



Brussels, 14 April 2026
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REV 1

LIMITE

CORLX 329
CFSP/PESC 467
RELEX 441
COEST 255
FIN 485

LEGISLATIVE ACTS AND OTHER INSTRUMENTS

Subject: COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2642 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia's destabilising activities

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2026/...

of ...

**implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2642
concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia's destabilising activities**

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2024/2642 of 8 October 2024 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia's destabilising activities¹, and in particular Article 13(1) thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,

¹ OJ L, 2024/2642, 9.10.2024, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2642/oj>.

Whereas:

- (1) On 8 October 2024, the Council adopted Regulation (EU) 2024/2642.
- (2) On 18 December 2025 the European Council adopted conclusions, in which it strongly condemned all recent hybrid attacks against the European Union and its Member State.
- (3) The Union remains unwavering in its condemnation Russia's malign activities directed against the Union, its Member States, international organisations and third countries.
- (4) In view of the gravity of the situation, the Council considers that two legal persons should be added to the list of natural and legal persons, entities and bodies set out in Annex I to Regulation (EU) 2024/2642.
- (5) Regulation (EU) 2024/2642 should therefore be amended accordingly,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

Annex I to Regulation (EU) 2024/2642 is amended in accordance with the Annex to this Regulation.

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on the date of its publication in the *Official Journal of the European Union*.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at ..., ...

For the Council

The President

ANNEX

In Annex I to Regulation (EU) 2024/2642, the following entries are added under the heading ‘B. Legal persons, entities and bodies’:

	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
‘18.	Euomore a.k.a. Euroview a.k.a. Euroview Media	Address: Avenue Ariane 5, 1200 Brussels, Belgium Website: https://euomore.eu/ , https://euroview.media	Euomore is a media platform which operates within the pro-Kremlin information architecture as an unofficial media relay, intended to amplify, recycle, and legitimise Russian narratives and disinformation targeting European audiences. Euomore recurrently disseminates content challenging the legitimacy of Union institutions and justifying Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. Its editorial line consistently converges with talking points promoted by the Kremlin, particularly regarding the alleged responsibility of NATO and the Union in the conflict in Ukraine and the delegitimisation of the Ukrainian authorities.	+

+ OJ: please insert the date of publication of this Regulation.

	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
			<p>The platform regularly hosts contributors known for their dissemination of conspiracy-driven narratives or disinformation, allowing those contributors to retain public visibility and to continue their influence activities. Euromore’s website appears to have been cleaned up and to contain only an article complaining about Western sanctions targeting propaganda media. However, the URL is still active, albeit now referring to the new name “Euroview Media: euroview.media”, and relays RT and Sputnik content.</p> <p>Therefore, Euromore is supporting, involved in and facilitating actions or policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union or in third country (Ukraine), through engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting and otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference.</p>	

	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
19.	<p>The Foundation for the Support and Protection of the Rights of Compatriots Living Abroad (Pravfond)</p> <p>(Russian: Некоммерческая организация “Фонд поддержки и защиты прав соотечественников, проживающих за рубежом”)</p>	<p>Address: Arbat Street, 55/32, Moscow, 119200, Russian Federation</p> <p>Place of registration: Moscow, Russia</p> <p>Date of registration: 21.11.2011</p> <p>Registration number: 1117799023330</p> <p>Website: www.pravfond.ru</p>	<p>The Foundation for the Support and Protection of the Rights of Compatriots Living Abroad (Pravfond) constitutes a core instrument of the Russian Federation’s foreign influence and propaganda strategy.</p> <p>Founded and financed by the Russian state, the Foundation is fully embedded within the Kremlin’s soft power architecture and operates as a para-institutional relay for official narratives. Pravfond’s legal and analytical output is systematically used to reinforce key Kremlin talking points, notably allegations of the “nazification” of Ukraine, claims of widespread “Russophobia,” and assertions of systematic persecution of Russian-speaking populations in neighboring states.</p>	+

+ OJ: please insert the date of publication of this Regulation.

	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
			<p>The Foundation channels funds to actors closely linked to pro-Kremlin influence networks. The Executive Director of Pravfond has publicly expressed support for President Vladimir Putin and for Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine. In parallel, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has praised the Foundation's "consistent work" in countering alleged xenophobia, neo-Nazism, and attempts to falsify history, thereby confirming Pravfond's direct integration into the Kremlin's official communication and conflict-legitimation strategy.</p> <p>Therefore, Pravfond is responsible for, implementing, supporting, involved in and facilitating actions or policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation, which undermine or threaten sovereignty and stability in the Union or in a third country (Ukraine), through planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting and facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference.</p>	