



Council of the
European Union

Brussels, 10 February 2020
(OR. en)

5764/20

LIMITE

**COPS 40
EUMC 19
CSDP/PSDC 57
CFSP/PESC 74
COAFR 31
EUTM MALI 3
EUTM RCA 2
EUTM SOMALIA 2**

COVER NOTE

From: European External Action Service (EEAS)
To: Political and Security Committee (PSC)
European Union Military Committee (EUMC)
Subject: Outline concept for EU Non-Executive Missions

DOCUMENT PARTIALLY ACCESSIBLE TO THE PUBLIC (14.12.2021)

Delegations will find attached document EEAS(2020) 76 REV 5.

Encl.: EEAS(2020) 76 REV 5

EEAS(2020) 76 REV 5
LIMITE

EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE



European Union Military Staff

Official document of the European External Action Service
of 10/2/2020

EEAS Reference	EEAS(2020) 76 REV 5
Distribution marking	LIMITE
From To	European Union Military Staff Political and Security Committee European Union Military Committee <i>CSDP/PSDC; EUMC</i>
Title / Subject	Outline concept for EU Non-Executive Missions
[Ref. prev. doc.]	EEAS(2020) 76 REV 4

Delegation will find attached the "Outline concept for EU Non-Executive Missions" as agreed by EUMC on 4th February 2020.

**OUTLINE CONCEPT FOR EU NON-EXECUTIVE
MISSIONS**

EEAS(2020) 76 REV 5

LIMITE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

A. INTRODUCTION	4
B. PURPOSE & SCOPE	4
C. GENERIC PRINCIPLES AND LINES OF EFFORT	4
D. DELETED	10
ANNEX A - DELETED	15
ANNEX B - LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.....	18
ANNEX C - LIST OF REFERENCES AND OTHER USEFUL DOCUMENTS	20

EEAS(2020) 76 REV 5

LIMITE

INTRODUCTION

1. On 21st November 2019, EUMC at CHODs level agreed with the 2nd Reflection Paper (Ref.Z) and tasked the EUMS to finalize it with the aim of conceptualizing the evolution of EU Non-Executive Missions into more ambitious Missions that could focus on institutional capacity building as well as on tactical levels. This 2nd Reflection Paper is therefore the basis and referential frame for the conceptualisation.
2. This outline concept should be seen as a guideline for the provision of useful inputs in order to further conceptualise the evolution of EU Non-Executive Missions. The aim is to improve Missions' effectiveness as one of the many tools of the EU Integrated Approach. Above all, this paper outlines what could be the future of EU Military Assistance – type missions. An important objective of this document is to agree common definitions and terminology linked to Military Assistance missions of the European Union.
3. The EU Guidance for a Generic EUTM/EUMAM (Ref. BB) agreed by EUMC on Thursday 28 June 2018 remains valid especially for all formal aspects related to the planning process and the development of the mission plan.

A. PURPOSE & SCOPE

4. The purpose of these suggested principles and lines of effort in this outline concept is to provide, without being exhaustive, a basis for the preparation, planning, provision, deployment, conduct and redeployment of a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) military Non-Executive Mission and to act as a generic aid for future MFCdr and TCNs. In the context of an EU-led military non-executive mission, it outlines the related characteristics and generic principles for missions and their associated lines of effort in order to obtain optimal effectiveness.

B. GENERIC PRINCIPLES AND LINES OF EFFORT

5. CSDP NON-EXECUTIVE MISSION PRINCIPLES¹

The principles below are derived from the EU Treaty (Ref. A), collective experience and subsequent analysis. The list is not exhaustive, but shows the key characteristics that a commander, planning staffs, and those involved in a non-executive mission should consider.

¹ These principles are taken from EU Guidance for a Generic EUTM/EUMAM (Ref. BB). They have been slightly adapted to the evolving context. Two new principles have been added: Operational spirit and Continuity.

EEAS(2020) 76 REV 5

LIMITE

- a. *Host Nation² (State) Ownership.* The mission has to work in close coordination with military and political authorities to support and ensure Host Nation (State) (HN(S)) ownership of any reform related activity.
- b. *Understand the Environment.* A shared understanding of the context within which insecurity and instability has arisen is essential to provide a basis for focused and coordinated action. To understand the contextual aspects of security and stabilization, anthropological, religious, ethnographic, social, political and economic information is required.
- c. *Respect for Local Culture.* The mission's and individual's capacity to learn and understand the local culture, trends, and traditions is a key factor for mission success. Missions have to follow an approach that respects the local culture, as a pre-condition for acceptance by the local population and HN(S).
- d. *Flexibility.* The Mission must remain flexible in order to adapt to new circumstances at any time while remaining within the scope of the mandate. Ingenuity, initiative and imagination are convenient tools to manage evolving situations.
- e. *Trust and Confidence.* It is the centre of gravity of any CSDP mission. Gaining HN(S)'s trust takes time and it is the combined product of a respectful approach, humility, professional integrity, and everyday transparency that achieves this. In cases where mutual trust is damaged, the HN(S) will be reluctant to provide essential information and cooperation for the activities of the Mission.
- f. *Exemplary Conduct.* Exemplary conduct is a vital part of military life. Each and every mission member has to exhibit the values of loyalty, cohesion and discipline. Adherence to these values will inculcate feelings of respect and confidence in deployed personnel, HN(S) and partners. The EU's reputation as a global provider of security and stability must be preserved in every dimension of the mission.
- g. *Operational spirit.* Tactical and technical training is important but will not be valued over time if the EU trainers do not transmit the values of cohesion, creed, morale and unit spirit in an operational mind-set. Forging a unit spirit is essential to make local units ready when they will be subsequently engaged in combat operations. The mission must accustom the local defence forces to harden physically and morally, trust their leaders and group

² Whilst "Host State" is the correct term, used in Council legal acts, the term "Host Nation" is more widely used by experts and partner organisations.

EEAS(2020) 76 REV 5

LIMITE

members as well as understand the purpose of their task in order to cope with perilous circumstances. Tactical leaders must then learn to make decisions within an uncertain operating environment.

h. *Legitimacy*. The mission's presence will have been requested by the HN(S) and the Mandate authorized by a unanimous Council Decision. Usually there will also be a UN Security Council Resolution. All of these reinforce the idea of legitimacy.

i. *Open Dialogue*. It is important to build networks at all levels in order to be recognized by everyone as a credible actor. This will occur through coordination and liaison with other actors, both civilian and military, who are present in theatre.

j. *Continuity*. The maintenance of continuity between rotations of mission staff is an essential element for success. Moreover, a continuous partnership between HN(S) institutions and all levels of the mission is important in order to build a sustainable solution. This could be applied with having a "train and follow" mind-set instead of a "train and forget" one. That is to say, utilising all evaluation opportunities with assisted units, within mandate defined conditions, in order to take stock and verify that the lessons or advice given have been taken into account.

k. *Transition and Exit Strategy*. The effective and progressive transfer of mission responsibilities to another stakeholder (EU, non-EU or the HN(S) itself), is critical to the HN(S) long-term stability and national autonomy. If transition activities are poorly managed, the gains achieved can be reversed.

6. CSDP NON-EXECUTIVE MISSIONS CONCEPTUAL LINES OF EFFORT

The lines of efforts below are taken from the reflection paper on possible evolution of EU Non-Executive Missions (Ref. Z). The 4th line of effort, continuity, is the link between the 3 other lines. This list is not exhaustive nor is it prescriptive, but shows identified lines that a commander, planning staffs, and those involved in a non-executive mission should consider when preparing their own lines of action. The sustainability of these lines of effort and the study of their operational and logistical consequences must be achieved according to the environment in which the mission takes place

a. Credibility

The credibility of the EU Non-Executive Mission can be achieved by:

EEAS(2020) 76 REV 5

LIMITE

- Bearing in mind that, as a political prerequisite, assisting has to be based on HN(S) ownership.
- Assisting the whole education and training process from initial education to and including pre-deployment training.
- Evaluating in HN(S) garrisons, training areas or HQ in the framework of an effective post-training-quality-control.
- Maintaining the capabilities transferred (education, technical skills, equipment, etc.) through the provision of Military Assistance for the full range of operational activities, which could also include accompaniment (within the parameters of the agreed definition and clarification).
- Ensuring traceability of and accountability for trainees in the operational units through garrisoning and further operational deployments.
- Increasing permanence for key posts (Heads of branches, specific advisors, etc.): extensions of tours of duty and/or consideration of civilian posts.
- Pooling equipment (lethal and non-lethal) loaned by Member States or 3rd countries to the Mission during the course of education and training in order to achieve its training objectives and to complete courses.
- Exploring financial ways to develop HN(S) capacity:
 - o Through equipment donations: since EU Non-Executive missions have no legal capacity to receive and own lethal and non-lethal equipment, and pending a decision on the European Peace Facility³, the ATHENA Special Committee, if Member States so decide, might serve as the legal entity under which the Mission could receive and use certain types of donations,
 - o EU effort in Capacity Building in support of Security and Development (equipping HN(S) forces, salary payments, supporting the construction of infrastructures and accommodations - Barracks/Garrison - for both trained units and their families, etc.) could be improved.
- Ensuring coherence in terms of respective Security Sector Reforms with key national and international actors as well as other missions/operations operating in the same area and

³ Negotiations on a draft council decision on the European Peace Facility, including the issue of EU financing of military equipment, are ongoing. This is a suggested idea, depending on the outcome of discussions in the Council this should be continued or abandoned

EEAS(2020) 76 REV 5

LIMITE

achieved through clear communication, collaborative planning, cooperation and deconfliction.

An example of coherence could be the continuity in the Education-Training-Deployment-Employment Cycle of assisted troops, which may be conducted by, or involve a number of different countries or organisations. When several and different countries or organisations conduct different assisting activities as part of this cycle, continuity has to be provided in handing over assisted individuals and units from one assisting entity to another (ensuring that no units 'get lost' between activities). Good coordination between all stakeholders is therefore paramount. The EU-mission can and should be an active "coordinator" in this, as it increases its credibility.

b. Agility

It's important that the EU Non-Executive Mission can respond with agility to the constantly changing environment, as well as to the changing/evolving needs of the HN(S) partner. Agility can be obtained by:

- Decentralizing training and advisory activities to the lower commanding echelon (Platoon – Company – Battalion – Brigade – Specialized Detachment...). Ensuring that trainees fulfil their tasks whilst still upholding the code of conduct and following the Law of Armed Conflict in order to ensure not only the legitimacy of EU but also HN(S).
- The increasing number of decentralised activities will induce an adaptation of some financial processes (in order to be more reactive). Furthermore, the rank of adviser/trainer should be consequently reviewed because of the changing audience (you don't train/advise the same personnel at Brigade and Platoon level).
- Increasing decentralised activities with long term and/or long distance CMATT.
- Developing light and mobile shelters of capabilities (e.g. armoury) in order to allow CMATT to deploy in good conditions when they plan to go away for a long time.
- Continuing full support from Member States to provide fully qualified personnel according to the skills required in the Mission's job description. The flexibility given by the job description allows the Mission Force Commander (MFCdr) to adapt the tasks given in order to fill gaps as they arise.
- Including key capabilities (FP including QRF / utility helicopter / efficient MEDEVAC process / intelligence including UAVs) allowing the MFCdr more flexibility in the field.

EEAS(2020) 76 REV 5

LIMITE

- Exploiting local “Lessons Identified – Lessons Learned” by MFCdr in order to adapt its tactical and technical procedures (TTP) to the evolving situation on the ground.

c. Influence

The EU Non-Executive CSDP Missions are one of the most visible and effective means within the EU-CSDP toolbox in order to assist a HN(S) in its SSR. This means also that there is a huge potential of influencing capacity within the Mission, towards the HN(S) as well as towards the international community and the MS. This capacity must be exploited to the maximum, for example by:

- Increasing the proportion of HN(S) language speakers within the Mission's staff. Additionally, provision of support for 3rd States, in accordance with the mandate, specific pre-deployment courses/training and the use of interpreters could also be considered.
- Developing a cultural pre-deployment training course.
- Enhancing STRATCOM (operational communication and military influence) for the mission to the HN(S). The military influence has to be based on a mission-led KLE campaign (steered by MPCC).
- Ensuring the MFCdr function as military adviser to the EU Del on security and defence matters, remains relevant, through his/her advocacy of, and promotion of consistency within, the EU Integrated Approach.
- Improving STRATCOM at the political, strategic, operational and tactical levels IOT attract attention, maintain interest and deliver more coordinated actions..
- Strengthening INFO-OPS and/or CIMIC cells (including Quick Impact Projects).
- Supporting the development of HN(S) concepts, doctrines, SOPs, handbooks and curriculums (TTPs). This also improves the possibility of deepening the influence at all levels of the HN(S) and creating and strengthening the conditions for the sharing and application of EU values and standards.
- Ensuring that common values of Human Rights (HR), including Women, Peace and Security (WPS) and Prevention of Sexual Violence (PSV), are recognized and upheld at all levels in the Mission as well as the Host Nation (State).

d. Continuity

Continuity has to be seen as a prerequisite to a coherent and sustainable way to implement these lines of efforts. As continuity is not a given and has to be worked on throughout the mission, it is considered as a supporting line of effort. Continuity can be obtained by:

EEAS(2020) 76 REV 5

LIMITE

- Ensuring coherence at/amongst all levels from institutional capacity building to tactical level training.
- Developing and encouraging HN(S) to apply an operational cycle (like Training-Deployment/Employment-Rest) in order to allow the benefits of the assistance process be delivered from a long term perspective.
- Ensuring sustainability of processes learned to the HN(S).
- Avoiding gaps in the composition of EU Missions through providing all the personnel required (CJSOR) in the Mission's mandate (with the support of Member States).
- Increasing permanence for key posts (Heads of branches, specific advisors, etc.): extensions of tours of duty and/or consider civilian posts.
- Handing over assisted individuals and units from one assisting entity to another (ensuring that no units 'get lost' between activities).
- Coordination between assisting entities.
- Exchanging information with other missions.

DELETED FROM THIS POINT UNTIL PAGE 17/21

EEAS(2020) 76 REV 5

LIMITE

ANNEX B - LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AU	African Union
C2	Command and Control
CBSD	Capacity Building in support of Security and Development
CHODs	Chiefs Of Defence
CIMIC	Civil-Military Co-operation
CMATT	Combined Mobile Advisory Training Team
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
EEAS	European External Action Service
EPF	European Peace Facility
EU	European Union
EU Del	European Delegation
EUMAM	European Union Military Assistance Mission
EUMC	European Union Military Committee
EUMS	European Union Military Staff
EUTM	European Union Training Mission
FP	Force Protection
HQ	Headquarters
HN(S)	Host Nation (State)
IO	International Organization
KLE	Key Leader Engagement
MA	Military Assistance
MFCdr	Mission Force Commander
MEDEVAC	Medical Evacuation

EEAS(2020) 76 REV 5

LIMITE

MOD	Ministry of Defence
MPCC	Military Planning and Conduct Capability
MS	Member States
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NSDF	National Security & Defence Forces
PDT	Pre-deployment Training
PESCO	Permanent Structured Cooperation
QRF	Quick Response Force
ROE	Rules of Engagement
SSR	Security Sector Reform
TCN	Troop Contributing Nation(s)
TTP	Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
UN	United Nations
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
WG	Working Group

EEAS(2020) 76 REV 5

LIMITE

ANNEX C - LIST OF REFERENCES AND OTHER USEFUL DOCUMENTS

- A. Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union.
- B. EU Concept for Military Command and Control (ST 8798/19, dated 23 April 2019).
- C. A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy (ST 10715/16, dated 28 June 2016).
- D. Implementation Plan on Security and Defence (ST 14392/16, dated 14 November 2016).
- E. EU Concept for the Use of Force in EU-led Military Operations – the partially declassified version (ST 17168/09, dated 2 February 2010).
- F. EU Concept for EU-led Military Operations and Missions (ST 14777/19, dated 3 December 2019).
- G. EU Concept for Military Planning at the Political Strategic Level (ST 6432/15, dated 23 February 2015).
- H. Suggestions for crisis management procedures for CSDP crisis management operations (ST 7660/2/13 REV 2, dated 18 June 2013).
- I. EUMS Crisis Management Manual Review 1 2015.
- J. CivOpsCdr Operational Guidelines for Monitoring, Mentoring and Advising in Civilian CSDP missions (ST 15272/14, dated 7 November 2014).
- K. Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: Elements for an EU-wide strategic framework to support Security Sector Reform (JOIN (2016)31, dated 05 July 2016).
- L. Military Input to the EU-wide Strategic Framework for Security Sector Reform (ST 7296/16, dated 18 March 2016).
- M. Military Advice on EU SSR Joint Communication: Elements for an EU-wide strategic framework to support Security Sector Reform (EEAS(2016) 961 REV 3, dated 15 September 2016).
- N. Council Conclusions on EU-wide strategic framework to support Security Sector Reform (doc. General Secretariat of the Council, ST 13998/16, dated 14 November 2016).
- O. Concept for EU Monitoring missions (ST 14536/03, dated 28 October 2003).
- P. Conduct and Discipline in CSDP Missions and Operations: Overview of Policies and Procedures (ST 7869/16, dated 13 April 2016).

EEAS(2020) 76 REV 5

LIMITE

- Q. Code of Conduct and Discipline for EU Civilian CSDP Missions (ST 12076/16, dated 9 September 2016).
- R. EUMC Glossary of Acronyms and Definitions (EEAS(2019) 169, dated 22 February 2019).
- S. Concept Note: Operational Planning and Conduct Capabilities for CSDP Missions and Operations (ST 6881/17, dated 6 March 2017).
- T. Regionalization of the CSDP Missions in Sahel – Strategic Concept (ST 12391/16, dated 20 September 2016).
- U. Best practice Guidelines – Coordination and Cooperation between CSDP missions/operations, EU Delegations and EU Special Representatives, (ST 12052/16, dated 8 September 2016).
- V. Council Decision (EU) 2017/971 of 8 June 2017 determining the planning and conduct arrangements for EU non-executive military CSDP missions and amending Decisions 2010/96/CFSP on a EU military mission to contribute to the training of Somali security forces, 2013/34/CFSP, on a EU military mission to contribute to the training of the Malian Armed Forces (EUTM Mali) and 2016/610 on a EU CSDP military training mission in the Central African Republic (EUTM RCA).
- W. EU Policy on Training for CSDP (ST 5197/2/17 REV 2, dated 15 March 2017).
- X. Shared Vision, Common Action: a stronger Europe – A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy (ST 13202/16, dated 17 October 2017).
- Y. Concept Note: Operational Planning and Conduct Capabilities for CSDP Missions and Operations (ST 6881/17, dated 6 March 2017).
- Z. Revision of the Second EUMS reflection paper on possible evolution of EU Training Missions agreed by CHODs level conference of EUMC on Thursday 21 November 2019.
- AA. Proposed work plan for the finalization of the reflection paper on possible evolution of EU Non-Executive Missions agreed by the EUMC after a silence procedure on Monday 13 January 2020.
- BB. EU Guidance for a Generic EUTM/EUMAM agreed by the EUMC after a silence procedure on Thursday 28 June 2018.