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WORKING DOCUMENT

| From: To: | Presidency Working Party on Trade Questions |
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| Subject: | ACI - 5-column document with SE Presidency Assessment for 27 January |

Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on the protection of the Union and its Member States from economic coercion by third countries 2021/0406(COD)

DRAFT [Version technical meeting on 26 January 2023]

| | | Commission Proposal | EP Mandate | Council Mandate | PRES ASSESSMENT | COM COMPROMISE 9/1 (markups as compared to Council mandate) |
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| G | 1 | 2021/0406 (COD) | 2021/0406 (COD) | 2021/0406 (COD) | | 2021/0406 (COD) |
| G | 2 | Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on the protection of the Union and its Member States from economic coercion by third countries | Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on the protection of the Union and its Member States from economic coercion by third countries | Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on the protection of the Union and its Member States from economic coercion by third countries | | Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on the protection of the Union and its Member States from economic coercion by third countries |
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| G | 3 | THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, | THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, | THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, | | THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, |

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| G | 4 | Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 207(2) thereof, | Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 207(2) thereof, | Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 207(2) thereof, | | Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 207(2) thereof, |
| G | 5 | Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission, | Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission, | Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission, | | Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission, |
| G | 6 | After transmission of the draft legislative act to the national parliaments, | After transmission of the draft legislative act to the national parliaments, | After transmission of the draft legislative act to the national parliaments, | | After transmission of the draft legislative act to the national parliaments, |
| G | 7 | Acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, | Acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, | Acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, | | Acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, |
| G | 8 | Whereas: | Whereas: | Whereas: | | Whereas: |

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| G | 9 | (1) Pursuant to Article 3(5) of the Treaty on European Union, in its relations with the wider world, the Union is to uphold and promote its values and interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens and, among other things, to solidarity and mutual respect among peoples and the strict observance and the development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter. | (1) Pursuant to Article 3(5) of the Treaty on European Union, in its relations with the wider world, the Union is to uphold and promote its values and interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens and, among other things, to solidarity and mutual respect among peoples and the strict observance and the development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter. | (1) Pursuant to Article 3(5) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in its relations with the wider world, the Union is to uphold and promote its values and interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens and is to contribute, among other things, to solidarity and mutual respect among peoples and the strict observance and the development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter (the "UN Charter"). | | (1) Pursuant to Article 3(5) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in its relations with the wider world, the Union is to uphold and promote its values and interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens and is to contribute, among other things, to solidarity and mutual respect among peoples and the strict observance and the development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter (the "UN Charter"). |
| | | | | | | |
| G | 10 | (2) Pursuant to Article 21(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the Union's action on the international scene is to be guided by | (2) Pursuant to Article 21(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the Union's action on the international scene is to be guided by principles such as the rule of law, equality | (2) Pursuant to Article 21(1) of the Treaty on European UnionTEU, the Union's action on the international scene is to be guided by principles such as the rule of law, equality and solidarity, | | (2) Pursuant to Article 21(1) TEU, the Union's action on the international scene is to be guided by principles such as the rule of law, equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the UN Charter and international law. It also states that the Union is to promote |

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| | principles such as the rule of law, equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law. It also states that the Union is to promote multilateral solutions to common problems. | and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law. It also states that the Union is to promote multilateral solutions to common problems. | and respect for the principles of the United Nations UN Charter and international law. It also states that the Union is to promote multilateral solutions to common problems. | | multilateral solutions to common problems. |
| 11 | (3) Pursuant to Article 1 of the United Nations Charter, the purposes of the United Nations include the purpose to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights. | (3) Pursuant to Article 1 of the United Nations Charter, the purposes of the United Nations include the purpose to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights. Moreover, in accordance with the Declaration On Principles Of International Law Friendly Relations And Co-Operation Among States in accordance with the Charter Of The United Nations, international relations are to be conducted in line with the principles of sovereign | (3) Pursuant to Article 1 of the United Nations UN Charter, one of the purposes of the United Nations include the purposeis to develop friendly relations among nations based on, among other things, respect for the principle of equal rights. | SE PRES agrees (Council mandate) | (3) Pursuant to Article 1 of the UN Charter, one of the purposes of the United Nations is to develop friendly relations among nations based on, among other things, respect for the principle of equal rights. |

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| | | | equality and non- intervention ^{1a} . Ia UN General Assembly, Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1970, A/RES/2625(XXV) | | | |
| | | | | | | |
| G | 12 | (4) Article 21(2) of the Treaty on European Union requires the Union to define and pursue common policies and actions, and work for a high degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations, among other things in order to safeguard its values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity, consolidate and support the rule of law, and the principles of international law. | (4) Article 21(2) of the Treaty on European Union requires the Union to define and pursue common policies and actions, and work for a high degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations, among other things in order to safeguard its values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity, consolidate and support the rule of law, and the principles of international law. | (4) Article 21(2) of the Treaty on European UnionTEU requires the Union to define and pursue common policies and actions, and work for a high degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations in order to, among other things in order to, safeguard its values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity, consolidate and support the rule of law, and the principles of international law. | | (4) Article 21(2) TEU requires the Union to define and pursue common policies and actions, and work for a high degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations in order to, among other things, safeguard its values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity, consolidate and support the rule of law, and the principles of international law. |

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| 12a | La fo will construct the construction of the c | The international wo of state responsibility or internationally rongful acts has been odified by the United ations' International aw Commission in 2001 ^{1a} and should guide the finion's action where the finion faces economic overcion from a third ountry that constitutes an aternationally wrongful act. The "Declaration on rinciples of International aw concerning Friendly elations and Coperation among States in accordance with the harter of the United ations" states that no tate may use or accourage the use of accourage of any kind. The accourage of any kind. The accourage of any kind. The accourage of any kind. | | | [(4a) The Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, states that international relations are to be conducted in line with the principles of sovereign equality and non-intervention. This Declaration also provides, in relation to the principle concerning the duty not to intervene in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any State, that no State may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any other type of measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights and to secure from it advantages of any kind. This reflects customary international law and is thus binding in the relations between third countries and the Union and its Member States. Rules of customary international law of state responsibility for internationally wrongful acts are reflected in the United Nations' International Law Commission's Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts and are binding in the relations between third countries and the Union and its Member |

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| | | customary international law are binding. Internationally Wrongful Acts, adopted by the United Nations' International Law Commission at its fifty-third session, in 2001, and taken note of by the United Nations General Assembly in resolution 56/83. Ib United Nations General Assembly in General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV) of 24 Oct 1970. | | | Ta UN General Assembly, Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1970, A/RES/2625(XXV). The Adopted by the United Nations' International Law Commission at its fifty-third session, in 2001, and taken note of by the United Nations General Assembly in Resolution 56/83. |
| 13 | (5) The modern interconnected world economy creates an increased risk of, and opportunity for, economic coercion, as it provides countries with enhanced, including hybrid, means to deploy such coercion. It is desirable that the Union contribute to the creation, development and | (5) The modern interconnected world economy creates an increased risk of, and opportunity for, economic coercion, as it provides countries with enhanced, including hybrid, means to deploy such coercion. It is desirable that the Union contribute to the creation, development and clarification of international frameworks for the prevention and | (5) The modern interconnected world economy ereates an increasedincreases the risk of, and opportunity for, economic coercion, as it provides countries with enhanced, including hybrid, means to deploy such coercion. It is desirable that the Union contribute to the creation, development and clarification of international frameworks for the prevention and elimination of | | (5) The modern interconnected world economy increases the risk of economic coercion, as it provides countries with enhanced, including hybrid, means to deploy such coercion. It is desirable that the Union contribute to the creation, development and clarification of international frameworks for the prevention and elimination of situations of economic coercion. |

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| | clarification of international frameworks for the prevention and elimination of situations of economic coercion. | elimination of situations of economic coercion. | situations of economic coercion. | | |
| | | | | | |
| 14 | (6) Whilst always acting within the framework of international law, it is essential that the Union possess an appropriate instrument to deter and counteract economic coercion by third countries in order to safeguard its rights and interests and those of its Member States. This is particularly the case where third countries take measures affecting trade or investment that interfere in the legitimate sovereign choices of the Union or a Member State by | (6) Whilst always acting within the framework of international law, it is essential that the Union possess an appropriate instrument to deter and counteract economic coercion by third countries in order to safeguard its rights and interests and those of its Member States. This is particularly the case where third countries take, fail to take or threaten to take measures affecting trade or investment that interfere in the legitimate sovereign choices of the Union or a Member State by seeking to prevent or obtain the cessation, modification or adoption of a particular act, including | within the framework of international law, it is essential that the Union possess an appropriate instrument to deter and counteract economic coercion by third countries in order to safeguard its rights and interests and those of its Member States. This is particularly the case where third countries take measures affecting trade or investment that interfere in the legitimate sovereign choices of the Union or a Member State by seeking to prevent or obtain the cessation, modification or adoption of a particular act by the Union or a Member State. Such measures affecting trade or investment | | (6) Whilst always acting within the framework of international law, it is essential that the Union possess an appropriate instrument to deter and counteract economic coercion by third countries in order to safeguard its rights and interests and those of its Member States. This is particularly the case where third countries take measures affecting trade or investment that interfere in the legitimate sovereign choices of the Union or a Member State by seeking to prevent or obtain the cessation, modification or adoption of a particular act by the Union or a Member State, including an expression of a position by an institution or body of the Union or a Member. Such measures affecting trade or investment may include not only actions taken on, and having effects within, the territory of the third country concerned, but also actions taken by the third country, including through entities |
| | seeking to prevent or obtain the cessation, | any form of a particular policy choice or a stance | may include not only actions taken on, and having effects | | controlled or directed by the third country and present in the Union, that cause harm |

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| | modification or adoption of a particular act by the Union or a Member State. Such measures affecting trade or investment may include not only actions taken on, and having effects within, the territory of the third country, but also actions taken by the third country, including through entities controlled or directed by the third country and present in the Union, that cause harm to economic activities in the Union. | with regard to a policy choice such as European Parliament resolutions, by the Union or a Member State. Such measures affecting trade or investment may include not only actions taken, failures to act, or actions threatened or to be taken on, and having effects within, the territory of the third country, but also actions taken or threatened to be taken by the third country, including through entities controlled or directed by the third country and present in the Union, that cause harm to economic activities in the Union, such as, among others, some extraterritorial effects of third country sanctions affecting EU businesses and individuals, and ultimately the sovereignty of the European Union's choices. | within, the territory of the third country concerned, but also actions taken by the third country, including through entities controlled or directed by the third country and present in the Union, that cause harm to economic activities in the Union. | | to economic activities in the Union. The terms "third country" should be understood to include not only a foreign State, but also a separate customs territory or other subject of international law because these entities are capable of economic coercion. The utilisation of these terms and the application of this Regulation does not have any implication regarding sovereignty. This Regulation should also be applied in conformity with the Union's position in relation to the third country concerned. |
| | | | | | |
| 15 | (7) This Regulation aims to ensure an | (7) This Regulation aims to ensure an effective, | (7) This Regulation aims to ensure an effective, efficient | SE PRES proposes to agree. | (7) This Regulation aims to ensure an effective, efficient and swift Union |

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| | effective, efficient and swift Union response to economic coercion, including deterrence of economic coercion of the Union or a Member State and, in the last resort, countermeasures. | efficient and swift Union response to economic coercion; including especially the deterrence of economic coercion of the Union or a Member State and, in the last resortwhere necessary because other instruments cannot protect the Union interest adequately, countermeasures. This Regulation complements Union law in the field of trade such as Regulation (EU)2021/167 of the European Parliament and of the Council Regulation (EC) No 2271/96 of 22 November 1996 protecting against the effects of the extra-territorial application of legislation adopted by a third country, and actions based thereon or resulting therefrom, OJ L 309,29.11.1996, p. 1. | and swift Union response to economic coercion, including deterrence of economic coercion of the Union or a Member State and, in theas a last resort, countermeasures. This Regulation is without prejudice to other existing Union instruments and international agreements, as well as actions taken thereunder, in the area of the common commercial policy, and to other Union policies. | | response to economic coercion, includingespecially the deterrence of economic coercion of the Union or a Member State and, as a last resort, countermeasures. This Regulation is without prejudice to other existing Union instruments and international agreements, as well as actions taken thereunder, in the area of the common commercial policy, and to other Union policies. |
| 15a | | | (7bis) Economic coercion by third countries may target foreign policy actions | SE PRES proposes to agree (Council mandate). | (7bis 7a) Economic coercion by third countries maytarget foreign policy actions of the Union or a Member State, |

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| | | | of the Union or a Member State, while a determination of the existence of economic coercion, and responses thereto, may have significant implications for relations with third countries. It is necessary to ensure consistent responses in distinct but related policy areas, and this Regulation is without prejudice to a possible Union action pursuant to specific provisions in Chapter 2 of Title V of TEU on the Union's common foreign and security policy, to which due consideration should be given when considering any response to economic coercion by a third country. | | while a determination of the existence of economic coercion, and responses thereto, may have significant implications for relations with third countries. It is necessary to ensure consistent responses in distinct but related policy areas, and this Regulation is without prejudice to a possible Union action pursuant to specific provisions in Chapter 2 of Title V of TEU on the Union's common foreign and security policy, to which due consideration should be given when considering any response to economic coercion by a third country. |
| 16 | (8) The objectives of this Regulation, in particular counteracting third countries' economic coercion of the Union or a Member State, cannot be sufficiently achieved by Member | (8) The objectives of this Regulation, in particular counteracting third countries' economic coercion of the Union or a Member State, cannot be sufficiently achieved by Member States acting on their own. This is because | (8) The objectives of this Regulation, in particular counteracting-Third countries' economic coercion of the Union ormeasures of economic coercion against a Member State, cannot be sufficiently achieved by Member States acting on | SE PRES proposes to agree. | (8) Third countries' measures of economic coercion against a Member State affect the Union's internal market and the Union as a whole. Member States, acting on their own cannot counteract third countries' economic coercion through measures falling under the area of common commercial policy. Given the exclusive competence conferred on the |

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| States acting on their own. This is because Member States as distinct actors under international law may not be entitled under international law to respond to economic coercion directed against the Union. Additionally, because of the exclusive competence conferred on the Union by Article 207 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Member States are prevented from taking common commercial policy measures as a response to economic coercion. Therefore, those objectives can be achieved with greater effectiveness at Union level. | Member States as distinct actors under international law may not be entitled under international law to respond to economic coercion directed against the Union. Additionally, because of the exclusive competence conferred on the Union by Article 207 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Member States are prevented from taking common commercial policy measures as a response to economic coercion. Therefore, those objectives can be achieved with greater effectiveness at it is necessary that the means for effectively achieving those objectives are created at the Union level. | their own. This is because affect the Union's internal market and the Union as a whole. Member States, acting on their own cannot counteract third countries' economic coercion through measures falling under the area of common commercial policy. Given—as distinct actors under international law may not be entitled under international law to respond to economic coercion directed against the Union. Additionally, because of the exclusive competence conferred on the Union by Article 207 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), only the Union may. Moreover, Member States are prevented from taking common commercial policy measures as a response to as distinct actors under international law, may not be entitled to counteract third countries economic coercion directed against the Union. This Regulation is without prejudice to the division of competences as defined in the Treaties—Therefore, those objectives | | Union by Article 207 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), only the Union may. Moreover, Member States as distinct actors under international law, may not be entitled to counteract third countries economic coercion directed against the Union. Therefore, it is necessary that the means for effectively achieving those objectives are created at the Union level. This Regulation is without prejudice to the division of competences as defined in the Treaties. |

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| | | ean be achieved with greater effectiveness at Union level. | | |
| (9) In accordance with the principle of proportionality, it is necessary and appropriate, for creating an effective and comprehensive framework for Union action against economic coercion, to lay down rules on the examination, determination and counteraction with regard to third countries' measures of economic coercion. In particular, the Union's response measures should be preceded by an examination of the facts, a determination of the existence of economic coercion, and, wherever possible, efforts to find a solution in cooperation with the | (9) In accordance with the principle of proportionality, it is necessary and appropriate, for creating an effective and comprehensive framework for Union action against economic coercion, to lay down rules on the examination, determination and counteraction with regard to third countries' measures of economic coercion. In particular, the Union's response measures should be preceded by an examination of the facts, a determination of the existence of economic coercion, and, wherever possible and provided the third country also engages in good faith, efforts to find a solution in cooperation with the third country concerned. Any measures imposed by the | (9) In accordance with the principle of proportionality, it is necessary and appropriate, for creating an effective and comprehensive framework for Union action against economic coercion, to lay down rules on the examination, determination and counteraction with regard to third countries' measures of economic coercion. In particular, the Union's response measures should be preceded by an examination of the facts, a determination of the existence of economic coercion, and, wherever possible, efforts to find a solution in cooperation with the third country concerned. Any measures imposed by the Union should be commensurate with the injury caused by the third countries' measures of economic coercion. The criteria for defining the Union response | | (9) In accordance with the principle of proportionality, it is necessary and appropriate, for creating an effective and comprehensive framework for Union action against economic coercion, to lay down rules on the examination, determination and counteraction with regard to third countries' measures of economic coercion. In particular, the Union's response measures should be preceded by an examination of the facts, a determination of the existence of economic coercion, and, wherever possible and provided the third country also engages in good faith, efforts to find a solution in cooperation with the third country concerned. Any measures imposed by the Union should be commensurate with the injury caused by the third countries' measures of economic coercion and should primarily be aimed at obtaining the cessation of the economic coercion and, where appropriate, the reparation for the injury caused. The criteria for defining the Union response measures should take into account in particular the effectiveness of the response measures in inducing the cessation of the economic coercion and |
| Virgo affaell e o or o e irra saffaelt | with the principle of proportionality, it is necessary and appropriate, for creating an effective and comprehensive framework for Union action against economic coercion, to ay down rules on the examination, determination and counteraction with regard to third countries' measures of economic coercion. In particular, the Union's response measures should be preceded by an examination of the facts, a determination of the existence of economic coercion, and, wherever cossible, efforts to find a solution in | with the principle of proportionality, it is necessary and appropriate, for creating an effective and comprehensive framework for Union action against economic coercion, to ay down rules on the examination, determination and counteraction with regard to third countries' measures of economic coercion. In particular, the Union's response measures should be preceded by an examination of the existence of economic coercion, and, wherever cossible, efforts to find a solution in cooperation with the hird country principle of proportionality, it is necessary and appropriate, for creating an effective and comprehensive framework for Union action against economic coercion, to lay down rules on the examination, determination and counteraction with regard to third countries' measures of economic coercion. In particular, the Union's response measures should be preceded by an examination of the facts, a determination of the existence of economic coercion, and, wherever possible and provided the third country also engages in good faith, efforts to find a solution in cooperation with the third country principle of proportionality, it is necessary and appropriate, for creating an effective and comprehensive framework for Union action against economic coercion, to lay down rules on the examination, determination and counteraction with regard to third countries' measures of economic coercion. In particular, the Union's response measures should be preceded by an examination of the facts, a determination of the existence of economic coercion, and, wherever possible and provided the third country also engages in good faith, efforts to find a solution in cooperation with the third country concerned. Any measures imposed by the Union should be | 9) In accordance with the principle of proportionality, it is necessary and appropriate, for creating an effective and comprehensive framework for Union action against economic coercion, to ay down rules on the examination, determination and counteraction with regard to third countries' measures of economic coercion. In particular, the Union's response measures should be preceded by an examination of the acts, a determination of the examination of the existence of economic coercion, and, wherever possible and provided the third country also engages in good faith, efforts to find a solution in cooperation with the third country (9) In accordance with the principle of proportionality, it is necessary and appropriate, for creating an effective and comprehensive framework for Union action against economic coercion, to lay down rules on the examination and counteraction with regard to third countries' measures of economic coercion. In particular, the Union's response measures should be preceded by an examination of the existence of economic coercion, and, wherever possible and provided the third country also engages in good faith, efforts to find a solution in cooperation with the third country concerned. Any measures imposed by the Union should be union response measures should take into | 9) In accordance with the principle of proportionality, it is necessary and appropriate, for creating an effective and comprehensive framework for Union action against economic coercion, to lay down rules on the examination, determination and counteraction with regard to third countries' measures of economic coercion. In particular, the Union's response measures should be preceded by an examination of the facts, a determination of the existence of economic coercion, and, wherever possible, efforts to find a solution in cooperation with the third country (9) In accordance with the principle of proportionality, it is necessary and appropriate, for creating an effective and comprehensive framework for Union action against economic coercion, to lay down rules on the examination, determination and counteraction with regard to third countries' measures of economic coercion. In particular, the Union's response measures should be preceded by an examination of the facts, a determination of the existence of economic coercion, and, wherever possible, efforts to find a solution in cooperation with the initro country concerned. Any measures imposed by the Union should be commensurate with the injury encaused by the third countries' measures of economic coercion. The criteria for defining the Union response measures should take into |

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| t t c c t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t | measures imposed by the Union should be commensurate with the injury caused by the third countries' measures of economic coercion. The criteria for defining the Union response measures should take into account in particular the need to avoid or minimise collateral effects, administrative burdens and costs imposed on Union economic operators as well as the Union's interest. Therefore, this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve the objectives pursued, in accordance with Article 5(4) of the Treaty on European Union. | injury caused by the third countries' measures of economic coercion and should primarily be aimed at obtaining the cessation of the economic coercion and, where appropriate, the reparation for the injury caused. The criteria for defining the Union response measures should take into account in particular the effectiveness of the measures in inducing the cessation of the economic coercion and the potential of the measures to provide relief to the economic operators within the Union affected by the economic coercion, including via internal measures such as an ad hoc compensation fund for those economic operators. The need for a precise indication of the next steps to be taken and need to avoid or minimise the risks of escalation in international trade relations, collateral effects, disproportionate administrative burdens complexity and costs imposed on Union | to avoid or minimise collateral effects, administrative burdens and costs imposed on Union economic operators as well as the Union's interest. Therefore, this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve the objectives pursued, in accordance with Article 5(4) of the Treaty on European UnionTEU. | | effects, disproportionate administrative complexity and burdens and costs imposed on Union economic operators as well as the Union's interest. Therefore, this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve the objectives pursued, in accordance with Article 5(4) TEU. |

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| | | economic operators as well as the Union's interest should also be taken into account. Therefore, this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve the objectives pursued, in accordance with Article 5(4) of the Treaty on European Union. | | | |
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| 18 | (10) Any action undertaken by the Union on the basis of this Regulation should comply with the Union's obligations under international law. International law allows, under certain conditions, such as proportionality and prior notice, the imposition of countermeasures, that is to say of measures that would otherwise be contrary to the international obligations of an injured party vis-à-vis the country | (10) Any action undertaken by the Union on the basis of this Regulation should comply with the Union's obligations under international law. The Union should continue to support the rules-based multilateral trading system, with the World Trade Organisation (WTO) at its core. International law allows, under certain conditions, such as proportionality and prior notice, the imposition of countermeasures, that is to say of measures that would otherwise be contrary to the | (10) Any action undertaken by the Union on the basis of this Regulation should comply with the Union's obligations underbe consistent with international law, including customary international law. International law allows, under certain conditions, such as proportionality and prior notice, the imposition of countermeasures, that is to say of measures that would otherwise be contrary to the international obligations of an injured party vis à vis the country responsible for a breach of international law, and that are aimed at obtaining the cessation of the | SE pres agrees (Council Mandate) | (10) Any action undertaken by the Union on the basis of this Regulation should be consistent with international law, including customary international law. Among the international agreements concluded by the Union and the Member States, the Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO) is the cornerstone of the rules-based multilateral trading system. Therefore, it is important that the Union continue to support that system, with the WTO at its core, and to use its dispute settlement system where appropriate. |

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| responsible for a | international obligations of | breach or reparation for it. ¹ | | |
| breach of international | an injured party vis-à-vis | Accordingly, response | | |
| law, and that are | the country responsible for | measures adopted under this | | |
| aimed at obtaining the | a breach of international | Regulation should take the | | |
| cessation of the | law, and that are aimed at | form of either measures | | |
| breach or reparation | obtaining the cessation of | adhering to the Union's | | |
| for it.1 Accordingly, | the breach or reparation for | international obligations or | | |
| response measures | it. ⁴¹⁰ Accordingly, response | measures constituting | | |
| adopted under this | measures adopted under | permitted countermeasures. | | |
| Regulation should | this Regulation should take | Under international law, and | ~ | |
| take the form of either | the form of either measures | in accordance with the | | |
| measures adhering to | adhering to the Union's | principle of proportionality, | | |
| the Union's | international obligations or | they should not exceed a | | |
| international | measures constituting | level that is commensurate | | |
| obligations or | permitted countermeasures. | with the injury suffered by | | |
| measures constituting | Under international law, | Among the international | | |
| permitted | and in accordance with the | agreements concluded by | | |
| countermeasures. | principle of | the Union and the Member | | |
| Under international | proportionality, they | States, the Agreement | | |
| law, and in | should not exceed a level | establishing the World | | |
| accordance with the | that is be commensurate | Trade Organization (WTO) | | |
| principle of | with the injury suffered by | is the cornerstone of the | | |
| proportionality, they | the Union or a Member | rules-based multilateral | | |
| should not exceed a | State due to the third | trading system. Therefore, | | |
| level that is | country's measures of | it is important that the | | |
| commensurate with | economic coercion, taking | Union or a Member State due | | |
| the injury suffered by | into account the gravity of | to the third country's | | |
| the Union or a | the third country's | measures of economic | | |
| Member State due to | measures and the Union's | coercion, taking into account | | |
| the third country's | rights and interests in | the gravity of the third | | |
| measures of economic | question. In this respect, | country's measures and the | | |
| coercion, taking into | injury to the Union or a | Union's rights and interests | | |
| account the gravity of | Member State is | in question. In this respect, | | |
| the third country's | understood under | injury to the Union or a | | |
| measures and the | international law to include | Member State is understood | | |
| Union's rights and | injury to Union economic | under international law to | | |

| | | Commission Proposal | EP Mandate | Council Mandate | PRES ASSESSMENT | COM COMPROMISE 9/1 (markups as compared to Council mandate) |
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| | | interests in question. In this respect, injury to the Union or a Member State is understood under international law to include injury to Union economic operators. 1. See Articles 22 and 49-53 of the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, adopted by the United Nations' International Law Commission at its fifty-third session, in 2001, and taken note of by the United Nations General Assembly in resolution 56/83. | operators. 10 See Articles 22 and 49-53 of the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, adopted by the United Nations' International Law Commission at its fifty-third session, in 2001, and taken note of by the United Nations General Assembly in resolution 56/83. 1. See Articles 22 and 49-53 of the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, adopted by the United Nations' International Law Commission at its fifty third session, in 2001, and taken note of by the United Nations General Assembly in resolution 56/83. | include injury to Union economic operatorscontinue to support that system, with the WTO at its core, and to use its dispute settlement system where appropriate. 1. See Articles 22 and 49-53 of the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, adopted by the United Nations' International Law Commission at its fifty third session, in 2001, and taken note of by the United Nations General Assembly in resolution 56/83. | | |
| | | | | | | |
| 1 | 8a | | | (10bis) Customary international law, as reflected in Articles 22 and 49 to 53 of the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts ("ARSIWA"), adopted by the United Nations' | | (10bis) Customary international law, as reflected in Articles 22 and 49 to 53 of the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (""ARSIWA""), adopted by the United Nations' International Law Commission at its fifty-third session in 2001 and taken note of by the United Nations General |

| International Law Commission at its fifty- third session in 2001 and taken note of by the United Nations General Assembly in resolution 56/83, allows, under certain conditions, such as proportionality and prior notice, the imposition of countermeasures, that is Assembly in Resolution under certain conditions proportionality and prior imposition of counterme say of measures that wo contrary to the internation an injured party vis-à-vi responsible for a breach law, and that are aimed a cessation of the breach of | ncil mandate) |
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| to say of measures that would otherwise be contrary to the international obligations of an injured party vis-à-vis the country responsible for a breach of international law, and that are aimed at obtaining the cessation of the breach or reparation for it. Accordingly, Union response measures could consist, as necessary, not only in measures consistent with the Union's international obligations, but also in the non- performance of international obligations towards the third country concerned insofar as the measures of economic coercion of the third country is measures cordinality, Union ron- international obligation to concerned insofar as the commensurate with of the commensurate with of the third country's measures coercion, taking into acc of the third country concerned insofar as the measures of economic coercion of the third country constitute an internationally wrongful act. Under international | in 56/83, allows, is, such as or notice, the heasures, that is to could otherwise be ional obligations of the country in of international at obtaining the or reparation for it. Sponse measures sary, not only in the Union's is, but also in the ternational at third country in the third country in the third country in ally wrongful act. It is the injury suffered in the injury suffered in the sures of economic in the gravity in the injury suffered in the country in the injury suffered in the sures of economic in the injury suffered in the injury to in the Union or a stood under lude injury to |

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| | | | law, and in accordance with the principle of proportionality, Union response measures should not exceed a level that is commensurate with the injury suffered by the Union or a Member State due to the third country's measures of economic coercion, taking into account the gravity of the third country's measures and the Union's rights and interests in question. In this respect, injury to the Union or a Member State is understood under international law to include injury to Union economic operators. | | |
| 18b | | | 10ter Where measures of economic coercion constitute an internationally wrongful act, the Union should, where appropriate, in addition to the cessation of economic coercion, request the third country concerned to make reparation of any injury caused to the Union | | 10ter Where measures of economic coercion constitute an internationally wrongful act, the Union should, where appropriate, in addition to the cessation of economic coercion, request the third country concerned to make reparation of any injury caused to the Union or a Member State, in accordance with Articles 31 and 34-39 of the ARSIWA. |

| | Commission Proposal | EP Mandate | Council Mandate | PRES ASSESSMENT | COM COMPROMISE 9/1 (markups as compared to Council mandate) |
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| | | | or a Member State, in accordance with Articles 31 and 34-39 of the ARSIWA. | | |
| | | | | | T |
| 19 | (11) Coercion is prohibited under international law when a country deploys measures such as trade or investment restrictions in order to obtain from another country an action or inaction which that country is not internationally obliged to perform and which falls within its sovereignty, when the coercion reaches a certain qualitative or quantitative threshold, depending on both the ends pursued and the means deployed. The Commission should examine the third-country action on the basis of qualitative and quantitative criteria that help in determining whether the third country | (11) Coercion is prohibited under international law when a country deploys measures such as trade or investment restrictions in order to obtain from another country an action or inaction which that country is not internationally obliged to perform and which falls within its sovereignty, when the coercion reaches a certain qualitative or quantitative threshold, depending on both the ends pursued and the means deployed. The Commission should examine the third-country action on the basis oftake into account qualitative andor quantitative criteria that help in determining whether the third country interferes in the legitimate sovereign choices of the Union or a Member State and whether its action | (11) Coercion is prohibited and therefore a wrongful act under international law when a country deploys measures such as trade or investment restrictions in order to obtain from another country an action or inaction which that country is not internationally obliged to perform and which falls within its sovereignty, when the coercion reaches a certain qualitative or quantitative threshold, depending on both the ends pursued and the means deployed. The Commission should examine the third-country action on the basis of qualitative and quantitative criteria that help in determining whether the third country interferes in the legitimate sovereign choices of the Union or a Member State and whether its action constitutes economic coercion which requires a Union response. Among | SE pres proposes to agree. | (11) Coercion is prohibited and therefore a wrongful act under international law when a country deploys measures such as trade or investment restrictions in order to obtain from another country an action or inaction which that country is not internationally obliged to perform and which falls within its sovereignty, when the coercion reaches a certain qualitative or quantitative threshold, depending on both the ends pursued and the means deployed. The Commission should examine the third country action on the basis oftake into account! qualitative and quantitative criteria that help in determining whether the third country interferes in the legitimate sovereign choices of the Union or a Member State and whether its action constitutes economic coercion which requires a Union response. Among those criteria, there should be elements that characterise, both qualitatively and quantitatively, notably the form, the effects and the aim of the measures which the third country is deploying. Applying those criteria would ensure that only economic coercion with a sufficiently serious impact or, where the economic coercion consists in a threat, |

| | Commission Proposal | EP Mandate | Council Mandate | PRES ASSESSMENT | COM COMPROMISE 9/1 (markups as compared to Council mandate) |
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| | interferes in the legitimate sovereign choices of the Union or a Member State and whether its action constitutes economic coercion which requires a Union response. | constitutes economic coercion which requires a Union response. | those criteria, there should be elements that characterise, both qualitatively and quantitatively, notably the form, the effects and the aim of the measures which the third country is deploying. Applying those criteria would ensure that only economic coercion with a sufficiently serious impact or, where the economic coercion consists in a threat, only a threat that is credible, would fall under this Regulation. In addition, the Commission should examine closely whether the third country pursues a legitimate cause, because its objective is to uphold a concern that is internationally recognised, such as, among other things, the maintenance of international peace and security, the protection of human rights, the protection of the environment, and the fight against climate change. | | only a threat that is credible, would fall under this Regulation. In addition, the Commission should examine closely whether the third country pursues a legitimate cause, because its objective is to uphold a concern that is internationally recognised, such as, among other things, the maintenance of international peace and security, the protection of human rights, the protection of the environment, and the fight against climate change. |
| 20 | | | | | page a partian by third countries 2021/0406/COD) 20 |

| Commission Proposal | EP Mandate | Council Mandate | PRES ASSESSMENT | COM COMPROMISE 9/1 (markups as compared to Council mandate) |
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| (12) Acts by third countries are understood under customary international law to include all forms of action that are attributable to a State under customary international law. International law qualifies as an act of a State, in particular: the conduct of any State organ, of a person or entity which is not an organ of the State but which is empowered by the law of that State to exercise elements of governmental authority, an organ placed at the disposal of a State by another State, a person or group of persons that are acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of, that State in carrying out the conduct, a person or group of persons that are exercising elements of the | (12) Acts by third countries are understood under customary international law to include all forms of action that are attributable to a State under customary international law. International law qualifies as an act of a State, in particular: the conduct of any State organ, of a person or entity which is not an organ of the State but which is empowered by the law of that State to exercise elements of governmental authority, an organ placed at the disposal of a State by another State, a person or group of persons that are acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of, that State in carrying out the conduct, a person or group of persons that are exercising elements of the governmental authority in the absence or default of the official authorities and in circumstances such as to call for the exercise of those elements of authority, and conduct that the State acknowledges and adopts as its own. ¹ | (12) Acts by third countries are understood under customary international law to include all forms of action or omission, including threats, that are attributable to a State under customary international law. Articles 2(a) and 4-11 of the ARSIWA confirm that customary international law qualifies as an act of a State, in particular: the conduct of any State organ, of a person or entity which is not an organ of the State but which is empowered by the law of that State to exercise elements of governmental authority, an organ placed at the disposal of a State by another State, a person or group of persons that are acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of, that State in carrying out the conduct, a person or group of persons that are exercising elements of the governmental authority in the absence or default of the official authorities and in circumstances such as to call for the exercise of those elements of authority, and conduct that the State | SE PRES proposes to agree (Council Mandate). | (12) Acts by third countries are understood under customary international law to include all forms of action or omission, including threats, that are attributable to a State under customary international law. Articles 2(a) and 4-11 of the ARSIWA confirm that customary international law qualifies as an act of a State, in particular: the conduct of any State organ, of a person or entity which is not an organ of the State but which is empowered by the law of that State to exercise elements of governmental authority, an organ placed at the disposal of a State by another State, a person or group of persons that are acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of, that State in carrying out the conduct, a person or group of persons that are exercising elements of the governmental authority in the absence or default of the official authorities and in circumstances such as to call for the exercise of those elements of authority, and conduct that the State acknowledges and adopts as its own. |

| | Commission Proposal | EP Mandate | Council Mandate | PRES ASSESSMENT | COM COMPROMISE 9/1 (markups as compared to Council mandate) |
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| | governmental authority in the absence or default of the official authorities and in circumstances such as to call for the exercise of those elements of authority, and conduct that the State acknowledges and adopts as its own. ¹ 1. See Articles 2(a) and 4-11 of the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, footnote 1 above. | 1. See Articles 2(a) and 4-11 of the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, footnote 1 above. | acknowledges and adopts as its own. ¹ 1. See Articles 2(a) and 4-11 of the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, footnote 1 above. | | |
| 21 | (13) The Commission should examine whether third-country measures are coercive, on its own initiative or following information received from any source, including legal and natural persons or a Member State. Following this examination, the Commission should determine in a decision whether the | (13) The Commission could and, in particular in the case of a substantiated complaint, should examine whether third-country measures are coercive, on its own initiative or following information received from any source, including legal and natural persons, the European Parliament or a Member State. Following this examination, the Commission should | (13) The Commission on its own initiative or upon a reasoned request of a Member State should examine whether third-country measures are coercive, on its own initiative or following. The Commission could carry out such examination on the basis of information received from any reliable source, including legal and natural persons or a Member State. Following this | | |

| Commission Proposal | EP Mandate | Council Mandate | PRES ASSESSMENT | COM COMPROMISE 9/1 (markups as compared to Council mandate) |
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| third-country measure is coercive. The Commission should communicate any affirmative determination to the third country concerned, together with a request that the economic coercion cease and a request, where appropriate, that any injury be repaired. | determine in a decision whether the third-country measure is coercive. The Commission should publicly communicate anythe result of this examination. In the case of an affirmative determination, the Commission should communicate to the third country concerned, together with a request that the economic coercion cease and a request, where appropriate, that any injury be repaired. | examination To determine if a third country applies or threatens to apply measures affecting trade or investment, the Commission's assessment should determine in be based on facts. In order to ensure uniform conditions for the implementation of this Regulation, and in view of the effects that a decision whether the third country measure is coercive. determining the existence of economic coercion by a third country has on the Union's overall relations with the third country concerned, implementing powers should be conferred on the Council. Therefore, following the Commission's examination and in the event that should communicate any affirmative determination to the third country eoncerned, together with a requestapplies or threatens to apply coercive measures affecting trade or investment, the Commission should submit a proposal to the Council to adopt an implementing act determining that the | | |

| | Commission Proposal | EP Mandate | Council Mandate | PRES ASSESSMENT | COM COMPROMISE 9/1 (markups as compared to Council mandate) |
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| | | | economic coercion cease and a request, where appropriate, that any injury be repaired third country is applying a measure of economic coercion. The Council should act expeditiously. | | |
| 21a | | | (13bis) In an effort to secure the cessation of economic coercion, the Union should seek an early and just settlement of the matter. Accordingly, the Commission should provide adequate opportunity for consultations with the third country concerned and, if that third country is ready to enter into consultations in good faith, engage with it expeditiously. In the course of such consultations, the Commission should endeavour to resort to means such as mediation, conciliation, good offices by a third party or submitting the matter to international adjudication, without prejudice to the division of competence between the | | (13bis) In an effort to secure the cessation of economic coercion and, where appropriate, reparation of injury, the Union should seek an early and just settlement of the matter. Accordingly, the Commission should provide adequate opportunity for consultations with the third country concerned and, if that third country is ready to enter into consultations in good faith, engage with it expeditiously. In the course of such consultations, the Commission should endeavour to resort to means such as mediation, conciliation, good offices by a third party or submitting the matter to international adjudication, without prejudice to the division of competence between the Union and the Member States. In particular, when the third country suspends its actions and agrees to submit the matter to international adjudication, an international agreement with the third country should be concluded, as necessary. Such an |

| | Commission Proposal | EP Mandate | Council Mandate | PRES ASSESSMENT | COM COMPROMISE 9/1 (markups as compared to Council mandate) |
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| | | | Union and the Member States. In particular, when the third country suspends its actions and agrees to submit the matter to international adjudication, an international agreement with the third country should be concluded, as necessary. Such an international agreement could be concluded either by the Union, in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 218 TFEU, or by the Member State concerned. | | international agreement could be concluded either by the Union, in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 218 TFEU, or by the Member State concerned. |
| 22 | (14) The Union should support and cooperate with third countries affected by the same or similar measures of economic coercion or other interested third countries. The Union should participate in international coordination in bilateral, plurilateral or multilateral fora that are geared | (14) The Union should support and cooperate with third countriespartners affected by the same or similar measures of economic coercion or other interested third countriespartners. The Union should participate in international coordination in any bilateral, plurilateral or multilateral fora that are geared towards suitable for the prevention or elimination of the | (14) The Union should support and cooperate with third countries affected by the same or similar measures of economic coercion or other interested third countries. The Union should participate in international coordination in bilateral, plurilateral or multilateral fora that are geared towards the prevention or elimination of economic coercion. The Commission should express the Union position after | | (14) The Union should support and cooperate with third countries affected by the same or similar measures of economic coercion or other interested third countries. The Union should participate in international coordination in any bilateral, plurilateral or multilateral fora that are geared towards suitable for the prevention or elimination of economic coercion. The Commission should express the Union position after having consulted the Council in accordance with the Treaties, where appropriate, with the participation of the Member States. |

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| | towards the prevention or elimination of the economic coercion. | economic coercion. | having consulted the Council in accordance with the Treaties, where appropriate, with the participation of the Member Statesthe economic coercion. | | |
| | | | <u> </u> | | 1 |
| 23 | (15) The Union should only impose countermeasures when other means such as negotiations, mediation or adjudication do not lead to the prompt and effective cessation of the economic coercion and to reparation of the injury it has caused to the Union or its Member States, and where action is necessary to protect the interests and rights of the Union and its Member States and it is in the Union's interest. It is appropriate that the Regulation sets out | (15) The Union should only impose countermeasures when otheris encouraged to use proactively all available means of engagement with the third country concerned such as negotiations, adjudication or mediation or adjudication and should impose measures in cases where such means do not lead to the prompt and effective cessation of the economic coercion and to reparation of the injury it has caused to the Union or its Member States, and where action is necessary to protect the interests and rights of the Union and its Member States and it is in | (15) The Union should only impose countermeasures when response measures if other means such as negotiations, mediation or adjudication do not lead to the prompt and effective cessation of the economic coercion and, where appropriate and requested by the Union from the third country concerned, to the to-reparation of the injury it has caused to the Union or its Member States, and where action is necessary to protect the interests and rights of the Union and its Member States under international law and it is in the Union's interest to take such action. It is appropriate that the Regulation sets out the | SE PRES proposes to agree. | (15) It is desirable that the Union should only impose response measures if other means use proactively all available means of engagement with the third country concerned such as negotiations, adjudication or mediation, and it should only impose response measures in cases where such means or adjudication do not lead to the prompt and effective cessation of the economic coercion and, where appropriate and requested by the Union from the third country concerned, to the reparation of the injury it has caused to the Union or its Member States, and where action is necessary to protect the interests and rights of the Union and its Member States under international law and it is in the Union's interest to take such action. It is appropriate that the Regulation sets out the applicable rules and procedures for the imposition and application of Union response measures and permits expeditious action where |

| | Commission Proposal | EP Mandate | Council Mandate | PRES ASSESSMENT | COM COMPROMISE 9/1 (markups as compared to Council mandate) |
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| | imposition and application of Union response measures and permits expeditious action where necessary to preserve the effectiveness of any Union response measures. | Regulation sets out the applicable rules and procedures for the imposition and application of Union response measures and permits expeditious action where necessary to preserve the effectiveness of any Union response measures. | and application of Union response measures and permits expeditious action where necessary to preserve the effectiveness of any Union response measures. | | |
| | | | | 1 | |
| 24 | (16) Union response measures adopted in accordance with this Regulation should be selected and designed on the basis of objective criteria, including: the effectiveness of the measures in inducing the cessation of coercion by the third country; their potential to provide relief to economic operators within the Union affected by the third-country measures of economic coercion; the aim of avoiding or minimising negative | (16) Union response measures adopted in accordance with this Regulation should be selected and designed on the basis of objective criteria, including: first and foremost, the effectiveness of the measures in inducing the cessation of coercion by the third country; the effectiveness of the measures in repairing the injury caused by the economic coercion; and their potential to provide relief to economic operators within the Union affected by the third-country measures of economic coercion; The Commission should also | (16) Union response measures adopted in accordance with this Regulation should be selected and designed on the basis of objective criteria, including: the effectiveness of the measures in inducing the cessation of coercion by the third country; theirthe potential to provide relief to economic operators within the Union affected by the third-country measures of economic coercion; the aim of avoiding or minimising negative economic and other effects on the Union; and the avoidance of disproportionate administrative complexity and costs. It is also essential that the selection and design | | (16) Union response measures adopted in accordance with this Regulation should be selected and designed on the basis of objective criteria, including: the effectiveness of the measures in inducing the cessation of the coercion by the third country and, where appropriate, the reparation of the injury it has caused; the potential to provide relief to economic operators within the Union affected by the third-country measures of economic coercion; the aim of avoiding or minimising negative economic and other effects on the Union; and the avoidance of disproportionate administrative complexity and costs. It is also essential that the selection and design of Union response measures take account of the Union's interest, which includes, inter alia, the interests of both upstream and downstream industries and final consumers in the Union. When the |

| Commission Proposal | EP Mandate | Council Mandate | PRES ASSESSMENT | COM COMPROMISE 9/1 (markups as compared to Council mandate) |
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| economic and other effects on the Union; and the avoidance of disproportionate administrative complexity and costs. It is also essential that the selection and design of Union response measures take account of the Union's interest. Union response measures should be selected from a wide array of options in order to allow the adoption of the most suitable measures in any given case. | consider other relevant factors such as the aim of avoiding or minimising negative economic and other effects on the Union; and the avoidance of disproportionate administrative complexity and costs. It is also essential that the selection and design of Union response measures take account of the Union's interest. Union response measures should be selected from a wide array of options in order to allow the adoption of the most suitable measures in any given case. | of Union response measures take account of the Union's interest, which includes, inter alia, the interests of both upstream and downstream industries and final consumers in the Union. When the Commission is considering Union response measures it should prioritise measures that would not have a disproportionate impact on legal certainty and predictability of the measures for economic operators, and on the administration of relevant national regulations. When the Commission is considering Union response measures affecting authorisations, registrations, licenses or other rights for the purposes of commercial activities, it should prioritise measures valid throughout the Union and based on secondary legislation, or, where no such measures are appropriate, measures in areas where extensive Union legislation exists. Union response measures | and its Mambar States from any | Commission is considering Union response measures it should prioritise measures that would not have a disproportionate impact on legal certainty and predictability of the measures for economic operators, and on the administration of relevant national regulations. When the Commission is considering Union response measures affecting authorisations, registrations, licenses or other rights for the purposes of commercial activities, it should prioritise measures valid throughout the Union and based on secondary legislation, or, where no such measures are appropriate, measures in areas where extensive Union legislation exists. Union response measures should be selected from a wide array of options in order to allow the adoption of the most suitable measures in any given case. |

| | Commission Proposal | EP Mandate | Council Mandate | PRES ASSESSMENT | COM COMPROMISE 9/1 (markups as compared to Council mandate) |
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| | | | should be selected from a wide array of options in order to allow the adoption of the most suitable measures in any given case. | | |
| 24a | | | (16bis) The Union should be able to designate natural or legal persons connected or linked to the government of the third country engaging in economic coercion and thereby make them subject to Union response measures in order to induce the prompt cessation of economic coercion. Such targeted response measures can effectively avoid or minimise the negative effects of such coercion on Member States' economies and Union economic operators and final consumers. | | (16bis) The Union should be able to designate natural or legal persons connected or linked to the government of the third country engaging in economic coercion and thereby make them subject to Union response measures in order to induce the prompt cessation of economic coercion. Such targeted response measures can effectively avoid or minimise the negative effects of such coercion on Member States' economies and Union economic operators and final consumers. |
| 24b | | | (16ter) As part of the | SE PRES suggests | (16ter) As part of the Union response in |
| 210 | | | Union response in order to induce the cessation of | making the addition of a reference to | order to induce the cessation of economic coercion by third countries, the |

| | Commission Proposal | EP Mandate | Council Mandate | PRES ASSESSMENT | COM COMPROMISE 9/1 (markups as compared to Council mandate) |
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| | | | economic coercion by third countries, the Commission could also adopt measures pursuant to other legal instruments that confer specific powers to the Commission, for example with regard to the granting of Union funding, following the applicable procedures set out therein. Measures adopted by the Commission pursuant to such other legal instruments should be synchronised with actions taken under this Regulation and be consistent with the Union's obligations under international law. In particular, such measures, together with Union response measures adopted under this Regulation, as the case may be, should be commensurate with the injury caused by the third countries' measures of economic coercion. This Regulation is without prejudice to rules and procedures under such other legal instruments. | participation in Union framework programmes conditional upon the removal of the reference to Union Funding in Annex I. SE PRES suggests accepting replacing "be commensurate with" with "not exceed" | Commission could also adopt measures pursuant to other legal instruments that confer specific powers to the Commission, for example with regard to the granting of Union funding or possibilities to limit participation in Union framework programmes for research and innovation, following the applicable procedures set out therein. Measures adopted by the Commission pursuant to such other legal instruments should be synchronised with actions taken under this Regulation and be consistent with the Union's obligations under international law. In particular, such measures, together with Union response measures adopted under this Regulation, as the case may be, should be commensurate with not exceed the injury caused by the third countries' measures of economic coercion. This Regulation is without prejudice to rules and procedures under such other legal instruments. |
| 25 | for a DECLIMATION OF THE FILE | DODEAN DAD MARKENT AND OF THE | COUNCIL on the masteration of the Union | and the Marshau Chakes from a co | nomic coercion by third countries 2021/0406(COD) 20 |

| | Commission Proposal | EP Mandate | Council Mandate | PRES ASSESSMENT | COM COMPROMISE 9/1 (markups as compared to Council mandate) |
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| | (17) It is appropriate to set out rules on the origin or nationality of goods, services and service providers, investment and holders of intellectual property rights, for the purposes of determining the Union response measures. The rules of origin or of nationality should be determined in the light of the prevailing rules for non-preferential trade and investment that are applicable under Union law and the Union's international agreements. | (17) It is appropriate to set out rules on the origin or nationality of goods, services and service providers, investment and holders of intellectual property rights, for the purposes of determining the Union response measures. The rules of origin or of nationality should be determined in the light of the prevailing rules for non-preferential trade and investment that are applicable under Union law and the Union's international agreements. | (17) It is appropriate to set out rules on the origin or nationality of goods, services and service providers, investment and holders of intellectual property rights, for the purposes of determining the Union response measures. The rules of origin orand of nationality should be determined in the light of the prevailing rules for non-preferential trade and investment that are applicable under Union law and the Union's international agreements. This regulation does not affect the division of competences between the Union and its Member States in the field of investment. | | (17) It is appropriate to set out rules on the origin or nationality of goods, services and service providers, investment and holders of intellectual property rights, for the purposes of determining the Union response measures. The rules of origin and of nationality should be determined in the light of the prevailing rules for non-preferential trade and investment that are applicable under Union law and the Union's international agreements. This regulation does not affect the division of competences between the Union and its Member States in the field of investment. |
| 26 | (18) In pursuing the objective of obtaining the cessation of the measure of economic coercion, Union response measures consisting of restrictions on foreign direct investment or on trade in services | (18) In pursuing the objective of obtaining the cessation of the measure of economic coercion and, where appropriate, the reparation of the injury caused, Union response measures consisting of restrictions on foreign direct investment or on | (18) In pursuing the objective of obtaining the cessation of thea measure of economic coercion, Union response measures consisting of restrictions on foreign direct investment or on trade in services should only apply with regard to services supplied, or direct | | (18) In pursuing the objective of obtaining the cessation of a measure of economic coercion and, where appropriate, the reparation of the injury caused, Union response measures consisting of restrictions on foreign direct investment or on trade in services should only apply with regard to services supplied, or direct investments made, within the Union by one or more legal |

| | | Commission Proposal | EP Mandate | Council Mandate | PRES ASSESSMENT | COM COMPROMISE 9/1 (markups as compared to Council mandate) |
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| | | should only apply with regard to services supplied, or direct investments made, within the Union by one or more legal persons established in the Union which are owned or controlled by persons of the third country concerned where necessary to ensure the effectiveness of Union response measures and in particular to prevent their avoidance. The decision to impose any such restrictions will be duly justified in implementing acts adopted pursuant to this Regulation in the light of the criteria specified in this Regulation. | trade in services should only apply with regard to services supplied, or direct investments made, within the Union by one or more legal persons established in the Union which are owned or controlled by persons of the third country concerned where necessary to ensure the effectiveness of Union response measures and in particular to prevent their avoidance. The decision to impose any such restrictions will be duly justified in implementing acts adopted pursuant to this Regulation in the light of the criteria specified in this Regulation. | investments made, within the Union by one or more legal persons established in the Union and which are owned or controlled by persons of the third country concerned, where necessary to ensure the effectiveness of Union response measures and in particular to prevent their avoidance. The decision to impose any such restrictions willshould be duly justified in implementing acts adopted pursuant to this Regulation in the light of the criteria specified in this Regulation. | | persons established in the Union and which are owned or controlled by persons of the third country concerned, where necessary to ensure the effectiveness of Union response measures and in particular to prevent their avoidance. The decision to impose any such restrictions should be duly justified in implementing acts adopted pursuant to this Regulation in the light of the criteria specified in this Regulation. |
| | | | | | | |
| G | 27 | (19) After the adoption of Union response measures, the Commission should continuously | (19) After the adoption of Union response measures, the Commission should continuously assess the situation in relation to the | (19) After the adoption of Union response measures, the Commission should continuously assess the situation in relation to the | | (19) After the adoption of Union response measures, the Commission should continuously assess the situation in relation to the third-country measures of economic coercion, the effectiveness of |

| | Commission Proposal | EP Mandate | Council Mandate | PRES ASSESSMENT | COM COMPROMISE 9/1 (markups as compared to Council mandate) |
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| | assess the situation in relation to the third-country measures of economic coercion, the effectiveness of the Union response measures and their effects, with a view to adjusting, suspending or terminating the response measures accordingly. It is therefore necessary to set out the rules and procedures for amending, suspending and terminating Union response measures and the situations in which these are appropriate. | third-country measures of economic coercion, the effectiveness of the Union response measures and their effects, with a view to adjusting, suspending or terminating the response measures accordingly. It is therefore necessary to set out the rules and procedures for amending, suspending and terminating Union response measures and the situations in which these are appropriate. | third-country measures of economic coercion, the effectiveness of the Union response measures and their effects, with a view to adjusting, suspending or terminating the response measures accordingly. It is therefore necessary to set out the rules and procedures for amending, suspending and terminating Union response measures and the situations in which these are appropriate. | | the Union response measures and their effects, with a view to adjusting, suspending or terminating the response measures accordingly. It is therefore necessary to set out the rules and procedures for amending, suspending and terminating Union response measures and the situations in which these are appropriate. |
| 28 | (20) It is essential to provide for opportunities for stakeholder involvement for the purposes of adoption and amendment of Union response measures, and as relevant for the purposes of | (20) It is essential to provide for opportunities for stakeholder involvement, <i>including</i> businesses, for the purposes of adoption and amendment of Union response measures, and as relevant for the purposes of suspension and termination, in view of the | (20) It is essential to provide for opportunities for stakeholder involvement for the purposes of the adoption and amendment of Union response measures, and, where-as relevant, for the purposes of their suspension and termination, in view of the potential impact on such stakeholders. | SE PRES proposes to agree. | (20) It is essential to provide for opportunities for stakeholder involvement, <i>among which businesses</i> , for the purposes of the adoption and amendment of Union response measures and, where relevant, for the purposes of their suspension and termination, in view of the potential impact on such stakeholders. |

| | Commission Proposal | EP Mandate | Council Mandate | PRES ASSESSMENT | COM COMPROMISE 9/1 (markups as compared to Council mandate) |
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| | suspension and termination, in view of the potential impact on such stakeholders. | potential impact on such stakeholders. | | | |
| 28a | | (20a) In light of the evident increase in the use of economic leverages by foreign countries against the Union and the likely increase of the frequency and severity of these practices in the future, the Chief Trade Enforcement officer (CTEO) should be overall responsible for the functioning and the implementation of this Regulation and including with a view to strengthening the preparedness for such instances, assessing Union's dependencies and assets, adopting the necessary coordinated measures and ultimately being able to react promptly when needed. Such a horizontal competence would provide necessary support to the Union in order to be able | | SE PRES proposes to agree (cf corresponding article in line 133a (Single Contact Point), with the suggested following change (replacing current proposed text): " the Commission should be overall responsible for monitoring such cases/practices of economic coercion including with a view to" so as to better align with the task given to the Commission in line 133" | (20a) In light of the evident increase in the use of economic coercion by foreign countries against the Union and its Member States and the likely increase of the frequency and severity of these practices in the future, the Commission should be overall responsible for the functioning and the implementation of this Regulation and including with a view to providing necessary support to the Union in order to be able to better anticipate and effectively react to economic coercion. |

| | Commission Proposal | EP Mandate | Council Mandate | PRES ASSESSMENT | COM COMPROMISE 9/1 (markups as compared to Council mandate) |
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| | | to better anticipate and effectively react to economic coercion. | | | |
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| ensure commexcha and i betwee Commone h Europand to other effor the the concessare economic and commany adoption responsessor comments of the concessare economic and commany adoption commany adoption command commany adoption command commany adoption command comm | It is important to re an effective munication and ange of views information een the mission on the mand and the pean Parliament the Council on the r, in particular on tts to engage with hird country erned to explore ons with a view to ming the ation of the omic coercion on matters that lead to the tion of Union onse measures or this Regulation. | (21) It is important to ensure an effective communication and regular dialogue and exchange of views and information between the Commission on the one hand and the European Parliament and the Council on the other, in particular regarding ongoing examinations or third country measures, on efforts to engage with the third country concerned to explore options with a view to obtaining the cessation of the economic coercion or, where appropriate, reparation of the injury caused and on matters that may lead to the adoption of Union response measures under this Regulation, including the stages of examination of third-country measures and determination with regard to measures of economic coercion and on the | (21) It is important to ensure an effective communication and an exchange of views and information between the Commission on the one hand, and the European Parliament and the Council, on the other, in particular on efforts to engageenter into consultations with the third country concerned to explore options with a view to obtaining the cessation of the economic coercion and on matters that may lead to the adoption of Union response measures under this Regulation. | | (21) It is important to ensure effective communication and an an effective and regular exchange of views and information between the Commission on the one hand, and the European Parliament and the Council, on the other, in particular on efforts to enter into consultations with the third country concerned to explore options with a view to obtaining the cessation of the economic coercion and on the application of this Regulation, in particular regarding ongoing examinations of third-country measures, [determination with regard to measures of economic coercion,] efforts to enter into consultations with the third country concerned, matters that may lead to the adoption of Union response measures under this Regulation and any other relevant development at subsequent stages, including as regards the effectiveness of Union response measures. |

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| | | effectiveness on Union response measures. | | | |
| 30 | (22) In order to allow the update of the range of Union response measures under this Regulation and the adjustment of the rules of origin or of other technical rules, the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union should be delegated to the Commission to amend the list of Union responses set out in Annex I and technical rules | | (22) In order to allow the updateadjustment of the range of Union response measures under this Regulation and the adjustment of the rules of origin or of other technical rules rules of origin or nationality to take account of relevant developments in international instruments, the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European UnionTFEU should be delegated to the Commission to amend the list of Union responses set out in Annex I and technical rules necessary for the application of the | | (22) In order to allow the adjustment of the rules of origin or nationality to take account of relevant developments in international instruments and experience in the application of measures under this Regulation or other Union acts under this Regulation or other Union acts, the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 TFEU should be delegated to the Commission in respect of amending Annex II. It is of particular importance that the Commission carry out appropriate consultations during its preparatory work, including at expert level, and that those consultations be conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in the Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making. In particular, to ensure equal participation in the preparation of delegated acts, the European Parliament and the Council should receive all |
| | necessary for the application of the Regulation, including rules of origin laid down in Annex II. It is of particular importance that the Commission carry out appropriate | Commission carry out appropriate consultations during its preparatory work, including at expert level, and that those consultations be conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in the Interinstitutional | Regulation, including rules of origin laid down inin respect of amending Annex II. It is of particular importance that the Commission carry out appropriate consultations during its preparatory work, including at expert level, and that those consultations be | | documents at the same time as Member States' experts, and their experts systematically should have access to meetings of Commission expert groups dealing with the preparation of delegated acts. 1. Interinstitutional Agreement between the European Parliament, the Council of |

| Commission Proposal | EP Mandate | Council Mandate | PRES ASSESSMENT | COM COMPROMISE 9/1 (markups as compared to Council mandate) |
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| consultations duri its preparatory wo including at exper level, and that the consultations be conducted in accordance with t principles laid do in the Interinstitutional Agreement on Be Law-Making.¹ In particular, to ensue equal participation the preparation of delegated acts, the European Parliam and the Council should receive all documents at the time as Member States' experts, and their experts systematically should have access to meetings of Commission experts groups dealing with the preparation of delegated acts. 1. OJ L 123, 12.5.2011. | Making. In particular, to ensure equal participation in the preparation of delegated acts, the European Parliament and the Council should receive all documents at the same time as Member States' experts, and their experts systematically should have access to meetings of Commission expert groups dealing with the preparation of delegated acts. The council should receive all documents at the same time as Member States' experts, and their experts systematically should have access to meetings of Commission expert groups dealing with the preparation of delegated acts. The council should receive all documents at the same time as Member States' experts, and their experts systematically should have access to meetings of Commission expert groups dealing with the preparation of delegated acts. | conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in the Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making.¹ In particular, to ensure equal participation in the preparation of delegated acts, the European Parliament and the Council should receive all documents at the same time as Member States' experts, and their experts systematically should have access to meetings of Commission expert groups dealing with the preparation of delegated acts. 1. Interinstitutional Agreement between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on Better Law-Making (OJ L 123, 12.5.2016, p.+1). | | Commission on Better Law-Making (OJ L 123, 12.5.2016, p. 1). 1. Interinstitutional Agreement between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on Better Law Making (OJ L 123, 12.5.2016, p. 1). |

| | Commission Proposal | EP Mandate | Council Mandate | PRES ASSESSMENT | COM COMPROMISE 9/1 (markups as compared to Council mandate) |
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| 31 | (23) In order to ensure uniform conditions for the implementation of this Regulation, implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission. Those powers should be exercised in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011. ¹ 1. Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 laying down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by the Member States of the Commission's exercise of implementing powers (OJ L 55, 28.2.2011, p. 13). | (23) In order to ensure uniform conditions for the implementation of this Regulation, implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission. Those powers should be exercised in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011. 1. Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 laying down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by the Member States of the Commission's exercise of implementing powers (OJ L 55, 28.2.2011, p. 13). | (23) In order to ensure uniform conditions for the implementation of Union response measures under this Regulation, implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission. Those powers should be exercised in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council. 1 - 1. Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 laying down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by the Member States of the Commission's exercise of implementing powers (OJ L 55, 28.2.2011, p. 13). | SE PRES proposes to agree (Council Mandate). | (23) In order to ensure uniform conditions for the implementation of [Union response measures under] this Regulation, implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission. Those powers should be exercised in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council.¹ 1. Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 laying down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by the Member States of the Commission's exercise of implementing powers (OJ L 55, 28.2.2011, p. 13). |
| | | | <u> </u> | J L | |
| 32 | (24) The examination procedure should be used for the adoption of Union response measures and their amendment, suspension or | (24) The examination procedure should be used for the adoption of Union response measures and their amendment, suspension or termination given that those acts | (24) The examination procedure should be used for the adoption of Union response measures and their amendment, suspension or termination given that those actsmeasures determine the | | (24) The examination procedure should be used for the adoption of Union response measures and their amendment, suspension or termination given that those measures determine the Union's response to economic coercion falling within the scope of this Regulation and as |

| Commission Proposal | EP Mandate | Council Mandate | PRES ASSESSMENT | COM COMPROMISE 9/1 (markups as compared to Council mandate) |
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| termination given that those acts determine the Union's responses to economic coercion falling within the scope of this Regulation. | determine the Union's responses to economic coercion falling within the scope of this Regulation. | Union's responses response to economic coercion falling within the scope of this Regulation and as determined by the Council. In exercising its implementing powers, special attention should be given by the Commission to solutions which command the widest possible support among Member States. Considering the specific nature of this Regulation and the particular sensitivity attached to the Union response measures, the Commission should not adopt a draft implementing act on any Union response measures where the committee delivers a no opinion on that act. The particular sensitivity attached to the Union response measures necessitates finding a balanced solution at all times and solutions should avoid going against any predominant position which might emerge within the appeal committee against the appropriateness of a draft implementing act. | and its Mambas States from an | its implementing powers, special attention should be given by the Commission to solutions which command the widest possible support among Member States. Considering the specific nature of this Regulation and the particular sensitivity attached to the Union response measures, the Commission should not adopt a draft implementing act on any Union response measures where the committee delivers a no opinion on that act. The particular sensitivity attached to the Union response measures necessitates finding a balanced solution at all times and solutions should avoid going against any predominant position which might emerge within the appeal committee against the appropriateness of a draft implementing act. |

| | Commission Proposal | EP Mandate | Council Mandate | PRES ASSESSMENT | COM COMPROMISE 9/1 (markups as compared to Council mandate) |
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| 33 | (25) The Commission should adopt immediately applicable implementing acts of limited duration where, in duly justified cases relating to the adoption, amendment, suspension or termination of Union response measures, imperative grounds of urgency so require. | (25) The Commission should adopt immediately applicable implementing acts of limited duration where, in duly justified cases relating to the adoption, amendment, suspension or termination of Union response measures, imperative grounds of urgency so require. | (25) The Commission should adopt immediately applicable implementing acts of limited duration where, in duly justified cases relating to the adoption, amendment, suspension or termination of Union response measures, imperative grounds of urgency so requireexpedited action to avoid irreparable damage or to ensure consistency with international law. Such expedited action could prevent the coercion from causing or worsening any economic damage, notably with a view to protecting acute and vital interests of the Union or a Member State. | | (25) The Commission should adopt immediately applicable implementing acts of limited duration where, in duly justified cases relating to the amendment, suspension or termination or suspension of Union response measures, imperative grounds of urgency require expedited action to avoid irreparable damage or to ensure consistency with international law. Such expedited action could prevent the coercion from causing or worsening any economic damage, notably with a view to protecting acute and vital interests of the Union or a Member State. |
| 33a | | | (25bis) Any action taken under this Regulation, including Union response measures with regard to natural or legal persons, should respect the Charter of Fundamental Rights of | SE PRES proposes to agree (Council Mandate). | (25bis) Any action taken under this Regulation, including Union response measures with regard to natural or legal persons, should respect the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Moreover, any processing of personal data pursuant to this Regulation |

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| | | the European Union. Moreover, any processing of personal data pursuant to this Regulation should be consistent with the applicable rules on the protection of personal data. Processing of personal data by Member States' officials obtaining information under this Regulation should be carried out in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council¹. Processing of personal data by the Commission should be carried out in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council². 1. Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1). 2. Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2018 on | | should be consistent with the applicable rules on the protection of personal data. Processing of personal data by Member States' officials obtaining information under this Regulation should be carried out in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council¹. Processing of personal data [by the Commission] should be carried out in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council². 1. Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1). 2. Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2018 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 and Decision No 1247/2002/EC (OJ L 295, 21.11.2018, p. 39). |

| | Commission Proposal | EP Mandate | Council Mandate | PRES ASSESSMENT | COM COMPROMISE 9/1 (markups as compared to Council mandate) |
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| | | | the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 and Decision No 1247/2002/EC (OJ L 295, 21.11.2018, p. 39). | | |
| 34 | (26) The Commission should evaluate measures adopted under this Regulation as to their effectiveness and operation and as to possible conclusions for future measures. The Commission should also review this Regulation after gaining sufficient experience with the existence or application of this Regulation. This review should cover the scope, functioning, efficiency and effectiveness of this Regulation. The Commission should | (26) The Commission should evaluate measures adopted under this Regulation as to their effectiveness and operation and as to possible conclusions for future measures. The Commission should also review this Regulation after gaining sufficient experience with the existence or application of this Regulation, and in particular in order to ensure complementarity with the upcoming review of the Blocking Statute ^{1a} . The review of this Regulation. This review should cover the scope, functioning, efficiency and effectiveness of this Regulation. The | (26) The Commission should evaluate measures adopted under this Regulation as to their effectiveness and operation and as to possible conclusions for future measures. The Commission should also review this Regulation after gaining sufficient experience with the existence or application of this Regulation. This review should cover the scope, functioning, efficiency and effectiveness of this Regulation and also its relationship to other Union policies and existing legal instruments. The Commission should report on its assessment to the European Parliament and the Council, | SE PRES proposes to agree | (26) The Commission should evaluate measures adopted under this Regulation as to their effectiveness and operation and as to possible conclusions for future measures. The Commission should also review this Regulation after gaining sufficient experience with the existence or application of this Regulation and also its relationship to other Union policies and existing legal instruments, including the Blocking Statute ^{1a} . The. This review of this Regulation should cover the scope, functioning, efficiency and effectiveness of this Regulation. The Commission should report on its assessment to the European Parliament and the Council and also its relationship to other Union policies and existing legal instruments. 1a Council Regulation (EC) No 2271/96 of 22 November 1996 protecting against the effects of the extra-territorial application of legislation adopted by a |

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| | | report on its assessment to the European Parliament and the Council, | Commission should report on its assessment to the European Parliament and the Council, Ia Council Regulation (EC) No 2271/96 of 22 November 1996 protecting against the effects of the extra-territorial application of legislation adopted by a third country, and actions based thereon or resulting therefrom, OJ L 309, 29.11.1996, p. 1. | | | third country, and actions based thereon or resulting therefrom The Commission should report on its assessment to the European Parliament and the Council, OJ L 309, 29.11.1996, p. 1 |
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| G | 35 | HAVE ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: | HAVE ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: | HAVE ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: | | HAVE ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: |
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| G | 36 | Article 1 Subject-matter | Article 1 Subject-matter | Article 1 Subject-matter | | Article 1 Subject-matter |
| | | | | | | |
| | 37 | 1. This Regulation lays down rules and procedures in order to ensure the effective | 1. This Regulation lays down rules and procedures in order to ensure the effective protection of the | 1. This Regulation lays down rules and procedures in order to ensure the effective protection of the interests of | SE PRES prosposes to agree | 1. This Regulation lays down rules and procedures to ensure the effective protection of the interests of the Union and its Member States where a third |

| | Commission Proposal | EP Mandate | Council Mandate | PRES ASSESSMENT | COM COMPROMISE 9/1 (markups as compared to Council mandate) |
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| | protection of the interests of the Union and its Member States where a third country seeks, through measures affecting trade or investment, to coerce the Union or a Member State into adopting or refraining from adopting a particular act. This Regulation provides a framework for the Union to respond in such situations with the objective to deter, or have the third country desist from such actions, whilst permitting the Union, in the last resort, to counteract such actions. | interests of the Union and its Member States where a third country seeks, through measures any form of action, failure to act or threat thereof affecting trade or investment, to coerce the Union or a Member State into adopting or refraining from adopting a particular act, including a particular policy choice, legal act or a stance with regard to a policy choice. This Regulation provides a framework for the Union to respond in such situations with the objective to deter, or have the third country desist from of deterring, or obtaining the cessation of such actions and, where appropriate, repairing the injury caused, thereby permitting the Union, whilst permitting the Union, whilst permitting the Union, in the last resort, to counteract such actions. | the Union and its Member States where a third country seeks, through measures affecting trade or investment, to coerce the Union or a Member State into adopting or refraining from adopting a particular act. This Regulation provides a framework for the Union to respond in such situations with the objective to deter, or have the third country desist from such actions, whilst permitting the Union, in the last resort, to counteract such actions. | | country seeks, through any measures affecting trade or investment, to coerce the Union or a Member State into adopting or refraining from adopting a particular act. |
| 37a | | | 2. This Regulation establishes a framework for the Union to respond to | SE PRES suggests replacing "obtaining" with "requesting" the | 2. This Regulation establishes a framework for the Union to respond_to economic coercion with the objective of |

| | Commission Proposal | EP Mandate | Council Mandate | PRES ASSESSMENT | COM COMPROMISE 9/1 (markups as compared to Council mandate) |
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| | | | economic coercion with the objective of deterring, or having the third country desist from such coercion, whilst enabling the Union, as a last resort, to counteract such coercion. | reparation of injury. | deterring, or having the third country desist from such coercion <u>and, where</u> <u>appropriate, obtaining the reparation of</u> <u>the injury caused</u> , whilst enabling the Union, as a last resort, to counteract such coercion. |
| | | | | | |
| 38 | 2. Any action taken under this Regulation shall be consistent with the Union's obligations under international law and conducted in the context of the principles and objectives of the Union's external action. | 2. Any action taken under this Regulation shall be consistent with the Union's obligations under international law and conducted in the context of the principles and objectives of the Union's external action. | 23. Any action taken under this Regulation shall be consistent with the Union's obligations under international law and be conducted in the context of the principles and objectives of the Union's external action. | SE PRES proposes to agree (Council Mandate). | 3. Any action taken under this Regulation shall be consistent with international law and be conducted in the context of the principles and objectives of the Union's external action. |
| | | | | | |
| 38a | | | 4. This Regulation shall be without prejudice to other existing Union instruments and international agreements, as well as actions taken thereunder, in the area of the common commercial policy, and to other Union policies. This | SE PRES proposes to agree. | 4. This Regulation shall be without prejudice to other existing Union instruments and international agreements, as well as actions taken thereunder, in the area of the common commercial policy, and to other Union policies. This Regulation <i>shall does</i> not affect the division of competences between the Union and its Member States as defined |

| | Commission Proposal | EP Mandate | Council Mandate | PRES ASSESSMENT | COM COMPROMISE 9/1 (markups as compared to Council mandate) |
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| | | | Regulation shall not affect the division of competences between the Union and its Member States as defined by the Treaties. | | by the Treaties. |
| | | | | | |
| 38b | | Article 1a Definitions For the purposes of this Regulation, the following definitions apply: 1. "coercion" means any third-country action or measure interfering in the legitimate sovereign choices of the Union or a Member State by seeking to prevent or obtain the cessation, modification or | | SE PRES would like to discuss and possibly suggest reverting to original EP suggestion and refrain from defining "country" or "third country" in this regulation. This would mean also retaining the somewhat ambiguous term "partner" in line 68 (Article 6 | Pefinitions For the purposes of this Regulation, the following definitions apply: 1. "measure of economic coercion" means a third country interfering in the legitimate sovereign choices of the Union or a Member State by seeking to prevent or obtain the cessation, modification or adoption of a particular act by the Union or a Member State by |
| | | adoption of a particular act by the Union or a Member State; 2. "third-country action or measure" means any type of action or measure, failure to act or threat thereof that is attributable to a third country; 3. "particular act" means a particular policy choice, legal act or a stance with regard to a | | International Cooperation) and line 22 (Recital 14) indicating possible for subject for EU co- operation against coercion, and change to "or partner" to signify that a country EU cooperate with does not necessarily also need to be a designated "partner". | applying or threatening to apply measures affecting trade or investment; 2. "measure" means any act or omission; 3. "third-country measure" means any measure attributable to a third country; 4. "particular act" means any legal or other act, including an expression of a position by an institution or body of the Union or a Member State; |

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| policor de 4. mente cou obbit binn inte 5. coe sub thir mente sign qui dep coe three acti affe inverse acti affe inverse coe 8. mente cou 8. mente cou 8. mente cou 1. mente c | licy choice of the Union a Member State; | | SE PRES would specifically ask MS views on including "any other measures adopted pursuant to other legal instruments that confer specific powers to the Commission" in the definition of "union response measures" SE PRES suggests, in order to streamline the Union interest definition with art 7bis, the following wording of 10. "Union interest": ', the interests of Union economic operators and Member States, including their upstream and downstream industries,' However, this part is still awaiting a response from the EP SE PRES suggests accepting the other definitions. | 5. "injury to the Union" means injury to the Union or a Member State, including to Union economic operators; 6. "injury" means negative impact, including economic damage; 7. "country" means any State, separate customs territory or other subject of international law; 8. "third country" means any country other than the Union or a Member State; 9. "Union response measure" means any measure listed in Annex 1 and adopted pursuant to Articles 7 and 8, or any measure adopted pursuant to other legal instruments that confer specific powers to the Commission as; 10. "Union interest" means all the various interests taken as a whole, including the interest in avoiding interference in legitimate sovereign choices of the Union and the Member States, the interests of Union economic operators, including upstream and downstream industries, as well as the interest shall be determined in accordance with Article 7bis. |

| | | Commission Proposal | EP Mandate | Council Mandate | PRES ASSESSMENT | COM COMPROMISE 9/1 (markups as compared to Council mandate) |
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| | | | injury suffered by the Union or a Member State and aims to obtain the cessation of economic coercion and, where appropriate, the reparation for the injury caused; 9. "Union interest" means first and foremost the need to preserve the policy space of the Union or its Member States to take legitimate sovereign choices in ensuring the social, political, and economic cohesion of the Union, and the upholding of its strategic and economic interests. | | | |
| G | 39 | Article 2 Scope | Article 2 Scope | Article 2 Scope | | Article 2 Scope |
| | 40 | 1. This Regulation applies where a third country: | 1. This Regulation applies only in the event of economic coercion where a third country: | This Regulation applies where a third country: | SE PRES proposes to agree. However, note that with the definition of economic coercion in line 38b, this line | 1. This Regulation applies only where a third country: |

| | | Commission Proposal | EP Mandate | Council Mandate | PRES ASSESSMENT | COM COMPROMISE 9/1 (markups as compared to Council mandate) |
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| | | | | | could read "This Regulation applies only where a third country takes measures of economic coercion". | |
| G | 41 | - interferes in the legitimate sovereign choices of the Union or a Member State by seeking to prevent or obtain the cessation, modification or adoption of a particular act by the Union or a Member State | - interferes in the legitimate sovereign choices of the Union or a Member State by seeking to prevent or obtain the cessation, modification or adoption of a particular act by the Union or a Member State | - interferes in the legitimate sovereign choices of the Union or a Member State by seeking to prevent or obtain the cessation, modification or adoption of a particular act by the Union or a Member State | | - interferes in the legitimate sovereign choices of the Union or a Member State by seeking to prevent or obtain the cessation, modification or adoption of a particular act by the Union or a Member State |
| | 42 | - by applying or threatening to apply measures affecting trade or investment. | - by applying or threatening applies or threatens to apply measures affecting trade or investment. | - by applying or threatening to apply measures affecting trade or investment. | SE PRES proposes to agree (Council Mandate). | - by applying or threatening to apply measures affecting trade or investment. |
| _ | 43 | For the purposes of this Regulation, such | For the purposes of this Regulation, such third | For the purposes of this Regulation, such third- | | |

| | Commission Proposal | EP Mandate | Council Mandate | PRES ASSESSMENT | COM COMPROMISE 9/1 (markups as compared to Council mandate) |
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| | third-country actions shall be referred to as measures of economic coercion. | country actions shall be referred to as measures of economic coercion.deleted | country actions shall be referred to as 'measures of economic coercion'. | | |
| | | | 1 | | |
| 44 | 2. In determining whether the conditions set out in paragraph 1 are met, the following shall be taken into account: | 2. In determining whether the conditions set out in paragraph 1 are met, the <i>following Commission</i> shall <i>be takentake</i> into account <i>the following</i> : | 2. In determining whether the conditions set out in paragraph 1 are met, the following shall be taken into account: | | 2. In determining whether the conditions set out in paragraph 1 are met, the following [Commission] [Commission and the Council] shall betake taken into account the following: |
| | | | | 1 | |
| 45 | (a) the intensity, severity, frequency, duration, breadth and magnitude of the third country's measure and the pressure arising from it; | (a) the intensity, severity, frequency, duration, breadth and magnitude of the third country's measure and or failure to act or threat thereof as well as the pressure arising from it; the Commission shall assess whether such measures are part of a broader pattern of behaviour; | (a) the intensity, severity, frequency, duration, breadth and magnitude of the third country's measure, including its impact on trade or investment relations with the Union, and the pressure arising from it on the Union or a Member State; | | (a) the intensity, severity, frequency, duration, breadth and magnitude of the third country's measure, including its impact on trade or investment relations with the Union, and the pressure arising from it on the Union or a Member State; |
| | | | | 1 | |
| 46 | (b) whether the third country is engaging in | (b) whether the third country is engaging in a | (b) whether the third country is engaging in a pattern of | | (b) whether the third country is engaging in a pattern of interference seeking to |

| | Commission Proposal | EP Mandate | Council Mandate | PRES ASSESSMENT | COM COMPROMISE 9/1 (markups as compared to Council mandate) |
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| | a pattern of interference seeking to obtain from the Union or from Member States or other countries particular acts; | clear pattern of interference seeking to obtain from the Union or from Member States or other countries particular acts; | interference seeking to obtain from the Union, a or from Member StatesState or other countries particular acts; | | obtain from the Union, a Member State or other countries particular acts; |
| | | | | | |
| 47 | (c) the extent to which the third-country measure encroaches upon an area of the Union's or Member States' sovereignty; | (c) the extent to which the third-country measure or failure to act or threat thereof encroaches upon an area of the Union's or Member States' sovereignty; | (c) the extent to which the third-country measure encroaches upon an area of the Union's or a Member States'State's sovereignty; | | (c) the extent to which the third-country measure encroaches upon an area of the Union's or a Member State's sovereignty; |
| | | | | | |
| 48 | (d) whether the third country is acting based on a legitimate concern that is internationally recognised; | (d) whether the third country is acting based on a legitimate concern that is internationally recognised as legitimate by international law and conventions; | (d) whether the third country is acting based on the basis of a legitimate concern that is internationally recognised; | | (d) whether the third country is acting on the basis of a legitimate concern that is internationally recognised; |
| | | | | | |
| 49 | (e) whether and in what manner the third country, before the | (e) whether and in what manner the third country, before the imposition of its | (e) whether and in what manner the third country, before the imposition | | (e) whether and in what manner the third country, before the— <u>imposition or</u> application of its measures, has made |

| | | Commission Proposal | EP Mandate | Council Mandate | PRES ASSESSMENT | COM COMPROMISE 9/1 (markups as compared to Council mandate) |
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| | | imposition of its measures, has made serious attempts, in good faith, to settle the matter by way of international coordination or adjudication, either bilaterally or within an international forum. | measures, has made serious attempts, in good faith, to settle the matter by way of international coordination or adjudication, either bilaterally or within an international forum. | application of its measures, has made serious attempts, in good faith, to settle the matter by way of international coordination or adjudication, either bilaterally or within an international forum. | | serious attempts, in good faith, to settle the matter by way of international coordination or adjudication, either bilaterally or within an international forum. |
| G | 50 | Article 3 Examination of third- country measures | Article 3 Examination of third- country measures | Article 3 Examination of third-country measures | | Article 3 Examination of third-country measures |
| | 51 | 1. The Commission may examine any measure of a third country in order to determine whether it meets the conditions set out in Article 2(1). The Commission shall act expeditiously. | 1. The Commission may or, in the case of a duly substantiated complaint, shall examine any measure of a third country, failure to act or threat thereof in order to determine whether it meets the conditions set out in Article 2(1). The Commission shall act expeditiously. | 1. The Commission may, on its own initiative or upon a reasoned request of a Member State, examine any measure of a third country in order to determine whether it meets the conditions set out in Article 2(1). The Commission shall act expeditiously. | SE PRES suggests to accept (as a concession). | 1. The Commission may, on its own initiative, or or or upon a reasoned duly substantiated request, including of a Member State, examine any measure of a third country in order to determine whether it meets the conditions set out in Article 2(1). The Commission shall act expeditiously and its examination shall normally not exceed four months. |
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| | Commission Proposal | EP Mandate | Council Mandate | PRES ASSESSMENT | COM COMPROMISE 9/1 (markups as compared to Council mandate) |
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| 52 | 2. The Commission may carry out the examination referred to in paragraph 1 on its own initiative or following information received from any source. The Commission shall ensure the protection of confidential information in line with Article 12, which may include the identity of the supplier of the information. | 2. The Commission mayshall carry out the examination referred to in paragraph 1 based on substantiated information collected on its own initiative or following information received from any reliable source, notably economic operators or trade unions. The European Parliament and a Member State may also provide such substantiated information to the Commission. The Commission shall ensure the protection of confidential information in line with Article 12, which may include concealing the identity of the supplier of the information. The Commission shall set up publicly available secure tools with a view to facilitating the submission of relevant and substantiated information from external sources. | 2. The Commission mayshall carry out the examination referred to in paragraph 1 on its own initiative or followingthe basis of information received from any reliable source. The Commission shall ensure the protection of confidential information in lineaccordance with Article 12, which may include the identity of the supplier of the information. | | 2. The Commission shall carry out the examination referred to in paragraph 1 based on substantiated information collected on its own initiative or on the basis of information received from any reliable source, including a Member State, the European Parliament, economic operators or trade unions. The Commission shall ensure the protection of confidential information in accordance with Article 12, which may include protecting the identity of the supplier of the information. The Commission shall set up publicly available secure tools with a view to facilitating the submission of information from external sources. |
| 52a | | | 2bis. Where there are | | 2bis.3 Where there are reasonable |

| | Commission Proposal | EP Mandate | Council Mandate | PRES ASSESSMENT | COM COMPROMISE 9/1 (markups as compared to Council mandate) |
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| | | | reasonable grounds to suspect that the measure of the third country concerned meets the conditions set out in Article 2(1), the Commission shall expeditiously inform Member States and keep them informed about developments. | | grounds to suspect that the measure of the third country concerned meets the conditions set out in Article 2(1), the Commission shall expeditiously inform Member States and keep them informed about developments The Commission shall duly and in a timely manner inform the Member States of relevant developments as regards launched and ongoing examinations. |
| 52b | | | 3. The Commission may request Member States to supply information on the impact of the measures of the third country concerned | | |
| 53 | 3. The Commission may seek information about the impact of the measures of the third country concerned. | 3. The Commission may seek information about the impact of the measures of the third country concerned. | 34. The Commission mayshall seek information about the impact of the measures of the third country concerned. | | 4. The Commission shall seek information about the impact of the measures of the third country concerned, where necessary. The Commission may request Member States to supply information on such impact and Member States shall act expeditiously. |
| 54 | The Commission may | The Commission shall | 5. The Commission may | SE PRES suggests to | 5. The Commission may publish a notice |

| | Commission Proposal | EP Mandate | Council Mandate | PRES ASSESSMENT | COM COMPROMISE 9/1 (markups as compared to Council mandate) |
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| | publish a notice in the Official Journal of the European Union or through other suitable public communication means with an invitation to submit information within a specified time limit. In that event, the Commission shall notify the third country concerned of the initiation of the examination. | inform duly, including in the form of an exchange of views, and in a timely manner the European Parliament and the Council of the launch of and of any development in the ongoing examination of third-country measures. The Commission may publish a notice in the Official Journal of the European Union or and through other suitable public communication means with of the launch of an examination procedure. The notice shall include an invitation to submit information within a specified time limit and an indication of the timeline for the determination referred to in Article 4, which shall not exceed four months. In that event, the Commission shall notify the third country concerned of the initiation of the examination. | publish a notice in the Official Journal of the European Union and, where appropriate, Official Journal of the European Union or through other suitable public communication means with an invitation to stakeholders to submit information within a specified time limit. In that event, the Commission shall notify the third country concerned of the initiation of the examination. | accept (as a concession) | in the the Official Journal of the European Unionand, where appropriate, through other suitable public communication means with an invitation to stakeholders to submit information within a specified time limit taking into account the timeline indicated in paragraph 1. In the In that event of the publication of a notice, the Commission shall notify the third country concerned of the initiation launch of the examination. |
| 54a | | | 6. The Commission and | | namic coording by third countries, 2021/0405(COD), 20 |

| | | Commission Proposal | EP Mandate | Council Mandate | PRES ASSESSMENT | COM COMPROMISE 9/1 (markups as compared to Council mandate) |
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| | | | | Member States shall act expeditiously throughout the examination. | | |
| G | 55 | Article 4 Determination with regard to the third-country measure | Article 4 Determination with regard to the third-country measure | Article 4 Determination with regard to the third-country measure | | Article 4 Determination with regard to the third- country measure |
| | 56 | Following an examination carried out in accordance with Article 3, the Commission shall adopt a decision determining whether the measure of the third country concerned meets the conditions set out in Article 2(1). The Commission shall act expeditiously. | Following an examination carried out in accordance with Article 3, the Commission shall adopt a decision, determining whether the measure of the third country concerned meets the conditions set out in Article 2(1). Where no notice was published pursuant to Article 3 and in the case of a positive determination, the decision shall include an indication of the timeline for the adoption of the implementing act referred to in Article 7, which shall not exceed six months. On duly justified imperative grounds in order to avoid | 1. Following an examination carried out in accordance with Article 3, in the event that the Commission considers that the measure of the third country concerned meets the conditions of Article 2(1), it shall submit a proposal to the Council to adopt a decisionan implementing act determining whetherthat the measure of the third country concerned meets the conditions set out in Article 2(1). The Commission- shall, where appropriate, propose that the country concerned repair the injury suffered by the Union or its Member States | | |

| | Commission Proposal | EP Mandate | Council Mandate | PRES ASSESSMENT | COM COMPROMISE 9/1 (markups as compared to Council mandate) |
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| | | irreparable damage to the Union or its Member States the Commission may extend that timeline by up to a further four months. The Commission shall act expeditiously. The Commission shall inform, including in the form of an exchange of views, the European Parliament and the Council about the decision and publish it in the Official Journal of the European Union and through other suitable public communication means. | act expeditiously. | | |
| 56 | ia | | | | The decision of whether it is appropriate to request that the third country concerned repair the injury caused shall be based on a consideration of the nature and extent of the damage caused and all other circumstances of the particular case. Specifically, the decision shall be guided by the overall relationship with the third country concerned, other aspects of Union interest, including the desirability for Union persons having suffered damage to have that damage repaired, and the general obligation under customary |

| | Commission Proposal | EP Mandate | Council Mandate | PRES ASSESSMENT | COM COMPROMISE 9/1 (markups as compared to Council mandate) |
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| | | | | | international law to make full reparation for the injury caused through an internationally wrongful act. |
| 57 | Prior to adopting its decision, the Commission may invite the third country concerned to submit its observations. | _Prior to adopting its decision, the Commission may invite the third country concerned to submit its observations within a reasonable and specified period of time that shall not unduly delay the Commission's decision. | 2. Prior to adopting its decisionthe proposal referred to in paragraph 1, where useful for the purposes of the determination referred to in that paragraph, the Commission mayshall invite the third country concerned to submit its observations within a reasonable period of time, without prejudice to Article 5. | | |
| 57a | | | 3. The Council shall act expeditiously throughout the process set out in this Article. The Council shall adopt the implementing act referred to in paragraph 1, acting by a qualified majority. The Council, acting by a qualified majority, may | | |

| | Commission Proposal | EP Mandate | Council Mandate | PRES ASSESSMENT | COM COMPROMISE 9/1 (markups as compared to Council mandate) |
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| | | | amend the Commission's proposal. | | |
| | | | | | |
| 57t | | | 4. The Council implementing act shall be published in the Official Journal of the European Union. | | |
| | | | | | |
| 58 | Where the Commission decides that the measure of the third country concerned meets the conditions set out in Article 2(1), it shall notify the third country concerned of its decision and request it to cease the economic coercion and, where appropriate, repair the injury suffered by the Union or its Member States. | Where the Commission decides that the measure of the third country concerned meets the conditions set out in Article 2(1), it shall notify the third country concerned of its decision and request **that third country** to cease the economic coercion **immediately** and, where appropriate, repair the injury suffered by the Union or its Member States **within a reasonable and **specified period of time*. | 5. Where the Commission decides that the measure of the third country concerned meets the conditions set out in Article 2(1), itCouncil adopts the implementing act referred to in this Article, the Commission shall notify the third country concerned of itsthat decision and request it to cease the economic coercion and, where appropriate and so decided by the Council, request it to repair the injury suffered by the Union or its Member States. | SE PRES suggests accepting "immediately" | 5. Where the [Council adopts the implementing act referred to in this Article, the Commission] shall notify the third country concerned of that decision and request it to cease the economic coercion immediately and, where appropriate and so decided by the Council, request it to repair the injury suffered by the Union or its Member States. |
| 59 | | | | | |

| | Commission Proposal | EP Mandate | Council Mandate | PRES ASSESSMENT | COM COMPROMISE 9/1 (markups as compared to Council mandate) |
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| | Article 5 Engagement with third country concerned | Article 5 Engagement with the third country concerned | Article 5 Engagement with the third country concerned | | Article 5 Engagement with the third country concerned |
| 6 | The Commission slabe open to engage of behalf of the Union with the third count concerned, to explosoptions with a view obtaining the cessation of the economic coercion. Such options may include: | referred to in Article 4, the Commission shall be open to engage on behalf of the Union with the third | 1. Following the adoption of an implementing act in accordance with Article 4, the Commission shall provide adequate opportunity for consultationsThe Commission shall be open to engage on behalf of the Union with the third country concerned, to explore options with a view to obtaining the cessation of the economic coercion. If the third country concerned enters into consultations with the Union in good faith the Commission shall expeditiously engage in such consultations. In the course of such consultations the Commission may explore options with the third country concerned | SE PRES suggests accepting without unduly delaying the procedure". | 1. Following the adoption of an implementing act in accordance with Article 4, the Commission shall provide adequate opportunity for consultations with the third country concerned with a view to obtaining the cessation of the economic coercion and, where requested, reparation of the injury it has caused to the Union or its Member States. If the third country concerned enters into consultations with the Union in good faith, the Commission shall expeditiously engage in such consultations. In the course of such consultations—, the Commission may, without unduly delaying the procedure, explore options with the third country concerned including: |

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| - | | | | including Such options may include: | | |
| G | 61 | - direct negotiations; | - direct negotiations; | - direct negotiations; | | - direct negotiations; |
| - | 62 | - mediation, conciliation or good offices to assist the Union and the third country concerned in these efforts; | - mediation, conciliation or good offices to assist the Union and the third country concerned in these efforts; deleted | - mediation, conciliation or good offices by a third party to assist the Union and the third country concerned in these efforts; | | |
| - | 63 | - submitting the matter to international adjudication. | - submitting, also in parallel to the other options, the matter to international adjudication. | - submitting the matter to international adjudication. | | - submitting the matter to international adjudication. |
| | 63a | | | | | - mediation, conciliation or good offices by a third party to assist the Union and the third country concerned in those efforts; |

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| 63b | | | | | In the event of the Commission or a Member State obtaining compensation from the third country concerned for the injury suffered, the Commission or the Member State shall be guided by the International Law Commission's recommendation that such compensation should be transferred to the injured persons, subject to reasonable criteria. FN Footnote: Draft articles on diplomatic protection, Article 19, 2006. |
| 64 | The Commission shall seek to obtain the cessation of the economic coercion by also raising the matter in any relevant international forum. | The Commission shall seek to obtain the cessation of the economic coercion by also raising the matter in any relevant international forum. | 2. The Commission shall seek to obtain the cessation of the economic coercion by also by raising the matter in any relevant international forum, after having, in accordance with the Treaty, consulted the Council. | | 2. The Commission shall seek to obtain the cessation of the economic coercion also by raising the matter in any relevant international forum, after having, in accordance with the Treaty, consulted the Council. |
| 65 | The Commission shall keep the European Parliament and the Council informed of relevant | The Commission shall keep the European Parliament and the Council fully informed, in a regular and timely | 3. The Commission shall keep the European Parliament and the Council informed of any relevant developments pursuant to | | 3. The Commission shall keep the European Parliament and the Council informed of any relevant developments pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 2. |

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| - | | developments. | manner, including in the form of an exchange of views, and shall notify them of any of relevant developments in the engagement with the third country concerned. | paragraphs 1 and 2. | | |
| | | The Commission shall | The Commission shall | 4. The Commission shall | ~ | |
| | 66 | remain open to engage with the third country concerned after the adoption of Union response measures pursuant to Article 7. The Commission may pursue these efforts, as the case may be, in conjunction with a suspension, pursuant to Article 10(2), of any Union response measures. | remain open to engage with the third country concerned after the adoption of Union response measures pursuant to Article 7. The Commission may pursue these efforts, as the case may be, in conjunction with a suspension, pursuant to Article 10(2), of any Union response measures. | remain open to engageenter into consultations with the third country concerned after the adoption of Union response measures pursuant to Article 7. The Commission may pursue these efforts and, as the case may be, in conjunction with a suspension, pursuant to Article 10(2), of any Union response measures pursuant to Article 10(2). | | 4. The Commission shall remain open to enter into consultations with the third country concerned after the adoption of Union response measures pursuant to Article 7 and, as the case may be, in conjunction with a suspension of any Union response measures pursuant to Article 10(2). |
| | | | | | | |
| ā | 67 | Article 6 International cooperation | Article 6 International cooperation | Article 6 International cooperation | | Article 6 International cooperation |
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| 68 | The Commission shall enter into consultations or cooperation, on behalf of the Union, with any other country affected by the same or similar measures of economic coercion or with any interested third country, with a view to obtaining the cessation of the coercion. This may involve, where appropriate, coordination in relevant international fora and coordination in response to the coercion. | The Commission shall enter into consultations or cooperation, on behalf of the Union, with any other country and partner affected by the same or similar measures of economic coercion or with any interested third country and partner, with a view to obtaining the cessation of the coercion. This may involve, where appropriate coordination in sharing related information and experiences to facilitate a collective and coherent response to such coercive measures, and \(\tau\) coordination in relevant international fora and coordination in response to the coercion. Such consultation or cooperation shall not unduly delay the application of this instrument. The Commission shall inform, including in the form of an exchange of views, the European Parliament and the Council about the consultation or | The Commission shall enter into consultations or cooperation, on behalf of the Union, with any otherthird country affected by the same or similar measures of economic coercion or with any interested third country, with a view to obtaining the cessation of the coercion, after having, in accordance with the Treaty, consulted the Council. This may involve, where appropriate, coordination in relevant international fora and coordination in response to the coercion. The Commission shall keep the European Parliament and the Council informed of any relevant developments and invite, where appropriate, Member States to participate in such consultation and cooperation. | SE PRES proposes to accept. | The Commission shall enter into consultations or cooperation with any third country affected by the same or similar measures of economic coercion or with any interested third country, with a view to obtaining the cessation of the coercion, after having, in accordance with the Treaty, consulted the Council. This may involve, where appropriate, sharing related information and experiences to facilitate a coherent response to such measures of economic coercion, coordination in relevant international fora and coordination in response to the coercion. The Commission shall keep the European Parliament and the Council informed of any relevant developments and Such consultation or cooperation shall not unduly delay the procedure under this Regulation. The Commission shall invite, where appropriate, Member States to participate in such consultation and cooperation. |

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| | | | cooperation. | | | |
| G | 69 | Article 7 Union response measures | Article 7 Union response measures | Article 7 Union response measures | | Article 7 Union response measures |
| | 70 | 1. The Commission shall adopt an implementing act determining that it shall take a Union response measure where: | 1. The Commission shall adoptake a Union response measure by means of an implementing act determining that it shall take a Union response measure from among the measures provided for in Annex I where: | 1. The Commission shall adopt an implementing act in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 15(2) determining that it shall take a Union response measure under this Regulation, where: | SE PRES proposes to accept. | 1. The Commission shall adopttake a Union response measure by means of an implementing act in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 15(2) determining that it shall take a Union response measure under this Regulation, where: |
| | 71 | (a) action pursuant to the Articles 4 and 5 has not resulted in the cessation of the economic coercion and reparation of the injury it has caused to the Union or a Member State within a reasonable period of time; | (a) action pursuant to the Articles 4 and 5 has not resulted in the cessation of the economic coercion and where appropriate, in the reparation of the injury it has caused to the Union or aits Member StateS within a reasonable the period of time set in the decision referred to in | (a) action pursuant to-the Articles 4 and 5 has not resulted in the cessation of the economic coercion and, where appropriate, the reparation of the injury it has caused to the Union or a Member State within a reasonable period of time; | SE PRES suggests accepting (as a concession). | (a) action pursuant to—Articles 4 and 5 has not resulted in the cessation of the economic coercion and, where <u>requested</u> , <u>in appropriate</u> , the reparation of the injury it has caused to the Union or a Member State within a reasonable period of time; <u>and not exceeding the time period indicated in the implementing act pursuant to Article 4 where such period is indicated.</u> |

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| | | Article 4; | | | |
| 72 | (b) action is necessary to protect the interests and rights of the Union and its Member States in that particular case, and | (b) action is necessary to protect the interests and rights of the Union and its Member States in that particular case, and | (b) action is necessary to protect the interests and rights of the Union and its Member States in that particular case, in light of the options available; and | | (b) action is necessary to protect the interests and rights of the Union and its Member States in that particular case in light of the options available; Where the third country has ceased the economic coercion but has not repaired in full the injury as requested, the consideration of whether action is necessary to protect the interests and rights of the Union and its Member States in that particular case shall be based on the nature and extent of the damage caused and all other circumstances of the particular case. Specifically, the consideration shall be guided by the overall relationship with the third country concerned, other aspects of Union interest, including the desirability for Union persons having suffered damage to have that damage repaired, and the general obligation under customary international law to make full reparation for the injury caused through an internationally wrongful act. -and |

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| 73 | (c) action is in the Union's interest. | (c) action is in the Union's interest in the particular case of economic coercion under examination. | (c) action is in the Union's interest in accordance with Article 7bis. | | (c) action is in the Union's interest. as determined in accordance with Article 7bis. |
| 74 | In the implementing act, the Commission shall also determine the appropriate Union response from among the measures provided for in Annex I. Such measures may also apply with regard to natural or legal persons designated in accordance with Article 8. The Commission may also adopt measures which it can take pursuant to other legal instruments. | In the implementing act referred to in the first subparagraph, the Commission shall also determine the appropriate Union response from among the measures provided for in Annex Fiustify that the conditions referred to in points (a), (b) and (c) are met. It shall also determine and justify the appropriate Union response. Such measures may also apply with regard to natural or legal persons designated in accordance with Article 8. The Commission may also adopt measures which it | In the implementing act referred to in the first subparagraph, the Commission shall also determine the appropriate Union response from among theconsisting in one or more measures provided for impursuant to Annex I. Such measures may-also apply with regard to natural or legal persons designated in accordance with Article 8. The Commission may also adopt measures which it can take pursuant to other legal instruments. | | In the implementing act referred to in the first subparagraph, the Commission shall also-determine the appropriate Union response consisting in one or more measures pursuant to Annex Imeasures. The Commission shall pay particular attention to the requirement to explain that the conditions referred to in points (a), (b) and (c) are met and that the Union response measure is appropriate in accordance with Article 9(2). Such measures may apply with regard to natural or legal persons designated in accordance with Article 8. |
| | | can take pursuant to other legal instruments. | | | |
| 75 | The implementing act | The implementing act | Insofar as the measures of | | Insofar as the measures of the third |

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| | shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 15(2). | referred to in the first subparagraph shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 15(2). The Commission shall inform, including in the form of an exchange of views, the European Parliament and the Council of the implementing act and publish it in the Official Journal of the European Union and through other suitable public communication means. | the third country concerned constitute an internationally wrongful act, Union response measures The implementing act shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 15(2) under this Regulation may consist of measures implying the nonperformance of international obligations towards the third country concerned. | | country concerned constitute an internationally wrongful act, Union response measures adopted under this Regulation may consist of measures implying the non-performance of international obligations towards the third country concerned. |
| | | | | | |
| 75a | | The Commission may also adopt measures that are not listed in Annex I pursuant to other legal instruments. Any such adoption shall be coordinated and consistent with action under this Regulation. | | | The Commission may also adopt, pursuant to other legal instruments, measures that are not listed in Annex I. Any such adoption shall be coordinated and consistent with action under this Regulation. |
| | | | | | |
| 76 | 2. The Union response measures | 2. The Union response measures shall apply from | 2. The Union response measures shall apply from a | SE PRES suggests accepting (as a | 2. The Union response measures shall apply from a specified date after the |

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| | shall apply from a specified date after the adoption of the implementing act referred to in paragraph 1. The Commission shall set this date of application, taking into account the circumstances, to allow for the notification of the third country concerned pursuant to paragraph 3 and for it to cease the economic coercion. | a specified date after the adoption of the implementing act referred to in paragraph 1 and in any case within three months from its adoption. The Commission shall set this date of application, taking into account the circumstances, to allow for the notification of the third country concerned pursuant to paragraph 3 and for it to cease the economic coercion and, where appropriate, to repair the injury caused. | specified date after the adoption of the implementing act referred to in paragraph 1. The Commission shall set thisspecify the date of application of the Union response measures, taking into account the circumstances, to allow for the notification of the third country concerned pursuant to paragraph 3 and for it to cease the economic coercion. | concession). | adoption of the implementing act referred to in paragraph 1. The specified date for application shall not be later than three months from the adoption of the implementing act, unless the implementing act specifies a later date in light of the specific circumstances. The Commission shall specify the date of application of the Union response measures, taking into account the circumstances, to allow for the notification of the third country concerned pursuant to paragraph 3 and for it to cease the economic coercion or, where requested, to repair the injury caused. |
| 77 | 3. The Commission shall, upon adoption of the implementing act, notify the third country concerned of the Union response measures adopted pursuant to paragraph 1. In the notification, the Commission shall, on behalf of the Union, call on the third country concerned to promptly | 3. The Commission shall, upon adoption of the implementing act, notify the third country concerned of the Union response measures adopted pursuant to paragraph 1. In the notification, the Commission shall, on behalf of the Union, call on the third country concerned to promptly immediately cease the economic coercion, offer to negotiate | 3. The Commission shall, Upon adoption of the implementing act, notify the third country concerned of the Union response measures adopted pursuant to referred to in paragraph 1. In the notification, the Commission shall, on behalf of the Union, eall on notify the third country concerned to promptly cease the economic coercion, offer to negotiate a solution, and inform the third | | 3. Upon adoption of the implementing act referred to in paragraph 1, the Commission shall notify the third country concerned thereof and: |

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| | cease the economic coercion, offer to negotiate a solution, and inform the third country concerned that the Union response measure will apply, unless the economic coercion ceases. | a solution including, where appropriate, with regard to the reparation of the injury caused by the third country to the Union or its Members States, and inform the third country concerned that the Union response measure will apply, unless the economic coercion ceases or, where appropriate, that third country repairs the injury caused. | country concerned that the Union response measure will apply, unless the economic coercion ceases.thereof and: | | |
| | | | | | |
| 77a | | | (a) call on the third country concerned to promptly cease the economic coercion; | | (a) call on the third country concerned to promptly cease the economic coercion; call on the third country concerned to immediately cease the economic coercion and, where appropriate, to repair the injury caused; |
| | | | | | |
| 77b | | | (b) offer the third country concerned to negotiate a solution; and | | (b) offer the third country concerned to negotiate a solution; and |
| 77c | | | (c) inform the third country | | (c) inform the third country concerned |

| | Commission Proposal | EP Mandate | Council Mandate | PRES ASSESSMENT | COM COMPROMISE 9/1 (markups as compared to Council mandate) |
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| | | | concerned that the Union response measures will apply, unless the economic coercion ceases. | | that the Union response measures will apply, unless the economic coercion ceases.inform the third country concerned that the Union response measures will apply, unless the economic coercion ceases and, where appropriate, the third country repairs the injury caused. |
| 78 | 4. The implementing act referred to in paragraph 1 shall state that the application of the Union response measures shall be deferred for a period specified in that implementing act, where the Commission has credible information that the third country has ceased the economic coercion before the start of application of the adopted Union response measures. In that event, the Commission shall publish a notice in the Official Journal of the | 4. The implementing act referred to in paragraph 1 shall state that the application of the Union response measures shall be deferred, but only for a period that is necessary for the Commission to verify the actual cessation of the coercion or threat thereof and that needs to be specified in that implementing act, where the Commission has credible information that the third country has ecased taken concrete steps to cease the economic coercion or the threat thereof or, where appropriate, has repaired the injury caused before the start of application of | 4. The implementing act referred to in paragraph 1 shall state that theprovide for a deferred application of the Union response measures shall be deferred for a period of time specified in that implementing act, where the Commission has credible information that the third country has ceased the economic coercion before the startdate of application of the adopted Union response measures. In that In the event; that the Commission has the information referred to in the first subparagraph, it shall publish a notice in the Official Journal of the European UnionOfficial | SE PRES suggests accepting the addition of "but only that is necessary for the Commission to verify the actual cessation of the coercion and which needs to be". | 4. The implementing act referred to in paragraph 1 shall provide for a deferred application of the Union response measures , but only for a period that is necessary for the Commission to verify the actual cessation of the coercion and which needs to be of time specified in that implementing act, where the Commission has credible information that the third country has ceased or has taken concrete steps to cease the economic coercion and, where appropriate, has repaired the injury caused before the datestart of application of the adopted Union response measures. In the event that the Commission has the information referred to in the first subparagraph, it shall publish a notice in the Official Journal of the European Union indicating that there is such information and the date from which the deferral shall apply. |

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| | European Union indicating that there is such information and the date from which the deferral shall apply. If the third country ceases the economic coercion before the Union response measures start to apply, the Commission shall terminate the Union response measures in accordance with Article 10. | the adopted Union response measures. In that event, the Commission shall publish a notice in the Official Journal of the European Union indicating that there is such information and the date from which the deferral shall apply. If the third country ceases the economic coercion or, where appropriate, repairs the injury caused before the Union response measures start to apply, the Commission shall terminate the Union response measures in accordance with Article 10. | Journal of the European Union indicating that there is such information and the date from which the deferral shall apply. If the third country ceases the economic coercion before the Union response measures start to applydate of application of the Union response measures, the Commission shall terminate the Union response measures in accordance with Article 10. | | If the third country ceases the economic coercion and, where appropriate, repairs the injury caused before the date of application of the Union response measures, the Commission shall terminate the Union response measures in accordance with Article 10. |
| 79 | 5. Notwithstanding paragraphs 2, 3 and 4, the Union response measures may apply without the Commission, on behalf of the Union, first calling, once more, on the third country concerned to cease the economic coercion or without | 5. Notwithstanding paragraphs 2, 3 and 4, The Union response measures may apply without the Commission, on behalf of the Union, first calling, once more again, on the third country concerned to cease the economic coercion or without the Commission first notifying it that Union response | 5. Notwithstanding paragraphs 2, 3 and 4, the implementing act referred to in paraghraph 1 may provide that Union response measures mayshall apply without the Commission, on behalf of the Union, first calling, once more, on the third country concerned to cease the economic coercion or without the Commission | | 5. Notwithstanding paragraphs 2, 3 and 4, the implementing act referred to in paraghraph paragraph 1 may provide that Union response measures shall apply without the Commission first calling, once more again, on the third country concerned to cease the economic coercion or, where appropriate, repair the injury caused, or without the Commission first notifying the third country concerned that Union response measure will apply pursuant to paragraph 3, where in duly |

| | Commission Proposal | EP Mandate | Council Mandate | PRES ASSESSMENT | COM COMPROMISE 9/1 (markups as compared to Council mandate) |
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| | the Commission first notifying it that Union response measure will apply, where this is necessary for the preservation of the rights and interests of the Union or Member States, notably of the effectiveness of Union response measures. | measure will apply pursuant to paragraph 3, where this is necessary for the preservation of the rights and interests of the Union or Member States, notably of the effectiveness of Union response measures. | first notifying itthe third country concerned that Union response measure will apply, where in duly justified cases, this is necessary for the preservation of the rights and interests of the Union or a Member StatesState, notably of the effectiveness of Union response measures. | | justified cases, this is necessary for the preservation of the rights and interests of the Union or a Member State, notably of the effectiveness of Union response measures. |
| 79a | | | 5bis. Notwithstanding paragraphs 2 and 4, where economic coercion consists in a threat to apply measures affecting trade or investment in accordance with Article 2(1), the date of application of the Union response measures shall be the date when the third country starts applying such measures. The Commission shall specify such date of application in the implementing act referred to in paragraph 1. If the third country delays to a specific date the application of its measures, the Commission shall publish a notice in the | | 5bis. Notwithstanding paragraphs 2 and 4, where economic coercion consists in a threat to apply measures affecting trade or investment in accordance with Article 2(1), the date of application of the Union response measures shall be the date when the third country starts applying such measures. The Commission shall specify such date of application in the implementing act referred to in paragraph 1. If the third country delays to a specific date the application of its measures, the Commission shall publish a notice in the Official Journal of the European Union indicating that the Union response measures shall apply on that date. |

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| | | | Official Journal of the European Union indicating that the Union response measures shall apply on that date. | | |
| 80 | 6. On duly justified imperative grounds of urgency to avoid irreparable damage to the Union or its Member States by the measures of economic coercion the Commission shall adopt immediately applicable implementing acts imposing Union response measures, in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 15(3). The requirements set out in paragraphs 2 to 5 shall apply. Those acts shall remain in force | 6. On duly justified imperative grounds of urgency to avoid irreparable damage to the Union or its Member States by the measures of economic coercion the Commission shall adoptake a Union response measure by means of an implementing act referred to in Article 7(1) as immediately applicable implementing acts imposing Union response measures, in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 15(3)The requirements set out in paragraphs 2 to 51 to 4 | 6. On duly justified imperative grounds of urgency to avoid irreparable damage to the Union or its Member States by the measures of economic coercion the Commission shall adopt immediately applicable implementing acts imposing Union response measures, in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 15(3). The requirements set out in paragraphs 2 to 5 shall apply. Those acts shall remain in force for a period not exceeding three months. | | |
| | for a period not exceeding three months. | shall apply and the conditions listed in paragraph 5 are considered to be met. Those acts shall remain in force for a period not | | | |

| | Commission Proposal | EP Mandate | Council Mandate | PRES ASSESSMENT | COM COMPROMISE 9/1 (markups as compared to Council mandate) |
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| | | exceeding three months after which the measures may be adopted by means of an implementing act referred to in Article 7(1) may be adopted as appropriate. The Commission shall inform, including in the form of an exchange of views, the European Parliament and the Council about the implementing acts and publish them in the Official Journal of the European Union and through other suitable public communication means. | | | |
| | | | | | |
| 81 | 7. The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 14 to amend the list provided for in Annex I in order to provide additional types of measures to respond to a third country's measure. The Commission may adopt such delegated | 7. The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 14 to amend the list provided for in Annex I in order to provide additional types of measures to respond to a third country's measure, after having informed the European Parliament and the Council of the delegated acts. The | deleted | | |

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| | acts where the types of response measures would: | Commission may adopt such delegated acts where the types of response measures would: | | | |
| | | | | | |
| 82 | (a) be as effective or more effective than the response measures already provided for in terms of inducing the cessation of measures of economic coercion; | (a) be as effective or more effective than the response measures already provided for in terms of inducing the cessation of measures of economic coercion; | deleted | | |
| | | | | | |
| 83 | (b) provide as effective or more effective relief to economic operators within the Union affected by the measures of economic coercion; | (b) provide as effective or more effective relief to economic operators within the Union affected by the measures of economic coercion; | deleted | | |
| | | | | | |
| 84 | (c) avoid or minimise the negative impact on affected actors; or | (c) avoid or minimise the negative impact on affected actors; or | deleted | | |

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| 85 | (d) avoid or minimise administrative complexity and costs. | (d) avoid or minimise administrative complexity and costs. | deleted | | |
| 85a | | | Article 7bis Union's interest | SE proposes to agree | Article 7bis Article 7bis Determination of the Union's interest |
| 85b | | | A determination as to whether it is in the Union's interest to act under this Regulation shall be based on an appreciation of all the various interests taken as a whole, including the interests of Member States, Union economic operators, including upstream and downstream industries, and final consumers. The general objective of deterring or having the third country desist from measures of economic coercion, whilst enabling the Union as a last resort to counteract such actions, shall be given special | SE PRES proposes to agree. | A determination as to whether it is in the Union's interest to act under this Regulation shall be based on an appreciation of all the various interests taken as a whole, including the interests of Member States, Union economic operators, including upstream and downstream industries, and final consumers. The general objective of deterring or having the third country desist from measures of economic coercion, whilst enabling the Union as a last resort to counteract such actions, shall be given special consideration in the determination. The determination shall be made on the basis of all the information available. Union response measures under this Regulation shall be taken where the Commission concludes that it is in the Union's interest to take such measures. |

| | | Commission Proposal | EP Mandate | Council Mandate | PRES ASSESSMENT | COM COMPROMISE 9/1 (markups as compared to Council mandate) |
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| | | | | consideration. The determination shall be made on the basis of all the information available. Union response measures under this Regulation shall be taken where the Commission concludes that it is in the Union's interest to take such measures. | | |
| G | 86 | Article 8 Union response measures with regard to natural or legal persons | Article 8 Union response measures with regard to natural or legal persons | Article 8 Union response measures with regard to natural or legal persons | | Article 8 Union response measures with regard to natural or legal persons |
| | 87 | 1. The Commission may provide, in the implementing act referred to in Article 7(1), or in a separate implementing act, that: | 1. The Commission may provide, in the implementing act referred to in Article 7(1), or in a separate implementing act, that: | 1. The Commission may provide, in the implementing act referred to inNatural or legal persons which engage, or may engage in activities covered by Article 7(1), or in a separate implementing act, that:207 TFEU and are connected or linked to the government of the third country concerned may be subject to Union response measures pursuant to | | 1. Natural or legal persons which engage, or may engage in activities covered by Article 207 TFEU and are connected or linked to the government of the third country concerned may be subject to Union response measures pursuant to Annex I. |

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| | | | Annex I. | | |
| | | | | | |
| 88 | (a) legal or natural persons designated in accordance with paragraph 2 point (a) shall be subject to Union response measures; or | (a) legal or natural persons designated in accordance with paragraph 2 point (a) shall be subject to Union response measures; or | deleted | | <u>(a)</u> |
| | | | | | |
| 89 | (b) without prejudice to the responsibility of the third country under international law, Union natural or legal persons affected by the third country's measures of economic coercion shall be entitled to recover, from persons designated pursuant to paragraph 2, point (b), any damage caused to them by the measures of economic coercion up to the extent of the designated persons' contribution to such measures of economic | (b) without prejudice to the responsibility of the third country under international law, Union natural or legal persons affected by the third country's measures of economic coercion shall be entitled to recover, from persons designated pursuant to paragraph 2, point (b), any damage caused to them by the measures of economic coercion up to the extent of the designated persons' contribution to such measures of economic coercion. | deleted | | |

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| | coercion. | | | | |
| | | | | | , |
| 90 | Those measures shall apply as of the same date of application as the Union response measures adopted pursuant to Article 7, or as of a later date specified in the implementing act pursuant to this paragraph. | Those measures shall apply as of the same date of application as the Union response measures adopted pursuant to Article 7, or as of a later date specified in the implementing act pursuant to this paragraph. | deleted | | |
| | | | | | |
| 91 | Those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 15(2). | Those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 15(2). | deleted | | |
| | | | | | I |
| 92 | 2. The Commission may designate a natural or legal person where it finds: | 2. The Commission may designate a natural or legal person where it finds: | deleted | | <u>2.</u> |
| | where it inius. | | | | |

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| 93 | (a) that such person is connected or linked to the government of the third country concerned; or, | (a) that such person is connected or linked to the government of the third country concerned; or, | deleted | | |
| | | | | | |
| 94 | (b) that such person is connected or linked to the government of the third country concerned and has additionally caused or been involved in or connected with the economic coercion. | (b) that such person is connected or linked to the government of the third country concerned and has additionally caused or been involved in or connected with the economic coercion. | deleted | | |
| 94a | | | 3. Paragraph 1 shall only apply to natural or legal persons designated in accordance with this Article. | | 3. Paragraph [1] shall only apply to natural or legal persons designated in accordance with this Article. |
| 94b | | | 4. For the purposes of this Article, the Commission shall adopt implementing acts in accordance with the | | 4. For the purposes of this Article, the Commission shall adopt implementing acts in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 15(2). |

| elementing acts shall designate falling under paragraph 1, and the Union response measures to such persons. |
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| |
| nplementing act referred to in n 4 of this Article may be simultaneously with the nting act referred to in Article ubsequently. |
| |
| eral or legal person may be eral as connected or linked to the eral of the third country d pursuant to paragraph 1 natural or legal person may be eral as connected or linked to the eral of the third country d pursuant to paragraph 1 |
| l S I |

| | Commission Proposal | EP Mandate | Council Mandate | PRES ASSESSMENT | COM COMPROMISE 9/1 (markups as compared to Council mandate) |
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| 94e | | | (a) that government beneficially owns more than 50% of the equity interest in such legal person, exercises directly or indirectly more than 50% of the voting rights in it, or has the power to appoint a majority of its directors or otherwise to legally direct its actions; | | (a) that government beneficially owns more than 50 % of the equity interest in such legal person, exercises directly or indirectly more than 50 % of the voting rights in it, or has the power to appoint a majority of its directors or otherwise to legally direct its actions; that government beneficially owns more than 50 % of the equity interest in such legal person, exercises directly or indirectly more than 50 % of the voting rights in it, or has the power to appoint a majority of its directors or otherwise to legally direct its actions; |
| 94f | | | (b) such person benefits from exclusive or special rights or privileges granted in law or in fact by the government of the third country concerned, if it operates in a sector where that government limits to one or more the number of suppliers or buyers, or if it is allowed directly or indirectly by that government to exercise practices which prevent, restrict or distort competition; or | | (b) such person benefits from exclusive or special rights or privileges granted in law or in fact by the government of the third country concerned, if it operates in a sector where that government limits to one or more the number of suppliers or buyers, or if it is allowed directly or indirectly by that government to exercise practices which prevent, restrict or distort competition; or such person benefits from exclusive or special rights or privileges granted in law or in fact by the government of the third country concerned, if it operates in a sector where that government limits to one or more the number of suppliers or buyers, |

| | Commission Proposal | EP Mandate | Council Mandate | PRES ASSESSMENT | COM COMPROMISE 9/1 (markups as compared to Council mandate) |
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| | | | | | or if it is allowed directly or indirectly by that government to exercise practices |
| 94g | | | (c) such person effectively acts on behalf of, or at the direction or instigation of the government of the third country concerned. | | (c) such person effectively acts on behalf of, or at the direction or instigation of the government of the third country concerned such person effectively acts on behalf of, or at the direction or instigation of the government of the third country concerned. |
| | | | | | |
| 95 | 3. In making this designation the Commission shall examine all relevant criteria and available information, including whether the persons concerned are known to effectively act on behalf of, or are beneficially owned or otherwise effectively controlled by the government of the third country. | 3. In making this designation the Commission shall examine all relevant criteria and available information, including whether the persons concerned are known to effectively act on behalf of, or are beneficially owned or otherwise effectively controlled by the government of the third country. | deleted | | |
| 96 | | | | | |

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| 4. Where the Commission has grounds to consider that persons should be designated pursuant to paragraph 2, point (a) or point (b) it shall publish a provisional list of persons and, where relevant, the possible measures pursuant to Annex I that they would be subject to. Before deciding on designation, it shall give any persons provisionally designated and other interested parties the opportunity to submit comments on the possible designation, in particular whether they fall under the conditions of paragraph 2, point (a) or point (b). The Commission may also seek additional information it considers pertinent concerning the potential designation. | 4. Where the Commission has grounds to consider that persons should be designated pursuant to paragraph 2, point (a) or point (b) it shall publish a provisional list of persons and, where relevant, the possible measures pursuant to Annex I that they would be subject to. Before deciding on designation, it shall give any persons provisionally designated and other interested parties the opportunity to submit comments on the possible designation, in particular whether they fall under the conditions of paragraph 2, point (a) or point (b). The Commission may also seek additional information it considers pertinent concerning the potential designation. | 48. Where the Commission has grounds to consider that personsbelieve that a person should be designated pursuant toon the basis of paragraph 2, point (a) or point (b) it shall publish a provisional list of persons 1, it shall inform such person of its intention, including the grounds for designation, and, where relevant, the possible measures pursuant to Annex I that that person that they would be subject to. Before deciding on designation, it shall give any persons provisionally designated and other interested parties the opportunity to submit comments on the possible designation, in particular whether they fall under the conditions of paragraph 2, point (a) or point (b). The Commission may also seek additional information it considers pertinent concerning the potential designation The Commission shall publish a notice in the Official Journal of the European Union to this effect and, whenever possible, notify directly the | | 8. Where the Commission has grounds to believe that a person should be designated on the basis of paragraph 1, it shall inform such person of its intention, including the grounds for designation, and, where relevant, the possible measures pursuant to Annex I that that person would be subject to. The Commission shall publish a notice in the Official Journal of the European Union to this effect and, whenever possible, notify directly the person concerned. |

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| | | | person concerned. | | |
| 96a | | | Before deciding on the designation, the Commission shall give: | | Before deciding on the designation, the Commission shall give: |
| 96b | | | (a) any persons referred to in the first subparagraph the opportunity to submit observations on the possible designation, in particular on whether they fall under the conditions established in paragraph 1; within a reasonable period of time; and | | (a) any persons referred to in the first subparagraph the opportunity to submit observations on the possible designation, in particular on whether they fall under the conditions established in paragraph [11]+; within a reasonable period of time; and |
| 96c | | | (b) other interested parties the opportunity to submit observations on the possible designation. | | (b) other interested parties the opportunity to submit observations on the possible designation. |
| 96d | | | The Commission may also seek information it | SE PRES agrees (Council mandate) | The Commission may also seek information it considers relevant |

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| | | | considers relevant concerning the potential designation under this Article, including by requesting such information from Member States. | | concerning the potential designation under this Article, including by requesting such information from Member States. |
| 96e | | | 9. Without prejudice to Article 10, the Commission shall review designations under this Article when new substantial evidence is submitted to the Commission and inform the designated natural or legal persons concerned accordingly. | | 9. Without prejudice to Article 10, the Commission shall review designations under this Article when new substantial evidence is submitted to the Commission and inform the designated natural or legal persons concerned accordingly. |
| 97 | Article 9 Criteria for selecting and designing Union response measures | Article 9 Criteria for selecting and designing Union response measures | Article 9 Criteria for selecting and designing Union response measures | | Article 9 Criteria for selecting and designing Union response measures |
| 98 | Any Union response measure shall not exceed the | Any Union response measure shall not exceed be commensurate to the level | Any Union response measure shall not exceed the level that is commensurate | | 1. Any Union response measure shall not exceed-the level that is commensurate withof the injury suffered by the Union or |

| | Commission Proposal | EP Mandate | Council Mandate | PRES ASSESSMENT | COM COMPROMISE 9/1 (markups as compared to Council mandate) |
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| | level that is commensurate with the injury suffered by the Union or a Member State due to the third country's measures of economic coercion, taking into account the gravity of the third country's measures and the rights in question. | that is commensurate withto the injury suffered by the Union or a Member State due to the third country's measures of economic coercion, taking into account the gravity of the third country's measures and the economic impact that those measures are having on the Union or a Member State and shall be effective in preserving the Union and its Member States' rights in questionmaking legitimate sovereign choices with regard to particular acts, policies or stances. | with the injury suffered by the Union or a Member State due to the third country's measures of economic coercion, taking into account the gravity of the third country's measures of economic coercion and the rights in question of the Union or a Member State. | | a Member State due to the third country's measures of economic coercion, taking into account the gravity of the third country's measures of economic coercion and the rights of economic impact that those measures of economic coercion are having on the Union or a Member State State and the rights of the Union and its Member States. |
| | | | | | |
| 99 | 2. The Commission shall select and design an appropriate response measure taking into account the determination made pursuant to Article 4, the criteria set out in Article 2(2) and the Union's interest, on the basis of available | 2. The Commission shall select and design an appropriate response measure taking into account the determination made pursuant to Article 4, the criteria set out in Article 2(2) and the Union's interest 2, on the basis of available information, including as collected pursuant to | 2. The Commission shall select and design an appropriate response measure taking into account the determination made pursuant to Article 4, the criteria set out in Article 2(2) and the Union's interest pursuant to Article 7bis , on the basis of available information, including as collected pursuant to Article 11, and | | 2. The Commission shall select and design an appropriate response measure taking into account the determination made pursuant to Article 4, the criteria set out in Article 2(2) and the Union's interest <u>determination</u> pursuant to Article 7bis, on the basis of available information, including as collected pursuant to Article 11, and the following criteria: |

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| | information, including as collected pursuant to Article 11, and the following criteria: | Article 11, and the following criteria: | the following criteria: | | |
| 100 | (a) the effectiveness of the measures in inducing the cessation of the economic coercion; | (a) the effectiveness of the measures in inducing the cessation of the economic coercion and, where appropriate, reparation of the injury caused to the Union and its Member States; | (a) the effectiveness of the Union response measures in inducing the cessation of the economic coercion; | | (a) the effectiveness of the Union response measures in inducing the cessation of the economic coercion and, where, reparation of the injury caused to the Union and its Member States; |
| 100a | | | (abis) the avoidance or minimisation of negative impacts | | (abis) the avoidance or minimisation of negative impacts |
| 100b | | | - on Union actors affected by Union response measures, including the availability of alternatives for such affected actors, for example alternative sources of supply for goods or services, | | - on Union actors affected by Union response measures, including the availability of alternatives for such affected actors, for example alternative sources of supply for goods or services, |

| | Commission Proposal | EP Mandate | Council Mandate | PRES ASSESSMENT | COM COMPROMISE 9/1 (markups as compared to Council mandate) |
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| 100c | | | - on the investment environment in the Union or a Member State, including the impact on employment and regional development policy; | | - on the investment environment in the Union or a Member State, including the impact on employment and regional development policy; |
| 101 | (b) the potential of the measures to provide relief to economic operators within the Union affected by the economic coercion; | (b) the potential of the measures to provide relief to economic operators within the Union affected by the economic coercion; | (b) the potential of the Union response measures to provide relief to Union economic operators within the Union affected by the economic coercion; | | (b) the potential of the Union response measures to provide relief to Union economic operators within the Union affected by the economic coercion; |
| 102 | (c) the avoidance or minimisation of negative impacts on affected actors by Union response measures, including the availability of alternatives for affected actors, for example alternative sources of supply for goods or services; | (c) the avoidance or minimisation of negative impacts on affected actors by Union response measures, including the availability of alternatives for affected actors, for example alternative sources of supply for goods or services; | (c) the avoidance or minimisation of negative impacts on affected actors by Union response measures, including the availability of alternatives for affected actors, for example alternative sources of supply for goods or services; | | |

| | Commission Proposal | EP Mandate | Council Mandate | PRES ASSESSMENT | COM COMPROMISE 9/1 (markups as compared to Council mandate) |
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| 103 | (d) the avoidance or minimisation of negative effects on other Union policies or objectives; | (d) the avoidance or minimisation of negative effects on other Union policies or objectives; | (d) the avoidance or minimisation of negative effects on other Union policies or objectives by Union response measures; | | (d) the avoidance or minimisation of negative effects on other Union policies or objectives by Union response measures; |
| 103a | | | (dbis) any relevant action in the Union's common foreign and security policy; | SE pres agrees (Council mandate) | (dbis) any relevant action in the Union's common foreign and security policy; |
| 104 | (e) the avoidance of disproportionate administrative complexity and costs in the application of the Union response measures; | (e) the avoidance of disproportionate administrative complexity and costs in the application of the Union response measures; | (e) the avoidance of disproportionate administrative complexity and costs in the application of the Union response measures; | | (e) the avoidance of disproportionate administrative complexity and costs in the application of the Union response measures; |
| 105 | (f) the existence and nature of any response measures enacted by other countries affected by the same or similar measures of economic coercion, | (f) the existence and nature of any response measures enacted by other countries affected by the same or similar measures of economic coercion, including where relevant | (f) the existence and nature of any response measures enacted by-other third countries affected by the same or similar measures of economic coercion, including where relevant any | | (f) the existence and nature of any response measures enacted by third countries affected by the same or similar measures of economic coercion, including where relevant any coordination pursuant to Article 6; |

| | | Commission Proposal | EP Mandate | Council Mandate | PRES ASSESSMENT | COM COMPROMISE 9/1 (markups as compared to Council mandate) |
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| | | including where relevant any coordination pursuant to Article 6; | any coordination pursuant to Article 6; | coordination pursuant to Article 6; | | |
| G | 106 | (g) any other relevant criteria established in international law. | (g) any other relevant criteria established in international law. | (g) any other relevant criteria established in international law. | | (g) any other relevant criteria established in international law. |
| | 106a | | | In selecting Union response measures, the Commission shall give predominant weight to measures which most effectively ensure compliance with criteria (a) and (abis). | | In selecting Union response measures, the Commission shall give predominant weight to measures which most effectively ensure compliance with criteria (a) and (abis). |
| | 106b | | | 2bis. Without prejudice to paragraph 2, when selecting and designing an appropriate response measure that affects a procedure whereby a public authority in the Union grants authorisations, registrations, licenses or | | Zbis. Without prejudice to paragraph 2, when selecting and designing an appropriate response measure that affects a procedure whereby a public authority in the Union grants authorisations, registrations, licenses or other rights to a natural or legal person for the purposes of their commercial activities, the Commission shall always consider |

| | Commission Proposal | EP Mandate | Council Mandate | PRES ASSESSMENT | COM COMPROMISE 9/1 (markups as compared to Council mandate) |
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| | | | other rights to a natural or legal person for the purposes of their commercial activities, the Commission shall always consider measures according to the following hierarchy of steps: | | measures according to the following hierarchy of steps: [|
| 106c | | | (a) measures affecting procedures duly initiated after the entry into force of the implementing act referred to in Article 7(1) or 8(1), respectively, or where no such measures are available | | [(a) measures affecting procedures duly initiated after the entry into force of the implementing act referred to in Article 7(1) or 8(1), respectively, or where no such measures are available. |
| 106d | | | (b) measures affecting procedures not yet completed upon the entry into force of the implementing act referred to in Article 7(1) or 8(1), respectively. | | (b) measures affecting procedures not yet completed upon the entry into force of the implementing act referred to in Article 7(1) or 8(1), respectively. |
| 106e | | | Where none of the | | Where none of the measures referred to |

| | Commission Proposal | EP Mandate | Council Mandate | PRES ASSESSMENT | COM COMPROMISE 9/1 (markups as compared to Council mandate) |
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| | | | measures referred to in points (a) and (b) of the first subparagraph are available, the Commission may, in exceptional circumstances consider other response measures, where it has been demonstrated, in light of the information-gathering exercise conducted pursuant to Article 11, that those other measures would not disproportionately affect the upstream industries, downstream industries or final consumers within the Union or impose a disproportionate burden on the process of administration of relevant national regulations, whilst ensuring effectiveness. | | in points (a) and (b) of the first subparagraph are available, the Commission may, in exceptional circumstances consider other response measures, where it has been demonstrated, in light of the information-gathering exercise conducted pursuant to Article 11, that those other measures would not disproportionately affect the upstream industries, downstream industries or final consumers within the Union or impose a disproportionate burden on the process of administration of relevant national regulations, whilst ensuring effectiveness. |
| 106f | | | In conjunction with the first subparagraph, when selecting and designing a response measure, the Commission shall always take into account the level of harmonisation while preferring measures | | In conjunction with the first subparagraph, when selecting and designing a response measure, the Commission shall always take into account the level of harmonisation while preferring measures affecting procedures applied on a Union-wide basis or measures affecting procedures applied in |

| | Commission Proposal | EP Mandate | Council Mandate | PRES ASSESSMENT | COM COMPROMISE 9/1 (markups as compared to Council mandate) |
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| | | | affecting procedures applied on a Union-wide basis or measures affecting procedures applied in an area where extensive Union legislation exists. | | an area where extensive Union legislation exists. |
| | | | | | |
| 107 | 3. The Commission may decide to apply Union response measures under Articles 7 or 8 consisting of restrictions on foreign direct investment or on trade in services also with regard to services supplied, or direct investments made, within the Union by one or more legal persons established in the Union and owned or controlled by persons of the third country concerned where necessary to achieve the objectives of this Regulation. The Commission may decide on such application where | 3. The Commission may decide to apply Union response measures under Articles 7 or 8 consisting of restrictions on foreign direct investment or on trade in services also with regard to services supplied, or direct investments made, within the Union by one or more legal persons established in the Union and owned or controlled by persons of the third country concerned where necessary to achieve the objectives of this Regulation. The Commission may decide on such application where Union response measures not covering such situations would be insufficient to effectively achieve the objectives of this Regulation, in particular where the effect | 3. Where necessary to achieve the objectives of this Regulation, the Commission may decide to apply Union response measures under Articles 7 or 8 consisting of restrictions on foreign direct investment or on trade in services also with regard to services supplied, or direct investments made, within the Union by one or more legal persons established in the Union and owned or controlled by persons of the third country concerned—where necessary to achieve the objectives of this Regulation. The Commission may decide on suchthe application whereof such Union response measures where not covering such situations would be insufficient to effectively achieve the objectives of this | SE PRES proposes to agree | 3. Where necessary to achieve the objectives of this Regulation, the Commission may decide to apply Union response measures under Articles 7 or 8 consisting of restrictions on foreign direct investment or on trade in services also with regard to services supplied, or direct investments made, within the Union by one or more legal persons established in the Union and owned or controlled by persons of the third country concerned. The Commission may decide on the application of such Union response measures where not covering such situations would be insufficient to effectively achieve the objectives of this Regulation, in particular where the effect of such measures could be avoided or circumvented by the third country or the person concerned. In assessing whether to adopt the decision referred to in the first subparagraph, the Commission shall consider, in addition to the criteria under paragraphs 1 and 2, amongst other things: |

| | Commission Proposal | EP Mandate | Council Mandate | PRES ASSESSMENT | COM COMPROMISE 9/1 (markups as compared to Council mandate) |
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| | Union response measures not covering such situations would be insufficient to effectively achieve the objectives of this Regulation, in particular where such measures could be avoided. In assessing whether to adopt such a decision the Commission shall consider, in addition to the criteria in paragraphs 1 and 2, amongst other things: | of such measures could be avoided or circumvented. In assessing whether to adopt such a decision the Commission shall consider, in addition to the criteria in paragraphs 1 and 2, amongst other things: | Regulation, in particular where such measures could be avoided—by the third country or the person concerned. In assessing whether to adopt such a decision the decision referred to in the first subparagraph, the Commission shall consider, in addition to the criteria inunder paragraphs 1 and 2, amongst other things: | | |
| 108 | (a) the patterns of trade in services and investment in the sector targeted by the envisaged Union response measures and the risk of avoidance of any Union response measures not applying to services supplied, or direct investments made, within the Union; | (a) the patterns of trade in services and investment in the sector targeted by the envisaged Union response measures and the risk of avoidance of any Union response measures not applying to services supplied, or direct investments made, within the Union; | (a) the patterns of trade in services and investment in the sector targeted by the envisaged Union response measures and the risk of avoidance by the third country or the person concerned of any Union response measures not applying to services supplied, or direct investments made, within the Union; | SE PRES agrees (Council mandate) | (a) the patterns of trade in services and investment in the sector targeted by the envisaged Union response measures and the risk of avoidance by the third country or the person concerned of any Union response measures not applying to services supplied, or direct investments made, within the Union; |

| | | Commission Proposal | EP Mandate | Council Mandate | PRES ASSESSMENT | COM COMPROMISE 9/1 (markups as compared to Council mandate) |
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| | 109 | (b) the effective contribution of such intra-Union restrictions to the objective of obtaining the cessation of the measure of economic coercion; | (b) the <i>possible</i> effective contribution of such intra-Union restrictions to the objective of obtaining the cessation of the measure of economic coercion; | (b) the effective contribution of such intra-Union restrictions referred to in the first subparagraph to the objective of obtaining the cessation to the objective of obtaining the cessation of the measure of economic coercion; | SE PRES proposes to agree. | (b) the <i>possible</i> effective contribution of such intra-Union restrictions referred to in the first subparagraph to the objective of obtaining the cessation of economic coercion; |
| | | | | | | |
| G | 110 | (c) the existence of alternative measures capable of achieving the objective of obtaining the cessation of the measure of economic coercion that are reasonably available and less restrictive of trade in services or investment within the Union. | (c) the existence of alternative measures capable of achieving the objective of obtaining the cessation of the measure of economic coercion that are reasonably available and less restrictive of trade in services or investment within the Union. | (c) the existence of alternative measures capable of achieving the objective of obtaining the cessation of the measure of economic coercion that are reasonably available and less restrictive of trade in services or investment within the Union. | | (c) the existence of alternative measures capable of achieving the objective of obtaining the cessation of the measure of economic coercion that are reasonably available and less restrictive of trade in services or investment within the Union. |
| | 111 | Any decision to apply restrictions with regard to services supplied, or direct | Any decision to apply restrictions with regard to services supplied, or direct investments made, within | Any decision to apply restrictions with regard to services supplied, or direct investments made, within the | SE PRES agrees (Council mandate). | Any decision to apply restrictions with regard to services supplied, or direct investments made, within the Union by one or more legal persons established in |

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| | investments made, within the Union by one or more legal persons established in the Union shall be duly justified in the implementing act referred to in paragraph 1 of Article 7 in light of the above criteria. | the Union by one or more legal persons established in the Union shall be duly justified in the implementing act referred to in paragraph 1 of Article 7 in light of the above criteria. | Union by one or more legal persons established in the Union shall be duly justified in the implementing act referred to in paragraph 1 of Article 7(1) and in Article 78(1) in light of the above eriteriacriteria referred to in the third paragraph of this Article. | | the Union shall be duly justified in the implementing act referred to in Article 7(1) and in Article 8(1) in light of the criteria referred to in the third paragraph of this Article. |
| 111a | | The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council about the criteria for selecting and designing the Union response measures. | | | |
| 112 | Article 10 Amendment, suspension and termination of Union response measures | Article 10 Amendment, suspension and termination of Union response measures | Article 10 Amendment, suspension and termination of Union response measures | | Article 10 Amendment, suspension and termination of Union response measures |
| 112 | | | | | |
| 113 | 1. The Commission | 1. The Commission shall | 1. The Commission shall | | 1. The Commission shall keep under |

| Commission Proposal | EP Mandate | Council Mandate | PRES ASSESSMENT | COM COMPROMISE 9/1 (markups as compared to Council mandate) |
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| shall keep under review the measures of economic coercion deployed by a third country that have triggered the Union response measures, the effectiveness of the Union response measures adopted and their effects on the Union's interests and shall keep the European Parliament and the Council informed thereof. | keep under review the measures of economic coercion deployed by a third country that have triggered the Union response measures, the effectiveness of the Union response measures adopted and their effects on the Union's interests and shall keep the European Parliament and the Council regularly informed thereof. | keep under review the measures of economic coercion deployed by a third country that have triggered the Union response measures, the effectiveness of the Union response measures adopted and their effects on the Union's interests and shall keep the European Parliament and the Council informed thereof. | | review the measures of economic coercion deployed by a third country that have triggered the Union response measures, the effectiveness of the Union response measures adopted and their effects on the Union's interests and shall keep the European Parliament and the Council regularly informed thereof. |
| 2. Where the third country concerned suspends the economic coercion, or where it is necessary in the Union's interest, the Commission may suspend the application of the respective Union response measure for the duration of the third country's | 2. Where the third country concerned entirely suspends the economic coercion, or where it is necessary in the Union's interest, the Commission mayshall suspend the application of the respective Union response measure for the duration of the third country's suspension, or where it is as long as necessary in light of the Union's interest, the Commission | 2. Where the third country concerned suspends the measures of economic coercion, or where it is necessary in the Union's interest referred to in Article 7bis, the Commission mayshall suspend the application of the respective Union response measure for the duration of the suspension of the measures of economic coercion by the third country's suspension, or as long as necessary in light | | 2. Where the third country concerned suspends the measures of economic coercion, or where it is necessary in the Union's interest referred to in Article 7bis, the Commission shall suspend the application of the respective Union response measure for the duration of the suspension of the measures of economic coercion by the third country, or concerned or for as long as necessary in light of the Union's interest determination pursuant to Article 7bis. |

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| of the Union's interest. The Commission shall suspend the Union response measures the third country concerned has offe and the Union has concluded, an agreement to submit the matter to bindi international third party adjudication the third country is also suspending its measures of econcercion. The Commission shall means of an implementing act, decide to suspend Union response measure. These implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred in Article 15(2). | measures if the third country concerned has offered, and the Union has concluded, an agreement to submit the matter to binding international third- party adjudication as and if and the third country is also suspending has also discontinued its measures of economic coercion and abide by the third-party adjudication. The Commission shall, by means of an implementing act, decide to suspend the Union response measure. These implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the | submit the matter to binding international third-party adjudication and the third | | State concerned has concluded, an agreement to submit the matter to binding international third-party adjudication and the third country also suspends its measures of economic coercion, the Commission shall suspend the Union response measures for the duration of the proceedings. The Commission shall, by means of an implementing act, adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 15(2), decide to suspend the Union response measure under this paragraph. |

| | | Commission Proposal | EP Mandate | Council Mandate | PRES ASSESSMENT | COM COMPROMISE 9/1 (markups as compared to Council mandate) |
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| | 115 | 3. Where it is necessary to make adjustments to Union response measures taking into account the conditions and criteria laid down in Articles 2 and 9(2), or further developments, including the third country's reaction, the Commission may, as appropriate, amend Union response measures adopted in accordance with Article 7, by means of an implementing act, in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 15(2). | 3. Where it is necessary to make adjustments to Union response measures taking into account the conditions and criteria laid down in Articles 2 and 9(2), or further developments, including the third country's reaction, the Commission mayshall, as appropriate, swiftly amend Union response measures adopted in accordance with Article 7, by means of an implementing act, in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 15(2). | 3. Where it is necessary to make adjustments to Union response measures taking into account the conditions and criteria laid down in Articles Article 2 and paragraphs 2 and 9(2)3 of Article 9, or further developments, including the third country's reaction, the Commission may, as appropriate, amend Union response measures adopted in accordance with Article 7Articles 7 and 8, by means of an implementing act, in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 15(2). | | 3. Where it is necessary to make adjustments to Union response measures taking into account the conditions and criteria laid down in Article 2 and paragraphs Articles 2 and 3 of Article 9, or further developments, including the third country's reaction, the Commission mayshall, as appropriate, amend Union response measures adopted in accordance with Articles Article 7 and 8, by means of an implementing act, in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 15(2). |
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| | 116 | 4. The Commission shall terminate Union response measures under any of the following circumstances: | 4. The Commission shall terminate Union response measures under any of the following circumstances: | 4. The Commission shall terminate Union response measures under any of the following circumstances: | | 4. The Commission shall terminate Union response measures under any of the following circumstances: |

| | | Commission Proposal | EP Mandate | Council Mandate | PRES ASSESSMENT | COM COMPROMISE 9/1 (markups as compared to Council mandate) |
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| 11 | 17 | (a) where the economic coercion has ceased; | (a) where the economic coercion has ceased <u>and</u> the injury caused has been repaired; | (a) where the economic coercion has ceased; | | (a) where the economic coercion has ceased <u>and the injury caused has been repaired, where requested;</u> |
| | | | | | | (abis) where the third country has ceased the economic coercion but has not repaired in full the injury as requested, but it is nevertheless appropriate to terminate the Union response measures. The consideration of |
| 11 | 7a | | | | | whether it is appropriate to terminate the Union response measures shall be based on the nature and extent of the damage caused and all other circumstances of the particular case. Specifically, the decision shall be guided by the overall relationship with the third country |
| | | | | | | concerned, other aspects of Union interest, including the desirability for Union persons having suffered damage to have that damage repaired, and the general obligation under customary international law to make full reparation for the injury caused through an |
| | | | | | | internationally wrongful act; |
| 11 | 18 | (b) where a mutually | (b) where a mutually | (b) where a mutually agreed | | (b) where a mutually agreed solution has |

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| | | agreed solution has otherwise been reached; | agreed solution has otherwise been reached; | solution has otherwise been reached; | | otherwise been reached; No changes to 4th column text. |
| | | | | | | <u> </u> |
| | 119 | (c) where a binding decision in international third-party adjudication in a dispute between the third country concerned and the Union or a Member State requires the withdrawal of the Union response measure; | (c) where a binding decision in international third-party adjudication in a dispute between the third country concerned and the Union or a Member State requires the withdrawal of the Union response measure provided that the third country has taken concrete steps to implement the decision; or | (c) where a binding decision in international third-party adjudication in a dispute between the third country concerned and the Union or a Member State requires the withdrawal of the Union response measure; | | (c) where a binding decision in international third-party adjudication in a dispute between the third country concerned on the issue of the economic coercion and the Union or a Member State requires the withdrawal of the Union response measure; or |
| | | | | | | |
| | 120 | (d) where it is appropriate in light of the Union's interest. | (d) where it is appropriate in light of the Union's interest. | (d) where it is appropriate in light of the Union's interest referred to in Article 7bis. | | (d) where it is appropriate in light of the Union's interest referred to inas determined pursuant to Article 7bis. |
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| | 121 | The termination of Union response measures adopted in accordance with Article 7 shall be decided, by means of | The termination of Union response measures adopted in accordance with Article 7 shall be decided, by means of an implementing act, in accordance with the | The termination of Union response measures adopted in accordance with Article 7Articles 7 and 8 shall be decided, by means of an implementing act, in | SE PRES proposes to agree (Council Mandate). | The termination of Union response measures adopted in accordance with Articles 7 and 8 shall be decided, by means of an implementing act, in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 15(2). |

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| | an implementing act, in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 15(2). | examination procedure referred to in Article 15(2). | accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 15(2). | | |
| 122 | 5. On duly justified imperative grounds of urgency, the Commission shall adopt immediately applicable implementing acts suspending, amending or terminating Union response measures adopted in accordance with Article 7. Those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 15(3) and they shall remain in force for a period not exceeding two months. | 5. On duly justified imperative grounds of urgency, the Commission shall adopt immediately applicable implementing acts suspending, amending or terminating or amending Union response measures adopted in accordance with Article 7. Those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 15(3) and they shall remain in force for a period not exceeding two months, after which an implementing act referred to in paragraphs 2, 3 or 4 may be adopted as appropriate. The Commission shall keep the European Parliament | 5. On duly justified imperative grounds of urgency, such as avoiding irreparable damage to the Union or a Member State or continuing to ensure consistency with the Union's obligations under international law pursuant to the suspension or cessation of measures of economic coercion from the third country concerned, the Commission shall adopt immediately applicable implementing acts suspending, amending or terminating Union response measures adopted in accordance with Article 7Articles 7 and 8. Those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the procedure referred to in | SE PRES proposes to agree (Council Mandate besides removal of "terminating"). | 5. On duly justified imperative grounds of urgency, such as avoiding irreparable damage to the Union or a Member State or continuing to ensure consistency with the Union's obligations under international law pursuant to the suspension or cessation of measures of economic coercion from the third country concerned, the Commission shall adopt immediately applicable implementing acts suspending, amending or terminating or amending Union response measures adopted in accordance with Articles 7 and 8. Those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 15(3) and they shall remain in force for a period not exceeding two months. |
| | | European Parliament informed without delay about the decision and its justification. | the procedure referred to in Article 15(3) and they shall remain in force for a period not exceeding two months. | | |

| | | Commission Proposal | EP Mandate | Council Mandate | PRES ASSESSMENT | COM COMPROMISE 9/1 (markups as compared to Council mandate) |
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| G | 123 | Article 11 Information gathering related to Union response measures | Article 11 Information gathering related to Union response measures | Article 11 Information gathering related to Union response measures | | Article 11 Information gathering related to Union response measures |
| | 124 | 1. Before the adoption of Union response measures or the amendment of such measures, the Commission shall, and before the suspension or termination of such measures, respectively, the Commission may, seek information and views regarding the economic impact on Union operators and Union's interest, through a notice published in the Official Journal of the European Union or through other suitable public communication means. The notice | 1. Before the adoption of Union response measures or the amendment of such measures, the Commission shall, and before the suspension or termination of such measures, respectively, the Commission may, seek information and views regarding the economic impact on Union operators and Union's interestas necessary, through a notice published in the Official Journal of the European Union or through other suitable public communication means. The notice shall indicate the period within which the input is to be submitted. | 1. Before the adoption of Union response measures or theor amendment of such Union response measures, the Commission shall, and before the suspension or termination of such measures, respectively, the Commission may, seek information and views regarding the economic impact on Union economic operators and Union's interest, through a notice published in the Official Journal of the European Union and, where appropriate, Official Journal of the European Union or through other suitable public communication means. The notice shall indicate the period within which the input is to be submitted. | SE PRES proposes to agree. | 1. Before the adoption or amendment of Union response measures, the Commission shall, and before the suspension or termination of such measures, respectively, the Commission may, seek information and views regarding the economic impact on Union economic operators and Union's interestas necessary, through a notice published in the Official Journal of the European Union_and, where appropriate, through other suitable public communication means. The notice shall indicate the period within which the input is to be submitted. |

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| | | shall indicate the period within which the input is to be submitted. | | | | |
| G | 125 | 2. The Commission may start the information gathering at any time it deems appropriate. | 2. The Commission may start the information gathering at any time it deems appropriate. | 2. The Commission may start the information gathering at any time it deems appropriate. | | 2. The Commission may start the information gathering at any time it deems appropriate. |
| | 126 | 3. In conducting the information gathering under paragraph 1, the Commission shall inform and consult stakeholders, in particular industry associations, affected by possible Union response measures, and Member States involved in the preparation or implementation of legislation regulating the affected fields. | 3. In conducting the information gathering under paragraph 1, the Commission shall inform and consult stakeholders, in particular industry associations <i>and Union social partners</i> , affected by possible Union response measures, and Member States involved in the preparation or implementation of legislation regulating the affected fields. | 3. In conducting the information gathering under paragraph 1, the Commission shall inform and consult stakeholders, in particular industry associations acting on behalf of Union economic operators, affected by possible Union response measures, and Member States' authorities involved in the preparation or implementation of legislation regulating the affected fields. | SE PRES proposes to agree. | 3. In conducting the information gathering under paragraph 1, the Commission shall inform and consult stakeholders, in particular associations acting on behalf of Union economic operators <i>and Union social partners</i> , affected by possible Union response measures, and Member States' authorities involved in the preparation or implementation of legislation regulating the affected fields. |

| | Commission Proposal | EP Mandate | Council Mandate | PRES ASSESSMENT | COM COMPROMISE 9/1 (markups as compared to Council mandate) |
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| 127 | 4. Without unduly delaying the adoption of Union response measures, the Commission shall, in particular, seek information on: | 4. Without unduly delaying the adoption of Union response measures, the Commission shall, in particular, seek information on: | 4. Without unduly delaying the adoption of Union response measures, the Commission shall identify possible options for Union response measures and, in particular, seek information and views on: | SE PRES proposes to agree (Council mandate). | 4. Without unduly delaying the adoption of Union response measures, the Commission shall identify possible options for Union response measures and, in particular, seek information and views on: |
| | | | | | T |
| 128 | (a) the impact of such measures on third-country actors or Union competitors, users or consumers or on Union employees, business partners or clients of such actors; | (a) the impact of such measures on third-country actors or Union competitors, users or consumers or on Union employees, business partners or clients of such actors; | (a) the impact of such measures on third-country actors or Union economic operators' competitors, users or consumers or on Union employees, business partners or clients of such actors; | SE PRES agrees (Council mandate) | (a) the impact of such measures on third-country actors or Union economic operators' competitors, users or consumers or on Union employees, business partners or clients of such actors; |
| | | | | | |
| 129 | (b) the interaction of such measures with relevant Member State legislation; | (b) the interaction of such measures with relevant <u>Union and Member State legislation</u> ; | (b) the interaction of such measures with relevant Member State legislation; | SE PRES agrees (Council mandate). | (b) the interaction of such measures with relevant Member State legislation; |
| | | | | | |
| 130 | (c) the administrative burden which may be occasioned by such | (c) the administrative burden which may be occasioned by such | (c) the administrative burden which may be occasioned by such measures; | | (c) the administrative burden which may be occasioned by such measures; |

| | Commission Proposal | EP Mandate | Council Mandate | PRES ASSESSMENT | COM COMPROMISE 9/1 (markups as compared to Council mandate) |
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| | measures; | measures; | | | |
| 131 | (d) the Union's interest. | (d) the Union's interest effect of such measures on diminishing the negative impact of the third country's coercive measures. | (d) the Union's interest referred to in Article 7bis. | SE PRES agrees (Council mandate). | (d) the Union interest referred to in Article 7bis. |
| | | | | | |
| 132 | 5. The Commission shall take utmost account of the information gathered during the information gathering exercise. An analysis of the envisaged measures shall accompany the draft implementing act when submitted to the committee in the context of the examination procedure referred to in Article 15(2). | 5. The Commission shall take utmost account of the information gathered during the information gathering exercise. An analysis of the envisaged measures and their potential impacts shall accompany the draft implementing act when submitted to the committee in the context of the examination procedure referred to in Article 15(2). The Commission shall inform the European Parliament of such analysis in accordance with Article 10 of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011. | 5. The Commission shall take utmost account of the information gathered during the information gathered during exercise. An analysis of the envisaged measures shall accompany the draft implementing act when submitted to the committee in the context of the examination procedure referred to in Article 15(2). That analysis shall include a thorough assessment of impact on both upstream and downstream industries and final consumers within the Union and, if relevant, point out any potential disproportionate effects. | SE PRES proposes to agree. | 5. The Commission shall take utmost account of the information gathered during the information gathering exercise. An analysis of the envisaged measures and their potential impacts shall accompany the draft implementing act when submitted to the committee in the context of the examination procedure referred to in Article 15(2). That analysis shall include a thorough assessment of impact on both upstream and downstream industries and final consumers within the Union and, if relevant, point out any potential disproportionate effects. |

| | Commission Proposal | EP Mandate | Council Mandate | PRES ASSESSMENT | COM COMPROMISE 9/1 (markups as compared to Council mandate) |
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| 133 | 6. Prior to the adoption of an implementing act in accordance with Article 7(6) or Article 10(5), the Commission shall seek information and views from relevant stakeholders in a targeted manner, unless the imperative grounds of urgency are such that information seeking and consultations are not possible or not needed for objective reasons, for instance to ensure compliance with international obligations of the Union. | 6. The Commission shall seek information and views from relevant stakeholders especially the economic operators affected by the economic coercion, as a general principle prior to the adoption of an implementing act in accordance with Article 7(6) or Article 10(5), the Commission shall seek information and views from relevant stakeholders in a targeted manner, unless the exceptional situation of imperative grounds of urgency are such that information seeking and consultations are not possible or not needed for objective reasons, for instance to ensure compliance with international obligations of the Union. | 6. Prior to the adoption of an implementing act in accordance with Article 7(6) or Article 10(5), the Commission shall seek information and views from relevant stakeholders in a targeted manner, unless the imperative grounds of urgency are such that information seeking and consultations are not possible or not needed for objective reasons, for instance to ensure compliance with international obligations of the Union. | SE PRES proposes to agree. | 6. Prior to the adoption of an implementing act in accordance with Article 10(5), the Commission shall seek information and views from relevant stakeholders in a targeted manner The Commission shall seek information and views in a targeted manner from relevant stakeholders prior to the adoption of an implementing act in accordance with Article 10(5), unless the exceptional situation of imperative grounds of urgency are such that information seeking and consultations are not possible or not needed for objective reasons, for instance to ensure compliance with international obligations of the Union. |
| 133a | | Article 11a | | SE PRES proposes to agree. Also see | <u>Article 11a</u> |

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| | The Chief Trade | | suggested language in | Single contact point |
| | Enforcement Officer | | corresponding recital, | <u> </u> |
| | The Chief Trade | | line 28a. | There shall be a single contact point |
| | Enforcement Officer | | | within the Commission in relation to the |
| | (CTEO) shall be | | | implementation of this Regulation and |
| | responsible for the | | | its coordination with other tools related |
| | implementation of this | | | to anti-coercion policy such as the |
| | Regulation and its | | | Blocking Statute ^{1a} . |
| | coordination with other | | | |
| | tools related to anti- | | V | For the purposes of this Regulation, the |
| | coercion such as the | | | Commission shall: |
| | Blocking Statute ^{1a} . For the | | | (a) gather information and provide |
| | purposes of this | | | cost and data analyses with a view to |
| | Regulation, the CTEO | | | determining the nature of economic |
| | <u>shall:</u> | | | <u>coercion measures;</u> |
| | <u>(a) gather</u> | | | (b) act, in full compliance with the |
| | information and provide | | | principle of confidentiality, as the main |
| | cost and data analyses | | | contact point for EU businesses and |
| | with a view to determining | | | private sector stakeholders affected by |
| | the nature of economic | | | economic coercion measures, including |
| | coercion measures; | | | with regard to assistance to be provided |
| | (b) act, in full | | | in the context of ongoing economic |
| | compliance with the | | | <u>coercion;</u> |
| | principle of | | | 10.00 11.00 11.00 11.00 |
| | confidentiality, as the | | | ^{1a} Council Regulation (EC) No 2271/96 |
| | main contact point for EU | | | of 22 November 1996 protecting against |
| | businesses and private | | | the effects of the extra-territorial |
| | sector stakeholders | | | application of legislation adopted by a |
| | affected by economic | | | third country, and actions based thereon |
| | <u>coercion measures,</u> | | | or resulting therefrom (OJL 309, |
| | including with regard to | | | <u>29.11.1996, p. 1.) (57).]</u> |
| | assistance to be provided | | | |
| | in the context of ongoing | | | |
| | economic coercion; | | | |
| | 1a Council Regulation | | | |
| | <u>Council Regulation</u> | | | |

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| | | | (EC) No 2271/96 of 22 November 1996 protecting against the effects of the extra-territorial application of legislation adopted by a third country, and actions based thereon or resulting therefrom (OJ L 309, 29.11.1996, p. 1.) (57). | | | |
| G | 134 | Article 12 Confidentiality | Article 12 Confidentiality | Article 12 Confidentiality | | Article 12 Confidentiality |
| _ | 135 | 1. Information received pursuant to this Regulation shall be used only for the purpose for which it was requested. | 1. Information received pursuant to this Regulation shall be used only for the purpose for which it was supplied , requested, or obtained . | 1. Information received pursuant to this Regulation shall be used only for the purpose for which it was requested. | | 1. Information received pursuant to this Regulation shall be used only for the purpose for which it was supplied, requested, or obtained. |
| | 136 | 2. The supplier of information may request that information supplied be treated as confidential. In such | 2. The supplier of information may request that information supplied be treated as confidential. In such cases, it shall be accompanied by a non- | 2. The supplier of information may request thatsuch information supplied be treated as confidential. In such cases, it shall be accompanied by a | | 2. The supplier of information may request such information be treated as confidential. In such cases, it shall be accompanied by a non-confidential <u>but</u> <u>meaningful</u> summary of the information concerned or a statement of the reasons |

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| | cases, it shall be accompanied by a non-confidential summary or a statement of the reasons why the information cannot be summarised. The Commission, the Council, the European Parliament, Member States or their officials shall not reveal any information of a confidential nature received pursuant to this Regulation, without specific permission from the supplier of such information. | confidential but meaningful summary or a statement of the reasons why the information cannot be summarised. The Commission, the Council, the European Parliament, Member States or their officials shall not revealare prohibited from revealing any information of a confidential nature received pursuant to this Regulation, without specific permission from the supplier of such information. | non-confidential summary of the information concerned or a statement of the reasons explaining why the information concerned cannot be summarised. The Commission, the Council, the European Parliament, Member States or their officials shall not reveal any information of a confidential nature received pursuant to this Regulation, without specific permission from the supplier of such information. | | explaining why the information concerned cannot be summarised. The Commission, the Council, the European Parliament, Member States or their officials shall not reveal any information of a confidential nature received pursuant to this Regulation, without specific permission from the supplier of such information. |
| 137 | 3. Paragraph 2 shall not preclude the Commission to disclose general information in a summary form, which does not contain information allowing to identify the supplier of the information. Such disclosure shall | 3. Paragraph 2 shall not preclude the Commission to disclose general information in a summary but meaningful form, which does not contain information allowing to identify the supplier of the information. Such disclosure shall take into account the legitimate | 3. Paragraph 2 shall not preclude the Commission to disclosefrom disclosing general information in a summary form, whichprovided that such disclosure does not contain information allowing to identifythe identity of the supplier of the information to be known. Such disclosure | | 3. Paragraph 2 shall not preclude the Commission from disclosing general information in summary but meaningful form, provided that such disclosure does not contain information allowing the identity of the supplier of the information to be known. Such disclosure shall take into account the legitimate interest of the parties concerned in not having confidential information disclosed. |

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| | | take into account the legitimate interest of the parties concerned in not having confidential information disclosed. | interest of the parties concerned in not having confidential information disclosed. | shall take into account the legitimate interest of the parties concerned in not having confidential information disclosed. | | |
| - | | | | | | |
| | 138 | Article 13 Rules of origin | Article 13 Rules of origin | Article 13 Rules of origin and nationality | | Article 13 Rules of origin and nationality |
| | | | | | | |
| co. | 139 | 1. The origin or nationality of a good, service, service provider, investment or intellectual property rightholder shall be determined in accordance with Annex II. | 1. The origin or nationality of a good, service, service provider, investment or intellectual property rightholder shall be determined in accordance with Annex II. | 1. The origin or nationality of a good, service, service provider, investment or intellectual property rightholder shall be determined in accordance with Annex II. | | 1. The origin or nationality of a good, service, service provider, investment or intellectual property rightholder shall be determined in accordance with Annex II. |
| | | | | | | |
| | 140 | 2. The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 14 to amend | 2. The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 14 to amend points 2 to 4 of | 2. The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 14 to supplement or amend points | | 2. The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 14 to <i>supplement or</i> amend points 2 <i>to 4-and 3</i> of Annex II—to take account of relevant developments in |

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| | | points 2 to 4 of Annex II in order to amend the rules of origin and add any other technical rules necessary for the application of the Regulation, to ensure its effectiveness and to take account of relevant developments in international instruments and experience in the application of measures under this Regulation or other Union acts. | Annex II in order to amend the rules of origin and add any other technical rules necessary for the application of the Regulation, to ensure its effectiveness and to take account of relevant developments in international instruments and experience in the application of measures under this Regulation or other Union acts. | 2 to 4and 3 of Annex II-in order to amend the rules of origin and add any other technical rules necessary for the application of the Regulation, to ensure its effectiveness and to take account of relevant developments in international instruments and experience in the application of measures under this Regulation or other Union acts. | | international instruments.—and experience in the application of measures under this Regulation or other Union acts under this Regulation or other Union acts. |
| G | 141 | Article 14 Delegated Acts | Article 14 Delegated Acts | Article 14 Delegated Acts | | Article 14 Delegated Acts |
| | | | | | | |
| G | 142 | 1. The power to adopt delegated acts is conferred on the Commission subject to the conditions laid down in this Article. | 1. The power to adopt delegated acts is conferred on the Commission subject to the conditions laid down in this Article. | 1. The power to adopt delegated acts is conferred on the Commission subject to the conditions laid down in this Article. | | 1. The power to adopt delegated acts is conferred on the Commission subject to the conditions laid down in this Article. |
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| 143 | 2. The power to adopt delegated acts referred to in Articles 7(7) and 13(2) shall be conferred on the Commission for an indeterminate period of time from [date of entry into force]. | 2. The power to adopt delegated acts referred to in Articles 7(7) and 13(2) shall be conferred on the Commission for an indeterminate period of time from [date of entry into force]. | 2. The power to adopt delegated acts referred to in Articles 7(7) and Article 13(2) shall be conferred on the Commission for an indeterminatea period of timefive years from [date of entry into force of this Regulation]. Such delegation of power shall be tacitly extended for periods of an identical duration unless the European Parliament or the Council opposes such extension not later than three months before the end of each period. | | 2. The power to adopt delegated acts referred to in Article 13(2) shall be conferred on the Commission for a period of five years from the fdate of entry into force of this Regulation. Such delegation of power shall be tacitly extended for periods of an identical duration unless the European Parliament or the Council opposes such extension not later than three months before the end of each period. |
| | | | | | |
| 144 | 3. The delegation of power referred to in Articles 7(7) and 13(2) may be revoked at any time by the European Parliament or by the Council. A decision to revoke shall put an end to the delegation of the power specified in that decision. It shall take effect the day | 3. The delegation of power referred to in Articles 7(7) and 13(2) may be revoked at any time by the European Parliament or by the Council. A decision to revoke shall put an end to the delegation of the power specified in that decision. It shall take effect the day following the publication of the decision in the Official Journal of the | 3. The delegation of power referred to in Articles 7(7) and Article 13(2) may be revoked at any time by the European Parliament or by the Council. A decision to revoke shall put an end to the delegation of the power specified in that decision. It shall take effect the day following the publication of the decision in the Official Journal of the European | | 3. The delegation of power referred to in Article 13(2) may be revoked at any time by the European Parliament or by the Council. A decision to revoke shall put an end to the delegation of the power specified in that decision. It shall take effect the day following the publication of the decision in the Official Journal of the European Union or at a later date specified therein. It shall not affect the validity of any delegated acts already in force. |

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| | | following the publication of the decision in the Official Journal of the European Union or at a later date specified therein. It shall not affect the validity of any delegated acts already in force. | European Union or at a later date specified therein. It shall not affect the validity of any delegated acts already in force. | Union or at a later date specified therein. It shall not affect the validity of any delegated acts already in force. | | |
| | | | | | | |
| G | 145 | 4. Before adopting a delegated act, the Commission shall consult experts designated by each Member State in accordance with the principles laid down in the Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making of 13 April 2016. | 4. Before adopting a delegated act, the Commission shall consult experts designated by each Member State in accordance with the principles laid down in the Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making of 13 April 2016. | 4. Before adopting a delegated act, the Commission shall consult experts designated by each Member State in accordance with the principles laid down in the Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making of 13 April 2016. | | 4. Before adopting a delegated act, the Commission shall consult experts designated by each Member State in accordance with the principles laid down in the Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making of 13 April 2016. |
| | | | | | | |
| G | 146 | 5. As soon as it adopts a delegated act, the Commission shall notify it simultaneously to the | 5. As soon as it adopts a delegated act, the Commission shall notify it simultaneously to the European Parliament and | 5. As soon as it adopts a delegated act, the Commission shall notify it simultaneously to the European Parliament and to | | 5. As soon as it adopts a delegated act, the Commission shall notify it simultaneously to the European Parliament and to the Council. |

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| | European Parliament and to the Council. | to the Council. | the Council. | | |
| 147 | A delegated act adopted pursuant to Articles 7(7) and 13(2) shall enter into force only if no objection has been expressed either by the European Parliament or by the Council within a period of two months of notification of that act to the European Parliament and the Council or if, before the expiry of that period, the European Parliament and the Council have both informed the Commission that they will not object. That period shall be extended by two months at the initiative of the European Parliament or of the Council. | A delegated act adopted pursuant to Articles 7(7) and 13(2) shall enter into force only if no objection has been expressed either by the European Parliament or by the Council within a period of two months of notification of that act to the European Parliament and the Council or if, before the expiry of that period, the European Parliament and the Council have both informed the Commission that they will not object. That period shall be extended by two months at the initiative of the European Parliament or of the Council. | A delegated act adopted pursuant to Articles 7(7) and Article 13(2) shall enter into force only if no objection has been expressed either by the European Parliament or by the Council within a period of two months of notification of that act to the European Parliament and the Council or if, before the expiry of that period, the European Parliament and the Council have both informed the Commission that they will not object. That period shall be extended by two months at the initiative of the European Parliament or of the Council. | | A delegated act adopted pursuant to Article 13(2) shall enter into force only if no objection has been expressed either by the European Parliament or by the Council within a period of two months of notification of that act to the European Parliament and the Council or if, before the expiry of that period, the European Parliament and the Council have both informed the Commission that they will not object. That period shall be extended by two months at the initiative of the European Parliament or of the Council. |

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| G | 148 | Article 15 Committee procedure | Article 15 Committee procedure | Article 15 Committee procedure | | Article 15 Committee procedure |
| G | 149 | 1. The Commission shall be assisted by a Committee. That committee shall be a committee within the meaning of Article 3 of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011. | 1. The Commission shall be assisted by a Committee. That committee shall be a committee within the meaning of Article 3 of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011. | 1. The Commission shall be assisted by a Committee. That committee shall be a committee within the meaning of Article 3 of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011. | | 1. The Commission shall be assisted by a Committee. That committee shall be a committee within the meaning of Article 3 of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011. |
| | 150 | 2. Where reference is made to this paragraph, Article 5 of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 shall apply. | 2. Where reference is made to this paragraph, Article 5 of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 shall apply. | 2. Where reference is made to this paragraph, Article 5 of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 shall apply. Where the Committee delivers no opinion, the Commission shall not adopt the draft implementing act and the third subparagraph of Article 5(4) of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 shall apply. | SE PRES proposes to agree (Council Mandate). | 2. Where reference is made to this paragraph, Article 5 of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 shall apply. Where the Committee delivers no opinion, the Commission shall not adopt the draft implementing act and the third subparagraph of Article 5(4) of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 shall apply. |

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| G | 151 | 3. Where reference is made to this paragraph, Article 8 of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 in conjunction with Article 5 thereof, shall apply. | 3. Where reference is made to this paragraph, Article 8 of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 in conjunction with Article 5 thereof, shall apply. | 3. Where reference is made to this paragraph, Article 8 of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 in conjunction with Article 5 thereof, shall apply. | | 3. Where reference is made to this paragraph, Article 8 of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 in conjunction with Article 5 thereof, shall apply. |
| | 151a | | | Article 15bis | | |
| | 151b | | | Member States officials obtaining information under this Regulation shall be subject to a duty of professional secrecy with regard to any confidential information which has come to their knowledge in the course of the performance of their official duties. A secure and encrypted system shall be provided by the Commission to support direct cooperation and exchange of information with Member States | | |

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| | | | officials. | | |
| 152 | Article 16 Review | Article 16 Reporting and Review | Article 16 Review | | Article 16 <u>Reporting and</u> Review |
| 153 | 1. The Commission shall evaluate any Union response measure adopted pursuant to Article 7 six months after its termination, taking into account stakeholder input and any other relevant information. The evaluation report shall examine the effectiveness and operation of the Union response measure, and draw possible conclusions for future measures. | 1. The Commission shall evaluate any Union response measure adopted pursuant to Article 7 six months after its termination, taking into account stakeholder input, and information provided by the European Parliament and the Council, and any other relevant information. The Commission shall publish every year an evaluation report shall examines the effectiveness and operation of the Union response measure, and draw possible conclusions for future measures. The Commission shall present such report to the European Parliament and the Council. | 1. The Commission shall evaluate any Union response measure adopted pursuant to Article 7 Articles 7 and 8 six months after its termination, taking into account stakeholder input and any other relevant information. The and shall report to the European Parliament and the Council. In this evaluation report the Commission shall examine the effectiveness and operation of the Union response measure, and, where appropriate, draw draw possible conclusions for future Union response measures and the review of this regulation pursuant to paragraph 2. | | 1. The Commission shall evaluate any Union response measure adopted pursuant to Articles 7 and 8 six months after its termination, taking into account stakeholder input and any other relevant information and shall report to the European Parliament and the Council. In this evaluation the Commission shall examine the effectiveness and operation of the Union response measure, and, keep the European Parliament and the Council informed, regularly and in a timely manner, of relevant developments in the application of this Regulation at the stage of examination [of any acts proposed or adopted pursuant to Article 4], engagement and international cooperation, and in the period during which Union response measures are in force. The reporting obligation may include an exchange of views where appropriate, draw conclusions for future Union response measures and the review of this regulation pursuant to paragraph 2 or requested by the European |

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| | | | | | Parliament or the Council. The European Parliament may express its views to [the Council and] the Commission via any appropriate means. |
| 154 | 2. No later than three years after the adoption of the first implementing act under this Regulation or six years after the entry into force of this Regulation, whichever is earlier, the Commission shall review this Regulation and its implementation and shall report to the European Parliament and the Council. | 2. No later than three years after the adoption of the first implementing act underentry into force of this Regulation, and at the latest every four years thereafter or six years after the entry into force of this Regulation, whichever is earlier, the Commission shall review this Regulation and its implementation, in particular, in ensuring complementarity with the review of the Blocking Statute and shall report to the European Parliament and the Council notably in the relevant reporting of the Chief Trade Enforcement Officer. | 2. No later than three years after the adoption of the first implementing act under this Regulation or sixfive years after the date of entry into force of this Regulation, whichever is earlier, and every five years thereafter, the Commission shall review this Regulation and its implementation and shall report to the European Parliament and the Council. In the course of such review, the Commission shall give particular consideration to any issues which may arise as regards the relationship of this Regulation to other existing Union instruments. | SE proposes to agree with the addition of a reference to Blocking Statute | 2. No later than three years after the adoption of the first implementing act under this Regulation or <i>fivethree</i> years after the <i>date of</i> entry into force of this Regulation, whichever is earlier, and every five years thereafter, the Commission shall review this Regulation and its implementation and shall report to the European Parliament and the Council. In the course of such review, the Commission shall give particular consideration to any issues which may arise as regards the relationship of this Regulation to other existing Union instruments, <i>such as the Blocking Statute</i> . |
| 155 | Article 17 Entry into force | Article 17 Entry into force | Article 17 Entry into force | | Article 17 Entry into force |

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| | | | | | | |
| G | 156 | This Regulation shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union. | This Regulation shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union. | This Regulation shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union. | | This Regulation shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union. |
| G | 157 | This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. | This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. | This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. | | This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. |
| G | 158 | Done at Brussels, | Done at Brussels, | Done at Brussels, | | Done at Brussels, |
| G | 159 | For the European Parliament | For the European Parliament | For the European Parliament | | For the European Parliament |
| G | 160 | The President | The President | The President | | The President |

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| | | * | | | | |
| G | 161 | For the Council | For the Council | For the Council | | For the Council |
| G | 162 | The President | The President | The President | | The President |
| | 163 | Union response measures pursuant to Articles 7 and 8 | Union response measures pursuant to Articles 7 and 8 | Union response measures pursuant to Articles 7 and 8 | | Union response measures pursuant to Articles 7 and 8 |
| | 164 | Measures which may be adopted pursuant to Articles 7 and 8 are: | Measures which may be adopted pursuant to Articles 7 and 8 are: | Measures which may be adopted pursuant to Articles 7 and 8 are: | | Measures which may be adopted pursuant to Articles 7 and 8 are: |
| | 165 | (a) the suspension of any tariff concessions, as necessary, and the imposition of new or increased customs duties, including the re-establishment of customs duties at the | (a) the suspension of any tariff concessions, as necessary, and the imposition of new or increased customs duties, including the reestablishment of customs duties at the most- | (a) the suspension of non- performance of applicable international obligations as regards any tariff concessions, as necessary, and the imposition of new or increased customs duties, including the re- | | (a) the non-performance of applicable international obligations as regards any tariff concessions, as necessary, and the imposition of new or increased customs duties, including the re-establishment of customs duties at the most-favourednation level or the imposition of customs duties beyond the most-favoured-nation |

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| | most-favoured-nation level or the imposition of customs duties beyond the most- favoured-nation level, or the introduction of any additional charge on the importation or exportation of goods; | favoured-nation level or the imposition of customs duties beyond the most- favoured-nation level, or the introduction of any additional charge on the importation or exportation of goods; | establishment of customs duties at the most-favoured- nation level or the imposition of customs duties beyond the most-favoured-nation level, or the introduction of any additional charge on the importation or exportation of goods; | | level, or the introduction of any additional charge on the importation or exportation of goods; |
| 166 | (b) the suspension of applicable international obligations, as necessary, and the introduction or increase of restrictions on the importation or exportation of goods, whether made effective through quotas, import or export licences or other measures, or on the payment for goods; | (b) the suspension of applicable international obligations, as necessary, and the introduction or increase of restrictions on the importation or exportation of goods, whether made effective through quotas, import or export licences or other measures, or on the payment for goods; | (b) the suspension-non-performance of applicable international obligations, as necessary, and the introduction or increase of restrictions on the importation or exportation of goods, whether made effective through quotas, import or export licences or other measures, or on the payment for goods; | | (b) the non-performance of applicable international obligations, as necessary, and the introduction or increase of restrictions on the importation or exportation of goods, whether made effective through quotas, import or export licences or other measures, or on the payment for goods; |
| 167 | (c) the suspension of applicable international | (c) the suspension of applicable international obligations, as necessary, | (c) the suspension-non- performance of applicable international obligations, as | | (c) the non-performance of applicable international obligations, as necessary, and the introduction of restrictions on |

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| | obligations, as necessary, and the introduction of restrictions on trade in goods made effective through measures applying to transiting goods or internal measures applying to goods. | and the introduction of restrictions on trade in goods made effective through measures applying to transiting goods or internal measures applying to goods. | necessary, and the introduction of restrictions on trade in goods made effective through measures applying to transiting goods or internal measures applying to goods. | | trade in goods made effective through measures applying to transiting goods or internal measures applying to goods. |
| | | | | | |
| 168 | (d) the suspension of applicable international obligations concerning the right to participate in tender procedures in the area of public procurement, as necessary, and: | (d) the suspension of applicable international obligations concerning the right to participate in tender procedures in the area of public procurement, as necessary, and: | (d) the suspension non- performance of applicable international obligations concerning the right to participate in tender procedures in the area of public procurement, as necessary, and: | | (d) the non-performance of applicable international obligations concerning the right to participate in tender procedures in the area of public procurement, as necessary, and: |
| | | | | | |
| 169 | (i) the exclusion from public procurement of goods, services or suppliers of goods or services of the third country concerned or the exclusion of tenders the total value | (i) the exclusion from public procurement of goods, services or suppliers of goods or services of the third country concerned or the exclusion of tenders the total value of which is made up of more than a | (i) the exclusion from public procurement of goods, services or suppliers of goods or services of the third country concerned or the exclusion of tenders the total value of which is made up of more than a specified | | (i) the exclusion from public procurement of goods, services or suppliers of goods or services of the third country concerned or the exclusion of tenders the total value of which is made up of more than 50% a specified percentage of goods or services originating in servicesoriginating in the third country concerned; and/or |

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| | of which is made up of more than a specified percentage of goods or services of the third country concerned; and/or | specified percentage of goods or services of the third country concerned; and/or | percentage50 % of goods or services of originating in the third country concerned; and/or | | |
| | | | T I | | |
| 170 | (ii) the imposition of a mandatory price evaluation weighting penalty¹ on tenders of goods, services or suppliers of goods or services of the third country concerned. 1. Mandatory price evaluation weighting penalty means an obligation for contracting authorities or entities conducting public procurement procedures to increase, subject to certain exceptions, the price of goods or services falling under this paragraph that have been offered in contract award procedures. | (ii) the imposition of a mandatory price evaluation weighting penalty¹ on tenders of goods, services or suppliers of goods or services of the third country concerned. 1. Mandatory price evaluation weighting penalty means an obligation for contracting authorities or entities conducting public procurement procedures to increase, subject to certain exceptions, the price of goods or services falling under this paragraph that have been offered in contract award procedures. | (ii) the imposition of a mandatory price evaluation weighting penaltyscore adjustment¹ on tenders of goods, services or suppliers of goods or services of the third country concerned. 1. Mandatory price evaluation weighting penaltyScore adjustment means an obligation for contracting authorities or entities conducting public procurement procedures to increase relatively diminish, subject to certain exceptions, the price of goods or services falling under this paragraph that have been offered in score of a tender resulting from its evaluation, on the basis of the contract award criteria defined in the relevant public procurement documents, by a given percentage. In cases where price or cost is the only contract award procedurescriterion, the score adjustment means the relative increase, for the purpose of the evaluation of tenders, by a given percentage of the price offered by a tenderer. | | (ii) the imposition of a score adjustment on tenders of goods, services or suppliers of goods or services of the third country concerned. I.Score adjustment means an obligation for contracting authorities or entities conducting public procurement procedures to increase relatively diminish, subject to certain exceptions, the score of a tender resulting from its evaluation, on the basis of the contract award criteria defined in the relevant public procurement documents, by a given percentage. In cases where price or cost is the only contract award criterion, the score adjustment means the relative increase, for the purpose of the evaluation of tenders, by a given percentage of the price offered by a tenderer. I. Score adjustment means an obligation for contracting authorities or entities conducting public procurement procedures to increase relatively diminish, subject to certain exceptions, the score of a tender resulting from its evaluation, |

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| _ | | | | | | on the basis of the contract award criteria defined in the relevant public procurement documents, by a given percentage. In cases where price or cost is the only contract award criterion, the score adjustment means the relative increase, for the purpose of the evaluation of tenders, by a given percentage of the price offered by a tenderer. |
| G | 171 | Origin shall be determined on the basis of Annex II; | Origin shall be determined on the basis of Annex II; | Origin shall be determined on the basis of Annex II; | | Origin shall be determined on the basis of Annex II; |
| | 172 | (e) the suspension of applicable international obligations, as necessary, and the imposition of restrictions on the exportation of goods falling under the Union export control regime; | (e) the suspension of applicable international obligations, as necessary, and the imposition of restrictions on the exportation of goods falling under the Union export control regime; | deleted | | |
| - | 173 | (f) the suspension of applicable international | (f) the suspension of applicable international obligations regarding trade | (f) the suspension-non- performance of applicable international obligations | | (f) the non-performance of applicable international obligations regarding trade in services, as necessary, and the |

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| | obligations regarding trade in services, as necessary, and the imposition of measures affecting trade in services; | in services, as necessary, and the imposition of measures affecting trade in services; | regarding trade in services, as necessary, and the imposition of measures affecting trade in services; | | imposition of measures affecting trade in services; |
| 174 | (g) the suspension of applicable international obligations, as necessary, and the imposition of measures affecting foreign direct | (g) the suspension of applicable international obligations, as necessary, and the imposition of measures affecting foreign direct investment; | (g) the suspensionnon- performance of applicable international obligations, as necessary, and the imposition of measures affecting the access of foreign direct investment to the Union; | | (g) the non-performance of applicable international obligations, as necessary, and the imposition of measures affecting the access of foreign direct investment to the Union; |
| | (h) the suspension of applicable international | (h) the suspension of applicable international obligations with respect to | (h) the suspensionnon-performance of applicable international obligations with | | (h) the non-performance of applicable international obligations with respect to trade-related aspects of intellectual |
| 175 | obligations with respect to trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights, as necessary, and the imposition of restrictions on the protection of such intellectual property rights or their | trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights, as necessary, and the imposition of restrictions on the protection of such intellectual property rights or their commercial exploitation, in relation to right-holders who are nationals of the third | respect to trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights granted by a Union institution or agency and valid throughout the Union, as necessary, and the imposition of restrictions on the protection of such intellectual property rights or their commercial | | property rights <code>/</code> granted by a Union institution or agency and valid throughout the Union, <code>/</code> as necessary, and the imposition of restrictions on the protection of such intellectual property rights or their commercial exploitation, in relation to right-holders who are nationals of the third country concerned; |

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| | commercial exploitation, in relation to right-holders who are nationals of the third country concerned; | country concerned; | exploitation, in relation to right-holders who are nationals of the third country concerned; | | |
| 176 | (i) the suspension of applicable international obligations with respect to financial services, as necessary, and the imposition of restrictions for banking, insurance, access to Union capital markets and other financial service activities; | (i) the suspension of applicable international obligations with respect to financial services, as necessary, and the imposition of restrictions for banking, insurance, access to Union capital markets and other financial service activities; | (i) the suspension-non-performance of applicable international obligations with respect to financial services, as necessary, and the imposition of restrictions for banking, insurance, access to Union capital markets and other financial service activities; | | (i) the non-performance of applicable international obligations with respect to financial services, as necessary, and the imposition of restrictions for banking, insurance, access to Union capital markets and other financial service activities; |
| | | | | | |
| 177 | (j) the suspension of applicable international obligations with respect to the treatment of goods, as necessary, and the imposition of restrictions on | (j) the suspension of applicable international obligations with respect to the treatment of goods, as necessary, and the imposition of restrictions on registrations and authorisations under the chemicals legislation of the | deleted | | |

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| | registrations and authorisations under the chemicals legislation of the Union; | Union; | | | |
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| 178 | (k) the suspension of applicable international obligations with respect to the treatment of goods, as necessary, and the imposition of restrictions on registrations and authorisations related to the sanitary and phytosanitary legislation of the Union; | (k) the suspension of applicable international obligations with respect to the treatment of goods, as necessary, and the imposition of restrictions on registrations and authorisations related to the sanitary and phytosanitary legislation of the Union; | deleted | | |
| | | | | | |
| 179 | (1) the suspension of applicable international obligations, as necessary, and the imposition of restrictions on access to Union-funded | (l) the suspension of applicable international obligations, as necessary, and the imposition of restrictions on access to Union-funded research programmes or exclusion from Union-funded | deleted | | |

| | | Commission Proposal | EP Mandate | Council Mandate | PRES ASSESSMENT | COM COMPROMISE 9/1 (markups as compared to Council mandate) |
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| | | research programmes or exclusion from Union-funded research programmes. | research programmes. | | | |
| - | | | | | | |
| | 180 | Rules of Origin | Rules of Origin | Rules of Origin and Nationality | | Rules of Origin and Nationality |
| - | | | | | | |
| G | 181 | 1. The origin of a good shall be determined in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council. 1. Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 October 2013 laying down the Union Customs Code (OJ L 269, 10.10.2013, p. 1). | 1. The origin of a good shall be determined in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council. ¹ 1. Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 October 2013 laying down the Union Customs Code (OJ L 269, 10.10.2013, p. 1). | 1. The origin of a good shall be determined in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council. ¹ 1. Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 October 2013 laying down the Union Customs Code (OJ L 269, 10.10.2013, p. 1). | | 1. The origin of a good shall be determined in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council. 1. Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 October 2013 laying down the Union Customs Code (OJ L 269, 10.10.2013, p. 1). |
| | _ | | | | | |
| | 182 | 2. The origin of a service, including a service supplied in the | 2. The origin of a service, including a service supplied in the area of | 2. The origin of a service, including a service supplied in the area of public | | 2. The origin of a service, including a service supplied in the area of public procurement, shall be determined on the |

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| _ | | area of public procurement, shall be determined on the basis of the origin of the natural or legal person providing it. The origin of the service provider shall be deemed to be: | public procurement, shall be determined on the basis of the origin of the natural or legal person providing it. The origin of the service provider shall be deemed to be: | procurement, shall be determined on the basis of the origin of the natural or legal person providing it. The origin nationality of the service provider shall be deemed to be: | | basis of the origin of the natural or legal person providing it. The nationality of the service provider shall be deemed to be: |
| | | | | | | |
| G | 183 | (a) in the case of a natural person, the country of which the person is a national or where the person has a right of permanent residence; | (a) in the case of a natural person, the country of which the person is a national or where the person has a right of permanent residence; | (a) in the case of a natural person, the country of which the person is a national or where the person has a right of permanent residence; | | (a) in the case of a natural person, the country of which the person is a national or where the person has a right of permanent residence; |
| | | | | | | |
| G | 184 | (b) in the case of a legal person any of the following: | (b) in the case of a legal person any of the following: | (b) in the case of a legal person any of the following: | | (b) in the case of a legal person any of the following: |
| | | , | | | | |
| G | 185 | (i) if the service is provided other than through a commercial presence within the Union, the country | (i) if the service is provided other than through a commercial presence within the Union, the country where the legal | (i) if the service is provided other than through a commercial presence within the Union, the country where the legal person is constituted | | (i) if the service is provided other than through a commercial presence within the Union, the country where the legal person is constituted or otherwise organised under the laws of that country and in the |

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| | | where the legal person is constituted or otherwise organised under the laws of that country and in the territory of which the legal person is engaged in substantive business operations; | person is constituted or otherwise organised under the laws of that country and in the territory of which the legal person is engaged in substantive business operations; | or otherwise organised under the laws of that country and in the territory of which the legal person is engaged in substantive business operations; | | territory of which the legal person is engaged in substantive business operations; |
| G | 186 | (ii) if the service is provided through a commercial presence within the Union, | (ii) if the service is provided through a commercial presence within the Union, | (ii) if the service is provided through a commercial presence within the Union, | | (ii) if the service is provided through a commercial presence within the Union, |
| G | 187 | (a) if the legal person is engaged in substantive business operations in the territory of the Member State where the legal person is established such that it has a direct and effective link with the economy of that Member State the origin of that legal person shall be deemed to be that of | (a) if the legal person is engaged in substantive business operations in the territory of the Member State where the legal person is established such that it has a direct and effective link with the economy of that Member State the origin of that legal person shall be deemed to be that of the Member State in which it is established | (a) if the legal person is engaged in substantive business operations in the territory of the Member State where the legal person is established such that it has a direct and effective link with the economy of that Member State the origin of that legal person shall be deemed to be that of the Member State in which it is established | | (a) if the legal person is engaged in substantive business operations in the territory of the Member State where the legal person is established such that it has a direct and effective link with the economy of that Member State the origin of that legal person shall be deemed to be that of the Member State in which it is established |

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| | the Member State in which it is established | | | | |
| G 188 | (b) if the legal person providing the service is not engaged in substantive business operations such that it has a direct and effective link with the economy of the Member State in which it is established, the origin of that legal person shall be deemed to be the origin of the natural or legal persons which own or control it. The legal person shall be considered to be "owned" by persons of a given country if more than 50 % of the equity interest in it is beneficially owned by persons of that country and "controlled" by persons of a given country if such persons have the power to name a | (b) if the legal person providing the service is not engaged in substantive business operations such that it has a direct and effective link with the economy of the Member State in which it is established, the origin of that legal person shall be deemed to be the origin of the natural or legal persons which own or control it. The legal person shall be considered to be "owned" by persons of a given country if more than 50 % of the equity interest in it is beneficially owned by persons of that country and "controlled" by persons of a given country if such persons have the power to name a majority of its directors or otherwise to legally direct its actions. | (b) if the legal person providing the service is not engaged in substantive business operations such that it has a direct and effective link with the economy of the Member State in which it is established, the origin of that legal person shall be deemed to be the origin of the natural or legal persons which own or control it. The legal person shall be considered to be "owned" by persons of a given country if more than 50 % of the equity interest in it is beneficially owned by persons of that country and "controlled" by persons of a given country if such persons have the power to name a majority of its directors or otherwise to legally direct its actions. | | (b) if the legal person providing the service is not engaged in substantive business operations such that it has a direct and effective link with the economy of the Member State in which it is established, the origin of that legal person shall be deemed to be the origin of the natural or legal persons which own or control it. The legal person shall be considered to be "owned" by persons of a given country if more than 50 % of the equity interest in it is beneficially owned by persons of that country and "controlled" by persons of a given country if such persons have the power to name a majority of its directors or otherwise to legally direct its actions. |

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| | majority of its directors or otherwise to legally direct its actions. | | | | |
| G 189 | (iii) By derogation from sub-paragraph (ii)(a), if it is decided that Union response measures should apply to legal persons falling under subparagraph (ii)(a), the origin of that person shall be the nationality or the place of permanent residence of the natural or juridical person or persons who own or control the legal person in the Union. The legal person shall be considered to be "owned" by persons of a given country if more than 50 % of the equity interest in it is beneficially owned by persons of that country and "controlled" by | (iii) By derogation from sub-paragraph (ii)(a), if it is decided that Union response measures should apply to legal persons falling under subparagraph (ii)(a), the origin of that person shall be the nationality or the place of permanent residence of the natural or juridical person or persons who own or control the legal person in the Union. The legal person shall be considered to be "owned" by persons of a given country if more than 50 % of the equity interest in it is beneficially owned by persons of that country and "controlled" by persons of a given country if such persons have the power to name a majority of its directors or otherwise to legally direct its actions. | (iii) By derogation from subparagraph (ii)(a), if it is decided that Union response measures should apply to legal persons falling under subparagraph (ii)(a), the origin of that person shall be the nationality or the place of permanent residence of the natural or-juridical legal person or persons who own or control the legal person in the Union. The legal person shall be considered to be "owned" by persons of a given country if more than 50 % of the equity interest in it is beneficially owned by persons of that country and "controlled" by persons of a given country if such persons have the power to name a majority of its directors or otherwise to legally direct its actions. | | (iii) By derogation from sub-paragraph (ii)(a), if it is decided that Union response measures should apply to legal persons falling under subparagraph (ii)(a), the origin of that person shall be the nationality or the place of permanent residence of the natural or legal person or persons who own or control the legal person in the Union. The legal person shall be considered to be "owned" by persons of a given country if more than 50 % of the equity interest in it is beneficially owned by persons of that country and "controlled" by persons of a given country if such persons have the power to name a majority of its directors or otherwise to legally direct its actions. |

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| | | persons of a given country if such persons have the power to name a majority of its directors or otherwise to legally direct its actions. | | | | |
| G | 190 | 3. The nationality of an investment shall be: | 3. The nationality of an investment shall be: | 3. The nationality of an investment shall be: | | 3. The nationality of an investment shall be: |
| G | 191 | (a) if the investment is engaged in substantive business operations in the territory of the Member State where the investment is established such that it | (a) if the investment is engaged in substantive business operations in the territory of the Member State where the investment is established such that it has a direct and effective link with the economy of | (a) if the investment is engaged in substantive business operations in the territory of the Member State where the investment is established such that it has a direct and effective link with the economy of that Member | | (a) if the investment is engaged in substantive business operations in the territory of the Member State where the investment is established such that it has a direct and effective link with the economy of that Member State the nationality of the investment shall be deemed to be that of the Member State in which it is |
| | 171 | has a direct and effective link with the economy of that Member State the nationality of the investment shall be deemed to be that of the Member State in which it is | that Member State the nationality of the investment shall be deemed to be that of the Member State in which it is established; | State the nationality of the investment shall be deemed to be that of the Member State in which it is established; | | established; |

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| | established; | | | | |
| | | | | | |
| G 192 | (b) if the investment is not engaged in substantive business operations such that it has a direct and effective link with the economy of the Member State in which it is established, the nationality of the investment shall be deemed to that of the natural or legal persons which own or control it. The investment shall be considered to be "owned" by persons of a given country if more than 50 % of the equity interest in it is beneficially owned by persons of that country and "controlled" by persons of a given country if such persons have the power to name a majority of its directors or otherwise | (b) if the investment is not engaged in substantive business operations such that it has a direct and effective link with the economy of the Member State in which it is established, the nationality of the investment shall be deemed to that of the natural or legal persons which own or control it. The investment shall be considered to be "owned" by persons of a given country if more than 50 % of the equity interest in it is beneficially owned by persons of that country and "controlled" by persons of a given country if such persons have the power to name a majority of its directors or otherwise to legally direct its actions; | (b) if the investment is not engaged in substantive business operations such that it has a direct and effective link with the economy of the Member State in which it is established, the nationality of the investment shall be deemed to that of the natural or legal persons which own or control it. The investment shall be considered to be "owned" by persons of a given country if more than 50 % of the equity interest in it is beneficially owned by persons of that country and "controlled" by persons of a given country if such persons have the power to name a majority of its directors or otherwise to legally direct its actions; | | (b) if the investment is not engaged in substantive business operations such that it has a direct and effective link with the economy of the Member State in which it is established, the nationality of the investment shall be deemed to that of the natural or legal persons which own or control it. The investment shall be considered to be "owned" by persons of a given country if more than 50 % of the equity interest in it is beneficially owned by persons of that country and "controlled" by persons of a given country if such persons have the power to name a majority of its directors or otherwise to legally direct its actions; |

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| | to legally direct its actions; | | | | |
| s 193 | (c) by derogation from sub-paragraph (a), if it is decided that Union response measures should apply to legal persons falling under subparagraph (a), the nationality of the investment shall be the nationality or the place of permanent residence of the natural or juridical person or persons who own or control the investment in the Union. The investment shall be considered to be "owned" by persons of a given country if more than 50 % of the equity interest in it is beneficially owned by persons of that country and "controlled" by persons of a given country if such | (c) by derogation from sub-paragraph (a), if it is decided that Union response measures should apply to legal persons falling under subparagraph (a), the nationality of the investment shall be the nationality or the place of permanent residence of the natural or juridical person or persons who own or control the investment in the Union. The investment shall be considered to be "owned" by persons of a given country if more than 50 % of the equity interest in it is beneficially owned by persons of that country and "controlled" by persons of a given country if such persons have the power to name a majority of its directors or otherwise to legally direct its actions. | (c) by derogation from subparagraph (a), if it is decided that Union response measures should apply to legal persons falling under subparagraph (a), the nationality of the investment shall be the nationality or the place of permanent residence of the natural or juridicallegal person or persons who own or control the investment in the Union. The investment shall be considered to be "owned" by persons of a given country if more than 50 % of the equity interest in it is beneficially owned by persons of that country and "controlled" by persons of a given country if such persons have the power to name a majority of its directors or otherwise to legally direct its actions. | | (c) by derogation from sub-paragraph (a), if it is decided that Union response measures should apply to legal persons falling under subparagraph (a), the nationality of the investment shall be the nationality or the place of permanent residence of the natural or legal person or persons who own or control the investment in the Union. The investment shall be considered to be "owned" by persons of a given country if more than 50 % of the equity interest in it is beneficially owned by persons of that country and "controlled" by persons of a given country if such persons have the power to name a majority of its directors or otherwise to legally direct its actions. |

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| | | persons have the power to name a majority of its directors or otherwise to legally direct its actions. | | | | |
| G | 194 | 4. Regarding traderelated aspects of intellectual property rights, the term "nationals" shall be understood in the same sense as it is used in the paragraph 3 of Article 1 of the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. | 4. Regarding trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights, the term "nationals" shall be understood in the same sense as it is used in the paragraph 3 of Article 1 of the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. | 4. Regarding trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights, the term "nationals" shall be understood in the same sense as it is used in the paragraph 3 of Article 1 of the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). | | 4. Regarding trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights, the term "nationals" shall be understood in the same sense as it is used in the paragraph 3 of Article 1 of the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). |