

Brussels, 9 April 2025
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From: Swedish delegation

To: Working Party on Frontiers / Mixed Committee (EU-Iceland/Norway and Switzerland/Liechtenstein)

No. prev. doc.: 15697/24

Subject: Prolongation of the temporary reintroduction of border controls at the Swedish internal borders in accordance with Article 25 of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code)

Delegations will find attached a copy of the letter received by the General Secretariat of the Council on 08 April 2025 regarding the prolongation of the temporary reintroduction of border controls by Sweden at the internal borders from 12 May 2025 to 11 November 2025.



IM 3608 2025
08-04-2025

8 April 2025

Secretary-General of The Council
Thérèse Blanchet

Ministry of Justice
Minister for Justice

Dear Secretary-General,

Please find enclosed our notification for a decision of prolongation of border control at the internal border in accordance with article 25a (4) and (5) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 (Schengen Borders Code).

The need for a continuation of border checks is due to a persisting serious threat to public policy and internal security. The decision of prolongation will be in force as of 12 May 2025 for a planned duration of six months.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read "Gunnar Strömmer".

Gunnar Strömmer

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Notification of a temporary reintroduction or prolongation of border control at internal borders

1. Notification submitted by:

Sweden

2. Date of the notification:

8 April 2025

3. Date and duration of the planned reintroduction or prolongation of border control at internal borders (Article 27(1), point (d), of Regulation (EU) 2016/399):

The decision will be in force for a period of 6 months as of 12 May 2025 up to and including 11 November 2025.

4. Scope of the proposed reintroduction or prolongation of border control at internal borders, specifying at which part or parts of the internal borders border control will be reintroduced or prolonged (Article 27(1), point (b), of Regulation (EU) 2016/399)

The scope will generally be the same as with the decision now in force ie. with the main focus being checks performed at the land border with Denmark at the exit of the Öresund bridge connecting Denmark and Sweden (and the two cities of Copenhagen and Malmö). Passenger traffic over the bridge consists of train- and motor vehicle traffic. Checks may also occur at airports and harbours in connection with harbours and airports in the cities of Stockholm, Gothenburg, Malmö and Västerås.

The Police Authority will also be given a continued mandate to perform checks elsewhere, if necessary and based on a risk analysis, intelligence or other relevant information. Border control and checks might therefore take place in other border regions and include both sea, air, and land borders.

5. Notification for a:

first reintroduction of border control at internal borders (unforeseeable event): Article 25a(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399

first reintroduction of border control at internal borders (foreseeable event): Article 25a(4) and (5) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399

prolongation of border control at internal borders (foreseeable event): Article 25a(4) and (5) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399

Period(s) of previous reintroduction(s) of border control at internal borders:

Current decision for the reintroduction of border control at the internal border in force between 12 November 2024 and 11 May 2025.

prolongation of border control at internal borders after 2 years, for major exceptional situation: Article 25a(6) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399

Period(s) of previous reintroduction(s) of border control at internal borders:

Please indicate the dates of previous reintroductions of border control at internal borders.

- prolongation of border control at internal borders after 2 years and 6 months, for major exceptional situation: Article 25a(6) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399

Period(s) of previous reintroduction(s) of border control at internal borders:

Please indicate the dates of previous reintroductions of border control at internal borders.

- reintroduction of border control at internal borders in accordance with a Council Implementing Decision: Article 28(1) and (5) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399

NB: A continuation of a reintroduction of border control at the internal borders does not have to be considered a prolongation if the serious threat to public policy or internal security upon which it is based is different from the serious threat that motivated the preceding reintroduction of border control at the internal border. If this is the case, please notify for a first reintroduction and specify the new and distinct nature of the serious threat to public policy or internal security under 7.

6. If the notification for a foreseeable event is made less than four weeks before the planned reintroduction or prolongation of border control at internal borders (Article 25a(4), (5) and (6) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399):

Please indicate when the circumstances giving rise to the need to reintroduce or prolong border control at internal borders became known.

7. Serious threat to public policy or internal security, consisting of:

- terrorist incidents or threats, and threats posed by serious organised crime

The serious threat against public policy and internal security that provided the justification and need for the decision of reintroduction of border control in November 2024 persists. A complex development that sees the combination of serious and organised cross-border crime and terrorism still poses a grave and serious threat. As reported before, a series of serious incidents involving military grade explosives and weapons have seen foreign state institutions and members of the public becoming targets and victims of ongoing conflicts in the organised crime environment. There is also strong suspicion of foreign state actors being involved in this ongoing situation by using criminal gangs for their own means and purposes. Apart from these circumstances, Sweden continues to be seen as a legitimate target by violent-Islamist groups and individuals.

- large-scale public health emergencies

Please specify and include all relevant data detailing the events that constitute a serious threat.

- an exceptional situation characterised by sudden large-scale unauthorised movements of third country nationals, within the meaning of Article 25(1), point (c), of Regulation (EU) 2016/399

Please specify and include all relevant data detailing the events that constitute a serious threat. Please include information as to the sudden nature of the large-scale unauthorised movement, the strain put on the resources and capacities of the competent authorities, the level of preparedness of the competent authorities, the likely risk to the overall functioning of the area without internal border control, and the available evidence from information analysis and all available data, including from relevant Union agencies.

Large scale or high-profile international event

Please specify and include all relevant data detailing the events that constitute a serious threat.

Other

Please specify and include all relevant data detailing the events that constitute a serious threat.

8. Names of authorised border crossing points

Border crossing points primarily affected at this time will as mentioned above be:

- Toll and Customs station at Lernacken (vehicle exit from the bridge of Öresund, Malmö).
- Train station at Hyllie (first station for trains arriving via the bridge of Öresund, Malmö).

9. Measures taken by other Member States (if applicable)

None.

10. Assessment of necessity and proportionality under Article 26(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399

10.1. Appropriateness: explanation how the reintroduction of border control at internal borders is likely to adequately remedy the threat

The continued reintroduction of border control greatly increases the capability and effectiveness of the Police Authority by providing them with the only tools that are functional at spots with great passenger flows such as the Öresund bridge connection. Being able to perform spot checks and to gather intelligence with the tools provided by the legal framework of the Schengen Borders Code, while at the same time being able to maintain an active Police presence is key in combating the serious threat and in complementing other measures.

10.2. Explanation why the objectives pursued by the reintroduction cannot be obtained by:

- the use of alternative measures, such as proportionate checks carried out in the context of checks within the territory as referred to in Article 23, point (a), of Regulation (EU) 2016/399;
- the use of the procedure laid down in Article 23a of Regulation (EU) 2016/399;
- other forms of police cooperation provided for under Union law;
- common measures regarding temporary restrictions on travel to the Member States as referred to in Article 21a(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399.

As indicated above, great passenger flows as well as practical and legal limitations of other type of measures makes internal border control a last resort. Other measures such as Police Checks in Border Areas and co-operation with neighbouring Member States, are part of the total approach taken by the government, the Police Authority, as well as other relevant authorities and agencies. After careful consideration the government has however found that such measures in themselves are not enough.

10.3	Likely impact on the movement of persons within the area without internal border control and the functioning of cross-border regions
	<p>The effect on the movement of persons remains minimal and all possible attention is paid to ensuring that this continues to be the case. The Police Authority are as much as possible working on an intelligence and risk analysis-based level. While performing spot checks these are done as swiftly and non-disruptive to traffic flows as possible. Trains needing to stop at Hyllie station have to do so for a few minutes longer than the actual checks due to traffic security reasons.</p>
10.4	If the serious threat consists of sudden large-scale unauthorised movements (Article 25(1), point (c), and 27(3) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399):
	<p><i>Please provide a risk assessment and information on the sudden large-scale unauthorised movements, including any information obtained from Union Agencies and data analysis from relevant information systems.</i></p>
	<p><i>Please include quantitative and qualitative data, including for example the number of applications for international protection and unauthorised movements, as well as information on to the sudden nature of the large-scale unauthorised movement, the strain put on the resources and capacities of the competent authorities, the level of preparedness of the competent authorities, the likely risk to the overall functioning of the area without internal border control.</i></p>
10.5	Opinion of the Commission and consultation process (if applicable)
	<p>Increased efforts and dialogue with stakeholders in the transport sector as well as the Police Authority for the purpose of finding further practical solutions for commuters and other members of the public within affected regions. Continued dialogue with the Police Authority for further implementing methods and solutions regarding police checks in border areas.</p>

11. If the notification concerns a prolongation of border control at internal borders after 6 months in accordance with Article 25a(5) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 (Article 27(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399)

11.1	Assessment of the necessity and proportionality based on the criteria laid down in Article 26(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399
	<p>Please see point 10.</p>
11.2	Scale and anticipated evolution of the serious threat
	<p><i>Please elaborate on the scale and anticipated evolution of the serious threat, in particular:</i></p>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> — <i>how long the serious threat is expected to persist;</i> — <i>which sections of the internal borders may be affected;</i> — <i>information regarding coordination measures with other Member States impacted or likely to be impacted by the border control at internal borders.</i>
	<p>At this time, it is not possible to foresee or anticipate the development of the serious threat due to its complex nature. For the same reasons it is not possible to make an estimation of time. The sections of the border that might be affected has been stated above. All decisions by the government and Police Authority will strictly observe the principles of necessity and proportionality. Dialogue and coordination with our neighbouring Member States is ongoing on a regular basis and an integral part of our relationship as neighbours.</p>

12. If the notification concerns a prolongation of border control at internal borders after 2 years, for a major exceptional situation (Article 25a(6) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399).

12.1.	Assessment of the necessity and proportionality based on the criteria laid down in Article 26(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 <i>Please fill in point 11.</i>
12.2.	Action taken in response to an opinion of the Commission issued in accordance with Article 25a(6) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 (if applicable)
12.3.	Action taken in response to a consultation process initiated in accordance with Article 25a(6) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 (if applicable)
12.4.	Substantiation of the continued threat to public policy or internal security
12.5.	Explanation why alternative measures are ineffective
12.6.	Presentation of mitigating measures
12.7.	Where appropriate: presentation of the means, actions, conditions and timeline with a view to lifting border control at internal borders

13. Any further information (optional)

For example:

- details of strategic and operational cooperation with other Member States
- details on to the use of alternative measures (Article 23 of Regulation (EU) 2016/399)
- whether the procedure laid down in Article 23a of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 is applied at the time of reintroduction of border control at internal borders
- bilateral or regional cooperation initiatives, including with third countries

14. Withholding of information on grounds of public security (Article 27(5) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399)

Detailed information has been withheld due to its relation to matters of national interest- and security as well as for reasons of ongoing criminal investigations.

15. Confidentiality of information (Article 35 of Regulation (EU) 2016/399)

No.