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To:	Delegations

Subject:	Council Conclusions for the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
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Delegations will find in the annex the Council Conclusions for the 11th Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), as approved by the Council (Foreign Affairs) at its 4145th meeting, held on 15 December 2025.

**COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS FOR THE 2026 REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES
TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (NPT)**

1. As part of its firm commitment to effective multilateralism and the rules-based international order, the Council reiterates its unwavering support for safeguarding and strengthening the nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control architecture. The European Union (EU) will continue to work towards a **successful 2026 NPT Review Conference**, as it has done throughout this cycle.
2. The Council reaffirms its **unequivocal support to the NPT** as the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament according to its Article VI, and an important element in developing nuclear energy applications for peaceful purposes according to its Article IV. It is crucial to the maintenance of international peace and security.
3. The Council recognises the **value of the NPT and its historic achievements**. For over five decades it has provided security benefits to all States Parties. The NPT contains a legally binding obligation towards nuclear disarmament and has enabled a significant reduction in nuclear weapons stockpiles from Cold War highs, paved the way for certain States to renounce nuclear weapons, and curbed nuclear proliferation. The Treaty is the basis for the nuclear safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It has played a central role in the development, research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, facilitating international cooperation in this field.

4. The Treaty faces **notable challenges**, including increasingly high tensions and a resurgence of nuclear rhetoric, as witnessed by Russia's actions in its unjustified and illegal full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine, with Moscow prioritising its war effort over its non-proliferation and disarmament obligations and commitments. Ongoing regional proliferation crises, China's rapid and opaque expansion of its nuclear arsenal, and an uneven implementation of obligations and commitments, also contribute to this complex situation.
5. The Council notes the **very severe consequences associated with nuclear weapons use** and emphasises that all States share the responsibility to prevent such an occurrence from happening. In this regard, it recalls the Joint Statement of Leaders of Five Nuclear-Weapon States on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races, including the principle that '**a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought**', to which the wider United Nations (UN) membership has committed through the Pact for the Future.
6. The Council reaffirms the importance of the **universalisation of the NPT** and calls on all States that have not yet done so, in particular India, Israel and Pakistan, to join it as non-nuclear-weapon States and, pending their accession, to adhere to its terms.
7. The Council reiterates its support for **all three mutually reinforcing pillars of the NPT** and for a comprehensive, balanced and full **implementation of the 2010 NPT Review Conference Action Plan**. The Council stresses the urgent need to implement **all obligations under the NPT**, as well as **commitments made during previous Review Conferences**, including the need for concrete progress towards full implementation of Article VI, with the ultimate goal of total elimination of nuclear weapons.

8. The Council acknowledges the progress made in this cycle to identify measures to **strengthen the NPT review process**. The EU has engaged constructively¹ and will work actively towards a decision in this regard at the Review Conference, as a central deliverable. In this regard, *Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/646 of 27 March 2025 in support of facilitating a successful outcome of 2026 NPT Review Conference* aims at improving inclusivity in the cycle.
9. The Council is committed to **enhancing transparency and accountability**. The EU supports establishing a process within the cycle for reviewing the implementation of NPT obligations and commitments by States Parties, especially by all nuclear-weapon States, across all three pillars, in particular with regard to article VI obligations. It also favours further qualitative improvements to reporting, encouraging the further development of previous proposals, including standardised templates, taking into account the 2013 model by nuclear-weapon States and best practices developed since, and acknowledging that developing a standardised template for national reports by non-nuclear-weapon States could stimulate an increase in submissions.²

¹ [A stronger review process for a stronger NPT – European Union proposals for the Working Group on strengthening the NPT review process and ahead of the First Preparatory Committee of the 11th NPT Review Conference](#), working paper submitted by the EU ahead of the working group on further strengthening the review process (Vienna, 24-28 July 2023).

² The latest EU contribution in this regard is [A path towards enhanced transparency and accountability within the NPT review process](#), working paper submitted by the EU ahead of the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York, 28 April-9 May 2025).

10. The Council encourages NPT States Parties to work towards full, equal and meaningful participation of women in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. It further underlines **gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls** as an important cross-cutting priority for the EU, and the importance of integrating a gender perspective into discussions across all pillars. The Council reiterates its commitment to the Women, Peace and Security agenda, including by supporting and promoting the equal participation and leadership of women and men in non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control. The Council reiterates its support for **disarmament and non-proliferation education**, to which the EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Consortium contributes through its activities, and for the participation of young people in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

PILLAR I – DISARMAMENT

11. The Council reaffirms its unwavering commitment to **advance nuclear disarmament**, in accordance with Article VI of the NPT, especially through the overall reduction of the global stockpile of nuclear weapons, and taking into account the **special responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States** that possess the largest nuclear arsenals.
12. Recalling the obligations for all nuclear-weapon States arising from Article VI of the NPT, the Council reiterates its commitment to **further reductions of nuclear arsenals** and, underlining the special responsibility of the States with the largest nuclear arsenals, strongly encourages seeking further reductions to their nuclear arsenals, including strategic and non-strategic, as well as deployed and non-deployed, nuclear weapons. The Council welcomes the repeated offers of dialogue made in this regard by the United States, urges **Russia** to engage meaningfully, and calls on **China** to contribute and engage actively and constructively. The Council condemns Russia's purported suspension of the **New START Treaty**, urges Russia to immediately return to compliance and fulfil all its obligations, and calls for urgent work towards a **successor agreement**. If the New START Treaty expires before such a successor agreement can be concluded, the EU encourages the United States and Russia to maintain the agreed limits on their nuclear arsenals.

13. The Council condemns in the strongest possible way **Russia's actions, its nuclear rhetoric and its threats to use nuclear force** in its war of aggression against Ukraine, which are irresponsible, provocative, dangerous and escalatory. The latest update of Russia's nuclear doctrine, aimed mostly at coercing and deterring further support to Ukraine, no longer includes "compliance with international arms control obligations" among the principles of Russia's deterrence policy. The Council is deeply concerned about Russia's announced **deployment of nuclear weapons in the territory of Belarus**. It recalls Belarus' commitment under the Budapest Memorandum 'to eliminate all nuclear weapons from [its] territory' and calls on both countries to reverse this decision. The Council categorically opposes the development and deployment of nuclear weapons and any other types of weapons of mass destruction in **outer space**. The deployment of such weapons would constitute a severe and wide-reaching breach of international law, including the Outer Space Treaty.
14. The Council is deeply concerned about **China's rapid, opaque expansion of its nuclear arsenal**, which is inconsistent with its disarmament commitments under the NPT. Its lack of transparency about its doctrine, policies and expanding arsenal raises serious doubts about the credibility of its '**No First Use**' policy, and fuels mistrust. We encourage China, holder of the world's third largest nuclear arsenal and a nuclear-weapon State under the NPT, to engage in risk reduction and arms control, including by enhancing transparency, establishing necessary communication lines to prevent misperceptions, and clarifying its strategic objectives.
15. The Council strongly encourages nuclear-weapon States to pursue discussions on **confidence-building, transparency, risk reduction and verification**, laying the ground for the negotiation of robust future arms control agreements and reporting. While not a substitute for nuclear disarmament, risk reduction contributes to the prevention of nuclear war, can play a major role in creating trust, confidence and predictability, and complements disarmament and arms control efforts. Concrete risk reduction measures, including measures to **reduce the risk of nuclear conflict**, should therefore be pursued.

16. The Council stresses the need to promote **universal adherence to and the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)**, and urges all States that have not yet done so, in particular those in Annex 2, to sign and ratify it without precondition or delay. The Council reaffirms its commitment to uphold and strengthen the norm against nuclear testing. It calls on all States to abide by the existing **moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions** or any other nuclear explosion, and to refrain from any action contrary to the object and purpose of the Treaty. Any explosive nuclear weapon test by any State would be harmful and destabilising for global non-proliferation efforts and for international peace and security. It calls on **Russia to reverse its unprecedented decision to revoke its ratification** of the CTBT and, in the meantime, respect the CTBT's object and purpose.
17. The Council commends the early deployment and operation of the **International Monitoring System (IMS)** and of the **International Data Centre (IDC)** that are at the core of the robust verification regime of the **Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO)**. This deployment ahead of the CTBT's entry into force has provided the international community with reliable and neutral scientific and technical information on nuclear test explosions carried out since 1997 and constituted a strong preventive measure against testing. The financial support provided by the EU through nine consecutive Council Decisions since 2006,³ as well as by EU Member States, has proved instrumental in this regard.
18. The Council reiterates its call for the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations of a **treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (FMCT)**. Pending the entry into force of such an FMCT, the Council calls on China, the only nuclear-weapon State not to have done so, and any other States concerned to declare and uphold an immediate **moratorium on the production of fissile material** for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

³ Currently, through [Council Decision \(CFSP\) 2023/2064 of 25 September 2023 on Union support for the activities of the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization \(CTBTO\) in order to strengthen its monitoring and verification capabilities](#).

19. With regard to the development of **new emerging technologies**, and in particular **artificial intelligence**, the Council underlines the importance of maintaining human control over decisions to use nuclear weapons. It welcomes recent progress in this regard, including the commitment made by France, the United States and the United Kingdom to maintain human control and involvement for all actions critical to informing and executing sovereign decisions concerning nuclear weapons employment, as well as a bilateral commitment in this regard between the United States and China. The Council calls on Russia and other States possessing nuclear weapons to follow suit. Such technologies may also present opportunities for arms control efforts, for example with regard to verification and monitoring, that should be explored.
20. While verification is not an end in itself, further development of **nuclear disarmament verification** (NDV) capabilities would facilitate progress on nuclear disarmament. The Council underscores the value of multilateral cooperation in advancing NDV, reiterating its support to the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification and other similar formats, and advocating constructive engagement on establishing a UN Group of Scientific and Technical Experts on NDV.
21. The Council recognises the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States in receiving unequivocal **security assurances** from nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Negative Security Assurances are important components of binding and agreed security arrangements, strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime, contributing to confidence-building and nuclear disarmament, and enhancing regional and global security. The Council reiterates its strong call on Russia to cease violating its commitments under the **Budapest Memorandum**.

PILLAR II – NON-PROLIFERATION

22. The Council stresses the urgent need to **address decisively the multiple existing nuclear proliferation challenges**, in order to preserve and strengthen the NPT's positive record in this regard. The Council highlights the **safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)** as a fundamental component of the NPT, as well as the great importance it attaches to the IAEA's mandate and its impartial, independent and objective role.
23. The Council recalls the severe implications of Russia's unjustified and illegal full-scale war of aggression for **safeguards in Ukraine**, especially the illegal seizure and militarisation of Ukraine's Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP). It calls on Russia to immediately and unconditionally withdraw from Ukraine's ZNPP and comply with all relevant UN General Assembly and IAEA resolutions. The EU and its Member States will continue to uphold international law and full respect for Ukraine's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders. Military activities continue to challenge the implementation of IAEA safeguards under Ukraine's Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol. The Council welcomes that the IAEA has continued to implement safeguards and undertake in-field verification activities in Ukraine, and stresses the importance that it continues to be able to do so, in accordance with Article III of the NPT and Ukraine's Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and its Additional Protocol. The Council is grateful to the IAEA for all its work to contribute to mitigating nuclear safety and security risks and reiterates its call that the IAEA is granted full, timely and unrestricted access for its experts to all requested locations, information and personnel at Ukraine's ZNPP.

24. The EU has always been clear that **Iran** must never be allowed to seek, acquire or develop a nuclear weapon. The UN Security Council Resolutions reinstated after completion of the snapback process create obligations for all UN Member States and decide that Iran shall suspend several proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities. The EU is gravely concerned by Iran's serious curtailing of its cooperation with the IAEA and calls on Iran to urgently comply with its legally binding nuclear safeguards obligations under the NPT, and to resume full cooperation with the IAEA without any further delay. The EU and its Member States remain committed to diplomacy and negotiations as the only way to achieve a lasting solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. The Council invites the High Representative to continue to support political and diplomatic efforts to find a negotiated solution in line with the provisions of the reinstated UN Security Council resolutions.
25. The Council reiterates its call on the **Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)** to abandon all its weapons of mass destruction (WMD), ballistic missile and existing nuclear programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, as required by UN Security Council Resolution 2397 (2017). It insists that the DPRK return to full compliance with the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State and with its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, bring into force the Additional Protocol, refrain from testing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, re-establish its pre-existing commitments to a moratorium on all missile launches and nuclear tests, and sign and ratify the CTBT. The DPRK will never be accepted as a nuclear-weapon State under the NPT or have any other special status in that regard. The Council urges the DPRK to engage in meaningful discussions with all relevant parties to build a basis for sustainable peace and security and to take steps aimed at pursuing the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula.

26. The Council expresses its deep concern about **Russia's disturbing shift of position on the DPRK's denuclearisation since 2024**, which undermines decades-long non-proliferation efforts in exchange for support for its war of aggression against Ukraine. All UN sanctions established pursuant to relevant UN Security Council resolutions remain fully in place. The Council welcomes the establishment of the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team, until the Panel of Experts of the UN Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006), whose mandate renewal Russia vetoed, can be reconstituted. The Council resolutely condemns Russia's continuing illegal military cooperation with the DPRK, in particular the DPRK's deployment of troops and arms transfers to Russia, including ballistic missiles, in flagrant violation of UN Security Council resolutions, and calls on both countries to cease immediately these activities, and on all States to implement fully the relevant UN resolutions.
27. The Council supports the IAEA's engagement with **Syria** and the ongoing process to clarify outstanding safeguards issues, welcomes efforts so far and calls on transitional Syrian authorities to continue to engage constructively. It strongly encourages Syria to conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol to rebuild confidence in the peaceful nature of its nuclear activities.
28. The Council acknowledges the importance of existing **Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZs)** for international peace and security and reiterates its commitment to implementing the Resolution on Middle East of the 1995 NPT Review Conference. It welcomes the six sessions of the UN Conference on the Establishment of a **Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction** and their outcomes. The Council recalls that NWFZs can only be established on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among States of the region concerned. The EU strongly urges all stakeholders to engage urgently in meaningful consultations to build an inclusive and consensus-based process to implement the 1995 Resolution on Middle East.

29. IAEA safeguards are a fundamental component of the NPT and help create an environment conducive to peaceful nuclear cooperation. **Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements**, together with the **Additional Protocol**, constitute the current IAEA verification standard under Article III of the NPT. The Council reiterates its call for their universalisation without delay. It urgently calls on concerned States, especially those who apply the original version or are engaged in building nuclear power plants or research reactors, to immediately amend or rescind their **Small Quantities Protocols**.
30. Effective **export controls** are fundamental to comply with non-proliferation obligations under Article III of the NPT and all relevant UN Security Council resolutions. The Council invites all States to adhere to the guidelines of relevant multilateral export control regimes, including the **Zangger Committee** and the **Nuclear Suppliers Group**. These regimes provide impartial guidelines to ensure proliferation concerns are addressed. They build trust that contributes to facilitating legitimate transfers of nuclear technology and scientific knowledge for peaceful uses, to maintaining a predictable, transparent framework and a well-defined level-playing field for international nuclear trade, and to improving overall trade and growth, not least in developing countries.
31. The Council reiterates its serious concern about the **proliferation of WMD-capable delivery systems** such as **ballistic missiles** and related technology, recalls its strong support for the **Missile Technology Control Regime**, and calls on all States that have not yet done so to subscribe to **The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation**.

PILLAR III – PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY

32. The Council reaffirms its support for the inalienable **right of NPT States Parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy and technology for peaceful purposes** without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of the Treaty, as reflected in its article IV, including in the framework of the IAEA's Technical Cooperation Programme, in accordance with its Statute.
33. The Council recognises the **possible contribution of nuclear science and technology in areas like human health, agriculture, food security and safety, water management, climate change, environmental protection, or preservation of cultural and natural heritage**. All these areas are directly linked to the 2030 Agenda and the IAEA has an important role to play therein. The Council appreciates the IAEA's activities in this regard, including the important initiatives launched by its Director General, such as Rays of Hope, ZODIAC, NUTEC Plastics and Atoms4Food. It also highlights the successful holding in 2024 of the *IAEA Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Science, Technology and Applications and the Technical Cooperation Programme*, and acknowledges the Ministerial Declaration adopted therein as a demonstration of growing interest in the use of nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes.
34. The Council underscores that the EU and its Member States continue to support activities to facilitate cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear technologies and provide technical expertise and know-how. EU Member States are among the largest donors to the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme. The European Commission also contributes, including through in-kind support provided by its Joint Research Centre, both to the IAEA and through bilateral projects.

35. The Council acknowledges the need to ensure energy security and respect the right of States to decide on their energy mix and choose the most appropriate technologies to collectively achieve the 2030 climate target and potentially mitigate the consequences of **global warming**. The Council acknowledges the unique value of the scientific data accumulated by the CTBTO Provisional Technical Secretariat since 1996 and made available for scientific studies and purposes, which contribute to the understanding and mitigation of climate change. The Council also underscores the crucial contribution of relevant IMS stations to the International Tsunami Information Center established in the framework of UNESCO.
36. The Council reiterates its commitment to the **highest standards of nuclear safety, security and safeguards**, essential to a responsible, safe and secure development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The European Commission through Euratom has guaranteed for decades nuclear materials controls in Europe and acted as a reliable partner to the IAEA in the domain of nuclear safeguards. It remains an essential supporting pillar, contributing substantially to global non-proliferation efforts. The Council stresses the IAEA's central role in this regard and the EU's significant contribution, including through the European Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation and *Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/656 of 19 February 2024 on Union support for the activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency in the area of nuclear security*.
37. The Council encourages all States that have not yet done so to adhere to **international nuclear safety and security conventions**, including the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its Amendment and the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, and other instruments such as the IAEA Code of Conduct on Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. The Council stresses the need to improve continuously nuclear safety and security for the development and deployment of new technology for the entire fuel cycle, including related to concepts of **small modular reactors**. Given that some partner countries opt for nuclear energy, the Council reiterates the necessity to continue to promote and support the highest nuclear safety, environmental and transparency standards, regionally, in the immediate vicinity of EU borders, and globally.

38. The Council is concerned over the potential implications of **armed attacks against nuclear facilities** devoted to peaceful purposes, recalls the importance of upholding the IAEA's seven pillars for ensuring nuclear safety and security in armed conflicts, and calls upon States to refrain from such actions, in accordance with international law. The Council highlights the difficulty of implementing nuclear safeguards and verification of diversion of nuclear materials under armed conflict situations and the consequent risks to nuclear proliferation. We note the relevant IAEA General Conference resolutions regarding armed attacks against nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes, in accordance with international law, including the UN Charter, the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols thereto.
39. The Council reiterates its grave concern over the **nuclear safety and security risks caused by Russia's unjustified and illegal full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine**. It recalls the importance of upholding the IAEA's seven pillars for ensuring nuclear safety and security in armed conflicts and five principles for ensuring nuclear safety and security at Ukraine's ZNPP. Any future potential restart of the reactors at this plant can only be considered once the safety and security conditions have been met and the facility has been returned to the legitimate control and oversight of Ukraine's competent regulatory authority. Any attempt to connect this plant with Russia's energy grid is unacceptable and would further exacerbate the already serious nuclear safety risks. The Council confirms its strong support to the IAEA's missions at all of Ukraine's nuclear facilities, as well as its monitoring at electrical substations. The EU urges Russia to refrain from carrying attacks on such infrastructure, which constitute a serious threat to nuclear safety and security.
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