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ESPACE 16 INTER-REP 15

## **COVER NOTE**

Subject:	Presentation of the European Space Policy Institute's activities and of the main takeaways of the Presidency's workshop on cyber resilience in space and key aspects of ESPI's recent report on "space, cyber and defense"
	- Powerpoint presentation (Space WP meeting 19.02.2024)


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# ESPI presentation at EU Council's Working Party on Space, 19 Feb 2024

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ESPI is Europe's independent think tank for space based in Vienna, Austria – the world's capital of space diplomacy. Working in a non-profit capacity, ESPI:

- Promotes European space policy on a global level;
- Facilitates an active forum for the analysis and discussion of European needs, capabilities, and long-term prospects in space activities;
- Develops approaches to European space policy;
- Makes proposals and recommendations to European decision-makers and

ESPI's mission is implemented through the ESPI Agenda, which is comprised of three types of activities: **European and International Engagement**, **Research**, and **Education**.



## **ESPI Governance and People**













rosa



20 member organisations

> Advisory Council



10 experts from across Europe's space sector (50% gender balance), currently chaired by:




















## Research - ESPI's key publications in 2023





Space Venture Europe 2022



Safety & Sustainability Momentum



Space Spectrum Management



Space, Cybersecurity & Defence



Value of Space Exploration





Space & Civil Society





Future of Space Exploration



WITH



OSAM State of Play & Future



HTI



## **ESPI2040**

ESPI's Policy vision for Europe in Space



## DIRECTORS PERSPECTIVES

(Monthly)



## **BRIEFS**



## SPACE SECTOR WATCH

ESPI Insights (Monthly)



ESPI Yearbook 2022



## BOOKS

Power, State & Space

EU Space Strategy for Security &

WRITTEN INPUTS TO


POLICY-

MAKING

Defence
EU Mid-Term
Evaluation of the EU
Space Programme

**EU Space Law** 





Presence across 30 EU and ESA member states

Global reach

across seven continents

APRSAF

ASIA-PACIFIC REGIONAL
SPACE AGENCY FORUM
























Europe has all the prerequisites to develop into a full space power, by bringing together, federating and developing the excellence of its European, national and industrial capacities.

However, what is missing is a clear political will and a whole-of-Europe vision beyond the perceived bounds of space systems, which would precipitate policy impact. To date, European space policy and programme action is mostly concerned with space capabilities, such as satellites and launchers, and less so with the policy impact of space. This includes how to integrate space into other policy sectors including security and defence, and how to build the required foundations in industrial competitiveness, scientific and technological excellence, innovation, talent and finance. Developing the policy impact of space is particularly critical at a time when crises affect policy priorities of public spending.

The *ESPI2040* Vision proposes to define and implement policy action on three levels and their interconnections:





# Key takeaways of the workshop of the Belgian Presidency of the Council of the EU

Cyber Resilience in Space

## Panel 1: Current Landscape – Mapping Challenges





Space and cyberspace are recognized as warfighting domains.

Space is considered as a critical infrastructure since NIS2/CER Directive.



Space companies lack an understanding of applicable processes and reporting mechanisms in case of cyberattack.



250 attacks recorded since the 1970s.
90 known attacks in 2023 alone.
30 attacks reported in January 2024 alone.
Low estimate as most attacks are not publicly disclosed.



Proactivity is needed before a cyberattack happens. Security controls, cyber hygiene, standards, and intelligence sharing are needed to act beforehand.



Space systems include the space, ground, control and user segments.

Space companies and the supply chain are subject to cyberattacks.



EU Space ISAC to be created this year to share threat intelligence and best practices.

Governance and processes remains to be established.



Post-quantum cryptography and physicsbased encryption methods.



Collaboration within the space sector and across sectors is essential

Lack of standardization and demonstrated efficiency and robustness

## Panel 2: Future Strategies – Forging Resilience





entities willing to do business in the EU

Proportionality based on the size and criticality of
missions



Cyber measures should not focus on specific technologies because technologies evolve and must interact with each other (QKD, PQE, etc.)



EU space law should not jeopardise competitiveness against non-EU entities as well as within the EU



Technical requirements vary between countries.

Necessary to agree on minimum standards for cybersecurity, including to obtain a license.



Adequate funding must be provided to ensure adherence and implementation by SMEs and start-ups



NIS2/CER Directive provide general rules but need to be adapted to the space domain. Support to industries and agencies need to be given to implement the EU Space Law + NIS2



Cybersecurity can be costly; an attack can be devastating.

EU space law has to show that higher cybersecurity can become Europe's comparative advantage.



Particular uses should be considered such as humanitarian operations to ensure implementation of IHL and strictly segregate networks between civilian and military use.



# The War in Ukraine from a Space Cybersecurity Perspective







A case study of the KA-SAT cyberattack conducted by Russia a few hours before the invasion of Ukraine



Analysis of cyber threats on the user segment and the space supply chain shows that the KA-SAT cyberattack is representative of the state of cybersecurity in the space sector



Study conducted in August 2022



Analysis of the lessons to learn from this attack for the cybersecurity of the European space infrastructure



A self-funded study produced by ESPI



Final Report released in October 2022





Investigation of the intersection between space, cyber and defence



Complexity of the spacecyber-defense nexus



Operational, legal, political and strategic implications of using commercial satellites in war



Analysis of the approach to space cybersecurity in the UK, France, and Italy



Collective Report Call for papers to the space community



Final Report published in November 2023




# Heterogeneous national approaches to space cybersecurity

- No EU Member State has a dedicated strategy for space cybersecurity
- FRA, ITA, UK recognize cyber threats on space systems in space policies
- Only the UK recognize cyber threats on space systems in cyber policies
- Only the UK has cybersecurity obligations in national space law
- No single entity responsible for space cybersecurity

# Skills development, cyber ranges, space exercises, and wargaming

- · Significant skills gap in space cybersecurity
- Need for more education and multidisciplinary efforts
- Resilience increases with exercises, cyber ranges, table top, and wargaming



# Is cybersecurity in space the same as cybersecurity on Earth?

- On the ground, user, control segments, cybersecurity of space systems is similar
- On the space segment, cybersecurity is very different
- · Challenges specific to the orbital environment

# The nature of satellites: military, commercial, or dual?

- New situation with the provision of commercial services and not systems to belligerents
- Dual-use concept
- Renew the question of commercial assets as legitimate targets

# Defining, conducting, attributing, and responding to an attack on a space system

- Uncertainties on the specific corpus of law that should be leveraged when conducting an attack in space
- Attribution is a complex task for cyberattacks
- When an action is clearly identified as an attack, is retaliation systematically allowed?