

Brussels, 22 May 2026
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COVER NOTE

From: Secretary-General of the European Commission, signed by Ms Martine DEPREZ, Director

date of receipt: 11 May 2026

To: Ms Thérèse BLANCHET, Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union

No. Cion doc.: C(2026) 3240 final

Subject: CORRIGENDUM to Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1366 of 11 March 2024 supplementing Regulation (EU) 2019/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council by establishing a network code on sector-specific rules for cybersecurity aspects of cross-border electricity flows
(Official Journal of the European Union L, 2024/1366, 24 May 2024)

Delegations will find attached document C(2026) 3240 final.

Encl.: C(2026) 3240 final



Brussels, 10.5.2026
C(2026) 3240 final

CORRIGENDUM

to Commission [Delegated Regulation \(EU\) 2024/1366](#) of 11 March 2024 supplementing Regulation (EU) 2019/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council by establishing a network code on sector-specific rules for cybersecurity aspects of cross-border electricity flows

(Official Journal of the European Union L, 2024/1366, 24 May 2024)

CORRIGENDUM

to Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1366 of 11 March 2024 supplementing Regulation (EU) 2019/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council by establishing a network code on sector-specific rules for cybersecurity aspects of cross-border electricity flows

(Official Journal of the European Union L, 2024/1366, 24 May 2024)

On page 12, in Article 7(3):

for: ‘Where TSOs of a system operation region deciding on proposals for plans listed in Article 6(2) are not able to reach an agreement, and where the system operation region concerned is composed of more than five Member States, TSOs shall decide by qualified majority voting. A qualified majority for proposals listed in Article 6(2) shall require the following majority:’,

read: ‘Where TSOs of a system operation region deciding on proposals for plans listed in Article 6(3) are not able to reach an agreement, and where the system operation region concerned is composed of more than five Member States, TSOs shall decide by qualified majority voting. A qualified majority for proposals listed in Article 6(2) shall require the following majority:’.

On page 20, in Article 21(1):

for: ‘The ENTSO for Electricity, in cooperation with the EU DSO entity and in consultation with the relevant Regional Coordination Centre, shall perform a regional cybersecurity risk assessment for each system operation region using the methodologies developed pursuant to Article 19, and approved pursuant to Article 8, to identify, analyse, and evaluate the risks of cyber-attacks affecting the operational security of the electricity system and disrupting cross-border electricity flows. The regional cybersecurity risk assessments shall not consider the legal, financial or reputational damage of cyber-attacks.’,

read: ‘The ENTSO for Electricity, in cooperation with the EU DSO entity and in consultation with the relevant Regional Coordination Centre, shall perform a regional cybersecurity risk assessment for each system operation region using the methodologies developed pursuant to Article 18, and approved pursuant to Article 8, to identify, analyse, and evaluate the risks of cyber-attacks affecting the operational security of the electricity system and disrupting cross-border electricity flows. The regional cybersecurity risk assessments shall not consider the legal, financial or reputational damage of cyber-attacks.’.

On page 21, in Article 23(4), second sentence:

for: ‘Without prejudice to Article 10(4) and Article 47(4), the ENTSO for Electricity and the EU DSO entity shall release a public version of that report which shall not contain information that can cause damage to entities listed in Article 2(1).’,

read: ‘ Without prejudice to Article 12(4) and Article 47(4), the ENTSO for Electricity and the EU DSO entity shall release a public version of that report which shall not contain information that can cause damage to entities listed in Article 2(1).’.

On page 22, in Article 24(7):

for: ‘When a service provider is reported to a competent authority as being a critical ICT service provider pursuant to Article 27 point (c),’

read: ‘When a service provider is reported to a competent authority as being a critical ICT service provider pursuant to Article 27 point (3),’.