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From: Swedish delegation

To: Working Party on Frontiers / Mixed Committee (EU-Iceland/Norway and Switzerland/Liechtenstein)

No. prev. doc.: 15176/25

Subject: Prolongation of the temporary reintroduction of border controls at the Swedish internal borders in accordance with Article 25a of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code)

Delegations will find attached a copy of the letter received by the General Secretariat of the Council on 09 April 2026 regarding the prolongation of the temporary reintroduction of border controls by Sweden at the internal borders from 12 May 2026 to 11 November 2026.



Government Offices of Sweden

9 April 2026

IM 2960 2026
09-04-2026

Secretary-General of the Council
Thérèse Blanchet

Ministry of Justice
Minister for Justice

E-MAIL


Dear Madam Secretary-General,

Please find enclosed our notification for a decision of prolongation of border control at the internal border in accordance with article 25a (4) and (5) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 (Schengen Borders Code).

The need for a further period of reintroduced border control and border checks is due to the persistence of the serious threat to public policy and internal security that is further elaborated in the notification.

The decision will be in force as of 12 May 2026 for a planned duration of six months.

Yours sincerely,



Gunnar Strömmer

Telephone: +46 8 405 10 00
Fax: +46 8 24 46 31
Web: www.regeringen.se

Postal address: SE 103 33 Stockholm
Street address: Drottninggatan 3
E-mail: ju.registrator@gov.se

Notification of a temporary reintroduction or prolongation of border control at internal borders

1. Notification submitted by:

Sweden

2. Date of the notification:

9 April 2026

3. Date and duration of the planned reintroduction or prolongation of border control at internal borders (Article 27(1), point (d), of Regulation (EU) 2016/399):

The prolongation decision will be in force for a period of 6 months as of 12 May 2026 up to and including 11 November 2026.

4. Scope of the proposed reintroduction or prolongation of border control at internal borders, specifying at which part or parts of the internal borders border control will be reintroduced or prolonged (Article 27(1), point (b), of Regulation (EU) 2016/399)

The land border with Denmark at the exit for train- and motor vehicle traffic from the Öresund bridge will continue to be the main scope and focus for border checks. Checks will also occur at all seaports and airports in the cities of Stockholm, Gothenburg, Malmö, Helsingborg, Trelleborg and Ystad.

The Police Authority will receive a continued mandate within the framework of the decision to perform checks elsewhere if they, based on a risk analysis, intelligence or other relevant information, consider it to be necessary to effectively address the serious threat. Border checks might therefore take place in other border regions than those mentioned above and include both sea, air, and land borders.

5. Notification for a:

first reintroduction of border control at internal borders (unforeseeable event): Article 25a(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399

first reintroduction of border control at internal borders (foreseeable event): Article 25a(4) and (5) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399

prolongation of border control at internal borders (foreseeable event): Article 25a(4) and (5) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399

Period(s) of previous reintroduction(s) of border control at internal borders:

The first decision of reintroduction of border control at the internal border was in force between 12 November 2024 and 11 May 2025, the current decision is in force up to and including 11 May 2026.

prolongation of border control at internal borders after 2 years, for major exceptional situation: Article 25a(6) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399

Period(s) of previous reintroduction(s) of border control at internal borders:

Please indicate the dates of previous reintroductions of border control at internal borders.

- prolongation of border control at internal borders after 2 years and 6 months, for major exceptional situation: Article 25a(6) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399

Period(s) of previous reintroduction(s) of border control at internal borders:

Please indicate the dates of previous reintroductions of border control at internal borders.

- reintroduction of border control at internal borders in accordance with a Council Implementing Decision: Article 28(1) and (5) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399

NB: A continuation of a reintroduction of border control at the internal borders does not have to be considered a prolongation if the serious threat to public policy or internal security upon which it is based is different from the serious threat that motivated the preceding reintroduction of border control at the internal border. If this is the case, please notify for a first reintroduction and specify the new and distinct nature of the serious threat to public policy or internal security under 7.

6. If the notification for a foreseeable event is made less than four weeks before the planned reintroduction or prolongation of border control at internal borders (Article 25a(4), (5) and (6) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399):

Please indicate when the circumstances giving rise to the need to reintroduce or prolong border control at internal borders became known.

7. Serious threat to public policy or internal security, consisting of:

- terrorist incidents or threats, and threats posed by serious organised crime

Organised criminal networks with international connections and cross-border *modus operandi*, continue to pose a serious threat to public policy and internal security. Hostile foreign state actors also continue to use and recruit members of these networks for criminal and terror related purposes. Sweden also continues to be seen as a legitimate target by violent-Islamist groups as well as individuals.

- large-scale public health emergencies

Please specify and include all relevant data detailing the events that constitute a serious threat.

- an exceptional situation characterised by sudden large-scale unauthorised movements of third country nationals, within the meaning of Article 25(1), point (c), of Regulation (EU) 2016/399

- Large scale or high-profile international event

- Other

Please specify and include all relevant data detailing the events that constitute a serious threat.

8. Names of authorised border crossing points

Border crossing points primarily affected at this time will as mentioned above be:

- Toll and Customs station at Lernacken (vehicle exit from the bridge of Öresund, Malmö).

- Train station at Hyllie (first station for trains arriving via the bridge of Öresund, Malmö).
 - Malmö Airport, Helsingborg, Trelleborg and Ystad seaports.
 - Arlanda Stockholm Airport and seaports of Stockholm.
 - Gothenburg Airport and seaports.
 - Nyköping Skavsta Airport.
- As before, border checks within the frame of the decision might also take place at other parts of the border with the Police Authority responsible for such operational decisions.

9. Measures taken by other Member States (if applicable)

Not applicable.

10. Assessment of necessity and proportionality under Article 26(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399

10.1. Appropriateness: explanation how the reintroduction of border control at internal borders is likely to adequately remedy the threat

The prolongation of border control continues to increase the capability and effectiveness of the Police Authority. Being able to perform spot checks, approach potential suspects and to gather intelligence through border checks is still a vital tool for the Police. Without causing delays or disruptions to traffic the Police Authority have managed to keep up their efforts with continued results in the fight against serious cross border crime.

10.2. Explanation why the objectives pursued by the reintroduction cannot be obtained by:

- *the use of alternative measures, such as proportionate checks carried out in the context of checks within the territory as referred to in Article 23, point (a), of Regulation (EU) 2016/399;*
- *the use of the procedure laid down in Article 23a of Regulation (EU) 2016/399;*
- *other forms of police cooperation provided for under Union law;*
- *common measures regarding temporary restrictions on travel to the Member States as referred to in Article 21a(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399.*

Further to the reasons stated above, the scale of passenger flows especially at the Öresund bridge connection, as well as practical and legal limitations of other type of measures makes internal border control the only viable option and a last resort. Other operational solutions and methods with a different legal basis have been discussed but has so far after a thorough assessment not stood up to the necessary criteria of effectiveness.

Measures such as Police Checks in Border Areas, and co-operation with neighbouring Member States however continues to be part of the total approach taken by the government and the Police Authority. After careful consideration and renewed dialogue with the Police Authority and other relevant stake holders the government has, as stated above, nonetheless found that such measures in themselves are still not enough to combat the serious threat.

10.3. Likely impact on the movement of persons within the area without internal border control and the functioning of cross-border regions

	<p>The effect on the movement of persons remains minimal, and all possible attention is paid to ensuring that this continues to be the case. The Police Authority are still working in an intelligence and risk analysis-based way of operations, while occasionally also performing randomised spot checks. These are done as swiftly and non-disruptive to traffic flows as possible. Trains needing to stop at Hyllie station must still do so for a few minutes. This has been shown to have no or little effect on the number of travellers and commuters as their numbers have increased during 2025.</p>
10.4.	<p>If the serious threat consists of sudden large-scale unauthorised movements (Article 25(1), point (c), and 27(3) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399):</p> <p><i>Please provide a risk assessment and information on the sudden large-scale unauthorised movements, including any information obtained from Union Agencies and data analysis from relevant information systems.</i></p> <p><i>Please include quantitative and qualitative data, including for example the number of applications for international protection and unauthorised movements, as well as information on to the sudden nature of the large-scale unauthorised movement, the strain put on the resources and capacities of the competent authorities, the level of preparedness of the competent authorities, the likely risk to the overall functioning of the area without internal border control.</i></p>
10.5.	<p>Opinion of the Commission and consultation process (if applicable)</p> <p>From dialogue we have taken note of the Commissions views that efforts and dialogue with stakeholders in the transport sector as well as the Police Authority should continue. Especially for the purpose of finding further practical solutions for commuters and other members of the public within affected regions. Continued dialogue with the Police Authority should also continue with the aim of implementing methods and solutions related to legislation allowing for Police Checks in Border Areas.</p>

11. If the notification concerns a prolongation of border control at internal borders after 6 months in accordance with Article 25a(5) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 (Article 27(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399)

11.1.	<p>Assessment of the necessity and proportionality based on the criteria laid down in Article 26(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399</p> <p>Please see point 10.</p>
11.2.	<p>Scale and anticipated evolution of the serious threat</p> <p><i>Please elaborate on the scale and anticipated evolution of the serious threat, in particular:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> — <i>how long the serious threat is expected to persist;</i> — <i>which sections of the internal borders may be affected;</i> — <i>information regarding coordination measures with other Member States impacted or likely to be impacted by the border control at internal borders.</i> <p>It is still not possible to foresee or anticipate the persistence or development of the serious threat due to its complex nature and to recent world events. Hence, a decision for six months is also necessary to allow the relevant authorities adequate strategic and operational leeway.</p>

The sections of the border that will or might be affected by border checks has been stated above.

All decisions by the government and Police Authority will strictly observe the principles of necessity and proportionality. Dialogue and coordination with our neighbouring Member States is ongoing on a regular basis and remain an integral part of our relationship as neighbours.

12. If the notification concerns a prolongation of border control at internal borders after 2 years, for a major exceptional situation (Article 25a(6) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399).

12.1.	Assessment of the necessity and proportionality based on the criteria laid down in Article 26(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399
12.2.	Action taken in response to an opinion of the Commission issued in accordance with Article 25a(6) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 (if applicable)
12.3.	Action taken in response to a consultation process initiated in accordance with Article 25a(6) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 (if applicable)
12.4.	Substantiation of the continued threat to public policy or internal security
12.5.	Explanation why alternative measures are ineffective
12.6.	Presentation of mitigating measures
12.7.	Where appropriate: presentation of the means, actions, conditions and timeline with a view to lifting border control at internal borders

13. Any further information (optional)

For example:

- details of strategic and operational cooperation with other Member States
- details on to the use of alternative measures (Article 23 of Regulation (EU) 2016/399)
- whether the procedure laid down in Article 23a of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 is applied at the time of reintroduction of border control at internal borders
- bilateral or regional cooperation initiatives, including with third countries

14. Withholding of information on grounds of public security (Article 27(5) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399)

Detailed and operational information has been withheld due to its relation to matters of national interest- and internal security as well as for reasons of ongoing criminal investigations.

15. Confidentiality of information (Article 35 of Regulation (EU) 2016/399)

No.