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Delegations will find attached the Annual 2014 CSDP Lessons Report for discussion and endorsement.

ANNUAL 2014 CSDP LESSONS REPORT

Executive summary

The implementation of the key lessons identified in 2013 made good progress, although further work is needed in particular on certain aspects of the Comprehensive Approach and on pre-deployment training.

The key lessons from 2014 are:

1. The **Political Framework for Crisis Approach** (PFCA) showed its potential but could be further improved.
2. The revised **Crisis Management Procedures** (CMP) proved their worth but need further analysis to avoid delays in mission launch.
3. Staff in Brussels and in EU Delegations would benefit from more systematic CSDP **training**.
4. There is insufficient **secure communication** capability.
5. **Coordination and cooperation between EU Delegations and CSDP missions** can be enhanced**.**

This report makes recommendations related to the lessons identified, whose implementation will be monitored and included in the next annual report.

References

A. Suggestion on a way forward on the implementation of lessons learned, including in field operations (EEAS 02065/13), dated 7 October 2013, endorsed by PSC on 5 November 2013.
B. Annual 2013 CSDP Lessons Report (EEAS 00407/14), dated 12 March 2014

Background

Based on the EEAS "Suggestion on a way forward on the implementation of lessons learned, including in field operations" (Ref. A), on 8 April 2014 the PSC discussed the Annual 2013 CSDP Lessons Report (Ref. B.) and on 11 June it endorsed the recommendations of CivCom, EUMC and PMG which supported the five key lessons identified in the report and the relevant key recommendations.

The CSDP Lessons Management Group (LMG) chaired by Deputy Secretary General Popowski monitored the implementation of these key lessons and recommendations.[1] A number of the lessons in this report link with broader work across the EU to take forward the EU Comprehensive Approac. Many of the actions in the Comprehensive Approach Action Plan (e.g. defining a common strategic vision), will also be essential for improving the efficiency and sustainability of mission results.

As anticipated in the Annual 2013 CSDP Lessons Report, the EEAS published a summary of the report in its website in September 2014. The CSDP Lessons Working Group held its first Peer Review on lessons with the UN DPKO in November.

The LMG prepared the report below on the implementation of the key lessons of 2013. The LMG has identified five additional key lessons for 2014 based on observations recorded in the EUMS Lessons Management Aid (ELMA), reports from CSDP missions and operations, contributions from LMG members and contributions from EU Delegations in Afghanistan, BiH, Central African Republic, Georgia, Kosovo[2], Mali, Mauritius and Somalia. In the light of the key lessons identified, the LMG also made the recommendations listed thereafter.

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[1] The LMG was established on the basis of Ref. A. It is chaired by a member of the EEAS Corporate Board and composed of CMPD, EUMS, CPCC, INTCEN, Security Policy and Conflict Prevention, MD CR&OC, CivCom, EUMC and PMG chairs, relevant geographic and thematic departments, as well as the Commission's DG DEVCO, ECHO and FPI. The LMG is assisted by a Lessons Working Group at expert level.

[2] This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.

Implementation of the key lessons identified in 2013

2013.1. A **Comprehensive Approach** improves efficiency and sustainability of mission results.

2013.1.1.   The EEAS should ensure that shared analysis informs the planning process.
In 2014 EEAS and Commission made significant progress towards shared analysis of crisis situations, with the contribution of several departments, e.g. through the Early Warning System and conflict analysis workshops. The first Political Framework for Crisis Approach (PFCA) was completed for Ukraine in May, followed by Libya and Central African Republic in October. The PFCA processes for Ukraine and for Libya in particular represented a step forward as the joint analysis helped overcome the challenges of coordinated planning. As a result, EU development planning and CSDP planning were able to better take account of each other as well as of Member States' bilateral actions. The experience accumulated in 2014 showed both the potential of the PFCA and some of its challenges, which are further elaborated in key lesson 2014.1 (see below).

2013.1.2.   The EEAS should ensure that planning documents provide an indication of tools needed, including equipment, and of the possible sources of funding.
The Crisis Management Concepts for two of the missions launched in 2014 (EUFOR RCA and EUCAP Sahel Mali) as well for EUMAM RCA addressed the issues of equipment needed and the possible sources of funding. The Crisis Management Concept for EUAM Ukraine did not. Despite these efforts and partial successes, we recognise that there are still challenges in financing equipment needs in order to ensure the sustainability and effectiveness of CSDP missions. In part this can be addressed through better and more joined-up planning across institutions but there is also more detailed work ongoing to better understand the causes and to devise possible actions in regard to this challenge, including a planned Joint Communication ahead of the European Council in June 2015.

2013.1.3.   From an early stage, the EEAS should start outlining an exit/transition strategy based on shared conflict analysis and also involving Commission, Member States, host countries and other actors as appropriate.
Planning documents for EUCAP Sahel Mali, EUAM Ukraine and EUMAM RCA outlined exit/transition strategies already at the stage of Crisis Management Concept, based on shared

conflict analysis. The Comprehensive Approach Action Plan aims at further reinforcing such shared analysis and such strategies for future missions. Annex B, p. 23-24 describes the experience of transition and phasing out of civilian CSDP missions in 2014.

2013.1.4.   The EEAS should post experts on a temporary basis to EU Delegations in countries at risk of conflict to help Delegations suggest possible response options based on the situation on the ground. To help identify such countries, EEAS should use its new Early Warning System and INTCEN analysis.

EU Member States and EEAS posted experts on a temporary basis to the EU Delegation in Ukraine to help suggest possible response options based on the situation on the ground. The EU Delegation in Somalia was reinforced with a Seconded National Expert in the field of security, which improved coordination and information flow in regard to CSDP activities. The EU Delegation in Mali found it useful to have a security and development counsellor with a broader understanding of the political context rather than a simple security expert. Observed lessons and best practice in 2014 confirmed that a perceived weakness in comprehensive capacity in EU Delegations could be ameliorated through the early deployment of temporary CSDP expertise. Early Warning assessments carried out in several countries identified needs in a number of Delegations (see for instance the updated assessment for the Sahel). Further investigation / analysis is required to determine the level of support required.

2013.1.5.   The EEAS should coordinate centrally all fact-finding / technical assessment missions (FFM / TAM).

 Coordination of fact-finding and technical assessment missions (FFM, TAM) improved among CMPD, CPCC and EUMS at the working level thanks to systematic consultation. The CMPD-led technical assessment mission for Ukraine is an example of best practice as it included experts from several EEAS departments and from the Commission (FPI, DEVCO).There remains some room for improvement of coordination with geographic desks and other services.

2013.1.6.   EU Delegations should help map out the various EU actions in their host countries as well as relevant non-EU actions, with a view to ensuring consistency and identifying synergies already at the planning stage. They should also help fine-tune missions and programmes during the implementation phase to better reflect the situation on the ground.

In July 2014 EU Delegations in countries with CSDP missions in place were instructed to map out the various EU actions in their host countries as well as relevant non-EU actions, with a view to ensuring consistency and identifying synergies already at the planning stage. To date, the EU Delegations in Afghanistan, Georgia, Kosovo and Mauritius as well as EUCAP Sahel Niger in cooperation with the EU Delegation in Niger have produced such maps. Early Warning assessments (checklists) were filled out by Delegations in consultation with Member States in several countries at risk. The feedback received includes relevant information and proposals in this respect.

2013.1.7.   The EEAS should ensure that missions' and operations' reports are circulated to the relevant EU Delegations, to other missions and operations in the same region (e.g. Sahel, Horn of Africa) and to other missions and operations that have similar tasks (e.g. Border Management, Police Training) as well as to the relevant EU services at HQ. EU Delegations should systematically circulate their reports, including EU Heads of Missions' reports, to the relevant missions and operations.

To improve the flow of information among the various EU actors in the field, in August 2014 the EEAS updated the circulation lists of civilian CSDP mission reports to ensure that missions' and operations' reports are circulated to the relevant EU Delegations, to other missions and operations in the same region (e.g. Sahel, Horn of Africa) and to other missions and operations that have similar tasks (e.g. Border Management, Police Training). The wider distribution of classified military CSDP reports has encountered structural IT problems. These are being pragmatically reviewed with the aim of targeted distribution in the future. In July 2014 the EEAS reminded EU Delegations to systematically circulate their own reports, including EU Heads of Missions' reports, to the relevant missions and operations.

2013.1.8.   EEAS HQ should consult EU Delegations at an early stage on Strategic Reviews of missions and operations, also seeking complementarities with programmes managed by Commission and Member States.

Throughout 2014 EEAS HQ consulted EU Delegations at an early stage on Strategic Reviews of missions and operations (EUMM Georgia, EULEX Kosovo, EUBAM Libya, EUCAP NESTOR,

EUCAP Sahel Niger and EUTM Somalia), also seeking complementarities with programmes managed by Commission and Member States.[3]

2013.1.9.   The EEAS should consider better ways to compile, analyse, coordinate and disseminate intelligence and information products in Brussels and in the field.
In June, EU INTCEN and the EUMS Intelligence Directorate reviewed the Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity (SIAC) agreement on coordination between the two entities. Furthermore, INTCEN and EUMS conducted basic and advanced analytical training and open source intelligence training for their staff throughout the year. They also adjusted constantly the scope of intelligence products to actual intelligence needs. These measures led to improved compilation, analysis and coordination of the relevant products. Dissemination remains however an issue for certain users as systems/accessibility constrain timely sharing of intelligence products at the HQ and particularly in the field (see also key lesson 2014.4 below).

2013.1.10.   The EEAS and Member States should seek ways to improve the sharing of intelligence to allow the EU to anticipate and respond to crises more rapidly and appropriately.
EEAS engaged with Member States' intelligence services through several high level meetings, through constant interaction between EEAS services and Member States' Points of Contact and through the organisation of numerous workshops, which helped raise awareness of the need for improved intelligence sharing. These measures resulted in greater contribution by Member States of non-requested intelligence information on topical crisis areas.

2013.2. A common foundation of **pre-deployment training** for all CSPD mission staff can greatly enhance mission effectiveness and coherence.

2013.2.1.   Member States and the EEAS should ensure that all contracted and seconded CSDP mission staff receive a common foundation of pre-deployment training including inter alia human

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[3] The Comprehensive Approach Action Plan includes measures aimed at defining a common strategic vision. Joint Framework Documents or other strategic vision documents should also draw on CSDP experience. In turn, Strategic Reviews of CSDP missions and operations should draw on such documents and analyse how CSDP contributes to the broader EU strategy.

rights and gender issues. Furthermore, they should explore ways to improve pre-deployment training for all CSDP mission staff in a systematic manner.

Based on the findings of the Annual 2013 CSDP lessons report, the European Security and Defence College (ESDC) with its network institutions developed a curriculum for the preparatory training for CSDP missions, which was piloted in Brussels in October. This curriculum could be standardised and could later on constitute the required "common foundation of pre-deployment training". The majority of learning objectives would be generic, not mission- or country-specific. Most of the learning needs concern the CSDP and EEAS functioning principles. The planning and implementation proved that the challenge in the future will be not what content to provide, but rather how to include preparatory training as part of the in-processing to the CSDP missions, and how to better coordinate the existing pre-deployment training in the MS. The insufficient pre-deployment training for contracted staff needs to be further addressed.

2013.2.2   The EEAS should ensure that the Internet Distance Learning pre-deployment training which is currently being developed addresses the issues of human rights, personal ethics, sexual harassment and gender, as well as the issue of EU standards, including the areas of Rule of Law and policing where relevant.

In October, the European Security and Defence College made available eLearning pre-deployment training material. Thanks to an external content provider, it was able to provide inter alia an eLearning unit on gender aspects in missions and operations. However, more efforts are required to enable the ESDC to cover other identified issues such as human rights, personal ethics and sexual harassment.

2013.3. **Ownership and support by the host country** is necessary if the mission is to be truly successful and sustainable.

2013.3.1   The EEAS should ensure that CSDP missions as part of an EU Comprehensive Approach respond to local needs. EEAS should devise targeted messages to strengthen local ownership at an early stage.

The Libya PFCA identified and tried to address risks and dilemmas regarding legitimacy of authorities and contested – even competing authorities. The Ukraine PFCA identified risks related to real ownership of the reform agenda and the PFCA process provided for upstream engagement

with authorities, listening to their needs and building the foundation for cooperation. Of the three missions launched in 2014, two were civilian (EUCAP Mali and EUAM Ukraine). The EEAS carried out a needs assessment through the CRT mechanism for both of them. The EEAS devised targeted messages early in the planning stage for each of the missions it set up in 2014. PSC endorsed these messages.

2013.3.2 The EEAS should invite key political figures of host countries to Brussels for face-to-face encounters with the PSC to raise the profile of CSDP missions and to underline the importance of political accountability.

The PSC visited BiH in November and met with key political figures there, which raised the profile of the EUFOR Althea mission in BiH and underlined the principle of political accountability. CivCom, PMG and EEAS senior management had several meetings with leaders of host countries to promote ownership and support.

2013.3.3 In order to ensure privileges and immunities for a mission, the EEAS should start work on a SOMA as early as possible after the adoption of the CMC with the aim of concluding it before the deployment of the mission.

The EEAS started work on a SOMA soon after the adoption of CMCs for the three missions that were set up in 2014. In the case of EUCAP Sahel Mali, it was possible to conclude the SOMA before the launch of the mission.

2013.3.4 The EEAS through CSDP missions and EU Delegations should survey the opinion of the local population about CSDP missions and monitor support by the host country authorities.

In July 2014, EU Delegations were instructed to report by December on the opinion of the local population and support by the host country authorities for CSDP missions. EUFOR CAR and the EU Delegation in the Central African Republic both reported a high level of support of this mission by the local population. Information shared between EUFOR CAR and the Commission's DG ECHO (weekly telephone calls) confirmed this. The Delegations in Afghanistan and in Somalia pointed out the difficulty of measuring local public opinion. The Delegations in Mali and Somalia reported that the inability to provide equipment impacted negatively on the image of EU training missions. Nevertheless, they also pointed out that the missions in question continued to be highly regarded. The Delegation in Georgia stressed the very high level of support, the trust and the

extremely high expectations among the local population, which sometimes leads to disappointment about what EUMM can actually do. The Delegation in BiH and the EU office in Kosovo reported continued overall support among the local population, although such support continues to be lower among ethnic Serbs. In addition, corruption allegations against EULEX Kosovo had a negative impact on local public opinion. The Delegation in Mauritius reported high support for EU action on counter-piracy and maritime security from the Seychelles authorities and civil society.

2013.4. The use of **"preparatory measures"** proved to be a useful tool.

2013.4.1   The EEAS should ensure that the use of preparatory measures for planning activities remains an option before the approval of the first Council Decision, in particular in case of complex scenarios or when security or other costs are high.

Preparatory measures were not used for the two new civilian missions of 2014, EUCAP Sahel Mali and EUAM Ukraine, which were launched under new procedures. However, EEAS deems it prudent to retain the option of preparatory measures for future, particularly complex and costly preparatory missions as was the case for Libya in 2013.

2013.4.2   The EEAS and the Commission/FPI should pursue the work undertaken at expert level, including in the context of the Roadmap on improving civilian CSDP management and as a follow up to the European Council on Defence, to ensure that the procedures and rules for civilian missions enable more flexibility and rapid deployment.

The CSDP warehouse contributed significantly to rapid deployment for the new civilian CSDP missions launched in 2014. In May 2014, the Commission completed a feasibility study for a shared service centre for CSDP missions. In October, the EEAS launched a feasibility study for the development of a standard IT system across all civilian CSDP missions. In November, EEAS and Commission sent these missions a joint note providing them with additional flexibility in procurement. The note fulfilled a task set by the December 2013 European Council. In addition, work started on even more flexible procurement rules for civilian CSDP missions, notably in regard to additional framework contracts for supplies, and on enhanced training in the field of mission support.

2013.5. **Lessons should be taken into account systematically** when planning new missions.

2013.5.1   The EEAS should take steps to ensure that civilian lessons, including those from missions, are learnt systematically. This will permit lessons to drive changes in standard practices, allowing all personnel to learn the relevant lessons.

The EEAS CMPD and CPCC took steps to improve the systematic recording and processing of lessons. CMPD adopted new guidelines on an internal lessons system in October, CPCC in December. In the second half of 2014, the CPCC lessons officer started attending regularly all CPCC Lead Planning Team meetings. In June 2014, the EEAS initiated the internal administrative procedure for a new internet-based application for the recording and processing of lessons. The new application would be accessible to all members of the CSDP Lessons Working Group and to all CSDP missions and operations in the field.

Finally, the Annual 2013 CSDP Lessons Report included an additional lesson on the **duration of secondment of experts** to CSDP missions, as a longer duration of secondment of experts would be more conducive to the achievement of mission results. Observations from both CSDP missions and EU Delegations in 2014 indicated that this lesson remains equally valid. In certain cases, experts wished to serve for longer on a mission but their national administration of origin declined. The implementation of this lesson lies beyond the control of the EEAS. Therefore this lesson will be considered as closed and no longer listed in future, annual CSDP lessons reports.

Key lessons identified in 2014

2014.1

The **Political Framework for Crisis Approach (PFCA) showed its potential** but could be further improved.

The experience with the first three PFCAs drafted in 2014 was different in each case, also because there was no cross-fertilisation. Each PFCA was thus drafted separately, by different colleagues, without the lessons from the previous ones being taken into account and without methodological support to promote quality and consistency.

In the case of Ukraine, a PFCA was requested at the time where Member States were already inclined to launch a CSDP mission, rather than at a stage where a number of options were being considered. The PFCA for Libya was prepared with sufficient time available and through shared analysis, including a meeting with all relevant services, but with a CSDP mission already on the ground. The PFCA for the follow-on mission in the Central African Republic had to be prepared in a very short time, which prevented a broader analysis. Still it was able to build on a previous conflict analysis that was conducted by EU and UN. Had a PFCA been prepared for the initial operation, this would have been helpful. The CAR example in particular showed the usefulness of the PFCA as a tool of shared analysis among EEAS, Commission and Member States. No PFCA was developed for Mali as it was considered that the agreed EU Strategy for the Sahel would serve the purpose

A PFCA is one way to define a common strategic vision. The lessons from PFCAs will therefore be useful in informing the development of guidelines for Joint Framework Documents (JFDs) as envisaged in the Comprehensive Approach Action Plan. Equally as other strategic vision documents are developed, it may become easier to develop a PFCA as it will be able to draw on these (as the CAR team was able to draw on previous joint conflict analysis).

2014.2

The revised **Crisis Management Procedures** (CMP) proved their worth but need further analysis to avoid delays in mission launch.

Whilst the revised Crisis Management Procedures of 2013 generally allowed for an earlier mission deployment and thus visibility/effect in-theatre, it appears that the revised procedures have not reduced the overall time of mission launch. Missions were provided the opportunity to inform the Concept of Operations (CONOPS), Operation Plan (OPLAN) and Budgetary Impact Statement (BIS) through continued hands-on local information gathering as well as the newly introduced notion of Initial Operational Capability (IOC). The IOC process helped focus preparatory work and

ensure real readiness to assume mandate implementation responsibilities upon mission launch. Some specific reasons for delay have been identified but require further analysis and discussion.

The main delaying factors remain the duration of the force generation process, which takes up to four months, and the lack of a shared understanding of the implications of the fast track process.

2014.3

Staff in Brussels and in EU Delegations would benefit from more systematic CSDP **training**.

A shared understanding of decision-making processes, structures and working methods is one of the prerequisites of the Comprehensive Approach. This is particularly important for CSDP, because it touches on the work of many EU actors. In this respect, there appears to remain a knowledge gap among Brussels staff on CSDP and on the work of EU Delegations.

On the military side, several lesson observations focussed on two particular aspects:

i.   Many military persons, working unusually at the EU political - strategic level, have found that the intricacies inherent in their roles have left them unprepared for the environment.

ii.   Those who work within CSDP should have specialist Crisis Management Procedure training to increase their understanding of this specific environment.

On the civilian side, police officers temporarily posted to Brussels also experienced difficulties working in an unusual and complex setting.

Furthermore, Brussels staff outside the CSDP structures is often unfamiliar with the PFCA and has uncertainties about how to draft it (see also key lesson 2014.1 above).

Finally, EU Delegation staff is often unaware of the workings of CSDP missions in the same country and CSDP mission staff are often not familiar with the activities of EU Delegations. Better knowledge of each other's work would help enhance synergies between EU Delegations and CSDP missions (see also key lesson 2014.5 below). This could be addressed through appropriate training.[4]

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[4] The EEAS is currently preparing a new CSDP training policy based on lessons identified and feedback from stakeholders including missions and operations. The new policy will also address the above issues.

2014.4

There is insufficient **secure communication** capability.

Inadequate secure communication capability in the field, between Brussels and the Operation / Mission and within Brussels itself has often raised concerns as it impacts on operational capability.[5] It remains a priority to determine what is required and how it may be provided. In addition, military missions where there is no leading OHQ have to rely, at least partially, on outsourced assets and services to ensure connectivity between Brussels and the MHQ and within mission activities. There is a need for a clear definition of the required classification level, support and subsequent CIS architecture to cover all classified communication requirements.

2014.5

Coordination and cooperation between EU Delegations and CSDP missions can be enhanced**.**

All agree in principle that EU Delegation should provide political direction at local level to CSDP missions and that CSDP missions should enjoy operational autonomy in their own field of action. In practice, however, there can be grey areas between the activities of EU Delegations and CSDP missions. This concerns for instance in the fields of political and security reporting, representation of the EU vis-à-vis the authorities of the host country, press and information activities and donor coordination in the security sector.

Certain EU Delegations and CSDP missions have discussed and clarified who does what in each of these fields, thus boosting cooperation and promoting useful synergies (see for example the November 2014 agreement on distribution of tasks between EU Delegation and EUMM in Georgia).

In crisis situations, coordination and cooperation between EU Delegations and CSDP missions can be challenging (for instance in the case of the temporary relocation of EUBAM Libya).Prior to the launch and in the initial phase of a mission, the EU Delegation's support is crucial for concluding a Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA) with the host country. Effective synergy between EU Delegations and CSDP missions could also be promoted through relevant training (see key lesson 2014.3 above).

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[5] This was also confirmed by the findings of the Multi-Layer Exercise ML-14. See Draft Final Exercise Report, Multi-Layer Exercise ML-14, doc. 5912/15 of 4 February 2015, p. 13.

Key Recommendations

2014.1.1   *The EEAS together with the Commission should develop a PFCA early on during the development of a crisis or conflict, considering all available tools and not awaiting a formal PSC tasking.*

2014.1.2   *The EEAS should reflect on whether the PFCA format prescribed by the Crisis Management Procedures can be usefully adjusted or not, on how to improve the inter-service PFCA drafting process and on how a PFCA can continue to be used as a strategic framework after its initial discussion with Member States.*

2014.1.3   *The EEAS should consider setting up a task force for methodological support to geographical desks who are responsible for drafting PFCAs. This task force should be composed of experienced colleagues from EEAS and Commission services.*

2014.1.4   *The EEAS should ensure that PFCAs draw on the other relevant EU documents for consistency, without however being bound by them in their analysis. This includes the EU strategic documents foreseen by the Comprehensive Approach Action Plan. Shared analysis of crisis and crisis risk situations and collaborative planning between the EEAS and the Commission should continue to be explored via PFCA and other mechanisms including conflict analysis products, the Early Warning System and country programming documents.*

2014.1.5   *EEAS should ensure that PFCAs help avoid duplication and promote synergies between EU actions. PFCA analysis should inform mission planning.*

2041.2.1   *The EEAS should further analyse and discuss with Member States the reasons for structural delay in mission launch, including force generation aspects.*

2014.2.2   *Member States and EEAS should reach a shared understanding of the Crisis Management Procedures agreed in 2013, notably regarding the fast track process.*

2014.3.1   *The EEAS, CSDP missions, other EU services and Member States should better explore and make use of existing training opportunities on all relevant CSDP aspects, in particular those offered by the European Security and Defence College (ESDC). This also includes the courses developed jointly by ESDC-and Commission (DEVCO) on fragility, security and development.*

2014.3.2 *For the military, the EEAS should offer training in core institutional and comprehensive working practice not only to EUMS staff but also those nominated on the EU OHQ augmentation lists. Specialised training should also be made more available to senior personnel who have the potential to be considered for Commander/Head of Mission roles.*

2014.3.3 *The EEAS should offer training on PFCA also others than those in the CSDP structures, to help create a better understanding of the value of a PFCA and of how to draft it.*

2014.3.4 *The EEAS should include a standardised training module on CSDP in the pre-posting training for EU delegations staff working in the potential crisis areas.*

2014.3.5 *The EEAS should include a standardised training module on EU Delegations and their activities in the pre-deployment training for CSDP mission staff and relevant Brussels staff.*

2014.4.1 *The EEAS should determine what is required to improve secure communication and how it may be provided in the field, between Brussels and operations/ missions and within Brussels.*

2014.4.2 *The EEAS should define the classification level of secure communication and subsequent CIS architecture.*

2014.5.1 *The EEAS should consider ways to improve coordination and cooperation between EU Delegations and CSDP missions, inter alia in regard to mission relocation, SOMA and understanding of CSDP.*

Way forward

If the PSC agrees, the LMG will follow up on the recommendations and report on their implementation in the next annual CSDP lessons report.

Annexes:

A.   CMPD contribution

B.   CPCC contribution

C.   EUMS contribution

CMPD Contribution

A. The first **PFCA** on Ukraine suffered from some lack of clarity on the purpose and also from some lack of comprehensiveness. In the following two PFCAs on Libya and on the Central African Republic these two aspects improved.

- Recommendations:

    i. The purpose of the PFCA should be stressed from the outset, as stated in the revised crisis management procedures. The PFCA should define common objectives and subsequently identify options for EU response, which may or may not include a CSDP mission.

    ii. The service in charge of crafting the PFCA should associate the relevant services of the EEAS and Commission to develop the PFCA.

    iii. Training activities could be considered to help create a better understanding of the value of a PFCA and of how to draft it.

    iv. Consideration could be given to discussing the experience with PFCAs and their possible improvement in a seminar with Member States in 2015.

    v.

B. The EU Action Plan for Human Rights and Democracy 2012-2014, called for systematic inclusion of **human rights, child protection, gender equality** and, where relevant, international humanitarian law in planning, implementation and review of CSDP missions and operations (action 12). Some progress has already been made: the new Crisis Management Procedures highlight the importance of integrating human rights and gender issues and all CSDP missions and operations include human rights and/or gender advisers or focal points in their organisational structure. Most of these posts are filled and personnel conduct activities in these areas. However, more can be done to ensure that human rights and gender issues are always considered in the CSDP cycle of planning, implementation and review in a way that is efficient and builds on the best practice of missions and operations. Such issues should be well adapted to both the mandate of the CSDP mission or operation and to the local context.

- Recommendations:

    i. Human rights and gender expertise should be included as early as possible in the planning process and provide relevant data and information. Where appropriate it could also be included in fact-finding missions, so that it can contribute relevant analysis. Human rights and gender expertise should also provide overviews of relevant international and local agencies and civil society organisations working on human rights and related issues.

    ii. Human rights and gender expertise within CSDP operations and missions should ensure that human rights and gender issues are effectively mainstreamed across mission activities, and reflected in reporting to headquarters. This will enable missions and operations to better address patterns of systematic human rights abuse that risks undermining the legitimacy of the justice or security sector institutions that CSDP seeks to support.

    iii. Human rights and gender issues should also be systematically included in general and mission- and operation-specific pre-deployment trainings. It is especially important that senior management of CSDP missions and operations appreciate the relevance of human rights, gender and related areas. In order to ensure that human rights and gender concerns receive attention early on in the mission's work, these elements should be included not only in the planning but also in the in-house training for HoM and core personnel. Note: one of the key obstacles to mainstreaming identified by CSDP Human Rights and Gender Advisers at their annual meeting was lack of management support.

C. In some cases, CMPD and FPI informed each other too late about planned Strategic **Reviews and** about the **Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) project pipeline** respectively, which prevented timely synergies and the optimal alignment of activities.

- Recommendation: CMPD should systematically alert FPI about the preparation of strategic reviews and include them in the preparation of the relevant papers so that any possibility to find synergies is exploited. It should encourage FPI to alert CMPD at the earliest stage of the IcSP project pipeline, so that synergies are fully explored.

D. Throughout 2014, **Third State** partners were regularly updated on the preparations for and implementation of missions and operations. This proved instrumental in encouraging them to participate and to offer useful contributions. It gave them a sense of inclusiveness from the very beginning of the process and helped them prepare a contribution offer matching mission/operation's requirements.

- Recommendation: For civilian missions, it is important to explain the recruitment process, selection criteria and share experiences of how Member States organise the selection and screening internally. This was reflected in various training and staff talks that were held with third States (best practice).

CPCC contribution

Introduction

The present CPCC contribution to the Annual 2014 CSDP Lessons Report is the result of contributions received as usual from CPCC and missions' staff. The first part provides a brief report on the main lessons learnt that were identified in 2013. The second part lists the lessons identified in 2014. Lessons identified during exercise ML14 are not replicated in this note but should be read in conjunction as they form an integral part of this report.

The CPCC has followed up on the bulk of its lessons, while a few challenges remain. Regarding the procedures for the planning of new missions lessons were implemented but at the same time new ones were encountered while implementing the new Crisis Management Procedures, CMP, e.g. lessons on force generation such as force sensing, timing of the recruitment of HoM and advance employment of mission support staff were implemented during the Ukraine and Mali planning. The exchange of personnel including personnel between missions from operations has been intensified and has allowed for a greater flexibility in short term operational requirements. Transition strategies are a key part of planning new missions or reviewing existing missions. As seen, joint planning of transition strategies between the EEAS and relevant actors is instrumental to successful implementation. In the field of security, lessons were implemented based on the tragic incident in Kosovo and further developed from the events that took place in 2014 in Afghanistan and Djibouti.

CPCC has identified the following key lessons for 2014:

o   With the number of serious incidents which occurred in the last year in addition to repeated challenges in dealing with evacuations, security of mission personnel remains a top concern in terms of duty of care and regarding mandate definition. The CPCC has already started to address this, including by revising/developing relevant SOPs and guidelines as well as organising appropriate training and exercises. In addition, the CPCC security expertise is being reinforced to this effect.

o   CPCC is generally satisfied with the new Crisis Management Procedures. They seem to have allowed for an earlier deployment and thus visibility/effect in-theatre; missions were provided the opportunity to inform the CONOPS, OPLAN and BIS through continued hands-on local information gathering. Also the IOC criteria helped focus preparatory work and helped in being more assured in terms of real readiness to assume mandate implementation responsibilities upon mission launch. Yet, it also seems that the new procedures have not as such reduced the time of mission launch. Some specific reasons for delay have been identified in this note and require further analysis and discussion.

    o   The main delaying factor in setting up of new missions remains the duration of the force generation process (up to four months), due to a variety of reasons, there is the possibility to reduce at least the time of the decision making process by relying more on the fast track procedure. Whilst Ukraine presented a good point in case, the fast track option was not considered. Member States and the services must reach a greater shared understanding of the recently agreed procedures. Missions are increasingly under time pressure. This is why the fast track modus was included during the revision of the crisis management procedures.

I. Implementation of Lessons Identified in 2013 (see CPCC Contribution to the Annual 2013 CSDP Lessons Report)

1.   Planning New Missions

<u>More thorough needs assessments</u> have been done prior to mission planning. In both cases, Mali and Ukraine, CRT deployments delivered detailed analysis of respective present state of local security forces and country dynamics.

<u>EU DEL Ukraine was temporarily reinforced</u> via the CRT mechanism, which helped greatly to facilitate with information gathering and analysis during intense and rapidly evolving developments. Sustaining such efforts however put a heavy burden on the EEAS administrative budget.

The <u>revised Crisis Management Procedures (CMP) allowed an earlier deployment in the field</u> and hence avoided the gap seen earlier.

<u>SOMA negotiations are now advanced</u> such that, in both cases, they could be concluded even before IOC.

. Planning team meeting invitations are not systematically followed by COM but are ideal for feeding early substantive input to planning documents.

<u>EU-UN coordinated planning</u> was <u>much improved</u> thanks to the recently agreed joint modalities.

<u>TAM and FFM compositions followed the conclusions of last year successfully</u>. <u>Engineers</u> were envisaged to join the Mali and Ukraine Core teams but did not materialise as no candidates were put forward. This hampered in both cases the HQ choices and refurbishment costings.

2.   Mission Support

Due to financial constraints in the EEAS administrative budget, not all mission support related lessons could be followed up. However, regarding the <u>ICT network</u>, as outcome of the two seminars organised by CPCC in 2012 and 2013, a team of experts studying IT/ICT options delivered to Member States a feasibility study outlining options for improving the administrative management of the CSDP civilian missions. Member States still have to thoroughly discuss the issue to this date.

The lessons concerning procurement have shown that the <u>crisis situation notion</u> could be used only if relevant in the country of operation, subject to FPI Director's decision.

An informal FPI-CPCC working group has been tasked to analyse how to further streamline <u>financial and procurement procedures</u> under the current legal framework, which ended with a joint note of instruction sent in November 2014. , A review of the operation modalities of the CSDP <u>Warehouse</u> is planned in the beginning of 2015, as foreseen in the related Council Decision. This would also provide an opportunity to examine possible difficulties encountered regarding the functioning of the Warehouse.

An internet-based so-called "Crisis Management Platform" (nick-named WIKI) that connects civilian CSDP missions with CPCC staff has been developed in 2012. It mainly aims to <u>share best practice and SOPs</u>, crucial notably during mission start-up (by providing templates, documents on administrative procedures, SOPs, guidelines etc.) and <u>enhancing the flow of information</u> (unclassified). The use of the WIKI is being extended to cover all CPCC, but being a living tool, it is susceptible to be further developed following indications of the stakeholders. A coherent system of secure communications is still missing.

Some of the lessons learnt in the field of <u>Force Generation</u>, like force sensing, recruitment of HoMs before the selection of Core teams and deployment of Mission Support staff in advance of the rest of the mission, have been implemented during Mali and partially Ukraine planning. Also a new selection procedure was agreed that aims at increasing the transparency of the process. Job Description standardisation is ongoing and should be concluded in the first quarter of 2015.

Some other key lessons in the field of <u>human resources/force generation</u> remain a challenge, notably the attraction of senior experienced staff under the current tight financial situation, or the assumption that certain processes can be further compressed: there are limits as to reducing the time between launching a call, selection, induction and deployment of qualified mission staffs.

Force generation remains a challenge because the processing time required often do not match with the deployment needs. In practice, this means that the time required for the full circle from the publication of posts to deployment cannot be less than twelve weeks for the seconded and sixteen weeks for the contracted staff, being five weeks the time needed from the publication to the start of the interviews.

As regards the harmonisation of the Code of Conduct across the missions, a first draft has been prepared in view to be included as an annex to the Council Decision establishing "*General Employment Conditions for civilian CSDP Mission staff*". In light of the diverging views on validity of the legal basis for such a Council decision under Title V of the TEU discussions on the matter continued throughout 2014. .

3. *Conduct of Operations*

The <u>length of mandate periods</u> for missions has been taken into account when developing the mandates of missions recently launched.

The <u>practice of concise Six-Monthly Reports and the </u>timing of their presentation have been improved; however further improvements are necessary, in particular there must be a clearer link between the Six-Monthly Reports and the OPLAN tasks/Mission Implementation Plan. A more consistent approach to the timing and preparation of Strategic Reviews remains a priority.

The <u>challenges of reacting in a timely manner to changing operational requirements</u> is assessed as leading to request more flexibility for the HoM to ensure a better match of operational expectations and human resources allocation. Implementation is ongoing and a few challenges remains to be addressed.

Missions are making good use of the <u>visiting experts concept</u> (EUCAP Nestor in Seychelles, Djibouti) whose <u>revision</u> is ongoing, including on the issue of allowing Visiting Experts from other EU Agencies or international and intergovernmental organisations; this is to increase synergies and to strengthen the Comprehensive Approach.

It was last year stated in the lessons that <u>cross-fertilisation and knowledge sharing between missions</u> remains difficult. Some HoMs find it difficult, for a variety of reasons, including budget to send mission members to Brussels to attend seminars and/or CPCC info days. The WIKI mentioned above should over time mitigate this partially by facilitating the exchange of information without imposing long-distance travelling.

4. Comprehensive Approach/Effective Coordination/Inclusiveness

The CPCC has taken an active role in the work on the <u>Comprehensive Approach Action Plan</u>, thus ensuring that CSDP structures are fully involved in its implementation. CPCC and missions maintain close contact with EUSRs and EU Delegations. In this regard, steps have also been taken to improve the sharing of information between CSDP missions, EU Delegations and EU stakeholders in Brussels despite the challenges remaining in the area of shared secure communications. CPCC has made an effort to become part of the EEAS/Commission programming cycle. EC and EEAS have cooperated in identifying priority sectors for funding, including security-related areas. This is inter alia to improve over time the chances for better management of transitions from CSDP missions to other EU instruments, where relevant and with due regard to the distinct competences, decision-making and timelines of the EU external action.

The CPCC and relevant missions also contributed to the Train and Equip development (e.g. equipment needs assessments in Mali and Somalia). In the case of the pilot projects on Train and Equip, they must be emphasised as a complementarity to EU actions on the ground.

5. Transitions and Phasing Out of CSDP Missions

A lesson from 2013 was that coordination within the EU family on the ground needs to be established early in the mission life-span so that all EU actors gain a good understanding of each other's activities, processes and limitations. Preparations for mission closure should start early and include relevant EU actors in theatre and in Brussels, as well as other relevant stakeholders, in order to ensure sustainability of results achieved. During the EUPOL DRC one-year transition-period, the work of both Brussels and Kinshasa Task Forces was relevant and adequate. The continued coordination between EUPOL DRC, the EU Delegation and the other European actors facilitated the activities and the final transition.

Further it was said that <u>a plan for the period after the mission withdrawal should be clearly communicated to the host country authorities, as they assume ownership of the reform processes</u>. This has been implemented in the case of <u>Afghanistan</u>. In the <u>DRC</u>, the local authorities were informed about the future activities carried out by other international stakeholders who took over from EUPOL DRC mission. Thanks to the specific format of the 'Comité de Suivi de la Réforme de la Police', chaired by the DRC Ministry of Interior, to be the local authorities had already assumed ownership of the reform process.

<u>The model for transition in Bosnia was highlighted as a good example to learn from whilst at the same time stressing the specificities of the Bosnia context</u>. A similar model continued being considered in the case of Afghanistan. In DRC, seven technical assistants were deployed by the EU Delegation in

Kinshasa in the framework of the PARP 2 (Programme d'Appui à la Réforme de la Police) to continue the EU Delegation programs and, partially follow up EUPOL DRC activities.

In the case of the closure of EUJUST LEX, it showed the need to ensure that the transition period is long enough to guarantee sustainability of mission achievements. This lesson was applied to the case of Afghanistan.

If a decision is made for another EU instrument to build upon the achievements of mission activities, a well-ordered transition and efficient handover with ideally a period of overlap of these instruments is crucial for the continuity of efforts. A gap could also be potentially bridged by an Art 28 capacity. In DRC, an overlapping took place between the Mission and the PARP 2 technical assistant charged with the continuation of some mission activities while in Iraq there was a gap between mission exit and start-up of development assistance due to parallel planning processes that were not coherent.

Further, with reference to the EUPOL DRC core activity (Strategic Advice to the Ministry of Interior, National Police HQ and Coordination bodies of reform implementation) the continuity was ensured through the handover to a newly established UNPOL team of six experts (three of them coming from EUPOL) and to the PARP 2 technical assistant.

Finally, it should be also noted that best practices for mission administrative closure also lacks codification, which is instead ensured by a set of guidelines issued by CPCC and FPI for the administrative liquidation.

6.   Information and Communication Strategy/Master Messages

According to last year's lessons report, Information strategies should be developed earlier in the mission planning process. An effort was made during Mali and Ukraine planning but still, ideally, Information Strategies are to be finalised by the time of CMC approval and then updated when reaching IOC to take into account of the operational planning details.

Visibility of CSDP missions generally still leaves a room for improvement. A wider distribution of relevant mission reports is planned by CPCC for 2015 as a means to increase visibility and knowledge of their valuable work as well as work on updating and reconfiguring the mission webpages.

7.   Methodology

Indicators related to benchmarking will be reviewed during 2015.

The Mission Model Structure implementation is being pursued but will be challenging to implement in cases of existing missions. A new version that takes into account the existing lessons is being developed by the CPCC.

MMA and Use of Force guidelines have been developed and agreed and are now being widely disseminated.

The civilian CSDP best practice hierarchy has been developed and is being widely disseminated.

8.   Security

EUBAM Libya had to be partly re-located and EUAVSEC South Sudan evacuated in 2013. Following lessons learnt from 2013, the relocation of EUBAM Libya was carried out in a fully coordinated way with the EU Delegation and relevant High-level preparatory meetings between the CivOpsCdr/CPCC and with MD Admin and Finance, MD IV, and EEAS Security took place in Brussels beforehand.

After the tragic incident with a fatal shooting in Kosovo in 2013, the mission reviewed its internal SOP and took steps to improve its response and reactions capabilities. Other conclusions and recommendations were integrated in the follow up of the post incident reviews in Afghanistan and Djibouti. In addition, CPCC has reinforced its security team in Brussels and will establish greater liaison with the EEAS Security Department.

9. Training

A <u>dedicated focal point for training has been appointed for the CPCC</u> mid-2014 (same post as the exercise focal point). It proves to be already now almost a full time job. The CPCC looks forward to the <u>new Training Policy in CSDP</u> that is under development and the possibilities it will bring and is actively contributing to its finalisation.

10. CPCC Lessons System

In 2014, the CPCC has enhanced its own lessons process by issuing <u>internal CPCC guidelines aimed at ensuring that lessons are identified and learnt systematically</u> throughout the year to continuously contribute to the improvement of the output of CPCC. The CPCC lessons process includes collection and verification/lessons observations, analysis/lessons identified, development/lessons learnt and best practices/outputs. It also includes the <u>appointment of a dedicated lessons focal point</u>.

II. Lessons Observations/Lessons Identified in 2014

1. Implementation of the Revised Crisis Management Procedures

a. PFCA

PFCAs prove to add value in planning missions; early and comprehensive consultations are key

There was no PFCA done for Mali because it was originally considered that the agreed EU Strategy for the Sahel would serve the purpose. A joint CivCom-COAFR meeting to inform CivCom, mainly, of the broader context was therefore held before taking the next step in the process. For Ukraine, a PFCA was done and helped greatly with the planning for the civilian CSDP mission. It benefited from a joint EEAS/Commission mission to Kiev to support the EU Delegation to provide its input to the draft PFCA. The PSC tasking to the EEAS to prepare the PFCAs implied however limited time to carry out an in depth analysis. The daily coordination meetings organised by the EEAS geographical directorate on Ukraine were very useful and contributed to a continued shared understanding of the rapid developments on ground. This could be considered best practice for future similar high intense crises.

b. CMC

CMCs benefit from in-depth needs analysis

When based on comprehensive needs analysis like the Niger-mission sponsored study on Mali security forces requirements, it makes the CMCs even more solid and therefore better enables appropriate subsequent operation planning.

CMCs are best if staying at the level of political strategic planning

Recent CMCs include 'lines of operation' which, however, are not part of the agreed template. 'Lines of operation' are normally the result of operational planning. As subsequent planning documents like CONOPS and OPLAN refer to the CMC, they may risk needing going into a level of detail that may later make it difficult for the CivOpsCdr and HOM to adapt to changing circumstances where required.

c. Risk Assessments

Effective planning benefits from up to date risk assessments

In the case of Mali, the risk assessment was not updated by the time the CMC was discussed. They are however needed to enable accurate planning considerations.

d. Road maps for Planning and Mission Start-up

Road maps are useful for as long as they are realistic and take all factors into account

Road maps have proven once more to be very useful for guiding the planning work and timing decision making with Member States. The new CMP allowed keeping momentum through an early and continued presence on the ground. Some challenges while implementing road maps include the following:

(i) setting realistic timelines, allowing for sufficient time for in-depth analysis and consultations, be it with local counterparts, other international partners or within the EU structures is important;

(ii) Parliamentary/governmental scrutiny of Council decisions remains a challenging factor in the decision making process. This factor needs to be taken into account whilst discussing the timelines for deployment;

(iii) In the same vein, force generation procedures the way they are currently agreed with Member States involve a minimum 4 months process before any deployments take place; this is and will remain a delaying factor, unless the procedures are changed; the attempt to shorten this timeframe by recruiting on an ad hoc basis through the CRT mechanism an Advance team for Ukraine led to disruptions in terms of continuity; a practice that should not be reconsidered; going for the fast track option might have achieved better results

(iv) unforeseen events on the ground, be it political or administrative, like in the case of the SOMA for Ukraine, have equally to be taken into account;

e.   CONOPS/OPLAN

It is worth exploring ways of ensuring more hands on input from the field while developing the OPLAN and BIS

As per the new CMP, the OPLAN also is a CivOpsCdr document, but still relies on input from the HoM and Core team, mainly due to the facts that the benchmarks need to originate from the context on the ground and be agreed with the local counterparts. Core teams are thus tasked to contribute to OPLAN and BIS drafting by reaching out to counterparts, carrying out research and further fact finding and analysis, which is then fed into the operational detailed planning. As this has worked to a limited extent in both Mali and Ukraine. CPCC staff should deploy for a period of time and help guide the Core team to undertake this work, including the physical set up such as HQ choices, procurement files, mission administration set up etc. Military operations are using a similar procedure with e.g. EU POLADs being seconded to military OHQs. Financing would need to be explored, as it seems that CPCC staff deployed to assist the Core team in their tasks cannot be paid from the mission budget.

A catalogue of Objective Verifiable Indicators and Means of Verification should be developed

A catalogue of Objective Verifiable Indicators and Means of Verification would have facilitated the development of both, Ukraine and Mali benchmarks. CPCC will address this issue in 2015.

f.   Budget

Preparing the first BIS through a first field visit is good practice

In implementing the revised CMP, it turned out to be necessary that the CPCC Planning Team collects reliable data to prepare the first BIS (Budgetary Impact Statement). This was done both for Mali and Ukraine around the time of CMC finalisation and in due time to inform the first Council Decision. The composition of the team preparing the first BIS was CPCC, EEAS security and FPI. This worked well and could become best practice. Preparatory measures could systematically be considered for this earlier phase.

Need for a project coordinator to feed into the second BIS

Recruiting a project coordinator for the Core team would be beneficial for the identification of projects which is a complex process. This would as well strengthen the capacity of both the operational staff and administrative staff in the missions in the project management cycle and to provide input to the 2nd BIS.

Inclusion of local staff numbers in the OPLAN

Since local staff levels do have a budgetary as well as an operational dimension, they should be agreed in the CivCom discussions so that RELEX can take them into account when finalising the BIS.

Opting for preparatory measures or not – potential advantages in specific cases

In the case of both Mali and Ukraine, preparatory measures were not opted for. Regarding Mali, the new CMP were to be implemented without the fast track option and therefore there was no need for preparatory measures. In the case of Ukraine, the use of preparatory measures was not possible due to the political imperative to see the first CD establishing the mission as early as 22 July 2014. One consequence was that the CPCC had an extraordinary amount of travel costs on its own administrative budget whilst many travels to Kiev directly served operational preparations on the ground. One other consequence was that some Member States were not able to contribute to the Advance team at their own cost.

g.   Force Generation

Temporary secondments across missions of support staff is good practice

The practice of temporary secondment of Mission Support staff from other civilian CSDP missions proved to be very positive, in addition to CRTs, and facilitated greatly with the execution of the complex tasks assigned to Core teams. This should be considered best practice where appropriate.

It is worth exploring ways of overcoming obstacles in hiring local staff at mission start up

The Ukraine team was not able to hire local staff in absence of the SOMA. In addition, local law employment rules were difficult to grasp. It should be considered to define standard rules for local staff employment with CSDP missions to be introduced in the model SOMA.

Need to further pursue the standardisation of job descriptions

Availability of standardised job descriptions would decrease workload, increase consistency and speed up the process as seen in Mali and Ukraine.

The first CfC job descriptions are subject to change through later operational planning which must be clearly articulated

In both cases, Mali and Ukraine, and due to the new CMP, the CPCC led Planning Teams issued the first CfC around the time of CMC finalisation, without being certain of the job profiles and reporting lines as this would be more clear in the course of further operational planning (CONOPS and OPLAN). Whilst the Planning Team made sure the job descriptions, CfCs, Selection letter and induction all referred to potential changes, it turned out to be a challenge, both in administrative terms and from a managerial point of view with staffs being unsecure as to their final position. This cannot be changed but should be kept in mind in forthcoming planning efforts, also in terms of management.

If CRTs are needed to speed up a presence on the ground, this implies a collective effort of making this happening

CRTs should be properly trained and equipped and be ready for deployment at the time indicated in Calls for Contribution, which was not always the case.

h.   *Procurement and other Logistical Arrangements during Mission Start-up*

Need to further accelerate procurement capacity at mission start-up

Civilian CSDP missions rely on essential equipment and services from the outset. However, they still face delays, although short ones for delivering e.g. laptops, phones etc., as was experienced in Mali and Ukraine; further work to accelerate procurement procedures and logistical provisions should be studied.

It should be explored if CPCC could be placing orders to the Warehouse

Consideration should be given to allow CPCC to place orders to the Warehouse for ICT/Security equipment on behalf of the CSDP mission and to avoid that Core team/mission personnel would have to bring their own equipment as it was done in the case of Mali.

Support by EU Delegations to Technical Assessment Missions and Core team is making a real difference

EU DEL in Bamako prepared very well for the TAM and HoM/Core team deployment, which makes a real difference.

i.   *Letters of Invitation/SOMA/Privileges and Immunities/Use of Force*

Obtaining the letter of invitation on time is critical as is the privileges and immunities paragraph

The letter of invitation for the Mali mission risked at some point being delayed and not containing the necessary privileges and immunities clause. The importance of both, the timely receipt of such letters and the respect of the legal provisions must again be underlined.

More concerted action to help the conclusion of a SOMA is at times needed as is a timely analysis of the legal and political implications of the SOMA

In cases where SOMA negotiations are difficult, it does help if a real concerted effort is put in place involving all actors (EEAS, EU DEL etc.). With Ukraine, there was for example an unprecedented situation whereby the host country would attach more importance to the SOMA as has been the case in other countries. Knowing early of such conditions would have helped featuring this factor into the planning. SOMAs are key enablers not only for local staff hiring (see above), but also for imports of equipment etc. (see also above).

j.   *Core Team Set-up/Induction/Instructions/Output*

CivOpsCdr instructions to Core teams are good practice

CivOpsCdr instructions covering the pre-CONOPS/OPLAN period were created for the purposes of providing the Core team with adequate administrative rules. Making existing OPLANs applicable to Core teams was granted by the Legal service and seems to be good practice. However, if the mission support annexes are taken out of the OPLAN and put into a separate document that each mission would refer to, this would help greatly in being more consistent and legally sound (see also in point 4. c).

External support to the Core teams is good practice

A seminar was organised by FBA at the mission HQ in Kiev to facilitate the Core team EUAM Ukraine, to define a common ground and understanding of SSR. This has generally proven to be a successful undertaking that could well become best practice once analysed further.

k.   EU-UN Planning Coordination Guidelines

The new EU-UN planning coordination guidelines work and are good practice

The CPCC kept the UN informed of the envisaged civilian CSDP mission in Mali and instructed the Core team of the need to consult them during CONOPS and OPLAN development, in line with the agreed EU-UN guidelines. The TAM met first with the UN counterparts with the aim to fully implement the guidelines and to create a momentum for good cooperation. The HoM and Core team maintained this relationship. This has worked well.

2. Evacuation and Security

a.   Relocation/Evacuation

It is worth working on staff regulations and other administrative provisions for cases of relocation and evacuation

Following the outbreak of heavy fighting between Islamist and Nationalist militia, EUBAM Libya staff were temporarily relocated from Tripoli to Tunis. A Core team continued working from Tunis whilst the majority of the international personnel conducted tele-working from their home destinations or from Brussels HQ. Staff regulations for administrative and operational maintenance of the mission outside the host country were not in place at the time of relocation. This created legal uncertainty. Teleworking turned out not being practical. There is also a question of cost/benefit if sustained over a period of time. As there might be future such cases, work on clarifying such provisions is needed.

Coordination of EU actors in the field in the case of evacuation

The experience from the evacuation of EUAVSEC South Sudan showed the need for coordinated and regularly updated evacuation plans for all EU entities in theatre. This includes addressing financial issues and proper decision-making procedures within the EEAS.

Civilian CSDP mission evacuation planning is to take account all possible scenarios

The Libya mission evacuation faced a number of challenges reported already separately and which are not replicated here. In terms of lessons however, the fact that the mission was almost the only international actor left with a certain protection capability, raises the question of earlier consideration of all planning parameters.

b.   Critical Threat Assessment Environments

After Incident reviews/SOPs need to be developed/reviewed

During 2014, members of two CSDP-missions became direct victims of terrorist attacks (one mission member was killed in Afghanistan in January and three were seriously injured in Djibouti in May). CPCC decided to send 'after incident review' teams to the field to assess and report, including regarding security, incident management, communication and human resources. A number of observations were made and lessons identified in the framework of the CPCC-led after action reviews that are now being addressed both by the CPCC and missions. They are not being replicated in detail here due to their classification. In brief, several areas were identified as requiring clarification/improvement at various levels - mission, CPCC, wider EEAS, Member States etc. CivOpsCdr has since issued instructions to address them as a matter of priority, including the revision of relevant SOPs and guidelines, and the

organisation of training and exercises. The CivOpsCdr also has reinforced the security expertise within the CPCC.

Limits of Private Security Company services need addressing

The shortcomings of Private Security Companies as experienced by the Libya mission requires further analysis as mission security is of prime concern and also impacts on mandate delivery.

There is a need to further standardise HEAT training and regulations

Strengthening the certification process of HEAT training could be considered with a view to ensure that personnel are able to cope with stressful environments. There is also a need to clarify with Member States HEAT training requirements in the context of deployment planning.

3. Mission Implementation

a. *Mentoring and Advising*

Bottom-up approach can help to by-pass deadlocks at political/strategic level

The mission in Niger applied a bottom-up approach when cooperation was stranded partly at senior local authority levels. It consists of putting in place activities at lower staff level (e.g. training in technical competencies of low and mid-level officers, or advice and training at the regional level). It aims at strengthening technical capacities at lower staff levels, thus to sensitise the national level of the need for such cooperation. In the field of crisis management, this bottom-up approach bears fruit already. After a year-long mission engagement in Niger's regions, the MoI requested support at central level as well (to have the capacity to execute control and coordination over the regional level).

Establish a trustful mentoring relation is key

It is key to establish a good mentoring relation. Successful mentoring requires relationship and trust. Mentors/advisers need to be better trained prior to deployment or before taking up their mentoring role (this includes coaching and negotiation skills as well as cultural awareness). In addition, closer cooperation amongst mentors within the mission, as well as with other operational/political colleagues should be encouraged. CPCC has addressed this issue in the new MMA guidelines.

b. *Training*

Train and equip - link training to mentoring and ensure local ownership is good practice

Mentoring could serve to identify gaps in knowledge of mentees. These gaps can be overcome through specific training. After the mentees have received training, the mentoring should serve to monitor if the lessons learnt are also implemented in the daily work of the mentees, i.e. the training has a tangible impact to their work. A good example is the CoPP training in Afghanistan. CoPP has been named as a very successful project which could be used in other mission contexts as well. The EUPOL Afghanistan/GIZ Coordination of Police and Prosecutors Training Project (CoPP) is a Dutch Funded EUPOL initiative implemented in Cooperation with *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit Project Implementation Unit (GIZ-PIU).* Training has been running over the course of three years and has been targeting about 1000 regional and district CID officers and prosecutors. CoPP was developed at the joint request of the Afghan Ministry of Interior and the Attorney General's Office. Prosecutors and police officers from all over Afghanistan attended the two-week training. All training were conducted in

local languages by specially trained Afghan CoPP Trainers, assisted by EUPOL mentors. The CoPP Training utilises the *EUPOL Police-Prosecutor Cooperation Manual*. The CoPP Project has recruited and trained a special pool of 30 Afghan trainers representing a cross-section of highly skilled national professionals. Each CoPP training is conducted by at least two trainers whose primary function is to act as "facilitators" rather than teachers. The best Afghan participants of the CoPP training are selected as mentors to spread the lessons learnt within their office and among their colleagues. These Afghan mentors are supervised and monitored by specific trained Afghan monitors.

Link projects to training is good practice

There is some positive evidence, , that projects (i.e. delivery of goods, infrastructure) combined with training are more successful/sustainable and vice versa. Projects function as incentives for training and training mitigate misuse or non-use of equipment.

Standardised knowledge management system should be put into place

Standardised and improved knowledge management systems within missions would for example improve the transfer to successors of mandatory end-of-mission reports.

c.   *Transitions and Phasing Out of CSDP Missions*

Participation of mission staff in regional seminars for joint programming could serve to further enhance the Comprehensive Approach

The possible participation of mission staff in regional seminars for joint programming could serve to further enhance the Comprehensive Approach in the field. It would increase the knowledge exchange between CSDP activities and development cooperation which in the long run could also pave the way for more informed transition strategies.

d.   *Cooperation with other International Organisations*

Cooperation with the UN, OSCE and AU can yet be increased

Whilst a lot has been achieved in the context of the EU-UN Action plan, cooperation and exchange regarding lessons and best practice with the OSCE and also the AU remains to be developed. Both organisations have a wealth of experience to share. There also is an interest to knowing more of respective approaches to crises as we increasingly work in the same theatres (e.g. Africa, Ukraine, and the Balkans).

e.   **Re-assignment of staff**

Temporary re-assignment of staff between missions coupled with Visiting Experts arrangement is good practice

Three staff members from EUBAM Libya have been temporarily re-assigned to support EUBAM Rafah (inter-mission loan arrangement). This inter-mission 'loan' proved a quick, flexible and effective tool to meet critical needs. Neither the ordinary recruitment tools (regular CfC, Visiting Experts Call), nor the CRT tool could have ensured a comparable response. It was also good practice to then have advertised these positions as Visiting Expert as both, the staff concerned benefited from uninterrupted service and the mission retained expertise and experience. This temporary re-assignment of staff coupled with the Visiting Experts arrangement has allowed EUBAM to pursue its tasks.

4.   CIS/Logistics/Procurement

a.   *CSDP Warehouse*

A conceptual rethinking of the CSDP Warehouse is needed

The CSDP Warehouse is limited to support missions in a start-up phase, which needs in any case to be supported by the EU Delegation in the absence of SOMA. This issue could be further looked into and the benefits of the following issues could be further considered: (i) enhancing the warehouse ability to store second hand vehicles which are no longer needed in the missions due to restructures and/or evacuations, (ii) the possibility to ensure the life-cycle of mission assets - including refurbishment of assets, ownership of inventories, expedition of assets capability - rather than just "feed" missions which are in a start-up phase, (iii) develop the Warehouse into a hub of expertise (Mission Experienced Support Staff) able to proactively support the missions with their logistical needs as well as defining standards of equipment needed, (iv) systematic issue of End User Certificates, (v) a non-sub-contracted warehouse that would embed the Diplomatic Pouch Service in the supply chain as well as the EU Delegations could formally be appointed/tasked to act as custodian or caretakers of consignments shipped into new mission areas where a SOMA agreement between the host country and the mission has yet to be signed.

A better use of the CSDP Warehouse could imply attaining: (i) synergies between missions, (ii) financial savings through economies of scale, (iii) rapidly available resources to all missions, and (iv) uniformity, research, development and improvements concerning assets.

b.   *CIS*

CIS network complementarity is needed

At times, missions use a different CIS network for sending and receiving sensitive unclassified and classified documents (encryption through ACID key) than the EU Delegation (encryption through SECEM and COREU). This hinders the sharing of sensitive documents between missions and EU DELs and slows down (exchanges are done with printed paper documents). CSDP missions and EU DELs should be equipped with complementary CIS networks. As a first step, the missions should be able to use SECEM.

Software for reporting could usefully be obtained

Standard software for structured internal mission reporting needs to be developed to allow effective follow-up and analysis of mandate implementation as well as enhance the institutional memory of a mission.

c.   *CONOPS and OPLAN*

Generic concepts to replace mission support annexes should be considered

Currently, the mission planning documents have several mission support related Annexes. Consideration could be given to extrapolating relevant such annexes that are of a generic nature, and have them agreed in separate Council document(s) (e.g. Code of Conduct, Human resources). Current work on the "General Employment Conditions for civilian CSDP Mission staff" goes in this direction. Planning documents would henceforth only need to refer to them, to make them directly applicable to the individual missions. Anything mission specific that diverts from the generic documents would have to be regulated in the mission planning documents. The advantage of proceeding in such a way would

be the facilitation of standardised policies across all missions that could be updated any time without re-opening the planning documents.

5.   Training

Pre-deployment training (PDT) for contracted personnel needs to be further addressed

While Member States are responsible for the PDT of seconded personnel, there is no equivalent for contracted personnel before signing the contract. After the contract has been signed, the mission is responsible and is able to finance training. Due to the irregular deployment of contracted staff (recruitment and deployment when needed) the coordination of training with the deployment is almost impossible. A possible solution could be the following: (i) CPCC and the missions agree on one or two fixed deployment dates every month (e.g. 1st and 15th each month), (ii) the contracted staff receives the training after signing the contract prior to the deployment, (iii) training institutions offer training at the certain dates and the training costs could be covered by the missions, (iv) there are three options to provide the training; (1) training in Brussels prior to the deployment to the mission, (2) training at a training institution of the Member States prior to the deployment to the mission and (3) use of mobile training teams in any location.

EEAS(2015) 256
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