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from: Secretary-General of the European Commission,  
signed by Mr Jordi AYET PUIGARNAU, Director

date of receipt: 9 March 2011

to: Mr Pierre de BOISSIEU, Secretary-General of the Council of the European  
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**JOINT STAFF WORKING PAPER**

**JOINT PAPER**

**European Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel**

# European Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel

## SUMMARY

This Strategy has four key themes:

- **Firstly, that security and development in the Sahel cannot be separated, and that helping these countries achieve security is integral to enabling their economies to grow and poverty to be reduced.**
- **Secondly, that achieving security and development in the Sahel is only possible through closer regional cooperation. This is currently weaker than it needs to be, and the EU has a potential role to play in supporting it.**
- **Thirdly, all the states of the region will benefit from considerable capacity-building, both in areas of core government activity, including the provision of security and development cooperation.**
- **Fourthly, that the EU therefore has an important role to play both in encouraging economic development for the people of the Sahel and helping them achieve a more secure environment in which it can take place, and in which the interests of EU citizens are also protected.**

The strategic priorities are reflected in an Action Plan (Annex 1) which sets out in more detail what this means in terms of practical measures.

### 1. Issues and Context.

The Sahel is one of the poorest regions of the world. It faces simultaneously the challenges of extreme poverty, the effects of climate change, frequent food crises, rapid population growth, fragile governance, unresolved internal tensions, the risk of Islamist radicalisation, illicit trafficking and terrorist-linked security threats.

The states of the region have to face these challenges directly. The three core Sahelian states, and the focus of this Strategy, are Mauritania, Mali and Niger, though the geographical conditions – and therefore challenges – also affect parts of Burkina Faso, Chad and Cameroon. Many of the challenges impact on neighbouring countries, including Algeria, Libya, Morocco and even Nigeria, whose engagement is necessary to help resolve them. And the problems facing the Sahel not only affect the local populations but increasingly impact directly on the interests of European citizens.


In few areas is the inter-dependence of security and development more clear. The fragility of governments impacts on the stability of the region and the ability to combat both poverty and security threats, which are on the rise. Poverty creates inherent instability that can impact on uncontrolled migratory flows. The security threat from terrorist activity by Al-Qaida in the Maghreb (AQIM), which has found a sanctuary in Northern Mali, is focussed on Western targets and has evolved from taking money to taking life, discouraging investment in the region. AQIM's resources and operational capacities appear to be growing much faster than those of the Sahel states' defence and security forces. Deteriorating security conditions pose a challenge to development cooperation and restrict the delivery of humanitarian assistance and development aid, which in turn exacerbates the vulnerability of the region and its population.

The EU's development policy in the Sahel, drawn up in partnership with the countries concerned, is geared towards tackling the root causes of the extreme poverty and towards

creating the grass-root conditions for economic opportunity and human development to flourish. But it will be hard for this policy to achieve a high impact unless security challenges are also tackled.

These problems are cross-border and closely intertwined. Only a regional, integrated and holistic strategy will enable us to make progress on any of the specific problems. A reinforced security and law enforcement capacity must go hand-in-hand with more robust public institutions and more accountable governments, capable of providing basic development services to the populations and of appeasing internal tensions.

This Strategy therefore proposes a framework for the coordination of the EU's current and future engagement in the region with the common objective of reinforcing security and development, thereby strengthening also the EU's own security. Building on work done up to now, the Strategy points to a number of specific actions that could be taken, drawing on all the instruments that the EU has at its disposal<sup>1</sup>. The Strategy is also intended to encourage EU Member States and other partners with similar interests in the region to play an integrated part therein.



## 2. Challenges

The challenges identified by the EU fact-finding missions to Mali, Mauritania and Niger (plus a further visit to Algeria) are at four levels:

**1) Governance, development and conflict resolution:** The remote and isolated character of this sensitive region and the difficulties faced by the Sahel countries in providing protection, assistance, development and public services to local populations, the insufficiently decentralised

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<sup>1</sup> The EU has been advocating a comprehensive security and development approach to respond to the complexity of the challenges in the Sahel since 2008. A joint paper (14361/10) on the security and development in the Sahel was drafted by the Commission and the Council Secretariat General, following the options paper (COREU SEC 750/09 of 7 April 2009), and joint fact finding missions to Mauritania, Mali and Niger, at the political and technical level. Following the rapid and serious deterioration of the security situation in the Sahel and notably the kidnapping of European nationals, the Foreign Affairs Council of 25 October 2010 invited the High Representative to draw up, in association with the Commission, a strategy on the Sahel, thus fully applying the provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon.

decision making and the inequitable sharing of revenues of capital-intensive economic activities pose serious challenges. Lack of education and employment opportunities for young people contributes to tensions and makes them prone to cooperate with AQIM or organized crime for financial reasons or to be radicalized and recruited by AQIM. Weak governance, in particular in the area of justice, a still insufficient level of development and social exclusion, together with remaining internal conflicts and recurrent rebellions in regions affected by insecurity, render the Sahel countries and their populations vulnerable to the activities of AQIM and organised crime networks. The desert regions of all three countries have a history of de facto autonomy which makes government control hard to exert. Corruption also hinders the effectiveness in the fight against AQIM. Carrying out development assistance projects has also become more dangerous.

**2) Regional political level - challenges of coordination:** The security threats in the Sahel – as well as their solution - are of a transnational nature, yet differ in intensity from one country to another. The sometimes differing perception of the threats and solutions by the three Sahel States and their three Maghreb neighbours (Algeria, Libya and Morocco) and the absence of a sub-regional organisation encompassing all the Sahel and Maghreb states, lead to unilateral or poorly coordinated action and hamper credible and effective regional initiatives. At the level of the international community (including the EU), coherent and systematic action linking political, security and development aspects is also insufficient.

**3) Security and the rule of law:** These states have insufficient operational and strategic capacities in the wider security, law enforcement and judicial sectors (military, police, justice, border management, customs) to control the territory, to ensure human security, to prevent and to respond to the various security threats, and to enforce the law (conduct investigations, trials etc.) with due respect to human rights. This is notably reflected in the insufficiency of legal frameworks and law enforcement capacity at all levels, ineffective border management, lack of modern investigation techniques and methods of gathering, transmitting and exchanging information, as well as obsolete or inexistent equipment and infrastructure. State control of the desert regions in the North of Mali and Niger is fragile at best, absent at worst. Available resources are insufficiently used to target terrorism and illegal activities.

**4) Radicalisation:** The Sahel region has become a theatre for ideological confrontation between the different streams of Islamism, and between them and the traditional, more tolerant streams of Islam of West Africa. The situation in Mauritania is particularly worrying in terms of risks of radicalisation and recruitment of youth by AQIM.

### **3. Mutual interests in improving the security and development situation in the Sahel**

There is a clear and longstanding interest both for the countries of the regions and for the EU in reducing insecurity and improving development in the Sahel region. Strengthening governance and stability within the Sahel countries through the promotion of the rule of law and human rights as well as socio-economic development, in particular for the benefit of the vulnerable local populations of these countries, is crucial.

An urgent and a more recent priority is to protect European citizens and interests, preventing AQIM attacks and its potential to carry out attacks on EU territory, to reduce and contain drug and other criminal trafficking destined for Europe, to secure lawful trade and communication links (roads, pipelines) across the Sahel, North-South and East-West, and to protect existing economic interests and create the basis for trade and EU investment. Improving security and development in Sahel has an obvious and direct impact on the EU internal security situation. It is

therefore important to ensure and strengthen coherence and complementarity between internal and external aspects of EU security.

#### **4. Objectives of the Strategy**

**Medium term objectives (in 5/10 years):** enhancing political stability, security, governance and social cohesion in the Sahel states, setting the conditions for local and national sustainable development so that the Sahel region can prosper and no longer be a potential safe haven for AQIM and criminal networks; assisting at national level in mitigating internal tensions, including the challenges posed by Islamist radicalisation on which AQIM and other criminal groups feed.

**Short term objectives (within 3 years):** improving access of populations in the contested zones to basic services (roads, livelihoods, education, social services), while improving their relations with their parent states; reducing terrorist attacks and kidnappings in the Sahel countries, limiting the capabilities of AQIM and criminal networks, improving security in the contested zones of Sahel as States' administration and services redeploy effectively, while their security capabilities to fight terrorism and criminal trafficking across the region are improved; supporting the implementation of peace settlements, raising awareness and training the local traditional elites to better understand and react to the threats of terrorism and organised crime; increasing confidence between local and state authorities.

In pursuing these objectives, the EU will need to demonstrate focus, urgency, pragmatism and political engagement, along with flexibility and a requirement to coordinate with other players, particularly the United Nations (UN), the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Arab League and the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), as well as both other bilateral partners with an interest in the region, including the USA, Canada and Japan and the Maghreb countries (Algeria, Libya and Morocco).

#### **5. Building on and supporting existing initiatives at the national and regional and international level**

To ensure ownership, coherence, and long-term impact, the EU has to build on and support the existing political and operational initiatives for security and development in the Sahel, both at national and regional levels, and take account of other planned initiatives of the international community.

**Mali** has set up, in the framework of the national policy to fight insecurity and terrorism, the *Programme spécial pour la paix, la sécurité et le développement dans le nord du Mali* (PSPSDN) to combat insecurity and terrorism in northern Mali. In parallel, Mali's President Amadou Toumani Touré has, since 2007, intended to organise a Conference of Heads of State, for which the political conditions (political will, threat perceptions, common vision and interests) have yet to be met. In addition, Mali has initiated a new office to fight against drug trafficking.

In **Mauritania**, a comprehensive national strategy to fight terrorism is being implemented with the following components: i) doctrinal and religious, ii) cultural and academic, iii) communication, iv) political, v) justice, defence and security. A Counter Terrorism law was adopted in 2010 providing a comprehensive legal framework for the judicial fight against terrorism.

In **Niger**, while there is no specific strategy to fight insecurity and terrorism, there is a strategy and action plan for the reform of the justice system, which foresees inter alia the creation of a

specialised chamber responsible for dealing with terrorism and trafficking which has been established recently in the Superior Court of Niger (Tribunal de Grande Instance).

**Burkina Faso** has been relatively successful in pursuing economic development and has a role in several of the anti-terrorist activities in the region.

For the **Maghreb** countries, the advanced political dialogue and legal structures existing between these partners and the EU in the framework of European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) Action Plans (for Morocco), the Roadmap (for Algeria), Association Agreements (for Algeria and Morocco) could serve as a basis to develop tailor-made and coordinated actions regarding the Sahel-Sahara region. Developments in Libya will determine the basis for the future co-operation in these matters.

At the initiative of Algeria and following a meeting of army chiefs of Algeria, Niger, Mali and Mauritania in August 2009, a **joint military command** was set up on 20 April 2010 **in Tamanrasset** (Algeria) to coordinate operations against terrorist groups in the Sahel, followed in September 2010 by a joint intelligence cell to monitor AQIM's activities. Although this structure has yet to produce tangible operational results, the initiative of coordinating activities among the countries of Sahel should be encouraged.

**ECOWAS** has developed a comprehensive regional framework for promoting good Governance, Peace and Security, based on the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework. It has also adopted a Common Position on Migration and a Strategy for the fight against drug trafficking and organised crime, completed with an Action Plan (Praia Action Plan), which provides a framework for regulatory and operational action by West Africa States. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (**UNODC**) is working with the Sahel countries on regional law enforcement cooperation, including through the Sahel judicial platform. All these strategies are supported by the EU through geographical and thematic cooperation instruments.

### **Operational Challenges**

There are a number of more concrete difficulties to overcome: The proposed counter-terrorism cell in Mali has still to be established, while progress on the PSPSDN (Special Programme for peace, security and development in the North of Mali) lacks momentum. In Niger, the central authority to fight against terrorism has still to be established. Local authorities face challenges in adequately mobilizing and using the units which have been trained and the material that has been provided by donors. In Mali, the setting up of the security and development poles in Northern Mali should muster strong political engagement of the central authorities while benefiting from a higher level of dialogue with the local civil society, in order to consolidate trust to avoid the deployment of security agencies in the North being interpreted by local and traditional leaders as undoing the engagements under the national pact. The security of development and humanitarian aid workers in the North of Mali and Niger has become a crucial challenge. The political instability in Niger has until now prevented this country from defining a long-term strategy to fight against terrorism.

### **6. Building on existing EU engagement in the Sahel countries**

Current EU cooperation strategies under the European Development Fund (EDF), agreed with Mali, Mauritania, Niger and ECOWAS focus on political and economic governance, institutional capacity building, and regional integration. The strategy with Mali focuses in particular on the economic development of the northern and Niger River inner delta regions.

Fighting terrorism, organized crime and addressing fragile states are priorities identified in the European Security Strategy<sup>2</sup>, the EU Council Conclusions on Security and Development<sup>3</sup>, the Internal Security Strategy<sup>4</sup> and the Stockholm Programme<sup>5</sup>. As outlined in the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy<sup>6</sup>, the EU's commitment is to contribute through its external action to global security and to promote the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy

Combating illicit trafficking of cocaine produced in Latin America and smuggled to Europe via West Africa is a priority for the EU, which has launched important initiatives in this area. Relevant progress in exchanging information among Member States as well as with major international partners (such as the US) and in avoiding overlap of actions and programs in the region can be flagged.

EU Member States and the EU coordinate their capacity building activities and exchange operational information in the region through the Maritime Analysis and Operations Centre – Narcotics (MAOC-N) and two EU cooperation platforms in Dakar, Senegal and Accra, Ghana. Moreover, on 23 April 2010, the Council adopted the Action Oriented Paper: "Strategic and concerted action to improve cooperation in combating organized crime, especially drug trafficking, originating in West Africa"<sup>7</sup>, and on 3 June 2010 the Council endorsed the European Pact to combat international drug trafficking – disrupting cocaine and heroin routes<sup>8</sup>.

### **7. Strategic Lines of Action.**

The Strategy focuses primarily on the most affected countries: Mali, Mauritania and Niger, and is articulated around four complementary lines of action:

- **Development, good governance and internal conflict resolution:** to promote home-grown and grass-roots solutions to social, political and ethnic tensions; to enhance transparent and locally accountable governance and re-establish an administrative presence of the state, particularly in the north of Niger and Mali; to help create economic opportunities for local communities; to open up the regions affected by insecurity through key road and social infrastructures; and to mitigate the impact of climate change effects.
- **Political and diplomatic:** to promote a common vision and a strategy by the relevant countries, to tackle cross-border security threats and address development challenges through a sustained dialogue at the highest level; to engage with partners (including Maghreb countries, regional organisations and wider international community) on a reinforced dialogue on security and development in the Sahel.

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<sup>2</sup> A Secure Europe in a Better World, European Security Strategy, 12 December 2003 <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>, 2008 Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy, Providing Security in a Changing World [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_data/docs/pressdata/en/reports/104630.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/reports/104630.pdf)

<sup>3</sup> 2831st EXTERNAL RELATIONS Council meeting, Brussels, 19-20 November 2007,

[http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressdata/en/gena/97157.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/gena/97157.pdf)

<sup>4</sup> <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/10/st05/st05842-re02.en10.pdf>

<sup>5</sup> The Stockholm Programme – an open and secure Europe serving and protecting citizens (2010/C 115/01)

<sup>6</sup> <http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/05/st14/st14469-re04.en05.pdf>

<sup>7</sup> Approved at the JHA Council of 10-11 May 2010

<sup>8</sup> [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_data/docs/pressdata/en/jha/114889.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/jha/114889.pdf)



- **Security and the rule of law:** to strengthen the capacities of the security, law enforcement and the rule of law sectors to fight threats and handle terrorism and organised crime in a more efficient and specialised manner.
- **Prevention of Islamist radicalisation:** to help enhance the resilience of societies to counter radicalisation; to provide basic social services, economic and employment perspectives to the marginalised social groups, in particular the youth vulnerable to Islamist proselytising; to support the states and legitimate non-state actors in designing and implementing strategies and activities aiming at countering extremism.

The Plan of Action (Annex 1), which is an integral part of this Strategy, sets out a range of potential projects, actions and instruments to implement the objectives defined above. All would be valuable contributions, but further discussion of desirability, feasibility and affordability is needed to identify which should be prioritised. This work should be done through the relevant Council Working Groups once the broad lines of the Strategy have been agreed.

### **8. Assumptions / risks**

It is assumed that legitimate democratic institutions are maintained in the countries concerned, and that they continue to welcome EU involvement in tackling the problems they face.

There is no shortage of risks. The three greatest are the weak absorptive capacity of the state structures concerned, the fragile political consensus in some states, and therefore their difficulty in delivering outcomes, plus the physical risk of continued insecurity in several areas.

### **9. Resources**

Political action and adequate engagement of the EU are now vital. Activities identified in this Strategy should lead to the commitment of adequate resources, expertise and funding by the EU and its Member States. Contributions by third countries in support of the Strategy should be encouraged.

The EU's financial contribution to this Security and Development Strategy is presented in Annex 3, which also contains a description of existing projects. Within the broader financial cooperation with these countries, the resources already committed or in the pipeline which specifically contribute to the objectives of this Strategy amount to approximately €700 million (approximately €450 million in the three Sahel countries and at the West Africa regional level and approximately €250 million in the Maghreb countries).

On the basis of the Mid-Term Review of the 10<sup>th</sup> EDF and the identification made on the ground, an additional amount of approximately €150 million may be mobilised until the end of 10<sup>th</sup> EDF in support to the Strategy (see Annex 3).

Moreover, funding through the Instrument for Stability should be pursued as appropriate, taking into account the possibility to resort to the crisis response component of the Instrument for Stability to take some immediate initiatives, while long term actions through the long term component of the IfS and through EDF are being pursued.

Bilateral support from EU Member States should be geared towards supporting the objectives of this proposed EU Strategy.

The attached Action Plan (Annex 1) sets out a range of possible steps, including some which would require financial and human resources under possible CSDP action, on which further

decisions would be needed. The reinforcement of Delegations with seconded experts from Member States may also be desirable.

When implementing the cooperation aspects of the Strategy, the EU will activate existing derogations to normal procedures for countries in situations of fragility.

The two tables below present the amounts of EU assistance to the Sahel and to the Maghreb countries under the EDF, IfS, European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI), thematic programmes and budget lines.

EU assistance to the Sahel countries:

Country/region	Ongoing (in million €)		Programmed (in million €)		New Resources (in million €)	Total (in million €)
	Country programmes <sup>9</sup>	IfS	10 <sup>th</sup> EDF	IfS		
<b>Niger</b>	39,9		42,2		90	<b>172,1</b>
<b>Mali</b>	202		38	4	50	<b>294</b>
<b>Mauritania</b>	21,25	1,2	22		10	<b>54,45</b>
<b>West Africa region</b>		13,7	66	6		<b>85,7</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>263,15</b>	<b>14,9</b>	<b>168,2</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>150</b>	<b><u>606,25</u></b>

EU assistance to the Maghreb countries:

Country/region	Ongoing (in million €)	Planned (in million €)	New resources	Total
<b>Algeria</b>	99		N.A	<b>99</b>
<b>Libya</b>	74,5		N.A	<b>74,5</b>
<b>Morocco</b>	70		N.A	<b>70</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>243,5</b>		N.A	<b>243,5</b>

Annex 1: The Plan of Action

Annex 2: The EU Strategy for Sahel: logical framework

<sup>9</sup> 9<sup>th</sup> and 10<sup>th</sup> EDF, thematic programmes and budget lines

Annex 3: Table – ongoing and planned EU security and development engagement in the Sahel and Maghreb countries

## **Annex 1: PLAN OF ACTION FOR SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE SAHEL**

### **1. Lines of action**

The Strategy envisages the following four complementary lines of action:

#### **1.1. GOVERNANCE / DEVELOPMENT / CONFLICT RESOLUTION**

**In partnership with the Sahel states, the EU should:**

- **support work with local communities to resolve social, political and ethnic tensions and create economic opportunities for young and old;**
- **support improved governance through decentralisation, providing basic public services (education, health, security, justice etc.), mobilising civil society and taking action against corruption;**
- **help opening up the remote and isolated areas by improving the road infrastructure to enhance economic opportunities, and provide conditions for development actors to operate in the most concerned zones;**
- **develop education and economic opportunities in northern regions of Mali and Niger where terrorism and organized crime develop, so the re-establishment of the state presence is seen as positive;**
- **encourage easier access to a strengthened justice system for the local population;**
- **help ensure the security of development and humanitarian workers.**

The remaining internal tensions and recurrent rebellions, social exclusion, the remote and isolated character (northern Mali and Niger in particular), wide spread poverty in the region concerned by insecurity make parts of the Sahelian population passive or active supporters of activities of AQIM and organised crime networks. The inability of the states to provide protection, the rule of law, development or public services to local populations and the insufficiently decentralised decision making and inequitable sharing of natural resources revenues pose a serious challenge in the long term to social and political stability.

The Sahel states need to find durable solutions to the alienation of the populations, in particular in northern areas of Niger and Mali, which have led in the past to recurring rebellions. In this respect, the nature of the relation between the state and the population is as important as the presence of the state. These solutions, developed in close consultation with the local communities, building on previous peace settlements should allow for an effective and non-antagonistic redeployment of a decentralised state capable of enhancing the governance, rule of law, human security and development assistance.

Social exclusion and the lack of education and employment opportunities for young people contribute to tensions and makes engagement with AQIM attractive for financial or ideological reasons. Corruption also hinders the effectiveness of the fight against it, and insecurity makes development assistance harder to deliver. The development of a functioning rule of law system would make an important contribution to the society and economic and political development, as well as effective fight against terrorism and organized crime.

Building on the ongoing EU engagement, this component of the Strategy will, depending on the security provided and the availability of additional resources, aim at assisting the Sahel states in:

### **Economic development**

- opening up the remote and isolated areas by improving the road infrastructure to enhance economic prospects, and provide conditions for development actors to access the most dangerous zones;
- improving livelihoods notably by strengthening sustainable agriculture and reintegrating ex-rebels (in particular in Mali and Niger);
- creating education, economic and employment opportunities, in particular for youth from marginalised social groups, among other through vocational training;
- exploring opportunities for isolated regions, in particular by improving information technology coverage;
- rehabilitation and further development of the tourism economy.

### **Social services**

- enhancing capacities to provide basic social, education and health, and development services to the population by effective decentralised delivery, where possible supporting the social dimension of the existing or envisaged security and development poles.

### **Conflict resolution**

- finding and implementing home-grown solutions to social, political and ethnic conflicts (Tuareg rebellion in Mali and Niger, ethnic tensions in Mauritania etc.) through i) inclusive inter-community fora to identify grass roots solutions to socio-economic problems, involving informal networks and locally elected officials (e.g. inter-Tuareg fora in Niger) and to enhance the acceptability of an increased presence of the state; ii) elaborating a strategy for local management of natural resources revenues; iii) reconciliation and awareness raising activities targeting the general population;
- furthering the decentralisation agenda, in particular by enhancing the active participation of the local population;
- supporting preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution efforts by national or regional actors, notably ECOWAS and the Arab Maghreb Union.

### **Governance and rule of law**

- enhancing transparent and locally accountable governance, state administration presence in the three countries, while supporting in particular the redeployment of the state in the North of Niger and Mali (e.g. support for PSPSDN in Mali);
- enhancing the performance of the rule of law and justice systems locally by improving the judicial coverage and enhancing the access to justice by the populations;
- furthering the decentralisation agenda and improving local political governance;
- promoting the political participation of marginalised social groups.

### ***Outcome indicators:***

- the re-establishment of the state presence is effective and benefits from the consent of the concerned populations, contributing to the sustainable reconciliation between the state and the population;

- the decentralisation agenda is finalised and decentralised government provides broad governance, law enforcement and justice services to the populations;
- the contested regions are unlocked through infrastructure development;
- employment and economic opportunities are sufficiently enhanced to counterweigh economic alternatives generated by AQIM and criminal economy;
- basic social demands (education, health) of local populations are satisfied.

## 1.2. POLITICAL/DIPLOMATIC

**It will be essential to build the political will in the Sahel countries to act.**

**Coordination on the ground and with other donors and partners is key.**

**Countries in the region as well as regional and international organisations have to be engaged.**

This EU Strategy aims at strengthening the commitment of the Sahel states to implement already agreed national and regional initiatives, and to agree, design and, most importantly, implement national and regionally concerted strategies and plans of action against common cross border security threats. Sustained dialogue at the highest level with the Sahel countries and other key players in the region (Algeria, Libya, Morocco, and Burkina Faso) is crucial to maintain the political momentum, and ensure the political will and commitment of all partners. At the diplomatic level, the Strategy aims also at ensuring that the governments mobilise their resources on counter-terrorism and organised crime in an effective manner. Internal security-related priorities should feature in political dialogues with these countries and relevant regional organisations, also to address, where relevant, EU internal security concerns. This may also include a further look at how best to respond to the problem posed by the demand for (and sometimes payment of) ransoms for hostages.

The Strategy can only succeed if EU Member States play an active role, place a premium on EU coordination, cooperation and transparency and support the Strategy politically and through their own contributions. The EEAS shall ensure that relevant Council working groups stay associated to the Sahel initiative within their fields of expertise as well as regularly brief the PSC.

### *Outcome indicators:*

- joint strategy on security threats adopted by the relevant countries, with highest level political endorsement;
- specific regional structures are established or strengthened to deal with trans-national security threats;
- comprehensive and balanced national strategies and actions plans on rule of law /security /justice are prepared and adopted.

## 1.3. SECURITY AND THE RULE OF LAW

**The EU needs to help to enhance the countries' law enforcement/judicial approach to terrorism and organized crime by increasing their capacities.**

**The EU should support the re-deployment of the state in northern parts of Mali and Niger.**

**The EU should encourage/support the development of regional operational cooperation in the field of security and the rule of law.**

The objective of the security component of this Strategy is to enable Sahel States to use security and law enforcement tools to dismantle AQIM sanctuaries in Northern Mali and to disrupt its capacities to conduct operations in Mauritania and Northern Niger, to fight organised crime and domestic banditry, to secure the trade routes across the Sahel, to re-establish rule of law and security by redeploying State authority in the most sensitive regions.

The EU should strengthen Sahel states' capabilities in the broader security and rule of law sector (law enforcement and justice, police, customs, gendarmerie, garde nationale, military) both by beefing up capabilities in the three Sahel states individually and by developing regional cooperation, while respecting human rights.

EU assistance and support, including from Member States should focus on a law enforcement approach towards terrorism and drug trafficking. Hence it should strengthen the capacities of the countries concerned to use the criminal justice system in an effective and specialized way. Additionally, the EU could support the Sahel countries' ability to effectively police and control their territory, counter organised crime and domestic banditry.

The EU's actions in the security field should cover the whole criminal justice chain from collecting, analysing and sharing information and intelligence, to investigations and forensics, strengthening the judiciary as well as the penitentiary systems and integrated border management. New EU actions in the area of justice shall strive to be complementary with Member States projects, and with existing EU programmes in the Sahel and in the Maghreb.

A key focus is assisting the re-deployment of the State in northern parts of Mali and Niger.

**Suggested actions in Mali, Mauritania and Niger:**

**The EU should step up the law enforcement/judicial approach to counter-terrorism and organized crime:**

- Assistance to the services directly in charge of the judicial treatment of trafficking and terrorism (police, gendarmerie, customs, justice);
- Support to customs and border agencies through the strengthening of control and surveillance of border areas; strengthening airport security; integrated border management. This would benefit both security (disrupting illegal trafficking) and economic development;
- Supporting investigation and intelligence exchange in the field of disrupting terrorism financing and money laundering;
- Strengthening the criminal justice system, including prison reform, and supporting specialised courts to try terrorism and organized crime in each country;
- Supporting the capacities of law enforcement agencies in particular in desert zones such as Agadez, Gao, Tombouctou;
- Law enforcement capacity building in analysis and forensics to increase the states' prevention capacities. This would enable the states to improve collection and analysis of information in order to understand the dynamics of how terrorist networks develop and operate. This in turn would improve the capacity to disrupt terrorist plots and develop effective strategies against radicalization and recruitment;

- Improving the working conditions of police, garde nationale and gendarmerie units in the North, in order to strengthen motivation and fight corruption;
- Logistic support and training, satellite imagery and communication assistance;
- Support the security dimension of PSPSDN in Mali, aiming at strengthening security in the desert zones by equipping/training the police, gendarmerie and related security services to operate more effectively in these regions.

**Regional operational cooperation could be developed in a number of ways, e.g.:**

- **The support for the establishment of a (virtual) Sahel Security College for joint training of justice and law enforcement actors<sup>10</sup>:** It would be based on a concept similar to the European Police College (CEPOL) with a steering board and a light civilian structure with training tasks. This virtual structure, where the training courses would take place in the existing training facilities, allows respecting the national sensitivities about working together and exploiting the existing structures. If successful, the College's activity could be extended to the defence area, resorting to the existing Defence training centres regional network.
- Develop measures on effective policing of borders, while preserving the freedom of movement of nomadic pastoralist populations: developing a common Sahel passport with a common database for these populations to facilitate their circulation across the borders; enhancing trans-border cooperation of justice and law enforcement agencies inspired by best practices developed in the EU such as information exchange, the European Arrest Warrant ("Sahel Arrest Warrant") or joint investigation teams, and adapted to local conditions; creating a law enforcement counter terrorism regional network in order to exchange information and coordinate actions modelled on the Police Working Group on Terrorism;
- Strengthening regional law enforcement cooperation, technical assistance and training, including supporting judicial platforms;
- Support to the Tamanrasset initiative (Joint Military Command) or to coordination between intelligence and security services by appropriate ways;
- Support bilateral administrative arrangements between Sahel and Maghreb countries in order to develop joint or integrated border management measures, coordinated or joint patrolling, Joint Task Forces for Police and Customs Cooperation, including sharing of technology / surveillance equipment, cross-border judicial cooperation.

**The implementation of these activities will require an adequate mix of EU and Member States instruments and sufficient technical and implementation resources.**

At the level of EU instruments, structural and long-term action funded under the EU external aid instruments shall support comprehensive and balanced justice and security integrated reform strategies and programmes covering all aspects of the justice and security systems at national level and, gradually, at regional level.

In this respect, several options can be considered:

- **An action in the framework of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP)** that would potentially cover aspects of the security system. The possible objectives of this action could be (i) contributing to capacity building of security forces in individual Sahel countries,

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<sup>10</sup> The concept of a "College Sahelien de sécurité" has been presented and supported by local partners in December 2010 at the IfS seminar in Nouakchott.



(ii) supporting and facilitating the **Malian plan** to redeploy into northern provinces and eventually a similar plan in northern Niger; (iii) supporting the implementation of the **Joint Military Command in Tamanrasset**.

- **Strengthened EU Delegations** in Mali, Niger and Mauritania with seconded national experts from Member States in the security field (e.g. defence, police, justice, border control, customs) to support the comprehensive implementation of the security dimension of the EU Strategy for Sahel (as several bilateral missions have already done). These experts would be able to liaise on a continuous basis with respective local authorities, be able to mentor them and to contribute to the implementation and identification of projects, as well as coordination and cooperation. The EU would be much better positioned with this expertise available on a full-time basis in the relevant Delegations. These experts should be networked with their colleagues in neighbouring countries.

- **EEAS/Commission services assistance to EU Delegations** in the three Sahel countries, who would ensure implementation of the suggested actions/project in the security and rule of law area financed through the geographic and thematic instruments – particularly the Instrument for Stability - while using their own organic staff resources.

***Outcome indicators:***

- a safe and secure environment in the Sahel region is gradually achieved;
- Sahel states redeploy effectively in the contested regions;
- number of attacks, murders, kidnappings reduced as well as drug and other illegal goods traffics reduced;
- law enforcement and justice system are put in place and are capable to operating effectively against terrorism and criminal activities;
- regional operational tools developed: trans-border right of observation and pursuit, judicial cooperation arrangements, harmonised border management.

#### **1.4. COUNTERING RADICALISATION AND RECRUITMENT BY AQIM**

**The EU should help to enhance the resilience of societies to counter Islamist radicalization.**

**The EU should study the problem in the Sahel, collect best practices and based on the knowledge gained, design interventions aiming at prevention and de-radicalisation.**

The objective of this component of the Strategy is to support Sahel and Maghreb states and legitimate non-state actors (including religious leaders, civil society and diaspora organizations), together with EU experts, in designing and implementing strategies/activities aiming at counteracting radical Islamist proselytizing and promoting tolerance and non-violence, including, where relevant, within communities established in the EU. While the religious traditions in all three countries are moderate, they have been the target for radical proselytising from foreign reformist, intolerant currents of Islam in societies that are vulnerable to radicalisation and recruitment by AQIM (in particular in Mauritania). Widespread poverty of the majority of the population, the growing number of uneducated and employed young people, constitute a fertile ground of recruitment for economic reasons and reinforced preaching of radical Islamism.

Effective interventions in the area of rehabilitation and de-radicalization cannot be formulated and much less implemented without a proper effort to gather sound knowledge. The focus should be on understanding opinions, perceptions, attitudes and needs of the local population to identify the concerns, the world views, the needs and therefore the points of entry for intervention.

Because of poor detention conditions and the intermingling of common criminals with terrorist inmates, prisoners are vulnerable to radicalisation, extremism and recruitment by AQIM.

The role of women in society as well as their access to higher education should be promoted as a priority in order to prevent the deterioration of their situation due to an increasingly fundamentalist approach to Islamic education.

### **Suggested actions:**

- **Build up knowledge on the basis of studies, lessons learned, and collection of best practices that would help in the designing of** interventions aiming at prevention and/or de-radicalization;
- Disseminate best practices on dealing with radicalism;
- Support programmes on de-radicalisation and **prevention of radicalization, in particular in prisons in Mauritania**, improve the detention conditions, separate prisoners detained for petty crimes and those detained for terrorist acts to prevent proselytising radicalisation;
- Support a **vibrant civil society in order to build up resilient societies, capable of resisting radicalisation**. Support consultation and dialogue between citizens and authorities on security issues. Support dialogue-oriented civil society players and activities such as conferences, fora, workshops and seminars. Awareness raising among the population. Positive engagement with certain Madrassas. Fellowships for relevant players: emerging religious leaders and opinion leaders. The EU Internal Security Strategy in Action sets actions designed to empower communities to prevent radicalisation and recruitment. In this context, synergies between the internal and external aspects of Member State and EU actions and experiences should be exploited to create a mutually reinforcing approach to counter-radicalisation.
- Working with the Islamic States' Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization, ECOWAS and UN structures (Alliance of Civilisations) to promote dialogue and inclusive values.

The **conditions conducive for radicalisation are addressed** through development assistance focused on education and creation of job opportunities for youth.

### ***Outcome indicators:***

- a better understanding of the dynamics, the actors and the process of radicalisation is acquired;
- civil society in the three countries develop a strong counter-narrative of traditional Islam capable of countering radicalisation narrative;
- conditions leading to radicalisation in prisons are effectively addressed;

- best practices in tackling radicalisation in the region have been identified.

## 2. Coordination modalities

### **Coordination in Brussels**

Coordination shall be conducted by the EEAS, through its Africa Department or via a **dedicated Coordinator** under the guidance of the Managing Director for Africa to whom she/he would report. There will be close coordination with relevant Commission services. The EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator (CTC) would be associated to the implementation of the Strategy, as relevant. Coordination and coherence with envoys/services of the EU's partners would be ensured. Under the authority of the EEAS Managing Director for Africa, the Coordinator would work out and implement a diplomatic plan of action.

An EU informal Sahel and Maghreb Experts Group, including EEAS and Commission services, could be set up.

### **Coordination on the ground**

**Heads of EU Delegations** in Mauritania, Mali and Niger, in association with Heads of Missions of Member States should intensify the dialogue with the respective governments concerning the Strategy; if appropriate, organise conferences, seminars etc. in the region to bring together relevant political actors in an effort to enhance mutual trust and create synergy at political level; this can be done with regional organisations. Heads of EU Delegations in neighbouring countries (Algeria, Libya, Morocco) should engage their host governments on Sahel security and development. **A network of relevant EU Heads of Delegations** should be created in order to closely monitor and assess developments in the Sahel through Delegations in Mauritania, Mali and Niger as well as Algeria, Morocco and Libya; The Heads of EU Delegations in Addis and Abuja should be associated to the Strategy, so that they can engage with the AU and ECOWAS HQ and explore areas for cooperation and support.

EU Delegations will lead local coordination. A **local security and development coordination working group** should be established in each of the three countries (Mali, Mauritania, Niger), led by the respective EU Delegation, which would act as a clearinghouse for exchange of information and assistance by EU Member States and lead the division of labour. This will be carried out in close coordination with the EU Delegations based in the Maghreb countries.

This EU internal coordination should be complemented by **regular meetings of local working groups with other donors** (for coordination and exchange of information), regional organizations and the host country authorities (ongoing evaluation of the situation in view of a specific EU contribution, implementing the assistance, identifying new needs).

## Annex 2: The EU Strategy for Sahel: logical framework

<b>European Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel</b>	
<b>Mutual interests</b>	<p><b>Longstanding mutual interests:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- to reduce insecurity and improve development in the Sahel region;</li> <li>- to strengthen governance and stability within the Sahel countries through the promotion of the rule of law, and human rights as well as socio-economic development, in particular for the benefit of the vulnerable local populations of these countries;</li> </ul> <p><b>Urgent and recent priority:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- to protect European citizens and interests, to prevent AQIM attacks and its potential to carry out attacks on EU territory;</li> <li>- to reduce and contain drug and other criminal trafficking destined for Europe;</li> <li>- to secure lawful trade and communication links (roads, pipelines) across the Sahel, North-South and East-West;</li> <li>- to protect existing economic interests and create the basis for trade and EU investment;</li> <li>- to ensure and strengthen coherence and complementarity between internal and external aspects of EU security.</li> </ul>
<b>Objectives</b>	<p><b>Medium term Objective (5/10 years horizon):</b> enhancing political stability, security, governance and social cohesion in the Sahel states setting the conditions for local and national sustainable development, so that the Sahel region can prosper and no longer be a potential safe haven for AQIM and criminal networks; assisting at national level in mitigating internal tensions, including the challenges posed by Islamist radicalisation on which AQIM and other criminal groups feed.</p> <p><b>Short term objectives (3 years horizon):</b> improving access of populations in the contested zones to basic services (roads, livelihoods, education, social services), while improving their relations with their parent states; reducing terrorist attacks and kidnappings in the Sahel countries, limiting the capabilities of AQIM and criminal networks, improving security in the contested zones of Sahel as States' administration and services redeploy effectively, while their security capabilities to fight terrorism and criminal trafficking across the region are improved; supporting the implementation of peace settlements, raising awareness and training the local traditional elites to better understand and react to the threats of terrorism and organised crime; increasing confidence between local and state authorities.</p> <p><b>The EU will need to demonstrate focus, urgency, pragmatism and political engagement, along with flexibility and a requirement to coordinate with other players</b> (UN, AU, ECOWAS, the Arab League, AMU, bilateral partners: USA, Canada, Japan, Maghreb countries).</p>
<b>Building on and supporting existing national, regional and international initiatives</b>	<p><b>Mali:</b> Programme spécial pour la paix, la sécurité et le développement dans le nord du Mali - PSPSDN; a new office to fight against drug trafficking; a Heads of State Conference.</p> <p><b>Mauritania:</b> comprehensive national strategy to fight terrorism, a Counter Terrorism law adopted in 2010.</p> <p><b>Niger:</b> a strategy and action plan for the reform of the justice system (foresees inter alia the creation of a specialised single pole on terrorism and trafficking in the Superior Court of Niger).</p> <p><b>Burkina Faso:</b> an important partner in the overall regional approach.</p> <p><b>Maghreb countries:</b> advanced political dialogue and legal structures existing between these partners and the EU.</p> <p><b>Joint military command in Tamanrasset</b> (Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Algeria) and joint intelligence cell: to coordinate operations against terrorist groups in the Sahel.</p> <p><b>ECOWAS:</b> Conflict Prevention Framework; Common Position on Migration and a Strategy for the fight against drug trafficking and organised crime, Praia Action Plan.</p> <p><b>UNODC:</b> working with the Sahel countries on regional law enforcement cooperation, including through the Sahel judicial platform.</p>

<p><b>Bulding on existing EU engagement</b></p>	<p><b>The ongoing EU cooperation strategies under the EDF agreed with Mali, Mauritania, Niger and ECOWAS</b> (political and economic governance, institutional capacity building, regional integration, economic development of Northern and Niger river inner delta regions in Mali);  <b>The European Security Strategy;</b>  <b>The EU Council conclusions on Security and Development;</b>  <b>The EU Internal Security Strategy;</b>  <b>The EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy;</b>  <b>The Stockholm Programme;</b>  <b>Action Oriented Paper:</b> "Strategic and concerted action to improve cooperation in combating organized crime, especially drug trafficking, originating in West Africa";          Coordination of activities and exchange of operational information through the <b>Maritime Analysis and Operations Centre-Narcotics (MAOC-N)</b>  <b>European Pact to combat international drug trafficking</b></p>			
<p><b>Lines of action</b></p>	<p><b>DEVELOPMENT / GOOD GOVERNANCE / CONFLICT RESOLUTION</b></p> <p><b>Objective:</b> to promote home-grown and grass-roots solutions to social, political and ethnic tensions; to enhance transparent and locally accountable governance and re-establish an administrative presence of the state, particularly in the north of Niger and Mali; to help create economic opportunities for local communities; to open up the regions affected by insecurity through key road and social infrastructures; and to mitigate the impact of climate change effects.</p>	<p><b>POLITICAL / DIPLOMATIC</b></p> <p><b>Objective:</b> to promote a common vision and a strategy by the relevant countries, to tackle cross-border security threats and address development challenges through a sustained dialogue at the highest level; to engage with partners (including Maghreb countries, regional organisations and wider international community) on a reinforced dialogue on security and development in the Sahel.</p>	<p><b>SECURITY AND THE RULE OF LAW</b></p> <p><b>Objective:</b> to strengthen the capacities of the security, law enforcement and the rule of law sectors to fight threats and handle terrorism and organised crime in a more efficient and specialised manner.</p>	<p><b>PREVENTION OF ISLAMIST RADICALISATION</b></p> <p><b>Objective:</b> to help enhance the resilience of societies to counter radicalisation; to provide basic social services, economic and employment perspectives to the marginalised social groups, in particular the youth vulnerable to Islamist proselytising; to support the states and legitimate non-state actors in designing and implementing strategies and activities aiming at countering extremism.</p>

Activities/Options

#### **Economic development**

- opening up the remote and isolated areas by improving the road infrastructure to enhance economic prospects, and provide conditions for development actors to access the most dangerous zones;
- improving livelihoods notably by strengthening sustainable agriculture and reintegrating ex-rebels (in particular in Mali and Niger);
- creating education, economic and employment opportunities, in particular for youth from marginalised social groups, among other through vocational training;
- exploring opportunities for isolated regions, in particular by improving information technology coverage;
- rehabilitation and further development of the tourism economy.

#### **Social services**

- enhancing capacities to provide basic social, education and health, and development services to the population by effective decentralised delivery, where possible supporting the social dimension of the existing or envisaged security and development poles;

#### **Conflict resolution**

- finding and implementing home grown solutions to social, political and ethnic conflicts (Tuareg rebellion in Mali and Niger, ethnic tensions in Mauritania etc.) through i) inclusive inter-community fora to identify grass roots solutions to socio-economic problems, involving informal networks and locally elected officials (e.g. inter-Tuareg fora in Niger) and to enhance the acceptability of an increased presence of the State; ii) elaborating a strategy for local management of natural resources revenues; iii) reconciliation and awareness raising activities targeting the general population;
- furthering the decentralisation agenda, in particular by enhancing the active participation of the local population;
- supporting preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution efforts by national or regional actors, notably ECOWAS and the Arab Maghreb Union.

This EU Strategy aims at **strengthening the commitment of the Sahel states to implement already agreed national and regional initiatives, and to agree, design and, most importantly, implement national and regionally concerted strategies and plans of action against common cross border security threats.**

Sustained dialogue at the highest level with the Sahel countries and other key players in the region (Algeria, Libya, Morocco, and Burkina Faso) is crucial to maintain the political momentum, and ensure the political will and commitment of all partners.

**At the diplomatic level, the Strategy aims also at ensuring that the governments mobilise their resources on counter-terrorism and organised crime in an effective manner.**

**Internal security-related priorities should feature in political dialogues** with these countries and relevant regional organisations, also to address, where relevant, EU internal security concerns. This may also include a further look at how best to respond to the problem posed by the demand for (and sometimes payment of) ransoms for hostages.

**The Strategy can only succeed if EU Member States play an active role, place a premium on EU coordination, cooperation and transparency and support the Strategy politically and through their own contributions.** The EEAS shall ensure that relevant Council working groups stay associated to the Sahel initiative within their fields of expertise as well as regularly brief the PSC.

#### **Actions in Mali, Mauritania and Niger: law enforcement/ judicial approach to counter-terrorism and organized crime:**

- Assistance to the services in charge of judicial treatment of trafficking and terrorism (police, gendarmerie, customs, justice);
- Support to customs and border agencies (strengthening of control and surveillance of border areas; airport security; integrated border management).
- Supporting investigation and intelligence exchange in the field of disrupting terrorism and money laundering;
- Strengthening criminal justice system, including prison reform, supporting specialised courts to try terrorism and organized crime;
- Supporting the capacities of law enforcement agencies in desert zones;
- Law enforcement capacity building in analysis and forensics to increase the States' prevention capacities.
- Improving working conditions of police, garde nationale and gendarmerie units in the North;
- Logistic support and training, satellite imagery and communication assistance;
- Support the security dimension of PSPSDN in Mali, aiming at strengthening security in the desert zones by equipping/training the police, gendarmerie and related security services to operate more effectively in these regions.

#### **Regional operational cooperation:**

- Sahel Security College for joint training of justice and law enforcement actors;
- Measures to compensate the difficulty of policing the borders (common Sahel passport, common database to facilitate the cross-border circulation of populations);
- Enhance trans-border cooperation of justice and law enforcement agencies (information exchange, "Sahel Arrest Warrant", joint investigation teams);
- Create a law enforcement counter terrorism regional network;
- Strengthening regional law enforcement cooperation, technical assistance & training,

**Build up knowledge** on the basis of studies, lessons learned, and collection of best practices to help design interventions aiming at prevention and/or de-radicalization.

#### **Disseminate best practices;**

**Support prevention of radicalization and de-radicalization programmes,** in particular in prisons in Mauritania, improve the detention conditions, separate prisoners detained for petty crimes and those detained for terrorist acts to prevent proselytising radicalisation.

**Support a vibrant civil society** - support consultation and dialogue between citizens and authorities on security issues; support dialogue-oriented civil society players and activities such as conferences, fora, workshops and seminars. Awareness raising among the population. Positive engagement with certain Madrassas. Fellowships for relevant players: emerging religious leaders and opinion leaders; synergies between the internal and external aspects of Member State and EU actions and experiences should be exploited to create a mutually reinforcing approach to counter-radicalisation.

**Working with the Islamic States' Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization, ECOWAS and UN structures (Alliance of Civilisations)** with a vocation to promote dialogue and inclusive values.

**Addressing the conditions conducive for radicalisation** through

	<p><b>Governance and rule of law</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- enhancing transparent and locally accountable governance, state administration presence in the three countries, while supporting in particular the re-establishment of the state presence in the North of Niger and Mali (e.g. support to PSPSDN in Mali);</li> <li>- enhancing the performance of the rule of law and justice systems locally by improving the judicial coverage and enhancing the access to justice by the populations;</li> <li>- furthering the decentralisation agenda and improving local political governance;</li> <li>- promote political participation of marginalised social groups.</li> </ul>		<p>supporting judicial platforms;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Support to the Tamanrasset initiative (Joint Military Command) or to coordination between intelligence and security services;</li> <li>- Support bilateral administrative arrangements between Sahel and Maghreb countries.</li> </ul> <p><b>A mix of EU external aid instruments and sufficient technical and implementation resources</b>, in parallel with options:</p> <p><b>1. A CSDP action</b> to contribute to capacity building of security forces in individual Sahel countries, to support and facilitate the Malian plan to redeploy into the north of its territory and to support the implementation of the Joint Military Command in Tamanrasset</p> <p><b>2. Strengthening of EU Delegations in Mali, Niger and Mauritania with security experts seconded by Member States</b> (e.g. Defence, Police, Justice, Border Control, Customs)</p> <p><b>3. EEAS/Commission HQs assistance to EU Delegations</b> in the three Sahel countries</p>	<p>development assistance focused on education and creation of job opportunities for youth.</p>
<b>Outcome</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• the State re-establishment is effective and benefits</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• joint strategy on security threats adopted by the</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• a safe and secure environment in the Sahel</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• a better understanding of the</li> </ul>

<b>indicators</b>	<p>from the consent of the concerned populations, contributing to the sustainable reconciliation between the State and the population;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• the decentralisation agenda is finalised and decentralised government provides broad governance, law enforcement and justice services to the populations;</li> <li>• the contested regions are unlocked through infrastructure development;</li> <li>• employment and economic opportunities are sufficiently enhanced to counterweigh economic alternatives generated by AQIM and criminal economy;</li> <li>• basic social demands (education, health) of local populations are satisfied.</li> </ul>	<p>concerned countries, with highest level political endorsement;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• specific regional structures are established or strengthened to deal with trans-national security threats;</li> <li>• comprehensive and balanced national strategies and actions plans on rule of law /security /justice prepared and adopted.</li> </ul>	<p>region is gradually achieved;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Sahel States redeploy effectively in the contested regions;</li> <li>• number of attacks, murders, kidnappings reduced as well as drug and other illegal goods traffics reduced;</li> <li>• law enforcement and justice system are put in place and are capable to operating effectively against terrorism and criminal activities;</li> <li>• regional operational tools developed: trans-border right of observation and pursuit, judicial cooperation arrangements, harmonised border management.</li> </ul>	<p>dynamics, the actors and the process of radicalisation is acquired;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• civil society in the three countries develop a strong counter-narrative of traditional Islam capable of countering radicalisation narrative;</li> <li>• conditions leading to radicalisation in prisons are effectively addressed;</li> <li>• best practices in the region have been identified.</li> </ul>
<b>Assumptions/ Risks</b>	<p><b>Assumption:</b> legitimate democratic institutions are maintained in the countries concerned, they continue to welcome EU involvement in tackling the problems they face.  <b>Risks:</b> weak absorptive capacity of the state structures concerned, the fragile political consensus in some states, and therefore difficulty in delivering outcomes, physical risk of continued insecurity in several areas.</p>			
<b>Coordination modalities</b>	<p><b>Coordination in Brussels: EEAS (Africa Department)</b> or via a <b>dedicated Coordinator</b> under the guidance of the Managing Director for Africa to whom she/he would report. Close coordination with relevant Commission services. The EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator (CTC) would be associated, as relevant. Coordination and coherence with envoys/services of the EU's partners would be ensured. Under the authority of the EEAS Managing Director for Africa, the Coordinator would work out and implement a diplomatic plan of action.  <b>An EU informal Sahel and Maghreb Experts Group</b>, including EEAS and Commission services.</p> <p><b>Coordination on the ground:</b> EU HoD in Mali, Mauritania, Niger, in association with MS HoMs intensify dialogue with Governments and implement activities. EU HoD in Maghreb countries engage with respective governments.  <b>An EU HoD network</b> (Sahel &amp; Maghreb; in association of EU HoD to the AU and ECOWAS)  <b>EU HoDs lead local coordination</b> (local security and development coordination working group, which would meet also with other donors, host authorities and regional organisations to act as a clearinghouse for exchange of information and assistance by EU Member States), in close coordination with the EU Delegations in the Maghreb countries.</p>			
<b>Resources</b>	<p><b>The resources already committed or in the pipeline: €700 million</b>  - Sahel countries and West Africa region (EDF, IfS, thematic programmes and budget lines) = <b>approximately €450 million.</b>  - Maghreb countries (ENPI, thematic programmes and budget lines) = <b>approximately €250 million.</b>  <b>An envelope of approximately 150 M€ may be mobilised</b> until the end of 10th EDF in support to the Strategy.  Moreover, funding through the Instrument for Stability should be pursued as appropriate (possibility to resort to the crisis response component, while long term actions through the LT component of IfS and through EDF are being pursued).  <b>Bilateral support from EU Member States should be geared towards supporting the objectives of the EU Strategy.</b>  Financial and human resources under possible CSDP action. The reinforcement of Delegations with seconded experts from Member States may also be desirable.</p>			



### Annex 3

#### Ongoing and planned EU security and development engagement in the Sahel and Maghreb countries

<b>1. The committed and programmed activities in the Sahel countries and West Africa region contributing to the objectives of the Strategy</b>								
Axis of the Strategy	MALI		MAURITANIA		NIGER		REGIONAL	
	Ongoing	Programmed	Ongoing	Programmed	Ongoing <sup>11</sup>	Programmed	Ongoing	Programmed
<b>DEVELOPMENT/GOVERNANCE/ CONFLICT RESOLUTION</b>	- Programme supporting the consolidation of decentralization process (PARADDER) ; structural investments to the 3 regions in the northern Mali; institutional support to regional assemblies (capacity building and funds for social projects) <u>€32 million for North Mali -10<sup>th</sup> EDF</u> (under a larger €75 million project)	- Support to PSPSDN ((Programme Spécial pour la Paix, Sécurité et Développement du Nord Mali): infrastructure and social services for the creation of 'security and development poles' and the re-establishment of the state in the north of Mali : <u>€4 million - Instrument for Stability (IfS CT) + €8 million - 10<sup>th</sup></u>	- European programme of support to local authorities: PERICLES: <u>€7.5 million- 9<sup>th</sup> EDF</u>  - Support to non-state actors and good governance (PASOC): <u>€4.5 million- 9<sup>th</sup> EDF</u>	- Support to civil society and culture <u>€7 million – 10<sup>th</sup> EDF</u>	- Support to decentralisation policy and to deconcentration of State services in the North: <u>€6.2 million - 10<sup>th</sup> EDF</u>  - Support to the organisation of elections: <u>€20 million - 10<sup>th</sup> EDF</u>  - Support to governance of the	Support to Civil Society (improving governance) – <u>€5 million 10<sup>th</sup> EDF</u>  Support to non-state actors and local authorities (€1.5 million budget line)  - Study on post-conflict situation in the North of Niger: <u>€0.2 million - 10<sup>th</sup> EDF (support to</u>		Regional Stability and Good Governance: <u>€50 million -10<sup>th</sup> EDF</u>

<sup>11</sup> Ongoing projects and actions under preparation (under existing financing commitments or commitments with possibility of increase, to be relaunched in parallel with progress on the transition process)

	<p>- Support to the sectoral infrastructure and transport programme in the North of Mali (Goma Coura – Tombouctou road): <u>€165 million 10th EDF</u></p> <p>- Support to food security specifically in Northern Mali (addendum to 10<sup>th</sup> EDF PASA<sup>12</sup> programme to include Tombouctou, Gao and Kidal regions): <u>€5 million - 10<sup>th</sup> EDF</u></p>	EDF			mining: <u>€4.5 million 8th EDF</u>	<u>NAO/TCF</u>		
<b>POL /DIPLO</b>								
<b>SECURITY</b>		- Support to PSPSDN (see details above)	- Support to border management (following the findings of the security and development fact-finding mission):	- Support to the justice reform :  (Strengthening of specialised poles including unique jurisdiction for	- PAJED: Support to the justice sector (including support to the police in the area of forensics and criminal	- PAJED II: Support to the justice sector (including capacity-building of law enforcement agencies to fight organised crime):	- Counter-terrorism project (training, capacity building and equipment for the justice and security services)	- Support for the ECOWAS anti-drugs plan: <u>€16million – 10<sup>th</sup> EDF</u>

<sup>12</sup> PASA - Programme d'appui à la sécurité alimentaire au Mali

			<p>operationalisation of 19 border posts and training for border agents: <u>€1.2 million - IfS CT</u></p> <p>- Support to border management (support to creation of priority border posts and training to border control agents): <u>€1.2 million - 9<sup>th</sup> EDF (RIP)</u></p> <p>- Support to justice reform (capacity building, technical assistance, support to various tasks and the functioning of the judiciary, awareness raising to public, modernisation and infrastructure) : <u>€4.75 million - 9<sup>th</sup> EDF</u></p> <p>- <u>Project West Sahel</u></p> <p>Support to Mauritania (gendarmerie), Senegal, Mali and Niger to manage to fight against illegal immigration and human trafficking.</p>	<p>terrorism and organised crime can be envisaged): <u>€7 million - 10<sup>th</sup> EDF</u></p> <p>- Support to implement the Mauritanian National Strategy to manage migration: <u>€8 million - 10<sup>th</sup> EDF</u></p> <p>- Technical cooperation in management of migration / capacity building in field of document fraud (carried out by ION and ICMPD) including Burkina Faso, Gabon, Mali, Mauritania and Senegal:</p> <p><u>57 000 EUR</u></p>	<p>investigations)): <u>€8 million - 9<sup>th</sup> EDF</u></p> <p>- <u>AENEAS €1.2 million</u></p>	<p>€15 million – 10<sup>th</sup> EDF</p> <p>- Institutional support to the Ministry of Finance – support to the cell dealing with the fight against money laundering: <u>€0.3 million - 10<sup>th</sup> EDF</u></p> <p>- Support to improved intelligence on population (support to Census, Registry Office and Statistics) - €19 million - 10<sup>th</sup> EDF</p> <p>- Support to Human Rights (EIDHR) – €1.2 million (2011-13) budget line)</p>	<p>Mauritania, Mali and gradually Niger – I and II phase: <u>€5.3million - IfS LT</u></p> <p>- Fight Against Organised Crime along the Cocaine Routes of Trafficking, Phases I &amp; II., including AIRCOP I- II (<u>€4.8million</u>), and SEACOP I-II (<u>€3 million</u>), IfS LT</p> <p>- Support the fight against terrorism in the African continent: Strengthening ACSRT and the AU Focal Points Structure - <u>€0.6 million</u>), IfS LT</p>	<p>- Counter-terrorism project (training, capacity building and equipment for the justice and security services) Niger &amp; Regional – III phase: <u>€2.5/3 million- IfS LT</u></p> <p>- Fight Against Organised Crime along the Cocaine Routes of Trafficking, Phase III (<u>approx. €3million on West Africa</u>), IfS LT</p>
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			<p>Grant to Guardia Civil : <u>€1.95 million</u> - <u>Thematic Programme Asylum &amp; migration</u></p> <p>Project to strengthen Mauritanian asylum and protection capacity. Grant to UNHCR: <u>€1.35 million</u> - <u>Thematic Programme Asylum &amp; migration</u></p>				
<b>RADICALISATION</b>				- Political analysis study on risk factors (religious radicalism, socio-ethnic tensions, conditions in prisons): <u>€0.1 million</u> – 10 <sup>th</sup> EDF			- Studies and conferences on Islam (Conference Sahel, Study on Political Islam): <u>€0.18million</u> – <u>Study Facility</u>
<b>Total Amount per country</b>		<b>€244 million</b>		<b>€44, 55 million</b>		<b>€82,1 million</b>	<b>€85,8 million</b>
<b>GLOBAL TOTAL</b>							<b><u>€456,45 million</u></b>
<b>Global financial efforts</b>	<p><i>EDF:</i></p> <p><b>Total 9<sup>th</sup> EDF:</b> €375 million (Transports - 35%, decentralisation and support to public structures: 24%; macroeconomic support 34%, non focal sectors: 7%).</p>		<p><i>EDF:</i></p> <p><b>Total 9<sup>th</sup> EDF:</b> €115.4 million (transport - 82%, capacity building -12%, non focal sectors - 6%, support to transition following the 2005 coup).</p>		<p><i>EDF:</i></p> <p><b>Total 9<sup>th</sup> EDF:</b> €212 million (focal sectors: rural development and food security – €26 million; transport - €66 million, Macroeconomic support - €95 million, non-focal sectors: good governance, institutional</p>		<p><i>EDF:</i></p> <p><b>Total 9<sup>th</sup> EDF:</b> €235 million (economic integration and trade: 50%; transport: 35%, non focal sectors: 15%).</p>

	<p><b>Total 10<sup>th</sup> EDF:</b> €533 million (focal sectors: governance (10%), economic development of the Northern and Niger Delta regions (51%), budget support (28%), non-focal sectors – support to food security, drinking water, non-state actors, culture, EPAs (11%).</p> <p><b>IfS Long term:</b> €2.67 million (Counter-terrorism)</p> <p><b>IfS Short term:</b> €4 million (under appraisal)</p> <p><i>Several budget lines</i></p>	<p><b>Total 10<sup>th</sup> EDF:</b> €156 million (focal sectors: i. Governance (30%), ii. regional integration and transport infrastructure (36%); budget support €40 million, non-focal sectors: migrations - €8 million, support to EPAs - €5 million)</p> <p><b>IfS Long term:</b> €2.67 million (Counter-terrorism)</p> <p><b>IfS Short term:</b> €1.22 million (Border management)</p> <p><i>Several budget lines and thematic programmes</i></p>	<p>support, etc.: €25 million; B envelope: €79 million (+ €55 million SYSMIN 8<sup>th</sup> EDF).</p> <p><b>Total 10<sup>th</sup> EDF:</b> €458 million (focal sectors: growth in rural areas and regional integration (35%), good governance and institutional and economic reforms (21%), general budget support (39%), support non-focal sectors (5%).</p> <p>Food crisis: €13,1 million</p> <p><i>IfS Long and short term interventions:</i> under appraisal</p> <p><i>Several budget lines</i></p>	<p><b>Total 10<sup>th</sup> EDF:</b> €597 million (focal sectors: regional integration, competitiveness and EPAs (70%), good governance and regional stability (20%), non-focal sectors – 10%)</p>
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2. Following the needs assessment carried out during the preparatory work for the Joint Paper and on the Sahel Strategy, the additional actions presented in the table below could be envisaged to increase EU's engagement in security and development in the Sahel. They will be further specified at a later stage.

Axis of the Strategy	MALI  <i>(topping up of envelope by €50 million is recommended)</i>	MAURITANIA  <i>(maintaining the envelope in the forthcoming MTR exercise is recommended)</i>	NIGER  <i>(maintaining the envelope is recommended)</i>	REGIONAL  <i>(based on ongoing Regional Indicative Programme; no additional resources are necessary)</i>
<b>DEV / GOV / CONFLICT</b>	- funding of programmes identified by the local administrations ("collectivités territoriales" – regions, municipalities); provision of social services, construction /rehabilitation/ improvement of land and air transport infrastructure, water supply, etc: through PARADDER decentralization	- activities targeting youth (employment opportunities, vocational training etc.), integrating specific youth-oriented activities in the ongoing or programmed activities. .	- support to stabilisation and post-conflict management in the North of Niger, on the basis of the results of the study on post-conflict situation (programmed under 10 <sup>th</sup> EDF.  - key infrastructure with the potential of	- under Good Governance programme: support to public institutions and services, decentralisation, support for the establishment of organisations of protection of Human Rights and for the initiatives of civil society.

	<p>programme. Employment creating initiatives would be preferred, to facilitate economic and social reinsertion of the local youth and to prevent participation in illegal traffics.</p> <p>- conflict prevention: support to inter-community fora through local communities; "observatoire", analysis and cartography</p>		<p>opening up of remote regions in the North of Niger (Tahoua, Agadez, Aïr) and contributing to the economic development of the region, to creating employment opportunities and improving access to social services for the local populations</p> <p>- Local development, support to public services and economic development in three regions bordering Mali (Tilabéri, Tahoua, Agadez), potentially reintegration of ex-combatants, and youth in the local economy</p> <p>- reconciliation and economic reintegration, support to "inter-Tuareg" fora in the framework of the support programme to the national security strategy (mentioned above);</p> <p>- support to civil society.</p>	<p>- support to consolidation and deepening of democracy: regional and local electoral support to encourage the democratic governance at the local level and implication of local communities in the definition of solutions to security and development challenges.</p>
<b>POL /DIPLO</b>			<p>- Support to development of a national strategy to fight against insecurity if post-transition government affirm their interest.</p>	<p>- Support to preventive diplomacy: financing of ECOWAS actions to allow i.a. the dialogue between the states of the Sahel Region (including facilitation for the Conference of the Heads of State of the sub-region), mediation in possible intra-state and international conflicts, and the operation of an early warning system.</p>
<b>SECURITY</b>	<p>- Support to the justice reform : national scope, with most of its components having a direct impact on the North:</p> <p>- Additional_support to the PSPSDN (Programme Spécial pour la Paix, Sécurité</p>	<p>- Reorienting / complementing of the ongoing (9<sup>th</sup> EDF) and programmed (10<sup>th</sup> EDF) justice reform programmes to include activities in support of the creation of a single anti-terrorism and organised crime pole, of improving the implementation of legislation on terrorism and organised crime, training and awareness raising on the</p>	<p>- Awareness raising, communication, intelligence and training of security sectors</p> <p>- In the framework of the support to the national strategy, once elaborated (mentioned in the pol/diplo component above):</p>	<p>- Good governance: support to reform of justice and security forces; support to increasing State presence in the region; establishment of a sub-regional centre of police training.</p>

	et Développement du Nord Mali)	subject  - A programme/project aiming at improving cooperation between security forces (gendarmerie, police) in terms of information sharing and common actions (border patrol, etc.)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Integration of Niger into the IfS programme ("counter terrorism");</li> <li>• Institutional equipment (vehicles, communication, IT), training and capacity building of the judiciary ("EU best practices") and police ("Intelligence Led Policing");</li> <li>• Support to legal embedding of the fight against terrorism and organised crime;</li> <li>• Support to the fight against money laundering;</li> </ul> - Support to border and migration management, improving quality of identification documents)	
<b>RADICALISATION</b>		- activities targeting youth (employment opportunities, vocational training etc.), integrating specific youth-oriented activities in the ongoing or programmed activities.  - integrating in the ongoing and programmed projects actions aiming at preventing radicalisation and extremism, notably in detention centres, and launching of activities identified in the political analysis study on risk factors (programmed under 10 <sup>th</sup> EDF) favouring dialogue and promotion of moderate Islam.		
<b>Total Amount</b>	<b>+/- €50 million</b>	<b>+/- €10 million</b>	<b>+/- €90 million</b>	

<b>per country</b>				
<b>GLOBAL TOTAL</b>	<b>+/- €150 million</b>			



### 3. The committed and programmed activities contributing to the objectives of the Security and Development Strategy for Sahel in the Maghreb countries

Axis of the Strategy	ALGERIA <i>(total 2011-2013 NIP: 172 MEUR)</i>		LIBYA <i>(total 2011-2013 NIP: 60 MEUR)</i>		MOROCCO <i>(total 2011-2013 NIP: 580.5 MEUR)</i>	
	Ongoing	Programmed/possible actions	Ongoing	Programmed	Closed/Ongoing <sup>13</sup>	Programmed/possible actions
<b>POLITICAL /DIPLOMATIC</b>						
<b>SECURITY AND THE RULE OF LAW</b>	<p>- Programme in support to the justice reform: 1/justice organisation, 2/ vocational training ; 3/ IT and modernisation.</p> <p><u>€15 million, 2005-2008 NIP (2004-2006) Closed.</u></p> <p>- JUSTICE II: Modernise the prison system, apply international standards for prison</p>	<p>Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) programme: a regional project aiming at the creation of regional centres working on CBRN risks in the Mediterranean and in the Middle East.</p> <p><u>IfS.</u></p>	<p>- Two ‘Across Sahara’ projects to strengthen border cooperation between Libya and Niger (with IT) <u>€2.5 million, AENEAS, closed in 2007</u></p> <p>- TRIM project (Enhancement of Transit and Irregular Migration Management in Libya), co-funded by IT: assistance to voluntary return and reintegration of migrants in Libya (mostly nationals of sub-Saharan Africa): <u>€4 million, AENEAS, and Thematic Programme through the "LI-MO" project</u></p>	<p>- Under EU – Libya Cooperation Agenda on migration: The Libya’s southern borders project (management and prevention of irregular migration flows, regional security scope, addressing terrorist threat in the Sahel by disrupting the freedom of movement enjoyed by the AQIM); <u>IfS</u></p> <p>- Migration: border management and migration management.</p> <p><u>€30million ENPI 2011-2013</u></p>	<p>- Money laundering: Twinning implemented by France and Spain for the Ministry of Finance and Privatization: setting up of a Unit to process finances intelligence. <u>€1.4 million, closed in April 2010</u></p> <p>- Border controls management: Support to the State on management of migratory flows and reinforcement of the fight</p>	<p>- Fight against terrorism and other traffics:</p> <p>Builds on the existing good relations between Morocco and Mauritania, with a possible enlargement to other partners in a second phase.</p> <p><u>IfS, identification phase</u></p> <p>- Money laundering</p>

<sup>13</sup> Ongoing projects and actions under preparation (under existing financing commitments or commitments with possibility of increase, to be relaunched in parallel with progress on the transition process)

<p>management/conditions of detention and prevention of re-offending by helping prisoners to reintegrate into economic and social life.</p> <p><u>€17 million, 2008-2012: NIP (2007-2010)</u></p> <p>- Programme for the modernisation of the Police,</p> <p>Training, institutional capacity building and equipment.</p> <p><u>€10 million (Decision in 2000) Closed in 2009.</u></p> <p>- Management of irregular migrants (Migration and Asylum; Italian NGO CIR), <u>€2 million, DCI</u></p>			<p>- Support to the development of an asylum system in Libya: assistance and "durable solutions" to migrants in need of international protection, enhancing the reception conditions for irregular migrants in detention centres.</p> <p><u>€2 million, AENEAS continued under the Thematic Programme</u></p> <p>- SAHARA-MED : Prevention and management of irregular migration flows from Sahara Desert to Mediterranean-Sea, <u>€10 million, Thematic programme on migration and asylum.</u></p> <p>- strengthening the criminal justice system response to smuggling of migrants in North Africa (with UNODC), <u>€1.8 million, AENAS (closed in 2010)</u></p> <p>- Facilitating a coherent migration management approach in Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal and Libya by promoting legal migration and preventing further illegal migration. <u>€2.6 million, AENAS (closed in 2009)</u></p> <p>- data collection and analysis on migration in the Maghreb/Mashrek region, <u>AENAS</u></p> <p>- Réseau Afrique/Migration : reinforcement of the operational commitment and of regional</p>	<p><u>NIP.</u></p>	<p>against illegal migration.</p> <p>(closing phase)</p> <p><u>€67.6 million, MED</u></p> <p>- Migration and Asylum Programme: population movements between sub-Saharan countries and Morocco. <u>€1 million, Migration and Asylum</u></p>	<p>(potential field of action):</p> <p>To bring support to existing fora between Morocco and its neighbours.</p> <p>- Illegal migration and trafficking in human beings, drugs and arms:</p> <p>The MLIEUX instrument could be used to harmonise and exchange knowledge in migration and human trafficking (conferences, seminars, national strategies, support to national legislation's drafting, needs assessment, and awareness raising campaigns).</p> <p>The experiences of the Cross Border Cooperation (CBC) and EU-BAM programmes might be replicable to reinforce the cooperation between Morocco and the Sahel states.</p> <p>The use of TAIEX should be pursued for</p>
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			<p>cooperation with civil society on management of transitory migratory flows in the Maghreb of <u>€1.6 million AENAS, (2005-2008)</u></p> <p>- Indirect implication in the East Africa Migration Route;</p> <p>- Protection of stranded and vulnerable migrants in North Africa and two projects following up on data collection.</p> <p>- Programme supporting the Libya authorities in enhancing their capacities on Border and migration management (incl. Southern border, and management of migration flows) <u>€10 million, special measure under the ENPI 2010</u></p> <p>- various TAIEX initiatives on JHA issues launched in 2010 (migration and asylum, police cooperation, counterfeiting, organised crime and money laundering)</p>			<p>relevant targeted missions, with the possibility for Morocco to associate the neighbouring countries. The respect of fundamental freedoms should always be taken into account in our demarche.</p>
<b>DEV / GOV/ CONFLICT</b>	<p>- Employment: support to the national employment agency (ANEM): modernisation, mediation, monitoring and steering functions in the labour market, <u>€14.1 million 2007-2010 NIP.</u></p>	<p>- Programme in support to local development and poverty reduction, touching mostly North Western Algeria</p> <p><u>30MEUR planned for 2013. (PADSEL-NO) (NIP 2011-2013)</u></p>	<p>- In 2011 support to the wider health sector. <u>€10 million 2011-2013 NIP</u></p>			

	- Higher education: Tackle the problem of the over-supply of graduates unsuited to labour market requirements €21.5 million 2007-2010 NIP					
<b>RADICALI SATION</b>	Numerous actions under the EIDHR instrument on rehabilitation of victims of terrorist violence, children and other vulnerable groups.	Possible projects under Thematic budget lines to finance Sahraouian refugees.				
<b>Total Amount per country</b>		<b>€99 million</b>	<b>€74.5 million with a possibility of additional funding under the IfS border control project</b>		<b>€70 million (but with a potential of increasing this amount with new projects)</b>	
<b>GLOBAL TOTAL</b>						<b>+/- €243,5 million</b>