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From:	European External Action Service (EEAS)
To:	Political and Security Committee (PSC) European Union Military Committee (EUMC)
Subject:	Concept for enhancing EU Military Missions Effectiveness

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**DOCUMENT PARTIALLY ACCESSIBLE TO THE PUBLIC (04.11.2022)**

Delegation will find attached the Concept for enhancing EU Military Missions' effectiveness as agreed by the EUMC on 8 March 2022.

Encl.: EEAS(2022) 130 REV 3

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EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE




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<b>Title / Subject</b>	<b>Concept for enhancing EU Military Missions Effectiveness</b>
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Delegation will find attached the “Concept for enhancing EU Military Missions’ effectiveness” as agreed by the EUMC on Tuesday 08 March 2022



**CONCEPT FOR ENHANCING**  
**EU MILITARY MISSIONS' EFFECTIVENESS**

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### A. INTRODUCTION

1. **DELETED**



6. As a result of all previous steps, this document should be seen as a guideline for the provision of actionable inputs to the level of the (strategic) planning for ISP, EUMS, OHQs and the MPCC, to further optimize EU military actions through a renovated concept of mission proposed to enlarge the scope of future military Missions to be developed. The aim is to improve effectiveness of the EU military actions through its Missions as one of the many tools within the EU Integrated Approach by making EU security assistance offerings more flexible and adaptable to the needs of EU partners, not only in crisis response/management situations but also upstream in crisis prevention for institution building purposes when appropriate and countering hybrid threats.

7. The EU Guidance for a Generic EUTM/EUMAM (Ref. BB) agreed by EUMC on Thursday 28 June 2018 remains valid especially for all formal aspects related to relations between MPCC and MFHQ and to the planning process and the development of the Mission plan at MFHQ level.

**B. STATE OF PLAY**

8. The review of our strategies and missions will need to take into consideration the following events and issues that are valid across the regions in which we operate and beyond.
- a. The rapid deterioration of the security situation in already crisis areas.
  - b. The latent spread of the instability to neighbouring areas where authorities are not prepared or adapted to deal with it.
  - c. The structural local shortfalls: authorities are faced with a lack of ownership, a lack of well-trained, equipped and structured security forces able to deploy and control their territory. The most critical issues concern the operational planning capabilities, the logistical support and equipment gaps. In some cases, our partners are not able to receive an oversized assistance, which goes beyond their capabilities and at the end saturates them.
  - d. **DELETED**
  - e. The more competitive international environment: increased presence and influence of EU's strategic competitors who directly or indirectly provide military assistance and thus challenge the EU's actions with serious consequences for the respect of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and Human Rights (HR); Disinformation is an essential tool of this international competition and it highlights our shortcomings and unpreparedness in Strategic Communication (STRATCOM).
9. **DELETED FROM THIS POINT UNTIL THE PAGE 20**

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### ANNEX B - DEFINITIONS OF TERMINOLOGY<sup>1</sup>

<b>Military Assistance</b>	<p><u>Definition:</u></p> <p><b>“Military Assistance (MA) is a broad range of measures and activities that support and influence critical friendly assets through organising, training, advising, education support, mentoring or contributing to operations in a clearly defined, pre-determined manner in keeping with the mandate. The range of MA includes, but is not limited to, capacity building of friendly security forces, engagement with local, regional and national leadership organisations and civic actions supporting and influencing the local population.”</b></p> <p><u>Clarification:</u></p> <p>Military Assistance is a task which can be performed in both executive and non-executive mandates and executable by both conventional and special operations force.</p>
<b>Training</b>	<p><u>Definition:</u></p> <p><b>“Broad range of activities that train designated individuals and units in tactical employment, sustainment and integration of land, air and maritime skills and provide training on tactics, techniques and procedures thus enabling the development of individual, leader and organisational skills.”</b></p> <p><u>Clarification:</u></p> <p>Training of partners is a task which can be performed in both executive and non-executive mandates.</p>
<b>Advising</b>	<p><u>Definition:</u></p> <p><b>“A range of activities that improve the performance of designated actors by providing expertise to achieve political, strategic, operational or tactical objectives.”</b></p> <p><u>Clarification:</u></p> <p>Advising is the collegial way to convey expertise (typically but not exclusively “one to many”) which can be carried out at the political, strategic, operational and/or tactical level, within the confines of the mandate. The responsibilities of an advisor are summarised as inform, recommend, liaise, observe, represent and support. Advising of partners is a task which can be performed in both executive and non-executive mandates.</p>

<sup>1</sup> Accordingly to Ref R.

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<b>Mentoring</b>	<p><u>Definition:</u></p> <p><b>“A range of activities conducted by subject matter experts who are tasked to work closely with designated personnel and provide direction or guidance with regard to military and security activities.”</b></p> <p><u>Clarification:</u></p> <p>Mentoring is a tailor-made and dedicated advice <b>facility</b> (typically “one to one”) <b>provided by an experienced person to a less experience one</b> which can be carried out at political, strategic, operational and/or tactical levels, <b>within the confines of the mandate</b>. The responsibilities of a mentor are summarised as teach, guide, influence and support. They may consist in assisting in the development of new skills and knowledge by coaching or showing how a task could be carried out; directing or guiding counterparts to take action and discuss the consequences of decisions and actions; conveying one's own experience and responsibilities to his/her counterpart.</p> <p>Mentoring of HN(S)’ forces is a task which can be performed in both executive (direction and guidance) and non-executive (guidance only) mandates.</p>
<b>Military Education</b>	<p><u>Definition:</u></p> <p><b>“The provision of tailored practical support to the HN(S) in developing, implementing and reforming their professional military education system and activities.”</b></p> <p><u>Clarification:</u></p> <p>Assistance to military Education does not imply education activities by the Mission itself, rather providing support in activities pertaining to optimising the HN(S) military educational system.</p>
<b>Accompaniment</b>	<p><u>Definition:</u></p> <p><b>“Operational activities consisting of going with those assisted, to pre-determined locations, for a specified extent under mandate-defined conditions, in order to reinforce and monitor the military assistance process and encourage continuity. It further helps to restore, maintain and enhance the self-confidence of the units accompanied and to better evaluate their performances.”</b></p> <p><u>Clarification:</u></p> <p>This posture would be dependent on a number of factors and criteria, assessed on a case-by-case basis, which would be necessary to determine the detailed nature of the accompaniment. These are, amongst others:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• risks involved and how to mitigate them,</li> <li>• resources needed,</li> <li>• required/available ROE,</li> <li>• sustainability of the effort,</li> <li>• location,</li> <li>• level and extent to which the partners are accompanied,</li> <li>• possible caveats from MS.</li> </ul> <p>Accompaniment in itself could be considered both in an executive mandate and in a non-executive one. It is not in itself a criterion to distinguish between them.</p>



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	<p>Accompaniment may be performed, as determined in the mandate, by acting as supplement (outside the designated entity's chain of command in order to enhance its capacity or expertise) or complement (embedded in the entity's chain of command in order to address capacity or expertise gaps) for a designated entity action. So, for a Non-Executive Mission accompaniment can only be conducted as a supplement to the entity's chain of command.</p> <p>The closer the association with partners, the more (self-) confident they will become. It would also allow the assisting entity to better evaluate the training investment and allow a more informed adaptation and calibration of the military assistance process.</p>
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**ANNEX C – EU MILITARY MISSION PRINCIPLES<sup>2</sup>**

The aim of this annex is to propose a more detailed, non-exhaustive list of principles taking into account the four main principles that have been identified: coherency, HN ownership, exemplary conduct and reversibility.

1. The principles below are derived from the EU Treaty (Ref. A), collective experience and subsequent analysis. The list is not exhaustive, but shows the key characteristics that a commander, planning staffs, and those involved in mission should consider:
2. *Host Nation<sup>3</sup> (State) Ownership*. The mission has to work in close coordination with military and political authorities to support and ensure Host Nation (State) (HN(S)) ownership of any reform related activity.
3. *Understand the operational Environment*. A shared understanding of the context within which insecurity and instability has arisen is essential to provide a basis for focused and coordinated action. To understand the contextual aspects of security and stabilization, anthropological, religious, ethnographic, social, political and economic information is required.
4. *Respect for Local Culture*. The mission's and individual's capacity to learn and understand the local culture, trends, and traditions is a key factor for mission success. Missions have to follow an approach that respects the local culture, as a pre-condition for acceptance by the local population and HN(S).
5. *Reversibility*. The Mission statement and the organisational structure of the mission must remain flexible enough to adapt to new circumstances at any time while remaining within the scope of the mandate. Ingenuity, initiative and imagination are convenient tools to manage evolving situations.
6. *Trust and Confidence*. It is the centre of gravity of any EU Military Mission. Gaining HN(S)'s trust takes time and it is the combined product of a respectful approach. Humility, professional integrity, and everyday transparency contribute to achieve this goal. In cases where mutual trust is damaged, the HN(S) will be reluctant to provide essential information and cooperation for the activities of the Mission.
7. *Exemplary Conduct*. Exemplary conduct is a vital part of military life. Each and every mission member has to exhibit the values of loyalty, cohesion and discipline. Adherence to these values

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<sup>2</sup> These principles are taken from EU Guidance for a Generic EUTM/EUMAM (Ref. BB). They have been slightly adapted to the evolving context. Two new principles have been added: Operational spirit and Coherency.

<sup>3</sup> Whilst "Host State" is the correct term, used in Council legal acts, the tem "Host Nation" is more widely used by experts and partner organisations.

will inculcate feelings of respect and confidence in deployed personnel, HN(S) and partners. The EU's reputation as a global provider of security and stability must be preserved in every dimension of the mission.

8. *Operational spirit.* Tactical and technical training is important but will not be valued over time if the EU trainers do not transmit the values of cohesion, creed, morale and unit spirit in an operational mind-set. Forging a unit spirit is essential to make local units ready when they will be subsequently engaged in combat operations. The mission must accustom the local defence forces to harden physically and morally, trust their leaders and group members as well as understand the purpose of their task in order to cope with perilous circumstances. Tactical leaders must then learn to make decisions within an uncertain operating environment.
9. *Legitimacy.* The mission's presence will have been requested by the HN(S) and the Mandate authorized by a unanimous Council Decision. Usually there will also be a UN Security Council Resolution. All of these reinforce the idea of legitimacy.
10. *Open Dialogue.* It is important to build networks at all levels in order to be recognized by everyone as a credible actor. This will occur through coordination and liaison with other actors, both civilian and military, who are present in theatre.
11. *Coherency.* The maintenance of coherency between rotations of mission staff is an essential element for success. Moreover, a continuous partnership between HN(S) institutions and all levels of the mission is important in order to build a sustainable solution. This could be applied with having a "train and follow" mind-set instead of a "train and forget" one. That is to say, utilising all evaluation opportunities with assisted units, within mandate defined conditions, in order to take stock and verify that the lessons or advice given have been taken into account.
12. *Transition and Exit Strategy.* The effective and progressive transfer of mission responsibilities to another stakeholder (EU, non-EU or the HN(S) itself), is critical to the HN(S) long-term stability and national autonomy. If transition activities are poorly managed, the gains achieved can be reversed.
13. *Respect of natural environment* and reduce the mission's ecological impact.
14. *Promote IHL, HR and gender approach.*

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
### **ANNEX H - LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

AM	Assistance Measure
AU	African Union
C2	Command and Control
CBDS	Capacity Building in support of Development and Security for Development
CE	Crisis Establishment
CHODs	Chiefs of Defence
CIMIC	Civil-Military Co-operation
CJSOR	Combined Joint Statement of Requirements
CMATT	Combined Mobile Advisory Training Team
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
EEAS	European External Action Service
ELMA	EUMS Lessons Management Application
EPF	European Peace Facility
EU	European Union
EU Del	European Delegation
EUMAM	European Union Military Assistance Mission
EUMC	European Union Military Committee
EUMS	European Union Military Staff
EUTM	European Union Training Mission
FP	Force Protection
FPI	Foreign Policy Instruments
HQ	Headquarter
HN	Host Nation

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HN(S)	Host Nation (State)
HR	Human Rights
HRM	Human Resources Management
IA	Integrated Approach
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
IO	International Organisation
ISP	Integrated approach for Security and Peace directorate
KLE	Key Leader Engagement
LAC	Law of Armed Conflicts
LI/LL	Lessons Identified / Lessons Learned
MA	Military Assistance
MCdr	Mission Commander
MFCdr	Mission Force Commander
MEDEVAC	Medical Evacuation
MFHQ	Mission Force Headquarter
MOD	Ministry of Defence
MPCC	Military Planning and Conduct Capability
MS	Member States
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NCO	Non-Commissioned Officer
NDICI	Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NSDF	National Security & Defence Forces
PDT	Pre-deployment Training
PESCO	Permanent Structured Cooperation



PSV	Prevention of Sexual Violence
QRF	Quick Response Force
ROE	Rules of Engagement
SMART	Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Realistic and Time-bound
SSR	Security Sector Reform
STRATCOM	Strategic Communication
TCN	Troop Contributing Nation(s)
TTP	Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
UN	United Nations
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
WG	Working Group
WPS	Women, Peace and Security

**ANNEX I - LIST OF REFERENCES AND OTHER USEFUL DOCUMENTS**

- A. Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union.
- B. EU Concept for Military Command and Control (ST 8798/19, dated 23 April 2019).
- C. A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy (ST 10715/16, dated 28 June 2016).
- D. Implementation Plan on Security and Defence (ST 14392/16, dated 14 November 2016).
- E. EU Concept for the Use of Force in EU-led Military Operations – the partially declassified version (ST 17168/09, dated 2 February 2010).
- F. EU Concept for EU-led Military Operations and Missions (ST 14777/19, dated 3 December 2019).
- G. EU Concept for Military Planning at the Political Strategic Level (ST 6432/15, dated 23 February 2015).
- H. Suggestions for crisis management procedures for CSDP crisis management operations (ST 7660/2/13 REV 2, dated 18 June 2013).
- I. EUMS Crisis Management Manual Review 1 2015.
- J. CivOpsCdr Operational Guidelines for Monitoring, Mentoring and Advising in Civilian CSDP missions (ST 15272/14, dated 7 November 2014).
- K. Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: Elements for an EU-wide strategic framework to support Security Sector Reform (JOIN (2016)31, dated 05 July 2016).
- L. Military Input to the EU-wide Strategic Framework for SSR (ST 7296/16, dated 18 March 2016).
- M. Military Advice on EU SSR Joint Communication: Elements for an EU-wide strategic framework to support Security Sector Reform (EEAS(2016) 961 REV 3, dated 15 September 2016).
- N. Council Conclusions on EU-wide strategic framework to support Security Sector Reform (ST 13998/16, dated 14 November 2016).
- O. Concept for EU Monitoring missions (ST 14536/03, dated 28 October 2003).
- P. Conduct and Discipline in CSDP Missions and Operations: Overview of Policies and Procedures (ST 7869/16, dated 13 April 2016).



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- Q. Code of Conduct and Discipline for EU Civilian CSDP Missions (ST 12076/16, dated 9 September 2016).
- R. EUMC Glossary of Acronyms and Definitions (EEAS(2020) 110, dated 10 May 2021).
- S. Concept Note: Operational Planning and Conduct Capabilities for CSDP Missions and Operations (ST 6881/17, dated 6 March 2017).
- T. Regionalization of the CSDP Missions in Sahel – Strategic Concept (ST 12391/16, dated 20 September 2016).
- U. Best practice Guidelines – Coordination and Cooperation between CSDP missions/operations, EU Delegations and EU Special Representatives, (ST 12052/16, dated 8 September 2016).
- V. Council Decision (EU) 2017/971 of 8 June 2017 determining the planning and conduct arrangements for EU non-executive military CSDP missions and amending Decisions 2010/96/CFSP on a EU military mission to contribute to the training of Somali security forces, 2013/34/CFSP on a EU military mission to contribute to the training of the Malian Armed Forces (EUTM Mali) and 2016/610 on a EU CSDP military training mission in the Central African Republic (EUTM RCA).
- W. EU Policy on Training for CSDP (ST 5197/2/17 REV 2, dated 15 March 2017).
- X. Shared Vision, Common Action: a stronger Europe – A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy (ST 13202/16, dated 17 October 2016).
- Y. Concept Note: Operational Planning and Conduct Capabilities for CSDP Missions and Operations (ST 6881/17, dated 6 March 2017).
- Z. Revision of the Second EUMS reflection paper on possible evolution of EU Training Missions agreed by CHODs level conference on 21 November 2019.
- AA. Proposed work plan for the finalization of the reflection paper on possible evolution of EU Non-Executive Missions agreed by the EUMC on 13 January 2020.
- BB. EU Guidance for a Generic EUTM/EUMAM (ST10650/18, dated 28 June 2018).
- CC. Outline Concept for EU non-Executive Missions (ST5764/20, dated 10 February, 2020)
- DD. CHODs Conclusions 09 July 2020.
- EE. The EU Guidance on countering Hybrid threats during the planning phase of EU-led CSDP military operations and missions (ST 8448/21, dated 5 May 2021).

FF. Report to the HRVP of the EUMC at the level of CHODs of 25-26 October 21 (CEUMC 430/21, dated 27 October 2021).

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