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## LEGISLATIVE ACTS AND OTHER INSTRUMENTS

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Subject: COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2642 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia's destabilizing activities

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**COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2024/...**

**of ...**

**implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2642  
concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia's destabilizing activities**

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2024/2642 of 8 October 2024 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia's destabilizing activities<sup>1</sup>, and in particular Article 13(1) thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,

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<sup>1</sup> OJ L, 2024/2642, 9.10.2024, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2642/oj>.

Whereas:

- (1) On 8 October 2024, the Council adopted Regulation (EU) 2024/2642.
- (2) In its conclusions of 17 October 2024, the European Council stated that the Union and the Member States will continue to strengthen their resilience and make full use of the EU hybrid toolbox to prevent, deter and respond to Russia's hybrid activities.
- (3) The Union remains unwavering in its condemnation of Russia's malign activities directed against the Union, its Member States, international organisations and third countries.
- (4) In view of the gravity of the situation, the Council considers that 16 natural persons and 3 legal persons should be added to the list of natural and legal persons, entities and bodies set out in Annex I to Regulation (EU) 2024/2642.
- (5) Regulation (EU) 2024/2642 should therefore be amended accordingly,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

*Article 1*

Annex I to Regulation (EU) 2024/2642 is amended in accordance with the Annex to this Regulation.

*Article 2*

This Regulation shall enter into force on the date of its publication in the *Official Journal of the European Union*.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at ..., ...

*For the Council*

*The President*

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**ANNEX**



Annex I to Regulation (EU) 2024/2642 is amended as follows:

(1) the following subheading and table are added:

‘A. Natural persons

	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
1.	Artem Sergeevich KUREEV (Russian: Артём Сергеевич КУРЕЕВ)	Officer of the 5th Service of the Federal Security Service, Editor-in-chief of the “African Initiative”, Founder of “Rusafro” DOB: 24.10.1980 POB: USSR (now Russian Federation) Nationality: Russian Gender: male Passport number: 4002209800 Tax Identification Number (INN): 782500167259	Artem Sergeevich Kureev is a Russian Federal Security Service officer involved in malign activities, namely coordinated disinformation campaigns, both in Europe and Africa. He conducts influence campaigns in Europe, including by organising the dissemination of articles in Russian and their English translations on proxy websites and making payments for the publication of pro-Russian articles, with the aim of spreading Russian disinformation in Europe. He founded two media outlets in Africa and conducted deliberate disinformation campaigns aiming at undermining Western health projects in Africa by spreading conspiracy theories such as the alleged use of Africa for biological warfare experiments and illicit trials of various drugs by Western pharmaceutical companies.  Therefore, Artem Sergeevich Kureev is implementing actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union or in third countries by planning and directing the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.	+

+ OJ: please insert the date of entry into force of this Regulation.

	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
2.	Nikolai Aleksandrovich TUPIKIN (Russian: Николай Александрович ТУПИКИН)	Executive director of the Structura National Technologies a.k.a. GK Struktura POB: USSR (now Russian Federation) Nationality: Russian Gender: male Tax Identification Number (INN): 773402066160	Nikolai Aleksandrovich Tupikin is the head and founder of Structura National Technologies (GK Struktura). The company has been involved in the so-called “Doppelganger” campaign, a Russian-led digital disinformation campaign aimed at manipulating information and spreading disinformation in support of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and targeting the Union’s Member States, the United States and Ukraine. He works in close coordination with the Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation. He has also been one of the key figures in Russia’s disinformation campaign across Latin America aiming at undermining support for Ukraine.  Therefore, Nikolai Aleksandrovich Tupikin is implementing actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union or in third countries by planning and directing the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference. He is also associated with Sofia Avraamovna Zakharova, department head in the Office of the President of the Russian Federation for the Development of Information and Communication Technologies and Communications Infrastructure.	+

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	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
3.	Sofia Avraamovna ZAKHAROVA (Russian: Софиа Авраамовна ЗАХАРОВА)	Department head in the Office of the President of the Russian Federation for the Development of Information and Communication Technologies and Communications Infrastructure  POB: USSR (now Russian Federation)  Nationality: Russian  Gender: female	Sofia Avraamovna Zakharova is the department head in the Office of the President of the Russian Federation for the Development of Information and Communication Technologies and Communications Infrastructure. She has been involved in the so-called “Doppelganger” campaign aimed at manipulating information and spreading disinformation in support of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and targeting the Union’s Member States, the United States and Ukraine. She has been working directly with Ilya Gambashidze and Nikolai Tupikin, heads of Social Design Agency and GK Struktura, respectively, on this operation. She has also been one of the team leaders and active members of the so-called “Team I” lead by Ilya Gambashidze, which stands behind the Kremlin’s campaign for disinformation in the West, interfering in the elections of different countries, and is preparing projects to discredit the Russian opposition.  Therefore, Sofia Avraamovna Zakharova is implementing actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union or in third countries by planning and directing the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.	+

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	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
4.	Andrey Vladimirovich AVERYANOV  (Russian: Андрей Владимирович АВЕРЬЯНОВ)	Commander of GRU unit 29155  Major General  DOB: 29.9.1967  POB: USSR (now Russian Federation)  Nationality: Russian  Gender: male  Tax Identification Number (INN): 773378888007	Andrey Vladimirovich Averyanov is a high-ranking military official of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU). After the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin and the restructuring of the Wagner Group, the command of Russian military operations in Africa was restructured and placed under the Africa Corps under the umbrella of the Russian Ministry of Defence, and Averyanov was placed in charge of the operations. In many African countries, Russian forces provide security to military juntas that have overthrown legitimate democratic governments, gravely worsening the stability, security and democracy of the countries.  In addition, Russian forces in Africa exploit the natural resources there to finance their operations. In the beginning of 2024, Russian forces took control of the Intahaka gold mine in Mali.  Therefore, Andrey Vladimirovich Averyanov is implementing actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in third countries by undermining the democratic political process in the African countries where Russian forces operate and by exploiting an armed conflict, instability or insecurity, including through the illicit exploitation or trade of natural resources and wildlife in a third country.	+

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	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
5.	<p>Tinatin Givievna KANDELAKI</p> <p>a.k.a.</p> <p>Tina KANDELAKI</p> <p>(Russian: Тинатин Гивиевна КАНДЕЛАКИ)</p>	<p>Journalist, public figure, celebrity, TV presenter and producer, Deputy General Director of Gazprom Media Holding</p> <p>DOB: 10.11.1975</p> <p>POB: Tbilisi, Georgian SSR (now Georgia)</p> <p>Nationality: Georgian</p> <p>Gender: female</p>	<p>Tinatin Givievna Kandelaki is a Russian journalist employed by the state-owned company Gazprom Media, and a public figure who has been using her popularity and influence in the public sphere to voice Russian propaganda and to justify the ongoing Russian war of aggression against Ukraine. She was among those who performed during the Luzhniki stadium concert of 18 March 2022 that marked the 8th anniversary of the illegal annexation of Crimea and served as a symbol of support for the ongoing war in Ukraine. After 2014, she fully supported the illegal annexation of Crimea. Moreover, she is a Deputy General Director of Gazprom Media Holding, a holding of several media outlets that spread anti-Ukrainian propaganda and justify Russian aggression against Ukraine.</p> <p>Several TV channels owned and governed by Gazprom Media Holding have replaced Ukrainian TV outlets on local TV frequencies previously seized forcefully by Russians after the Russian invasion of Crimea and have thus actively participated in the process of the illegal annexation of Crimea.</p> <p>Therefore, Tinatin Givievna Kandelaki is responsible for, implementing, supporting or benefiting from actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in one or several of its Member States, in an international organisation, or in a third country, or which undermine or threaten the sovereignty or independence of one or several of its Member States, or of a third country, by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.</p>	+

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	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
6.	Vladimir Vladimirovich SERGIYENKO  (Russian: Владимир Владимирович СЕРГИЕНКО)	Former assistant of Member of Bundestag Eugen Schmidt  DOB: 23.5.1971  POB: Lviv, Ukrainian SSR (now Ukraine)  Nationality: Russian / Ukrainian  Gender: male	Vladimir Vladimirovich Sergiyenko is a former parliamentary assistant of the Member of the German Bundestag, Eugen Schmidt. In parallel, Sergiyenko actively colluded with Russian intelligence officers seeking to leverage his privileged parliamentary and political access to the detriment of the democratic political process and constitutional order of the Federal Republic of Germany.  Therefore, Vladimir Vladimirovich Sergiyenko implemented and supported actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law and security in the Federal Republic of Germany by engaging in, directly or indirectly, the obstruction or undermining of the democratic political process.	+

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	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
7.	Denis Alexandrovich SMOLYANINOV  (Russian: Денис Александрович СМОЛЯНИНОВ)	GRU colonel DOB: 26.8.1976 POB: Chelyabinsk, USSR (now Russian Federation) Nationality: Russian Gender: male Passport number: 672904784466	<p>Denis Alexandrovich Smolyaninov is a GRU colonel who specialises in psychological operations. He is in charge of the Ukrainian direction of the GRU. Lists of mercenaries to be sent to the Donbass passed through the Ukrainian direction. He also supervised two private military companies (PMCs) associated with the Ministry of Defense: Longifolia, a military company of crime bosses from the 1990s, through which contacts were established with Western PMCs, and Convoy, the military security company. Shortly before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, he deployed an agent network in Ukraine. He uses Telegram channels to spread disinformation, including in Ukraine. Through social media he recruits agents for sabotage activities in the Union and other activities aimed at creating tensions between NATO countries.</p> <p>The GRU is responsible for actively preparing explosions, arson and damage to infrastructure on Union territory, with the goal of slowing down the supply of weapons to Ukraine and of creating discord and the appearance of dissatisfaction with support for Ukraine in Europe.</p> <p>Therefore, Denis Alexandrovich Smolyaninov is responsible for, implementing, supporting or benefiting from actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union or in third countries by planning and directing acts of violence, and by facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.</p>	+

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	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
8.	Vladimir/ Volodymyr LIPCHENKO  (Russian: Володимир ЛИПЧЕНКО)	GRU officer DOB: 28.9.1974 POB: Mykolaiv, Ukrainian SSR (now Ukraine) Nationality: Russian Gender: male Passport number: 4015400649	Vladimir Lipchenko is a GRU officer responsible for hybrid attacks in Europe under his pseudonym “Wlodek Lyakh”. He is part of a special department led by GRU Colonel Denis Alexandrovich Smolyaninov, set up to conduct sabotage activities in Western countries. He recruited a person to set fire to the Museum of the Occupation in Riga by throwing Molotov cocktails.  Therefore, Vladimir Lipchenko is responsible for or implementing actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union by planning and directing acts of violence.	+

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	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
9.	Yuriy SIZOV (Russian: Юрий СИЗОВ)	GRU military officer DOB: 17.2.1988 POB: St. Petersburg, USSR (now Russian Federation) Nationality: Russian Gender: male Passport number: 784805190577	Yuriy Sizov is a GRU military officer. He serves in military unit No 92154. He personally gave instructions to recruit agents to target a hypermarket in Kyiv and recorded a video tutorial on installing an explosive device in one of the stores of the same chain in the Moscow region. He was also responsible for orchestrating sabotage in Ukraine in the Lviv region in February 2024. He supervised and gave orders to the Russian intelligence agents involved in the planned sabotage activity.  Therefore, Yuriy Sizov is responsible for, implementing, supporting or benefiting from actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union by planning and directing acts of violence.	+

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	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
10.	<p>Visa Nokhayeovich MIZAEV (Виса Нохаевич МИЗАЕВ) a.k.a. Vishan Nochaevic MIZAYEV; Vysa Nokhaevich MIZAEV; Visa Nokhaievych MIZAIEV; Oleg SHISHKIN</p>	<p>Entrepreneur DOB: 9.7.1963 POB: Grozny, USSR (now Russian Federation) Nationality: Russian Gender: male Passport No 753870064 (Russian Federation) Passport No PRE0018440 (Federation of Saint Christopher and Nevis) Tax Identification Number (INN): 481101523410</p>	<p>Visa Nokhayeovich Mizaev is a Russian entrepreneur. He played a key role in a Russian intelligence operation against the German Federal Intelligence Service (BND) in which he instigated his accomplices to procure highly classified information from the BND and to pass it to the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB). Therefore, Visa Nokhayeovich Mizaev implements and supports actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the security in the Federal Republic of Germany by attempting to destabilise the constitutional order.</p>	+

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	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
11.	Olga Alekseevna BELYAVTSEVA  (Ольга Алексеевна БЕЛЯВЦЕВА)  a.k.a. Olha Oleksiyivna BIELIAVTSEVA;  Olga Alekseevna BELJIAWZEWA;  Olga Alekseevna MIZAEV	Entrepreneur  DOB: 25.10.1969  POB: Lipetsk, USSR (now Russian Federation)  Nationality: Russian  Gender: female  Passport No 768613166 (Russian Federation)  Tax Identification Number (INN): 481100083621	Olga Alekseevna Belyavtseva is a Russian entrepreneur. She is the wife and business partner of Visa Nokhayevich Mizaev. She is associated with Visa Nokhayevich Mizaev through the co-ownership of the two Russia-based Limited Liability Companies “OOO Agronom-sad” and “OOO Biplast”. She founded those companies and was the single shareholder before transferring 30 % of the shares for each company after their marriage in 2018. Moreover, Belyavtseva and Mizaev had a similar ownership arrangement over the company Agronom-Sad Trading before Mizaev sold his shares to Belyavtseva on 22 February 2023 in direct temporal connection with Visa Mizaev’s involvement in the Russian intelligence operation against the Federal Republic of Germany, providing Mizaev with additional liquidity and concealing his asset base.  Therefore, Olga Alekseevna Belyavtseva supports natural or legal persons, entities or bodies engaged in implementing actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the security of the Federal Republic of Germany. She is also associated with Visa Nokhayevich Mizaev.	+

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	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
12.	Timofey Vyacheslavovich BORDACHEV (Russian: Тимофей Вячеславович БОРДАЧЕВ)	Political scientist DOB: 28.1.1973 POB: St. Petersburg, USSR (now Russian Federation) Nationality: Russian Gender: male	Timofey Vyacheslavovich Bordachev is a Russian political scientist and international affairs specialist. He is the Programme Director of the Valdai Discussion Club, Academic Supervisor of the Centre for Comprehensive European and International Studies at the National Research University – Higher School of Economics, as well as member of the Council for Foreign and Defence Policy.  Through his activities, he substantially contributes to the ideological base and rationalisation of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and aggressive policies of the Kremlin, including by promoting the view that neither Ukraine as a state nor its government are legitimate.  Therefore, Timofey Vyacheslavovich Bordachev is responsible for or supporting actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the sovereignty or independence of Ukraine by engaging in and supporting the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.	+

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	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
13.	Harouna DOUAMBA	<p>Businessman, director of the Groupe Panafricain pour le Commerce et l'investissement</p> <p>DOB: 8.1.1973</p> <p>POB: Cocody, Ivory Coast</p> <p>Nationality: Ivorian</p> <p>Gender: male</p>	<p>Harouna Douamba is an Ivorian businessman, and the head of a pro-Russian, anti-Western disinformation network in the Central African Republic (CAR) and Burkina Faso.</p> <p>In 2011, Douamba founded a non-governmental organisation called <i>Aimons Notre Afrique</i> (ANACOM) in the CAR. That organisation received funding from Lobaye Invest, which has been associated with the Wagner Group. In 2022, Harouna Douamba established the <i>Groupe Panafricain pour le Commerce et l'Investissement</i> (GPCI) in Burkina Faso. GPCI has been involved in covert influence operations.</p> <p>Harouna Douamba's disinformation networks were dismantled by Meta in May 2021, and later in May 2023. Despite this, GPCI-related disinformation groups are still active and running structured and coordinated disinformation campaigns, with the use of a vast network of information chains. Those campaigns target France in particular, including through accusations of conspiracy, terrorism, destabilisation operations or preparing coups against the Union or its Member States.</p> <p>Therefore, Harouna Douamba is supporting and implementing actions or policies of the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in a Member State or in a third country by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.</p>	+

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	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
14.	Anatolii PRIZENKO	<p>Businessman, employed by the Oriflame Cosmetics S.A. company</p> <p>DOB: 26.11.1974</p> <p>POB: Moldovan SSR (now Moldova)</p> <p>Nationality: Moldovan</p> <p>Gender: male</p>	<p>Anatolii Prizenko is a Moldovan businessman working for the Oriflame Cosmetics S.A. company. In late October 2023, he coordinated the dispatch of several Moldovan citizens to France, where they painted stars of David on the streets in exchange for financial compensation. That operation was widely reported by the media and had a significant destabilising effect, in the context of the conflict between Israel and Hamas following the attacks on 7 October 2023. The images of that operation were first spread by the Recent Reliable News media network, which is associated with the Government of the Russian Federation and used by Russian actors to conduct disinformation campaigns.</p> <p>Anatolii Prizenko publicly took responsibility for his role as the organiser of that operation. According to media reports, that destabilising operation was carried out for the benefit of the Russian military intelligence service, the GRU, and aimed at fuelling tensions in French society.</p> <p>Therefore, Anatolii Prizenko is responsible for, implementing, supporting or benefiting from actions or policies of the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the stability in a Member State and therefore, in the Union by planning, directing, or engaging in, directly or indirectly, the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.</p>	+

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	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
15.	Alesia MILORADOVICH or Alesya MILORADOVICH or Olesya MILORADOVIC  Алесья МИЛОРАДОВИЧ or Олеся МИЛОРАДОВИЧ	Russian Government employee,  “Foreign Affairs Facilitator”  Associate of the project “Foreign journalists for Russia” (“Иностранцы за Россию”)  DOB: 10.3.1968  POB: Angarsk, USSR (now Russian Federation)  Nationality: Russian  Gender: female	Alesya Miloradovich is a collaborator of the Government of the Russian Federation in France, and calls herself a “foreign affairs facilitator”.  Alesya Miloradovich organised a so-called “electoral observation” mission in the Ukrainian territories illegally occupied by Russia, in the context of the referendum on the annexation of those regions to Russia, and recruited French nationals who participated in the mission. She publicly admitted that she did this for the benefit of the Russian Government.  She was also a co-organiser of trips for French children to the Artek International Children Center in illegally annexed Crimea, which were funded by the Government of the Russian Federation. She has also been involved in the Russian propaganda project “Foreign journalists for Russia” and has participated in spreading pro-Russian views, including by claiming that French and Western societies support Russian actions against Ukraine.  Therefore, Alesya Miloradovich is responsible for, implementing, supporting or benefiting from actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in a third country by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, or otherwise facilitating the obstruction or undermining of the democratic political process of a third country, including by attempting to destabilise its constitutional order.	+

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	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
16.	Oleg Sergeevich EREMENKO (Russian: Олег Сергеевич ЕРЕМЕНКО)	Representative of Officers of Russia, former GRU officer DOB: 18.5.1978 POB: Bishkek, Kyrgyz SSR (now Kyrgyzstan) Nationality: Russian Gender: Male	Oleg Sergeevich Eremenko is a former GRU officer and an active member of various Russian influence groups. Notably, he is a member of “Officers of Russia” an organisation used by the Russian military and security services to influence domestic politics by cultivating links to veterans amongst the Russian diaspora and to retired military and security personnel of former Soviet-allied armed forces, in which he serves as their main representative in Germany. In that capacity, Oleg Sergeevich Eremenko is associated with the EU designated entities Rossotrudnitschestvo, which is the operator of the “Russian House” in Berlin, and the Wagner Group. In his role as an envoy of the Russian state security apparatus, Oleg Sergeevich Eremenko is cultivating links to and supporting anti-democratic organisations within Germany. He is well connected with far-left anti-democratic groups and groups of former personnel of outlawed GDR security services and veterans of GDR military formations, such as Desant e.V., a pro-Russian association of former paratroopers.  Therefore, Oleg Sergeevich Eremenko is supporting actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Federal Republic of Germany by undermining the democratic political process, including by attempting to destabilise its constitutional order.	+

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(2) the following subheading and table are added:

‘B. Legal persons, entities and bodies

	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
1.	GRU Unit 29155 ФКУ “Войсковая Часть 29155”	Place of registration: 105077, Moscow 11th Parkovaya Street, 38A  Registration No: 7719737879  OGRN: 1097746770395	GRU Unit 29155 is a covert unit within the Russian military intelligence agency (GRU), known for its involvement in foreign assassinations and destabilisation activities across Europe. Through coups, assassinations, bombings, and cyberattacks against other countries around the world in connection with the war in Ukraine, it has sought to create chaos and destabilise European Union countries. By carrying out such actions, it seeks to help and benefit Russia. GRU Unit 29155 carried out cyberattacks and other attacks against critical infrastructure. Therefore, it is responsible for, implementing, supporting or benefiting from actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in one or several of its Member States by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating acts of violence, as well as planning, directing, engaging in, supporting or otherwise facilitating any actions aimed at interfering with, damaging or destroying, including through sabotage or malicious cyber activities as part of hybrid activities, critical infrastructure.	+

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	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
2.	Groupe Panafricain pour le Commerce et l'Investissement GPCI	Place of registration: Lomé, Togo Date of registration: January 2022	<p><i>Groupe Panafricain pour le Commerce et l'Investissement</i> (GPCI) is a disinformation network carrying out pro-Russian covert influence operations, particularly in the Central African Republic and Burkina Faso. GPCI was dismantled by Meta in May 2023. Despite this, GPCI is still active and is running structured and coordinated disinformation campaigns with the use of a vast network of information chains. Those campaigns target France in particular, including through accusations of conspiracy, terrorism, destabilisation operations or preparing coups against the Union or its Member States. GPCI has been indirectly funded by the Wagner Group.</p> <p>Therefore, GPCI is responsible for, implementing and supporting actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, stability or security in the Union or in one or several of its Member States by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.</p>	+

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	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
3.	African Initiative	Place of Registration: Moscow, Russia  Date of registration: September 2023	<p>African Initiative is a news agency that operates on the African continent. It has been involved in spreading Russian propaganda and disinformation against the West, and has hired journalists and influencers for the purpose of spreading Russian propaganda. It has also organised press tours for African journalists in the illegally occupied territories of Ukraine, during which pro-Russian narratives about the war were spread. African Initiative has also organised events serving the interests of the Government of the Russian Federation, including by facilitating access to mineral resources.</p> <p>Therefore, African Initiative is responsible for or supporting actions and policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability and security in the Union or in one or several of its Member States or in a third country by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.</p>	+

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