on the day following that		
of its publication in the Official Journal of the		
European Union.		

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Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
(62) Given the exceptional nature of the		
measures set out in this Regulation, and the		
need to apply them in particular during the		
winter season 2022-23, the Regulation should		
apply for a period of one year after its entry into		
force.		
(63) Since the objectives of this Regulation		
cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member		
States, but can rather be better achieved at		
Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in		
accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as		
set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European		
Union. In accordance with the principle of		
proportionality, as set out in that Article, this		
Regulation does not go beyond what is		
necessary to achieve that objective.		

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Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments	
HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:			
CHAPTER I			
SUBJECT MATTER AND DEFINITIONS			
Article 1			
Subject matter			
This Regulation establishes an emergency intervention to mitigate the effects of high			
energy prices via exceptional, targeted and time-			
limited measures. These measures aim to reduce electricity consumption, to cap the market			
revenues that certain producers receive from the			
generation of electricity and redistribute them to final customers in a targeted manner, to enable			

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Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
Member States to apply public interventions in		
the price setting for the supply of electricity for		
households and small and medium-sized		
enterprises, and to establish rules for a		
temporary solidarity contribution for from EU		
companies and permanent establishments with		
activities predominantly in the <u>crude</u> oil, gas,		
coal and refinery sectors to contribute to the		
affordability of energy for households and		
companies.		
Article 2		
Definitions		
For the purposes of this Regulation, the		
definitions in Article 2 of Directive (EU)		
2019/944 and Article 2 of Regulation (EU)		
2019/943 apply. In addition, the following		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
definitions also apply:		
(1) 'small and medium-sized enterprise'		
means an enterprise as defined in Article 2 of		
the Annex to Commission Recommendation		
2003/361/EC ¹ ;		
(2) 'gross electricity consumption' means		
overall supply of electricity for activities in the		
territory of a Member State;		
(3) 'reference period' means the period from		
1 November to 31 March in the five consecutive		
years preceding the date of entry into force of		
this Regulation, starting with the period from 1		
November 2017 to 31 March 2018;		

Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC of 6 May 2003 concerning the definition of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (OJ L 124, 20.05.2003, p. 36).

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
(4) 'peak price hours' means hours of the		
day where, based on the forecasts of		
transmission system operators and, where		
applicable, nominated electricity market		
operators, day-ahead wholesale electricity		
prices are expected to be the highest, the gross		
electricity consumption is expected to be the		
highest or the gross consumption of		
electricity generated from sources other than		
renewable sources as referred to in Article		
2(1) of Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of the		
European Parliament and of the Council is		
expected to be the highest; based on forecasts		
by transmission system operators and nominated		
electricity market operators;		

Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources (recast).

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Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
(5) 'market revenue' means realised income		
a producer receives in exchange for the sale and		
delivery of electricity in the Union, regardless of		
the contractual form in which such exchange		
takes place, including power purchase		
agreements and other hedging operations		
against fluctuations in the wholesale electricity		
market and excluding any support granted by		
the State;		
(6) 'settlement' means a payment that is		
made and received between counterparties,		
against delivery and receipt of electricity where		
applicable, in fulfilment of the counterparties'		
respective obligations pursuant to one or more		
clearing transactions;		

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Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
(7) 'competent authority' means an		
authority as defined in Article 2(11) of		
Regulation (EU) 2019/941;		
(8) 'surplus revenues' means a positive		
difference between the market revenues of		
producers per MWh of electricity and the cap of		
180 Euros per MWh of electricity;		
(9) 'waste' means any substance or object		
which the holder discards or intends or is		
required to discard as defined in Article 3 (1) of		
Directive 2008/98/EC;		
(10) 'net imports <u>dependence</u> of electricity'		
means, for the period between 1 January 2021		
and 31 December 2021, the difference between		
the total electricity imports and total electricity		

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Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
exports as a percentage of divided by the total		
gross production of electricity in a Member		
State;		
(11) 'fiscal year' means a tax year, calendar		
year or any other appropriate period for tax		
purposes as defined in national law;		
(12) 'customer' means a wholesale or final		
customer;		
(13) 'final energy customer' means a		
customer who purchases energy for own use;		
(14) 'final electricity customer' means a		
customer who purchases electricity for own use;		
(15) 'support scheme' means, any instrument,		

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Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
scheme or mechanism applied by a Member		
State, or a group of Member States, that		
promotes the use of energy from renewable		
sources;		
(16) 'guarantee of origin' means an electronic		
document providing evidence to a final		
customer that a given share or quantity of		
energy was produced from renewable sources;		
(17) 'activities in the field of <u>crude</u> oil, gas,		
coal and refinery sectors' as defined by		
Regulation (EC) No 1893/2006 means any		
economic activity performed by an EU company		
or permanent establishment generating at least		
75_% of turnover in the field of the extraction,		
mining, refining of petroleum and/or		
manufacture of coke oven products;		

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Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
(18) 'EU company' means a company of a		
Member State which according to the tax laws		
of that Member State is considered to be		
resident in that Member State for tax purposes		
and, under the terms of a double taxation		
agreement concluded with a third State, is not		
considered to be resident for tax purposes		
outside the Union;		
(19) 'permanent establishment' means a fixed		
place of business situated in a Member State		
through which the business of a company of		
another State is wholly or partly carried on in so		
far as the profits of that place of business are		
subject to tax in the Member State in which it is		
situated by virtue of the relevant bilateral tax		
treaty or, in the absence of such a treaty, by		

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Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions Comments
virtue of national law;	
(20) 'surplus profits' means taxable profits.	
as determined under national tax rules in the	
fiscal year starting on or after 1 January	
2022, accrued from activities carried out at the	
level of companies or permanent establishments	
in the field of <u>crude</u> oil, gas, coal and refinery	
sector which are above a 20% increase of the	
average of the taxable profits of in the previous	
three fiscal tax years starting on or after 1	
<u>January 2019</u> ;	
(21) 'solidarity contribution' means a	
temporary measure intended to address surplus	
profits of EU companies and permanent	
establishments with activities in the field of	
<u>crude</u> oil, gas, coal and refinery sectors to	

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Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
mitigate exceptional price developments in the		
energy markets for Member States, consumers		
and companies:		
(22) 'surplus congestion income revenues'		
means the residual revenues that remain		
unused following the allocation of the		
congestion income revenues in accordance		
with the priority objectives set out in Article		
19(2) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943;		
(23) 'enacted equivalent national measure'		
means a legislative, regulatory or		
administrative measure adopted and		
published by a Member State by 31		
December 2022 which contributes to the		
affordability of energy.		

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Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions Comments	
CHAPTER II		
MEASURES CONCERNING THE		
ELECTRICITY MARKET		
Section 1		
Demand Reduction		
Article 3		
Reduction of gross electricity consumption		
Member States shall endeavour should seek to		
implement measures to reduce their total		
monthly gross electricity consumption by 10 %		
compared to the average of gross electricity		
consumption in the corresponding months of the		
reference period.		

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Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
Article 4		
Reduction of gross electricity consumption		
during peak price hours		
1. For every month, each Each Member		
State shall identify peak price-hours		
corresponding in total to a minimum of 10 % of		
all hours of the period between 1 December		
2022 and 31 March 2023 month.		
2. Each Member State shall reduce its gross	Each Member State shall endeavour to reduce	Latvia would like to ask for more flexibility to
electricity consumption during the identified	its gross electricity consumption during the	implement this measure.
peak price-hours. For every month, The the	identified peak price -hours with the aim of	
reduction achieved over the identified peak	achieving. For every month, The the reduction	
price hours shall reach at least 5 % on average	achieved over the identified peak price hours	
per hour. The reduction target shall be	shall reach hours of at least 5 % on average per	
calculated as the difference between the actual	hour. The This indicative reduction target shall	

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Drafting Suggestions Comments
be calculated as the difference between the
actual gross electricity consumption for the
identified peak price hours and the gross
electricity consumption forecasted by the
transmission system operators, without taking
into account the effect of the measures put in
place to reach the target set out in this Article.
Transmission system operators' forecasts
may include historical data of the reference
period.

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Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
transparent, proportionate, non-discriminatory		
and verifiable and shall, in particular:		
(a) be market-based, with compensation, where applicable relevant established through an open competitive process, including tenders in which successful bidders receive compensation;		
(b) only involve financial compensation when such compensation is paid for additional electricity not consumed compared to the expected consumption in the hour concerned without the tender;		
(c) not unduly distort competition or the proper functioning of the internal market in		
electricity;		

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		V
Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
(d) not be unduly limited to specific		
customers or customer groups, including		~
aggregators, in accordance with Article 17 of		
Directive (EU) 2019/944;		
(e) not unduly prevent the process of		
replacing fossil fuel technologies with		
technologies using electricity.		
Section 2		
Cap on market revenues and distribution of		
surplus revenues to final customers		
Article 6		
Mandatory cap on market revenues		
		1

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Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
Market revenues of producers obtained		
from the generation of electricity from the		
sources referred to in Article 7(1) shall be		
capped to a maximum of 180 EUR per MWh of		
electricity produced.		
2. Member States shall ensure that the cap		
targets all the market revenues of producers,		
regardless of the market timeframe in which the		
transaction takes place and of whether the		
electricity is traded bilaterally or in a centralised		
marketplace.		
3. Member States shall decide whether to		
apply the cap on revenues at the settlement of		
the exchange of energy or thereafter.		
4. Without prejudice to paragraph 1,		

Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
Member States may maintain or introduce		
measures that further limit the market revenues		
of producers, provided that these measures are		
proportionate and non-discriminatory, do not		
jeopardise investment signals, ensure that the		
investments costs are covered, do not distort the		
functioning of electricity wholesale markets,		
and are compatible with Union law.		
5. Subject to the requirements under		
Article 6(4), Member States may allow the		
regulatory authority to maintain or set a		
specific cap on the market revenues obtained		
from the sale of electricity produced from		
hard coal for producers who demonstrate to		
the regulatory authority their current		
levelised costs of energy exceed the maximum		
set in Article 6(1). The specific revenue cap		

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Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
shall allow for those costs and a reasonable		
profit margin to be covered. Such measures		
shall be designed so as not to affect the merit		
order and the price formation on the		
wholesale market.		
Article 7		We strongly support that this list should be kept
Application of the cap on market revenues to		as it is in REV1.
electricity producers		us te is in RD v 1.
cicententy producers		
1. The obligation in Article 6 shall apply to		
the market revenues obtained from the sale of		
electricity produced from the following sources:		
(a) wind energy;		
(b) solar energy (solar thermal and solar		
photovoltaic);		

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	Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
(c)	geothermal energy;		
(d)	hydropower without reservoir;		
(e)	biomass fuel (solid or gaseous biomass), excluding bio-methane;		
racis), excluding 010 memane,		
(f)	waste;		
(g)	nuclear energy;		
(h)	lignite;		
(i)	crude oil and other oil products:		
<u>(i)</u>	peat.		

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Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
2. The cap provided for in Article 6(1)		
shall not apply to sources where they set the		
generation system marginal cost,		
demonstration projects or to producers whose		
revenues per MWh of electricity produced are		
already capped as a result of State measures.		
3. Member States may, notably in cases	Member States may, notably in cases where the	20 kW to 20 MW – we suggest that the
where the application of the cap provided for in	application of the cap provided for in Article	threshold should be lifted in order to reduce
Article 6(1) leads to a significant administrative	6(1) leads to a significant administrative burden,	administrative burden.
burden, decide that the cap does not apply to	decide that the cap does not apply to producers	Additionally, we feel that introduction of
producers generating electricity with power-	generating electricity with power-generating	mandatory cap mentioned in Article 6 may
generating facilities with an installed capacity of	facilities with an installed capacity of maximum	cause significant administrative burden, while
maximum 20 kW. Member States may,	20 kW MW. Member States may, notably in	not providing sufficient positive results. We see
notably in cases where the application of the	cases where the application of the cap	that the issue of administrative burden is
cap provided for in Article 6(1) leads to a risk	provided for in Article 6(1) leads to a risk of	addressed in Article 7 point 3, but it does not
of increasing CO2 emissions and decreasing	increasing CO2 emissions and decreasing	solve all concerns that we have and some other
renewable energy generation, decide that the	renewable energy generation, decide that the	MS may share.

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Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
cap does not apply to electricity produced in	cap does not apply to electricity produced in	We see the necessity to balance the benefits of
hybrid plants which also use conventional	hybrid plants which also use conventional	the cap with the administrative burden that
energy sources.	energy sources.	is created.
	To avoid the excessive administrative burden,	Therefore we would like to address this issue by
	the obligation in Article 6 shall not apply to the	_
	member states, where the yearly amount of	adding the following text to the Article 7
	electricity produced from the sources listed in	point 3.
	Article 7 point 1 and excluding electricity	
	produced under specific circumstances	
	described in Article 7 points 2 and 3 is lower or	
	equal to 10% of overall electricity production in	
	the member state.	
4. <u>Member States may allow the</u>		
regulatory authority to set a specific revenue		
cap for producers producing from the		
sources listed in Article 7(1) who demonstrate		
to the regulatory authority that their current		

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Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions Comments
levelised costs of energy produced exceed the	
maximum set in Article 6(1). The specific	
revenue cap shall allow for those costs and a	
reasonable profit margin to be covered. Such	
measures shall be designed so as not to affect	
the merit order and the price formation on	
the wholesale market. The specific revenue	
cap shall also comply with the requirements	
set out in Article 6(4).	
5. <u>Producers and relevant market</u>	
participants shall provide to Members States	
all necessary data for the application of	
Article 6, including on the electricity	
produced and the related market revenues,	
regardless of the market timeframe in which	
the transaction takes place and of whether	
the electricity is traded bilaterally, within the	

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Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
same undertaking or in a centralised		
marketplace.		
Article 8		
Incentives for renewables power purchase		
agreements		
1. Within the framework of this		
Regulation, Member States shall swiftly remove		
any unjustified administrative or market barriers		
to renewables power purchase agreements. They		
shall take measures to accelerate the uptake of		
renewables power purchase agreements, in		
particular by small and medium-sized		
enterprises.		
2. Member States shall design, schedule		
and implement support schemes – and		

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Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
guarantees of origin in such a way that they		
are compatible with, complement and enable		
renewables power purchase agreements.		
Article 8a		
Surplus congestion income revenues resulting		
from allocation of cross-zonal capacity		
1. Member States may use the surplus		
congestion income revenues resulting from		
the allocation of cross-zonal capacity to		
finance measures in support of final		
electricity customers in accordance with		
<u>Article 9(2).</u>		
2. The use of the surplus congestion		
income revenues in accordance with		

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Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions Comments
paragraph 1 shall be subject to the approval	
by the regulatory authority.	
3. Member States shall notify the use of	
surplus congestion income revenues in	
accordance with paragraph 1 to the	
Commission within one month of the	
adoption of the relevant national measure.	
Article 9	
Distribution of the surplus revenues	
1. Member States shall ensure that all	
surplus revenues resulting from the application	
of the cap on market revenues are employed to	
finance measures in support of final electricity	
customers that mitigate the impact of high	
electricity prices on those customers, in a	

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Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
targeted manner.		
2. The measures referred to in paragraph 1		
shall be clearly defined, transparent,		
proportionate, non-discriminatory and verifiable		
and shall not counteract the reduction obligation		
of gross electricity consumption in Articles 3		
and 4.		
3. The measures referred to in paragraph 1		
may for example include:		
(a) granting a financial compensation to		
final electricity customers for reducing their		
electricity consumption, including through		
demand reduction auctions or tender schemes;		
,		
(b) direct transfers to final electricity		

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Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
customers;		
(c) compensation to suppliers who have to		
deliver electricity to customers below costs		
following a State intervention in price setting		
pursuant to Article 12;		
(d) lowering the electricity purchase costs of		
final electricity customers for a limited volume		
of the electricity consumed;		
(e) promoting investments by final		
electricity customers into decarbonisation		
technologies, renewables and energy efficiency		
investments.		
Article 10		
Agreements between Member States		

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Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
<u>1.</u> In situations where a Member State's net		
imports dependence of electricity are equal or		
higher than 100%, an agreement to share the		
surplus revenues <u>adequately</u> shall be concluded		
by 1 December 2022 between the importing		
Member State and the main exporting country.		
All Member States may, in a spirit of solidarity,		
conclude such agreements.		
2. The Commission shall assist Member		
States throughout the negotiation process,		
encourage and facilitate the exchange of best		
practices.		
Section 3		
Retail measures		

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Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
Article 11		
Temporary extension to small and medium-		
sized enterprises of public interventions in		
electricity price setting		
By way derogation from the EU rules on public		
interventions in price setting, Member States		
may apply public interventions in price setting		
for the supply of electricity to small and		
medium-sized enterprises. Such public		
interventions shall:		
interventions share.		
() 1 1: '4 14 000/ 04 1 0 0 : 1		
(a) be limited to 80% of the beneficiary's		
highest annual consumption over the last 5 years		
and retain an incentive for demand reduction;		
(b) comply with the conditions of Article		

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Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
5(4) and (7) of Directive (EU) 2019/944;		
(c) where relevant, comply with the		
conditions of Article 12 of this Regulation.		
Article 12		
Temporary possibility to set electricity prices		
below cost		
By way of derogation from the EU rules on		
public interventions in price setting, when		
applying public interventions in the price setting		
for the supply of electricity pursuant to Article		
5(6) of Directive (EU) 2019/944 or Article 11 of		
this Regulation, Member States may		
exceptionally and temporarily set a price for the		
supply of electricity which is below cost		
provided that all of the following conditions are		

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Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions Comments
fulfilled:	
(a) T the measure covers a limited amount of	
consumption and retains an incentive for	
demand reduction;	
(b) T there is no discrimination between	
suppliers;	
(c) <u>Ssuppliers are compensated for</u>	
supplying below cost;	
(d) Aall suppliers are eligible to provide	
offers at the regulated price on the same basis.	
CHAPTER III	
MEASURE CONCERNING THE <u>CRUDE</u>	

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Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
OIL, COAL, GAS AND REFINERY		
SECTOR <u>S</u> S		
Article 13		
Support to final customers through a mandatory		
temporary solidarity contribution		
1. Surplus profits generated from activities		
in the <u>crude</u> oil, gas, coal and refinery sector		
shall be subject to a temporary solidarity		
contribution unless Member States have		
enacted equivalent national measures.		
2. Member States shall ensure that		
enacted equivalent existing or planned national		
measures share sharing similar objectives and		
are subject to equivalent rules as the		
temporary solidarity contribution under this		

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Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
Regulation comply with or complement the		
rules governing the temporary solidarity		
contribution set by this Regulation and		
generate proceeds at least equal to the		
estimated proceeds from the solidarity		
contribution.		
3. The Member States shall adopt and		
publish measures implementing the		
mandatory temporary solidarity contribution		
referred to in paragraph 1 by shall apply from		
31 December 2022 at the latest.		
Article 14		
Base for calculating the temporary solidarity		
contribution		
The temporary solidarity contribution for EU		

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Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
companies and permanent establishments.		
including those that are part of a		
consolidated group merely for tax purposes,		
performing activities in the field of crude oil,		
gas, coal and refinery sectors shall be calculated		
on the taxable profits, as determined under		
national tax rules in the fiscal year starting on or		
after 1 January 2022, which are above a 20%		
increase of the average of the taxable profits, as		
determined under national tax rules, of in the		
three fiscal years starting on or after 1 January		
2019. If the average of the taxable profits		
annual result from the period covering the in		
those three fiscal years starting on or after 1		
January 2019-is negative, the average taxable		
profits shall be zero for the purpose of		
calculating the temporary solidarity		
contribution.		

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Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
Article 15		
Rate for calculating the temporary solidarity		
contribution		
1. The rate applicable for calculating the		
temporary solidarity contribution shall be at		
least 33_% of the base referred to in Article 14.		
least 33_% of the base referred to in Africie 14.		
2. The temporary solidarity contribution		
shall apply in addition to the regular taxes and		
levies applicable according to the national		
legislation of a Member State.		
Article 16		
Use of proceeds from the temporary solidarity		
contribution		

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Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
Member States shall use the proceeds		
from the temporary solidarity contribution with		
sufficiently timely impact for the following		
purposes:		
(a) financial support massures to final		
(a) financial support measures to final		
energy customers, and notably vulnerable		
households, to mitigate the effects of high		
energy prices, in a targeted manner;		
(b) financial support measures to help		
reducing the energy consumption such as		
through demand reduction auctions or tender		
schemes, lowering the energy purchase costs of		
final energy customers for certain volumes of		
consumption, promoting investments by final		
energy customers into renewables, structural		
energy efficiency investments or other		

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Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
decarbonisation technologies;		
(c) financial support measures to support		
companies in energy intensive industries		
provided that they are made conditional upon		
investments into renewable energies, energy		
efficiency or other decarbonisation		
technologies.		
(d) financial support measures to develop		
the energy autonomy in particular investments		
in line with REPowerEU objectives notably		
projects with a cross-border dimension.		
(e) in a spirit of solidarity, between Member		
States, assignment by Member States of a share		
of the proceeds of the temporary solidarity		
contribution to the common financing of		

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Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
measures to reduce the harmful effects of the		»
energy crisis including support for protecting		
employment and the re- and upskilling of the		
workforce or to promote investments in energy		
efficiency and renewable energy including in		
cross-border projects and the Union renewable		
energy financing mechanism provided for		
Article 33 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 of		
the European Parliament and of the Council		
1.		
2. The measures referred to in paragraph 1		
shall be clearly defined, transparent,		
proportionate, non-discriminatory and		

Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on the Governance of the Energy Union and Climate Action, amending Regulations (EC) No 663/2009 and (EC) No 715/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council, Directives 94/22/EC, 98/70/EC, 2009/31/EC, 2009/73/EC, 2010/31/EU, 2012/27/EU and 2013/30/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, Council Directives 2009/119/EC and (EU) 2015/652 and repealing Regulation (EU) No 525/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

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Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
verifiable.		
Article 17		
Temporary nature of the solidarity contribution		
The temporary solidarity contribution applied		
by Member States in accordance with this		
Regulation shall be of a temporary nature. It		
shall only apply to surplus profits generated in		
the fiscal year that started on or after 1 January		
2022.		
CHAPTER IV		
FINAL PROVISIONS		
Article 18		
Monitoring and enforcement		

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Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
1. The competent authority of each		
Member State shall monitor the implementation		~
of the measures referred to in Articles 3, 4, 5, 6,		
7, 9, 11 and 12 on its territory.		
2. As soon as possible after the entry into		
1		
force of this Regulation and at the latest by 1		
December 2022, Member States shall report to		
the Commission the planned measures required		
pursuant to Article 5 and the agreements		
concluded pursuant to Article 10.		
3. By 15 January 2023 and every month		
thereafter until-15 April 2023, Member States		
shall report to the Commission on:		
(a) the demand reduction achieved pursuant		

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Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions Comments	
to Articles 3 and 4 and the measures put in place		
to achieve the reduction pursuant to Article 5;		
(b) the surplus revenues generated pursuant		
to Article 6 <u>.</u> ;		
3a. By 15 of January 2023 and every		
month thereafter until April 2023, Member		
States shall report to the Commission on:		
(<u>ae</u>) the measures concerning the distribution		
of the surplus revenues applied to mitigate the		
impact of high electricity prices on final		
customers pursuant to Article 9;		
(<u>b</u> d) any public interventions in price setting		
for electricity referred to in Articles 11 and 12.;		

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Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions Comments
4. Member States shall report to the	
Commission on:	
(a) the introduction of the temporary	
solidarity contribution pursuant to Article 13 by	
31 December 15 October 2022;	
(b) any subsequent amendments to <u>the</u>	
national legal framework said measure within	
one month of the publication in the national	
official journal;	
(c) on the use of the proceeds pursuant to	
Article 16 within one month from of the	
moment the proceeds have been collected by	
Member States in accordance with national law:	
(d) enacted equivalent national measures	

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Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
referred to in Article 13 by 31 December		
2022. Member States shall also provide an		
assessment of the amount of proceeds		
generated by those national measures and on		
the use of those proceeds within one month of		
the moment the proceeds have been collected		
by Member States in accordance with		
national law.		
Article 19		
Review		
1. By 28 February 2023, the Commission		
shall carry out a review of Chapter II in view of		
the general situation of electricity supply and		
electricity prices in the Union and present a		
report on the main findings of that review to the		
Council. Based on that report, the Commission		

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Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
may in particular propose, in case this is		
justified by the economic circumstances or the		
functioning of the electricity market in the		
Union and individual Member States, to prolong		
the period of application of this Regulation, to		
amend the level of the revenue cap in Article 6		
(1) and its application to the sources of		
electricity generation referred to in Article		
7(1) to which it applies producers in Article 7,		
or otherwise amend Chapter II.		
2. By 15 October 2023, the Commission		
shall carry out a review of Chapter III in view of		
the general situation of the fossil fuel sector and		
surplus profits generated and present a report on		
the main findings of that review to the Council.		
Article 20		

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Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
Entry into force and application		
1. This Regulation shall enter into force on		
the day following that of its publication in the		
Official Journal of the European Union.		
2. Without prejudice to the need obligation		
to ensure the distribution of surplus revenues in		
accordance with Article 9, and to use proceeds		
from the temporary solidarity contribution in		
accordance with Article 16, this Regulation		
shall apply for a period of one year from its		
entry into force.		
Articles 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10 shall apply as of 1		
December 2022. This shall be without prejudice		
to an earlier voluntary application by Member		
States.		

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Presidency compromise text	Drafting Suggestions	Comments
Articles 3, 4, 6, 7, shall apply until 31 March		
2023.		
This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety		
and directly applicable in the Member States in		
accordance with the Treaties.		
Done at Brussels,		
For the Council		
The President		
	End	End