



Council of the
European Union

Brussels, 10 December 2024
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LEGISLATIVE ACTS AND OTHER INSTRUMENTS

Subject: COUNCIL DECISION amending Decision (CFSP) 2017/1775 concerning
restrictive measures in view of the situation in Mali

COUNCIL DECISION (CFSP) 2024/...

of ...

**amending Decision (CFSP) 2017/1775
concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Mali**

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union and in particular Article 29 thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,

Whereas:

- (1) On 28 September 2017, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2017/1775¹.
- (2) On 13 December 2021, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2021/2208², which established a new framework providing for additional restrictive measures against individuals and entities responsible for or complicit in, or having engaged, directly or indirectly, in, actions or policies that threaten the peace, security or stability of Mali, or obstructing or undermining the successful completion of Mali's political transition.
- (3) On the basis of a review of the restrictive measures provided for in Article 1(1) and Article 2(1) and (2) of Decision (CFSP) 2017/1775, those measures should be renewed until 14 December 2025 and the reasons in the entries for three of the persons included in the lists of natural or legal persons, entities or bodies in the Annex to that Decision should be amended.
- (4) Decision (CFSP) 2017/1775 should therefore be amended accordingly,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

¹ Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/1775 of 28 September 2017 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Mali (OJ L 251, 29.9.2017, p. 23).

² Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/2208 of 13 December 2021 amending Decision (CFSP) 2017/1775 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Mali (OJ L 446, 14.12.2021, p. 44).

Article 1

Decision (CFSP) 2017/1775 is amended as follows:

- (1) in Article 8, paragraph 1 is replaced by the following:
- ‘1. The measures referred to in Article 1(1) and Article 2(1) and (2) shall apply until 14 December 2025 and shall be kept under constant review. They shall be renewed, or amended, as appropriate, if the Council deems that their objectives have not been met.’;
- (2) the Annex is amended as set out in the Annex to this Decision.

Article 2

This Decision shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the *Official Journal of the European Union*.

Done at ..., ...

For the Council
The President

ANNEX

The Annex to Decision (CFSP) 2017/1775 is amended as follows:

- (1) the title of Section A is replaced by ‘A. List of natural persons referred to in Article 1(1)’;
- (2) in Section A (‘List of natural persons referred to in Article 1(1)’) entries 2, 3 and 4 are replaced by the following:

	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
‘2.	WAGUÉ, Ismaël	Place of birth: Bamako Date of birth: 2.3.1975 Nationality: Malian Passport number: diplomatic passport AA0193660 valid until 15.2.2023 Gender: male Position: Minister for Reconciliation, Colonel- Major	Colonel-Major Ismaël Wagué is a key member of Colonel Assimi Goïta’s inner circle and was one of the main actors responsible for the 18 August 2020 coup, alongside Colonel Goïta, Colonel Sadio Camara, Colonel Modibo Koné and Colonel Malick Diaw. On 19 August 2020, he announced that the army had taken power, and he then became spokesperson for the National Committee for the Salvation of the People (<i>Comité national pour le salut du peuple, CNSP</i>). Ismaël Wagué is therefore responsible for actions that threaten the peace, security and stability of Mali. As Minister for Reconciliation in the Transition Government since October 2020, Ismaël Wagué was in charge of the implementation of the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali.	4.2.2022

	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
			<p>Through his statement in October 2021 and his perpetual disagreements with the members of the Permanent Strategic Framework (<i>Cadre Stratégique Permanent, CSP</i>), he contributed to the blocking of the Monitoring Committee of the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali (<i>Comité de suivi de l'accord, CSA</i>), which led to the suspension of CSA meeting from October 2021 to September 2022. That situation obstructed the implementation of that Agreement, which was one of the “missions” of the political transition of Mali, as provided for in Article 2 of the Transition Charter.</p> <p>On 25 January 2024, the Transition Government denounced the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali and declared its immediate termination. Since that date, there has been a significant increase in the authoritarian constraints imposed by the Transition Government.</p> <p>The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) adopted individual sanctions against the Transition Authorities (including Ismaël Wagué) in November 2021 for their delay in organising the elections and the completion of the political transition of Mali. On 3 July 2022, ECOWAS decided to maintain those individual sanctions.</p> <p>Ismaël Wagué is therefore responsible for actions that threaten the peace, security and stability of Mali, and is obstructing and undermining the successful completion of the political transition of Mali.</p>	

	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
3.	MAÏGA, Choguel	<p>Place of birth: Tabango, Gao, Mali</p> <p>Date of birth: 31.12.1958</p> <p>Nationality: Malian</p> <p>Passport number: diplomatic passport DA0004473, issued by Mali, Schengen visa issued</p> <p>Gender: male</p> <p>Position: former Prime Minister</p>	<p>As Prime Minister from June 2021 to November 2024, Choguel Maïga led the Transition Government of Mali established following the coup of 24 May 2021.</p> <p>Contrary to the timetable for reform and elections previously agreed with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in line with the Transition Charter, he announced in June 2021 the organisation of the National Consultations for Refoundation (<i>Assises nationales de la refondation, ANR</i>) as a pre-reform process and a precondition to the organisation of the elections scheduled for 27 February 2022.</p> <p>As announced by Choguel Maïga, the ANR were then postponed several times and the elections delayed. The ANR, which were eventually held in December 2021, were boycotted by multiple stakeholders. On the basis of the final recommendations of the ANR, the Transition Government presented a new timetable providing for the holding of presidential elections in December 2025, thus allowing the Transition Authorities to stay in power for more than five years. Following a revised timetable presented in June 2022, providing for the holding of presidential elections in March 2024, the Transition Government announced on 21 September 2023 a further postponement of the elections.</p>	4.2.2022

	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
			<p>On 25 January 2024, the Transition Government denounced the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali and declared its immediate termination. Since that date, there has been a significant increase in the authoritarian constraints imposed by the Transition Government.</p> <p>ECOWAS adopted individual sanctions against the Transition Authorities (including Choguel Maïga) in November 2021 for their delay in organising the elections and the completion of the political transition of Mali. ECOWAS underlined that the Transition Authorities have used the need to implement reforms as a pretext to justify the extension of the political transition of Mali and to maintain themselves in power without democratic elections. On 3 July 2022, ECOWAS decided to maintain those individual sanctions.</p> <p>On 21 November 2024, Choguel Maïga was dismissed as Prime Minister by junta leader Colonel Assimi Goïta, following criticism by Choguel Maïga of the military junta.</p> <p>As Prime Minister, Choguel Maïga was directly responsible for postponing the elections foreseen in the Transition Charter. Choguel Maïga was also directly responsible for the denunciation of the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, as well as for the authoritarian measures enacted by the Transition Government. Therefore, he has obstructed and undermined the successful completion of the political transition of Mali, in particular by obstructing and undermining the holding of elections and the handover of power to elected authorities.</p>	

	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
4.	MAÏGA, Ibrahim Ikassa	<p>Place of birth: Tondibi, Gao region, Mali</p> <p>Date of birth: 5.2.1971</p> <p>Nationality: Malian</p> <p>Passport number: diplomatic passport issued by Mali</p> <p>Gender: male</p> <p>Position: Minister of Refoundation</p>	<p>Ibrahim Ikassa Maïga is a member of the strategic committee of M5-RFP (<i>Mouvement du 5 juin – Rassemblement des forces patriotiques</i>), which played a key role in the overthrow of President Keita.</p> <p>As Minister of Refoundation since June 2021, Ibrahim Ikassa Maïga was entrusted with planning the National Consultations for Refoundation (<i>Assises nationales de la Refondation, ANR</i>) announced by Prime Minister Choguel Maïga.</p> <p>Contrary to the timetable for reform and elections previously agreed with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in line with the Transition Charter, the ANR were announced by the Transition Government as a pre-reform process and a precondition to the organisation of the elections scheduled for 27 February 2022.</p> <p>As announced by Choguel Maïga, the ANR were then postponed several times and the elections delayed. The ANR, which were eventually held in December 2021, were boycotted by multiple stakeholders. On the basis of the final recommendations of the ANR, the Transition Government presented a new timetable providing for the holding of presidential elections in December 2025, thus allowing the Transition Authorities to stay in power for more than five years. Following a revised timetable presented in June 2022, providing for the holding of presidential elections in March 2024, the Transition Government announced on 21 September 2023 a further postponement of the elections.</p>	4.2.2022’;

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			<p>On 25 January 2024, the Transition Government denounced the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali and declared its immediate termination. Since that date, there has been a significant increase in the authoritarian constraints imposed by the Transition Government.</p> <p>ECOWAS adopted individual sanctions against the Transition Authorities (including Ibrahim Ikassa Maïga) in November 2021 for their delay in organising the elections and the completion of the political transition of Mali. ECOWAS underlined that the Transition Authorities have used the need to implement reforms as a pretext to justify the extension of the political transition of Mali and to maintain themselves in power without democratic elections. On 3 July 2022, ECOWAS decided to maintain those individual sanctions.</p> <p>In his position as Minister of Refoundation, Ibrahim Ikassa Maïga is obstructing and undermining the successful completion of the political transition of Mali, in particular by obstructing and undermining the holding of elections and the handover of power to elected authorities.</p>	

(3) the title of Section B is replaced by ‘B. List of natural or legal persons, entities or bodies referred to in Article 2(1)’;

(4) in Section B (‘List of natural or legal persons, entities or bodies referred to in Article 2(1)’) entries 2, 3 and 4 are replaced by the following:

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			<p>Through his statement in October 2021 and his perpetual disagreements with the members of the Permanent Strategic Framework (<i>Cadre Stratégique Permanent, CSP</i>), he contributed to the blocking of the Monitoring Committee of the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali (<i>Comité de suivi de l'accord, CSA</i>), which led to the suspension of CSA meeting from October 2021 to September 2022. That situation obstructed the implementation of that Agreement, which was one of the “missions” of the political transition of Mali, as provided for in Article 2 of the Transition Charter.</p> <p>On 25 January 2024, the Transition Government denounced the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali and declared its immediate termination. Since that date, there has been a significant increase in the authoritarian constraints imposed by the Transition Government.</p> <p>The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) adopted individual sanctions against the Transition Authorities (including Ismaël Wagué) in November 2021 for their delay in organising the elections and the completion of the political transition of Mali. On 3 July 2022, ECOWAS decided to maintain those individual sanctions.</p> <p>Ismaël Wagué is therefore responsible for actions that threaten the peace, security and stability of Mali, and is obstructing and undermining the successful completion of the political transition of Mali.</p>	

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