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Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability – CPCC

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Introduction

This report covers lessons from the civilian CSDP Missions, based on contributions from within the CPCC and from the Missions. It has been consulted with ISP and FPI and it complements the *EUMS Annual Lessons and Best Practice Report 2018*, and together they report comprehensively on the CSDP lessons from 2018.

A main issue to note from 2018 is the agreement on a civilian CSDP Compact (ST 14305 2018 INIT). This aims to strengthening Civilian CSDP, and many work strands connected to lessons will be covered by the Joint Action Plan to implement the Compact. As such, in some cases, issues are considered learnt in this format, and moved over to the process implementing the Compact.

Work to develop how to improve the lessons process has continued in 2018, starting with the launch of an instruction from the Civilian Operations Commander for the overall Lessons Process, with specific guidelines for writing and reporting on lessons, early in the year. The software tool, a CSDP Lessons Database, was used by the missions, and although still in need of further modifications, it has improved the visibility and functionality of the lessons process across missions. Furthermore, during 2018, EUAM Ukraine made a special report on lessons in the area of integrated approach. This was a useful exercise, that indeed can and should be replicated on other topics and in other missions. Main outcomes from the report is also included in this report.

As regards to structure, both new and previous lessons are presented by theme and topic. There are four themes, all of which have a section with the state of play in relation to previously identified lessons, followed by a section with - if available - new lessons identified. The four themes are: 1) Planning, 2) Conduct of Operations, 3) Mission Support and 4) Horizontal issues. **Planning** covers both, lessons in operational planning/mission set up and planning aspects of mission reviews and/or transition. The **Conduct of Operations** phase refers to the time a Mission is operational on the ground in theatre. Most of the lessons are identified during this phase; however, many will be recorded as either Mission Support or a Horizontal issue. Lessons directly connected to mandate implementation in need of Mission specific actions in theatre are recorded under this theme. Functional **Mission Support** is crucial to support effective mandate implementation and an agreed minimum requirement support for a CSDP Mission is needed before any Mission is launched or established. As **Horizontal issues** span over more topics than the other themes, this part is the largest.

1. Planning

1.1 Implementation of previously identified lessons

1.1.1 CONOPS/OPLAN

Frequent strategic reviews with consequent development of new OPLANs hamper Mission delivery (2015)

Strategic reviews are part of the Crisis Management Procedures (CMP) and provide the basis upon which CSDP mandates are evaluated by PSC and are conducted by a Service outside the chain of command (ISP3). Triggered at the request of the PSC, or by an initiative of the HR, Strategic Reviews are conducted when: (i) the security or political context within which a CSDP Mission/Operation changes, (ii) when called upon to do so by Member States or, (iii) when the mandate is nearing its end. As part of the Strategic Review Process, the planning assumptions that were made at the time of the conceptual design for the CSDP engagement are re-visited (whether these assumptions were made in an options paper, CMC, or other political-strategic planning document), to determine their validity. This permits Member States the opportunity to re-focus or amend existing mandate (and Council Decision), if necessary, or suggest changes to operational planning documents (such as the CONOPS or OPLAN). Strategic reviews necessitate a long preparation process and in the past often were followed by an OPLAN revision. Hence, the timeframe required for a Strategic review to be completed and approved can sometimes impact negatively on mandate implementation, and possibly lead to some confusion among Mission members and local authorities. Rather than the OPLAN, the appropriateness of revising the CONOPS should be first looked at for the sake of good order and sound planning. In specific cases, Missions' Six-Monthly Reports can be used to seek MS' guidance regarding the potential and more limited refocusing or evolution of a Mission's mandated tasks, allowing for more flexibility before a full-fledged Strategic review process is launched. As part of the implementation of the civilian CSDP Compact, the EEAS will also explore the opportunity for modular and scalable mandates, to increase flexibility, something that is aimed to improve efficiency, as well as the possibility, when appropriate, to look at longer mandates. The CPCC will also seek to ensure more forward planning of the requirements and timings of strategic reviews against pol-strat necessities. As such, this lesson is considered learnt, and developments will continue in the framework of the Compact.

1.1.2 Planning methodology

An overall methodological guidance as well as 'checklist' for planning and launching new Missions should be developed (2017)

This lesson originated in the planning and launching of EUAM Iraq 2016. At the time, with no new civilian mission launched since 2014, and due to a high level of staff rotation, only a few staff remained with an institutional experience of launching a new Mission. As the Mission also was planned in a very short timeframe and in light of the loss of institutional memory lately in CPCC, it became evident that knowledge of the already existing internal Planning SOPs and related documents such as the agreed mission model structure, the benchmarking and MIP methodology and IOC/FOC documents as well as familiarity with the 2013 Crisis Management Procedures has to be enhanced. One example was the fact that only one Council Decision was used in the case of Iraq, following the use of preparatory measures, which ignored the previously identified lessons that two Council Decisions actually make mission set-up quicker and more efficient. CPCC is currently working on an updated version of the Planning SOPs that would take new developments into account. Work continues by the MSP on the new Warehouse II as well as standardising IT support and more efficient logistics, financing and human resources management which will contribute to future more seamless mission set up. This is also part of the implementation of the Civilian CSDP Compact, and as such this lesson is considered learnt and is closed.

1.1.3 Transition

There is a need for a comprehensive package of SOPs for administrative issues in relation to closing a Mission (2013)

A final consolidated version of the guidelines on managerial inventory, including depreciation, disposal and replacement of assets was shared with EU Member States and sent to the Mission in the end of 2018. The Mission Liquidation Guidelines are to be presented to the EU Member States in Q3 2019. Council Decisions on CSDP Missions may need to be updated to include standard provisions on the closure process.

2. Conduct of Operations

2.1 Implementation of previously identified lessons**2.1.1 Mandate delivery**

Adjudicating serious crimes through the entire chain of justice takes a long time and a sufficient number of judges is required to avoid unnecessary delays (2017)

This lesson originated in EULEX Kosovo, that as part of their previous executive mandate dealt with very serious crimes (war crimes, cases of organised crime, etc.). The executive judicial mandate in EULEX ended in June 2018. Up until that date, executive judges were still in theatre, finalising as many cases as they could. Cases still open at that time were handed over to local authorities to adjudicate. Looking at executive mandates, like the one EULEX had, from a longer-term perspective, the framework used in Kosovo in granting two-year mandates with annual employment contracts of personnel involved in adjudicating criminal cases in an executive capacity (in particular judges and prosecutors) may put a heavy strain on the delivery of expected results. Therefore, should a similar engagement be planned in the future, either a more longer-term perspective should be considered the initial planning or alternatively methods of engagement be considered. As executive mandates of this kind have not been replicated since EULEX, this lesson is closed.

To actively support local 'internalisation' of definitions, through extensive communication and mentoring is an effective way to support the advancement of strategic concepts (2017)

The methodology used by EUPOL COPPS, to promote the advancement of strategic concepts through 'internalisation' of definitions is considered as successful and a best practice in the Mission's current activities and both the community policing as well as information-led policing concepts have been adopted and are being implemented. As such, this is a best practice and the lesson is closed.

2.2 New lessons identified**Training delivery hampered as counterparts having difficulties to nominate appropriate participants due to lack of an appropriate HR Management system – EUAM Ukraine**

Lesson identified: On various occasions, the National Police of Ukraine (NPU) nominated personnel that did not match the necessary requirements for the trainings delivered by the Mission,

despite the fact that detailed descriptions and selection criteria were provided. Moreover, in some cases course participants were only selected on very short notice, sometimes without being aware of the training topic or they were ordered to attend training after a nightshift or on their day off. On a few occasions, some officers attended the same training more than once.

Lesson analysis: This type of circumstances has a negative impact on the effectiveness of the delivered trainings. In order to guarantee appropriate participation in the trainings delivered there is a need to develop a more effective human resource management (HRM) system for the NPU. As a remedial action, the Mission addressed the NPU leadership to request better coordination and a more thorough selection of the candidates for trainings. EUAM also keeps its own record of participants and identified a point of contact within the NPU to improve the selection and training process. Part of the problem is that the NPU's HRM system is not centralised and thus cannot keep track of nominations. The Mission will continue to advise the NPU on developing a professional HRM system, including a possible database that would register trainings as part of the personal file.

3. Mission Support

3.1 Implementation of previously identified lessons

3.1.1 Procurement

Need to further accelerate procurement capacity at Mission start-up. (2014)

Effective procurement in the start-up phase is crucial, followed by the elaboration of a thorough and comprehensive procurement plan. The lack of availability of Framework Contracts or warehouse at the time of the establishment of EUAM Iraq obliged the Mission, with the support of FPI and CPCC MSP, to carry out a lot of tender procedures on its own, resulting in slow provision of equipment to Mission staff. Lack of specific training on EU procurement rules is also an issue that can hamper procurement processes. This can be mitigated through the use of procurement experts as part of the Core Responsiveness Concept, the Mission Support Platform and new Framework Contracts that are being put in place. Through the establishment of a strategic stock at the CSDP Warehouse, Missions starting up can have access to a standardized set of equipment needed for a

proper setting up (including IT and Communications, Vehicles, Security Equipment). This is complemented by e.g. accessibility of DG Digit FWC for Microsoft licences,

3.1.2 Logistics

Swift and correct identification of equipment needs at Mission start-up (2017)

When establishing a Mission/Office, Fact-Finding and Technical Assessment teams must include logistics, transport, and CIS, in order to ensure swift and correct identification of equipment needs. A generic equipment start-kit, for TAM members and core team, is planned to be established, but this still needs to be complemented by context specific equipment, defined case by case. MSD staff works closely to the planners, but this is still a key issue to be considered in the planning phase. To ensure that items from either the CWH, another Mission or a supplier can reach the Mission faster, Missions have started to use the freight forwarding framework contract attached to the CWH.

3.1.3 CIS

CIS network complementarity is needed (2014)

Email encryption tools have been installed and are currently used in Missions for non-classified information email exchange. New encryption tools (ZEUS and Filcrypto) have been installed in the Missions and are used to encrypt Restricted EU documents. A Secure Communication Task Force has been created as part of implementing the Civilian CSDP COMPACT and is bringing together CPCC and EEAS responsible staff in order to strengthen capabilities in this area for CSDP Missions. CPCC, as a future user, could be part of the new systems EC3IS, Classified Document Management System (CDMS) and RESCOM which will be the new EEAS Classified Corporate systems. It is foreseen that a third phase, extending to Missions, will take place after the systems have been deployed in EEAS HQ and Delegations. The question of the feasibility of an accredited Secured Area within the Mission is still not yet addressed. Hence, a final solution on joint classified CIS is still pending; the Secure Communication Task Force is also investigating on the feasible solutions to solve this issue.

A lack of specific software applications for operational activities in Missions hampers follow-up and analysis of activities (2016)

The follow-up of the implementation of the Mission Implementation Plan (MIP) is different in all Missions, sometimes performed manually through Excel sheets. To enhance the follow-up at Mission and HQ level, a software system would need to be developed, based on a business case for the process it aims to support. Due to lack of resources both in terms of creating the business case, as well as developing the system this has not yet materialised. CPCC will explore options for this during this year.

3.1.4 Human resources

National constraints as well as conditions in the field may limit the number of candidates for CSDP Head of Mission (HoM) positions (2016)

The number of candidates nominated for Head of Mission positions is in general rather low. In some cases there have been no applicants at all.¹ The reasons for the low number of nominated candidates for Head of Mission positions are likely to be numerous and can also differ from country to country. One issue is that persons with a HoM profile (a senior person able to lead and manage a large organisation in a complex political and operational context) are also in high national demand. Another factor may be that information does not reach potential candidates, in particular in line ministries (MoI/MoJ). Furthermore, all civilian CSDP Missions are non-family Missions, and this is a documented reason why suitable candidates decide not to apply. CPCC intends to address this issue with MS and the COM, in the framework of the Civilian CSDP Compact, in view of finding a solution. As such, this lesson is considered as handled within the Compact and is closed.

A minimum Mission Support Staffing needed to start-up and deploy new Missions and Field Office should be defined (2016)

This lesson originated in EUBAM Libya, a high-risk Mission in which, when it was to be re-launched, only three Mission Support positions were planned and subsequently authorised by EU MS. As a consequence, the Mission faced major difficulties, specifically in the areas of Logistics, CIS, Procurement and Finance. This is not an issue that is isolated to EUBAM Libya, and challenges are repeatedly identified in other Missions when crucial Mission Support functions are

¹ During 2016, four HoM positions were advertised, of which three had two applicants each and one had to be re-advertised, finally also receiving two applicants. In 2017 five HoM positions were advertised, of which four has two applicants each, and only one had as much as five (EUMM Georgia). 2018, one HoM position was advertised, with three nominated candidates.

lacking, either due to positions not being planned for or not being filled. Enabling functions are very important and without key Mission Support positions, sound financial management and/or duty of care cannot be ensured. The lack of minimum Mission Support staffing creates delays in deployment and/or problems once the Mission deploys. This can additionally cause security risks and hamper mandate implementation. By having a minimum figure set to ensure business continuity and back-ups, this issue can more easily be properly planned for and deployment can be more rapid, while problems and security risks can be limited. It is then equally important actually to recruit this minimum staff and ensure deployment before launching the Mission. In the case of launching Iraq, Mission Support staff was deployed at the same time as operational staff, however no operational activities could begin before Mission Support had finalised some preparations. Hence, also the best timing of deployment for different staff categories should be assessed, in line with the existing provision in this regard in the agreed Mission model structure document of 2013.

A Gender Action Plan in the area of recruitment can enhance gender balance in the Mission (2017)

This lesson comes from EUMM Georgia, that has continued to implement its internal Gender Action Plan in order to increase the gender balance in the mission and to recruit more women. At the end of 2018, the Mission reached 40 % female staff members (a slight improvement since the year before), and there has been an increase in the proportion of female staff members among senior managers. The Mission considers it still too early to evaluate the overall impact resulting from the Mission's changes made last year to the wording of some job descriptions in order to make them more inclusive. The Mission has continued internal awareness-raising about gender mainstreaming, and a training session about unconscious gender bias was organised by the Gender Adviser for members of recruitment panels. CPCC is planning to use a similar methodology reviewing also wording in the central template job descriptions during 2019.

3.2 New lessons identified

Possibility for Missions to hire replacements to cover periods of maternity leave would increase business continuity – EULEX Kosovo

Lesson identified: Currently it is not possible for a Mission to fund a replacement when a Mission member takes their maternity leave, which in total is 20 weeks². Only when a seconding state offer a replacement, it is possible to have a person cover, and in these cases the person is deployed without a per diem funded from the Mission. There is no possibility to hire a replacement for contracted staff, neither international nor local.

Lesson analysis: This not necessarily an issue for all position, however in key functions where there is only one person (e.g. gender adviser or PPIO), it does create challenges. Without the possibility to hire a replacement, business continuity is hampered, and the person on maternity leave can also accumulate stress, as all tasks are accumulated during your time away. Hence it would be beneficial for both delivery of the Mission as well as the well-being of staff, if the Mission could hire replacements for the time period of which a key staff member is on maternity leave. To enable Missions to hire replacements during maternity leave it would need to be reflected in the budget, although this puts further pressure on the margins of the overall CFSP Budget.

A realistic and smart budget setting and higher budget implementation rates across all Missions is highly beneficial in times of high political demands placed on the CFSP Budget

Lesson identified: In times of limited margins of resources under the CFSP Budget, realistic budget setting and the capacity of Missions to implement the funds they have been allocated in line with their Operational Plans, are two crucial factors. Budget implementation rates vary substantially from Mission to Mission. Generally speaking, three levels of implementation can be identified: some of the 'older' Missions that have been established more than a decade ago and whose mandates do not change substantially any more over time, have the capacity to absorb funds at satisfactory levels of roughly 90%. A wide range of Missions is situated in a middle playing field with budget implementation rates between 80 and 90%. At the lower end, there are Missions that show rates of even below or around 70%, which is an unsatisfactory level. There are a number of lessons to be learned from these figures, while fully acknowledging that Missions operate in civilian crisis scenarios that may negatively impact on their capacity to reach high absorption levels. The reasons for this are multiple, varying from too ambitious operational objectives to low staffing levels and/or

² If national legislation in the home nation of a seconded staff member legally allows longer time off, the person is allowed to take longer special leave in connection with the 20 weeks maternity, hence this period can be significantly longer.

staffing situations where the lack of skills and required competence may hamper a Mission to fully implement its budget. Many other factors may be the root causes of low implementation rates.

Lesson analysis: There is room for improvement and measures can be taken to help alleviate the burden on the CFSP Budget. Missions do not work in silos, when it comes to the overall perspective of how funds are allocated across Missions – when one Mission requires a substantial increase of funding, eating up an important share of the annual envelope of the CFSP Budget, this may have consequences for other Missions. This is why, when making budget proposals, Missions should take factors into account that may hamper a satisfactory budget implementation. When preparing budget proposals in the course of a mandate renewal for review by the Commission, these proposals must be as realistic as possible and be informed by the level of implementation of the previous mandate. The idea of requesting funds for elements that may be just ‘*nice to have*’ must be avoided. Furthermore, in the course of two year mandates, stock will have to be taken after an appropriate time span, to check against delivery so as to decide whether to review the level of the allocated budget. This will allow freeing budgetary resources from Missions with lower implementation levels to those which are able to absorb funding in a better way and may require even additional funds, if justified. Furthermore and reaching farer, over-ambitious mandate objectives of a Mission may need to be looked at, when structural challenges in a Mission (e.g. lack of personnel) prevent a full budget implementation. Such stock taking has already taken place in 2017/2018, but must be further intensified and approached in a systematic and coherent manner in the coming years. CPCC will work closely with FPI during budget preparation to ensure realistic and operationally sound budgets are prepared.

4. Horizontal issues

4.1 Implementation of previously identified lessons

4.1.1 Conduct and discipline

A common Code of Conduct and Discipline for all civilian CSDP Missions should be developed (2013)

The implementation of the Code of Conduct and Discipline for all civilian CSDP Missions endorsed by the Council in 2016 continues. EUMS, MPCC and CPCC designed a common reporting template for civilian and military Missions and operations for the yearly update to Member States. A central archiving system of disciplinary measures imposed to mission members and/or recommended to seconding authorities is being developed in CPCC in consultation with the EEAS data protection office and the European Data Protection Supervisor. An E-learning module on the Code of Conduct and Discipline and the Generic Standards of Behaviour was developed in 2018 and finalised early 2019. This module is mandatory for all current and future staff in civilian CSDP Missions. In-person training on the topic is also delivered during the monthly ESDC pre-deployment training and personal induction training of senior mission members in CPCC. An additional joint training for all the Deputy Heads of Mission and Heads of Mission -the responsible authorities- is expected to take place in Brussels in 2019. The implementation of the new Code has given additional tasks to CPCC, being very time and resource consuming. Therefore, a full time AD position dedicated to Conduct and Discipline was created in CPCC in 2018. The 2013 lesson can now be considered implemented and closed.

4.1.2 Methodology and Operational Capability

The lack of essential SOPs hampers CSDP Missions mandate implementation (2015)

This lesson originated in the launch of EUAM Ukraine, and has been an issue every time a Mission is launched. A list of existing SOPs should be available for mission start up, providing basic templates that can be contextualised by the Mission. This would also benefit existing Missions and not least contribute to enhanced harmonisation. CPCC has started a process to do this, including through its Mission Support Platform but it will take some time to finalise. The FPI MSP started the same process with the aim of developing standard horizontal SOPs in the procurement and finance areas.

The lack of monitoring and evaluation (M&E) framework for Missions impedes progress tracking. (2015)

Strategic reviews and six-monthly reports are the main tools for Member States to evaluate both the political objectives as well as the operational impact of the Missions. The MIP template, introduced in 2013, functions as an internal management tool and enables close monitoring of operational

activities as well as gives the possibility to track progress. However, it is not always fully implemented. CPCC is planning to put further emphasis on training for Ops desks and Missions on how to implement the existent methodology, starting with a seminar for Ops desks and planners in Missions in March. Furthermore, as part of implementing the Civilian CSDP Compact, further methodology on monitoring and evaluation will be elaborated. Currently, no external evaluations through independent external experts are foreseen. With these actions this lesson is considered as dealt with as part of the implementation of the Compact and is closed.

4.1.3 Duty of Care/Security

Security support for CSDP Missions at central level should be further enhanced. (2015)

CSDP Missions continues to face a challenging number of diverse and dynamic risk environments, in particular in countries with CRITICAL or HIGH SIAC Threat Ratings (Somalia, Sahel, Iraq and Libya). CPCC has increased the security risk management capacity both in HQ and across the missions and developed a wide range of general and specific measures. In CPCC the Security Office has been transformed into a separate section, the CPCC Security and Duty of Care Office, now referring directly to the CivOpsCdr. The organisational developments in Brussels have also been reflected in most missions, and security departments are being renamed as Mission Security and Duty of Care Departments, where the medical capacities also will be included.

There have been significant policy developments, including the in-depth revision of the Field Security Handbook, the completion of the new Firearms Policy and an outline of a CSDP HEAT policy as well as introducing technical specifications on Personal Protective Equipment and Armoured Vehicles. Annual trainings are now held for the new Mission Security Officers, as well as biannual seminars for the Senior Mission Security Officers. Furthermore, an e-learning module on basic security awareness for new CSDP Mission Members is being completed. The ongoing cooperation between CPCC Security and Duty of Care Office and the various EEAS security functions, continues to prove valuable in ensuring compliance with the Duty of Care responsibilities outlined in the shared Field Security Policy. In the mission Areas of Operation practical cooperation between the respective Delegations and missions are mainly centred on resolving issues such as safe transport, specific security trainings, sharing specialised local resources such as Close Protection, sharing of intelligence and exchanging EUCI etc.

Common CSDP Mission minimum standards for medical examinations should be developed (2016)

At the moment civilian CSDP Missions have no common minimum standards for medical examinations. This is an issue connected to duty of care, and with regards to contracted staff the responsibility lies with CPCC. CPCC want to take a holistic approach to this issue, aiming to develop a standard template that would apply both for contracted and seconded staff. Currently internal discussions are ongoing, and next step will be to, drawing on different MS current procedures, develop and suggest a draft template to be discussed with MS. An expected key issue will be the discussion on what the criterion will be for being deemed non-suitable for deployment.

4.1.4 Legal issues

The legal status of a temporarily relocated Mission needs to be addressed in advance in order to avoid any legal vacuum (2015)

When a Mission is temporarily relocated (which in some cases can last for a prolonged period), the Mission itself does not have legal status in the country of residence, and it is legally questionable whether a relocated civilian CSDP Mission can continue operating from the 'temporary' host country without the agreement of the local authorities. As a Status Of Mission Agreement (SOMA) A as such cannot be used in the 'temporary' host country another legal solution should be defined, as there are many legal, financial, administrative, security, technical and other practical aspects that need to be tackled. So far there has been no general progress, but Mission members are included on the diplomatic list in the 'temporary' host country. A proper solution is not easy to find, sometimes due to the lack of willingness from host country.

Using an exchange of letters referring to the Terms of Reference (ToR) in a Status Of Force Agreements (SOFA) instead of a proper SOMA in conformity with the existing template, is not recommendable (2016)

When setting up a Mission, there is often a political pressure for timely deployment. In these cases, waiting for a full SOMA is usually not an option, and a temporary solution is needed, as a feasible and sound legal basis need to be in place. An exchange of letters, referring to the Vienna Convention, or exchange of letters extending the remit of the SOFA, when there is a military mission there, remains only an initial and temporary solution, and not a satisfactory long-term solution for the full duration of a mission. Negotiations for a SOMA need to be initiated as early as

in parallel to the finalisation of CMCs as not having a SOMA in place can cause serious problems, from among others the operational, logistic, legal, and security point of view.

4.1.5 Integrated approach

Cooperation with the UN, OSCE and AU can yet be increased (2014)

Cooperation with UN is ongoing in several areas and both in HQ level and in theatre, and is well functioning, framed through the EU-UN steering committee on Crisis management, and relevant work strands falling under this. For the OSCE, cooperation exists, but is still more ad hoc in its nature. In relation to AU, cooperation is more limited, and there is room for improvement, however AU is involved in some of the EU-UN initiatives, notably different table-top exercises.

Support from EU CSDP Missions with expertise and technical advice to other EU programmes enhances a comprehensive approach on the ground (2016)

When this lesson was recorded in 2016 this was only random practice. Now it is a more common practice that generally works well, and several Missions work closely with the EU Delegations, supporting them with technical advice and expertise when identifying, preparing and implementing EU-financed projects and programs. This type of cooperation in the field has allowed for a regular dialogue and complementary actions, enabling a more comprehensive work on security sector reform in general, and border management programmes in particular. At HQ level, it has reinforced consultation, planning and synergies between the EEAS and relevant Commission services. The specific lessons report on Integrated Approach from EUAM Ukraine this year was a good deliverable, listing more specific lessons on how the Mission may support the implementation of COM funded programmes (see new lessons). As such, this lesson is considered learnt, and is closed.

Regional presence gives a real added value, as local level coordination can serve as a model for similar mechanisms at the central level (2017)

The EUAM Ukraine's Regional Presences (RPs) were established in Kharkiv and Lviv in May 2016, and proved to be a valuable tool to support the delivery of strategic advice on CSS reform at the central level by supporting bottom-up initiatives and when successful also deploying them on a nation-wide basis. Furthermore, the RPs enhanced EUAM's visibility in the regions and strengthened the Mission's regular interaction with key regional interlocutors. The experience with

establishing RPs in Ukraine shows that RP can be instrumental in furthering regional initiatives centrally and as such provide added operational impact, and the mission sees this as a best practice that they use. This includes the opening of RP Odessa in March 2018. As such this lesson is closed.

4.1.6 Information and Communication

The visibility of CSDP Missions in the field should be strengthened (2013)

When this lesson was recorded in 2013, the visibility of CSDP Missions was stronger in some Mission areas than in others – to a large extent connected to the level of resourcing in the different Missions for this issue. Today all Missions, except EUBAM Libya, have a specific PPIO budget and most missions have dedicated PPI staff. While the communication activities carried out by the individual missions have in general developed positively, a better analysis of the general framework, including the identification of further potential resources and possibilities, is necessary, particularly at HQ level in Brussels.

Communication on Civilian CSDP is part of the Compact and should - in a clear and understandable manner – explain the added-value that the civilian CSDP Missions generate both to our partners in the field and to the security of European citizens. This aims also to explain why we engage in Civilian CSDP and why this particular form of the European effort to stabilize our wider neighbourhood is worth supporting and resourcing.

Resourcing is key, not least to enable contracting external resources for specific projects. CPCC has no specific funds for information activities neither does it have its own digital accounts. Enhanced outreach by the CPCC to inform wider audiences on civilian CSDP would necessitate the establishment of its own digital media accounts (i.e. Facebook, LinkedIn etc.). Work is also ongoing to increase relevant PPIO training, and a Pilot Course on Strategic Communication will be held in March 2019.

4.1.7 Training (of staff)

Pre-deployment training (PDT) for contracted personnel needs to be further addressed. (2014)

With the adoption of the new Policy on Training in April 2017, pre-deployment training has become a prerequisite for all staff in CSDP Missions prior to deployment. For contracted staff, this becomes the responsibility of the Mission. The ESDC is conducting PDTs on a regular basis, and

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Missions are to send contracted staff to this course, financed by the missions' budget. CPCC has circulated and administrative guideline on this. With this, this lesson is considered implemented and is closed.

Mission induction training has to be standardised and better linked to Pre-deployment training (PDT) (2015).

Mission induction training curricula vary from one Mission to another. In order to ensure more coherence while respecting the specific needs of every Mission, CPCC is working on harmonising Mission induction training and setting minimum standards that should be followed by every Mission, including through the drafting of certain presentations of horizontal nature. This will also help mitigate the risk of duplication with the PDT that is now being conducted on a more systematic basis. However, due to lack of resources in CPCC, this has not yet been finalised.

4.2 New lessons identified

The established PEER-support program is a successful tool, but lacks appropriate expertise and resources in CPCC, which limits the efficient monitoring of psychosocial issues in the Missions

Lesson identified: The first Peer-program was created in EUPOL Afghanistan in 2013 and was implemented in all CSDP Missions 2014. The program consists of mission members that are selected and trained to give psychosocial support to colleagues when needed, and so far approximately 150 mission members have been trained. However, there is no central expertise in this area that can support and advise them in the case of critical incidents or severe inter-personal conflicts.

Lesson analysis: The addition of a CPCC Medical Advisor/ Coordinator in 2018 was a crucial addition to the CPCC Security/ Duty of Care Office. It has also visualised the need for central expertise in the area of psychosocial issues. Currently the Missions turns to the Medical Advisor/Coordinator when critical incidents or severe inter-personal conflicts occurs, however, this is neither part of the JD for the Medical Advisor/Coordinator, nor has the person in the position the appropriate knowledge and skills for such specific issues. The PEER support program in Missions can handle certain issues, but members often require professional guidance and support. To follow and more closely support this network would be very helpful in order to have a full picture of the

overall psychosocial wellbeing in the Missions. This would however require that CPCC recruits another staff member, with this type of expertise

The SOMA template needs to be revised in order to also serve in high risk environments – EUAM Iraq

Lesson observation: In the case of launching EUAM Iraq, the Council Decision on the authorisation to negotiate a SOMA (so called negotiating mandate), based on the agreed SOMA-template, was early adopted. However, this template is not fully adapted for a high-risk Mission, and as such, certain additions would have been helpful for the way ahead.

Lesson Analysis: Tailor-made provisions need to be added to the first draft of the SOMA reflecting the special needs of a mission in a risk environment, which should notably be based on already agreed amendments (such as the text on use of arms agreed for EUCAP Somalia). Timely preparation should be considered to allocate the necessary time in Relex in order to adopt the negotiating mandate as early as possible. In addition, the delineation of responsibilities between CMPD, CPCC, delegation and missions in this matter should be clarified or even reviewed to ensure closer involvement by those responsible for the operational aspects (CPCC).

Import of arms to Mission areas is a cumbersome process, unclear legal status makes it an unpredictable process, and contingency planning need to be in place – EUBAM Libya

Lesson observation: Weapons required for the close protection team in EUBAM Libya's presence in Tripoli were imported directly from Europe to Libya during the period from December 2016 to May 2018. To use EUBAM Libya's office in Tunis as a logistical platform was not an option as the Mission lacks a formal legal status in Tunis, as well as due to the complicated Tunisian bureaucracy. The imports were done with designated charter flights and EUBAM Security staff followed the transport, physically present, from the clearing in Europe until arrival in EUBAM armoury. Due to the fact that weapons are very valuable commodity in Libya, as well as having in mind the problems encountered by the Mission in 2014 – when EUBAM's weapon shipment was stolen from the custody of Libyan authorities – it was decided to import weapons in two batches, in parts. This as if any parts would be lost, the weapons would be useless. Since EUBAM also has an unclear legal status in Libya, as there is no SOMA in place, each case was treated differently, resulting in major delays. The import process was also vulnerable to arbitrary actions from the Libyan side, and the fact that Libya is in many ways a failed state with several actors involved in

any official actions further complicated the situation. At the first attempt of import, Libyan authorities claimed that one document was missing and wanted to keep the weapons and ammunition in their own care. EUBAM refused and flew the weapons back to Malta, awaiting a renewed clearance from the Libyan side, generating high additional costs.

Lesson analysis: When a civilian CSDP Mission is required to work in a security environment where it is assessed that there is a need for armed security and the country's laws does not allow for this unless it is connected to a diplomatic entity (as in the case of Libya), as a minimum an exchange of letters to clarify the mission's legal status in a country must be put in place before the deployment of security staff and import of weapons. Furthermore, when the CSDP Mission provided the legal basis for regulated items such as weapons, it is vital that all legal documentation is under the same body (ownership, end user agreement and export-import license). To clarify the mission's legal status and finalizing a SOMA as soon as possible is one way to provide additional protection for mission members and related security personnel and should be seen as a priority in the planning phase of a mission. In this case, finalizing a SOMA before the decision to move the Mission to Tripoli would have helped to regulate these issues and provide for smoother transfer. Contingency planning needs to be in place for these types of situations, like a readiness to use additional funds and assets for a more secure transport. Finally, it is crucial that the Missions are provided with a functioning logistical platform. If there is a delay in the possibility to import sensitive and/or security related equipment, the Mission should have the ability to store the equipment at alternative location, in a country where the Mission has a proper legal status, until a suitable solution is available.

A shared understanding of Integrated Approach between the Mission and implementers of EC-funded projects would be beneficial for cooperation on the ground – EUAM Ukraine

Lesson identified: The Integrated Approach is one of the objectives of EUAM Ukraine, as it is mandated to contribute to ensuring that EU instruments are used in a coherent manner and that unnecessary duplication is avoided in the field of Civilian Security Sector Reform (CSSR) in UA. EUAM is profiling itself so that the Mission's expertise in this area is systematically requested and taken into account with regard to political messaging at all levels of EU engagement in UA. On the operational level, the Mission has not only aligned its plans and actions with the EU Integrated Approach, but moreover advises and actively supports the implementation of EC-funded projects. However, in situations where the activities of the CSDP mission are complemented by that of an

EU-funded project, significant efforts are necessary to ensure a common joint understanding as to what the Integrated Approach and its implementation in UA concretely means – especially among the project managers of projects that have only partially complementary objectives with the Mission and whose key focus lies on their particular project objectives. *Lesson analysis:* In the future, a joint briefing between EUDEL, EUAM and the implementer on joint objectives of the Integrated Approach would ease the way for better cooperation. It is important that the implementer is told by the EU partners ‘in one voice’ what cooperation with a CSDP mission would entail. Only a joint understanding of the added value of working together will ensure efficiency of the EU reform efforts. More formalised joint guidelines from EC and the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) could serve as basis for such joint briefings on the ground by EUDEL and the Mission in addition to more technical MoUs or other similar documents between the Mission and the project implementer.

Using the Mission as a key source for subject matter expertise is an efficient way to avoid duplication between CSDP and externally funded consultants – EUAM Ukraine

Lesson identified: EUDEL is increasingly seeking advice from the Mission on matters related to EUAM's mandate. In 2016, the Mission contributed significantly to the development of the EC-funded projects and programmes in the rule of law sector, thereby ensuring consistency and complementarity of the Mission priorities with EU programming. In 2017, the Mission was closely involved in elaborating the contractual documents with the implementers. EUAM made suggestions for the project activities based on needs/gap assessments identified through Mission's contacts with the beneficiaries. The implementer based their preliminary budgetary plans for the assistance to UA counterparts on EUAM recommendations. In the absence of an overarching strategy for the law enforcement sector in UA, the EC suggested that the inception phase would be used to conduct a number of general and specific assessments, which would provide the necessary clarity for a comprehensive approach to the reforms. Consequently, in early 2018 the implementer commissioned a consultancy firm to produce a general assessment on the basis of the available legal and policy documents, even though these are areas where the Mission holds key expertise and is the key interlocutor with local counterparts. To mitigate possible misunderstandings among the beneficiaries, it was agreed that EUAM would provide its expertise and contacts with the local beneficiaries to the consultants to ensure that EU presents a unified position.

Lesson analysis: A lot of Mission staff working time was used for this extensive support to the consultants. Unfortunately, the consultants did not receive the necessary guidance on the limits of their assignment from either the implementer or the Terms of Reference. The report they produced was not only delayed but also of poor quality. In the future, it should be assessed if not the subject matter expertise of CSDP missions to a larger degree can be taken into consideration as a sufficient basis for the release of funds in order to mitigate the need for time-consuming assignments to outside consultants who may not be fully familiar with the Ukrainian particularities. More specifically, where an EC-funded project requires an assessment of the readiness of the policy, legal or institutional framework in areas where the Mission has specific expertise, it should be discussed if not the Mission should first be asked whether or to what extent it is ready and able to produce this assessment itself, and possibly only if the Mission considers that this is not feasible, external consultants should be given the task in full or in support of the Mission. Where external consultants are contracted, their assignment should be clearly defined and delineated. The full potential of the complementarity of the substance matter expertise of a Mission and project management expertise of specialised development assistance actors needs to be carefully considered. This is now the policy line followed by the Mission, EUDEL and the Support Group for Ukraine (SGUA)

Joint advisory and support packages combining the Mission and EC-funded project objectives is a way to provide more efficient delivery of EU support – EUAM Ukraine

Lesson identified: In 2017, based on an in-depth analysis, the Mission developed an Organised Crime Advisory Package (OCAP) to advise the UA law enforcement agencies on possible actions to take in order to enhance organised crime fighting capabilities. The OCAP was well received by the beneficiaries and the established best practice paved the way for the PRAVO-Police ‘Support Packages’. EUAM contributed to the planning of PRAVO support by drafting its strategic advice on needed operational and technical support and trainings in unified thematic packages with particular objectives and deliverables. Such clear vision is easy to share with the beneficiary and clarifies the necessary reform steps to take.

Lesson analysis: The Organised Crime and the Special Bureau of Investigation support packages are currently in the implementation phase, other support packages such as for prosecution and criminal investigations are being prepared. The SGUA, EUDEL, EUAM, UNOPS and the beneficiaries approve each support package in the Executive Committee. This best practise of creating specific support packages for each reform area, aligning all trainings and other support

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funded by the EC-projects with the Mission strategic advice, helps to ensure efficient delivery of the EU-support.