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LABOUR MARKET AND WAGE DEVELOPMENTS IN EUROPE ANNUAL REVIEW 2025

European Commission

Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion

Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe

Annual review 2025

EUROPEAN ECONOMY

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FOREWORD

The remarkable performance of the EU labour market over the past years is strong testimony to the efforts made by the Member States to preserve our social model in a rapidly changing world. The job market has shown significant resilience, with robust employment growth and historically low unemployment. These achievements are particularly noteworthy given modest economic growth, accelerated structural transformations and mounting geopolitical tensions.

Nonetheless, challenges remain and new ones are emerging. The labour market has recently started to show some signs of weakness. The EU's productivity gap vis-à-vis many advanced economies is an additional concern. Moreover, one out of five workers is in low-wage jobs in sectors with limited productivity growth. Labour shortages also persist, in part due to poor working conditions in some sectors, and they are expected to increase on the back of demographic change and new skill needs.

This year's Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe report takes a deeper look at one of the most pressing issues we currently face: how to promote quality jobs, including adequate wages, and a competitive economy.

On a positive note, the report shows that the situation of low-wage earners has improved in recent years. This reflects our collective efforts to shield vulnerable workers from the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and energy crisis, through minimum wage increases and support measures. By contrast, middle-income workers, particularly in higher-income Member States, seem to struggle more as they have not experienced sufficient wage increases to cope with the consequences of high inflation.

To create more high-quality jobs and protect vulnerable workers, while keeping our economy competitive, we need to act fast and decisively. To achieve higher wage growth, boosting productivity is crucial, as it allows wages to grow. While higher wages can enhance productivity by motivating workers and driving companies to innovate, it is key for firms to compete on product quality rather than low costs. At the same time, to ensure that all workers benefit from productivity gains in an equitable manner, effective minimum wage protection and well-functioning collective bargaining are essential.

The Commission has already adopted several flagship initiatives that will help the EU to attain these goals. In particular, the Minimum Wage Directive supports low-wage earners and collective bargaining. The upcoming Quality Jobs Roadmap will further promote quality jobs, including fair wages.

The report also highlights that job retention schemes, if designed well, can be a powerful instrument to increase the resilience of our labour markets and safeguard jobs and incomes in times of economic downturns. During the pandemic, the support provided by the Support to mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency (SURE) instrument proved crucial. To be effective, national schemes need to be permanent, respond to shocks, in a timely fashion and be well-targeted towards affected firms and viable jobs as they may otherwise hold back transitions to more productive firms and better jobs. Social partners also have a key role to play in their implementation. Building on the positive experience with SURE, the Commission has proposed to establish a new crisis mechanism under the 2028–2034 Multiannual Financial Framework.

The challenges that our labour markets face today are multifaceted. Addressing them effectively is critical for Europe to navigate through the evolving geo-strategic landscape and achieve its pursuit of greater strategic independence in key sectors. Success is within our reach if we stand united, taking decisive and coordinated action at the EU and national levels.

Roxana Mînzatu

Executive Vice-President for Social Rights and Skills, Quality Jobs and Preparedness

CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF GRAPHS

LIST OF BOXES

SUMMARY AND MAIN FINDINGS

The EU labour market, which has been remarkably resilient over the past years, has started to slow.

In recent years, the EU labour market has shown remarkable resilience, with strong employment growth and historically low unemployment rates, despite weak economic growth and ongoing structural transformations. However, in 2024, the labour market showed signs of deceleration, with employment growth slowing to 0.8% from 1.2% in the previous year. Moreover, the recent shift in US trade policy is expected to adversely affect employment, both through heightened uncertainty and the imposition of higher tariffs on EU exports. The impact of tariff hikes is estimated to be unevenly distributed across sectors, reflecting their different exposures to the US market. Pharmaceuticals are likely to face the largest relative job losses, while wholesale and retail trade are expected to experience the greatest absolute employment decline.

Weaker employment growth coincides with a rise in restructuring announcements in key sectors.

In this context, announced job cuts due to restructuring are increasing, particularly in capital-intensive industries such as automotive, telecommunications, electrical equipment and pharmaceuticals, which have traditionally witnessed high productivity growth. The employment slowdown is more significant in countries with large manufacturing sectors, such as Czechia, Germany, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia, where employment is stagnating or declining.

Boosting productivity requires innovation and upskilling.

Since 2018, the share of manufacturing's added value has declined faster than its share of employment, resulting in lower productivity compared with the rest of the economy. The declining role of manufacturing as an engine of growth is a notable change from historical patterns. This in turn has increased the reliance on the services sector to sustain productivity growth. Tackling low productivity growth requires faster technology adoption and a stronger focus on innovation and knowledge-driven activities. Policies can play a crucial role in supporting the upgrading of workers' skills and promoting job creation in future-oriented occupations and industries.

Changes in job composition have supported productivity growth, but challenges remain.

Despite the overall decline of manufacturing, high-skilled, high-paying jobs in high-productivity growth sectors such as pharmaceuticals and telecommunications have grown by nearly one-third since 2012. At the same time, low-skilled, low-paid jobs in manufacturing and retail have declined due to automation, capital investment and increasing skill levels. However, nearly one third of jobs remain in low- and medium-wage jobs in low-productivity growth sectors such as transport, hospitality and domestic services. While these sectors have experienced limited productivity gains in the past decades, they remain essential to society and are key to ensuring a dynamic and inclusive economy. At the same time, the increasing presence of highly skilled workers in low-productivity sectors may signal an inefficient use of human capital.

While real wages have improved, ensuring they are adequate remains a challenge.

Real wages began recovering in the second half of 2023, after their sharp decline between the end of 2021 and the first half of 2023 due to high inflation. Growth accelerated in 2024, with real wages in the EU rising by 2.7%. In 2025, they are set to exceed their 2019 levels, except in a few Member States. In one third of Member States, real wages now significantly surpass pre-pandemic levels. In contrast, in Czechia, Germany, France, Italy and Finland they have yet to recover. Skills and labour shortages are driving up wages for some workers, but real wage growth is expected to slow down markedly. Overall, the risk that wage growth would trigger sizeable inflationary pressures is low. Over the medium term, low productivity growth, economic uncertainty and less tight labour markets will continue to constrain broader wage growth. In this context, ensuring adequate wages, a key component of job quality, remains a high policy priority.

The relative situation of low-wage earners has improved since the pandemic…

Since the COVID-19 pandemic, low-wage earners have experienced positive developments. Narrowing disparities between them and other workers, in terms of both disposable income and wages, are reflected in the decline in in-work poverty and the share of low-wage earners. This improvement is largely due to emergency support measures during the pandemic and energy crises, along with significant minimum wage increases in many Member States. The latter have also boosted wages which already were slightly above the minimum wage.

… but the middle class has become more vulnerable.

At the same time, since the pandemic, lower-middle and middle-wage earners, typically the core of the middle class, are increasingly struggling to afford basic goods and services. Many of these workers have not benefited from recent minimum wage increases or support measures. Their situation has worsened in most higher-income Member States where declines in real wages have been followed by a weak recovery in 2024. By contrast, in Member States where real wages have sizeably exceeded pre-pandemic levels, both low- and middle-wage earners have seen improvements.

Wage adequacy and productivity can reinforce each other – but this is not automatic.

To improve wage adequacy, enhancing productivity is essential, as it allows wages to grow without harming competitiveness. The EU continues to face persistently weak labour productivity growth, which limits the potential for higher wages. Higher wages can help to boost productivity in some cases, by increasing workers' motivation and driving companies to innovate. Rather than relying solely on low costs to promote competitiveness, strengthening non-cost competitiveness, such as product quality, can support wage and productivity growth at the same time. However, stronger productivity and wage growth together do not guarantee that all workers benefit adequately. Without safeguards, wage disparities across workers may increase, for instance through job polarisation.

Well-designed job retention schemes can safeguard employment and income during downturns.

Policies that protect jobs during downturns are crucial. Job retention schemes help to prevent unemployment spikes, maintain employment contracts and support incomes during crises. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the effectiveness of these schemes was demonstrated by their widespread use, which was financed partially through the EU's

Support to mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency (SURE) instrument. Active labour market policies, including skills training, employment incentives and job search assistance, are an important tool to support workers in job transitions during economic shifts.

During the pandemic, broad eligibility and simple administrative procedures boosted participation in job retention schemes.

During the pandemic, simplified administrative procedures and broad eligibility for companies and workers boosted participation in job retention schemes and helped to preserve employment. By contrast, conditions like mandatory training or dismissal bans reduced companies' participation, despite being beneficial for workers. At the same time, although broad coverage helped job retention, it was associated with lower productivity after two to three years.

Job retention schemes must balance job preservation with necessary employment adjustment.

The extensive use of job retention schemes during the pandemic offers important lessons for the future. They are most effective during temporary downturns, helping employers retain their employees. Their design must carefully balance employment preservation with the need for efficient resource reallocation. When used, these schemes should therefore target the most affected companies and workers, while avoiding long-term support for non-viable jobs in inefficient firms. As conditions improve, they should be gradually phased out to allow job reallocation. Permanent and flexible job retention schemes that can be rapidly activated during crises can boost economic resilience and adapt to emerging challenges. Furthermore, the involvement of social partners in their activation can help to ensure the adequate targeting and fair sharing of costs between relevant stakeholders. Finally, employers' co-financing and experience ratings can limit their overuse.

When used during restructuring, job retention schemes should be accompanied by active labour market policies.

Recently, the use of job retention schemes has increased due to signs of a labour market slowdown, as well as structural shifts related to the green and digital transitions. These schemes, together with company restructuring plans and targeted training, can help workers to remain employed during companies' restructuring and support their reskilling and upskilling. However, when companies cannot restart their business after restructuring, such schemes may slow necessary job changes. To support workers in moving to new jobs, job retention schemes should be complemented with active labour market measures, such as training, tailored job search assistance and employment incentives.

EU policies support the shift towards high-productivity jobs while ensuring quality jobs and wage adequacy.

To foster high-quality jobs, wage adequacy and innovation-driven growth, the EU promotes policy measures and reforms aimed at raising productivity, upgrading skills and facilitating job transitions. Several EU initiatives are paving the way toward an innovation-centred growth model. The Competitiveness Compass seeks to reduce regulatory barriers and enhance investment in research and development (R&D), digitalisation and strategic sectors. The Union of Skills supports training and smooth job transitions. Initiatives such as the Skills Guarantee Pilot and the extension of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund may also help workers adapt. Enhancing job quality is crucial, in particular for low-wage workers in sectors with low productivity growth. This will also help alleviate acute labour shortages in these sectors. Moreover, boosting employment

and wage adequacy, while preserving competitiveness requires a range of policies to promote non-cost competitiveness, innovation and investment. It is also essential to ensure that all workers benefit from productivity gains, with minimum wages and collective bargaining playing a central role in protecting vulnerable workers, as highlighted in the Minimum Wage Directive. The forthcoming Quality Jobs Roadmap will further support adequate wages, good working conditions and fair job transitions for both workers and self-employed people.

1. GENERAL LABOUR MARKET CONDITIONS IN THE EU AND ITS MEMBER STATES

1.1. INTRODUCTION

The EU labour market has remained resilient in recent years, with strong employment growth and historically low unemployment. This was supported by robust labour demand, high profit margins, moderate real wage growth, and a growing labour force ([1]). After stagnating in 2023, EU economic growth picked up in the second half of 2024. GDP rose by 1.1% in 2024, up from 0.5% in 2023, but below the 2014-2019 average of 2.2%. At the end of 2024, the job vacancy rate had declined to 2.3%, 0.1 pp below the pre-pandemic peak. However, recent trends suggest a weakening labour market in 2025, as profit margins and labour demand fell back to pre-COVID levels in late 2024.

Elevated geopolitical tensions and trade policy uncertainty are weighing on the EU economy. In early 2025, the economic sentiment indicator declined, with confidence falling in industry, services and retail. Employment expectations dropped below their historical average for the first time since the pandemic. Services continued to grow faster than manufacturing, raising concerns about divergences between countries with different industrial structures. Looking ahead, rising tensions, trade barriers and uncertainty could further dampen investment and consumption, slow global growth and fuel inflation.

In the Spring European Economic Forecast, the growth outlook for 2025 has been revised downwards to 1.1% in the EU and 0.9% in the euro area, broadly in line with 2024 rates. This downward revision from 1.5% in the Autumn forecast mainly reflects the impact of higher tariffs and increased uncertainty stemming from shifts in US trade policy. Employment growth is expected to slow from 0.8% in 2024 (1.0% in the euro area) to 0.5% in both regions in 2025, while unemployment is set to remain at record lows (5.9%). Looking ahead, solid consumption, supported by real wage growth, is expected to drive GDP, while weaker external demand and subdued investment will weigh on growth. This trend is likely to favour services, with labour demand in manufacturing remaining subdued.

While labour market outcomes have been favourable in recent years, the sustainability of high employment growth is increasingly challenged by structural trends. Demographic change is slowing labour force expansion and driving labour and skill shortages, which in turn risks to hamper the EU growth potential and EU's competitiveness. The recent decline in manufacturing employment raises concerns about the service sector's ability to fully absorb displaced workers ([2]). Unlike in the past, this shift is not accompanied by stronger productivity growth in manufacturing compared to services, potentially limiting future employment and income gains. The EU's persistently weak productivity growth – especially compared to other advanced economies like the United States – is a major challenge, undermining competitiveness,

([1]) After the pandemic, the EU labour force has grown faster than both its pre-pandemic average and the working age population, leading to higher participation rates (see European Commission 2024a).

([2]) The decline in the manufacturing sector is not necessary the result of many workers being displaced as retiring workers may not be replaced by new hires. While this is important from the social policy perspective, the causes of these dynamic is less relevant for the description of the changes in the sectoral composition of employment and their links with productivity growth.

job creation, and economic resilience. Rising global trade uncertainty poses short- and long-term employment risks, notably for countries and sectors more reliant on international trade.

Against this backdrop, the chapter reviews recent labour market developments in the EU and its Member States. Section 1.2. sets the stage by analysing recent trends in labour demand and supply. It also examines the impact of announced job reductions linked to restructuring. Section 1.3. presents some early evidence of how increased trade uncertainty and potential changes in the US trade policy may affect employment. Section 1.4. explores job composition and whether job shifts over the past decade point to the transition towards a more productive service economy. Section 1.5. discusses the implications for policy and Section 1.5. concludes.

1.2. LABOUR MARKET DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EU AND ITS MEMBER STATES

In the last quarter of 2024, employment growth in the EU started to slow, while labour productivity showed modest signs of recovery from its previous downward trend. EU employment (in terms of persons) edged up by 0.1% in the third quarter of 2024 (0.2% in the euro area) and by 0.2% quarter-on-quarter in the fourth quarter (0.1% in the euro area). As a result, yearly employment growth slowed to 0.8% in 2024, down from 1.2% in 2023 and below the 2014-2019 average of 1.2% (Graph 1.1 and Table 1.1). In the euro area, employment growth fell to 1% from 1.4% in 2023. With economic activity picking up in the second half of the year, EU labour productivity (on headcount basis) started to recover, rising 0.3% annually (0.3% quarter-on-quarter in the third quarter and 0.2% in the fourth quarter), compared to a decline of 0.7% in 2023. In the euro area, productivity fell by 0.1%, an improvement from the sharper 0.8% drop recorded in 2023. In the first half of 2025, the decline in the unemployment rate came to a halt. Since the end of 2024, the number of unemployed increased by about 260 thousands, an increase largely offset by the growing labour force.

Table 1.1: **Unemployment, compensation per employee and GDP growth in the euro area and the EU (missing data not yet available)**

				Quarter over same quarter of the previous year						Quarter over previous quarter, % and pps					
		2023	2024	2024Q1	2024Q2	2024Q3	2024Q4	2025Q1	2025Q2	2024Q1	2024Q2	2024Q3	2024Q4	2025Q1	2025Q2
Unemployment rate	EA	6.6	6.4	-0.1	-0.1	-0.3	-0.4	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	0.2	0.0
	EU	6.1	5.9	0.1	0.0	-0.2	-0.3	-0.1	0.0	0.0	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	0.2	0.0
Unemployment growth	EA	-1.1	-1.0	0.1	-0.3	-3.4	-5.1	-1.8	-0.2	-0.3	-1.4	-1.4	-2.1	3.2	0.3
	EU	-1.9	-2.1	1.4	0.4	-1.6	-4.3	-0.8	1.0	-0.4	-1.4	-0.5	-2.0	3.2	0.3
Growth of nominal compensation per employee	EA	5.3	4.5	4.8	4.9	4.6	4.1	3.8		1.3	0.9	0.9	0.9	1.0	
	EU	6.0	5.3	5.7	5.5	5.4	4.6	4.5		1.5	1.0	1.0	0.9	1.4	
GDP growth	EA	0.6	0.9	0.6	0.6	1.0	1.3	1.5	1.4	0.4	0.2	0.4	0.3	0.6	0.1
	EU	0.5	1.1	0.7	0.9	1.2	1.5	1.6	1.5	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.2
Employment growth	EA	1.4	1.0	1.2	1.0	1.0	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.1
	EU	1.2	0.8	1.0	0.9	0.8	0.6	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.0	0.1
Inflation	EA	5.4	2.4	2.6	2.5	2.2	2.2	2.3	2.0	0.3	0.3	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.3
	EU	6.4	2.6	2.8	2.6	2.4	2.5	2.7	2.3	0.4	0.3	0.0	0.2	0.3	0.3
Inflation (Core)	EA	5.0	2.8	3.1	2.8	2.8	2.7	2.6	2.4	0.3	0.5	0.1	0.0	0.2	0.5
	EU	5.7	3.1	3.5	3.1	3.0	2.9	2.8	2.6	0.3	0.5	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.4

Note: For the unemployment rate changes are in percentage points (pps). EA: euro area. Q1: first quarter; Q2: second quarter; Q3: third quarter; Q4: fourth quarter. Seasonally adjusted data; 2025q2 average of monthly rates.

Source: Eurostat, National accounts, and Labour Force survey: (une_rt_q; namq_10_gdp) (namq_10_a10_e) (prc_hicp_manr) and (prc_hicp_mmor).

Graph 1.1: **Employment,, GDP, and productivity in the EU (growth rates on the same quarter of the previous year**



Source: Eurostat, National accounts, [namq_10_gdp] and [namq_10_a10_e].

1.2.1. Evolution of labour demand

Survey data suggest a slowdown in labour demand in late 2024. Economic sentiment in the EU dropped below pre-pandemic levels by late 2022 and remained weak in early 2025, but hiring intentions declined only gradually, an unusual divergence as these indicators typically move together (Graph 1.2). By late 2024, employment expectations fell in line with weak sentiment, and previously high unmet demand for labour started to ease. After peaking at around 3% in 2022Q1-2023Q2, the job vacancy rate declined but remained near its pre-pandemic high of 2.4%. Meanwhile, consumers' unemployment expectations, below average until the third quarter of 2024, began to worsen, surpassing the pre-pandemic levels by late 2024 and early 2025.

Graph 1.2: **EU economic sentiment and employment expectations (relative to pre-pandemic average)**



Note: The zero line represents pre-pandemic average.
Source: European Commission Business and consumer surveys.

Despite some recent easing, labour shortages remain elevated across most Member States. Between the 2022 post-pandemic peak and the first quarter of 2025, job vacancy rate fell by at least 1.5 pps (percentage points) in Austria, Finland, and Germany A more moderate decline (between 1 and 1.5 pps) was recorded in the Netherlands, Latvia, Denmark, Belgium, Slovenia, Hungary and Sweden, while the other Member States saw a reduction of less than one pp. In the first quarter of 2025, only a few Member States had a job vacancy rate lower than the pre- pandemic level, notably Latvia, Hungary and Germany. According to the European Commission's Business and Consumer Surveys, 19% of industrial firms cited labour shortages as a constraint in the first quarter of 2025, down from 22.3% a year earlier ([3]). In services, shortages remained acute, with 24% of firms reporting constraints – only slightly down from 27% of one year earlier.

Graph 1.3: **Change in job vacancy rate (pps difference in 2025Q1 relative to post-pandemic peak and to 2019Q4)**



Note: Post pandemic peak is reached in 2022 in most of the countries. Chechia is dropped due to a methodological break in 2025Q1

Source: Eurostat, Job vacancy statistics.

Differences in employment growth across countries largely reflect country-specific labour market structures, in particular the share of manufacturing jobs. Countries with the highest manufacturing intensity experienced the sharpest employment decline, with manufacturing jobs falling by 0.5% in 2024, accentuating the negative trend observed during 2021-2023 (Table 1.2). Similarly, in more diversified but still manufacturing-intensive economies such as Germany and Italy, sectoral employment growth contracted by 0.5% in 2024 after growing by 0.6% yearly between 2021 and 2023 ([4]). In both cases, job losses were offset by continued growth in market services (excluding real estate), highlighting the buffering role of the service sector. Combined these two country groups – which represents 70% of EU manufacturing employment – contributed a 0.3 pps decline to the EU overall employment drop of 0.2% in 2024. By contrast, countries with lower manufacturing shares such as France, the Netherlands and Spain saw modest gains in manufacturing employment, partly offsetting job losses elsewhere. However, in these countries wholesale and retail trade, professional services and construction recorded a notable slowdown ([5]).

([3]) Compared to the pre-pandemic average, the highest share of firms in industry reporting labour as a production constrain was in Ireland, the Netherlands, Croatia, Greece, Denmark, and Poland, while Hungary, Czechia, Estonia, and Finland saw declines.

([4]) These countries account for 40% of total EU employment in manufacturing.

([5]) Meanwhile, employment in professional, and technical services, as well as ICT, continued to grow across all country groups, reinforcing their importance in the digital and green transition.

Table 1.2: **Employment growth by sector (countries are grouped based on the share of employment in manufacturing)**

					2021-2023					
Countries with:	Total	C	F	G-I	J	K	L	M_N	O-Q	R-U
Highest share of manufactuing	0.6	-0.1	0.1	0.5	6.5	1.3	2.9	3.3	1.2	1.0
Medium-high share of manufactuing	1.4	0.6	1.9	1.9	4.6	-0.5	2.2	2.2	1.4	0.3
Medium-low share of manufactuing	2.8	1.5	3.8	4.4	5.9	0.8	2.9	3.7	1.9	2.2
Lowest share of manufactuing	2.0	1.6	1.9	2.5	4.8	1.7	2.1	2.9	1.0	3.3
Countries with:					2023-2024					
Highest share of manufactuing	0.1	-0.5	0.7	0.5	4.8	0.0	-0.9	1.4	1.5	2.1
Medium-high share of manufactuing	0.8	-0.5	1.0	1.0	1.4	1.5	-0.5	0.1	1.8	0.6
Medium-low share of manufactuing	1.3	0.3	1.9	1.2	4.1	-0.9	-0.3	1.6	1.8	0.1
Lowest share of manufactuing	0.8	0.8	0.1	0.8	-0.6	1.1	-1.1	0.3	1.5	0.9

Note: Groups are based on the distribution of the employment share in manufacturing. Highest share of manufacturing includes CZ, SK, SI, PL, HU, EE and RO. Medium-high share includes DE, BG, HR, LT, IT, and AT. Medium-low share includes PT, FI, LV, IE, SE ES, DK, and BE. Lowest share of manufacturing includes FR, EL, MT, NL, CY and LU. Countries are ranked from the highest to the lowest employment share in manufacturing.
NACE codes: C, manufacturing; F, construction; G-I wholesale and retail trade; J, Information and communication; K finance and insurance; M_N, professional, scientific and technical activities; O-Q, public administration; R-U arts and entertainment. To compare growth rates of different periods, the change from the beginning to the end of each period is divided by the number of quarters; the growth rate is multiplied by four to get the annualised rate.
Source: Eurostat, National Accounts.

Since early 2023, the slowdown in labour demand has been accompanied by a rise in planned job reductions due to restructuring, a trend that began in early 2022 ([6]). In 2024, they totalled around 65,000 across the EU, well below the 350,000 recorded at the peak of the financial crisis in 2009. As a share of total employment, announced job reductions represented 0.03% in 2024, compared to nearly 0.2% in 2009. Since the first quarter of 2023, net job reductions have increased alongside weaker employment growth and declining hiring intentions (Graphs 1.2 and 1.5 panel a). Although modest in scale, this rise reflects growing adjustment pressures in specific sectors. Since the onset of the energy crisis in autumn 2021, manufacturing output has declined sharply, falling below pre-pandemic levels by the end of 2024. This was driven by high energy costs, weak global demand, fragmented trade flows and rising competition from Chinese producers – particularly affecting the automotive sector. Between 2023 and 2024, the automotive industry alone accounted for around 70,000 expected net job losses. Telecommunications and postal services followed, with expected losses of 19,000 and 17,000 jobs, respectively (Graph 1.4 and Table 1.2).

([6]) The European Restructuring Monitor (ERM) is an EU-wide dataset, based on national media reports, tracking large-scale planned layoffs due to restructuring events. It covers restructuring events affecting at least one Member State and involving the creation or loss of either at least 100 jobs, or of over 10% of the workforce at sites with more than 250 employees. ERM excludes smaller cases, routine staff replacement, non-imminent events (starting beyond nine months), and temporary or seasonal layoffs. It does not capture incremental job losses over time; see Eurofound (2013).

Graph 1.4: **Announced net job reductions in restructuring events (as % of employment in the sector): 2023-2024**



Note: Data cover the countries in which announcements of restructuring events took place between 1 January 2023 and 1 January 2025, The Eurofound captures announcements of restructuring that affects at least 100 jobs or 10% of workers in enterprises with 250 or more employees and may not reflect incremental employment changes and developments in SMEs.

Source: Own calculation based on European Restructuring Monitor microdata.

Restructuring announcements may impact employment and productivity through confidence effects. There is a strong correlation between planned net job reductions and labour reallocation (Graph 1.5 panel b). While the 2008-2009 financial crisis mainly affected manufacturing, the pandemic triggered a significant shift within services, further amplifying the upward trend in manufacturing reallocation observed since 2017 ([7]). Rising uncertainty may prompt firms and households to postpone major, often irreversible, decisions such as hiring and investments, setting off adjustment mechanisms that shape the business cycle. Evidence shows that an increase in the planned job destruction tends to worsen economic conditions in the short run, leading to a gradual decline in both employment and productivity. Beyond the short-term, restructuring can enhance productivity by reallocating workers from less to more productive firms and encouraging the introduction of more efficient production processes (Annex 1.1).

([7]) The data allow computing a sectoral reallocation index at the 2-digits level, capturing employment growth dispersion across industries. Analysis in Box 1.2 confirms that restructuring plans typically lead to a lasting increase in job reallocation.

Graph 1.5: **Announced net job changes due to restructuring events EU employment growth and labour reallocation**



Note: Net job changes equal planned job reductions minus planned job creation, 3-quarters moving average. The reallocation index, based on Chodorow-Reich and Wiedland (2020), measures employment growth dispersion across 30 manufacturing industries and 34 services. For ERM data see footnote 3.

Source: Own calculations based on ERM microdata LFS and European Commission Business and consumer survey.

1.2.2. Evolution of labour supply

Graph 1.6: **Working age population in the EU and the euro area by citizenship**



Source: Eurostat, LFS [lfsq_pganws].

The increase in the EU working-age population was mainly driven by the increase in the euro area countries. Between the first quarter of 2021 and the fourth quarter of 2024, the EU population aged 15-64 grew by 0.6% compared to 1.4% in the euro area (Graph 1.6 left panel) ([8]). This gap reflects a larger contribution from non-EU nationals in the euro area and declines in national populations in several large Central and Eastern European Member States outside the euro area (Graph 1.6 right panel and Graph 1.7). Ageing and labour mobility from non-euro area

([8]) As euro area countries represents a larger share of the EU population, the overall EU population expanded by about 1%

to euro area countries are likely drivers of this increase, with non-euro area nationals accounting for less than one fifth of the euro area population growth (Graph 1.6 right panel) ([9]).

In some Member States, the declining domestic working-age population was partially offset by inflows of non-EU nationals. The domestic population fell in about ten Member States, notably in Slovakia (-4.4%), Poland (-5.4%), Czechia (-4.8) and Bulgaria and Romania (-3%) ([10]). In general, the arrival of non-EU citizens moderated the effect on total population of the decline in the domestic population. In several countries, inflows of foreign individuals from both other Member States and non-EU countries helped to mitigate the effect of an aging domestic population. In some cases – such as Germany, Austria Portugal, Finland, Estonia, Cyprus and Malta – these inflows even contributed to overall population growth (Graph 1.7).

Graph 1.7: **Contribution to the growth of the working age population (15-64) by citizenship: 2021Q1-2024Q4**



Note: For Slovakia 2020Q4-2024Q4.

Source: Eurostat, National accounts, [namq_10_a10_e] and LFS [lfsq_pganws].

The rising share of non-EU born citizens may help mitigate the impact of ageing on labour supply and future employment growth. On average, non-EU nationals are 8% less likely to participate in the labour force than nationals, with the gap rising to 17% for women. Female participation has been increasing — from about 53% in 2005 to 60.8% in the first quarter of 2025 for nationals and from 50.7% to 56.6% for non-nationals. However, the high incidence of part-time work among women (28.6% of total employment in the first quarter of 2025 compared with 8.5% for men) suggests that many still face constraints that prevent full-time employment. Persistent gender gaps are often linked to the unequal distribution of informal care responsibilities.

Policies are needed to support labour force participation of women and non-EU born citizens. The design of tax and benefit systems plays a key role in shaping financial incentives to work, particularly for second wage earners. Policies that help reconcile work and family life – such as access to affordable, high-quality early childhood education and care – can significantly boost women's labour market participation. In addition, effective public employment services may support jobseekers through counselling, job search assistance, and targeted activation measures ([11]).

([9]) In addition, the share of the population of the euro area born in a non-euro area country remains rather small, although increasing from 3.7% of the first quarter of 2021 to 3.9% of the third quarter of 2024. Data on labour flows are available only for 2020. In this year, Romania, Croatia, and Slovakia were the only net sending countries mostly due to the outflows of national being larger than the inflows of national (European Commission, 2024).

([10]) For Poland, Slovakia and Sweden beneficiaries of temporary protection who fled the war in Ukraine are not included in the LFS working age population (Eurostat, 2025).

([11]) European Commission (2025g) offers an in-depth analysis of the barriers to migrants' labour market participation and the policies designed to overcome them.

1.3. THE IMPACT OF US TARIFF HIKES ON EMPLOYMENT

The recent trade agreement between the EU and US has reduced the uncertainty triggered by the shift in US trade policy. On April 2, President Trump announced a minimum 10% tariff on all US imports and higher rates on imports from 57 countries. On April 9, higher tariffs were suspended for the EU and most countries for 90 days, although the 10% levy continued to apply to nearly all global imports, with increased rates still in effect for steel, aluminium and cars. On 27 July 2025, European Commission and US reached a political agreement, followed by a joint statement on transatlantic trade and investment issued on 21 August 2025 ([12]). The deal establishes a single, all-inclusive US tariff ceiling of 15% for most EU goods, including cars, pharmaceutical, and semiconductors. Moreover, the tariffs on cars and car parts will be reduced from 27.5% to 15%, retroactively as of 1 August 2025. Certain product categories, including aircraft and aircraft parts, generic pharmaceuticals, and certain natural resources will be exempted, and subject to the US Most Favoured Nation tariffs. Aluminium, steel and copper remain subject to 50% tariffs. The deal avoided the imposition of a 30% reciprocal US tariff on EU goods and has reduced trade policy uncertainty and downside risks to economic growth. As a consequence, after the strong deterioration in April, the Economic sentiment indicator returned to its previous levels, while the US trade policy uncertainty index declined, albeit still hovering above its historical average (Graph 1.8) ([13]).

([12]) The political agreement is not yet legally binding. Both sides must now translate the commitments into legislative proposals and implement them according to their respective legal processes.

([13]) The trade policy uncertainty indicator by Baker et al (2016) follows closely another indicator of trade uncertainty by Caldara et al (2020). Both indicators have recently spiked. The IMF WEO (2025) uses the Baker et al index.

The uncertainty generated by the changes in US trade policy can have adverse effects on economic activity. Higher uncertainty induces a cautionary attitude whereby firms delay investment and hiring decisions, and households increase their savings. All this has an effect on economic activity comparable to a fall in aggregate demand ([14]). As shown in Graph 1.9, a trade policy uncertainty shock – comparable to the shift from the 1997–2016 to the 2017–2024 average – reduces turnover by up to 3% after two years, with lasting effects ([15]). This decline is accompanied by a drop in employment of about 0.5%, which reaches its lowest point three years after the shock and remains below the pre-shock level for several years before gradually recovering ([16]). This underlines the importance of the EU-US agreement in restoring some stability and predictability in EU-US trade relationships.

Graph 1.8: **US trade policy uncertainty index**



Note: Trade Policy Uncertainty Index reflects the frequency of articles in American newspapers that discuss policy-related economic uncertainty and also contain one or more references to trade policy.

Source: Baker, Bloom and Davis et al (2016) https://www.policyuncertainty.com/index.html.

Higher tariffs could also impact EU employment primarily through an increase in export prices. The increase in tariffs raises the prices of US imports from the EU and constrains the demand for EU labour via higher prices of exported goods. This affects the income linked to both the direct and indirect EU value added embedded in exports to the US ([17]). The overall effect will depend on how US trade patterns react to the shift in the trade policy regime and how firms will adapt to this change. A substantial reduction of value added generated by exports to the US is expected to negatively affect employment.

([14]) Uncertainty amplifies business cycle fluctuations, making recessions and recoveries respectively deeper and weaker on average Kose and Terrones (2012).

([15]) Excluding the Biden administration period, the shift in the average index is even higher. However, US trade policy uncertainty began rising in November before the new administration took office. Although its intensity declines quickly, trade policy uncertainty tends to persist.

([16]) IMF (2025) simulates a scenario where downside risks to the central forecast materialise due to a rise in global economic policy uncertainty (Baker et al, 2016), leading to a 1% GDP decline. Although the uncertainty measure here focuses more on trade-specific risks rather than global macroeconomic policy uncertainty, the estimated impact is broadly comparable. After adjusting both indices for scale and variability, the rise in trade policy uncertainty is three times larger than that of global economic policy uncertainty, consistent with their historical relationship. Given that a 1% change in turnover corresponds to a 0.3% of GDP - a 3% drop in turnover implies a 0.9% fall in GDP, in line with the IMF projection.

([17]) The direct income generated by an industry's exports to the US is referred to as the direct domestic effects. In contrast, the indirect domestic effects represent the value added within a specific industry that results from the exports of another industry (Eurostat, 2024).

Graph 1.9: **Response of turnover and employment to an increase in the trade policy uncertainty equal to the change between 1997Q1-2016Q4 average and the 2017Q1-2024Q4 average (% deviation from pre-shock level)**



Note: The chart shows the response of employment and turnover in manufacturing to a trade uncertainty shock. This is done fitting a VAR with 3 lags over the period 1997Q1-2024Q4. Shocks are identified assuming that trade uncertainty responds instantaneously to news, while turnover and employment respond contemporaneously and with lags to uncertainty shocks.
Following Baker et al. (2016), macroeconomic data are used to estimate how trade policy uncertainty influences turnover and employment embedded in EU exports to the US. This employment measure includes both direct jobs linked to US imports and indirect jobs supported through domestic and global value chains. For example, a European country may export directly to the US and to a non-EU country that, in turn, exports to the US. Both direct and indirect effects are captured by the employment measure used.

Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat and Baker et al.

The reduction of exports to the US has both direct and indirect impacts. Exporting industries bear the direct effect, while wholesale and retail trade and supporting services are affected indirectly through lower intermediate demand along value chains ([18]). Available studies estimate that a 15 pps ([19]) increase in US tariffs would reduce EU GDP by 0.1% to 0.7%, and exports by 1% to 2% within two years ([20]). Assuming a lower and upper bound of the response in GDP of 0.1% and 0.3%, employment would decline by 0.07% and 0.2% respectively ([21]). In absolute terms, this implies that between 135,000 to 405,000 jobs would be lost. The estimated employment effect depends on the extent to which EU companies would pass on the cost

([18]) Exports to the US represent 21% of total EU exports. The EU value added embedded in the EU exports to the US is about 2.9% (Barata da Rocha et al 2025). This value added includes not only the direct value added from the exporters but also the value added of upstream suppliers and other businesses involved in the production process.

([19]) The analysis assumes an increase in the effective tariff rate of 15 percentage points. This is a simplification as it does not consider the effective tariff rate of 1.6% that applied before the tariff increase and its sectoral distribution. In contrast to the negotiated agreement, the analysis also assumes a uniform application of the tariff increase and does not take into account specific sectoral arrangements for example for the steel and aluminium industries or specific products that are exempt from tariffs.

([20]) See for example CPB (2024), IMF (2024), WIFO (2024), Bruegel (2025), ONB (2025). According to the European Economic Spring Forecast 2025, a 20% US tariff is expected to lower EU GDP by 0.2% compared to a scenario without tariffs. Retaliation by the EU and all other trading partners would increase the GDP losses further to 0.3%-0.4%.

([21]) The response of employment to a value-added shock is estimated by a fixed effects panel regression at sectoral level, from 2010 to 2024 for 64 industries and 27 Member States. The analysis builds on sector- and country specific employment elasticities derived from these regressions. The 2025 European Economic Spring Forecast estimated the effect of tariff hikes on GDP, which are scaled accordingly to match the 15% tariff scenario. A 15% tariff is estimated to lead to a 0.3% GDP shock, which is assumed to be transmitted proportionally through direct and indirect input-output linkages (FIGARO), proportionally depending on exposure to US exports. It covers direct effects through exports, but also indirect effects through value chains.

increase to US customers and how the latter would react ([22]). Furthermore, the employment impact of the higher tariffs is likely to be softened by national employment protection legislation and existing job retention schemes, as well as the fact that firms may accept lower profit margins. By comparison, in the unlikely scenario of an almost complete collapse of exports to the US, EU employment would decline by 0.8%.

The impact on employment varies across Member States, reflecting the different levels of trade exposure to the US market. Countries potentially facing the largest employment declines, include Ireland, Germany, Denmark and Slovakia (Graph 1.10) ([23]). These countries have high levels of both direct exports and indirect integration into transatlantic value chain, making them more vulnerable to trade shocks. In contrast, countries expected to experience smaller relative losses – such as Cyprus, Croatia, Greece, Luxembourg, Romania, Malta, Spain, Portugal and Sweden - have more service-oriented economies with lower participation into global value chains linked to the US. For several smaller economies, such as Slovenia and Slovakia, indirect exposure, through the supply of intermediate goods to countries such as Germany or France, significantly amplifies their total exposure.

Graph 1.10: **Expected employment decline due to US tariffs by country**



Note: Lower and upper range refers to respectively 0.1% and 0.3%.

Source: Own calculation.

The assumed reduction in exports to the US is expected to have a significant impact on some sectors. Sectors that are likely to be more impacted by the higher US tariffs have high dependence on international trade (Graph 1.10). Pharmaceuticals are expected to experience the largest relative employment decline of up to 1.3%, followed by chemicals and machinery and equipment, with declines of 1% and 0.9%, respectively. In absolute terms, the highest loss is expected in wholesale and retail trade, primarily due to demand spillover effects of decreased exports of manufacturing goods. The wholesale sector is expected to experience the largest absolute employment loss of up to 24,000 jobs, followed by machinery and equipment (20,000), retail trade (17,000) and automotive industry (12,000). Least exposed are sectors with primarily domestic demand, such as public sector, construction, non-business services, and infrastructural monopolies.

([22]) If EU exporters decide to absorb the tariff impact, their profit margins might decline, potentially affecting wage and employment decisions. Alternatively, EU exporters might decide to pass the tariff increase on to US importers, resulting in higher-priced exports. US importers could in turn either absorb the cost increase by reducing their profit margins or pass it on to US consumers in the form of higher prices.

([23]) However, it is essential to note that Ireland's role as a headquarters location for many multinational companies may affect the accuracy of these figures, as some employment related to these sectors may not be physically located in Ireland, despite being accounted for in the country's statistics.

By country, the potential employment losses are concentrated in specific sectors. For example, the pharmaceutical sector is particularly exposed in Ireland, Denmark, Slovenia, Finland, Austria, and Germany, with possible employment declines of up to 2.6%, 2.5%, 2.4%, 1.5% and 1.4% respectively. Air transport would be disproportionately hit by US tariffs in Denmark and the Netherlands with 2% and 1.3% of job losses, while 2.3% of the employed in manufacturing of computer, electronic and optical products would be at risk in Estonia. In Ireland, several sectors are expected to experience significant employment declines, with the furniture and other manufacturing sector facing a 2.9% decline, followed by the basic metals sector at 2.3%, machinery and equipment sector at 1.6%, and the computer and information sector at 1.6%, the fabricated metal sector at 1.5%, the paper products sector at 1.4%.

The negative impact on employment might be reduced by a number of factors. The magnitude of this impact depends on how EU firms, US importers and US consumers adjust. EU companies may absorb the increase in the tariff by reducing their profit margins on exports to the US. Similarly, US importers may only partially the increases in prices due to higher tariffs. EU companies may also maintain production by redirecting exports within and beyond the EU, although building new distribution networks takes time in a context of increasingly diversified trade relations. Therefore, boosting trade, through new trade agreements, can mitigate the effects of US tariff increases. Exemptions for strategic sectors agreed with the US lower the effective average tariff rate and further reduce the impact on EU exports.

1.4. CHANGES IN THE EMPLOYMENT STRUCTURE AFTER THE PANDEMIC AND IMPLICATIONS FOR PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH

The long-term decline in manufacturing employment reflects structural change in advanced economies ([24]). As previously experienced by agriculture, rising productivity in manufacturing – driven by automation and technology – has reduced the need for labour while maintaining output (Graph 1.11) ([25]). Until 2017, productivity gains in manufacturing supported real wage growth, which boosted demand for services, which are typically less productive ([26]). In contrast, employment and valued added shares have moved closely together in wholesale and retail trade, suggesting weak productivity growth. Since 2018, this pattern has shifted. The share of value added in manufacturing has fallen faster than its share of employment, leading to a 0.7 percentage point annual decline in productivity since 2022. Unlike in the past, these losses have not been offset by gains in other sectors or by a shift toward more productive industries (Graph 1.11). As services take up a growing share of employment, future productivity gains – and therefore improvements in living standards – will increasingly depend on raising productivity within the service sector. As the recent evidence suggests, changes in employment composition are not necessarily linked to productivity gains.

([24]) In major industrialised countries, the decline share of manufacturing is a secular trend which reflects productivity gains within the sector (Tasci, 2025).

([25]) The stronger increase in productivity in manufacturing than services implies that a larger number of people needs to be employed in services to keep its output rising in line with manufacturing (Rowthorn and Ramaswamy, 1997).

([26]) The complementarity between automation and non-automatable tasks enhances the productivity of all related activities across the production chain. (Autor, 2015).

Graph 1.11: **Employment share and value-added share in industries and wholesale and retail trade: 2000Q1-2024Q4**



Source: Commission calculations on Eurostat, national accounts.

The structure of employment is a key driver of economic growth. This section examines the labour market changes over the last decade focusing on the links between employment structure, productivity growth and earnings. These elements are interconnected and jointly shape a country's economic performance. The sectors and occupations where employment expands or contracts matter, as they differ in productivity growth, wage levels, job quality and broader socio-economic features. Shifts toward higher- or lower-productivity growth sectors can influence overall growth. While wage growth generally reflects productivity trends, a disconnect between the two may signal inefficiencies, labour market mismatches, or weak bargaining power among workers in productive sectors. Understanding these interlinkages is key to assessing whether job creation is contributing to sustainable growth or if structural issues are holding back economic performance. Therefore, the analysis focuses on changes in the employment composition across sectors and occupations, categorised by different earnings and productivity growth. For this purpose, sectors and occupations are grouped in six categories([27]) based on two criteria: sectoral productivity growth of the last 20 years and current wage levels, leading to decomposition on low, medium, and high wage jobs, and low, high productivity growth sectors ([28]).

([27]) The six groups are based on 1) their tercile position in the earning distribution by sector and occupation; 2) the sector's average productivity growth of the past 20 years, relative to the median sectoral productivity growth, which approximates each sector long-term productivity growth. This results in 2,304 sector-occupations, based on the combination of ISCO at the 3-digit level (256 categories) and sectors at the 1-digit level (9 sectors). This categorisation is carried out using detailed data from LFS microdata, the Structure of Earning Statistics and the National Accounts.

([28]) Each sector-occupation combination pair is assigned to either a high or a low productivity growth group (based on deviation from average) and to one of three wage groups (based on the terciles of the earning distribution of occupations and sectors), resulting in six distinct categories. A tercile is a statistical term that refers to one of three equal parts into which a dataset or distribution is divided. This approach enables a more precise mapping of occupations to their sectoral productivity growth and earnings characteristics, allowing for the tracking of employment shifts both within and across sectors - for example, from lower- to higher-complexity jobs or from low-productivity to high-productivity growth sectors.

Assessing sectoral productivity requires acknowledging measurement challenges and the relevance of different sectors. The analysis in this section excludes public administration, defence, education and healthcare sectors, because in these sectors the measure of value added (which is the basis for productivity measurement) is based on the costs. In addition, while sectors such as *water collection, treatment* and *supply or postal and courier activities* have displayed low productivity growth over the last two decades, they remain crucial to society and may experience stronger growth going forward**.**

Graph 1.12: **Shares of the 6 task-groups in the EU: 2023Q4**



Source: Own calculations based on LFS and SES.

More than half of workers earn low- to medium- wages despite being in high-productivity growth industries. In the fourth quarter of 2023, the low- wage, high-productivity growth and the medium- wage, high-productivity growth categories accounted respectively for 32.1% and 21% of business sector employment (Graph 1.12). In these groups, the largest sectors are respectively *retail* and *wholesale* ([29]). In contrast, high-wage, high-productivity growth jobs represented 10.5% of total business sector employment, concentrated in *manufacturing of machinery and equipment* and *financial services except insurance and pension funds*. Low-wage, low-productivity growth jobs made up 19.7% with key sectors including *land transport and transport via pipelines*, *employment services* and wholesale and retail trade and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles. Finally, the medium- and the high-wage, low-productivity growth categories have shares of around 12.2% and 4.6%, respectively, covering natural monopolies or industries with high concentration rates and rents (such as gas and electricity) ([30]).

([29]) Table A1.2.1 in Annex II provides the sectoral composition of each group.

([30]) A natural monopoly is a market where a single firm can produce goods or services at a lower cost than multiple competing firms due to high fixed costs and economies of scale. This makes competition inefficient because duplicating infrastructure would be too costly.

Graph 1.13: **The occupational composition**



Source: Own calculations based on LFS and SES.

The occupational composition strongly correlates with wage levels. The high-wage, high-productivity growth group is dominated by managers and professionals, who make up 87.7% of the total share (Graph 1.13). A similar pattern is observed among those in high-wage tasks within low-productivity growth sectors. This suggests that certain tasks remain well-paid regardless of the sectoral productivity dynamics, indicating that factors beyond sector-wide productivity growth—such as specialised skills, intrinsic task value or possibly rents—play a crucial role in determining wages. In the medium-wage, high-productivity growth tasks, technicians and associate professionals account for 38% of the total, while craft workers make up 21%. A similar pattern appears in the medium-wage, low-productivity growth tasks, with a slight preponderance of professionals and craft workers. Low-wage tasks are concentrated among plant and machine operators, in particular in high-productivity growth industries, and service and sales workers. Elementary occupations and service and sales workers remain overrepresented in low-wage, low-productivity growth tasks.

Graph 1.14: **Structure of employment by Member State in 2023 Q4**



Source: Own calculations based on LFS and SES.

The employment structures differ considerably across Member States. Luxembourg and Ireland have the highest share of high-wage, high-productivity jobs with 27.6% and 16.3% respectively, while Greece, Italy, and Romania have the lowest share with 5.8%, 6.5% and 7.4% respectively. Countries such as Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Greece, Latvia and Poland have a high share of low-wage, high-productivity jobs at 35.3% and 35.6% respectively. In countries such as Denmark and Germany the distribution between the different categories is more balanced, with a strong presence of medium-wage, high-productivity jobs (23.1% and 24.4% respectively), indicating a highly productive base in manufacturing (Graph 1.14).

Between 2012 and 2023, there has been a major shift from low- to high-wage jobs accompanied by an increase in the share of employment in low-productivity growth sectors. The high-wage, high-productivity category saw the largest increase in its employment share, rising 2.5 pps over the period, though starting from a relatively low level, with a notable surge after the pandemic (Graph 1.15). In contrast, the low-wage, high productivity group experienced a sharp decline, by 4.5 pps, reflecting a broader shift away from low-paid occupations toward highly paid tasks in high-productivity sectors. This trend suggests an acceleration in demand for highly skilled workers in high-productivity sectors, likely driven by diffusion of new technologies, digitalisation, automation, and structural economic changes ([31]). At the same time, there has been a shift from high-productivity growth sectors to low-productivity growth sectors as a whole, by 2.4 pp since 2012 ([32]). Within low-productivity industries, employment experienced increases in the high- and medium-wage categories, by 0.6 and 1.1 pps respectively (Graph 1.15). There is high cross-country variability in these trends (Annex II).

Graph 1.15: **Structural shifts in employment - cumulative change in percentage points for each group in the EU**



Source: Own calculations based on LFS and SES.

The shift of employment to low-productive sectors appears to be driven primarily by adoption of new technologies and automation. In sectors with high productivity growth, fewer workers are needed to produce the same output, leading to long-term shifts of employment from high to low productivity growth sectors (Box 1). Despite the increase in the share of employment in high-wage, high- productivity growth category, over the last two decades, the share of employment in low- and medium-wage tasks in low-productivity sectors remained high at 32% and it has even increased between 2012 and 2023 by about 1 pp. At the sectoral level this concerns several labour-intensive services, such as warehousing, repair, courier, hospitality, recreational and amusement services. High productivity growth sectors are losing low-wage and medium-wage employment, while employment in low productivity sectors

([31]) From the supply side, higher educational attainment kept pace with growing labour demand and contributed to higher productivity (European Commission, 2024b).

([32]) Similarly, the European Commission 2024 Autumn forecast finds a small negative persistent impact of sectoral reallocation on productivity growth. This negative effect is mostly offset by the productivity growth stemming from changes in sectoral employment shares, with productivity within each sector held constant. However, the productivity developments are largely driven by within sectoral dynamics (shifts from less productive to more productive firms), as well as with occupational dynamics (shifts between occupations within the sector).

is expanding, with large differences across countries (Graph A1.2.3, Box 1). This represents a small negative persistent constraint on productivity growth and thus a challenge for economic

Box 1.1: **Structural change and deindustrialisation – shifts in sectoral and occupational composition**

There is strong evidence that the sectoral structure of employment shifts with the level of GDP

growth and competitiveness.

The increasing number of highly educated workers employed in low-productivity jobs may indicate that the available skills are not fully utilised. In 2023, 75.8% of high wage-high productivity workers had tertiary education reinforcing the importance of education in accessing

well-paid, high productivity occupations. Conversely, the low-wage low-productivity category has the smallest share of highly educated workers (15.7%), and the highest share of low educated workers (31.6%) (Graph 1.17a). However, the educational landscape of the labour market has undergone significant changes between 2012 and 2023. The share of workers with high education has increased in most categories, especially in the high-productivity growth industries and in the medium-wage low-productivity category, with the latter experienced the large increase in relative terms (Graph 1.17b) ([33]). This leads to a larger share of highly educated workers being employed in jobs with lower productivity growth at similar wage levels. This trend potentially reflects an inefficient use of the available high skilled people, possibly due to occupational barriers, skill mismatches, or wage compression.

Graph 1.16: **Structural shifts in employment - cumulative change in percentage points for each group in the EU**



Source: Own calculations based on LFS and SES.

Graph 1.17: **Employment structure of 6 groups by education**



Source: Own calculations based on LFS and SES.

([33]) In this group, the share of high skilled increased by 41% the same as the increase of high skilled in the high-wage high productivity growth group

Graph 1.18: **Distribution of non-EU-citizen workforce**



Source: Own calculations based on LFS and SES.

As concerns non-EU citizens, there is a strong increase in the demand for occupations at both ends of the wage-productivity growth spectrum. More than 80% of non-EU workers remain in low-skilled, low-paying jobs, compared to 4% for the high-wage, high-productivity category (Graph 1.18) ([34]). However, the growth rate of the non-EU workforce was highest for the high-wage, high-productivity and low-wage, low-productivity categories indicating a U-shaped pattern of employment growth among non-EU nationals (Graph 1.18). This polarization in labour demand could be the result of better targeted migration policies and/or greater opportunities for non-EU citizens to access higher skilled, better paying jobs, due to improved recognition of their qualifications.

Overall, the EU labour market has undergone significant transformations over the past decade, but these changes only partially support the needs of a dynamic economy. Sustainable economic growth requires, *inter alia,* ensuring that more high skilled workers are employed in sectors that drive productivity and innovation ([35]). The rise in high-wage high-productivity jobs suggests a shift towards better-paying jobs and a more knowledge-intensive and innovative economy. A decline of low-wage high productivity jobs is also a broadly positive development, as it was driven by automation, productivity growth and improvements in educational attainment, creating positive spillovers in terms of available labour and skills. However, concerns related to an inefficient job structure remain, as over half of European workers remain in low-wage occupations (Graph 1.12), and an increasing share of workers is employed in low-productivity growth sectors. Additionally, the relatively high share of high-skilled workers in medium-wage low-productivity growth industries, suggests a growing skills mismatch and the increasing difficulty of the economy to absorb the highly educated workers. Without policies that boost productivity in services and that trigger demand for manufacturing goods, manufacturing employment is likely to continue declining.

1.5. POLICY IMPLICATIONS

As emphasised by the Competitiveness Compass, investing in human capital and closing the innovation gap with other major economies are essential for strengthening the competitiveness of the EU economy ([36]). R&D drives innovation, while a skilled workforce fosters its diffusion. Policies that promote educational attainment (tertiary education and vocational education and training), quality jobs and lifelong learning, while improving the match between supply and demand of skills, are essential to support sustainable productivity growth. This is particularly vital for the green and digital transitions and to underpin competitiveness

([34]) This suggests barriers to career progression, such as credential recognition issues, discrimination, or limited access to higher-skilled job markets.

([35]) Arpaia (2025).

([36]) European Commission (2025a).

across all sectors, as outlined in the EU Competitiveness Compass and the Clean Industrial Deal ([37]).

The Union of Skills provides a strategic framework to address skills needs across the EU. President Ursula von der Leyen's political guidelines ([38]) and Mario Draghi's report on *The Future of European Competitiveness* call for adapting education and training systems to meet evolving skill demands, particularly in sectors vital for the green and digital transitions ([39]). Upskilling and reskilling are crucial to support restructuring and promote a just transition, including in the context of demographic change. Improved access to high-quality adult and lifelong learning support labour mobility, job matching and productivity growth. Launched in March 2025, the Union of Skills is a strategic initiative to boost EU competitiveness through investments in human capital, fair mobility, and mutual recognition of different types of training ([40]). Under the Basic Skills Action Plan, the European Commission aims to improve basic reading, mathematics, science, digital and citizenship, promoting excellence from early childhood years to adult learning. By 2030, the target is to reduce underachievement in these areas to below 15%, and raise the top performance to at least 15%. The STEM Education Strategic Plan addresses challenges in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics, aiming to unlock opportunities and ensure the EU's technological leadership, preparedness, and global competitiveness, including by raising female participation in these fields.

Continued focus on adult learning and continuing vocational education and training is key to upskill the ageing workforce, and support workers in sectors undergoing restructuring. The Union of Skills will continue to promote *individual learning accounts* ([41]) to help people adapt and acquire the skills needed to move into new occupations. At the same time, the rollout of *micro-credentials* ([42]) will be expanded to facilitate skill acquisition, ensure they are trusted, understandable, digitally accessible and comparable across sectors and countries. Timely implementation of these new initiatives will improve workforce adaptability to structural changes – especially those driven by the green and digital transitions – while fostering smoother labour reallocation, higher productivity and competitiveness, improved working conditions across the EU. A new European Strategy for Vocational Education and Training has been announced to enhance the attractiveness, quality and inclusiveness of VET.

Unlocking the full potential of the EU workforce and attracting skilled talent from outside the EU is also essential, particularly in the context of an ageing population. This involves tapping into underrepresented groups and facilitating international talent mobility. The *Skills Portability Initiative* will explore ways to facilitate the recognition of qualifications and the free movement of talent within the EU ([43]). To further enhance mobility, the Commission will consider a legislative proposal to remove barriers to cross-border labour mobility, including unregulated professions. It will also explore actions to simplify, expand and modernise recognition processes for regulated professions. Other initiatives to better attract and retain skilled non-EU workers to the EU, such as the *EU Talent Pool and Talent Partnerships* ([44]) will help connect job seekers from

([37]) European Commission (2025a,b).

([38]) European Commission (2024).

([39]) Draghi (2024a), Draghi (2024b), European Commission (2024e).

([40]) European Commission (2025c).

([41]) Council Recommendation 2022/C 243/03.

([42]) Council Recommendation 2022/C 243/02.

([43]) European Commission (2025c).

([44]) European Commission (2023).

outside the EU with employers experiencing skill shortages, ensuring a more efficient match between global talent and EU labour market needs ([45]). At the same time, long-standing initiatives such as EURAXESS ([46]) continue to play a key role in helping researchers worldwide identify opportunities in Europe. The platform provides support for relocating, working, and pursuing career development within Europe. In addition, the Choose Europe ([47]) initiative is specifically aimed at attracting researchers, by promoting Europe as a destination for excellent research and innovation.

Enhancing job quality is essential, especially for workers in low-wage jobs within sectors with low productivity growth. They account for close to 20% of private sector employment. Improving job quality, including wages, for these jobs would not only enhance working conditions for these workers but also help alleviate acute labour shortages that are prevalent in many of these occupations. This is particularly relevant in labour intensive sectors or occupations requiring more manual skills or with higher health and safety hazards ([48]). Several EU initiatives aim at promoting fair working conditions and adequate wages, including the Directive on adequate minimum wages ([49]), the Directive on transparent and predictable working conditions ([50]) and the Strategic Framework on Health and Safety at Work ([51]). The forthcoming Quality Jobs Roadmap will further support fair wages, good working conditions, training and fair job transitions for workers and self-employed ([52]).

The decline of manufacturing calls for a policy response centred on innovation and knowledge-intensive activities. Through the Clean Industrial Deal ([53]), the European Commission aims to revitalise the industrial base by supporting skill development, unlocking clean energy investment, fostering clean technologies uptake, and promoting AI diffusion across firms and SMEs. Shifting from the traditional 'take-make-dispose' model to systems based on reuse, repair, remanufacturing, and recycling, enhances economic diversification, secures access to critical materials, and creates jobs in sectors like maintenance, logistics, and eco-design. It also fosters new value chains and cross-industry innovation. In doing so, the EU can position itself as an attractive hub for manufacturing, including for energy-intensive industries, and strengthen its industrial leadership in high-growth sustainable sectors. This transformation is supported by Horizon Europe (2021–2027), the EU's flagship research and innovation programme with a budget of EUR 95.5 billion. It analyses the impact of the green, digital, economic and demographic transitions on society and funds technologies and solutions that

([45]) European Commission (2025c).

([46]) https://euraxess.ec.europa.eu/

([47]) https://commission.europa.eu/topics/research-and-innovation/choose-europe_en

([48]) Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions Labour and skills shortages in the EU: an action plan, COM(2024) 131 final.

([49]) Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on adequate minimum wages in the European Union, (EU) 2022/2041.

([50]) Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on transparent and predictable working conditions in the European Union, (EU) 2019/1152.

([51]) European Parliament resolution of 10 March 2022 on a new EU strategic framework on health and safety at work post 2020 (including better protection of workers from exposure to harmful substances, stress at work and repetitive motion injuries) (2021/2165(INI)).

([52]) European Commission (2024a), Directorate-General for Communication and Leyen, U., *Europe's choice: political guidelines for the next European Commission 2024–2029*, Publications Office of the European Union, 2024, https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2775/260104.

([53]) European Commission (2025b).

drive them. By fostering collaboration between research institutions, businesses, and public authorities, it accelerates innovation uptake across sectors. A proposed successor programme ([54]) for 2028–2034 aims to enhance Europe's global competitiveness and the impact of research and innovation in delivering strategic policy priorities.

Policies should foster productivity to create jobs, strengthen resilience, and boost competitiveness while advancing the green transition. Reversing the decline in manufacturing requires targeted measures to foster innovation, modernise production and accelerate the adoption of advanced technologies. This includes increased public investment in R&D and incentives for firms to adopt productivity-enhancing technologies. The growth of high-tech industries also relies on a skilled workforce. The InvestAI initiative aims to mobilise EUR 200 billion to scale up artificial intelligence across sectors. Building on this, the AI Continent Action Plan will promote AI use in strategic industries and strengthen capabilities and skills ([55]). Ensuring a skilled workforce that meets the demand of high-productivity growth sectors, particularly those driven by deep technologies, is key to accelerate technology adoption and underpin reindustrialisation ([56]). At the same time, sectors with structurally lower productivity but high societal value, such as health and education, remain key to ensure a resilient, competitive and inclusive economy.

Boosting productivity across all sectors requires balanced regulations. As indicated in the Competitiveness Compass, reducing regulatory and administrative burden will improve business dynamism and attract investments. The Compass also promotes streamlined access to EU funds and simpler administrative procedures. On 26 February 2025, the Commission adopted proposals to cut red tape and simplify rules for EU citizens and business, aiming to reduce the administrative burden by at least 25% for firms and by at least 35% for SMEs ([57]). Furthermore, well-designed employment protection rules, job search assistance, and financial security during unemployment can ease transitions and reduce uncertainty, increasing workers' readiness to adapt. Stable employment relationships encourage firms to invest in training and workers to gain new skills. Combining employment protection with targeted retraining and reskilling help address skills gaps, promote transferable skills, and support a smoother and fairer transition to an economy undergoing rapid structural change.

In light of the shift in US trade policy, opening new export opportunities and investing in strategic sectors would contribute to strengthening the resilience of the EU economy. Heightened trade policy uncertainty and higher US tariffs could adversely affect employment, in particular in some sectors and Member States. Closer collaboration with other trading partners, including India, Mexico and Mercosur, could offset some of these possible negative impacts. In addition, in line with the Competitiveness Compass, Europe must continue to pursue policies to reduce its reliance on single or highly concentrated suppliers across key strategic sectors. Recent initiatives to bolster European capacities in these areas include the Clean Industrial Deal and the EU Action Plan on Critical Raw Material. In her 2025 State of the Union address, the President announced additional initiatives including an Industrial Accelerator Act for key strategic sectors and technologies.

([54]) https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/news/all-research-and-innovation-news/horizon-europe-2028-2034-twice-bigger-simpler-faster-and-more-impactful-2025-07-16_en

([55]) European Commission (2025d); https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_467;

https://commission.europa.eu/topics/eu-competitiveness/ai-continent_en

([56]) European Commission (2025a).

([57]) On 26 February 2025, the European Commission adopted new proposals to cut red tape and simplify rules

Effective protection should support workers during job transitions, while promoting early job search. Short-time work schemes were highly effective during the pandemic in cushioning demand shocks and preventing mass unemployment. However, they are less suited to manage structural changes, such as those driven by technological progress, which reduce labour demand in mature industries and require labour reallocation. In such cases, income support should be linked to policies which promote better job matching and facilitate the search for employment for workers transitioning between jobs (see Chapter 3). As part of the Union of Skills, the Commission will launch a Skills Guarantee Pilot to help workers in restructuring sectors or at risk of unemployment to develop their careers in other sectors and/or companies ([58]). The Commission has also proposed extending the scope of the European Globalisation Fund to workers at risk of imminent job displacement, while the mid-term review of Cohesion Policy presents an additional opportunity to reallocate ESF+ resources ([59]). Furthermore, active labour market policies, focusing on upskilling, reskilling, job search assistance and career counselling, can provide affected workers with a pathway toward quality jobs.

1.6. CONCLUSIONS

In 2024 and early 2025, the EU labour market began to slow. After previously outpacing economic growth, employment growth started to align more closely with economic trends in the second half of 2024. Despite a pick-up in economic activity at the end of the year, employment growth slowed from high levels, slightly improving productivity growth, after a decline since mid-2022. Aggregate figures hide cross-country differences - with countries more specialised in manufacturing experiencing a stagnation or job losses. Unlike in the past, these losses no longer bring productivity gains in manufacturing, highlighting the need for improvements in services as well.

The recent changes in US trade policy may have a negative impact on employment. This could happen by increasing uncertainty, which may lead to delays in investment, hiring, and spending decisions, as well as through the direct effects of potentially higher tariffs on EU exports. The overall impact of a 15 percentage point increase in US tariffs on employment is estimated to be between 135 000 and 450 000 jobs with the effects being distributed unevenly across sectors and countries.

Addressing these challenges and to unlocking the full potential of the EU labour market requires coordinated action across multiple policy areas. While With manufacturing is no longer the main driver of productivity growth, greater emphasis is needed on boosting efficiency in both manufacturing and services through innovation, digitalisation, new technologies, including AI, and skills development. In this context, strengthening the single market for services, particularly by facilitating cross-border service provision and enhancing competition, can be pivotal for driving productivity gains. Equally important are upskilling, improved job-matching, and vocational training to support the reallocation workers towards higher-productivity sectors. Moreover, investments in strategic sectors such as defence and related to the Green industrial Deal will strengthen the EU's industrial base and manufacturing capacity, increase strategic dependencies. Productivity growth depends not only on technology and investment, but also on cultural values and social norms. These foster social capital by building trust and cooperation, promote education and inclusion by ensuring equal opportunities. Policies that reinforce these norms—through public investment in education,

([58]) European Commission (2025c).

([59]) European Commission (2025f).

healthcare, diversity, and community engagement—can strengthen cohesion and make economies more dynamic and inclusive.

Labour market trends over the past decade have been broadly positive, with gains in high-wage, high-productivity jobs reflecting progress toward a more innovative, knowledge-based economy. The decline in low-wage, high-productivity jobs also signals improvements in education and productivity. However, the presence - and in some Member States the growth - of low-productivity jobs with low and medium wages remains a key obstacle to EU competitiveness. Many high- and medium-skill workers are employed in low-productivity sectors and low-wage occupations pointing to a utilisation of human capital that falls short of the needs of an innovation led growth model. Finally, low-productivity growth sectors of key importance for our society such as health and education remain essential to ensure a sustainable and dynamic economy, even if it is difficult to measure or achieve significant productivity gains because many tasks require personal interactions that are less susceptible to efficiency improvements. While technology can improve service quality (e.g. telemedicine, AI-assisted diagnostic or e-learning), it often may not lead to a decline in the amount of labour required to deliver these services, as efficiency gains are likely to also increase their demand. This implies that wages in these sectors must rise in line with the broader economy even when productivity lags.

Addressing these challenges and unlocking the full potential of the EU labour market requires coordinated action across multiple policy areas. While manufacturing is no longer the main driver of productivity growth, greater emphasis is needed on boosting efficiency in both manufacturing and services through innovation, digitalisation, new technologies, including AI, and skills development. In this context, strengthening the single market for services, particularly by facilitating cross-border service provision and enhancing competition, can be pivotal for driving productivity gains. Equally important are upskilling, improved job-matching, and vocational training. Moreover, investments in strategic sectors - such as defence and those linked to the Green industrial Deal - will strengthen the EU's industrial base and manufacturing capacity, while also reducing strategic dependencies.

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ANNEX 1.1

The impact of restructuring on employment and productivity

Productivity growth often involves restructuring and reallocation across firms. Schumpeter argued that restructuring benefits the economy by enabling adjustments in technologies and products, particularly during recessions. This process selects the most productive firms, through existing companies adopting more efficient technologies or innovations by new entrants.

Announced job reductions do not always result in job losses. Support measures often prevent planned job cuts by helping workers transition within firms or to new roles. Conversely, job losses can occur without announcements (Eurofound 2024). The broader economic context also matters - recessions typically bring more layoff announcements and slower employment growth. However, the correlation between planned redundancies and weak employment growth is not necessarily causal.

A VAR model assesses how planned net job reductions affect employment and productivity in the short-term. The model estimated over the period 2002Q1-2025Q4 uses four lags and includes the economic sentiment indicator, planned job reductions, employment growth, and labour productivity growth. The Doornik-Hansen test confirms no systematic bias in the residuals. The joint test for skewness and kurtosis supports the hypothesis of normality of residuals. This indicates that the model captures the dynamics of the variables well, with most of the unexplained component being random.

Restructuring effects are identified using three assumptions in a Structural VAR (SVAR) model, which allows for causal interpretation through theoretical restrictions ([60]). First, restructuring shocks—measured by planned job reductions—immediately affect confidence, while their impact on employment and productivity is delayed. Second, employment responds instantly to confidence shocks but only gradually to restructuring and productivity shocks. Third, productivity reacts within a quarter to confidence and employment shocks but adjusts more slowly to restructuring. The graph below shows that a restructuring shock immediately weakens confidence and gradually reduces employment and productivity. Productivity drops more sharply due to labour hoarding, but recovers in six quarters compared to eleven for employment. After four quarters, employment falls by 0.2% and productivity by 0.3%, implying a 0.5% output loss. A confidence shock reduces planned job cuts and boosts productivity, with effects lasting five and ten quarters, respectively. Employment responses are more persistent, lasting nearly two and a half years. Lastly, an employment shock lowers planned job cuts, though less than confidence shocks.

Beyond the short-term, restructuring can boost productivity by reallocating workers from less to more productive firms and encouraging more efficient production processes. Table 1 shows regression results on EU aggregate data for labour productivity and its within and between-sector components. Estimates suggest that productivity gains mainly stem from within sectors productivity improvements, especially in manufacturing. These results align with the 2024 Autumn Forecast, which finds that sectoral reallocation plays only a marginal effect. The reallocation index may be endogenous and correlated with the cycle, potentially making the estimates statistically biased (i.e. systematically off from the true value) and inconsistent (i.e. they do not converge to the true value even with more data). To address this, the index was cyclically adjusted using residuals from a regression on total employment growth. Even after adjustment, productivity growth remains largely driven by within-sector dynamics (Table 2). In services, the negative reallocation effect suggests that rising employment may lower the capital–labour ratio

([60]) Unlike standard VARs, SVARs identify the underlying shocks driving variable movements, offering deeper insight into the economic impact of restructuring

and dampen productivity, consistent with previous analysis (European Commission 2024a, 2024b). Table 3 reports instrumental variables estimates confirming dominant role of within-sector gains in manufacturing and the exogeneity of the regressors.

Graph A1.1.1: **Response to restructuring, confidence shock and employment shock**



Note: VAR estimate for the EU with four lags. Estimation period 2002Q1-2024Q4 excluding 2020Q1-2021Q4; a dummy equal 1 in 2009Q1 and 2009Q2 has been introduced to model a temporary shift in confidence for the 2009 financial crisis shock. Normality test: Chi-square = 3.6 (p-value=0.46).

Table A1.1.1: **Impact on labour productivity growth of reallocation**

Panel a: **OLS estimates**

	Labour productivity growth			Between component	Within component
Effect of:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Reallocation index industry three quarters earlier	0.8***				
	(0.34)				
Reallocation in manufacturing predicted by planned job reductions due to restructuring three quarters earlier		2.2***	2.2***	-0.1	2.2***
		(0.31)	(0.25)	(0.07)	(0.25)
Reallocation in services three quarters earlier	0.15	0.23*	0.14*	-0.006	0.24***
	(0.27)	(0.12)	(0.08)	(0.03)	(0.07)
Confidence indicator			0.06***	0.003	0.05***
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.009)
Constant	-0.4***	-3.1***	-3***	0.3**	-3.2***
		(0.5)	(0.4)	(0.14)	(0.4)
R2	0.2	0.6	0.8	0.06	0.8

Panel b **OLS estimates**

	Labour productivity growth	Between component	Within component
Effect of:	(1)	(2)	(3)
Productivity growth lagged	0.8***	0.50***	0.79***
	(0.07)	(0.13)	(0.07)
Cyclically adjusted reallocation index industry (-3)	0.5*	-0.01	0.51*
	(0.28)	(0.06)	(0.29)
Cyclically adjusted reallocation in services (-3)	-0.24**	0.02	-0.21
	(0.13)	(0.03)	(0.14)
Constant	0.13	0.05***	0.14
	(0.13)	(0.02)	(0.14)
R2	0.7	0.24	0.67

Note: EU aggregate date. Sample period 2002Q1-2024Q3. To smooth cyclical fluctuations, the reallocation index is a three-term moving average. Cyclically adjusted reallocation is the residuals of a regression of reallocation index on total employment growth.

Source:

Table A1.1.2: **Impact on labour productivity growth of labour reallocation: Instrumental variables estimation**

	Labour productivity growth		Between component	Within component
Effect of:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Reallocation in manufacturing predicted by planned job reductions due to restructuring three quarters earlier	2.8**	2.9***	0.15	2.7***
	(1.00)	(0.58)	(0.15)	(0.56)
Reallocation in services three quarters earlier	0.6	0.38	0.06	0.42**
	(0.43)	0.13	(0.08)	(0.20)
Confidence indicator		0.07***	0.005	0.06***
		(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.01)
Constant	-4.6**	-4.6***	-0.3	-4.3***
	(2.3)	(1.2)	(0.35)	(1.1)
R2	0.5	0.68	-0.75	0.75
Durbin-Wu-Hausman endogeneity test	0.09	0.10	0.07	0.26

Note: EU aggregate date. Sample period 2002Q1-2024Q3. To smooth cyclical fluctuations, the reallocation index is a three-term moving average. Instruments are in specification (1) constant, old age dependency ratio and investment-GDP ratio; in specifications (2)-(4) in addition to those of (1) pps change of the investment-GDP ratio and employment growth

Source:

Table A1.1.3: **Announced job reductions and plan job creation in restructuring events: 2023-2024**

	Announced job reductions	Planned job creation	Announced net employment changes	Announced net employment changes as % of sectoral empoyment	Total empoyment (1000s)	Sectoral employment as % of total
Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers	70158	1528	-68630	-2.2	3108	1.5
Telecommunications	19229	214	-19015	-1.8	1032	0.5
Postal and courier activities	20092	2959	-17133	-1.2	1443	0.7
Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas	530	0	-530	-1.0	51	0.0
Manufacture of electrical equipment	14342	1037	-13305	-1.0	1358	0.7
Manufacture of paper and paper products	6122	446	-5676	-0.9	641	0.3
Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparat	6063	188	-5875	-0.6	947	0.5
Financial service activities, except insurance and pension funding	17551	681	-16870	-0.5	3128	1.5
Mining of metal ores	350	0	-350	-0.5	67	0.0
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products	6887	157	-6730	-0.5	1369	0.7
Manufacture of textiles	2785	173	-2612	-0.4	592	0.3
Other mining and quarrying	874	0	-874	-0.4	201	0.1
Mining of coal and lignite	920	185	-735	-0.4	179	0.1
Manufacture of basic metals	4375	445	-3930	-0.4	1042	0.5
Travel agency, tour operator and other reservation service and related activiti	1600	0	-1600	-0.4	453	0.2
Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products	4931	489	-4442	-0.3	1333	0.7
Air transport	1992	858	-1134	-0.3	379	0.2
Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products	2938	65	-2873	-0.2	1160	0.6
Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.	8441	877	-7564	-0.2	3209	1.6
Information service activities	2183	1061	-1122	-0.2	515	0.3
Manufacture of furniture	2588	143	-2445	-0.2	1125	0.5
Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles	39208	2488	-36720	-0.2	16987	8.3
Manufacture of food products	9065	490	-8575	-0.2	4028	2.0
Manufacture of beverages	1076	179	-897	-0.2	441	0.2
Scientific research and development	1929	49	-1880	-0.2	1029	0.5
Office administrative, office support and other business support activities	2802	496	-2306	-0.2	1487	0.7
Printing and reproduction of recorded media	863	0	-863	-0.2	573	0.3
Water transport	707	289	-418	-0.1	309	0.2
Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment	6236	1738	-4498	-0.1	3597	1.8
Gambling and betting activities	353	0	-353	-0.1	303	0.1
Warehousing and support activities for transportation	3828	1343	-2485	-0.1	3146	1.5
Manufacture of rubber and plastic products	1314	320	-994	-0.1	1466	0.7
Other manufacturing	1327	548	-779	-0.1	1210	0.6
Activities auxiliary to financial services and insurance activities	834	96	-738	-0.1	1354	0.7

Note: Data cover the countries in which restructuring events took place between 1 January 2023 and 1 January 2025, The Eurofound captures announcements of restructuring that affects at least 100 jobs or 10% of workers in enterprises with 250 or more employees, and may not reflect incremental employment changes and developments in SMEs.

Source: Own calculation based on Eurofound Restructuring Monitor microdata.

ANNEX 1.2

Selected graphs and tables

Graph A1.2.1: **Productivity growth and employment growth by sector: relationship with employment share and productivity levels**



Note: Bubble represents the share of employment in 2024Q3

Source: National Accounts

Graph A1.2.2: **The expected relative and absolute employment decline by sector**



Source: Own calculations.

Table A1.2.1: **Sectors corresponding to the division of 6 groups – business economy**

Sectors by subgroups	Employment share	Productivity growth
Low Wage-Low Productivity		
Fishing and aquaculture	0.2%	-0.41%
Water collection, treatment and supply	0.4%	0.17%
Wholesale and retail trade and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles	3.8%	0.39%
Land transport and transport via pipelines	6.0%	-0.03%
Postal and courier activities	1.6%	-0.95%
Employment activities	4.3%	-0.55%
Travel agency, tour operator and other reservation service and related activities	0.4%	-2.76%
Sports activities and amusement and recreation activities	1.6%	-1.27%
Repair of computers and personal and household goods	0.4%	-0.95%
Other personal service activities	3.3%	-1.87%
Low Wage-High Productivity		
Crop and animal production, hunting and related service activities	8.5%	4.65%
Forestry and logging	0.5%	1.99%
Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except furniture; manufa	1.0%	1.21%
Printing and reproduction of recorded media	0.6%	1.40%
Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles	16.9%	1.51%
Activities of membership organisations	2.2%	0.56%
Medium Wage-Low Productivity		
Manufacture of basic metals	0.9%	0.05%
Repair and installation of machinery and equipment	1.5%	0.47%
Water transport	0.3%	-0.38%
Warehousing and support activities for transportation	3.0%	0.42%
Architectural and engineering activities; technical testing and analysis	3.2%	-0.66%
Rental and leasing activities	0.7%	0.44%
Medium Wage-High Productivity		
Manufacture of paper and paper products	0.6%	2.13%
Manufacture of rubber and plastic products	1.6%	2.29%
Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products	1.2%	2.01%
Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment	3.5%	1.41%
Manufacture of electrical equipment	1.5%	1.32%
Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers	2.4%	3.05%
Manufacture of other transport equipment	0.7%	1.26%
Wholesale trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles	9.1%	2.47%
Real estate activities	2.3%	0.56%
Advertising and market research	1.0%	1.95%
High Wage-Low Productivity		
Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products	0.1%	-3.69%
Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply	1.2%	0.18%
Air transport	0.3%	-4.38%
Publishing activities	0.7%	0.45%
Insurance, reinsurance and pension funding, except compulsory social security	0.8%	-0.51%
Activities auxiliary to financial services and insurance activities	1.4%	-0.51%
High Wage-High Productivity		
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products	1.1%	1.10%
Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations	0.7%	4.84%
Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products	1.1%	8.97%
Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.	2.9%	1.70%
Telecommunications	0.8%	11.92%
Financial service activities, except insurance and pension funding	2.6%	2.88%
Scientific research and development	1.2%	0.65%

Source: Own caluculations on LFS and Structure of business statistics, Eurostat

Graph A1.2.3: **Evolution of the structure of employment by Member States from 2013 to 2023.**



Note: Annual moving average is taken to smooth the quarterly fluctuations due to small sample sizes.

Source: Own calculation.

Graph A1.2.4: **Evolution of the structure of employment by Member States from 2013 to 2023.**



Source:

2. WAGE AND LABOUR COST DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EU AND ITS MEMBER STATES

2.1. INTRODUCTION

Despite the recent rebound in real wages, wage adequacy, a key component of job quality, remains a concern in some Member States and for certain groups of workers. Real wages edged up in 2024, after losses in 2022 and 2023 and are set to exceed their pre-pandemic levels of 2019 in 2025. However, significant differences are observed across Member States, sectors and groups of workers. The outlook for wage growth is subdued as the macroeconomic context remains challenging, characterised by low productivity growth and high economic uncertainty in a context of increased geopolitical and trade tensions. As a result, concerns have grown about the adequacy of wages and the vulnerability of certain groups of workers, who may be disproportionately affected by these trends.

Moreover, productivity, competitiveness and wage developments are closely interlinked, with important implications for the sustainability, adequacy and distribution of wages. Productivity growth is a key ingredient for sustainable increases in real wages. But higher wages can also boost productivity, under some circumstances. The extent to which competitiveness relies on cost and wage pressures, or rather product quality and innovation, can also affect wages and productivity. Moreover, enhancing productivity and competitiveness can sometimes go along with raising disparities in the wage distribution, for instance through job polarisation. Thus, understanding how productivity, competitiveness and wage developments interact is key for achieving sustainable and adequate wage growth.

Against this background, this chapter looks at wage developments, wage adequacy and the interplay between wages and competitiveness. Section 2.2 assesses recent wage developments and their prospects. Section 2.3 delves into wage adequacy. Section 2.4 investigates the interactions between wages, productivity and competitiveness. Finally, Section 2.5 aims at informing policies to promote both adequate and sustainable wage growth based on a competitive economy.

2.2. WAGE DEVELOPMENTS AND OUTLOOK

Despite strong nominal wage growth and the rebound in real wages, a number of challenges remain. This Section reviews nominal and real wage developments and their underlying drivers, highlighting differences across Member States and groups of workers.

2.2.1. Nominal wage growth is still strong, yet slowing down

Robust nominal wage growth in 2024 reflected the delayed effect of high past inflation and labour market tightness. The growth in nominal compensation per employee reached 5.3% in 2024, lower than its historical peak in 2023 (5.9%) (Graph 2.1) ([61]). Looking ahead, the Commission's *European Economic Forecast Spring 2025*, suggests a further decrease to 3.8 % in 2025 and 3.0% in 2026, still well above the pre-pandemic average of 1.8% between 2013–2019

([61]) Nominal compensation includes gross wages and employer contributions.

([62]). Such developments can be attributed to inflation, which tends to affect wage growth with a delay. Inflation in the EU decreased from 6.4% in 2023 to 2.6% in 2024, and is set to reach 2.3% in 2025 and 1.9% in 2026 ([63]). Moreover, labour markets remain tight, despite some easing, which continues to support wage growth (see Chapter 1).

Graph 2.1: **Nominal compensation per employee, annual percentage change**



Note: Nominal compensation per employees is calculated as the total compensation of employees divided by the total number of employees. EA20 - the 20 countries in the euro area. Data for 2025 reflects projections calculated on the basis of the *Commission's European Economic Forecast Spring 2025*.

Source: AMECO database and Eurostat, National accounts [namq_10_gdp, namq_10_a10_e].

Since mid-2023, wage growth has also reflected a strong increase in negotiated wages, but they are softening in 2025. Between mid-2021 and mid-2023, the role of negotiated wages in nominal wage growth was limited. Firms either offered higher pay than under the prevailing collective agreements or paid bonuses on top of agreed wages (sometimes as one-offs), in a context of economic uncertainty and high labour shortages ([64]). Since mid-2023, negotiated wages have played an increasing role in driving nominal wages up. Negotiated wage growth peaked at 5.4% in the third quarter of 2024 (Graph 2.2). The part of wages that is not negotiated, (sometimes called the 'wage drift') has decreased significantly ([65]), from around 1.5 percentage points over 2022 and 2023, to 0.4 percentage points in the second half of 2024. These developments highlight the influence of collective bargaining in mitigating the loss of purchasing power experienced since end 2021. However, negotiated wages have been moderating in 2025. From the second half of 2024, collective agreements have been settled well below initial demands by trade unions, in particular in Germany, Italy, Spain and Sweden. These

([62]) According to the Commission's European Economic Spring forecast 2025 , wage growth in the euro area follows the same pattern, reaching respectively 5.3% in 2023, 4.5% in 2024, and set to reach 3.3% in 2025 and 2.7% in 2026.

([63]) This is notably due to the pace of wage negotiations. Furthermore, the formal role of inflation in wage-setting (e.g. with indexations) has decreased over time (see Koester and Grapow, 2021). Nevertheless, due to the sizeable losses in real wages in 2022, wage negotiations are expected to take into account such losses at some point, notably in sectors or Member States where profits are resilient.

([64]) This may indicate that negotiated wages (although picking-up from the beginning of 2022) were constrained by the high economic uncertainty, but it also reflects the fact that it takes time to renegotiate collective agreements and that negotiations faced additional hurdles with the containment measures during the pandemic period.

([65]) The 'wage drift' notably captures elements of the growth in wages and salaries per employee that are not covered by collectively negotiated wages, such as individual bonus payments, or changes in average hours worked. It is also affected by departures from and newly hired workers in firms. See : European Central Bank (2024).

deals mainly applied from 2025 onwards. Consistently, the growth of wages in job postings for newly hired workers continues to decline since it peaked in 2022 (Graph 2.2).

2.2.2. Wage growth and its drivers differ sizeably across countries

Wage growth varied considerably across Member States in 2024, reflecting persisting, yet narrowing differences in inflation. Nominal wages increased particularly strongly in Romania (16.6 %), Hungary (12.6%), and Poland (12.3%) in 2024 (Graph 2.1). This reflects high current or recent inflation, as well as relatively higher labour productivity growth and tight labour markets. By contrast, more moderate wage growth was witnessed in Member States where inflation has been lower: wage growth was between 3% and 5% in Cyprus, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Spain and Sweden. Finland (1.8%), Luxembourg (2.2%) and Belgium (2.9%) exhibited the lowest wage growth in the EU. At the same time, the differences in wage growth among countries decreased considerably in 2024 and are set to decrease further in 2025, reflecting narrowing inflation differentials.

Graph 2.2: **Growth of negotiated wages and of wages in job postings (%), euro area**



Note: The wages in job postings is an indicator developed by the Central Bank of Ireland. It reflects the pay offered to a newly hired worker in six of the largest euro-area countries (Germany, Ireland, Spain, France, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands). The negotiated wages indicator also covers the wages offered to incumbent workers. Q1 - first quarter; Q2 - second quarter: Q3 - third quarter: Q4 - fourth quarter.

Source: European Central Bank [STS.Q.U2.N.INWR.000000.3.ANR.] and Central Bank of Ireland.

In 2024, wage growth was above what can be predicted on the basis of its main macroeconomic drivers in most Member States, consistent with the recovery in real wages. The growth of nominal compensation per employee can be compared with a 'benchmark' growth rate predicted by the main macroeconomic drivers of wages, including inflation, unemployment, and productivity ([66]). In 2024, wage growth was above its benchmark (indicating a "positive gap") in almost all Member States, reflecting their real wage rebound, and above 5 % in Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Portugal, and Romania (Graph 2.3) ([67]). The gap was negative in Belgium, Czechia, Finland, and Slovakia. Belgium and Finland displayed a relatively mild inflation in recent years and now a mild wage growth. In 2025, wage growth is predicted to be below the benchmark in five countries, including Belgium, Finland, Greece, Poland, and Slovakia

Over a longer period, the cumulative gap between wage growth and its benchmark also reflects different competitiveness pressures across Member States. During the period 2013-2024, wage growth was well above its benchmark in Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia Lithuania, and Romania in line with continued cost-competitiveness pressures (see also Section 2.4) ([68]). In contrast, wage growth was below its benchmark in ten Member States, with particularly large

([66]) For methodological details, see European Commission: Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion (2024).

([67]) The positive gap in many countries is partly linked to the delayed impact of the high inflation in recent years on current wage developments, while the inflation abated quickly in 2024. See also Bates et al. (2025).

([68]) European Commission: Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion (2024).

Graph 2.3: **Gap in the wage growth relative to its benchmark (%)**



Note: Wage benchmarks are predicted by developments in inflation, productivity and the unemployment rate.

Source: Own calculations based on AMECO [1100 OVGD; 1000 NETD; 3099427 XUNRQ; 1000 ZCPIH; 1000 ZUTN; 1000 UWCD; 1000 NWTD] and Eurostat [ert_eff_ic_a; une_rt_a_h]).

negative gaps in: Finland, Greece, Poland and Slovakia, suggesting that a relative wage moderation in the past may allow to accommodate for higher wage increases.

There is a low risk that wage growth would trigger significant inflationary pressures in the foreseeable future. At EU level, profits are still cushioning the impact of the sustained wage growth on inflation ([69]). In addition, in the euro area, indicators of underlying inflation are in line with a return to the ECB's medium-term target for inflation of 2%, while long-term inflation expectations remain also broadly unchanged at around 2%. This points overall to a low risk of unintended wage-price spirals. At the same time, the situation varies across countries as the underlying factors of inflation persistence differ. Whether high wage growth fuels persistent inflation depends among others on a country's wage-setting system. In this regard, countries with prevalent wage indexation systems, notably Belgium, Luxembourg and Malta, have registered relatively moderate inflation peaks and wage growth since 2022, and only Belgium shows a more persistent inflation. In other countries like Germany, the Netherlands and Portugal, inflation has been more persistent, notably in services (more than 4.5% in 2024). This can be explained by sustained wage growth and sizeable delays in price adjustments to past inflation surges for some services in these countries ([70]).

2.2.3. Real wages started to increase, with significant differences across Member States and workers

Real wages are bouncing back, sustaining the recovery in disposable income. Real wages dropped substantially in 2022 and, more moderately, in the first half of 2023, resulting in a substantial decline in households' disposable income. In the third quarter of 2023 the annualised real wage growth turned positive and accelerated to 2.7% in 2024 (Graph 2.4). This is due to lower inflation and a still robust, albeit moderating nominal wage growth. Since the beginning

([69]) The gross operating surplus decreased to 40.9% of GDP in 2024, from 42.2% in 2022 and 2023. This indicates that profits decreased, mitigating the effect of rising wages on prices. The gross operating surplus is now broadly at the levels shown in the 2010 decade.

([70]) Inflation in services in the euro area reached 4.0% in December 2024 (compared to December 2023), well above its long-term average of 1.9%. Delayed price adjustments may concern notably recreation and transport services (ECB, 2025).

of 2024, real wages have become the major factor sustaining growth in households' disposal income (GDHI) (Graph A.2.1.1 in the annex), whereas the overall effect of public transfers and tax reductions declined and turned negative in the second half of 2023 ([71]).

The magnitude of the rebound in real wages differs across Member States. In 2024, the biggest increases were observed in Romania (10.2%), Poland (9.0%) and Hungary (8.7%), after a marked slowdown in 2022-2023 compared to previous trends. This was due to both strong wage growth and a rapidly decreasing inflation. In contrast, real wage growth remained below the EU average of 2.7% in Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, Slovakia, Spain and Sweden, and was negative in Belgium ([72]). This was notably due to a somewhat persistent inflation in Cyprus, Estonia, Luxembourg, Slovakia, and to a low nominal wage growth in Finland, Ireland, Italy and Sweden, while in Belgium, France and Spain both factors played a role.

Graph 2.4: **Real wages, annual percentage change**



Note: EA-20, the 20 countries that have adopted the euro. Real wages were computed using the harmonised index of consumer prices as deflator.

Source: AMECO [5 0 0 0 HWWDW, 5 0 0 0 ZCPIH] and Eurostat [namq_10_gdp, namq_10_a10_e,prc_hicp_midx].

In 2024, real wages remained slightly below their 2019 levels in the EU, with significant variations among Member States. In 2024, real wages in the EU remained 0.7% below their 2019 levels on average, with large differences across countries reflecting different nominal wage and inflation dynamics (Graph 2.5) ([73]). In one-third of Member States, real wages exceeded pre-pandemic levels by more than 12%, ranging from 12% to 18% in Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Portugal and Slovenia, and surpassing 20% in Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania. Another third of EU countries experienced more modest increases, with real wages surpassing the 2019

([71]) European Commission: Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion (2024).

([72]) This weak rebound in real wages follows marked losses in previous years, notably in Estonia, Finland, Italy, Slovakia and Sweden. In Belgium, the decrease in 2024 followed a strong increase in 2023.

([73]) Over the last years, inflation was high notably in many Central and Eastern European countries, but then declined rapidly, while a robust nominal wage growth allowed for sustained real wage growth (except in Czechia). In contrast, in some other countries, real wage growth was weak, either due to low nominal wage growth or to a persistent inflation. For instance, in Finland, France, and Italy inflation rates were relatively moderate, but nominal wage growth was low compared to other countries. In Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden inflation tended to be persistent, while nominal wage growth remained moderate. See also European Commission: Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion (2024).

levels by less than 7% (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Ireland, Malta, Slovakia and Spain). By contrast, nine Member States, including some of the largest EU economies, saw real wages fall short of pre-pandemic levels (by less than 3% in Finland, France, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Sweden, and by over 4% in Czechia and Italy). These Member States have faced sluggish economic and labour productivity growth since the pandemic, that has likely weighed on wage growth (see also Section 2.4). In 2025, real wages are set to exceed their 2019 levels in the EU by 0.6%, but in Czechia, Germany, Italy, Finland and France they would still be below.

At the same time, minimum wage increases have broadly offset losses in purchasing power from previous years for minimum wage earners. Between January 2020 and January 2025, statutory minimum wages expressed in national currency increased from 17.1% in France to 80% or more in Croatia, Hungary and Romania (Graph 2.6). These heterogeneous increases reflect notably the large differences in inflation levels among countries, and therefore mainly developments since the surge in inflation in 2022. Between January 2022 and January 2025, statutory minimum wages indeed increased from 12.4% in France to 65.7% in Bulgaria, and by more than 40% in 7 out of the 21 Member States concerned (Bulgaria, Romania Croatia, Poland, Latvia, Hungary and Lithuania) ([74]). In real terms, the latter countries also tended to register the highest increases, despite the high inflation over that period. In contrast, real minimum wages grew by less than 5% in Luxembourg, Czechia, Slovakia, Estonia and Slovenia, and slightly decreased in France ([75]).

Graph 2.5: **Real wage changes (%) compared with pre-pandemic levels (2019), 2024 and 2025**



Note: Real wages were computed using the harmonised index of consumer prices as a deflator. EA-20 = the 20 countries in the euro area. Data for 2025 reflects projections calculated on the basis of the Commission's European Autumn 2024 Economic Forecasts.

Source: AMECO [5 0 0 0 HWWDW, 5 0 0 0 ZCPIH].

([74]) All but five Member States (Denmark, Italy, Austria, Finland and Sweden) have statutory minimum wages. Cyprus introduced a statutory minimum wage in 2023. Between January 2022 and January 2025, statutory minimum wages expressed in national currency increased by more than 50% in Bulgaria (65.7%), Romania (58.8%) and Poland (55.0%), all countries with relatively low or medium minimum wage levels (when compared to the national average wage). Moreover, growth was above 20% in all EU countries with statutory minimum wages except France (12.4%), Luxembourg (16.9%) and Slovenia (19.0%).

([75]) The patterns are more heterogeneous among Member States where minimum wages are set by collective bargaining only. For instance, minimum wages increased strongly in Austria, but significantly less in Italy and Finland (Eurofound, 2025a).

Graph 2.6: **Minimum wage developments, in Member States where they exist**



Note: Cyprus was excluded as the statutory minimum wage was introduced in 2023.

Source: Eurofound and Eurostat [earn_mw_cur, prc_hlcp_mldx].

2.3. DEVELOPMENTS IN WAGE ADEQUACY

Wage adequacy has received growing attention among policy makers in recent years as one aspect of job quality and working conditions. The outlook for real wage growth remains restrained and aggregate developments can hide important differences across workers, for instance based on their sector of activity, occupation or skill level (Section 2.2). Besides, inadequate wages are mentioned as a reason for persisting labour shortages in some sectors ([76]). Against this backdrop, promoting adequate wages, a key component of job quality, remains high on the political agenda.

The concept of adequate wages is multi-dimensional. Wage adequacy typically refers to at least two dimensions: one being how wages compare to other wages, and the other being whether wages provide enough purchasing power ([77]). As there is no commonly agreed measure to assess either dimension, the section goes through a range of indicators that shed light on various aspects of wage adequacy.

2.3.1. The relative situation of low wage earners has improved since the pandemic

In-work poverty has continued its decreasing trend, highlighting the improving income situation of workers living in low-income households, relative to other workers. In-work poverty represents the share of persons at work who have an equivalised disposable income below 60% of the national median. It reached 8.2% in 2024 from a peak of 9.8% in 2016 and 8.9% in 2021 (Graph 2.7, panel a). Between 2016 and 2024, in-work poverty decreased in around half of the Member States, and notably by more than 1 percentage point in Germany, Greece,

([76]) European Commission: Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion (2024).

([77]) Principle 6 of the European Pillar of Social Rights notably underlines that workers have the right to fair wages that provide for a decent standard of living. See also Impact assessment (SWD(2020) 245 2020 and SWD(2020)) which explains that fairness of the wage in relation to the wage of other workers in the same country (relative) and the sufficiency of the wage in relation to a decent standard of living (absolute) are important.

Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Romania and Spain. However, it increased by more than 1 percentage point in Croatia, Luxembourg, Malta, and Slovakia. Overall, beyond the impact of support measures adopted during the pandemic and the energy crisis, these improvements may also reflect a more sustained wage growth among lower-income working households compared to others. At the same time, in-work poverty is also affected by other factors, such as other sources of household income (including the income of other household members and social benefits), the household's composition (e.g. the number of dependent children), and work intensity of the household ([78]).

Also the share of low-wage earners has decreased in the EU. The share of low-wage earners, reflecting the proportion of employees earning two-thirds or less of the median gross hourly earnings in a country, decreased in the EU, from 15.2% in 2018 to 14.7% in 2022 ([79]). This indicates that, on average, low hourly wages tended to increase more than other wages, or people moving out of low-paid jobs, and thus to get closer to the median (Graph 2.7, panel b). The situation, however, varies greatly across Member States. The share decreased by more than 2 percentage points in Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia and Slovenia. In contrast, it increased by more than 2 percentage points in Belgium, Bulgaria, Greece, Luxembourg, Hungary and Romania, indicating in those countries a compression of the hourly wage distribution at the bottom. However, this may not fully reflect the wages ultimately perceived by workers - due to differences in hours worked during a month.

These developments may somewhat contrast with a widespread perception of an unfair distribution of income. In the Special Eurobarometer survey on Fairness, inequality, and intergenerational mobility held in 2022 ([80]), across the EU, 57% of respondents indicated that large differences in people's incomes are acceptable to properly reward differences in talents and efforts. At the same time, 37% of respondents tended to believe that, by and large, people do not get what they deserve (versus only 35% that believe the opposite). The perception of unfairness was marked in Cyprus (65% of respondents), Greece (60%) or Slovenia (55%), and less in Luxembourg (18%), Denmark (25%) or Finland (26%). Furthermore, based on the 2024 European Working Conditions Survey conducted by Eurofound, 14% of responding men and more than 18% of responding women disagree that they get appropriately paid when considering all their efforts and achievements in their jobs. The share of workers who consider their pay as inappropriate is above 16% in agriculture, education, heath, as well as in commerce and hospitality.

([78]) **In-work at-risk-of-poverty rate** refers to the percentage of persons in the total population who declared to be at work (employed or self-employed) who are at-risk-of-poverty (i.e. with an equivalised disposable income below the risk-of-poverty threshold, which is set at 60 % of the national median equivalised disposable income (after social transfers)). The **equivalised disposable income** is the total income of a household, after tax and other deductions, that is available for spending or saving, divided by the number of household members converted into equalised adults; household members are equalised or made equivalent by weighting each according to their age, using the so-called modified OECD equivalence scale.

([79]) Based on the structure of earnings survey.

([80]) European Commission (2022).

Graph 2.7: **Share of in-work poverty and low wage earners**



Note: Countries are sorted according to their GDP per capita in PPP 2023.
Source: Eurostat [ilc_iwp01 and earn_ses_pub].

Looking more in-depth at the distribution of wages and their ability to prevent material deprivation can provide further insights about wage adequacy. A declining rate of in-work poverty or a decreasing share of low-wage earners is not sufficient to conclude that wages are adequate. It is also key to examine the wage distribution to allow for a better comparison of wages across and within groups of workers. Moreover, the degree of material deprivation of workers can help to better understand to what extent wages provide for a decent living ([81]). Boxes 2.1 and 2.2 present those indicators, as well as their pros and cons when it comes to assessing wage adequacy.

2.3.2. Wages have played an important role in improving the situation of vulnerable workers

Minimum wages have increased more than the average in most Member States, improving the relative situation of minimum wage earners. Between 2019 and 2024, most Member States where a statutory minimum wage exists showed large increases in the Kaitz indexes, that represent the ratio of the gross minimum wage to the mean or average earnings (Graph 2.8, panel a). Among the 18 Member States for which data is available (for 2024, or for 2023), the ratio of the minimum wage to the average earnings increased in 15 Member States. This reflects sizeable updates aimed at mitigating the effects of the high inflation on the lowest paid (see also Section 2.2). The ratio remained stable in four countries, (Belgium, Hungary, Ireland and Luxembourg) and dropped only in three (Bulgaria, Lithuania and Malta).

([81]) Some authors have also suggested to consider broader aspects of wage-setting when studying wage adequacy, such as the transparency and predictability of wages (including delays in payment), compliance with regulation, social dialogue, or working time (Balestra et al.. 2023; Bronkhorst, 2020; Neugebauer et al., 2017).

Graph 2.8: **Kaitz index and wage ratio W20/W50 (for single-person households, working full-time)**



(1) In panel a: The Kaitz index can only be for Member States with statutory minimum wage. In panel b: Member States are sorted according to their GDP per capita in PPP 2023. The wage ratios is calculated for single-person households working full-time.

Source: Eurostat [earn_avgr2] and own calculations based on EU SILC microdata.

In half of Member States, wage decile ratios also point to declining disparities at the bottom of the wage distribution. The gap between lower and median wages can be assessed using ratios of percentiles to the median of the gross wage distribution computed for full-time single workers ([82]). For instance, the ratio of the 2nd decile to the median wage increased in 13 countries (Austria, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Greece, Lithuania, Malta, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain), indicating narrowing disparities. The ratio remained stable in five other countries (Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Latvia). However, it decreased in nine Member States (Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, France, Ireland, Italy, Poland, Romania and Sweden) (Graph 2.8, panel b). Among the latter countries, Bulgaria, Croatia, Poland and Romania displayed strong real wage increases: lower-wage earners also benefitted from some increases in real terms, although disparities increased. In contrast, Czechia, France, Italy, Sweden showed expanding disparities between lower-wage earners and the median, while real wages remained below 2019 levels (see also section 2.2). This points to relatively weak average wage growth for lower-middle-wage earners in these countries.

Minimum wage increases have a significant impact on the wages of low-paid workers earning beyond minimum wage. A 1% increase in minimum wages results on average in a 0.3% increase in the wages of low-paid employees, but only large minimum wage increases (at least 15% in nominal terms) have a significant impact ([83]). Minimum wage updates can also benefit workers with higher wages, but with a time lag compared to spillover effects on low wages, as collective agreements take some time to translate national minimum wage increases to the whole wage distribution. As a result, increases in minimum wages appear to initially compress the wage distribution, but the extent to which compression persists depends notably

([82]) Similar to the previous sub-section, in this analysis, low wages are defined as gross wages within the first two deciles of the wage distribution, lower-middle wages as those in the 3rd and 4th deciles, and middle wages as those in the 5th and 6th deciles. Different ratios of percentiles to the median of the gross wage distribution are computed (including W20/W50 and W10/W50), for full-time single workers.

([83]) See in particular Eurofound (2025b).

on sectors and collective bargaining characteristics ([84]). In addition, spill-overs on other low-to-medium wages may have been less marked after 2022 due to high inflation. Firms faced increasing cost pressures (notably in energy-intensive industries) and were less able to increase wages as they would have done before, considering increases in minimum wages.

Wage disparities based on skill levels and occupations vary widely across Member States. Some countries, including Estonia, Ireland, Latvia, or Portugal, exhibit a highly polarised wage structure, hinting at a high wage premia for skills and large differences in wages across occupations ([85]). In contrast, a more compressed distribution is observed in Czechia, Denmark, Slovakia or Sweden, with overall lower wage premia for skills. Over time, the wage differentials along skills, thus the skill premia, increased in 10 countries, in particular in Finland, Ireland and Malta. This is consistent with the evidence pointing to the increased labour demand for digital or cognitive skills and an associated wage premium for those workers. This may also hint at specific skill gaps, e.g. linked to the twin transition, or the high labour shortages following the pandemic ([86]). Seven countries experienced a decrease in wage polarisation, especially Poland, Romania and Slovakia, despite tight labour markets.

Women and third country nationals are more likely to remain in low-paid jobs. In 2023, women's gross hourly earnings remained on average 12.0% below those of men in the EU ([87]). The gender pay gap has decreased compared to 2019, for the EU (from 14.1%), as well as in 21 EU countries. However, the gap tends to increase with age (as a result of the career interruptions women may experience during their working life), and is on average higher in the private sector than in the public sector. Furthermore, in 2023, the persistence in low-paid jobs for at least 4 years ranged from less than 2% in Finland, Denmark and Sweden and more than 10% in Latvia, Estonia, Hungary, Malta, Cyprus, Portugal, Lithuania, Ireland, Bulgaria ([88]). In a majority of countries, women are more likely to experience low pay for multiple years compared to men, with wider gender differences in Cyprus, Czechia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Malta. The persistence of low-paid jobs is significantly higher among migrants than native employees, except notably in Sweden.

([84]) In particular, labour shortages tend to amplify spill-over effects of increases in minimum wages on other wages, while higher initial minimum wage levels would decrease those effects. Other factors, include the existence of bargaining actors on both sides of industry, the union density in the sector, or the percentage of workplaces with worker representation structures.

([85]) Stazi (2025).

([86]) Jona-Lasinio and Venturini (2024); Kölling (2022); Josten et al. (2024).

([87]) The highest gender pay gap was recorded in Latvia (19.0%) and the lowest in Luxembourg (-0.9%), see *Eurostat (online data code: sdg_05_20)*. The gender pay gap comes on top of an overall lower participation in the labour market and fewer hours worked per month for women compared to men.

([88]) While numerous factors influence the extent of persistency in low paid jobs, including technological change, labour market conditions, labour policies and institutional factors, the degree of persistence in low-paid jobs mirrors, as expected, the prevalence of low-paid jobs (Dreger et al., 2015; Schnabel, 2021; Stazi, 2025).

Box 2.1: **The relative situation of lower and middle wage earners along the wage distribution.**

The Kaitz indexes provide insights about the fairness of the statutory minimum wages (where they exist). They are calculated by dividing the gross statutory minimum wage by the median or the average wage for full-time employees. The Kaitz index is published by Eurostat based on country declarations, but there are sizeable delays for the indicator referring to the median. Other data sources (e.g. the OECD) can provide more up-to-date information, but with notable differences in concepts and estimates compared to Eurostat. Furthermore, the Kaitz index cannot be calculated for Member States without a statutory minimum wage. Finally, the indicator does not provide information on the share of workers earning minimum or close-to-minimum wages.

Other ratios can compare wages at different points of the earnings distribution. Common decile ratios used in the literature include the ratio of the 90th to the 10th or of the 80th to the 20th percentiles of the wage distribution. Other common ratios are expressed in relation to the median wage. At the EU level, such ratios can be estimated using the EU Structure of Earnings Survey (SES) or the yearly EU-SILC micro data. In this section, ratios of the 10th, 20th and 30th percentiles to the median are considered to reflect the relative wage of low or lower-middle wage earners. Those percentiles, including the median, are determined using the variable 'Employee cash or near cash income', from the User Database of EU-SILC, see also Box 2.2.

Some indicators exist but are not presented in the chapter because they are difficult to interpret or present a perspective that is outside the scope of this chapter.

The Gini coefficient is commonly used to summarise the extent of income inequalities, but is sensitive to changes in the middle of the distribution ([1]). A higher (lower) Gini coefficient indicates a more (less) unequal distribution. Nonetheless, it is very sensitive to changes in the middle of the wage distribution and less so to changes at the extremes, which is where wage inequality is often more marked (Hey and Lambert, 1980). In addition, the Gini coefficient can produce similar estimates in the presence of different distribution patterns (Atkinson, 2009).

The mean log deviation, the Theil index and the coefficient of variation are other possible metrics, although difficult to interpret. The mean log deviation and the Theil index are used by some international organisations (see for instance World Bank, 2024; International Labour Organisation, 2024a). They belong to entropy measures that are also used in physics to measure randomness. They have the key advantage of being easily decomposable into a between and within groups component, e.g. groups of countries or of workers (Shorrocks, 1980). At the same time, both indicators (that can only take positive values, with zero representing an equal distribution) do not have an upper bound. Therefore, they can also be difficult to interpret. Similarly, the coefficient of variation, defined as the ratio of the standard deviation of a distribution to the mean, has also been used to gauge the extent to which wages deviate from the average wage, and can be decomposed into between- and within-country components (see for instance, European Commission: Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion, 2023a; Zwysen, 2024). It also faces similar caveats.

Additionally, wage ratios focusing on the extreme segments of the distribution focus on a very low proportion of workers and often are affected by highest wage earners. This is for instance the case for the income of the top 1% of the wage distribution. The Palma ratio is also a common indicator computed by dividing the total wages accumulated by the top 10% by the total wages accumulated by the bottom 40% of the wage distribution (International Labour Organisation, 2017). It however reflects in part the situation of some workers at the top of the wage distribution.

([1]) It considers the area between the Lorenz curve of an income distribution and a hypothetical line of absolute equality.

2.3.3. Yet, middle class workers have become more exposed to material deprivation in some countries

An in-depth analysis of worker's material deprivation provides valuable insights whether wages are sufficient to afford basic goods and services. One can argue that the more adequate wages are, the less workers are materially deprived. Although it is not universally agreed what this implies in terms of ultimate purchasing power, this concept of material deprivation, developed by Eurostat, provides a commonly agreed framework at the EU level ([89]). The concept lists goods and services generally required for a household to lead a decent life and integrate meaningfully into society. As such it is relevant to analyse the extent to which individuals (or households) can afford these 13 pre-defined 'basic' items ([90]). There are a number of caveats though. In particular, the level of deprivation can be affected not only by wage rates but also by work intensity, other sources of incomes and household composition, as well as other factors such as the relative prices of these basic items (e.g. energy) and in which quantity they are needed (see also Box 2.2) ([91]).

Developments in the average number of items deprived among workers are assessed, accounting for household composition or work intensity. The situation of two groups of workers is considered: single, full-time workers without children and all workers. This allows, respectively, to look at wage adequacy for a single worker, excluding the effects of second wage earners in the household or other dependent household members (including family benefits), and also the actual average situation of workers. In essence the results are similar for both types of workers ([92]). The analysis also provides further insights into the role played by hours worked and gross wages ([93]) vis-à-vis other sources of income. The section then focuses on the three lower monthly gross wage quintiles in each Member State, as deprivation is expected to generally affect lower-wage workers.

Overall, workers' material deprivation of basic items depends on GDP per capita, but the distribution of incomes also matters. At EU level in 2023, workers reported on average to be deprived of 1.3 basic items (1.4 for single, full-time workers). Less than 10% of workers lacked 5 or more basic items, i.e. faced social and material deprivation, according to Eurostat's definition. In countries with a lower GDP per capita, such as Bulgaria, Greece and Romania, workers report on average to be deprived of 2 or more items and the share of socially and materially deprived workers lies above 15%. This underlines the key role of GDP per capita, and ultimately national productivity in determining the standards of living of a country's workers. At the same time, in some countries with medium GDP per capita, notably Czechia, Estonia and Slovenia, workers have similar or fewer deprivation items (ranging from an average of 0.8 items for single, full-time workers in Slovenia to 1.1 items in Estonia) than countries with a higher GDP per capita such as Denmark and Germany (resp. 1.2 and 1.5 items reported on average). This suggests that the income distribution can also play a significant role in reducing material deprivation, either via wages - notably by ensuring that more workers benefit from economic growth - or via redistribution by the tax-benefit system.

([89]) Eurostat's concept of material deprivation is consistent with Townsend (1979).

([90]) They consist of seven items linked to the functioning of a household (including, for instance, the ability to keep the home adequately warm), and six personal items (including, for example, replacing worn-out cloths). For more details see Box 2.2. below.

([91]) If the individual cannot afford at least 5 out of these 13 basic items, he or she is classified as socially and materially deprived. However, workers across all income groups are deprived of some of these items.

([92]) The degree of workers' material deprivation somewhat varies, with the biggest difference for 2023 in, Finland, Greece, the Netherlands, Malta and Romania .

([93]) As approximated by the variable *cash income from employment* in gross terms in EU SILC.

Graph 2.9: **Average number of deprivation items for wage earners (single-person households working full-time)**



Note: Analysis takes only those individuals into account who report to be receiving income from work in EU SILC data. For this graph the sample includes only single-person households working full-time. Member States are ranked according to their GDP per capita in PPS 2023.

Source: Own calculcations based on EU SILC microdata and Eurostat [prc_ppp_ind].

Since 2019 lower-middle and middle wage earners have increasingly struggled to afford basic goods or services, in particular in higher income countries. Between 2019 and 2023 the average number of material deprivation items reported by workers tended to decrease in catching-up countries, consistent with a strong real wage growth. However, it increased in many higher income Member States (Graph 2.9 and Graph A.2.1.2 in the annex) ([94]). The worsening in some Member States reflects increases in energy and food prices which led to a growing share of workers being deprived of proper heating or quality food, and a slow recovery in real wages (see Section 2.2). The increase in deprivation was marked for the lower-middle wage earners and the middle wage earners, represented respectively by the 2nd and 3rd wage quintiles, but less for the lowest wage earners (Graph A.2.1.3 in the annex) ([95]). Thus, lower-middle wage groups, that benefitted less from support measures and minimum wage increases than the lowest wage earners, have become more vulnerable ([96]). From 2024, the persistence of inflation in some services, which replaced food and energy as drivers of inflation, may also affect workers in those lower-middle wage groups.

Less hours worked is one reason for the increase in deprivation for some workers. Between 2019 and 2023, the number of hours worked declined in most countries. This concerns the hours worked for full-time employees in almost all countries (except in Cyprus and Poland where it slightly increased and in Denmark, Lithuania where it stayed stable), as well as for part-time workers in most higher income Member States. This decline in hours worked, coupled with the strong decreases in real hourly wages experienced over 2022-2023, is likely to have contributed

([94]) For single, full-time workers, deprivation increased in all catching-up Member States, as well as in Italy, Portugal and to some extent in Ireland and France. By contrast, it increased from 2019 in the more affluent Member States (see Graph 2.8 for full-time, single workers; the results generally hold when considering all workers, see Graph A.2.1.2 in annex).

([95]) For example, in Germany, the lowest wage group (1st quintile) saw an increase by 0.67 items on average while the 2nd quintile saw an increase of 0.73 items. Or for Belgium where the lowest wage group (1st quintile) saw a decrease by 0.11 items while the 2nd quintile saw an increase by 0.26 items.

([96]) In addition, a sizeable share of low-wage earners can be second earners in a household. As such, the main wage in the household may have acted as a buffer for some expenses linked to the household, such as energy and food.

to the increase in workers' material deprivation. Conversely, in lower income Member States, real hourly wages and working hours of part-time workers tended to increase, except in Romania, which may have helped to reduce the material deprivation of workers.

Box 2.2: Measures linked to the affordability of basic goods and services

There is no commonly agreed measure defining whether wages allow for a sufficient purchasing power. Across countries, wages can be compared in terms of their purchasing power, by using purchasing power standards (PPS) to reflect differences in prices. But defining a threshold below which a wage is inadequate for a worker also depends on the consumer basket that he or she can afford. Only a few EU countries (e.g. Ireland or Romania) have assessed poverty lines based on a consumer basket. Across countries, recent initiatives have aimed to agree on common concepts for a lower threshold capturing the decency of wages ([1]). The EU project on reference budgets underlined the challenges to develop an EU-wide measure, both in terms of agreeing on a minimum consumer basket and of collecting the relevant data.

The section analyses to what extent workers regard their wage as sufficient to afford basic goods and services. This avoids assuming a common minimum consumer basket to estimate a threshold for wage adequacy. Material deprivation, a concept that is commonly agreed among Member States, refers to individuals' inability to afford items necessary or desirable for an adequate life – but without setting a priori how many of each basic item are needed (Townsend, 1979). Eurostat's material deprivation indicator is based on 13 questions asking for pre-defined basic items, integrated into the EU-SILC (European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions) survey. The indicator, which is reported yearly by Eurostat, indicates the share of persons that cannot afford at least 5 items out of the 13 basic items ([2]). However, the data show that people across all income levels and countries may be deprived of some basic items.

The analysis looks at the degree of deprivation of individual basic items, as measured by the average number of deprived items, and looks into the role played by wages. For a given category of workers, the fewer items they are deprived of, the more adequate wages are considered to be. However, material deprivation does not only depend on the individuals' wages, but also on other factors such as other sources of income (including a second income in the household, or social benefits), or the number of dependent persons in the household. It also depends on work intensity. Therefore, the degrees of deprivation are considered, both for single, full-time workers without children and for all workers. This provides insights about wage adequacy for one person alone, and also considering the actual average situation of all workers. Wages are also expressed in gross terms, instead of net terms. Indicators using net wages would allow to consider the effects of the tax-benefit system, but are more complex, since taxes and benefits are affected by household composition. In addition, ratios expressed in net terms provide a less clear signal on whether the wages paid by employers are adequate (before redistribution by the tax-benefit system). Furthermore, the analysis focuses on the three lowest quintiles of the wage distribution as they capture, respectively, the lower, lower-middle and middle wage earners.

Some caveats apply when using material deprivation to assess wage adequacy. First, as for any survey data, answers are subject to respondents' interpretation. For instance, a worker declaring not being able to afford heating may be constrained, but not completely deprived of heating. Second, it may also depend on the specific individual needs of the worker (e.g. transports or heating needs depend on the region where the individual lives and works). Third, wages are approximated by the variable *cash income from employment* from the User Database in EU-SILC ([3]). Besides wages and salary, this variable also includes social contributions and income taxes, 'remuneration for time not worked', 'enhanced rates of pay for overtime' and other components. While this is the closest approximation of gross wages which can be retrieved across Member States using the yearly EU-SILC data, not all types of bonuses are covered. This may slightly affect the definition of wage quintiles used to assess differences across the wage distribution.

([1]) At the EU level, the European Refence Budgets Network and the JRC project on "Measuring and monitoring absolute poverty" (ABSPO) aimed to establish a common methodology to define a lower threshold for decent wages i.e. living wages. This approach would imply quantifying a basket of goods and services deemed essential for a decent life. A decent wage would then be determined by a threshold, meaning being able to afford such consumer basket, taking into account the worker's location (International Labour Organisation, 2024b, Menyhert et al., 2025).

([2]) They consist of 7 items linked to the functioning of a household (warming home, buying meat, buying furniture, having a car, going to holidays, paying arrears or unexpected expenses), and 6 items linked to the living standard of the individual within the household (buying shoes, clothes, having some leisure activity, spent money on oneself, meeting outside with friends, or accessing internet)

([3]) This corresponds to the variable PY010G in EU-SILC.

2.4. THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN WAGES AND COMPETITIVENESS

Productivity growth is key for promoting adequate wages. Productivity growth supports economic growth, competitiveness, job creation and sound public finances, which are all essential for maintaining our social welfare model. In turn, it contributes to the economic fundamentals needed for sustainable wage growth. However, productivity gains can in some cases also be accompanied by downward pressure on wages and wage disparities. Against this backdrop, this section examines under which circumstances productivity and adequate wage growth go hand in hand, and how non-cost competitiveness, such as the business environment and the quality of products, can help in this respect.

2.4.1. Weak productivity in the way of higher wage growth in the EU

Productivity gains tend to give companies room to reward their workers for the higher output, and therefore typically goes hand in hand with higher wages. This is also reflected in the strong, positive correlation between productivity gains and real wage growth (Graph 2.10). However, heterogeneity across countries also highlights the important role of other factors, including policies (Section 2.5). If real wage growth is below productivity growth, the labour share declines, reflecting a distribution of productivity gains increasingly oriented towards capital rather than labour (see also Annex 2.1) ([97]).

Weak productivity growth has weighed on sustainable wage increases in the EU over the past decade. For the EU, average annual labour productivity growth was 0.7% between 2010 and 2022, well above real compensation growth, at 0.1% (Graph 2.10). The stronger increase in productivity than wages has resulted in a decline in the labour share in 2022 ([98]). In turn, with the recovery in real wages over 2023-25, annualised real compensation growth increased to 2% and exceeded labour productivity growth, at 0.4%, leading to a recovery in the labour share. Productivity growth in the EU was lower than in the US in both periods (see also Section 2.4.2).

([97]) The labour share is calculated as the ratio of total compensation per employee over nominal GDP per person employed. (European Commission: Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion, 2024).

([98]) European Commission: Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion (2024).

Graph 2.10: **Productivity and real compensation per employee, annualised growth rates**



Note: Real compensation is deflated using the HICP index.

Source: Ameco [UWCD.1.0.0.0; NWTD.1.0.0.0; NETD.1.0.0.0; OVGD.1.0.0.0; ZCPIH.1.0.0.0].

Several structural factors have contributed to this weakness in productivity growth in the EU ([99]). This includes the declining share of manufacturing in value added and a growing share of employees in low- to medium-wage jobs in low-productivity sectors (Chapter 1). Moreover, the EU suffers from innovation and R&D spending gaps vis-à-vis the US, and relatively small sectors where productivity growth is relatively strong, notably ICT, industries and digital services. This weighs on total factor productivity and the creation of high-quality jobs. Also firms tend to be smaller in the EU than the US which reduces their potential to harness productivity gains through economies of scale.

However, higher wages can also boost productivity, fuelling a virtuous circle between wage and productivity growth. For instance, increases in minimum wages were in some cases found to boost the labour productivity of low wage earners ([100]). In particular, the existence of wage premiums can motivate employees to upskill and use their work time more efficiently, which contributes to raising productivity. Also, higher wages can push for more rationalisation of production and innovation by firms in order to preserve competitiveness. Finally, wage pressures can also incentivise firms to improve their competitiveness by means of non-price aspects, such as the quality of their products, rather than cutting costs ([101]). A positive impact of higher wages on productivity also depends on various other factors, including a country's economic characteristics and policies ([102]). Policies that boost wages and productivity at the same time therefore support competitiveness and wage adequacy (Section 2.5).

2.4.2. Both non-cost and cost competitiveness matter for sustainable and adequate wage increases

The interplay between wage and productivity growth has direct implications for cost competitiveness. Improvements in wages need to go hand in hand with economic sustainability and competitiveness to ensure sustainable economic activity and job creation. Nominal wage

([99]) Dias Da Silva, A. & di Casola P. (2024); Draghi, M. (2024); European Commission (2025a), Commission communication; European Commission: Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs (2024).

([100]) Coviello et al. (2022), Riley and Bondibene (2017).

([101]) European Commission: Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion (2024).

([102]) Kleinknecht (2020).

increases beyond what productivity gains suggest risk undermining investment and a country's cost competitiveness. Over recent years, a number of Member States have witnessed substantial increases in unit labour costs (ULCs). ULCs, the ratio of nominal compensation to productivity is commonly used as a measure of cost competitiveness. Many catching-up countries have witnessed strong increases in ULCs between 2010 and 2022, and also more recently, between 2023 and 2025, including Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania (Graph 2.11). This has raised competitiveness concerns in several of these countries and may weigh on wage growth in the future ([103]). However, if firms excessively rely on cost competitiveness and low wages, there is a risk that productivity gains are accompanied by a race to the bottom in terms of labour costs and downward pressure on wages, which ultimately leads to a decline in the labour share.

Graph 2.11: **Unit labour costs (ULCs), nominal compensation per employee and labour productivity**



Note: Unit labour costs are defined as compensation per employee over gross value added divided by total employment. Therefore, productivity is shown with a negative sign in this graph, reflecting its mitigating effect on unit labour costs.

Source: Ameco [UWCD.1.0.0.0; NWTD.1.0.0.0; NETD.1.0.0.0; OVGD.1.0.0.0].

Non-cost competitiveness can play an important role in supporting productivity and higher wages. If non-cost aspects of competitiveness such as the business environment or the quality of exported goods increase, demand is less likely to decline in response to higher prices and labour costs ([104]). In fact, many Member States have witnessed substantial increases in export market shares, despite a notable rise in unit labour costs and real effective exchange rates. In the EU, export market shares of services and goods increased by 8% between 2012 and 2023, while ULCs unit labour costs in the tradeable sector rose by 15% (Graph 2.12) ([105]). The

([103]) European Commission: Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs (2024c); European Commission: Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion (2024).

([104]) As highlighted in Box A.2.1.1. in the annex, non-price competitiveness is proxied based on export market shares, the price elasticity of exports and real effective exchange rates based on unit labour costs (REER). The cost determinant is estimated as changes in REERs multiplied by the price elasticity of exports. The price elasticity of exports is set at -1.25, broadly in line with estimates for EU countries in the literature (Correa-Lopez, et al., 2012; Keil, 2024, Xifre (2021).

([105]) Simple regression analysis shows that productivity accounts for 60% of the variation in non-cost competitiveness. This highlights that non-cost competitiveness can capture effects of overall competitiveness that go beyond cost and labour productivity aspects (European Commission: Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs (2024a).

Graph 2.12: **Non-cost competitiveness, 2012-2023**



Note: Estimates of cost competitiveness are based on changes in REERs and an assumed price elasticity of exports equal to -1.25 (see also Correa-Lopez, et al., 2012 and Annex 2.1). Non-cost competitiveness is then approximated as residual by subtracting the estimated changes in cost competitiveness from changes in export market shares. Export market shares refer to goods and services.

Source: Eurostat [tipsex11; tipser13].

gains in non-cost competitiveness allowed to offset losses in cost competitiveness in Bulgaria, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania. In some other countries for which cost competitiveness concerns have been voiced in recent years, non-cost competitiveness led to more limited gains in export market shares, including in Czechia, Estonia, and Latvia. The potential role of non-cost competitiveness in promoting higher wages is also reflected in its high correlation with real wage growth (Graph 2.13, panel a).

However, although productivity and non-cost competitiveness gains promote higher wages, they can, in some cases, be accompanied by a less even wage distribution ([106]). The link between changes in non-cost competitiveness and the wage distribution is quite heterogeneous across countries, also among Member States with similar levels of GDP per capita (Graph 2.13, panel b) ([107]). For instance, non-cost competitiveness improved and wage disparities declined in Czechia, Cyprus, Estonia, Poland, and Romania. Instead, Malta and Bulgaria witness rising wage disparities, despite improvements in non-cost competitiveness. Wage disparities declined in Greece, despite losses in non-cost competitiveness. Thus, although non-cost competitiveness typically comes along with higher productivity and wages, as argued above, it does not necessarily result in a more even distribution of wages. This highlights the important role of policies in ensuring that wage growth adequately reflects productivity gains (Section 2.5).

Several structural factors may have hindered productivity and non-cost competitiveness gains to translate into a more even wage distribution. Examples are the twin transition, globalisation, the ongoing shift of economic activity towards services and the development of alternative forms of work. These factors, among several others, can be important engines of job creation and productivity. However, they also may have contributed to a decline in unionisation rates and workers' bargaining power, a decline in labour shares, or wage disparities in some

([106]) Soldani et al. (2024).

([107]) A similar pattern also emerges when looking at productivity growth and wage ratios (Graph A.2.1.5. in the annex).

countries and sectors ([108]). Competitiveness pressures can also lead to less generous social policies, which may exacerbate income inequality. Understanding how these factors affect different groups of workers is key to design effective policies to boost productivity competitiveness and wage growth at the same time (see Section 2.5). A comparison of productivity, wage, and inequality developments between the EU and US reveals that the EU is characterised by lower productivity and lower wage growth, but also lower inequality (Graph A2.1.4 in the annex) ([109]).

Graph 2.13: **Non-cost competitiveness, real wages, and the wage distribution, 2012-2023**



(1) Real compensation is deflated using the HICP index.

Source: Eurostat [tipsex11; tipser13] and own calculations based on EU SILC microdata, Ameco [UWCD.1.0.0.0; NWTD.1.0.0.0; ZCPIH.1.0.0.0].

2.5. POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Boosting productivity growth and promoting adequate and fair wages at the same time requires a comprehensive policy effort. Ensuring that productivity, competitiveness and adequate wages go hand in hand requires a range of policies to promote notably non-cost competitiveness, innovation and investment, but also R&D investment, the availability of venture capital and enabling firms to scale up. This is also highlighted in the Competitiveness Compass and Draghi report ([110]). However, to ensure that productivity gains are also adequately reflected in the distribution of wages, as argued in section 2.4, additional structural policies are needed. This includes policies to enhance skills and facilitate job transitions and labour market

([108]) European Commission: Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion (2024); Wallskog et al. (2024).

([109]) Between 2019 and 2024, productivity increased faster in the US than the EU, by 8.6%, compared to 0.9%. Labour productivity growth is also expected to remain structurally low in the EU, compared to the US. In turn, real wages increased by 4.7 percentage points more in the US than the EU over the same period. The difference in productivity and wage developments between the EU and US is likely to reflect a number of factors. Total factor productivity growth, digitalisation in some sectors, innovation capacity and business dynamism are notably lower in the EU than the US (Draghi, 2024; Dias da Silva et al., 2024). At the same time, the level of inequality remains substantially higher in the US than the EU. In 2023, the Gini coefficient of household disposable income stood at 29.6% for the EU, compared to 39.4% for the US.

([110]) Draghi, M. (2024); European Commission (2025a), Commission communication.

reallocation, as well as measures that influence wage-setting – in particular policies related to minimum wages and collective bargaining.

2.5.1. Enhancing skills and labour market reallocation can improve wage adequacy over time

The Union of Skills emphasises the importance of promoting skills and quality jobs. The Commission launched the Union of Skills with the objective to ensure equal access to education, lifelong learning, and quality jobs for all, while focusing on skills creation and retention ([111]). The potential for higher wages can also motivate workers to gain further skills, notably those associated with raising wage premia ([112]). It is essential to ensure that skills are relevant to the labour market, notably by maintaining strong dialogue with the social partners and developing tools to anticipate changes in skills requirements ([113]). Moreover, a Skills Portability Initiative is being developed to facilitate the recognition of skills acquired across EU Member States and outside the EU. Active Labour Market Policies can also facilitate access to quality jobs and jobseekers' access to training, upskilling and reskilling for those further away from the labour market. The Union of Skills and Competitiveness Compass also highlight that skills policies should align with and complement other initiatives to drive productivity, especially in areas like innovation, the development of new technologies, and fostering a robust business environment.

Early childhood education and care can contribute to both improving wage prospects for parents and providing more equal opportunities for children over the long run. The availability, accessibility and affordability of high-quality early childhood education and care facilitate parental employment, particularly for mothers, and can contribute to higher employment rates and address the gender pay gap, as underlined by the Council Recommendation on "High-Quality Early Childhood Education and Care Systems" ([114]). Early childhood education and care can also help to achieve higher educational attainment which translates into better job opportunities and higher wages in adulthood. Beyond, promoting work-life balance it can also facilitate parents' employment, notably for women ([115]).

Moreover, smooth job-to-job transitions and an efficient allocation of the workforce enhance productivity and can improve wage adequacy. The mobility of workers across sectors or occupations, and locations can result in better job matches and a better allocation of human resources, boosting productivity and possibly wages. It can also facilitate the transition of workers (notably from middle-skill occupations) to emerging sectors, mitigating possible displacement effects linked to technological transitions. Several EU initiatives and funds aim at facilitating workforce transitions. The Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) aims to make the EU's economies and societies more sustainable, resilient and prepared for the green and digital transitions. The European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) is the EU's main instrument for investing in people, making it easier to invest in skills for Europe's strategic sectors and emerging priorities. The European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), supports infrastructure, opportunities in the twin transition, skills development and cooperation across borders. It notably facilitates job transitions by supporting investments in regions undergoing economic and social changes.. The European Globalisation Adjustment Fund for Displaced Workers

([111]) European Commission (2025b), Commission communication.

([112]) See: OECD and European Commission (2025).

([113]) Cedefop has developed since January 2024 the Skills Intelligence online tool which provides visualisations and dashboards on skills data through a combination of quantitative indicators from various sources (e.g. Eurostat EU-LFS and EU-SILC) and short qualitative reports.

([114]) Council of the European Union (2019).

([115]) This is underlined in the Pillar Principle 9 of the European Pillar of Social Rights.

currently provides individual support to workers or self-employed that were displaced due to restructuring ([116]). The Just Transition Fund and the Council Recommendation on ensuring a fair transition towards climate neutrality aim to support workers in the wake of possible adverse effects linked to the green transition on some workers ([117]).

2.5.2. Promoting adequate wages while protecting vulnerable workers is key

Effective wage-setting can also contribute to sustainable and adequate wage growth. Policies to boost productivity, and the structural policies discussed above to boost skills and workforce reallocation may not be enough to ensure adequate wages for all ([118]). One reason is that productivity enhancing policies may not benefit all workers equally and can adversely affect some workers (see Section 2.4). Therefore, an effective design of wage-setting mechanisms can support wage equality.

Enhancing the effective access of workers to minimum wage protection remains essential to ensure fair and adequate wages for low-wage earners. In many Member States minimum wages are an important tool to help low-wage earners benefit equitably from productivity gains, as low-wage workers often have low bargaining power and may not be covered by collective bargaining. Minimum wages can also benefit a larger group of low-wage earners through their spillover effects across the income distribution ([119]). However, non-compliance with minimum wage regulation is widespread in the EU ([120]). This highlights the relevance of enhancing effective access of workers to rights to minimum wage protection provided in national law and/or collective agreements, which is one of the objectives of the EU Directive on adequate minimum wages ([121]). In turn, adequate minimum wages might also contribute to enhancing productivity, via a higher motivation of workers and incentives for firms to rely more on non-cost competitiveness (see section 2.4), as well as by boosting household consumption ([122]).

Strong and well-functioning collective bargaining is also conducive to fairer and adequate wages. There is evidence that high collective bargaining coverage is associated with higher wages and a lower share of low-wage workers ([123]). While higher productivity can create scope for higher wages, workers need sufficient bargaining power to reap the benefits of these gains. Over the last decades, the shift of the workforce from historically highly unionised sectors (e.g. mining, manufacturing) towards less unionised sectors (services), together with a decline in trade union membership linked to the rise of non-standard forms of work, has driven the overall negative trend of collective bargaining coverage in the EU.

Several initiatives at EU level are contributing or will contribute to strengthening collective bargaining. Promoting collective bargaining is one of the objectives of the EU

([116]) European Commission (2021a): Regulation (EU) 2021.

([117]) European Commission (2021b): Regulation (EU) 2021/691; European Commission (2022): Council Recommendation of 16 June 2022.

([118]) Draghi, M. (2024).

([119]) Cova, J. (2025).

([120]) European Commission: Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion (2024).

([121]) European Commission (2022), Directive (EU) 2022/2041. The Directive is currently subject to Court case C-19/23, Denmark vs EP and Council.

([122]) Low-income workers, who benefit the most from minimum wage increases, tend to have a higher marginal propensity to consume, which can increase aggregate demand and productivity (European Central Bank (2022).

([123]) European Commission: Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs (2020).

Directive on adequate minimum wages ([124]). In addition, the Pact for European Social Dialogue establishes a framework with concrete actions to be taken by the Commission and social partners to strengthen social dialogue ([125]). In this context, the Commission also presented a Council Recommendation, setting out how EU countries can further strengthen social dialogue and collective bargaining at the national level, and issued a Communication on reinforcing and promoting social dialogue at the EU level ([126]). The Commission is developing a Quality Jobs Roadmap, together with social partners, aimed at supporting fair wages, high standards for health and safety, good working conditions, and fair job transitions for workers and self-employed, notably by increasing collective bargaining coverage ([127]).

2.6. CONCLUSIONS

Real wages in the EU have broadly recovered their pre-pandemic levels, but their growth is constrained by structurally weak productivity developments. The rebound in real wages in the EU is due to a still robust nominal wage growth amid a rapid disinflation. However, the situation varies across Member States and groups of workers. Looking forward, real wage growth is expected to decline, reflecting weak productivity growth, increased uncertainty, as well as easing labour markets.

The risk that wage growth would trigger sizeable inflationary effects is low. At EU level, profits are still cushioning the impact of sustained wage growth on inflation, while long-term inflation expectations remain broadly unchanged at around 2%. This points to a low risk of large inflationary pressures for the EU overall, although inflation is somewhat more persistent in some countries like Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands and Portugal, and notably in services.

There have been positive developments for low-wage earners over the last years, but wage adequacy remains a concern in some countries and for some groups of workers. While the situation of low wage earners requires continued policy attention, their relative situation has improved since the pandemic, as reflected in declines in in-work poverty and the share of low-wage earners. At the same time, lower-middle- and middle-wage earners have become on average more vulnerable, with many reporting increased difficulty in affording basic goods or services between 2019-2023. This reflects the drop in real wages during the high inflation period, but also that these wage earners typically have not benefitted from support measures and minimum wage increases. Their situation has particularly worsened in some Member States with higher GDP per capita where the rebound in real wages in 2024 has been weak, such as Germany, Finland and Sweden. This may have fed the perceptions of unfair income distribution and rising discontent among middle classes. In this context, policies need to account for the lingering effects of the pandemic and energy crises that many of the workers of or close to the middle class still experience.

Policies need to focus on reinforcing productivity and adequate wages at the same time, with non-cost competitiveness playing a crucial role in this dynamic. Weak productivity growth continues to weigh on cost competitiveness and the potential for wage increases in

([124]) It includes several provisions in this respect. Notably, all Member States should take measures towards promoting the capacity-building of social partners to engage in collective bargaining on wage-setting. In addition, Member States where the collective bargaining coverage rate is below 80% have to produce an action plan to increase collective bargaining.

([125]) European Commission Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion (2025b).

([126]) European Commission (2022), Council Recommendation; European Commission (2023), Commission communication..

([127]) European Commission (2025a).

many Member States. Several structural factors contribute to this weakness in productivity growth, such as the decline in manufacturing, as well as innovation and R&D spending gaps vis-à-vis the US. Focusing on non-cost competitiveness, such as the quality of products, rather than relying excessively on cost aspects and low wages can help to ensure that wage growth goes hand in hand with productivity growth in the future. At the same time, productivity gains are sometimes accompanied by increasing wage disparities, for instance due to wage polarisation. Thus, focusing solely on productivity may not be enough to improve wages for all.

Enhancing competitiveness and wage adequacy simultaneously requires a comprehensive policy mix, tailored to country-specific needs. Weaknesses in investment, innovation activity, digitalisation, and business dynamism call for policy attention, as highlighted in the Competitiveness Compass and the Draghi report and outlined in the Clean Industrial Deal. Beyond, structural policies are needed to enhance skills and facilitate labour market reallocation, but also measures that directly affect wage-setting – especially by implementing an adequate minimum wage protection and well-functioning collective bargaining so that workers reap the benefits of the gains in productivity. This should go hand in hand with improving overall job quality.

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ANNEX 2.1

Selected graphs

Graph A2.1.1: **Growth in Real Gross Disposable Household Income (GDHI) and its main components, EU**



Note: The nominal GDHI is converted into real GDHI by deflating values using the deflator (price index) of household final consumption expenditure. Net transfers notably include net social benefits and taxes on income and wealth (negative contributions). GDHI = gross disposable household income; Q1 = first quarter; Q2 = second quarter; Q3 = third quarter; Q4 = fourth quarter.

Source: European Commission calculations based on Eurostat, National Accounts [nasq_10_nf_tr and namq_10_gdp].

Graph A2.1.2: **Average number of deprivation items for wage earners (all workers) across Member States**



Note: Analysis only takes those individuals into account who report to be earning a wage in EU SILC data. Member States are ranked according to their GDP per capita in PPS 2023.

Source: Own calculations based on EU SILC microdata and Eurostat (prc_ppp_ind)

Graph A2.1.3: **Change in number of deprivation items between 2019 and 2023, by wage quintile**



Note: Graph takes only those individuals into account who report to be earning a wage in the EU SILC data. Member States are ranked according to their GDP per capita in PPS 2023. Data for CZ and ES is mission for the 2nd and 3rd wage quintiles.

Source: Own calculations based on EU SILC microdata and Eurostat (prc_ppp_ind)

Graph A2.1.4: **Productivity, compensation and inequality in the EU and US**



Source: Eurostat, OECD.

Non-cost competitiveness

Non-cost competitiveness is a broad concept which encompasses different determinants of export performance. Non-cost competitiveness captures two broad categories (Xifre, 2021). First, there are elements of the economic environment of the exporting country that influence firms' ability to produce and export, such as the business climate. Second, there are properties of the exported goods (or services), such as their quality, variety, innovation content, the reputation of the seller and the quality of the distribution networks and post-sales services (European Commission: Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs,, 2017). The literature has focused mainly on the quality of exports . When the quality of a product increases, price of the product (and hence the wages of the workers producing it) can rise without adversely affecting demand. By contrast, competition based on costs only imply that higher

wages and prices would lower competitiveness and weigh on the demand for these products (unless the producer decreases its profit margins).

Measuring non-cost competitiveness is not straightforward and the literature has identified a number of ways to approximate export quality. Unlike prices and costs, non-price competitiveness is not directly observable and therefore has to be measured indirectly (European Commission: Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, 2017; Banque de France, 2019). For instance, non-cost competitiveness can be estimated by decomposing the change in export market shares into cost and non-cost components. This decomposition can be based on estimated price elasticities or regression analysis. The literature on international trade has also used unit value measures of exports to approximate non-cost competitiveness. Export unit values can serve as a proxy for the price of a product and are obtained by dividing export values by export quantities. However, the literature also points to important shortcomings of this indicator as prices can increase for other reasons than quality improvements (Keil, 2024; Xifre, 2023).

Non-cost competitiveness in this chapter is approximated as residual based on the evolution of export market sharesand real effective exchange rates (REER). The variation of the export market share is decomposed into changes in relative cost and non-cost competitiveness. The cost determinant is estimated as changes in real effective exchange rates based on unit labour costs multiplied by the price elasticity of exports. The price elasticity of exports is set at -1.25, broadly in line with estimates for EU countries found in the literature (Correa-Lopez, et al., 2012). However, the results do not change substantially by changes in the elasticiy in a range of plus/minus 20 %. Non-cost competitiveness is then computed as a residual, from the difference between the change in export market shares and its approximated cost-competitiveness component.

3. JOB RETENTION SCHEMES IN PERSPECTIVE: LESSONS LEARNT AND INSIGHTS FOR FUTURE POLICY

3.1. INTRODUCTION

Job retention schemes, underpinned by EU financing, proved to be crucial and effective measures in safeguarding employment and incomes during the COVID-19 pandemic. By May 2020, nearly 42 million workers in the EU, around 27% of the workforce, had applied for support from job retention schemes, a level far exceeding that of the 2008–2009 financial crisis ([128]). This widespread use of the schemes was not only due to their swift national implementation, but also to the crucial role of the EU's temporary Support to mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency (SURE) instrument, which made EUR 100 billion available in loans to finance national public expenditure on short-time work and similar measures. On top of the impact on jobs, job retention schemes also played a key role in softening the blow to household incomes and helped limit increases in inequality and poverty during the crisis.

The experience with job retention schemes in the pandemic demonstrated that their deployment in economic shocks can contribute significantly to economic stability and resilience. The EU economy has been characterised by weak economic growth in the past two years. Furthermore, it now faces growing uncertainty due to rising geopolitical tensions, trade policy uncertainty and the effects of the twin transition. In this context, the labour market has started to slow down with a decrease in labour demand and an increase in planned job reductions in key sectors due to restructuring (see Chapter 1). Amid these developments, a few Member States have recently increased their reliance on job retention schemes. More broadly, Member States' decision to implement job retention schemes may prove essential to preserve jobs and income in case of future temporary crises. In light of this, learning from the diverse approaches adopted during the COVID-19 crisis is crucial to improve the design and thus also the effectiveness of these schemes across the EU.

Against this backdrop, this chapter provides insights about the design of job retention schemes in the EU. It aims to complement the findings of the ex-post evaluation of the SURE instrument, with a focus on the design of job retention schemes in the EU. Section 3.2 describes the main characteristics of job retention schemes, the evolution of their design over time, and the recent rise in their use. Section 3.3 provides advice on their design based on economic theory and examines their interplay with other labour market policies and institutions. Section 3.4 assesses how different features of their design across the EU have affected the participation in these schemes and broader economic outcomes during the pandemic. Section 3.5 presents policy recommendations and concludes.

3.2. JOB RETENTION SCHEMES IN THE PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE

The importance of job retention schemes has increased over time in the EU, peaking during the pandemic, and they remain a vital tool for tackling potential future downturns. This section presents the purpose of these schemes, their different types and design dimensions; it then briefly illustrates their history and the main changes in their design in the EU. Finally, it shows that a few Member States have increased their reliance on job retention schemes, amid

([128]) Corti et al. (2023).

the current surge in restructuring needs in the wake of new economic shocks and against the background of the green and digital transitions.

3.2.1. Job retention schemes aim to preserve employment during temporary economic disruptions

Job retention schemes are policy measures designed to help employers retain their employees during periods of temporary economic disruption. They are mainly used in case of external events that negatively affect business activity (technical accidents, bad weather conditions, other causes of force majeure) and in case of transitory business downturns (e.g. substantial reduction in turnover or orders, expected to be temporary). In some Member States, they are also used in case of company restructuring. These schemes subsidise wages or provide financial support to maintain the employer-employee relationship and to prevent layoffs.

During temporary economic crises, retaining employment relationships may be advantageous for both workers and firms ([129]). When it comes to immediate costs, firms can find it expensive to lay off a worker due to firing costs, and the worker may not wish to quit and suffer a loss of income and – in case of a longer unemployment spell – potentially also a deterioration of skills and work habits. Due to search frictions in the labour market, it may take time for the worker to find another good job that matches his or her skills and experiences. For the firm, finding a suitable replacement once the economic conditions improve is also time and cost intensive. The firm may, furthermore, wish to retain the firm- or job-specific human capital that the worker has acquired. This can be especially relevant for firms faced with significant labour and skills shortages. Specific human capital can also limit workers' external job opportunities, making continued employment relationships with the company more appealing. Finally, for the firm, preserving employment allows a faster re-scaling of activities once the temporary shock subsides.

These schemes have the potential to also benefit the economy as a whole. They can increase the probability of firms surviving temporary downturns. They allow the burden of adjustment to be shared more equally across employees, compared to a situation when some transit into unemployment. From a macroeconomic point of view, they reduce the volatility of employment and incomes. Depending on their coverage of sectors and types of employment contracts, the schemes can mitigate the impacts of a crisis on inequalities. By preserving employment relationships, they can promote a faster recovery, fostering the resilience of the labour market. They alleviate the financial burden on unemployment benefit systems (albeit the net fiscal effect also depends on the costs of job retention schemes and their take-up). Moreover, by preventing a rise in long-term unemployment, they minimise negative social impacts. However, the actual impacts of the schemes depend on their design and the patterns of their use.

There are three main types of job retention schemes, characterised by slightly different aims and features. They are short-time work schemes, partial unemployment schemes and wage subsidy schemes (see Box 3.1). Short-time work schemes subsidise reduced working hours while keeping workers employed. Partial unemployment schemes are similar to short-time work schemes in terms of their outcomes, but they are organised differently: workers whose working hours are reduced are registered as partially unemployed and receive a partial unemployment benefit for the hours not worked. Furlough schemes can be seen as an extreme case of partial unemployment schemes; they provide subsidies when the number of hours worked is reduced

([129]) See discussion in Balleer (2024).

to zero. Wage subsidies provide financial support for hours effectively worked, maintaining full employment and stable pay.

Box 3.1: **Types of job retention schemes and main features of their design**

Short-time work schemes allow firms to temporarily reduce the working hours of their employees, who in turn receive public support for the hours not worked. Public support for workers is channelled through firms, and it is companies that have to meet the eligibility conditions. These schemes can be financed through general taxation (e.g. Luxembourg), through the social security budget (e.g. Austria, Germany and Portugal) or a combination of both (e.g. France). In some Member States, national short-time work schemes are set up as an insurance mechanism, financed through contributions of participating companies (e.g. Italy). To prevent misuse, companies may be required to partially contribute to the financing of the subsidy. They either contribute directly to the fund for short-time work, or are expected to co-finance the public support (by paying part of the indemnity to the worker, or by paying full or reduced social security contributions). The co-financing can be capped, reduced or waived, depending on the type of the crisis. Employees typically also bear some of the adjustment costs by receiving lower pay for hours not worked. Therefore, overall, the state, companies and workers share the costs of short-time work schemes. This arrangement spreads the costs of adjustment more equally across the workforce, instead of leading to job loss for certain groups of workers. Moreover, since the work reduction is assumed to be temporary, the workers concerned are not considered as 'jobseekers' and are not required to search for alternative employment opportunities.

Partial unemployment schemes, including furlough schemes, can be regarded as functionally equivalent to short-time work schemes, with one major difference. The employment contracts of workers on partial unemployment are maintained, but social security contributions are not paid for the hours not worked. The eligibility conditions for the receipt of the public subsidy apply to the individual worker, rather than the enterprise. Workers are subject to the same eligibility criteria that apply to the standard ('full') unemployment benefits, they can claim the (partial) unemployment insurance benefit only if they have the necessary contribution record. The main difference with short-time work schemes is that workers can seek alternative employment opportunities, meaning that they are expected to look for and accept possible offers for full-time jobs (Adăscăliței et al., 2024; Corti et al., 2023; Drahokoupil and Muller, 2021) and they are eligible for training and job search assistance.

Third, wage subsidies offer financial support to companies in difficulty regardless of the reduction in hours worked. Their aim is to preserve employment through subsidising companies' wage bills, similarly to short-time work schemes. However, in contrast with the other two types of schemes, wage subsidies can be provided irrespective of a possible reduction in working hours, and workers' wages are not decreased ([1]) (Drahokoupil and Muller, 2021). Social insurance contributions remain due. These schemes are typically financed from the state budget and used to provide support at short notice given that they can be deployed relatively swiftly (Drahokoupil and Muller, 2021).

([1]) There can be other types of wage subsidy schemes, for example to incentivise the employment of people underrepresented in the labour market. Those schemes are not considered in this chapter.

Job retention schemes can be designed with the following dimensions in mind:

- **Activation conditions** (criteria related to the economic difficulties covered, role of social partners)

- **Eligibility criteria or coverage** (sectors, types of firms and types of employment contracts covered)
- **Target of support** (workers' income or employer wage cost)
- **Generosity** (size of the wage replacement, or, in the case of wage subsidies, size of support relative to the total wage costs of the employer; co-financing requirements)
- **Extent of working time reduction** (ranging from potentially zero in the case of wage subsidies, to potentially 100% in the case of furlough schemes)
- **Conditions for the receipt of the subsidy** (maintaining employment relationships, participation in training)
- **Duration of the support**

The design of job retention schemes influences their take-up and broader economic impact. Activation conditions need to balance the need for a swift response to economic shocks and the need to target the subsidy to firms in need. Social partners can play a role in aligning the interests of employers and employees amid a shock and avoid the misuse of funding. While a higher generosity of support increases take-up by reducing costs for firms and employees, it can also increase the likelihood of inefficiencies associated with the use of support. Section 3.3. will analyse in-depth the main economic considerations on the design of job retention schemes and the main trade-offs involved, based on economic theory and recent empirical evidence.

3.2.2. The use of job retention schemes in the EU increased over the past decades

Before the financial crisis of 2008, 11 Member States had job retention schemes in place to mitigate the impact of recessions. Germany established its first '*Kurzarbeit*' scheme in 1910 ([130]), while Italy introduced its '*Cassa integrazione guadagni Ordinaria*' in 1947. In France, a scheme was legislated in 1951 and Austria introduced it in 1968 ([131]). This was followed by the introduction of job retention schemes in Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal, and Spain ([132]) by the beginning of the 2008 financial crisis.

In some of these Member States, job retention schemes were employed also in case of restructuring. In Italy, the '*Cassa Integrazione Guadagni Straordinaria*' (set up in 1968) is a type of short-time work schemes that was created to help large companies in manufacturing, construction, and services, that were affected by significant company crises and reorganisations. In Luxembourg, the 'Chômage partiel pour difficultés économiques structurelles' is a short-time work scheme that can be activated in case of companies' structural problems. In both countries, the request for support has to be accompanied by a restructuring plan ([133]). In Germany, the '*Transferkurzarbeitergeld*' (introduced in 1989) is a form of short time-work scheme that supports workers' transitions during companies' restructuring and insolvency ([134]).

During the 2008 financial crisis, both new and existing job retention schemes mitigated the impact of the recession on employment in Member States. Bulgaria, Czechia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia put in place for the first time temporary job retention schemes

([130]) OECD (2024).

([131]) Sacchi et al. (2011).

([132]) Corti et al. (2023).

([133]) Efstathiou et al. (2018).

([134]) It has been widely used for employment transitions in east Germany in the early 1990s, but it accounted for only 8.6% of short-time payments during the Great Recession (see Burda et al. (2011)).

during the Great Recession, while the Netherlands implemented a permanent partial unemployment scheme ([135]). Furthermore, among the Member States that already had introduced them, Germany, Italy, and France expanded their coverage to include also fixed-term and temporary contracts on top of permanent ones ([136]), while other non-standard workers ([137]) and self-employed remained excluded. Only Austria and Luxembourg forbade workers' dismissal during the duration of the scheme. In addition, schemes' durations were extended in some countries (Austria, Italy, Germany, and Portugal), and the replacement wage was increased in others (Belgium and France) ([138]). Evidence shows that these schemes have effectively preserved jobs ([139]), especially in countries with high take-up rates, for instance, in Germany they are estimated to have saved between 300,000 and 400,000 jobs in 2009 ([140]).

During the pandemic, all Member States relied on job retention schemes, introducing new schemes or modifying the design of existing ones ([141]). 17 countries had a short-time work scheme or a partial unemployment scheme in place before the pandemic ([142]) and eight Member States ([143]) introduced a new scheme. In addition, four Member States started to use different types of schemes (i.e. partial unemployment or furlough schemes, short-time work schemes, and wage subsidies), simultaneously or in sequence. Overall, short-time work schemes were the most employed type (19 countries), followed by furlough schemes (ten countries), and wage subsidies (eight countries); some countries had different types of schemes operating in parallel.

During the pandemic, Member States simplified access to short-time work schemes, broadened their coverage and increased their generosity. Administrative procedures to access support have been simplified. The coverage of the schemes has been increased in the majority of Member States, to ensure the eligibility of all sectors, types of firms, and employment contracts potentially affected by the crisis. This typically included a broadened coverage, to include workers on fixed-term contracts, temporary agency and non-standard workers. Countries with partial unemployment benefit schemes (e.g. Belgium, Spain, Finland) relaxed the eligibility conditions for workers to receive benefits. The costs to be borne by employers have been typically reduced, while the wage replacement rates for employees have been increased. In view of the uncertainty of the crisis, the duration of support has been

([135]) Sweden introduced a permanent short-time work scheme only after the Great Recession.

([136]) Nevertheless, overall in the EU non-standard workers and self-employed remained excluded from the coverage of these measures during the financial crisis.

([137]) 'Non-standard workers' include alternative employment arrangements such as fixed-term contracts, workers on zero-hour contracts, casual workers, on-call workers, and workers in a triangular employment relationship.

([138]) The information on the evolution of the design of job retention schemes is based on Corti et al. (2023).

([139]) For an analysis of the quantitative effects of short time work programmes on labour market outcomes, during the global financial crisis, see Hijzen and Martin, (2013).

([140]) For an analysis that quantifies the effects of short time work schemes on labour outcomes from both a cross-country and a time-series perspective, during the Great Recession, see Boeri et al. (2011).

([141]) The whole paragraph is based on a study on how the design of these schemes affected their take up rates during the pandemic and the Great Recession (see Corti et al., 2023), and on a review of the job retention schemes introduced during the pandemic, which also includes preliminary evidence of their use (see European Commission, 2020).

([142]) Austria, Belgium Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal and Hungary had permanent and ongoing short-time work schemes. Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain and Finland had partial unemployment benefit schemes. In Croatia and Slovakia, short-time work has been supported through active labour market policies. Bulgaria and Sweden had inactive short-time work schemes.

([143]) Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, and Romania.

extended. Most Member States have introduced protection against dismissal as a condition of support from job retention schemes.

Job retention schemes, supported by SURE, experienced high uptake and proved effective in cushioning the labour market impact of the pandemic. They helped to preserve jobs and skills, as well as to foster economic resilience and a rapid recovery ([144]). Furthermore, they helped to protect future pension entitlements through continued social security contributions ([145]). Financing from the SURE instrument contributed to this outcome. A total of EUR 98.4 billion of SURE financial assistance was disbursed to 19 Member States. Approximately 31.5 million people and 2.5 million firms are estimated to have been covered by SURE in 2020. 9 million people and over 900,000 firms were covered by SURE in 2021 in 15 Member States, with a clear phasing out in 2022 when 350,000 people and 40,000 firms were covered in 4 Member States. According to its final evaluation ([146]), job retention schemes, including those financed through SURE, are conservatively estimated to have saved between 1.03 million and 1.66 million jobs in 2020 alone in SURE beneficiary Member States ([147]). The availability of SURE financing enabled Member States to support additional employment-related measures and more ambitious measures. In other words, in the absence of SURE, the deployment of national measures would have been less ambitious. Limited layoffs also prevented a disproportionate burden on the social protection and welfare systems ([148]). Looking at the whole EU, estimates indicate that job retention schemes saved the equivalent of 13.3% and 1.1% of employment in the EU in 2020 and 2021, respectively ([149]). The extensive use of job retention schemes in the EU, compared to higher reliance on unemployment benefits in the US, led to significant differences in terms of unemployment and hours worked in the short-term, but these differences converged in the medium term ([150]).

After the pandemic, several EU Member States have kept job retention schemes in place as a policy tool that can be adjusted to address different types of crises. For instance, France and Romania extended these schemes specifically to help businesses manage the economic disruption caused by the war in Ukraine, particularly its impact on supply chains ([151]). By spring 2024, 13 Member States had permanent short-time work schemes in place, accessible to companies that meet specific eligibility criteria. In addition to the 11 countries with long-standing systems, the Czech Republic and Slovakia established permanent short-time work schemes during the pandemic, integrating them into their labour market frameworks after this crisis ([152]).

3.2.3. Job retention schemes have been increasingly used amid recent economic developments, but design matters

Recently, there have been signs of a labour market slowdown in the EU, with slowing employment growth and job losses concentrated in specific countries and sectors due to

([144]) European Commission (2020); European Commission (2021).

([145]) European Commission (2024).

([146]) See Commission Staff Working Document (2025).

([147]) According to the final bi-annual report on SURE implementation, SURE-funded schemes may have contributed to the bulk of this, that is 1 million jobs in the euro area alone.

([148]) Eurofound (2024); European Commission (2021).

([149]) European Commission (2021).

([150]) OECD, 2022.

([151]) Eurofound (2022).

([152]) Eurofound (2024).

restructuring. Since the first quarter of 2023, employment growth and hiring intentions have started to decrease in parallel with an increase in planned job reductions due to restructuring (see Chapter 1). In 2024, in more than half of EU Member States companies' restructuring led to negative net job growth, particularly in manufacturing, where internal restructuring was the main driver. Germany recorded the highest net job losses (-92,025), especially in manufacturing (83.2% of the job losses occurred in this sector) due to restructuring, followed by Sweden and the Netherlands, with losses concentrated in manufacturing and retail respectively. Across the EU, manufacturing, financial services, and retail sectors have been most affected. Internal restructuring alone accounted for nearly 60% of all job losses in the EU, reflecting mounting pressures on companies to adapt to structural and economic changes ([153]) (see Chapter 1).

In this context, some EU countries have increased their reliance on job retention schemes in 2024 to protect employment. Germany has seen a sharp rise in short-time work use, with 268,000 employees covered in September 2024, up by 76% from the previous year, particularly in manufacturing. Italy also reported significant increases in hours authorised under its ordinary short-time work scheme. For instance, Slovenia is working to establish a permanent short-time work scheme, in which the support, during part-time work, will be linked to training and skill development for workers affected by increasing digitalisation and automation of business processes ([154]).

The experiences of Germany and Italy with the use of short-time work for restructuring underline the crucial role of ALMPs for the re-employment of redundant workers. In Germany, '*Transferkurzarbeit*' allows workers to be laid off during restructuring to enter a 'transfer company' with a fixed term employment contract, and to receive short-time work support along with training and job search assistance. Fackler, Stegmaier and Upward (2023) show that employees with more limited labour market options choose to enter this scheme, which boosts their chances to be re-employed within five years, by five percentage points. This impact can be attributed mainly to the active components of the scheme. In Italy, the '*Cassa integrazione guadagni straordinaria*' (CIGS) provides short-time work support to firms in a prolonged crisis or with restructuring needs. Giupponi and Landais (2023) demonstrate that, although CIGS helped to maintain employment and wages during the provision of the subsidy in the pre-pandemic period, these positive effects did not persist after firms ceased to receive support. Subsequent reforms incorporated ALMP components (training, support for personalised job search and a wage subsidy to boost re-employment) into the scheme. However, evaluations to assess the impact of these additional tools are not available yet. Other major changes to the design of this scheme included phasing out support to firms in insolvency and reducing the fragmentation of a system with many different types of subsidies.

Overall, job retention schemes can preserve employment and offer short-run income support, but they need to be accompanied with active components to promote employment transitions amid restructuring. Job retention schemes can delay the displacement of at-risk workers, and provide them with income support above the level of unemployment benefits. This can be especially valuable in periods of high unemployment when outside options are scarce for laid off workers and for workers who have low chances of re-

([153]) The figures in this paragraph are based on Eurofound's European Restructuring Monitor.

([154]) Furthermore, in Belgium, Italy and Spain, companies can, under some conditions, use the job retention scheme in case of exceptionally high temperatures. In particular, in Spain the number of workers in short-time work has increased substantially, from 9,400 people at the end of August 2024 to 28,200 in October 2024. While multiple factors may be behind this increase, including cyclical or seasonal variations in activity, the tragic floods in southern Spain, with a potential impact on employment estimated at 30,000 people in the province of Valencia alone, were a likely contributing factor.

employment in general. Firms may have incentives to co-finance this, during a period when it is unclear how restructuring will affect their employment, or when the alternative costs of laying off workers would be too high. However, such income support can be expensive, can be seen as not equitable (as it is not available to people who are already unemployed), and is in itself not effective to promote employment in the medium term. The evaluation findings highlighted above and also the broader economic literature confirm that chances of re-employment can be more effectively promoted by the use of active labour market policy measures than by job retention schemes alone.

The Commission recommendation on Effective Active Support to Employment (EASE) ([155]) **remains relevant for public policies to accompany restructuring.** In 2021, this recommendation provided policy suggestions for promoting transitions in the labour market in response to structural change. It called on Member States to develop coherent packages of strengthened active labour market policies, consisting of three elements: i) employment (hiring and transition) incentives; ii) upskilling and reskilling opportunities linked to labour market needs; and iii) enhanced support by employment services. It invited policy efforts to focus on groups that are in a vulnerable position or underrepresented in the labour market. These suggestions remain applicable in the current economic environment of slowing employment growth and intensifying restructuring.

3.3. THE DESIGN OF JOB RETENTION SCHEMES IN THEORY AND PRACTICE

Economic theory has much to say on the design of job retention schemes. This section uses insights from research to provide a rationale for government involvement in job retention policies, explains the most important trade-offs involved in their implementation, and provides advice on their optimal design. In addition, it examines the features of job retention schemes in the broader context of other labour market policies and institutions: unemployment benefits, active labour market policies – notably the training component – and employment protection legislation. In doing so, it does not only draw upon theory but also on examples from various EU Member States. It then analyses the role of social partners and collective bargaining in delivering effective job retention programmes. These insights are complemented with results from empirical studies of job retention schemes that have been adopted across the EU.

3.3.1. Legal and financial constraints justify government involvement in job retention schemes

Legal and financial constraints may prevent voluntary work-sharing arrangements, and thus justify government intervention. As discussed in section 3.2.1, maintaining the employment relationship in times of temporary disruption can be beneficial both for workers and firms. Thus, in principle, they could agree on a work-sharing arrangement, in which they share the costs of the economic crisis. The firm would retain the worker, even at a short-term cost. Similarly, the worker would stay in the same company, and temporarily accept lower income in the form of fewer hours or lower wages. Government intervention would then be unnecessary and potentially wasteful ([156]). In reality, however, legal restrictions on employment contracts may prevent firms from reducing hours or lowering pay ([157]). In addition, due to financial constraints, such as a lack of liquidity and the inability to borrow, firms may be unable to afford to retain workers. Government-sponsored job retention schemes can ease these

([155]) C(2021) 1372 final

([156]) See discussion in Balleer (2024).

([157]) Balleer et al. (2016).

constraints by providing monetary support during crises and creating an explicit framework in which working hours and pay can be adjusted.

While job retention schemes can provide benefits to workers, firms and the broader economy, their design and use also implies potential risks for efficiency and equity. The schemes may also subsidise jobs and firms which do not require support (deadweight effect); subsidised firms may receive an unfair competitive advantage over non-subsidised ones (displacement effect); and the incentives of firms and workers to adapt to a changing economic environment by adapting technologies or investing in human capital may be reduced (moral hazard) ([158]). More broadly, by preserving employment, job retention schemes may hamper *creative destruction* ([159]) in downturns and a timely reallocation of labour from less productive to more productive firms, thereby slowing restructuring and preventing adjustment to a more efficient allocation of workers and other resources ([160]). Design and financing choices can have implications for equity, if some sectors, firm types and employment contracts are covered, while others are not. The need to contain such risks is a key consideration in the design of job retention schemes. It pervades all their most important aspects, such as eligibility rules, the targeting of support, their phasing out, as well as their fiscal cost.

3.3.2. Job retention schemes should be used in severe but temporary crises, and should be gradually phased out

Job retention schemes are most appropriate in severe but temporary economic crises caused by unexpected shocks. Deep economic downturns cause many layoffs and can lead to long-term unemployment. As a result, they have scarring effects on unemployed workers, who experience a gradual depreciation of their human capital, lose work habits, and may experience stigma. In such cases, job retention schemes are more effective than supporting workers through unemployment benefits, due to their ability to bridge a temporary crisis and prevent the termination of mutually beneficial employment relationships ([161]). This is especially true when the economic shock is exogenous – unexpected and largely unrelated to any ongoing structural transformation processes in the economy. It is therefore unsurprising that job retention schemes were used intensively during the COVID-19 pandemic, which affected a large number of firms across many industries due to widespread uncertainty, lockdowns, restrictions to mobility and social distancing measures ([162]).

([158]) See discussion in Hofer et al. (2013), Aiyar and Dao (2021) and Benkovskis et al. (2024).

([159]) In the context of economic crises, 'creative destruction' refers to the disappearance of less productive firms and jobs, which allows for the reallocation of resource towards more productive uses. The concept was introduced by Schumpter (1942).

([160]) Caballero and Hammour (1996).

([161]) Indeed, one of the main objectives of job retention schemes is supporting labour hoarding during downturns, as described by Giupponi and Landais (2023).

([162]) Andrews et al. (2021) also point out an alternative view, according to which firms with different productivity levels were affected to varying degrees. In this view, the pandemic shock accentuated the importance of firm capabilities and organisational capital, led to a wave of experimentation with novel approaches to doing business, working and communicating (Barrero et al., 2020).

Box 3.2: **Job retention schemes and productivity**

The effect of job retention schemes on productivity depends greatly on the type of shock that hits the economy. Schemes are least likely to distort the productivity-enhancing reallocation of resources when the shock is unexpected but temporary, and affects all sectors, firms and workers similarly, regardless of their productivity. It has been argued that the COVID-19 pandemic was precisely such an exogenous shock – given that it was a health crisis, and that lockdowns and restrictions affected a broad swathe of the economy. Nevertheless, some economists have argued that a link between the shock and firm productivity was maintained even during the pandemic, with empirical evidence supporting this view (Andrews et al., 2021). By contrast, job retention schemes may harm productivity more significantly when the shock has a persistent impact on particular sectors of the economy, as they might prevent efficiency-improving adjustments in the economy.

Job retention schemes can also affect productivity by changing the skill composition of the workforce in supported firms. In Latvia, the COVID-19 job retention scheme was found to have reduced the proportion of skilled employees within a given occupation in firms that received support (Benkovskis, 2024). Workers who received support were more likely to remain employed by the same firm. However, higher-skilled individuals were less likely to receive the subsidy, due to design features such as the programme's benefit ceiling and a regressive income replacement rate. These employees were less likely to remain employed by the firm one year after the end of the first wave of the pandemic.

Empirical studies suggest that job retention support may have saved jobs at some cost to productivity. A study of short-time work schemes implemented during the global financial crisis of 2008-2009 in several OECD countries by Aiyar and Dao (2021) found that, in countries with a large pre-existing need for some sectors to shrink and others to expand ([1]), resource reallocation was slower. Another study based on firm-level data from 11 EU Member States, found that more generous job retention support during the COVID-19 pandemic weakened the productivity-enhancing reallocation of labour, although the magnitude of this effect varied across countries. On the one hand, the study found that highly productive firms were likely to receive support than low-productivity ones. On the other hand, conditional on receiving job retention support, less productive firms received greater amounts of aid. In most examined Member States (such as Croatia, Estonia, Latvia and Portugal), the intensive margin dominated, resulting in a negative relationship between the amount of pandemic support received and firm productivity (Lalinsky et al., 2024). In Estonia, another study of the COVID-19 job retention scheme found a weakening of the link between firm productivity and hiring. As a result, there was less reallocation of jobs from low-productivity firms to high-productivity firms, potentially leading to a significant aggregate productivity loss (Meriküll and Paulus, 2022).

([1]) The pre-existing need for sectors to shrink or expand – i.e., the initial level of resource misallocation, was proxied by the cross-sectoral dispersion of the marginal revenue product of labour.

The design of job retention schemes involves a trade-off between preserving employment and allowing resources to be reallocated towards more productive sectors. This tension is particularly well-illustrated by the interaction of job retention programmes with unemployment benefits. Generous job retention scheme benefits which provide high wage replacement rates relative to unemployment benefits may discourage workers from searching for opportunities

outside their current firms ([163]). Following a temporary shock to a specific sector, relying on unemployment insurance facilitates the reallocation of resources towards more productive sectors, but comes at the cost of higher unemployment and potential loss of human capital. By contrast, job retention schemes may preserve employment and human capital, but may slow down resource reallocation. Box 3.3 describes how the relative generosity of job retention schemes and unemployment benefits has evolved during the course of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Box 3.3: **The relative generosity of job retention schemes and unemployment benefits during the COVID-19 pandemic**

At the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, job retention schemes provided more generous support than unemployment benefit systems. While job retention schemes varied significantly across Member States, they generally offered higher financial support than unemployment benefits, even when the employment of workers was fully suspended (OECD, 2022). In particular, Member States in western and southern Europe had on average relatively generous short-time work schemes, while Nordic and Eastern European countries relied more on automatic stabilisers, generous unemployment benefits and employability support tools. For instance, Austria and Belgium offered highly generous short-time work schemes, Germany covered the full labour costs of furloughed workers, and the Netherlands introduced a wage subsidy providing full income protection (Cantillon et al., 2021). In Denmark and Sweden, wage replacement rates in short-time work schemes were high, but subsidies for firms' labour costs were less generous, leading to low take-up rates (Greve et al., 2021). The higher generosity of job retention schemes, also supported by SURE, was crucial for their effective rollout and achieving high take-up rates.

However, job retention schemes were adjusted as the crisis evolved, narrowing the generosity gap with unemployment benefits. With the easing of social restrictions in the third quarter of 2020, around two-thirds of Member States adopted measures to reduce the generosity of their job retention schemes. The aim was to improve cost-effectiveness and better target support to sectors still in need, thus limiting moral hazard (i.e. making it less attractive to retain non-viable jobs and reducing public support for those that would have resumed activities anyway). Between June 2020 and November 2021, these reductions were especially large in Sweden, Czechia and France. The reductions included restricted eligibility to firms experiencing large reductions in turnover (e.g. Ireland and Portugal), lower co-financing rates (e.g. Austria, France, Luxembourg) or reduced benefit amounts as part of their phasing-out (e.g. the Netherlands, Slovenia). Yet, in November 2021, public support for job retention schemes still covered 50% of labour costs on average. Nordic countries such as Finland, which already relied on generous unemployment benefits, continued using them extensively.

([163]) García-Cabo et al. (2023).

Box 3.4: Policy responses to the pandemic in the European Union vs. the United States

The EU and US policy responses to the COVID-19 pandemic illustrate differences in the effects of job retention schemes and unemployment benefits. While job retention schemes were widely used to maintain the employment and incomes of workers in the European Union, the policy response in the United States focused more on extending and increasing the unemployment benefits of workers who have been laid off. Each approach had a different impact on employment and the number of hours worked, especially in the short run. To support displaced workers affected by trade or structural changes, furthermore, the United States has – unlike the EU - long relied on wage insurance programmes.

In the United States, the policy response relied primarily on the extension of unemployment benefits. At the federal level, the most significant policy measure was the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, which was signed into law in March 2020. It established the Pandemic Unemployment Assistance (PUA) programme, which temporarily broadened eligibility for unemployment insurance to additional categories of workers (such as self-employed and part-time workers, but also independent contractors and gig workers) who have lost work for COVID-related reasons and allowed them to receive benefits for up to 39 weeks. In addition, the Act established two new temporary programs for recipients of regular unemployment benefits – the Pandemic Emergency Unemployment Compensation (PEUC) programme, which provided them with an additional 13 weeks of benefits, and the Federal Pandemic Unemployment Compensation (FPUC) programme, which provided them with an additional weekly lump-sum benefit.

By contrast, the use of job retention schemes was relatively limited in the United States. It consisted of programmes such as the Short-Time Compensation (STC) programme, which provided employees whose hours were reduced with pro-rated unemployment benefits, the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP), which provided low-interest loans to help small business to maintain their pre-pandemic employment and wages, and the Employee Retention Tax Credit (ERTC) for companies which have experienced a revenue decline of at least 50 %.

In the short run, unemployment increased more significantly in the United States than in Europe. Even though the EU experienced a dramatic economic contraction, the impact on employment was limited. The employment rate fell by much less than the pre-pandemic Okun's law relationship between GDP growth and unemployment suggested and remained only at 0.7 percentage points below its pre-crisis levels. Most of the labour market adjustment in Europe occurred through a sharp decrease in working hours per worker, by 12 percent in the second quarter of 2020. By contrast, in the United States, the labour markets adjusted via a dramatic increase in the unemployment rate – by 11 percentage points in the first two months of the pandemic – while working hours per worker decreased only moderately (Lam and Solovyeva, 2023). Unemployment can lead to human capital loss and worker discouragement. This holds even when most re-employed workers return to their previous employers, as was the case in the United States, if the probability of re-employment decreases as an individual is out of work for longer (Cheng et al., 2020).

In addition, labour shortages worsened to a greater extent in the United States than in the EU (OECD, 2020a). The seemingly paradoxical combination of high unemployment rates and acute labour shortages in specific sectors was apparent in many developed economies and resulted from a combination of factors. On the one hand, the COVID-19 pandemic had an unbalanced impact across different sectors and led to changes in the composition of labour demand. At the same time, the pattern of labour supply also changed as the risks posed by the pandemic made many occupations much less attractive for workers, thus increasing reservation wages and making it more difficult for employers to find qualified candidates (UN DESA, 2021).

In the United States, wage insurance programmes have supported displaced workers who find re-employment at a lower wage. Unlike unemployment benefits, wage insurance does not aim to replace past labour income, but instead is designed to compensate the worker for the difference between the pre-layoff wage and the re-employment wage in a new job (McHugh and McKenna, 2016). Proponents argue that such programmes also incentivise job search, shorten the duration of unemployment spells, support workers for whom training may be less effective (Kletzer and Litan, 2001). By easing long-tenured workers' fears of job and income loss, it can reduce opposition to trade and other structural changes in the economy

(Continued on the next page)

Box (continued)

(LaLonde, 2007). Evidence from the US Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program suggests that eligibility for wage insurance increased both short-run employment probabilities and long-run cumulative earnings, making the programme very cost-effective (Hyman et al, 2024). On the other hand, large-scale wage insurance could lead employers to offer lower wages if they expect some of their new hires to receive wage compensation (Davidson and Woodbury, 1993), thus increasing the fiscal costs of the programmes. Critics of wage insurance programmes have, furthermore, argued that they subsidise downward mobility and encourage displaced workers to accept employment that they otherwise would not have and in which they may not be able to use their skills (EPI, 2007).

After the pandemic, the US economic recovery outpaced most other large advanced economies, including the euro area. In particular, the United States experienced much stronger growth in labour productivity since the pandemic. This development was partly the result of the greater use of job retention schemes in Europe, as opposed to allowing the labour markets to adjust via change in unemployment in the United States. While they mitigated employment losses, they also restricted the ability of the economy to adapt through sectoral reallocation – reflecting a key trade-off in the application of job retention schemes (de Soyres et al., 2024). According to some estimates, there was three times more sectoral reallocation of workers in the United States compared to the euro area (Garcia-Cabo et al., 2023).

3.3.3. Job retention schemes should be targeted at the most vulnerable recipients, including temporary workers

Job retention schemes should avoid supporting employment relationships which would have survived the crisis anyway. They should target sectors, firms or workers that would otherwise suffer the most severe adverse impacts. Doing so would not only allow job retention schemes to achieve their primary goal of maintaining employment and incomes most efficiently, but would also reduce their fiscal cost and risk of misuse. This approach to targeting is reflected in existing job retention schemes, which may condition firm eligibility or level of support based on the decline of business activity or on the sector or industry in which the recipient operates ([164]). During the COVID-19 pandemic, most Member States used economic hardship as an eligibility requirement for the job retention schemes. While countries with more established, permanent job retention schemes have used a general notion of economic difficulties as the criterion ([165]), the newly established schemes in Central and Eastern Europe tended to rely on specific thresholds for a drop in company revenue. Although these thresholds have ranged from 10% in Romania up to 50% in Estonia, they were typically in the 20-30% range. Furthermore, in some Member States, schemes targeted particular sectors, such as hospitality, tourism, culture or sport ([166]).

In addition to permanent employees, temporary and fixed-term workers should also be eligible for job retention schemes on equity grounds, especially in dual labour markets. If employees on temporary or fixed-term contracts are eligible for assistance, job retention schemes may end up supporting the employment of workers whose contracts are likely to expire soon after in any case. On the other hand, in dual labour markets with insider-outsider dynamics, excluding short-term employment contracts from coverage may disproportionately

([164]) OECD (2022).

([165]) Job retention schemes may, for instance, require firms to explain the nature of their economic difficulties in order to be eligible, as was the case in the COVID-19 short-time work scheme in Austria (Tamesberger & Moser, 2021), or may require an agreement between social partners.

([166]) Drahokoupil and Müller (2021).

increase unemployment among temporary workers, who are already disadvantaged in the labour market ([167]).

Empirical studies show that covering temporary workers by job retention schemes can mitigate inequalities in employment and wages. A study of COVID-19 short-time work schemes in France, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands shows that they protected permanent workers much more effectively than temporary ones ([168]). As most flows in and out of employment in dual labour markets affect temporary workers, job retention schemes that cover them can help to avoid sharp rises in their unemployment rates ([169]). Evidence from the Spanish job retention scheme suggests that its extension to temporary workers during the pandemic has narrowed the gap with permanent employees in terms of post-crisis employment probabilities and wage gains ([170]). Another example is Germany's short-time work scheme, which had a positive impact on retaining employment during the 2008 global financial crisis. However, it was mostly limited to workers with permanent contracts, and thus increased labour market segmentation ([171]). During the COVID-19 pandemic, an enhanced short-time work scheme mitigated the employment impact on temporary workers in Germany, reducing the disparity with those on permanent contracts compared to the financial crisis. Further discussion of the interplay between the design of job retention schemes and employment protection legislation can be found in Box 3.5.

Box 3.5: **Job retention schemes and employment protection legislation**

The design of employment protection legislation can affect how job retention schemes preserve employment. Increasing (decreasing) the strictness of employment protection implies higher (lower) costs for firms to hire and fire workers. This affects their ability to adjust their workforce following an economic shock or reduction in activity, which implies *de facto* internalising (externalising) the societal costs of dismissal. High (low) dismissal costs can (de)incentivise the use of job retention schemes, affecting labour market reallocation regardless of firms' performance. Before the COVID-19 pandemic, Member States with stricter employment protection rules (e.g. Belgium, Germany, Italy and Luxembourg) had more comprehensive short-time work schemes. In contrast, EU countries that have often relied on employment flexibility to adapt the number of employees to labour demands (e.g. Greece and Spain), had less protective short-time work schemes (OECD, 2020b). As the COVID-19 crisis hit, several EU countries strengthened protection against dismissals (e.g. France, Greece, Italy, Slovakia and Spain). This favoured the continuation of existing employment relationships by restricting dismissals or increasing their costs. For instance, Italy and Spain imposed a universal ban on dismissals throughout the COVID-19 crisis. These measures were often adopted in conjunction with also providing support through short-time work schemes. The combination of generous short-time work schemes and high dismissal protection incentivized firms to retain workers, avoiding sudden workforce reductions as the crisis hit.

([167]) Boeri and Cahuc (2023).

([168]) Lafuente and Ruland (2022).

([169]) Landais and Giupponi (2020).

([170]) Carrasco et al. (2024).

([171]) Hijzen and Venn (2011).

3.3.4. Employer co-financing and experience-rating can limit the overuse of job retention schemes

Less stringent eligibility criteria can speed up the implementation of job retention schemes but increase the risk of inefficient support allocation. In severe crises which require faster delivery of assistance with fewer bureaucratic obstacles, some eligibility criteria for job retention schemes may be relaxed or suspended. For instance, during the COVID-19 pandemic, countries such as Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and Slovakia have widened the scope of their schemes. They did so by making more companies eligible, by extending coverage to temporary and fixed-term workers, or by introducing administrative simplifications ([172]). In principle, an easing of eligibility criteria increases the risk of some firms or workers receiving windfall benefits from the scheme. However, at the onset of the pandemic, this concern has been mitigated by the fact that the health crisis has been an external force, affecting most firms and sectors in a similar way. As the pandemic shock eased, concerns about the inefficient allocation of job retention support drove some Member States to restrict their eligibility criteria over time – such as Ireland and Portugal, which have increased the economic hardship threshold for eligibility, or Luxembourg and Greece, which have tightened administrative restrictions based on sector or region ([173]).

Employer co-financing and experience-rating can be used to prevent moral hazard and limit the overuse of job retention schemes. As the severity of an economic crisis gradually eases, the risk of overreliance on job retention schemes becomes an increasing concern. To reduce such overuse, firms may, for example, be required to pay social insurance contributions for their workers, or to cover another part of their labour costs. During the COVID-19 pandemic, some Member States required employers to co-finance the job retention support – e.g. by paying 40% in Bulgaria, 25% for white-collar workers in Denmark, or a fixed amount of at least 150 euro per worker in Estonia ([174]). Another way of limiting overuse might be through a system of experience-rating, in which firms that have benefitted from job retention support bear a higher burden of financing it – for instance, through higher social security contributions ([175]). Such systems have already been used in the context of financing unemployment insurance in the United States, where they have reduced excess layoffs and thus reduced reliance on benefits ([176]). In cases where co-financing or experience-rating could significantly deepen the financial difficulties experienced by the firm, delayed payment or zero-interest loans might prove useful ([177]).

3.3.5. Permanent schemes with an automatic activation mechanism can be particularly effective

Permanent, but still flexible, schemes can be more effective than temporary job retention programmes. During severe economic crises, the speed of implementation is crucial for the effectiveness of job retention schemes. In order to ensure that support is provided in a timely and effective way, administrative costs, processing times, as well as bureaucratic and political delays should be minimised. Rather than quickly designing ad-hoc job retention schemes in response to an economic emergency, governments could implement well-designed, permanent job retention schemes that are automatically activated during a crisis. Such schemes would deliver the benefits of employment and income stabilisation but should also be flexible enough

([172]) Drahokoupil and Müller (2021).

([173]) OECD (2022).

([174]) Corti et al. (2023).

([175]) Cahuc (2019).

([176]) Duggan et al. (2022).

([177]) Scarpetta et al. (2020).

to allow for adjustments that would reflect the characteristics and evolution of economic crises ([178]).

Predictable and automatically activated permanent job retention schemes encourage more consumption by workers, as well as more hiring by employers. Job retention schemes are a type of insurance mechanism, as they provide workers with protection against income losses due to layoffs. As such, they are more effective in preserving employment when they are predictably and automatically activated, rather than put in place through the discretionary actions of a government ([179]). By alleviating concerns about income losses more credibly, such job retention schemes prop up aggregate demand more effectively during crises, as workers maintain higher consumption levels and engage in less precautionary saving. At the same time, employers who have confidence that workers will receive financial support in bad times will hire more in good times, thereby increasing overall employment levels ([180]). Indeed, evidence from empirical studies of job retention schemes in Germany ([181]) and OECD countries ([182]) shows that established permanent schemes have maintained employment more effectively than either short-run temporary and newly implemented schemes. This result suggests that market participants may need to learn how to use newly implemented schemes ([183]), or that some new schemes may have been implemented too late to have the greatest effect.

The wage subsidy implemented in the Netherlands illustrates the trade-off between the speed of policy response and the ability to target it appropriately. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the Netherlands implemented a completely new temporary scheme to compensate the wage costs of employers who have suffered at least a 20 percent loss of turnover ([184]). It replaced a previously existing permanent scheme ([185]), which was seen as not adequate for the new crisis, because it was too complex, slow to administer and limited in its coverage ([186]). Due to the government's focus on providing support to firms and workers quickly, the new wage subsidy was set up in a very short period of time as a relatively simple scheme.

The need for changes to the Dutch job retention scheme highlights the advantages of implementing a well-designed, permanent emergency scheme. In its initial form, the new wage subsidy did not contain provisions that would tailor it to the specific sectoral or employer characteristics ([187]). Although the initial policy response was generally considered timely and

([178]) Balleer (2024).

([179]) Balleer (2024).

([180]) Balleer et al. (2016).

([181]) Balleer et al. (2016). This paper finds that, during the 2008 financial crisis, the rule-based component of short-time work scheme in Germany was effective at saving jobs, while the discretionary component was completely ineffective. Established job retention schemes can rely more significantly on the effects of known rule-based components than new schemes with recently implemented rules.

([182]) Brey and Hertweck (2020).

([183]) Boeri and Bruecker (2011).

([184]) This paragraph refers to the main job retention scheme implemented in the Netherlands - *Noodfonds Overbrugging Werkgelegenheid (NOW)* or the *Temporary emergency scheme for job retention*. In addition to this wage subsidy scheme, the Netherlands also implemented a supplementary temporary support scheme for self-employed and freelance workers - *Tijdelijke overbruggingsregeling zelfstandig ondernemers (TOZO)*.

([185]) The previous, more generic and general short-time work scheme – Werktijdverkorting (WTV) – allowed for the reduction of working hours due to extraordinary circumstances, such as a period of abnormally weak economic activity (Cremers, 2021).

([186]) Cantillon et al. (2021).

([187]) Ter Haar and Bennaars (2021); Bennaars (2020).

successful in maintaining employment and incomes ([188]), the wage subsidy scheme in the Netherlands had to be amended several times partly to adjust to the evolution of the crisis, but also to improve its targeting and prevent misuse ([189]). These amendments gradually adjusted eligibility conditions and compensation levels by increasing the percentage of revenue loss required for participation, raising the salary gap eligible for compensation, and lowering the amount of the subsidy. They also introduced auditing requirements to prevent misuse and introduced incentives for employers to support worker training and job-to-job transitions ([190]). The Dutch case suggests that well-designed, more permanent schemes could reduce the need for repeated amendments of job retention programmes. Such schemes could be activated when needed, but should be flexible enough to adjust to specific challenges posed by the crisis. More permanent schemes also benefit from greater predictability, as market participants are already familiar with their rules, as well as from their ability to be deployed swiftly.

3.3.6. Flexibility can help retention schemes to adapt to new challenges

Job retention schemes can be designed so that they can be activated to provide timely help, and flexibly adapt to new challenges. For example, in 2021, a comprehensive labour market reform led to an expansion of the Spanish furlough and short-time work scheme beyond its traditional uses for economic reasons and emergencies. Under the new regulations, the scheme could also be activated during recessions, as well as to provide support during sectoral transformations ([191]). The introduction of sectoral job retention support can help to tackle emerging challenges related, for instance, to the reallocation of labour as a result of the twin green and digital transitions.

Social partners' involvement in the activation mechanism of job retention schemes can help to prevent their misuse. In the example of the Spanish scheme, the mechanism for cyclical downturn and sectoral job retention support can be activated by the government ([192]). In the case of sectoral support, this activation can be requested by an agreement between the most representative trade union and business organisations in the affected sector ([193]). The ability to activate already existing provisions allows support to be provided quickly when the need arises, without the delays inherent in political decision-making or in the implementation of new policies. At the same time, the necessity of an agreement between social partners protects against the misuse of the job retention scheme. Since receiving support from the scheme involves a decrease in the pay received by workers, employees' representatives are unlikely to agree unless there is a risk of lay-offs ([194]). Box 3.6 provides additional examples from across the

([188]) Jongen and Verstraten (2020).

([189]) The successive versions of the NOW job retention schemes were numbered NOW-1, NOW-2, up to NOW-6.

([190]) See overviews of changes, for instance, in Sagel and Kloppert (2020), PwC Netherlands (2020) or RSM (2021).

([191]) The job retention scheme in Spain – *Expedientes de Regulación Temporal de Empleo* (*ERTE*) – initially provided support either for "economic, technical, organisational or productive" reasons (*ERTE ETOP*) or in case of *force majeure* (*ERTE FM*). The 2021 labour market reform added governmental actions that restrict normal economic activities (such as those related to lockdown policies during the pandemic) as a potential use case for ERTE FM. It also introduced job retention support which can be activated in case of macroeconomic cyclical downturns, or sectoral transformations requiring a substantial reallocation of labour.

([192]) The activation mechanism – called the 'RED mechanism for the flexibility and stablisation of employment' – can be activated for a maximum duration of one year in the case of its modality for cyclical macroeconomic downturns, and an initial duration of one year, but extensible twice by six months each, in the case of its sectoral restructuring modality.

([193]) Spain, Royal Decree-Law 4/2022.

([194]) OECD (2024).

EU, which illustrate the role that social partners and collective bargaining can play in improving the effectiveness and efficiency of job retention schemes.

Box 3.6: **The role of social partners and collective bargaining in job retention schemes**

The involvement of social partners in the design and implementation of job retention schemes during previous crises helped to enhance their effectiveness during the pandemic. For instance, Austria and Germany had already established permanent short-time work schemes before the global financial crisis, supported by a strong tradition of social dialogue. This pre-existing framework facilitated the involvement of social partners, leading to a strengthened design (i.e. higher benefit support and wider coverage of specific categories of workers) and higher take-up rates in the early stages of the COVID-19 crisis (Eurofound, 2024).

In most Member States, social partners have played a crucial role in the design and implementation of job retention schemes, although to varying degrees. This involvement occurred at different stages, particularly during the design phase and through sectoral- or firm-level procedures. Formal consultation requirements were most common in short-time work schemes as a prerequisite for accessing their benefits (Drahokoupil and Müller, 2021). Among the 19 Member States with short-time work schemes in 2021, 10 required informing or consulting social partners (i.e. Bulgaria, Czechia, Spain, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia). In Austria, the adoption of the short-time work scheme was based solely on a social partner agreement. Wage subsidy schemes in Bulgaria, Czechia, Croatia, Ireland and Malta were in place without requiring formal involvement. Among the six furlough schemes available in Member States, three had formal consultation requirements (Belgium, Denmark and Finland).

Collective bargaining has helped to strengthen statutory job retention schemes, notably at sectoral level and for certain categories of workers. In some Member States (Belgium, Czechia, France, Germany, Italy and Slovenia), collective agreements have supplemented statutory provisions, increasing benefits for certain categories of workers. This was usually done at sectoral level, for example in the metal sector in Belgium and the public sector in Slovenia. Sectoral agreements were most common in Germany, where the automotive, hospitality, insurance and retail trade sectors included higher allowances for workers in atypical contracts. In Austria, 46 % of workers had an increase in the replacement rates of short-time work allowances paid as a result of company-level agreements (Eurofound, 2021). In France, these agreements at firm level improved short-time work allowances to protect low-wage workers (Vincent, 2021).

To prepare workers for future challenges, job retention schemes can be complemented by training and activation policies. Although the primary aim of job retention schemes is to preserve employment and sustain income during economic crises, the reduction in working time can serve as an opportunity for up-skilling and re-skilling, if training needs exist. However, although life-long learning and upskilling is a policy priority in the context of structural economic change, not all workers may have specific training needs. Training should, furthermore, be provided in a way that does not impede the timely deployment of job retention support. In addition, schemes can be combined with active labour market policies to increase job opportunities for workers who may nevertheless end up displaced, such as job search assistance or measures to promote geographic mobility ([195]). Box 3.7 describes the training and

([195]) Balleer (2024).

activation policies, with which some Member States have complemented their job retention schemes during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Box 3.7: **Shifting focus from job retention schemes to activation policies during the COVID-19 pandemic**

During the COVID-19 pandemic, some Member States complemented their job retention schemes by training and activation policies. Initially, the policy focus during the pandemic was on retaining employment through job retention schemes (Eichhorst et al., 2022), supporting incomes through easing access to social benefits (Marx et al., 2022), and stabilising overall labour demand (e.g. by providing ad hoc support for firms). As the crisis unfolded and restrictions to mobility were lifted, the focus shifted towards strengthening active labour market policies and re-activation support, particularly for underrepresented groups and those in vulnerable situations.

Some job retention schemes contained provisions such as training incentives, compulsory or voluntary registration within the public employment services and access to career guidance. Nine EU countries made participation in training optional while in short-time work (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain), with six of them offering financial incentives for firms or employees (Austria, France, Luxembourg and Portugal). However, most Member States' schemes did not include measures to up- and re-skill workers or to facilitate their re-employment in new jobs, should they lose their work after the support ended. This may have reflected concerns about the administrative and organisational burden of setting up such training schemes, and about the delay they may cause for the delivery of job retention assistance.

As Europe recovered from the pandemic, active labour market policies were increasingly used to help specific groups return to work. For instance, several Member States strengthened training programmes for young people (Estonia, Spain) and adopted new employment subsidies for the long-term unemployed (Greece, Sweden) and persons with disabilities (Czechia, Croatia). Most Member States increased expenditure on these policies and enhanced the capacity of public employment services to deliver them, in line with the Commission recommendation on Effective Active Support to Employment (EASE) ([1]). These efforts, including a growing reliance on digital tools, helped enhance support for workers in short-time work and facilitated their transition to new roles as their previous positions became unviable during the economic recovery. Measures such as re-employment services (France), employment support for jobseekers (the Netherlands), and work resumption bonuses (Spain) eased the adjustment or phasing-out of job retention schemes. These efforts prevented significant scarring effects and may have reduced the need for activation support later.

([1]) C(2021) 1372 final

3.4. ANALYSIS OF DIFFERENT DESIGNS OF JOB RETENTION SCHEMES

This section analyses the links between the different features of the design of job retention schemes and their participation rates as well as their broader economic impact. First, it provides a brief overview of the core features of the design of job retention schemes during the COVID-19 pandemic, that are used in the analysis, as well as of the chosen outcome variables. Second, it presents the results of the analysis of the correlations between these design features and the take-up of job retention schemes as well as further economic outcomes

(namely unemployment, firm survival, and labour productivity). The analysis focuses on Member States and covers the time period during the COVID-19 pandemic ([196]).

3.4.1. Coverage, generosity and conditionalities are among the key design features analysed

Graph 3.1: **Relationship between take-up rates (Q2 2020) and number of jobs saved in % (2020)**



Source: Eurofound (2024)

During the pandemic, the design of job retention schemes varied across the EU in terms of coverage, generosity, and some key conditionalities. The analysis is based on detailed quarterly information about such institutional features of job retention schemes, which has been collected by Eurofound ([197]). It considers, in particular, the following institutional characteristics as explanatory variables: coverage, that is, both which firms were eligible, and which types of workers were eligible ([198]), and generosity, that is, composed by the "replacement wage" ([199]) and the "duration" ([200]). It also considers other institutional characteristics, for instance whether schemes included conditionalities such as protecting jobs from dismissal or requiring workers to attend training ([201]).

The analysis looks at how the take-up of job retention schemes is related to their design characteristics. Take-up rates refer to the proportion of employed workers who actually benefited from the scheme during a certain time period. Average quarterly take-up rates are used in the analysis to assess how different design features influenced employers' willingness or ability to apply for job retention schemes ([202]). In line with the literature ([203]), it is reasonable to expect that take-up is correlated with jobs saved (see Graph 3.1), which is relevant since the latter is a well-known measure of effectiveness.

([196]) The analysis is based on the methodology used by Corti et al. (2023) and Eurofound (2024).

([197]) Eurofound (2024).

([198]) Which types of contracts were covered.

([199]) The percentage of the original wage the subsidy was replacing.

([200]) For how many weeks the support was provided.

([201]) A measure of administrative requirements needed to be eligible has also been considered among the institutional characteristics. In particular, the minimum percentage of weekly working hours which should be reduced for a company to be eligible.

([202]) High take-up generally signals that the scheme is accessible and timely. It also reflects employers' perception of the scheme's value in responding to ongoing labour market disruptions.

([203]) Corti et al. (2023).

At the peak of the pandemic, the take-up of job retention schemes varied significantly across the EU, reflecting different policy responses, designs, and the urgency of the crisis at national level. As shown in Graph 3.2 the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Cyprus, Croatia, France, Ireland and Austria reported the highest take-up rates on average in the second quarter of 2020, exceeding 20%, suggesting broad access or high reliance on job retention measures during the peak of the COVID-19 crisis. Malta and Italy also had high take-up rates, slightly below 20%. On the contrary, Hungary, Finland, Bulgaria, and Latvia showed very low take-up rates, all under 5%.

Graph 3.2: **Take-up rates across the EU (average rates in Q2 2020)**



Source: Eurofound (2024)

However, take-up rates in themselves are not a measure of the effectiveness of job retention schemes. These rates measure participation, and they are also influenced by external factors such as the severity of the economic shock, public communication, and administrative capacity. As a result, high participation does not necessarily mean a scheme is achieving its intended outcomes, and low take-up may not imply poor design if the underlying need is limited. While useful as a first indicator, take-up should therefore be interpreted alongside other measures of impact.

To evaluate the broader effectiveness of job retention schemes, the analysis also considers economic outcomes such as unemployment, bankruptcy rates, and labour productivity. Quarterly unemployment rates, measured at different time intervals (i.e. in the same quarter, as well as in the following quarter and one year after a job retention scheme with certain characteristics was implemented) help capture whether schemes were successful in preserving jobs both in the short and medium term. Firm bankruptcy rates offer insights into the schemes' role in supporting business continuity, particularly for firms facing liquidity constraints. Labour productivity is included to assess whether support schemes help preserve or even enhance economic efficiency during periods of disruption. The analysis relies on real labour productivity per hour, as the use of job retention schemes reduces real labour productivity per person by definition (reducing the average hours worked per person). These outcome variables complement take-up data by providing a broader picture of whether schemes contribute to labour market resilience and economic stability.

3.4.2. Broad coverage, simplified administrative requirements and some conditionalities have different correlations with participation and economic outcomes

First, wider coverage, as well as fewer administrative requirements to access the schemes, significantly boost take-up. The analysis shows (see Table A3.1.1 in Annex) that schemes covering a broader range of workers and companies are strongly associated with higher average quarterly take-up rates. This supports the idea that reducing eligibility restrictions helps more firms and workers benefit from job retention support. In addition, the results reveal that a higher threshold for hours reduction (required to be eligible) is negatively associated with take-up, suggesting that schemes requiring only modest cuts in working hours are associated with higher

participation rates. These results underline the importance of broad coverage and lower barriers to entry during the pandemic to enhance participation in job retention schemes.

Furthermore, some conditionalities can deter participation in the schemes, while generosity alone is not significantly associated with participation. Design features like dismissal protection rules and mandatory training are significantly associated with lower take-up rates, indicating that imposing strict conditions may discourage employers' participation. By contrast, more generous wage replacement levels and longer benefit durations do not show a statistically significant effect on take-up. This suggests that employers prioritise flexibility and accessibility over financial generosity alone, and that there is a trade-off between introducing conditionalities and aiming to maximise the take-up of schemes.

Second, broader job retention schemes support medium to long-term labour market recovery. The analysis shows (see Table A3.1.2 in Annex) that broader eligibility, namely when more workers and companies are eligible for these subsidies, is associated with higher initial unemployment and bankruptcy rates. This is likely due to reverse causation: job retention schemes are likely adopted with a broader scope in countries that face acute economic shocks. However, over time, broader eligibility for workers is significantly correlated with lower unemployment, suggesting that such schemes can play a stabilising role by supporting job preservation and economic recovery.

Less stringent administrative requirements are associated with lower unemployment after one quarter. Schemes that minimise access barriers, such as those requiring smaller minimum reductions in working hours, are associated with better unemployment outcomes after one quarter. Furthermore, more generous wage replacement appears to be only slightly significantly correlated with a lower unemployment rate in the subsequent quarter, and no clear relationship emerges in relation to bankruptcy rates, suggesting that financial generosity alone does not determine the success of a scheme.

Third, job retention schemes with broad eligibility criteria can support labour productivity, but careful design is essential to avoid inefficiencies. In this regard, the results (see Table A3.1.3 in Annex) indicate that broader eligibility for firms (i.e. coverage is extended to all firms including solo self-employed) is associated with higher labour productivity after one year, but with lower labour productivity in the medium term (i.e. after two and three years). The first result could suggest that broad access helps maintain productive capacity during economic downturns; however, it could also be due to higher capacity utilisation after one year at the beginning of the recovery ([204]). One potential explanation of the pattern observed over the medium term could be that job retention schemes may have deferred the cleansing impact of the crisis, namely that broad eligibility may have allowed also firms with lower productivity to weather the crisis. Further research could investigate the different potential explanations that could drive this pattern.

3.5. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

Job retention schemes have proven to be an effective policy response to economic crises arising from sudden and unexpected shocks. Government intervention to preserve employment is justified by the legal and financial constraints that affect both firms facing economic difficulties and workers facing the risk of unemployment. The main advantage of

([204]) This result could also be due to reverse causation, namely the fact that broader coverage might have been implemented where more jobs were lost before the program, which could have likely caused an increase in labour productivity.

these schemes lies in helping firms to avoid the significant costs associated with layoffs, rehiring, and retraining, while also preserving valuable firm-specific human capital acquired by workers. During severe but short-lived downturns (i.e. notably the type that was associated with the COVID-19 pandemic), job retention schemes are often more effective than relying solely on unemployment benefits, as they help prevent mass layoffs and the rise in long-term unemployment that may follow.

Job retention schemes are most effective when deployed swiftly but flexibly, and when they are phased out as economic conditions improve. Key design features include flexibility and adaptability, focusing on the sectors and workers most heavily impacted by the shock. While broader coverage helps reducing the overall unemployment risk, the appropriate targeting of job retention schemes can improve their cost-effectiveness and better support sectors and population groups as the crisis evolves. The involvement of social partners in their activation can help to ensure the adequate targeting of the schemes and ensure the fair sharing of costs between the government, employers, and workers with different types of contracts. Ideally, job retention schemes should be predictable and capable of automatic activation as a crisis hits, potentially available as a permanent framework that can be triggered during downturns. This feature can enhance preparedness and ensure timely support when it is most needed.

During the pandemic, broad job retention schemes boosted participation and preserved jobs, but were also associated with lower productivity in the medium term. The empirical analysis shows that, during the pandemic, broad eligibility for firms and workers, combined with simplified administrative procedures, significantly enhanced participation and supported employment in the medium term. By contrast, some conditionalities, such as mandatory training or dismissal bans, were associated with lower participation rates. Furthermore, the results show that a broad coverage of firms by job retention schemes was associated with lower labour productivity on average two and three years later.

It is important to ensure the efficient use of job retention schemes and prevent their misuse. Beneficiaries may rely excessively on support from job retention schemes, particularly when their eligibility criteria are less stringent or when the level of support provided is very generous without requiring a significant contribution from employers. To address this risk, features such as employer co-financing and experience-rating into the design of these schemes can help to better align incentives by preventing firms from treating the support as a cost-free option, thereby reducing the risk of overuse and moral hazard, particularly in less severe economic downturns.

If used in restructuring cases, job retention schemes can help to protect workers of viable companies, while, for non-viable companies, they should be complemented with active labour market policies. Evidence from the use of short-time work in restructuring cases in Germany and Italy shows that these schemes, combined with restructuring plans and targeted training, can help in protecting workers and their income during restructuring of viable firms that will restart their operations after the restructuring. However, the deployment only of short-time work in cases of restructuring of non-viable firms is not advisable in the medium run, since it would delay labour reallocation, which is necessary for competitiveness and growth. In these cases, job retention schemes should be complemented with active labour market policies, such as training and tailored job search assistance, which are more appropriate to facilitate workers' transitions to new jobs.

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ANNEX 3.1

Selected graphs and tables

This Annex presents the correlation tables referred to in section 3.4. They show how specific design features of job retention schemes were associated with the participation in these schemes, as well as unemployment and labour productivity during and after the pandemic. The statistical analysis (OLS regressions with country fixed effects, to account for structural characteristics at national level) has used quarterly data from 2020-2021 (unless otherwise specified) to assess these relations. The results are shown in tables where different shades of blue highlight how strong the relationship between the design features and the outcome variables is: dark blue means very significant, medium blue means moderately significant, and light blue means weakly significant.

Table A3.1.1: **Correlations between different features of the design of job retention schemes and their take-up rates (2020-2021)**

	Quarterly take-up rates	Quarterly take-up rates	Quarterly take-up rates	Quarterly take-up rates	Quarterly take-up rates
Companies' coverage	2.627				2.665
Workers' coverage	0.838	1.043	0.838	0.628	
Maximum duration of support	-0.016	-0.007	-0.019	-0.058	-0.051
Replacement wage	0.003	-0.011	0.004	0.013	0.000
% change in GDP quarter on quarter	-0.510	-0.506	-0.509	-0.506	0.490
Minimum % of weekly working hours to be reduced to be eligible		-0.150			-0.149
Conditional on dismissal protection			-2.086		-4.261
Conditional on mandatory participation in training				-9.368	-10.920
Constant	-6.708	7.798	8.884	7.085	3.696
Observations	193	185	193	185	177
R-squared	0.22	0.242	0.22	0.242	0.273

Note: OLS regression with country fixed effect and robust standard errors clustered at country level (2020-2021). All variables are quarterly. Different shades of blue are used to signal different significance level of the coefficients: dark blue: p<0.01, medium blue: p<0.05, light blue: p<0.1.

Source: Eurofound (2024), database on institutional features of job retention schemes in the European Union and Eurostat.

Table A3.1.2: **Correlations between different features of the design of job retention schemes during the pandemic and unemployment rates in 2021, 2022, 2023**

	Unemployment rate - same quarter	Unemployment rate - one quarter after	Unemployment rate - one year after
Companies' coverage	1.144	0.931	0.508
Workers' coverage	0.065	-0.600	-0.860
Maximum duration of support	0.0192	-0.0106	-0.00534
Replacement wage	-0.01	-0.0236	0.00212
Minimum % of weekly working hours to be reduced to be eligible	-0.011	0.0144	-0.0167
Conditional on dismissal protection	0.546	-0.0197	-0.37
% change in GDP quarter on quarter	0.0247	-0.0147	-0.048
Constant	0.947	5.390	5.965
Observations	181	182	185
R-squared	0.077	0.088	0.229

Note: OLS regression with country fixed effect and robust standard errors clustered at country level (2020-2021). All variables are quarterly. Different shades of blue are used to signal different significance level of the coefficients: dark blue: p<0.01, medium blue: p<0.05, light blue: p<0.1.

Source: Eurofound (2024), Database on institutional features of job retention schemes in the European Union and Eurostat.

Table A3.1.3: **Correlations between different features of the design of job retention schemes during the pandemic and labour productivity in 2021, 2022, 2023 (expressed in % change on previous year)**

	Labour productivity- one year later	Labour productivity- two years later	Labour productivity- three years later
Companies' coverage	0.473	-1.479	-0.523
Workers' coverage	-0.676	-0.488	0.705
Replacement wage	0.00195	0.0313	0.00258
Conditional on dismissal protection	-0.5	0.438	-0.0514
% change in GDP quarter on quarter - starting 2021	0.311		
% change in GDP quarter on quarter - starting 2022		0.211	
% change in GDP quarter on quarter - starting 2023			0.0462
Constant	-1.066	4.758	0.975
Observations	193	193	193
R-squared	0.069	0.068	0.011

Note: OLS regression with country fixed effect and robust standard errors clustered at country level (2020-2021). All variables are quarterly. Different shades of blue are used to signal different significance level of the coefficients: dark blue: p<0.01, medium blue: p<0.05, light blue: p<0.1.

Source: Eurofound (2024), Database on institutional features of job retention schemes in the European Union and Eurostat.

APPENDIX: STATISTICAL ANNEX

Belgium	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2024-2023
1 - **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	11539	11586	11680	11780	11850	0.6 %
2 - **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	7326	7345	7396	7441	7464	0.3 %
(% of total population)	63.5	63.4	63.3	63.2	63.0	-0.2 pps
3 - **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	5022	5118	5214	5247	5286	0.7 %
Male	2670	2718	2753	2775	2801	0.9 %
Female	2352	2400	2460	2473	2485	0.5 %
4 - **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	68.6	69.7	70.5	70.5	70.8	0.3 pps
Young (15-24)	28.4	30.3	31.1	31.6	31.9	0.3 pps
Prime age (25-54)	84.5	85.4	86.1	85.7	85.7	0.0 pps
Older (55-64)	55.6	57.1	58.8	59.9	61.5	1.6 pps
Nationals (15-64)	69.2	70.1	71.0	71.2	71.3	0.1 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	63.7	66.7	67.4	66.5	67.8	1.4 pps
Male	72.6	73.7	74.2	74.4	74.8	0.5 pps
Young (15-24)	30.3	32.2	32.4	32.9	34.0	1.2 pps
Prime age (25-54)	88.7	89.7	90.2	90.3	90.3	0.0 pps
Older (55-64)	61.5	62.5	64.0	64.5	66.2	1.7 pps
Female	64.5	65.7	66.8	66.7	66.8	0.1 pps
Young (15-24)	26.5	28.2	29.7	30.2	29.6	-0.6 pps
Prime age (25-54)	80.3	81.1	81.9	81.2	81.2	0.0 pps
Older (55-64)	49.8	51.8	53.7	55.2	56.7	1.5 pps
5 - **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	64.7	65.3	66.5	66.6	66.7	0.2 pps
Young (15-24)	24.1	24.8	26.0	26.5	26.3	-0.2 pps
Prime age (25-54)	80.3	80.7	81.8	81.5	81.4	-0.1 pps
Older (55-64)	53.3	54.5	56.6	57.8	59.4	1.6 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	34.8	34.0	35.1	35.1	35.2	0.1 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	65.9	64.4	65.0	65.5	65.8	0.2 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	83.5	84.0	85.0	85.7	86.0	0.3 pps
Nationals (15-64)	65.8	66.2	67.4	67.6	67.7	0.1 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	57.1	59.2	61.0	60.0	61.0	1.0 pps
Male	68.4	68.7	69.8	69.9	70.2	0.3 pps
Young (15-24)	25.6	25.8	26.5	27.1	27.4	0.3 pps
Prime age (25-54)	84.2	84.6	85.6	85.4	85.5	0.1 pps
Older (55-64)	58.7	59.3	61.5	62.2	63.9	1.7 pps
Female	61.0	61.8	63.2	63.3	63.3	0.0 pps
Young (15-24)	22.5	23.7	25.4	25.9	25.3	-0.7 pps
Prime age (25-54)	76.4	76.9	78.1	77.5	77.3	-0.2 pps
Older (55-64)	48.0	49.6	51.8	53.4	54.9	1.5 pps
6 - **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	4740.6	4794.7	4920.9	4954.1	4981.1	0.5 %
7 - **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	-0.1	1.7	1.9	0.8	0.3	-0.5 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	-0.6	1.1	2.6	0.7	0.5	-0.1 pps
Male	-0.4	0.8	2.1	0.7	0.8	0.1 pps
Female	-0.9	1.5	3.2	0.7	0.3	-0.4 pps
8 - **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	13.4	13.0	13.8	13.7	13.3	-0.4 pps
Male	16.8	16.4	17.4	17.2	16.6	-0.6 pps
Female	9.4	9.2	9.8	9.9	9.7	-0.2 pps
9 - **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	10.1	10.3	9.7	9.3	9.7	0.4 pps
Male	9.6	9.5	8.6	8.3	8.6	0.3 pps
Female	10.7	11.1	10.8	10.4	10.9	0.5 pps
10 - **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	24.4	24.1	23.8	23.7	24.1	0.4 pps
Male	10.5	10.4	10.8	10.7	11.6	0.9 pps
Female	40.1	39.5	38.4	38.1	38.2	0.1 pps
11 **Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	1.1	5.2	4.4	4.2	4.3	0.1 pps
12 - **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	5.8	6.3	5.6	5.5	5.7	0.2 pps
Young (15-24)	15.3	18.2	16.4	16.1	17.4	1.3 pps
Prime age (25-49)	5.0	5.5	4.9	4.9	5.0	0.1 pps
Older (55-64)	4.2	4.6	3.7	3.5	3.4	-0.1 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	12.3	14.7	13.4	13.4	13.2	-0.2 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	5.8	7.0	6.4	6.3	6.6	0.3 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	3.5	3.6	3.1	3.0	3.1	0.1 pps
Nationals (15-64)	5.0	5.6	5.0	5.0	5.1	0.1 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	10.4	11.2	9.5	9.8	10.1	0.3 pps
Male	6.0	6.6	5.8	6.0	6.1	0.1 pps
Female	5.5	5.9	5.3	5.1	5.3	0.2 pps
13 - **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	41.6	42.5	42.3	40.1	36.4	-3.7 pps
14 - **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	39.8	38.9	39.0	38.7	38.1	-1.6 %
Male	40.7	39.7	39.6	39.7	38.8	-2.3 %
Female	36.9	36.2	35.8	36.1	36.3	0.6 %
15 - **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
Agriculture	0.7	1.2	-1.2	-2.0	-0.9	1.1 pps
Building and construction	1.7	3.9	2.2	0.8	-0.3	-1.1 pps
Services	-0.7	2.0	2.5	0.8	0.5	-0.4 pps
Manufacturing industry	-0.7	0.1	1.3	-0.3	-2.1	-1.8 pps
16 - **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
Compensation per employee	-1.2	4.9	7.5	8.0	2.9	-5.1 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP	-3.1	1.1	1.4	:	:	: pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	1.6	1.2	6.1	8.3	2.4	-5.9 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	1.5	1.2	6.0	8.6	2.4	-6.2 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	-4.7	4.4	2.3	0.4	0.7	0.3 pps

Bulgaria	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2024-2023
1 - **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	6551	6507	6465	6447	6437	-0.2 %
2 - **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	4114	4068	4022	3993	3979	-0.3 %
(% of total population)	62.8	62.5	62.2	61.9	61.8	-0.1 pps
3 - **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	2986	2940	2965	2951	2946	-0.2 %
Male	1596	1567	1572	1560	1560	0.0 %
Female	1390	1373	1393	1392	1385	-0.5 %
4 - **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	72.6	72.3	73.7	73.9	74.0	0.1 pps
Young (15-24)	21.8	19.6	21.7	21.4	19.7	-1.6 pps
Prime age (25-54)	84.9	84.9	86.1	86.6	87.7	1.1 pps
Older (55-64)	67.0	67.9	70.8	72.1	72.2	0.1 pps
Nationals (15-64)	72.6	72.3	73.8	74.0	74.1	0.1 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	0.0	56.3	56.8	55.6	52.6	-2.9 pps
Male	77.1	76.4	77.4	77.3	77.6	0.2 pps
Young (15-24)	25.2	23.7	25.5	24.3	23.7	-0.6 pps
Prime age (25-54)	89.2	88.5	89.1	89.7	91.0	1.3 pps
Older (55-64)	72.7	73.5	76.2	76.8	76.2	-0.6 pps
Female	68.0	68.0	70.0	70.4	70.4	0.0 pps
Young (15-24)	18.2	15.3	17.7	18.2	15.5	-2.6 pps
Prime age (25-54)	80.5	81.1	82.9	83.4	84.3	0.9 pps
Older (55-64)	62.0	62.7	65.7	67.7	68.5	0.7 pps
5 - **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	68.9	68.5	70.6	70.7	70.9	0.2 pps
Young (15-24)	18.7	16.5	19.4	18.8	17.3	-1.5 pps
Prime age (25-54)	80.8	80.7	82.6	83.0	84.1	1.1 pps
Older (55-64)	64.2	64.8	68.3	69.5	69.9	0.3 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	35.6	34.3	36.9	36.3	33.6	-2.7 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	73.0	71.7	73.5	72.9	72.1	-0.8 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	87.5	88.6	89.8	90.2	90.5	0.3 pps
Nationals (15-64)	68.9	68.5	70.7	70.7	71.0	0.3 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	0.0	55.0	51.9	54.3	50.4	-3.9 pps
Male	72.9	72.3	74.0	73.9	74.1	0.2 pps
Young (15-24)	21.5	19.9	22.7	21.2	20.7	-0.5 pps
Prime age (25-54)	84.5	84.0	85.4	85.9	87.0	1.2 pps
Older (55-64)	69.5	70.0	73.3	74.0	73.8	-0.2 pps
Female	64.8	64.6	67.2	67.4	67.6	0.2 pps
Young (15-24)	15.7	13.0	15.9	16.1	13.7	-2.4 pps
Prime age (25-54)	76.8	77.1	79.6	79.9	81.0	1.1 pps
Older (55-64)	59.4	60.1	63.6	65.3	66.2	0.8 pps
6 - **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	2833.4	2785.4	2840.7	2821.7	2820.8	0.0 %
7 - **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	-1.8	0.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	0.0 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	-3.8	-1.7	2.0	-0.7	0.0	0.6 pps
Male	-3.6	-1.9	1.5	-0.9	0.0	0.9 pps
Female	-4.1	-1.5	2.6	-0.4	-0.1	0.3 pps
8 - **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	10.2	10.2	10.4	10.3	11.0	0.7 pps
Male	12.8	12.7	12.9	12.6	13.6	1.0 pps
Female	7.1	7.3	7.5	7.8	8.2	0.4 pps
9 - **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	3.5	3.3	3.8	3.0	2.8	-0.2 pps
Male	3.9	3.9	4.2	3.2	3.0	-0.2 pps
Female	3.0	2.8	3.3	2.8	2.6	-0.2 pps
10 - **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	1.8	1.5	1.6	1.4	1.5	0.1 pps
Male	1.6	1.3	1.4	1.3	1.5	0.2 pps
Female	2.1	1.8	1.7	1.5	1.5	0.0 pps
11 **Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	1.0	0.7	0.8	0.6	0.6	0.0 pps
12 - **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	6.1	5.2	4.2	4.3	4.2	-0.1 pps
Young (15-24)	14.2	15.8	10.6	12.1	12.3	0.2 pps
Prime age (25-49)	4.9	5.0	4.1	4.2	4.1	-0.1 pps
Older (55-64)	4.2	4.5	3.5	3.6	3.2	-0.4 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	14.2	16.2	12.8	13.1	14.7	1.6 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	4.7	4.9	4.0	4.2	4.2	0.0 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	2.5	2.0	1.6	1.9	1.7	-0.2 pps
Nationals (15-64)	5.1	5.3	4.2	4.4	4.2	-0.2 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0 pps
Male	6.4	5.4	4.3	4.4	4.4	0.0 pps
Female	5.6	4.9	3.9	4.2	3.9	-0.3 pps
13 - **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	45.5	49.8	53.8	52.0	50.9	-1.1 pps
14 - **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	39.7	39.8	39.6	39.2	39.3	0.3 %
Male	40.0	40.1	39.8	39.5	39.4	-0.3 %
Female	39.4	39.5	39.2	39.0	39.1	0.3 %
15 - **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
Agriculture	1.8	-6.6	-2.0	-0.9	-5.4	-4.5 pps
Building and construction	-1.3	1.7	-1.4	1.8	4.8	3.0 pps
Services	-3.5	1.2	3.2	1.3	3.2	1.8 pps
Manufacturing industry	-4.7	0.8	-0.9	-1.2	-1.8	-0.6 pps
16 - **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
Compensation per employee	7.2	11.3	14.2	13.4	10.4	-3.1 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP	2.8	3.9	-1.7	:	:	: pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	7.5	7.1	16.1	14.5	13.6	-0.9 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	7.5	7.7	16.3	14.9	13.6	-1.3 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	-1.5	7.7	3.0	0.8	1.7	0.9 pps

Czechia	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2024-2023
1 - **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	10502	10501	10760	10878	10890	0.1 %
2 - **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	6838	6810	6653	6511	6642	2.0 %
(% of total population)	65.1	64.8	61.8	59.9	61.0	1.1 pps
3 - **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	5224	5216	5138	5023	5148	2.5 %
Male	2909	2898	2850	2809	2808	0.0 %
Female	2315	2318	2288	2214	2340	5.7 %
4 - **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	76.4	76.6	77.2	77.1	77.5	0.4 pps
Young (15-24)	27.3	27.0	27.6	27.8	27.0	-0.8 pps
Prime age (25-54)	88.7	88.7	89.2	90.0	90.0	0.0 pps
Older (55-64)	69.6	71.6	74.4	75.6	78.5	3.0 pps
Nationals (15-64)	76.2	76.4	77.0	76.9	77.3	0.4 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	83.0	82.8	84.2	82.4	81.9	-0.5 pps
Male	83.3	83.3	83.7	83.4	83.1	-0.4 pps
Young (15-24)	32.9	31.8	31.7	31.7	30.2	-1.5 pps
Prime age (25-54)	95.8	95.8	96.3	96.4	96.2	-0.1 pps
Older (55-64)	76.5	78.1	80.5	80.5	82.3	1.7 pps
Female	69.2	69.6	70.4	70.4	71.7	1.3 pps
Young (15-24)	21.4	21.9	23.3	23.9	23.7	-0.2 pps
Prime age (25-54)	81.1	81.1	81.7	82.9	83.5	0.6 pps
Older (55-64)	62.8	65.2	68.3	70.6	74.8	4.2 pps
5 - **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	74.4	74.4	75.5	75.1	75.4	0.3 pps
Young (15-24)	25.1	24.8	25.7	25.5	24.5	-1.0 pps
Prime age (25-54)	86.5	86.3	87.4	87.9	87.9	0.0 pps
Older (55-64)	68.2	69.9	72.9	74.0	77.0	3.0 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	27.6	25.7	25.6	25.9	25.7	-0.2 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	80.0	79.7	81.1	81.3	81.7	0.4 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	83.9	84.8	86.2	86.5	87.0	0.6 pps
Nationals (15-64)	74.2	74.2	75.3	74.9	75.3	0.4 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	80.7	80.5	82.1	79.8	78.8	-1.0 pps
Male	81.4	81.3	82.2	81.6	81.1	-0.4 pps
Young (15-24)	30.5	29.4	29.8	29.2	27.7	-1.6 pps
Prime age (25-54)	93.8	93.8	94.8	94.6	94.4	-0.2 pps
Older (55-64)	75.2	76.5	79.2	78.9	80.8	1.9 pps
Female	67.1	67.1	68.5	68.2	69.5	1.3 pps
Young (15-24)	19.4	19.9	21.5	21.8	21.4	-0.5 pps
Prime age (25-54)	78.8	78.4	79.5	80.5	81.1	0.6 pps
Older (55-64)	61.3	63.3	66.8	69.0	73.2	4.2 pps
6 - **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	5086.9	5066.1	5021.7	4890.3	5010.4	2.5 %
7 - **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	-2.3	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.3	-0.7 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	-1.2	-0.4	-0.9	-2.6	2.5	5.1 pps
Male	-0.7	-0.4	-1.1	-1.9	-0.1	1.8 pps
Female	-1.9	-0.4	-0.6	-3.5	5.7	9.2 pps
8 - **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	15.8	15.1	15.1	15.8	15.1	-0.8 pps
Male	19.4	18.6	18.6	19.8	18.7	-1.1 pps
Female	11.2	10.6	10.7	10.7	10.7	-0.1 pps
9 - **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	7.0	6.5	6.1	7.0	7.6	0.6 pps
Male	5.9	5.3	5.0	5.5	6.1	0.6 pps
Female	8.2	7.9	7.5	8.8	9.3	0.5 pps
10 - **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	5.7	5.7	6.0	6.9	7.7	0.8 pps
Male	2.4	2.5	2.7	3.2	3.6	0.4 pps
Female	9.9	9.6	10.2	11.6	12.7	1.1 pps
11 **Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	0.3	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.3	0.2 pps
12 - **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	2.6	2.8	2.2	2.6	2.6	0.0 pps
Young (15-24)	8.0	8.2	6.8	8.3	9.1	0.8 pps
Prime age (25-49)	2.4	2.6	2.0	2.3	2.3	0.0 pps
Older (55-64)	2.0	2.4	2.0	2.2	2.0	-0.2 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	10.7	13.2	13.0	13.0	12.3	-0.7 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	2.4	2.7	2.1	2.4	2.4	0.0 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	1.5	1.4	0.9	1.4	1.4	0.0 pps
Nationals (15-64)	2.6	2.9	2.3	2.6	2.6	0.0 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	2.8	2.8	2.5	3.2	3.8	0.6 pps
Male	2.2	2.3	1.8	2.2	2.3	0.1 pps
Female	3.0	3.4	2.8	3.1	3.0	-0.1 pps
13 - **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	22.0	27.6	27.8	29.2	29.0	-0.2 pps
14 - **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	38.8	39.2	38.4	38.6	39.0	1.0 %
Male	39.6	40.0	39.6	39.7	39.8	0.3 %
Female	37.7	38.1	37.4	37.7	38.0	0.8 %
15 - **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
Agriculture	-4.6	-0.7	4.8	0.4	0.8	0.4 pps
Building and construction	-2.0	2.8	1.8	2.6	-0.2	-2.8 pps
Services	-2.5	0.6	1.3	1.1	0.9	-0.2 pps
Manufacturing industry	-4.6	0.3	0.0	-0.2	-2.0	-1.8 pps
16 - **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
Compensation per employee	4.0	6.2	6.9	6.7	5.9	-0.8 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP	-1.2	1.7	-2.4	:	:	: pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	7.0	-0.8	3.8	8.7	6.4	-2.3 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	9.0	2.9	4.0	8.6	6.4	-2.2 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	-3.1	3.0	1.8	-1.1	0.8	1.9 pps

Denmark	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2024-2023
1 - **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	5830	5854	5906	5948	5977	0.5 %
2 - **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	3700	3702	3730	3763	3782	0.5 %
(% of total population)	63.5	63.2	63.2	63.3	63.3	0.0 pps
3 - **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	2922	2946	3000	3040	3117	2.5 %
Male	1528	1543	1557	1578	1623	2.9 %
Female	1394	1403	1443	1462	1494	2.2 %
4 - **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	79.0	79.6	80.4	80.8	82.4	1.6 pps
Young (15-24)	60.2	60.4	62.8	64.5	69.1	4.6 pps
Prime age (25-54)	86.4	87.0	87.8	87.4	88.1	0.7 pps
Older (55-64)	74.6	75.3	75.1	76.5	78.0	1.5 pps
Nationals (15-64)	79.5	79.9	80.5	80.9	82.2	1.3 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	74.1	76.2	80.1	79.3	84.6	5.3 pps
Male	81.8	82.6	82.7	83.1	85.1	2.0 pps
Young (15-24)	60.1	60.9	62.7	63.4	68.7	5.3 pps
Prime age (25-54)	89.7	90.5	90.2	90.2	91.2	1.0 pps
Older (55-64)	79.1	79.7	79.4	80.6	82.3	1.7 pps
Female	76.1	76.5	78.1	78.4	79.7	1.3 pps
Young (15-24)	60.3	59.9	62.9	65.6	69.6	4.0 pps
Prime age (25-54)	83.0	83.6	85.2	84.5	84.9	0.4 pps
Older (55-64)	70.1	70.9	70.9	72.4	73.8	1.4 pps
5 - **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	74.4	75.5	76.8	76.6	77.2	0.7 pps
Young (15-24)	53.2	53.9	56.1	57.0	59.0	2.0 pps
Prime age (25-54)	82.1	83.4	84.6	83.5	83.7	0.2 pps
Older (55-64)	71.5	72.3	72.9	74.2	75.0	0.9 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	52.2	53.7	55.6	55.3	55.9	0.6 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	78.6	79.4	80.7	80.0	80.1	0.1 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	87.1	87.3	88.2	88.4	88.2	-0.2 pps
Nationals (15-64)	75.2	76.1	77.2	77.0	77.4	0.4 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	66.7	69.4	72.7	71.4	75.1	3.7 pps
Male	77.3	78.4	79.0	78.9	79.9	1.1 pps
Young (15-24)	52.5	54.3	56.0	55.9	58.4	2.5 pps
Prime age (25-54)	85.8	86.7	87.0	86.4	87.0	0.7 pps
Older (55-64)	75.8	76.3	76.8	78.3	79.0	0.8 pps
Female	71.5	72.5	74.5	74.2	74.5	0.2 pps
Young (15-24)	53.9	53.4	56.3	58.2	59.7	1.5 pps
Prime age (25-54)	78.4	79.9	82.1	80.6	80.3	-0.4 pps
Older (55-64)	67.1	68.2	69.0	70.1	71.0	1.0 pps
6 - **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	2753.3	2794.3	2864.2	2881.3	2920.2	1.4 %
7 - **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	-1.1	2.3	4.0	1.3	0.8	-0.5 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	-0.9	1.5	2.5	0.6	1.4	0.8 pps
Male	-1.0	1.4	1.5	0.7	1.8	1.1 pps
Female	-0.8	1.6	3.6	0.4	0.8	0.4 pps
8 - **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	7.5	7.7	7.6	7.4	6.9	-0.6 pps
Male	10.0	10.3	10.1	9.5	8.5	-1.0 pps
Female	4.8	4.9	4.8	5.2	5.1	-0.1 pps
9 - **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	10.9	10.9	10.9	10.2	12.6	2.4 pps
Male	9.3	9.4	9.7	9.0	11.8	2.8 pps
Female	12.5	12.5	12.1	11.5	13.4	1.9 pps
10 - **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	23.4	23.9	24.2	25.2	26.9	1.7 pps
Male	14.7	15.2	15.2	16.1	17.3	1.2 pps
Female	32.9	33.5	33.8	35.2	37.4	2.2 pps
11 **Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	2.7	2.2	1.5	1.7	1.8	0.1 pps
12 - **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	5.6	5.1	4.5	5.1	6.2	1.1 pps
Young (15-24)	11.7	10.8	10.6	11.5	14.6	3.1 pps
Prime age (25-49)	4.9	4.2	3.6	4.4	5.0	0.6 pps
Older (55-64)	4.2	4.0	2.9	3.1	3.9	0.8 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	9.8	8.7	8.0	9.1	11.3	2.2 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	4.9	4.5	3.8	4.7	5.6	0.9 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	4.7	4.1	3.6	3.9	4.7	0.8 pps
Nationals (15-64)	5.4	4.8	4.1	4.8	5.8	1.0 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	9.9	8.9	9.2	9.9	11.3	1.4 pps
Male	5.3	5.0	4.4	5.0	5.9	0.9 pps
Female	6.0	5.2	4.5	5.3	6.5	1.2 pps
13 - **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	16.7	20.0	11.4	10.8	12.1	1.3 pps
14 - **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	38.1	38.7	38.1	38.1	37.9	-0.5 %
Male	39.2	39.8	39.3	39.0	38.6	-1.0 %
Female	36.6	37.2	36.5	36.8	36.6	-0.5 %
15 - **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
Agriculture	-0.3	-4.9	0.6	-0.7	0.3	1.0 pps
Building and construction	1.4	4.5	4.0	-0.1	1.1	1.2 pps
Services	-2.3	2.0	5.3	1.5	0.7	-0.8 pps
Manufacturing industry	-2.0	2.2	4.5	1.4	1.7	0.3 pps
16 - **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
Compensation per employee	2.5	3.1	2.6	3.1	4.4	1.2 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP	-0.5	0.3	-4.6	:	:	: pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	0.9	2.5	2.7	2.9	3.3	0.4 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	2.5	2.7	2.3	2.9	3.2	0.3 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	-0.7	5.0	-2.4	1.1	2.8	1.7 pps

Germany	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2024-2023
1 - **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	83161	83196	83798	84514	84704	0.2 %
2 - **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	53229	52968	53318	53577	53607	0.1 %
(% of total population)	64.0	63.7	63.6	63.4	63.3	-0.1 pps
3 - **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	41806	41583	42299	42709	43006	0.7 %
Male	22241	22145	22465	22653	22796	0.6 %
Female	19565	19437	19835	20056	20211	0.8 %
4 - **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	78.5	78.5	79.3	79.7	80.2	0.5 pps
Young (15-24)	51.8	52.0	53.5	54.0	54.6	0.5 pps
Prime age (25-54)	87.3	87.2	87.7	87.8	88.4	0.5 pps
Older (55-64)	74.0	74.1	75.3	76.4	77.0	0.6 pps
Nationals (15-64)	79.9	80.1	81.0	81.7	82.2	0.5 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	70.6	69.6	70.9	70.4	71.5	1.1 pps
Male	82.5	82.5	83.3	83.6	83.9	0.3 pps
Young (15-24)	53.7	54.8	56.2	56.5	56.6	0.2 pps
Prime age (25-54)	91.8	91.4	92.1	92.2	92.4	0.2 pps
Older (55-64)	78.1	78.6	79.5	80.3	81.0	0.7 pps
Female	74.5	74.4	75.3	75.8	76.5	0.7 pps
Young (15-24)	49.9	49.1	50.7	51.4	52.3	0.9 pps
Prime age (25-54)	82.6	82.8	83.2	83.4	84.2	0.8 pps
Older (55-64)	69.8	69.6	71.2	72.6	73.0	0.5 pps
5 - **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	75.4	75.6	76.8	77.2	77.4	0.2 pps
Young (15-24)	48.1	48.4	50.3	50.8	51.0	0.2 pps
Prime age (25-54)	84.0	84.2	85.1	85.2	85.4	0.2 pps
Older (55-64)	71.7	71.8	73.3	74.6	75.2	0.6 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	49.4	50.8	54.0	54.6	54.8	0.2 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	79.4	79.7	80.9	81.4	81.7	0.2 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	87.0	87.9	88.7	88.3	87.9	-0.4 pps
Nationals (15-64)	77.4	77.7	78.9	79.7	80.0	0.3 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	64.0	64.1	66.3	65.8	66.0	0.2 pps
Male	78.9	79.1	80.4	80.8	80.8	0.0 pps
Young (15-24)	49.6	50.7	52.5	52.8	52.5	-0.2 pps
Prime age (25-54)	88.0	87.9	89.1	89.3	89.1	-0.2 pps
Older (55-64)	75.5	75.9	77.2	78.2	78.9	0.7 pps
Female	71.9	71.9	73.0	73.6	74.0	0.5 pps
Young (15-24)	46.5	45.9	47.9	48.7	49.3	0.6 pps
Prime age (25-54)	79.9	80.3	80.9	81.0	81.5	0.5 pps
Older (55-64)	67.8	67.7	69.4	71.0	71.5	0.4 pps
6 - **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	40155.2	40035.7	40926.5	41363.0	41511.9	0.4 %
7 - **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	-0.7	0.2	1.4	0.7	0.2	-0.5 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	-2.2	-0.3	2.2	1.1	0.4	-0.7 pps
Male	-2.4	-0.2	2.1	1.0	0.3	-0.7 pps
Female	-2.0	-0.4	2.4	1.2	0.5	-0.7 pps
8 - **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	7.8	7.8	7.7	7.4	7.1	-0.4 pps
Male	9.7	9.7	9.5	9.2	8.8	-0.3 pps
Female	5.7	5.6	5.6	5.5	5.0	-0.4 pps
9 - **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	10.8	11.5	12.4	12.0	11.4	-0.6 pps
Male	10.8	11.6	12.6	12.3	11.5	-0.8 pps
Female	10.8	11.4	12.3	11.6	11.2	-0.4 pps
10 - **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	27.8	27.8	28.0	28.7	29.2	0.5 pps
Male	10.2	10.7	11.0	11.5	11.9	0.4 pps
Female	47.8	47.2	47.1	47.9	48.8	0.9 pps
11 **Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	2.1	2.0	1.7	1.6	1.5	-0.1 pps
12 - **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	3.7	3.7	3.2	3.1	3.4	0.3 pps
Young (15-24)	7.1	7.0	6.0	5.9	6.6	0.7 pps
Prime age (25-49)	3.7	3.4	3.0	3.0	3.4	0.4 pps
Older (55-64)	3.1	3.1	2.7	2.4	2.4	0.0 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	9.4	8.0	6.8	6.5	6.8	0.3 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	3.3	3.2	2.8	2.6	2.9	0.3 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	2.6	2.5	2.1	2.2	2.7	0.5 pps
Nationals (15-64)	3.1	3.1	2.7	2.5	2.6	0.1 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	9.4	7.8	6.6	6.5	7.7	1.2 pps
Male	4.0	4.0	3.4	3.3	3.6	0.3 pps
Female	3.3	3.2	2.9	2.8	3.1	0.3 pps
13 - **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	29.3	32.7	33.3	30.6	27.1	-3.5 pps
14 - **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	39.4	39.5	39.5	38.9	38.8	-0.3 %
Male	40.1	40.2	40.1	39.6	39.4	-0.5 %
Female	38.0	37.9	38.1	37.4	37.8	1.1 %
15 - **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
Agriculture	-2.2	-1.5	-0.2	-0.7	-0.9	-0.2 pps
Building and construction	1.3	0.9	0.9	0.5	-1.1	-1.6 pps
Services	-1.8	-0.3	1.9	0.9	-0.1	-1.0 pps
Manufacturing industry	-2.4	-1.4	0.3	0.2	-1.1	-1.3 pps
16 - **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
Compensation per employee	0.3	3.2	4.3	5.8	5.3	-0.5 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP	-1.5	0.1	-1.3	:	:	: pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	1.8	1.2	6.8	4.7	4.8	0.1 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	1.7	1.2	5.4	4.8	5.1	0.3 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	-3.4	3.5	0.0	-1.0	-0.4	0.6 pps

Estonia	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2024-2023
1 - **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	1329	1330	1332	1366	1375	0.6 %
2 - **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	836	833	833	856	864	0.9 %
(% of total population)	62.9	62.6	62.5	62.7	62.8	0.2 pps
3 - **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	659	659	676	699	710	1.5 %
Male	341	340	347	352	357	1.5 %
Female	317	319	330	347	353	1.6 %
4 - **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	78.8	79.1	81.2	81.6	82.2	0.5 pps
Young (15-24)	41.9	40.3	44.9	43.7	43.8	0.1 pps
Prime age (25-54)	87.8	88.8	90.8	91.0	92.2	1.1 pps
Older (55-64)	76.5	76.6	77.4	80.7	80.9	0.2 pps
Nationals (15-64)	78.5	79.2	81.5	81.5	81.8	0.3 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	80.3	78.8	78.9	82.3	83.9	1.6 pps
Male	81.8	81.4	82.7	82.2	82.7	0.4 pps
Young (15-24)	42.9	40.6	41.4	41.0	41.0	0.0 pps
Prime age (25-54)	92.5	91.9	93.9	92.9	93.9	1.0 pps
Older (55-64)	74.3	76.0	75.9	78.3	78.5	0.1 pps
Female	75.8	76.8	79.6	81.0	81.7	0.6 pps
Young (15-24)	41.0	40.0	48.4	46.3	46.4	0.2 pps
Prime age (25-54)	83.0	85.4	87.4	89.1	90.3	1.2 pps
Older (55-64)	78.5	77.0	78.7	82.6	83.1	0.5 pps
5 - **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	73.2	74.0	76.4	76.2	75.7	-0.5 pps
Young (15-24)	34.2	33.5	36.5	36.1	35.4	-0.7 pps
Prime age (25-54)	82.5	84.0	86.5	85.9	85.8	-0.2 pps
Older (55-64)	71.3	71.6	73.8	76.0	75.7	-0.3 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	39.5	40.1	43.4	42.6	42.1	-0.5 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	76.5	76.0	79.2	78.5	78.6	0.1 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	84.6	87.1	88.1	89.7	89.2	-0.5 pps
Nationals (15-64)	73.3	74.7	77.2	76.6	76.1	-0.5 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	72.0	70.0	71.8	73.9	73.7	-0.2 pps
Male	75.8	75.6	77.5	77.1	76.2	-0.9 pps
Young (15-24)	35.0	33.1	32.7	33.4	33.3	-0.1 pps
Prime age (25-54)	87.0	86.6	89.2	88.1	87.6	-0.5 pps
Older (55-64)	68.4	70.2	71.6	74.0	72.7	-1.4 pps
Female	70.5	72.3	75.3	75.4	75.2	-0.2 pps
Young (15-24)	33.5	34.0	40.4	38.6	37.5	-1.1 pps
Prime age (25-54)	77.8	81.1	83.6	83.7	83.9	0.2 pps
Older (55-64)	74.0	72.9	75.5	77.6	78.4	0.8 pps
6 - **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	611.5	616.1	636.5	652.7	653.9	0.2 %
7 - **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	-2.7	0.1	4.6	3.2	0.2	-3.0 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	-2.3	0.8	3.3	2.5	0.2	-2.4 pps
Male	-2.5	-0.4	2.9	1.5	-0.2	-1.7 pps
Female	-2.1	1.9	3.8	3.6	0.6	-3.0 pps
8 - **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	10.5	10.6	10.1	10.8	11.9	1.1 pps
Male	14.5	14.8	13.8	14.3	16.4	2.1 pps
Female	6.2	6.3	6.3	7.1	7.2	0.1 pps
9 - **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	2.8	1.7	3.2	3.2	3.9	0.7 pps
Male	2.8	1.8	3.1	3.3	4.3	1.0 pps
Female	2.9	1.6	3.2	3.1	3.5	0.4 pps
10 - **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	12.3	12.2	13.2	13.5	13.5	0.0 pps
Male	8.1	7.6	8.1	8.9	9.3	0.4 pps
Female	16.8	16.9	18.5	18.1	17.8	-0.3 pps
11 **Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	0.8	1.9	2.1	2.0	2.5	0.5 pps
12 - **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	6.9	6.2	5.6	6.4	7.6	1.2 pps
Young (15-24)	18.5	16.7	18.6	17.3	19.1	1.8 pps
Prime age (25-49)	6.0	5.4	4.7	5.6	6.9	1.3 pps
Older (55-64)	6.7	6.4	4.7	5.8	6.4	0.6 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	13.8	15.0	12.6	13.1	15.2	2.1 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	7.6	7.1	6.2	7.8	8.7	0.9 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	4.9	3.6	3.8	3.6	4.9	1.3 pps
Nationals (15-64)	6.6	5.7	5.4	6.0	7.0	1.0 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	10.3	11.2	9.0	10.2	12.2	2.0 pps
Male	7.1	6.8	6.1	6.2	7.6	1.4 pps
Female	6.6	5.6	5.1	6.7	7.5	0.8 pps
13 - **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	17.4	25.1	22.2	20.1	23.5	3.4 pps
14 - **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	39.2	39.1	38.9	38.7	38.6	-0.3 %
Male	39.2	39.4	39.4	39.4	39.1	-0.8 %
Female	38.1	38.0	38.2	37.2	37.3	0.3 %
15 - **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
Agriculture	-10.3	-12.9	2.3	4.0	18.1	14.1 pps
Building and construction	0.8	-4.2	6.3	0.5	-0.2	-0.7 pps
Services	-5.7	0.4	6.0	5.5	3.7	-1.8 pps
Manufacturing industry	-2.5	-1.3	4.0	-2.2	-7.9	-5.7 pps
16 - **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
Compensation per employee	4.5	9.3	8.2	8.2	5.6	-2.6 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP	5.4	3.2	-6.9	:	:	: pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	1.5	6.3	9.9	10.2	7.1	-3.1 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	1.8	6.1	9.5	10.2	7.2	-3.0 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	-0.2	7.0	-4.3	-6.0	-0.5	5.5 pps

Ireland	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2024-2023
1 - **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	5034	5092	5200	5296	5385	1.7 %
2 - **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	3254	3330	3400	3473	3541	2.0 %
(% of total population)	64.6	65.4	65.4	65.6	65.7	0.2 pps
3 - **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	2339	2482	2610	2690	2758	2.5 %
Male	1253	1311	1376	1406	1437	2.2 %
Female	1086	1172	1233	1283	1321	2.9 %
4 - **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	71.9	74.6	76.8	77.5	77.9	0.4 pps
Young (15-24)	43.7	50.0	52.7	53.9	53.6	-0.3 pps
Prime age (25-54)	82.5	84.2	86.1	86.7	87.4	0.8 pps
Older (55-64)	64.4	66.5	69.2	69.9	70.2	0.3 pps
Nationals (15-64)	71.2	74.0	75.6	76.3	76.7	0.3 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	75.1	77.5	82.0	82.3	82.8	0.5 pps
Male	77.7	79.4	81.9	82.0	82.0	0.1 pps
Young (15-24)	44.3	50.1	53.1	53.6	53.9	0.3 pps
Prime age (25-54)	89.5	90.2	92.0	92.0	92.2	0.2 pps
Older (55-64)	72.7	73.6	77.7	78.2	78.0	-0.2 pps
Female	66.2	69.8	71.8	73.0	73.8	0.8 pps
Young (15-24)	43.1	49.8	52.3	54.2	53.3	-0.9 pps
Prime age (25-54)	75.6	78.4	80.3	81.5	82.8	1.3 pps
Older (55-64)	56.4	59.5	60.9	61.9	62.7	0.9 pps
5 - **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	67.7	69.8	73.3	74.0	74.5	0.4 pps
Young (15-24)	37.0	42.7	47.4	48.2	47.9	-0.2 pps
Prime age (25-54)	78.7	79.9	82.8	83.6	84.3	0.7 pps
Older (55-64)	61.8	62.9	66.9	67.7	68.1	0.4 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	35.4	36.1	38.9	39.0	37.5	-1.5 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	66.3	67.8	72.3	74.0	74.2	0.2 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	83.8	84.9	87.1	87.4	87.5	0.1 pps
Nationals (15-64)	67.4	69.4	72.3	73.1	73.6	0.5 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	69.6	71.8	77.6	78.0	78.0	0.0 pps
Male	73.2	74.3	78.2	78.2	78.4	0.1 pps
Young (15-24)	37.5	42.8	47.6	47.9	48.0	0.1 pps
Prime age (25-54)	85.3	85.4	88.6	88.6	88.9	0.4 pps
Older (55-64)	69.6	69.6	75.2	75.6	75.5	-0.1 pps
Female	62.4	65.5	68.4	69.9	70.6	0.7 pps
Young (15-24)	36.5	42.5	47.1	48.4	47.8	-0.6 pps
Prime age (25-54)	72.2	74.6	77.2	78.8	79.9	1.1 pps
Older (55-64)	54.3	56.4	58.8	60.0	60.8	0.8 pps
6 - **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	2203.9	2325.0	2490.9	2570.7	2636.3	2.6 %
7 - **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	-2.5	6.6	6.9	3.5	2.7	-0.8 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	-1.5	5.5	7.1	3.2	2.6	-0.7 pps
Male	-1.4	3.9	7.2	2.1	2.3	0.2 pps
Female	-1.7	7.3	7.0	4.4	2.8	-1.6 pps
8 - **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	12.3	11.4	11.7	11.1	10.9	-0.2 pps
Male	16.7	15.7	16.3	15.6	14.9	-0.7 pps
Female	7.2	6.5	6.5	6.3	6.5	0.2 pps
9 - **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	9.0	9.4	8.4	8.4	7.4	-1.0 pps
Male	8.4	9.1	7.6	7.5	6.7	-0.8 pps
Female	9.5	9.7	9.2	9.2	8.1	-1.1 pps
10 - **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	18.2	19.7	20.0	20.3	19.6	-0.7 pps
Male	9.6	10.9	10.9	11.2	11.5	0.3 pps
Female	28.2	29.5	30.2	30.3	28.5	-1.8 pps
11 **Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	2.5	2.5	2.0	1.9	1.6	-0.3 pps
12 - **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	5.9	6.2	4.5	4.3	4.3	0.0 pps
Young (15-24)	15.3	14.6	10.1	10.7	10.6	-0.1 pps
Prime age (25-49)	4.6	5.0	3.8	3.5	3.5	0.0 pps
Older (55-64)	4.0	5.4	3.3	3.2	3.1	-0.1 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	9.1	11.5	9.7	9.6	8.5	-1.1 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	7.1	8.0	5.3	5.1	5.2	0.1 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	4.2	4.3	3.1	2.9	3.2	0.3 pps
Nationals (15-64)	5.5	6.1	4.4	4.2	4.0	-0.2 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	7.3	7.5	5.4	5.2	5.8	0.6 pps
Male	5.8	6.3	4.4	4.4	4.3	-0.1 pps
Female	5.9	6.1	4.6	4.2	4.3	0.1 pps
13 - **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	23.7	29.8	30.7	27.4	23.2	-4.2 pps
14 - **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	40.8	40.6	40.7	40.1	39.5	-1.5 %
Male	41.4	41.1	40.9	40.4	39.8	-1.5 %
Female	36.9	37.2	37.0	36.6	36.2	-1.1 %
15 - **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
Agriculture	0.2	5.1	-5.0	3.8	0.7	-3.1 pps
Building and construction	-7.7	3.5	19.4	-1.1	2.9	4.0 pps
Services	-3.9	5.8	7.8	4.0	2.0	-1.9 pps
Manufacturing industry	3.1	7.3	2.3	-0.5	0.8	1.3 pps
16 - **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
Compensation per employee	2.9	2.9	2.5	6.8	3.5	-3.3 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP	5.0	2.2	-3.6	:	:	: pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	-3.6	4.2	10.1	6.1	6.3	0.2 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	3.4	4.6	3.7	4.7	6.1	1.4 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	9.9	9.1	1.6	-8.7	-1.4	7.3 pps

Greece	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2024-2023
1 - **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	10699	10640	10579	10548	10531	-0.2 %
2 - **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	6719	6678	6640	6601	6552	-0.8 %
(% of total population)	62.8	62.8	62.8	62.6	62.2	-0.4 pps
3 - **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	4526	4492	4609	4591	4618	0.6 %
Male	2514	2486	2559	2543	2558	0.6 %
Female	2013	2006	2050	2048	2060	0.6 %
4 - **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	67.4	67.3	69.4	69.5	70.5	0.9 pps
Young (15-24)	21.2	20.7	23.4	24.9	23.8	-1.1 pps
Prime age (25-54)	84.0	83.1	85.3	85.1	86.0	0.9 pps
Older (55-64)	50.8	54.4	57.1	58.0	61.7	3.7 pps
Nationals (15-64)	67.2	67.2	69.4	69.6	70.5	0.9 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	70.7	68.3	70.5	69.2	70.3	1.1 pps
Male	75.5	75.0	77.5	77.4	78.3	0.9 pps
Young (15-24)	23.1	22.6	25.4	26.8	25.6	-1.2 pps
Prime age (25-54)	91.6	90.6	92.9	92.6	93.9	1.2 pps
Older (55-64)	64.5	66.5	70.3	70.2	72.9	2.7 pps
Female	59.4	59.6	61.4	61.8	62.7	0.9 pps
Young (15-24)	19.3	18.8	21.5	23.1	22.1	-1.0 pps
Prime age (25-54)	76.3	75.4	77.4	77.3	77.8	0.5 pps
Older (55-64)	38.6	43.6	45.3	47.3	51.8	4.4 pps
5 - **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	56.3	57.2	60.7	61.8	63.3	1.5 pps
Young (15-24)	13.8	13.4	16.1	18.3	18.5	0.2 pps
Prime age (25-54)	70.4	71.1	75.0	75.7	77.3	1.6 pps
Older (55-64)	44.6	48.3	51.9	54.1	57.3	3.2 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	37.7	38.9	40.6	41.7	41.4	-0.3 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	54.8	55.0	58.8	60.3	62.4	2.1 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	74.5	75.1	78.5	79.1	80.3	1.2 pps
Nationals (15-64)	56.6	57.5	60.9	61.9	63.5	1.5 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	50.4	52.1	56.1	58.1	58.8	0.7 pps
Male	65.2	66.4	70.3	70.8	72.0	1.2 pps
Young (15-24)	15.9	15.6	19.0	20.2	20.2	-0.1 pps
Prime age (25-54)	79.7	80.8	84.8	85.0	86.4	1.4 pps
Older (55-64)	57.0	60.7	65.4	66.8	69.2	2.4 pps
Female	47.5	48.2	51.2	52.9	54.7	1.8 pps
Young (15-24)	11.7	11.1	13.1	16.3	16.8	0.5 pps
Prime age (25-54)	61.1	61.3	65.0	66.1	67.9	1.7 pps
Older (55-64)	33.5	37.3	39.9	42.8	46.7	3.8 pps
6 - **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	3780.3	3822.8	4030.2	4078.2	4145.9	1.7 %
7 - **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	-2.6	5.1	2.4	1.2	1.2	0.0 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	-1.2	1.1	5.4	1.2	1.7	0.5 pps
Male	-1.8	1.4	5.5	0.2	1.1	0.8 pps
Female	-0.3	0.7	5.4	2.5	2.5	0.0 pps
8 - **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	27.9	27.8	26.3	26.5	26.1	-0.4 pps
Male	32.9	33.2	31.6	32.1	31.8	-0.3 pps
Female	21.2	20.6	19.2	19.1	18.7	-0.4 pps
9 - **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	10.1	10.2	10.1	10.8	9.5	-1.3 pps
Male	8.8	8.3	8.1	8.8	7.7	-1.1 pps
Female	11.7	12.4	12.6	13.1	11.6	-1.5 pps
10 - **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	8.6	8.2	8.0	7.3	6.3	-1.0 pps
Male	5.5	5.0	4.9	4.0	3.3	-0.7 pps
Female	12.7	12.5	12.2	11.7	10.4	-1.3 pps
11 **Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	5.6	4.6	3.9	3.1	2.6	-0.6 pps
12 - **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	17.6	14.7	12.5	11.1	10.1	-1.0 pps
Young (15-24)	35.0	35.5	31.4	26.7	22.5	-4.2 pps
Prime age (25-49)	16.2	14.4	12.0	11.0	10.1	-0.9 pps
Older (55-64)	12.2	11.1	9.1	6.8	7.2	0.4 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	19.8	17.4	15.3	12.8	11.8	-1.0 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	18.6	17.1	14.5	12.9	11.9	-1.0 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	12.2	11.2	9.0	8.3	7.4	-0.9 pps
Nationals (15-64)	15.7	14.5	12.2	11.0	10.0	-1.0 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	28.7	23.7	20.4	15.9	16.3	0.4 pps
Male	14.6	11.4	9.3	8.5	8.0	-0.5 pps
Female	21.5	18.9	16.4	14.3	12.8	-1.5 pps
13 - **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	66.5	62.7	63.0	57.0	54.8	-2.2 pps
14 - **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	41.6	41.6	41.1	40.8	40.5	-0.7 %
Male	43.3	43.5	43.2	43.1	42.9	-0.5 %
Female	39.8	39.6	39.1	39.2	38.6	-1.5 %
15 - **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
Agriculture	-3.5	4.9	0.6	2.1	-2.5	-4.6 pps
Building and construction	0.5	-5.9	3.6	2.6	8.8	6.2 pps
Services	-5.3	8.0	3.5	1.4	2.2	0.8 pps
Manufacturing industry	0.0	7.9	2.6	2.6	0.5	-2.1 pps
16 - **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
Compensation per employee	-0.5	1.6	1.8	3.7	6.0	2.3 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP	0.3	2.2	-4.7	:	:	: pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	2.9	0.7	8.8	8.4	7.6	-0.8 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	3.0	1.0	8.9	8.1	6.8	-1.3 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	-6.8	3.4	3.2	1.1	1.0	-0.1 pps

Spain	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2024-2023
1 - **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	47345	47347	47781	48383	48832	0.9 %
2 - **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	31110	31209	31475	31909	32225	1.0 %
(% of total population)	65.7	65.9	65.9	66.0	66.0	0.0 pps
3 - **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	22475	23006	23295	23765	24045	1.2 %
Male	11961	12194	12360	12542	12705	1.3 %
Female	10513	10812	10935	11223	11340	1.0 %
4 - **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	72.2	73.7	74.0	74.5	74.6	0.1 pps
Young (15-24)	29.9	31.5	32.6	33.1	33.8	0.7 pps
Prime age (25-54)	85.5	86.9	87.2	87.6	87.5	0.0 pps
Older (55-64)	62.5	64.4	65.4	67.1	68.3	1.2 pps
Nationals (15-64)	72.1	73.6	73.9	74.4	74.6	0.2 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	73.5	74.6	74.7	75.1	74.8	-0.3 pps
Male	76.9	77.9	78.3	78.4	78.6	0.2 pps
Young (15-24)	32.2	33.2	34.5	35.1	36.3	1.2 pps
Prime age (25-54)	90.1	91.1	91.5	91.4	91.3	-0.2 pps
Older (55-64)	69.6	71.0	72.2	73.5	74.8	1.4 pps
Female	67.6	69.5	69.7	70.5	70.6	0.1 pps
Young (15-24)	27.5	29.8	30.5	30.9	31.2	0.2 pps
Prime age (25-54)	80.8	82.7	82.8	83.7	83.8	0.1 pps
Older (55-64)	55.7	58.1	58.9	61.1	62.0	1.0 pps
5 - **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	60.9	62.6	64.3	65.3	66.1	0.8 pps
Young (15-24)	18.5	20.5	22.9	23.6	24.9	1.3 pps
Prime age (25-54)	73.1	75.0	76.8	78.0	78.7	0.6 pps
Older (55-64)	54.7	55.8	57.7	59.5	61.1	1.6 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	49.5	48.9	50.5	51.6	52.2	0.7 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	57.6	59.1	60.8	61.6	62.2	0.6 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	78.2	79.6	81.1	81.9	82.4	0.5 pps
Nationals (15-64)	61.8	63.4	65.0	66.0	66.8	0.8 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	55.3	57.4	60.2	61.8	62.3	0.5 pps
Male	66.1	67.5	69.3	70.0	70.5	0.5 pps
Young (15-24)	20.3	21.9	24.6	25.0	26.9	1.9 pps
Prime age (25-54)	78.8	80.3	82.2	83.0	83.2	0.1 pps
Older (55-64)	61.6	62.7	64.7	66.3	68.0	1.7 pps
Female	55.7	57.7	59.2	60.7	61.6	0.9 pps
Young (15-24)	16.6	19.0	21.1	22.1	22.7	0.6 pps
Prime age (25-54)	67.4	69.7	71.3	73.0	74.1	1.1 pps
Older (55-64)	48.0	49.2	51.0	53.0	54.5	1.5 pps
6 - **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	18957.5	19546.2	20234.7	20851.5	21300.1	2.2 %
7 - **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	-4.4	2.6	3.5	3.0	2.2	-0.8 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	-3.1	3.1	3.5	3.0	2.2	-0.9 pps
Male	-3.1	2.7	3.5	2.3	1.9	-0.4 pps
Female	-3.1	3.6	3.5	3.9	2.5	-1.4 pps
8 - **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	15.3	15.0	14.5	14.4	14.0	-0.4 pps
Male	18.5	18.4	17.5	17.3	17.0	-0.3 pps
Female	11.4	11.0	11.0	11.1	10.7	-0.5 pps
9 - **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	24.2	25.4	21.4	17.3	16.0	-1.3 pps
Male	22.7	23.2	19.1	15.1	13.6	-1.5 pps
Female	25.7	27.7	23.9	19.6	18.5	-1.1 pps
10 - **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	13.9	13.7	13.4	13.1	13.4	0.3 pps
Male	6.5	6.3	6.4	6.4	6.5	0.1 pps
Female	22.6	22.4	21.6	21.0	21.3	0.3 pps
11 **Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	7.3	7.4	6.8	6.5	6.2	-0.2 pps
12 - **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	15.5	14.9	13.0	12.2	11.4	-0.8 pps
Young (15-24)	38.3	35.0	29.7	28.7	26.5	-2.2 pps
Prime age (25-49)	14.5	13.7	11.9	10.9	10.1	-0.8 pps
Older (55-64)	12.5	13.4	11.8	11.4	10.5	-0.9 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	21.9	21.7	19.5	18.1	17.1	-1.0 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	16.6	16.2	14.2	13.3	12.3	-1.0 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	10.3	9.4	7.8	7.4	6.9	-0.5 pps
Nationals (15-64)	14.2	13.8	12.1	11.3	10.4	-0.9 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	24.7	23.1	19.5	17.8	16.7	-1.1 pps
Male	13.9	13.2	11.4	10.7	10.2	-0.5 pps
Female	17.4	16.8	14.9	13.9	12.7	-1.2 pps
13 - **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	32.0	41.6	38.9	34.9	33.3	-1.6 pps
14 - **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	39.2	38.9	39.1	38.8	39.0	0.5 %
Male	39.3	39.0	39.0	38.7	38.7	0.0 %
Female	38.0	37.7	38.0	37.7	37.8	0.3 %
15 - **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
Agriculture	-5.8	3.5	-0.9	-2.6	-1.4	1.2 pps
Building and construction	-4.9	4.8	5.3	4.1	4.8	0.7 pps
Services	-6.5	2.1	5.6	4.1	2.4	-1.7 pps
Manufacturing industry	-4.1	-0.3	2.4	1.5	1.6	0.1 pps
16 - **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
Compensation per employee	0.8	4.8	4.9	5.8	5.0	-0.8 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP	0.1	1.8	-0.1	:	:	: pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	3.9	0.0	2.6	6.0	4.5	-1.5 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	3.1	0.5	3.2	5.3	4.3	-1.0 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	-6.8	4.0	2.6	-0.3	0.9	1.2 pps

France	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2024-2023
1 - **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	67627	67939	68197	68372	68552	0.3 %
2 - **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	40692	40558	40820	40931	41128	0.5 %
(% of total population)	60.2	59.7	59.9	59.9	60.0	0.1 pps
3 - **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	28902	29620	30029	30253	30654	1.3 %
Male	14846	15125	15329	15419	15684	1.7 %
Female	14056	14495	14700	14833	14970	0.9 %
4 - **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	71.0	73.0	73.6	73.9	74.5	0.6 pps
Young (15-24)	35.6	39.7	42.2	42.5	42.5	0.0 pps
Prime age (25-54)	86.9	88.0	88.2	88.3	88.6	0.3 pps
Older (55-64)	57.1	59.7	60.3	61.7	63.7	2.0 pps
Nationals (15-64)	71.5	73.6	74.2	74.5	75.1	0.6 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	65.5	66.5	66.6	67.4	68.2	0.8 pps
Male	74.5	76.2	76.6	76.8	77.5	0.8 pps
Young (15-24)	38.2	41.7	44.5	44.9	45.4	0.5 pps
Prime age (25-54)	91.5	92.3	92.3	92.1	92.4	0.3 pps
Older (55-64)	59.4	61.7	61.9	63.1	65.5	2.4 pps
Female	67.6	70.0	70.7	71.2	71.6	0.5 pps
Young (15-24)	33.1	37.7	39.9	40.0	39.5	-0.5 pps
Prime age (25-54)	82.6	84.0	84.3	84.6	85.0	0.3 pps
Older (55-64)	54.9	57.9	58.8	60.4	61.9	1.5 pps
5 - **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	65.3	67.2	68.1	68.4	69.0	0.5 pps
Young (15-24)	28.5	32.2	34.9	35.2	34.6	-0.6 pps
Prime age (25-54)	80.8	82.1	82.7	82.7	83.0	0.4 pps
Older (55-64)	53.8	55.9	56.9	58.4	60.4	1.9 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	38.8	38.0	38.8	38.7	38.5	-0.2 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	64.8	67.8	68.3	68.5	68.7	0.2 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	82.5	84.2	84.8	85.0	85.7	0.7 pps
Nationals (15-64)	66.1	68.1	69.0	69.3	69.9	0.6 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	55.7	57.2	58.1	59.1	59.3	0.2 pps
Male	68.5	70.1	70.8	71.0	71.6	0.7 pps
Young (15-24)	30.4	33.8	36.3	36.7	36.8	0.1 pps
Prime age (25-54)	85.0	86.0	86.6	86.4	86.6	0.2 pps
Older (55-64)	56.0	57.7	58.3	59.7	62.1	2.4 pps
Female	62.2	64.5	65.6	66.0	66.4	0.4 pps
Young (15-24)	26.5	30.6	33.5	33.6	32.2	-1.3 pps
Prime age (25-54)	76.7	78.3	79.0	79.1	79.6	0.5 pps
Older (55-64)	51.8	54.3	55.5	57.2	58.7	1.5 pps
6 - **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	26563.1	27273.9	27815.5	28012.0	28363.6	1.3 %
7 - **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	-0.1	2.6	2.3	1.1	0.8	-0.3 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	-0.6	2.7	2.0	0.7	1.3	0.5 pps
Male	-0.6	2.0	1.9	0.6	1.6	1.0 pps
Female	-0.5	3.4	2.1	0.8	0.9	0.1 pps
8 - **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	11.6	11.8	12.2	12.1	12.5	0.4 pps
Male	14.5	14.7	15.0	14.6	14.8	0.2 pps
Female	8.6	8.7	9.3	9.5	10.1	0.6 pps
9 - **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	15.3	15.0	16.1	15.5	15.3	-0.2 pps
Male	14.7	14.3	15.5	14.8	14.8	0.0 pps
Female	15.9	15.6	16.6	16.3	15.7	-0.6 pps
10 - **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	17.0	17.3	16.5	16.6	16.8	0.2 pps
Male	7.6	7.6	7.5	7.7	7.8	0.1 pps
Female	27.0	27.4	25.9	25.8	26.1	0.3 pps
11 **Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	6.5	4.9	4.3	4.0	3.8	-0.2 pps
12 - **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	8.0	7.9	7.3	7.3	7.4	0.1 pps
Young (15-24)	20.2	18.9	17.3	17.2	18.7	1.5 pps
Prime age (25-49)	7.1	6.8	6.2	6.4	6.3	-0.1 pps
Older (55-64)	5.8	6.3	5.7	5.4	5.2	-0.2 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	14.2	14.6	13.6	13.7	13.9	0.2 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	8.9	8.5	8.2	8.1	8.3	0.2 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	5.3	5.3	4.8	5.0	5.0	0.0 pps
Nationals (15-64)	7.6	7.5	6.9	7.0	7.0	0.0 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	14.9	14.0	12.7	12.3	12.9	0.6 pps
Male	8.1	8.0	7.5	7.5	7.5	0.0 pps
Female	8.0	7.8	7.1	7.2	7.2	0.0 pps
13 - **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	36.8	29.4	27.3	24.4	22.9	-1.5 pps
14 - **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	38.1	38.6	38.7	38.5	38.4	-0.3 %
Male	40.3	40.6	40.8	40.4	40.2	-0.5 %
Female	36.8	37.3	37.4	37.4	37.2	-0.5 %
15 - **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
Agriculture	-0.8	-1.8	0.3	-0.7	0.4	1.1 pps
Building and construction	3.3	4.2	1.9	0.3	-0.9	-1.2 pps
Services	-0.5	3.6	3.5	1.4	0.6	-0.8 pps
Manufacturing industry	-0.4	0.6	1.6	1.0	0.8	-0.2 pps
16 - **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
Compensation per employee	-3.5	5.0	5.0	4.1	3.2	-1.0 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP	-6.2	3.4	1.9	:	:	: pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	2.0	0.7	4.0	3.8	3.1	-0.7 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	3.1	1.0	4.0	4.0	2.7	-1.3 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	-7.4	4.2	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.1 pps

Croatia	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2024-2023
1 - **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	3950	3923	3918	3942	3938	-0.1 %
2 - **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	2477	2442	2420	2417	2422	0.2 %
(% of total population)	62.7	62.2	61.8	61.3	61.5	0.2 pps
3 - **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	1665	1685	1696	1695	1741	2.7 %
Male	894	897	896	893	917	2.7 %
Female	771	788	800	802	824	2.8 %
4 - **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	67.2	69.0	70.1	70.1	71.9	1.8 pps
Young (15-24)	32.8	33.2	34.0	31.4	31.0	-0.4 pps
Prime age (25-54)	83.9	85.4	85.8	86.3	88.6	2.2 pps
Older (55-64)	47.6	51.2	53.8	54.0	55.7	1.7 pps
Nationals (15-64)	67.2	69.0	70.0	70.1	71.8	1.8 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	57.5	66.7	80.0	75.9	78.8	3.0 pps
Male	72.7	73.9	74.1	73.6	74.9	1.3 pps
Young (15-24)	39.7	38.7	38.8	37.3	36.1	-1.2 pps
Prime age (25-54)	88.0	89.4	89.1	88.7	90.6	1.9 pps
Older (55-64)	55.9	57.9	59.3	58.4	59.1	0.7 pps
Female	61.8	64.2	66.0	66.6	68.8	2.2 pps
Young (15-24)	25.5	27.4	28.9	24.9	25.3	0.4 pps
Prime age (25-54)	80.0	81.4	82.5	83.9	86.4	2.4 pps
Older (55-64)	40.2	45.2	48.8	50.1	52.6	2.6 pps
5 - **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	62.2	63.8	65.3	65.8	68.3	2.5 pps
Young (15-24)	26.0	26.0	28.0	25.4	25.7	0.3 pps
Prime age (25-54)	78.4	79.6	80.5	81.7	84.7	3.0 pps
Older (55-64)	45.4	49.1	51.3	51.6	53.9	2.2 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	25.4	27.5	26.5	24.3	24.1	-0.1 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	64.9	66.2	68.0	67.7	70.5	2.8 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	83.6	84.7	85.1	86.5	87.2	0.7 pps
Nationals (15-64)	62.2	63.9	65.2	65.7	68.2	2.5 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	56.3	48.0	72.5	74.1	75.5	1.3 pps
Male	67.3	68.6	69.7	69.4	71.1	1.7 pps
Young (15-24)	32.3	31.6	33.1	31.0	30.4	-0.6 pps
Prime age (25-54)	82.1	83.5	84.3	84.3	86.5	2.2 pps
Older (55-64)	53.5	55.6	56.8	56.2	57.6	1.4 pps
Female	57.1	59.1	60.8	62.1	65.4	3.3 pps
Young (15-24)	19.5	20.2	22.5	19.4	20.7	1.3 pps
Prime age (25-54)	74.6	75.6	76.5	78.9	82.7	3.8 pps
Older (55-64)	38.0	43.2	46.3	47.5	50.5	2.9 pps
6 - **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	1540.8	1558.6	1579.2	1589.3	1652.9	4.0 %
7 - **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	-1.0	1.2	2.2	2.2	6.1	3.9 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	-1.3	1.2	1.3	0.6	4.0	3.4 pps
Male	-0.9	0.6	1.1	-0.1	3.4	3.4 pps
Female	-1.8	1.8	1.6	1.4	4.7	3.3 pps
8 - **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	10.9	11.1	11.9	12.1	11.8	-0.3 pps
Male	14.2	14.8	15.7	16.0	15.7	-0.4 pps
Female	7.1	6.8	7.7	7.8	7.6	-0.2 pps
9 - **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	15.1	13.3	14.3	11.1	9.0	-2.1 pps
Male	14.3	11.7	12.1	9.5	7.6	-1.9 pps
Female	16.0	15.0	16.6	12.8	10.4	-2.4 pps
10 - **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	4.5	4.7	4.7	3.7	3.0	-0.7 pps
Male	3.1	3.6	3.6	3.0	2.2	-0.8 pps
Female	6.1	5.9	6.0	4.5	3.8	-0.7 pps
11 **Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	1.3	1.7	1.5	1.1	0.6	-0.5 pps
12 - **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	7.4	7.5	6.8	6.1	5.0	-1.1 pps
Young (15-24)	20.6	21.5	17.7	18.9	16.8	-2.1 pps
Prime age (25-49)	6.7	6.8	6.2	5.4	4.4	-1.0 pps
Older (55-64)	4.8	4.1	4.7	4.4	3.3	-1.1 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	10.6	11.4	11.9	12.4	11.4	-1.0 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	8.1	8.3	7.2	6.9	5.5	-1.4 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	5.2	4.7	5.1	3.7	3.3	-0.4 pps
Nationals (15-64)	7.5	7.5	6.9	6.3	5.1	-1.2 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	0.0	27.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0 pps
Male	7.3	7.1	5.9	5.7	5.0	-0.7 pps
Female	7.5	8.0	7.9	6.7	5.0	-1.7 pps
13 - **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	28.7	36.8	35.4	35.3	38.0	2.7 pps
14 - **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	39.1	39.0	38.8	38.7	38.3	-1.0 %
Male	39.5	39.6	39.4	39.2	38.8	-1.0 %
Female	38.8	38.5	38.2	38.2	37.8	-1.0 %
15 - **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
Agriculture	4.4	3.0	-9.5	-16.1	13.0	29.1 pps
Building and construction	7.1	6.1	1.6	5.1	5.6	0.5 pps
Services	-1.6	-0.8	6.0	3.4	10.4	7.0 pps
Manufacturing industry	-3.0	1.4	1.3	-1.4	0.6	2.0 pps
16 - **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
Compensation per employee	1.0	6.1	12.3	15.9	11.2	-4.6 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP	0.4	4.2	2.6	:	:	: pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	-2.6	2.7	9.4	13.9	11.6	-2.3 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	-1.7	2.7	9.4	13.9	11.6	-2.3 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	-7.4	11.3	5.0	1.1	-2.0	-3.1 pps

Italy		2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2024-2023
1	- **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	59439	59133	59014	58984	58967	0.0 %
2	- **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	37798	37526	37266	37143	37230	0.2 %
	(% of total population)	63.6	63.5	63.1	63.0	63.1	0.2 pps
3	- **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	24220	24198	24421	24766	24798	0.1 %
	Male	13860	13782	13896	14074	14106	0.2 %
	Female	10360	10416	10526	10692	10692	0.0 %
4	- **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	64.1	64.5	65.5	66.7	66.6	-0.1 pps
	Young (15-24)	23.8	24.9	26.0	26.4	24.7	-1.6 pps
	Prime age (25-54)	76.5	77.3	78.6	79.7	79.6	-0.1 pps
	Older (55-64)	56.8	56.5	57.8	60.1	61.3	1.3 pps
	Nationals (15-64)	63.9	64.1	65.2	66.4	66.3	-0.1 pps
	Non-nationals (15-64)	66.1	67.6	68.9	69.6	69.4	-0.2 pps
	Male	73.6	73.6	74.6	75.7	75.6	-0.1 pps
	Young (15-24)	28.4	29.4	30.1	30.8	29.7	-1.1 pps
	Prime age (25-54)	87.0	87.3	88.6	89.4	89.1	-0.3 pps
	Older (55-64)	67.7	67.2	68.6	71.0	72.7	1.7 pps
	Female	54.7	55.4	56.4	57.7	57.6	-0.1 pps
	Young (15-24)	18.9	20.1	21.5	21.6	19.4	-2.2 pps
	Prime age (25-54)	66.1	67.3	68.5	69.9	70.1	0.2 pps
	Older (55-64)	46.6	46.5	47.6	49.6	50.5	0.9 pps
5	- **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	58.1	58.2	60.1	61.5	62.2	0.7 pps
	Young (15-24)	16.7	17.5	19.8	20.4	19.7	-0.7 pps
	Prime age (25-54)	69.6	70.2	72.4	73.8	74.5	0.7 pps
	Older (55-64)	54.0	53.4	55.0	57.3	59.0	1.7 pps
	Low-skilled (15-64)	42.8	42.7	44.4	44.6	44.9	0.3 pps
	Medium-skilled (15-64)	63.8	63.7	65.8	66.8	67.2	0.4 pps
	High-skilled (15-64)	78.2	79.2	80.6	81.6	82.2	0.6 pps
	Nationals (15-64)	58.1	58.3	60.1	61.5	62.2	0.7 pps
	Non-nationals (15-64)	57.3	57.8	60.6	61.6	62.3	0.7 pps
	Male	67.2	67.1	69.2	70.4	71.1	0.7 pps
	Young (15-24)	20.4	21.3	23.4	24.3	24.0	-0.3 pps
	Prime age (25-54)	80.1	80.2	82.7	83.7	84.1	0.4 pps
	Older (55-64)	64.2	63.4	65.3	67.8	70.1	2.2 pps
	Female	49.0	49.4	51.1	52.5	53.3	0.7 pps
	Young (15-24)	12.8	13.5	16.0	16.2	15.1	-1.1 pps
	Prime age (25-54)	59.2	60.1	62.0	63.8	64.9	1.1 pps
	Older (55-64)	44.3	44.0	45.2	47.2	48.5	1.3 pps
6	- **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	21943.4	21849.2	22412.5	22834.9	23150.0	1.4 %
7	- **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	-2.0	1.0	1.9	1.9	1.6	-0.3 pps
	Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	-2.3	-0.4	2.6	1.9	1.4	-0.5 pps
	Male	-1.8	-0.8	2.6	1.6	1.2	-0.4 pps
	Female	-3.0	0.1	2.6	2.2	1.6	-0.6 pps
8	- **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	20.2	19.6	19.5	19.3	19.1	-0.1 pps
	Male	24.3	23.6	23.3	22.9	22.9	-0.1 pps
	Female	14.7	14.2	14.4	14.3	14.1	-0.2 pps
9	- **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	15.1	16.6	16.9	16.1	14.8	-1.3 pps
	Male	14.8	15.8	15.7	14.8	13.5	-1.3 pps
	Female	15.5	17.4	18.3	17.7	16.3	-1.4 pps
10	- **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	18.2	18.2	17.9	17.6	16.8	-0.8 pps
	Male	8.0	8.4	7.7	7.4	7.0	-0.4 pps
	Female	32.1	31.5	31.7	31.4	29.9	-1.5 pps
11	**Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	12.0	11.4	10.4	9.6	8.6	-1.0 pps
12	- **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	9.3	9.5	8.1	7.7	6.5	-1.2 pps
	Young (15-24)	29.7	29.7	23.7	22.7	20.3	-2.4 pps
	Prime age (25-49)	9.0	9.2	7.9	7.5	6.4	-1.1 pps
	Older (55-64)	5.0	5.5	4.8	4.6	3.8	-0.8 pps
	Low-skilled (15-64)	13.3	13.7	12.0	11.7	10.0	-1.7 pps
	Medium-skilled (15-64)	8.8	9.3	7.9	7.5	6.5	-1.0 pps
	High-skilled (15-64)	5.5	5.2	4.2	3.9	3.4	-0.5 pps
	Nationals (15-64)	9.0	9.1	7.8	7.4	6.2	-1.2 pps
	Non-nationals (15-64)	13.2	14.5	12.0	11.5	10.2	-1.3 pps
	Male	8.6	8.7	7.1	6.8	5.9	-0.9 pps
	Female	10.4	10.6	9.4	8.8	7.3	-1.5 pps
13	- **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	53.4	58.0	58.4	56.0	52.1	-3.9 pps
14	- **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	38.8	39.2	39.2	39.1	38.8	-0.8 %
	Male	39.8	40.3	40.6	40.5	39.9	-1.5 %
	Female	36.5	36.8	36.9	36.9	36.7	-0.5 %
15	- **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
	Agriculture	-2.1	-0.2	0.3	-1.5	0.5	2.0 pps
	Building and construction	1.6	5.5	6.7	1.3	3.8	2.5 pps
	Services	-3.5	0.7	2.7	2.8	1.8	-1.0 pps
	Manufacturing industry	-2.1	0.2	1.4	1.7	0.6	-1.1 pps
16	- **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
	Compensation per employee	-4.0	6.8	3.7	2.9	3.4	0.4 pps
	Real compensation per employee based on GDP	-5.6	5.1	1.1	:	:	: pps
	Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	3.9	-1.3	2.1	3.0	3.2	0.2 pps
	Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	4.3	-1.0	2.2	2.8	3.1	0.3 pps
	Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	-7.0	7.9	2.8	-1.2	-0.9	0.3 pps

Cyprus	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2024-2023
1 - **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	908	922	939	958	973	1.6 %
2 - **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	586	595	606	616	623	1.1 %
(% of total population)	64.5	64.5	64.5	64.3	64.0	-0.3 pps
3 - **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	451	462	480	493	495	0.5 %
Male	238	240	246	251	253	1.1 %
Female	213	222	234	242	242	0.0 %
4 - **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	76.9	77.7	79.2	80.0	79.5	-0.5 pps
Young (15-24)	38.0	40.7	41.5	42.1	40.7	-1.4 pps
Prime age (25-54)	87.9	88.0	89.5	90.0	88.9	-1.1 pps
Older (55-64)	64.4	65.9	68.1	70.1	72.6	2.5 pps
Nationals (15-64)	76.6	77.0	78.6	79.1	79.4	0.3 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	78.0	80.0	81.3	82.4	79.7	-2.7 pps
Male	83.2	83.5	84.2	84.4	84.3	0.0 pps
Young (15-24)	41.1	43.3	42.4	43.7	42.1	-1.5 pps
Prime age (25-54)	93.4	93.1	94.0	94.3	93.8	-0.5 pps
Older (55-64)	76.9	78.2	79.7	78.6	81.2	2.6 pps
Female	70.9	72.3	74.6	75.9	75.0	-0.9 pps
Young (15-24)	34.8	38.4	40.6	40.5	39.2	-1.3 pps
Prime age (25-54)	82.8	83.3	85.4	86.1	84.4	-1.6 pps
Older (55-64)	52.8	54.2	57.2	62.2	64.5	2.3 pps
5 - **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	70.9	72.0	74.1	75.2	75.5	0.3 pps
Young (15-24)	31.3	33.7	34.0	35.2	35.4	0.2 pps
Prime age (25-54)	81.5	82.0	84.4	85.2	84.7	-0.4 pps
Older (55-64)	60.4	62.2	64.9	67.0	70.4	3.4 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	49.5	48.7	49.6	49.4	51.6	2.3 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	69.2	70.4	73.4	74.9	74.2	-0.7 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	83.3	83.8	85.1	85.4	85.8	0.5 pps
Nationals (15-64)	70.9	71.8	74.0	74.8	75.9	1.1 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	71.0	72.7	74.7	76.3	74.6	-1.7 pps
Male	76.6	77.4	79.2	79.3	80.3	1.0 pps
Young (15-24)	31.9	35.2	34.7	35.6	37.0	1.4 pps
Prime age (25-54)	86.8	86.8	89.1	89.6	89.6	0.0 pps
Older (55-64)	72.0	74.2	75.7	74.9	78.9	4.0 pps
Female	65.5	66.9	69.4	71.4	71.1	-0.3 pps
Young (15-24)	30.6	32.1	33.2	34.8	33.7	-1.0 pps
Prime age (25-54)	76.5	77.6	80.0	81.2	80.3	-1.0 pps
Older (55-64)	49.6	51.0	54.6	59.7	62.3	2.6 pps
6 - **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	415.5	428.3	448.9	463.2	470.6	1.6 %
7 - **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	-0.4	2.9	4.0	1.4	2.0	0.6 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	1.0	3.1	4.8	3.2	1.6	-1.6 pps
Male	1.7	1.8	3.9	1.9	2.4	0.5 pps
Female	0.3	4.5	5.9	4.5	0.8	-3.8 pps
8 - **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	12.3	10.2	9.9	9.4	8.8	-0.6 pps
Male	14.8	12.1	10.9	10.5	10.1	-0.4 pps
Female	9.5	8.0	8.8	8.3	7.4	-0.9 pps
9 - **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	13.6	13.2	12.0	13.7	14.1	0.4 pps
Male	9.4	9.2	8.2	10.9	10.3	-0.6 pps
Female	18.0	17.3	15.9	16.5	17.9	1.4 pps
10 - **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	9.9	10.3	9.5	8.3	7.9	-0.4 pps
Male	6.8	8.2	7.4	5.8	5.3	-0.5 pps
Female	13.4	12.6	11.9	10.9	10.6	-0.3 pps
11 **Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	5.5	4.8	4.7	4.0	3.4	-0.6 pps
12 - **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	7.6	7.2	6.3	5.8	4.9	-0.9 pps
Young (15-24)	17.6	17.3	18.1	16.6	13.0	-3.6 pps
Prime age (25-49)	7.3	6.8	5.7	5.3	4.7	-0.6 pps
Older (55-64)	6.2	5.7	4.7	4.4	3.0	-1.4 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	8.1	8.6	7.7	7.0	6.0	-1.0 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	8.8	8.5	7.2	6.4	5.9	-0.5 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	6.8	6.2	5.5	5.4	4.0	-1.4 pps
Nationals (15-64)	7.4	6.8	5.9	5.4	4.4	-1.0 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	9.0	9.1	8.1	7.5	6.5	-1.0 pps
Male	7.7	7.0	5.8	5.8	4.6	-1.2 pps
Female	7.5	7.3	6.8	5.9	5.1	-0.8 pps
13 - **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	29.5	35.5	33.1	31.1	27.4	-3.7 pps
14 - **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	39.1	39.4	39.4	39.8	39.2	-1.5 %
Male	40.4	40.5	40.9	41.2	40.5	-1.7 %
Female	38.2	38.3	38.0	38.4	38.0	-1.0 %
15 - **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
Agriculture	2.0	0.7	1.2	0.5	1.4	0.9 pps
Building and construction	7.2	3.1	2.9	1.3	1.5	0.2 pps
Services	-3.2	3.7	5.5	1.3	1.7	0.5 pps
Manufacturing industry	-1.6	2.8	3.5	2.0	1.8	-0.2 pps
16 - **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
Compensation per employee	0.5	4.6	7.3	5.0	4.5	-0.5 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP	0.9	1.6	-4.7	:	:	: pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	-2.2	1.2	8.5	5.7	5.5	-0.2 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	-2.6	1.1	8.0	5.7	5.1	-0.6 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	-2.9	8.2	3.0	1.3	1.4	0.1 pps

Latvia	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2024-2023
1 - **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	1901	1885	1886	1882	1861	-1.1 %
2 - **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	1190	1177	1178	1166	1159	-0.6 %
(% of total population)	62.6	62.4	62.5	62.0	62.3	0.3 pps
3 - **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	931	892	904	894	889	-0.5 %
Male	469	454	455	451	449	-0.5 %
Female	461	438	449	443	440	-0.6 %
4 - **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	78.2	75.8	76.8	76.6	76.7	0.1 pps
Young (15-24)	34.8	32.7	36.2	35.0	34.6	-0.4 pps
Prime age (25-54)	89.3	87.1	87.7	87.6	87.8	0.2 pps
Older (55-64)	74.7	72.2	73.7	75.5	76.8	1.3 pps
Nationals (15-64)	78.2	76.1	76.8	76.6	76.7	0.1 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	78.0	74.2	76.2	77.1	76.7	-0.4 pps
Male	80.7	78.8	79.1	79.0	78.9	0.0 pps
Young (15-24)	38.0	35.3	39.1	37.0	35.9	-1.1 pps
Prime age (25-54)	92.0	90.9	90.9	91.0	91.2	0.2 pps
Older (55-64)	76.8	73.2	73.4	75.3	76.8	1.4 pps
Female	75.8	73.0	74.5	74.4	74.6	0.2 pps
Young (15-24)	31.5	30.0	33.1	32.7	33.0	0.3 pps
Prime age (25-54)	86.6	83.3	84.4	84.3	84.5	0.2 pps
Older (55-64)	72.9	71.4	74.0	75.6	76.8	1.3 pps
5 - **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	71.6	69.9	71.3	71.5	71.2	-0.3 pps
Young (15-24)	29.7	27.9	30.6	30.6	29.8	-0.8 pps
Prime age (25-54)	82.2	80.4	81.8	82.0	81.8	-0.2 pps
Older (55-64)	68.6	67.8	69.5	70.9	71.9	1.0 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	35.3	31.7	32.4	33.8	32.3	-1.6 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	72.4	69.9	72.3	72.5	72.7	0.1 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	86.3	85.7	86.6	87.5	87.5	0.0 pps
Nationals (15-64)	71.9	70.4	71.6	71.6	71.4	-0.1 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	69.8	65.9	68.8	71.0	69.5	-1.5 pps
Male	73.1	71.9	72.5	72.7	72.3	-0.4 pps
Young (15-24)	32.5	30.1	31.5	31.7	31.2	-0.5 pps
Prime age (25-54)	83.8	82.9	84.0	84.3	83.8	-0.4 pps
Older (55-64)	69.5	68.5	68.2	69.9	70.7	0.9 pps
Female	70.2	68.0	70.2	70.2	70.0	-0.2 pps
Young (15-24)	26.7	25.5	29.8	29.5	28.4	-1.1 pps
Prime age (25-54)	80.6	77.9	79.6	79.8	79.7	-0.1 pps
Older (55-64)	67.9	67.1	70.5	71.6	72.8	1.1 pps
6 - **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	852.2	822.0	840.0	833.4	824.6	-1.1 %
7 - **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	-0.7	-1.3	0.2	0.1	-0.9	-1.0 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	-2.1	-3.5	2.2	-0.8	-1.1	-0.3 pps
Male	-2.1	-2.6	0.8	-0.4	-1.0	-0.6 pps
Female	-2.1	-4.4	3.6	-1.2	-1.1	0.0 pps
8 - **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	12.2	12.2	12.6	12.5	12.6	0.1 pps
Male	14.0	14.6	15.0	15.1	15.0	0.0 pps
Female	10.5	9.8	10.2	10.0	10.2	0.3 pps
9 - **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	2.8	2.8	2.7	2.6	2.3	-0.3 pps
Male	3.0	3.3	3.1	3.1	2.7	-0.4 pps
Female	2.6	2.3	2.4	2.2	1.9	-0.3 pps
10 - **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	8.9	7.8	6.6	6.8	7.0	0.2 pps
Male	6.5	5.6	4.2	4.7	4.9	0.2 pps
Female	11.3	10.0	8.9	8.9	9.1	0.2 pps
11 **Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	2.1	2.7	2.1	1.8	2.0	0.1 pps
12 - **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	8.1	7.6	6.9	6.5	6.9	0.4 pps
Young (15-24)	14.9	14.8	15.3	12.3	13.6	1.3 pps
Prime age (25-49)	7.9	7.8	6.7	6.4	6.9	0.5 pps
Older (55-64)	8.1	6.2	5.7	6.1	6.4	0.3 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	18.9	15.1	15.2	13.5	15.6	2.1 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	9.1	9.3	8.2	8.3	8.5	0.2 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	5.3	4.8	4.2	3.5	4.2	0.7 pps
Nationals (15-64)	8.1	7.4	6.8	6.6	6.9	0.3 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	10.5	11.2	9.6	7.9	9.4	1.5 pps
Male	9.1	8.5	8.1	7.6	8.0	0.4 pps
Female	7.1	6.6	5.6	5.4	5.8	0.4 pps
13 - **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	27.4	30.1	28.9	27.2	32.2	5.0 pps
14 - **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	39.3	39.5	39.7	39.6	39.5	-0.3 %
Male	39.5	39.8	39.9	39.8	39.7	-0.3 %
Female	38.9	39.1	39.6	39.2	39.3	0.3 %
15 - **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
Agriculture	10.4	1.6	-1.8	1.9	-1.2	-3.1 pps
Building and construction	-1.1	-3.8	2.4	1.2	-5.8	-7.0 pps
Services	-2.8	-2.0	0.7	0.0	-0.8	-0.8 pps
Manufacturing industry	-0.6	1.3	-0.1	-2.4	-3.4	-1.0 pps
16 - **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
Compensation per employee	2.7	7.6	13.1	15.6	9.1	-6.5 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP	2.2	4.6	0.4	:	:	: pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	5.7	3.1	8.3	11.3	12.3	1.0 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	5.9	4.1	7.5	11.5	12.3	0.8 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	-2.8	8.3	1.6	2.7	0.5	-2.2 pps

Lithuania	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2024-2023
1 - **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	2810	2808	2832	2872	2888	0.6 %
2 - **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	1812	1808	1836	1870	1881	0.6 %
(% of total population)	64.5	64.4	64.9	65.1	65.1	0.0 pps
3 - **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	1423	1414	1444	1473	1496	1.5 %
Male	719	717	712	741	767	3.5 %
Female	704	698	732	732	729	-0.4 %
4 - **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	78.5	78.2	78.6	78.8	79.5	0.7 pps
Young (15-24)	36.6	36.3	36.3	35.8	36.8	1.0 pps
Prime age (25-54)	90.4	90.1	90.1	90.1	90.9	0.8 pps
Older (55-64)	75.0	74.0	74.9	75.3	75.6	0.3 pps
Nationals (15-64)	78.5	78.2	78.6	78.7	79.5	0.8 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	81.4	77.8	81.1	80.9	79.8	-1.1 pps
Male	79.9	79.2	79.2	79.8	80.7	1.0 pps
Young (15-24)	38.9	38.2	36.5	36.1	39.0	2.9 pps
Prime age (25-54)	91.4	91.0	91.2	91.5	92.0	0.5 pps
Older (55-64)	76.6	74.1	74.7	75.3	75.7	0.4 pps
Female	77.2	77.2	78.0	77.8	78.3	0.5 pps
Young (15-24)	34.2	34.3	36.1	35.5	34.4	-1.1 pps
Prime age (25-54)	89.4	89.2	89.0	88.7	89.7	1.1 pps
Older (55-64)	73.6	74.1	75.1	75.3	75.5	0.2 pps
5 - **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	71.6	72.4	73.8	73.2	73.6	0.5 pps
Young (15-24)	29.4	31.1	32.0	30.8	30.8	0.0 pps
Prime age (25-54)	83.7	84.3	85.2	84.6	85.3	0.7 pps
Older (55-64)	67.6	68.0	69.7	69.0	69.1	0.0 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	22.7	25.1	23.8	24.4	24.9	0.6 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	68.4	69.3	71.7	71.0	71.2	0.2 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	89.5	89.3	89.7	89.4	90.2	0.8 pps
Nationals (15-64)	71.6	72.5	73.7	73.1	73.6	0.5 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	77.1	71.0	74.5	75.6	73.3	-2.3 pps
Male	72.2	72.9	73.9	73.7	74.2	0.5 pps
Young (15-24)	30.5	32.8	31.6	29.9	32.8	2.9 pps
Prime age (25-54)	84.0	84.6	85.8	85.9	85.9	0.0 pps
Older (55-64)	68.4	67.6	69.3	68.0	67.8	-0.2 pps
Female	71.0	71.9	73.6	72.6	73.0	0.4 pps
Young (15-24)	28.3	29.3	32.3	31.9	28.8	-3.1 pps
Prime age (25-54)	83.4	83.9	84.6	83.2	84.6	1.4 pps
Older (55-64)	66.9	68.4	70.1	69.9	70.1	0.2 pps
6 - **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	1297.6	1309.8	1354.4	1368.0	1384.7	1.2 %
7 - **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	-1.6	1.3	4.9	1.4	1.7	0.3 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	-2.0	0.9	3.4	1.0	1.2	0.2 pps
Male	-0.9	1.6	0.6	3.2	2.9	-0.3 pps
Female	-3.1	0.3	6.3	-1.1	-0.5	0.6 pps
8 - **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	11.1	10.7	11.5	11.1	11.0	-0.1 pps
Male	14.4	12.9	13.5	13.8	13.9	0.0 pps
Female	7.7	8.5	9.6	8.4	8.1	-0.3 pps
9 - **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	1.2	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.6	-0.3 pps
Male	1.4	1.9	1.8	1.9	1.7	-0.2 pps
Female	1.1	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.6	-0.3 pps
10 - **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	6.1	6.0	5.7	5.9	6.1	0.2 pps
Male	4.8	4.3	3.9	4.0	4.6	0.6 pps
Female	7.5	7.6	7.4	7.7	7.7	0.0 pps
11 **Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	1.8	1.5	1.1	0.9	1.3	0.3 pps
12 - **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	8.5	7.1	6.0	6.9	7.1	0.2 pps
Young (15-24)	19.6	14.3	11.9	13.8	16.2	2.4 pps
Prime age (25-49)	7.4	6.5	5.4	6.2	6.2	0.0 pps
Older (55-64)	9.9	8.2	6.9	8.3	8.7	0.4 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	23.3	16.9	16.8	18.5	17.6	-0.9 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	11.9	9.7	8.0	9.4	9.8	0.4 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	4.2	4.2	3.6	3.9	4.3	0.4 pps
Nationals (15-64)	8.9	7.4	6.2	7.1	7.4	0.3 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	0.0	8.5	8.1	6.5	8.4	1.9 pps
Male	9.3	7.6	6.5	7.3	7.8	0.5 pps
Female	7.7	6.6	5.5	6.4	6.5	0.1 pps
13 - **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	29.0	36.7	38.9	33.3	32.6	-0.7 pps
14 - **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	39.1	39.5	39.0	38.7	39.3	1.6 %
Male	39.6	39.9	39.6	39.7	39.6	-0.3 %
Female	38.7	39.2	38.6	38.5	38.3	-0.5 %
15 - **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
Agriculture	-11.7	-5.3	5.2	-6.3	-2.5	3.8 pps
Building and construction	-4.9	3.2	12.8	1.0	2.4	1.4 pps
Services	-0.7	2.2	5.1	4.0	-0.1	-4.1 pps
Manufacturing industry	-1.3	5.5	-0.6	2.1	2.2	0.1 pps
16 - **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
Compensation per employee	6.6	11.8	11.6	11.9	9.1	-2.8 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP	4.7	5.0	-4.4	:	:	: pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	6.1	12.3	13.7	12.5	9.8	-2.7 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	9.9	10.6	13.8	12.5	9.7	-2.8 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	1.6	5.0	-2.3	-1.1	1.0	2.1 pps

Luxembourg	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2024-2023
1 - **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	631	641	655	668	678	1.6 %
2 - **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	431	437	440	452	459	1.6 %
(% of total population)	68.3	68.1	67.2	67.7	67.7	0.0 pps
3 - **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	311	320	324	335	342	2.1 %
Male	166	170	172	179	181	1.1 %
Female	146	150	152	157	162	3.1 %
4 - **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	72.2	73.2	73.5	74.2	74.5	0.4 pps
Young (15-24)	32.4	35.3	33.5	35.7	37.3	1.6 pps
Prime age (25-54)	89.1	89.2	89.9	90.5	89.9	-0.6 pps
Older (55-64)	45.9	48.8	48.7	48.3	51.0	2.6 pps
Nationals (15-64)	67.4	69.0	69.2	69.0	69.6	0.6 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	76.8	77.4	77.6	79.1	79.2	0.2 pps
Male	75.4	76.4	76.4	77.5	77.2	-0.3 pps
Young (15-24)	33.8	36.2	32.0	37.9	39.7	1.8 pps
Prime age (25-54)	92.9	92.5	92.7	93.9	92.5	-1.4 pps
Older (55-64)	49.7	54.5	56.6	53.1	55.0	1.9 pps
Female	68.7	69.9	70.4	70.7	71.7	1.0 pps
Young (15-24)	30.9	34.4	35.1	33.3	34.7	1.4 pps
Prime age (25-54)	85.3	85.9	86.9	86.9	87.2	0.3 pps
Older (55-64)	41.8	42.8	40.4	43.3	46.7	3.4 pps
5 - **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	67.2	69.4	70.1	70.3	69.7	-0.6 pps
Young (15-24)	24.9	29.4	27.5	29.0	29.2	0.2 pps
Prime age (25-54)	84.0	85.4	86.8	86.8	85.0	-1.8 pps
Older (55-64)	44.1	46.5	46.5	46.4	49.4	3.0 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	44.0	46.5	47.1	48.7	43.4	-5.3 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	66.7	66.9	65.8	66.1	65.4	-0.7 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	83.2	84.1	85.0	84.4	84.7	0.2 pps
Nationals (15-64)	64.2	66.1	66.1	65.7	65.7	0.0 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	70.2	72.5	74.0	74.7	73.6	-1.1 pps
Male	70.4	72.6	73.0	73.7	72.2	-1.5 pps
Young (15-24)	25.2	29.8	26.7	32.0	29.9	-2.1 pps
Prime age (25-54)	88.0	89.1	89.5	90.2	87.6	-2.6 pps
Older (55-64)	47.2	51.5	54.1	50.5	53.4	2.9 pps
Female	63.9	66.0	67.1	66.8	67.2	0.4 pps
Young (15-24)	24.3	28.9	28.4	25.9	28.5	2.6 pps
Prime age (25-54)	80.0	81.6	83.9	83.3	82.3	-1.0 pps
Older (55-64)	40.5	41.5	38.5	42.0	45.4	3.4 pps
6 - **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	290.0	302.8	308.7	317.7	320.1	0.8 %
7 - **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	1.8	2.9	3.3	2.1	1.1	-1.0 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	0.9	4.4	1.9	2.9	0.8	-2.2 pps
Male	-0.4	4.5	1.5	3.4	-0.6	-4.0 pps
Female	2.5	4.4	2.4	2.4	2.3	-0.1 pps
8 - **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	7.8	8.3	8.6	8.0	8.2	0.2 pps
Male	9.0	9.1	9.0	8.0	8.7	0.6 pps
Female	6.4	7.4	8.2	8.0	7.6	-0.4 pps
9 - **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	7.7	9.2	7.3	7.5	9.5	2.0 pps
Male	7.1	8.3	6.9	6.8	8.9	2.1 pps
Female	8.3	10.1	7.8	8.2	10.1	1.9 pps
10 - **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	18.1	18.1	18.3	18.3	17.5	-0.8 pps
Male	6.8	7.0	7.1	8.5	7.4	-1.1 pps
Female	31.0	30.9	30.9	29.7	28.8	-0.9 pps
11 **Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	2.1	1.7	1.9	1.9	1.9	0.0 pps
12 - **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	6.8	5.3	4.6	5.2	6.4	1.2 pps
Young (15-24)	23.2	16.9	17.6	18.8	21.6	2.8 pps
Prime age (25-49)	5.7	4.3	3.4	4.1	5.5	1.4 pps
Older (55-64)	4.1	4.6	4.4	0.0	0.0	0.0 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	11.5	8.6	8.8	8.9	11.3	2.4 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	6.9	5.5	4.0	5.5	7.4	1.9 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	4.7	4.0	3.5	3.9	4.8	0.9 pps
Nationals (15-64)	4.8	4.2	4.4	4.8	5.6	0.8 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	8.6	6.3	4.7	5.5	7.2	1.7 pps
Male	6.6	4.9	4.5	5.0	6.6	1.6 pps
Female	7.0	5.6	4.7	5.4	6.3	0.9 pps
13 - **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	26.8	34.0	28.7	32.7	25.5	-7.2 pps
14 - **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	39.9	38.8	38.2	37.9	38.2	0.8 %
Male	40.5	39.6	38.9	38.4	39.1	1.8 %
Female	38.7	37.2	36.9	36.9	36.6	-0.8 %
15 - **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
Agriculture	21.3	1.8	-1.2	-3.0	0.4	3.4 pps
Building and construction	3.1	3.5	2.3	-0.9	-4.8	-3.9 pps
Services	0.4	2.4	3.1	2.9	1.3	-1.6 pps
Manufacturing industry	-1.6	-1.4	1.7	-1.9	-1.5	0.4 pps
16 - **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
Compensation per employee	1.1	5.3	4.5	2.4	2.2	-0.3 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP	-3.0	0.5	0.1	:	:	: pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	0.9	2.2	5.3	6.4	2.2	-4.2 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	0.5	2.5	5.5	6.3	2.2	-4.1 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	-2.3	3.9	-4.3	-2.8	-0.1	2.7 pps

Hungary	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2024-2023
1 - **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	9670	9631	9605	9592	9562	-0.3 %
2 - **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	6220	6158	6122	6110	6092	-0.3 %
(% of total population)	64.3	63.9	63.7	63.7	63.7	0.0 pps
3 - **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	4542	4702	4732	4775	4791	0.3 %
Male	2512	2515	2524	2542	2536	-0.2 %
Female	2029	2186	2208	2233	2254	1.0 %
4 - **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	73.0	76.3	77.3	78.2	78.6	0.5 pps
Young (15-24)	30.8	31.0	30.3	31.6	32.0	0.4 pps
Prime age (25-54)	86.2	90.1	91.0	91.3	91.7	0.4 pps
Older (55-64)	61.5	64.9	67.7	71.5	73.0	1.5 pps
Nationals (15-64)	73.0	76.3	77.3	78.3	78.8	0.5 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	73.1	76.0	73.8	65.6	67.6	2.0 pps
Male	80.5	81.3	82.0	82.6	82.5	-0.1 pps
Young (15-24)	35.0	34.3	33.4	35.8	35.0	-0.7 pps
Prime age (25-54)	93.0	93.4	94.2	94.1	94.4	0.2 pps
Older (55-64)	74.1	76.8	79.3	81.9	81.8	-0.1 pps
Female	65.5	71.4	72.5	73.6	74.7	1.1 pps
Young (15-24)	26.3	27.4	27.0	27.2	28.8	1.6 pps
Prime age (25-54)	79.3	86.6	87.7	88.3	88.9	0.6 pps
Older (55-64)	50.4	54.2	57.2	62.1	64.9	2.8 pps
5 - **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	69.9	73.3	74.5	74.9	75.1	0.2 pps
Young (15-24)	26.8	26.8	27.1	27.5	27.2	-0.4 pps
Prime age (25-54)	82.9	86.9	88.1	88.0	88.2	0.2 pps
Older (55-64)	59.7	63.0	65.6	69.3	70.4	1.1 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	37.8	39.2	38.8	40.1	38.5	-1.6 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	74.5	77.3	78.7	78.6	79.0	0.4 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	85.4	89.9	91.4	91.4	91.0	-0.4 pps
Nationals (15-64)	69.9	73.3	74.5	75.0	75.2	0.2 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	67.0	73.3	70.4	62.7	64.4	1.7 pps
Male	77.2	78.1	79.0	79.2	78.7	-0.5 pps
Young (15-24)	30.8	30.2	29.6	31.0	29.6	-1.4 pps
Prime age (25-54)	89.6	90.3	91.2	90.9	90.7	-0.2 pps
Older (55-64)	71.8	74.3	76.8	79.2	79.0	-0.2 pps
Female	62.6	68.3	70.0	70.6	71.4	0.8 pps
Young (15-24)	22.6	23.2	24.4	23.9	24.6	0.7 pps
Prime age (25-54)	76.0	83.4	84.9	84.9	85.6	0.6 pps
Older (55-64)	49.0	52.8	55.6	60.2	62.5	2.3 pps
6 - **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	4346.6	4511.2	4560.8	4577.3	4573.8	-0.1 %
7 - **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	-1.1	1.8	1.5	0.3	0.1	-0.2 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	-1.6	3.8	1.1	0.4	-0.1	-0.4 pps
Male	-1.2	0.4	0.5	0.3	-0.7	-1.0 pps
Female	-2.1	8.0	1.7	0.4	0.7	0.2 pps
8 - **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	11.2	11.7	11.7	11.3	10.9	-0.5 pps
Male	13.3	14.0	14.1	13.9	13.3	-0.7 pps
Female	8.6	9.0	9.0	8.4	8.2	-0.2 pps
9 - **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	5.9	5.8	5.4	5.0	4.7	-0.3 pps
Male	5.3	5.6	5.3	5.0	5.1	0.1 pps
Female	6.5	6.1	5.5	4.9	4.4	-0.5 pps
10 - **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	4.8	4.6	4.2	4.0	4.2	0.2 pps
Male	2.8	2.7	2.6	2.4	2.6	0.2 pps
Female	7.2	6.7	6.0	5.8	6.1	0.3 pps
11 **Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	0.9	1.1	0.8	0.8	0.9	0.1 pps
12 - **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	4.1	4.0	3.6	4.1	4.5	0.4 pps
Young (15-24)	12.9	13.6	10.6	12.8	15.2	2.4 pps
Prime age (25-49)	3.8	3.5	3.2	3.6	3.8	0.2 pps
Older (55-64)	3.0	2.9	3.1	3.2	3.6	0.4 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	10.9	11.0	11.6	12.9	14.0	1.1 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	4.2	3.9	3.3	3.9	4.3	0.4 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	1.9	1.8	1.5	1.6	1.8	0.2 pps
Nationals (15-64)	4.3	4.1	3.6	4.1	4.5	0.4 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	8.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0 pps
Male	4.1	3.9	3.7	4.1	4.6	0.5 pps
Female	4.1	4.2	3.5	4.2	4.4	0.2 pps
13 - **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	26.3	31.5	34.6	35.1	34.6	-0.5 pps
14 - **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	38.9	39.0	39.3	38.5	38.1	-1.0 %
Male	39.1	39.3	39.6	38.9	38.6	-0.8 %
Female	38.3	38.4	39.0	38.1	37.5	-1.6 %
15 - **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
Agriculture	0.9	-5.7	-7.9	0.7	-0.8	-1.5 pps
Building and construction	4.0	6.1	4.7	0.0	-1.9	-1.9 pps
Services	-1.2	1.5	3.1	1.0	0.8	-0.2 pps
Manufacturing industry	-4.2	1.5	1.4	0.1	-1.9	-2.0 pps
16 - **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
Compensation per employee	3.0	8.6	17.1	14.9	12.6	-2.2 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP	-3.2	1.7	2.4	:	:	: pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	7.1	5.9	13.1	17.3	12.2	-5.1 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	8.1	7.2	15.6	17.6	12.4	-5.2 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	-3.3	5.3	2.7	-1.1	0.4	1.5 pps

Malta		2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2024-2023
1	- **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	515	518	532	554	571	3.2 %
2	- **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	351	351	362	381	393	3.3 %
	(% of total population)	68.0	67.7	68.1	68.8	68.9	0.1 pps
3	- **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	267	271	287	307	323	5.1 %
	Male	158	160	167	182	191	5.3 %
	Female	109	111	120	126	132	4.8 %
4	- **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	76.1	77.2	79.3	80.7	82.1	1.4 pps
	Young (15-24)	52.9	52.3	56.0	55.5	55.9	0.4 pps
	Prime age (25-54)	87.1	88.5	90.0	90.8	91.7	0.9 pps
	Older (55-64)	53.7	52.9	54.2	57.4	59.8	2.5 pps
	Nationals (15-64)	75.0	76.0	77.3	77.1	78.2	1.1 pps
	Non-nationals (15-64)	78.7	80.1	84.1	87.7	88.9	1.2 pps
	Male	84.7	85.3	85.6	87.3	88.3	1.0 pps
	Young (15-24)	54.5	54.0	56.8	58.4	58.7	0.3 pps
	Prime age (25-54)	95.7	96.3	95.9	96.5	96.6	0.1 pps
	Older (55-64)	68.3	67.2	65.6	69.9	72.6	2.7 pps
	Female	66.2	67.8	71.9	72.7	74.5	1.8 pps
	Young (15-24)	51.0	50.0	55.0	52.4	52.9	0.4 pps
	Prime age (25-54)	77.3	79.5	82.9	83.7	85.3	1.5 pps
	Older (55-64)	38.2	38.1	42.8	44.6	46.3	1.7 pps
5	- **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	72.3	74.2	76.5	77.8	79.5	1.7 pps
	Young (15-24)	46.9	47.1	51.0	50.4	50.9	0.6 pps
	Prime age (25-54)	83.5	85.8	87.3	88.1	89.3	1.3 pps
	Older (55-64)	51.4	51.1	53.2	56.0	58.3	2.3 pps
	Low-skilled (15-64)	61.4	62.4	64.4	65.9	67.5	1.6 pps
	Medium-skilled (15-64)	71.5	73.9	76.7	77.5	79.1	1.6 pps
	High-skilled (15-64)	87.4	88.2	89.4	89.8	90.6	0.9 pps
	Nationals (15-64)	72.2	73.5	75.4	75.0	76.1	1.1 pps
	Non-nationals (15-64)	72.6	76.1	79.2	83.3	85.3	2.0 pps
	Male	80.7	81.9	82.4	84.0	85.4	1.3 pps
	Young (15-24)	46.9	47.1	50.4	51.7	53.0	1.3 pps
	Prime age (25-54)	92.0	93.4	92.9	93.6	94.1	0.5 pps
	Older (55-64)	66.0	64.9	63.6	67.5	70.0	2.4 pps
	Female	62.7	65.4	69.7	70.3	72.3	2.0 pps
	Young (15-24)	46.5	47.1	51.7	49.2	48.4	-0.8 pps
	Prime age (25-54)	73.7	77.0	80.5	81.1	83.1	2.0 pps
	Older (55-64)	36.2	36.4	42.1	43.9	46.0	2.0 pps
6	- **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	253.4	260.5	277.3	296.5	312.7	5.5 %
7	- **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	2.9	2.8	4.9	6.8	5.3	-1.5 pps
	Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	2.6	2.8	6.4	6.9	5.5	-1.5 pps
	Male	1.6	1.9	5.0	8.6	5.8	-2.8 pps
	Female	4.1	4.1	8.5	4.6	5.1	0.5 pps
8	- **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	15.7	14.9	14.7	13.9	13.2	-0.7 pps
	Male	19.9	19.2	18.7	16.9	16.0	-0.9 pps
	Female	9.5	8.7	9.0	9.6	9.2	-0.4 pps
9	- **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	8.0	8.0	8.1	8.9	9.6	0.7 pps
	Male	6.1	6.7	6.9	8.4	10.4	2.0 pps
	Female	10.5	9.7	9.7	9.5	8.5	-1.0 pps
10	- **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	11.1	10.7	10.8	10.6	10.2	-0.4 pps
	Male	4.7	5.5	4.8	5.5	4.9	-0.6 pps
	Female	20.3	18.3	19.1	17.9	17.8	-0.1 pps
11	**Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	0.8	1.1	0.7	0.5	0.5	0.0 pps
12	- **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	4.9	3.8	3.5	3.5	3.1	-0.4 pps
	Young (15-24)	11.5	9.9	9.0	9.2	9.1	-0.1 pps
	Prime age (25-49)	4.2	3.0	3.0	3.0	2.6	-0.4 pps
	Older (55-64)	4.0	3.6	1.9	0.0	2.6	2.6 pps
	Low-skilled (15-64)	6.6	5.4	4.4	5.3	4.3	-1.0 pps
	Medium-skilled (15-64)	4.8	4.4	3.4	3.3	3.5	0.2 pps
	High-skilled (15-64)	3.5	1.8	2.9	2.5	2.1	-0.4 pps
	Nationals (15-64)	3.8	3.3	2.4	2.7	2.6	-0.1 pps
	Non-nationals (15-64)	7.8	5.0	5.8	4.9	4.0	-0.9 pps
	Male	4.7	3.9	3.7	3.7	3.2	-0.5 pps
	Female	5.1	3.6	3.1	3.2	3.0	-0.2 pps
13	- **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	25.7	25.4	34.4	23.3	21.5	-1.8 pps
14	- **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	40.5	39.3	39.1	38.9	39.1	0.5 %
	Male	40.5	39.8	39.9	39.6	39.8	0.5 %
	Female	38.8	38.2	37.5	37.9	37.9	0.0 %
15	- **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
	Agriculture	3.4	4.0	3.1	3.5	4.2	0.7 pps
	Building and construction	10.5	5.4	4.6	6.6	6.0	-0.6 pps
	Services	1.8	3.0	6.7	8.7	6.3	-2.4 pps
	Manufacturing industry	0.1	0.7	-0.4	4.5	1.8	-2.7 pps
16	- **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
	Compensation per employee	1.6	4.9	5.0	2.2	6.3	4.1 pps
	Real compensation per employee based on GDP	-3.3	2.2	-2.1	:	:	: pps
	Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	-6.8	2.4	10.4	6.2	2.0	-4.2 pps
	Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	3.2	0.0	4.7	3.7	1.9	-1.8 pps
	Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	-6.1	10.2	-0.6	0.0	0.6	0.6 pps

Netherlands	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2024-2023
1 - **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	17442	17533	17701	17877	17994	0.7 %
2 - **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	11160	11200	11294	11388	11432	0.4 %
(% of total population)	64.0	63.9	63.8	63.7	63.5	-0.2 pps
3 - **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	9030	9372	9569	9732	9773	0.4 %
Male	4752	4900	5003	5082	5098	0.3 %
Female	4278	4472	4566	4650	4676	0.5 %
4 - **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	80.9	83.7	84.7	85.5	85.5	0.0 pps
Young (15-24)	68.7	79.1	81.8	83.4	83.2	-0.1 pps
Prime age (25-54)	87.6	88.7	89.1	89.3	89.3	0.0 pps
Older (55-64)	73.0	73.8	75.3	76.7	77.0	0.3 pps
Nationals (15-64)	81.8	84.5	85.3	86.1	86.1	0.1 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	69.0	73.2	76.8	77.9	77.9	0.0 pps
Male	84.8	87.1	88.3	89.0	88.9	-0.1 pps
Young (15-24)	67.7	76.8	81.7	83.7	83.2	-0.5 pps
Prime age (25-54)	91.5	92.2	92.6	92.7	92.6	0.0 pps
Older (55-64)	81.5	82.1	82.1	83.4	83.5	0.1 pps
Female	77.0	80.2	81.1	81.9	82.1	0.1 pps
Young (15-24)	69.9	81.4	81.8	83.0	83.3	0.3 pps
Prime age (25-54)	83.7	85.1	85.5	85.9	85.9	0.0 pps
Older (55-64)	64.4	65.6	68.5	70.1	70.5	0.4 pps
5 - **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	77.8	80.1	81.8	82.4	82.3	-0.1 pps
Young (15-24)	62.5	71.7	75.5	76.5	76.0	-0.5 pps
Prime age (25-54)	85.1	85.9	86.8	87.0	86.9	-0.1 pps
Older (55-64)	71.0	71.4	73.1	75.0	75.3	0.3 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	60.2	65.5	67.9	69.4	68.7	-0.6 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	79.2	81.5	83.1	83.8	83.4	-0.4 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	88.4	88.4	89.1	89.5	89.9	0.4 pps
Nationals (15-64)	78.8	81.1	82.4	83.2	83.2	0.0 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	63.9	66.8	72.4	72.4	72.0	-0.4 pps
Male	81.6	83.6	85.4	86.0	85.7	-0.2 pps
Young (15-24)	61.4	69.4	75.7	76.8	75.9	-0.9 pps
Prime age (25-54)	89.0	89.7	90.5	90.5	90.4	0.0 pps
Older (55-64)	79.4	79.4	80.1	81.7	81.7	-0.1 pps
Female	73.9	76.6	78.1	78.9	78.9	0.0 pps
Young (15-24)	63.6	74.1	75.3	76.2	76.2	0.0 pps
Prime age (25-54)	81.2	82.1	83.2	83.5	83.4	-0.2 pps
Older (55-64)	62.6	63.5	66.3	68.2	69.0	0.7 pps
6 - **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	8681.0	8975.1	9233.9	9386.9	9412.9	0.3 %
7 - **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	-0.5	1.7	3.9	1.6	1.0	-0.6 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	-0.1	3.4	2.9	1.7	0.3	-1.4 pps
Male	-0.2	2.8	2.9	1.5	0.2	-1.3 pps
Female	0.1	4.0	2.9	1.9	0.4	-1.5 pps
8 - **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	15.8	14.3	14.9	15.2	15.3	0.2 pps
Male	18.9	17.8	18.0	18.3	18.7	0.3 pps
Female	12.4	10.6	11.5	11.6	11.6	0.0 pps
9 - **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	18.0	27.4	27.7	27.3	26.3	-1.0 pps
Male	17.0	25.6	25.8	25.3	24.4	-0.9 pps
Female	19.0	29.2	29.6	29.4	28.2	-1.2 pps
10 - **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	50.8	42.7	42.6	42.8	42.7	-0.1 pps
Male	28.6	22.5	23.5	23.8	23.6	-0.2 pps
Female	75.5	65.0	63.8	63.7	63.7	0.0 pps
11 **Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	3.0	1.6	1.2	0.9	0.9	0.0 pps
12 - **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	4.9	4.2	3.5	3.6	3.7	0.1 pps
Young (15-24)	9.1	9.3	7.6	8.2	8.7	0.5 pps
Prime age (25-49)	2.9	3.1	2.5	2.5	2.7	0.2 pps
Older (55-64)	2.7	3.3	2.8	2.3	2.2	-0.1 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	7.0	7.2	5.8	5.9	6.2	0.3 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	3.7	4.0	3.3	3.2	3.4	0.2 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	2.6	2.9	2.7	2.7	2.8	0.1 pps
Nationals (15-64)	3.6	3.9	3.4	3.3	3.4	0.1 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	7.4	8.7	5.7	7.1	7.5	0.4 pps
Male	4.6	4.0	3.3	3.4	3.5	0.1 pps
Female	5.1	4.5	3.8	3.8	3.8	0.0 pps
13 - **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	23.4	19.6	18.4	13.4	13.4	0.0 pps
14 - **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	40.3	38.4	38.4	37.9	37.7	-0.5 %
Male	40.8	39.1	39.1	38.6	38.5	-0.3 %
Female	37.9	34.9	35.1	34.8	34.6	-0.6 %
15 - **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
Agriculture	0.5	0.5	0.0	-2.0	-5.1	-3.1 pps
Building and construction	2.1	4.4	4.9	3.0	1.4	-1.6 pps
Services	-2.5	1.4	4.7	1.1	0.3	-0.8 pps
Manufacturing industry	0.3	0.3	2.5	2.4	1.0	-1.4 pps
16 - **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
Compensation per employee	4.1	2.7	3.6	6.3	6.4	0.2 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP	2.4	-0.8	-1.5	:	:	: pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	2.8	1.7	5.4	6.8	5.0	-1.8 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	6.1	0.9	2.9	6.8	4.7	-2.1 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	-3.4	4.5	1.1	-1.5	-0.1	1.4 pps

Austria	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2024-2023
1 - **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	8917	8952	9053	9131	9181	0.5 %
2 - **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	5835	5845	5887	5929	5932	0.0 %
(% of total population)	65.4	65.3	65.0	64.9	64.6	-0.3 pps
3 - **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	4467	4515	4577	4634	4637	0.1 %
Male	2362	2395	2420	2448	2440	-0.3 %
Female	2105	2119	2157	2186	2197	0.5 %
4 - **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	76.6	77.2	77.8	78.2	78.2	0.0 pps
Young (15-24)	56.1	56.3	57.4	59.2	57.2	-2.0 pps
Prime age (25-54)	88.3	89.0	89.6	89.5	89.7	0.2 pps
Older (55-64)	57.0	58.4	58.6	59.8	61.1	1.3 pps
Nationals (15-64)	77.2	77.6	78.1	78.7	78.7	0.1 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	73.8	75.7	76.4	76.3	76.3	0.0 pps
Male	81.0	81.9	82.1	82.4	82.1	-0.3 pps
Young (15-24)	59.5	61.2	61.4	62.7	60.6	-2.1 pps
Prime age (25-54)	91.4	92.3	92.6	92.2	92.1	-0.1 pps
Older (55-64)	65.5	66.4	66.8	68.8	69.3	0.6 pps
Female	72.1	72.6	73.4	73.9	74.2	0.3 pps
Young (15-24)	52.8	51.5	53.2	55.7	53.7	-2.0 pps
Prime age (25-54)	85.1	85.6	86.6	86.8	87.3	0.4 pps
Older (55-64)	48.8	50.7	50.5	50.9	53.0	2.1 pps
5 - **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	72.4	72.4	74.0	74.1	74.1	0.0 pps
Young (15-24)	50.2	50.1	51.9	53.1	51.3	-1.7 pps
Prime age (25-54)	83.9	83.8	85.7	85.4	85.4	0.0 pps
Older (55-64)	54.7	55.4	56.4	57.3	58.8	1.5 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	47.5	47.6	48.2	49.1	49.4	0.3 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	74.1	73.8	76.1	75.7	75.7	-0.1 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	84.6	84.7	85.7	85.6	85.0	-0.6 pps
Nationals (15-64)	74.1	73.8	75.2	75.6	75.7	0.0 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	65.3	66.7	69.5	68.7	68.9	0.1 pps
Male	76.5	76.7	78.0	77.9	77.5	-0.4 pps
Young (15-24)	52.7	54.6	55.6	56.3	54.3	-2.0 pps
Prime age (25-54)	86.9	86.9	88.5	87.8	87.4	-0.4 pps
Older (55-64)	62.7	62.7	63.9	65.4	66.2	0.8 pps
Female	68.3	68.1	70.0	70.3	70.7	0.4 pps
Young (15-24)	47.8	45.7	48.2	49.8	48.3	-1.5 pps
Prime age (25-54)	80.8	80.7	83.0	83.0	83.4	0.4 pps
Older (55-64)	47.0	48.3	49.0	49.4	51.6	2.2 pps
6 - **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	4224.0	4231.7	4357.2	4394.3	4395.1	0.0 %
7 - **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	-1.6	2.0	2.6	0.8	0.0	-0.8 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	-1.3	0.2	3.0	0.9	0.0	-0.8 pps
Male	-1.6	0.6	2.5	0.7	-0.5	-1.2 pps
Female	-1.0	-0.3	3.5	1.0	0.6	-0.4 pps
8 - **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	10.5	10.0	10.4	10.4	10.6	0.2 pps
Male	12.7	12.2	12.5	12.7	12.9	0.2 pps
Female	7.9	7.6	8.0	8.0	8.2	0.2 pps
9 - **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	8.2	8.8	8.7	9.0	8.4	-0.6 pps
Male	8.3	9.0	8.9	9.2	8.5	-0.7 pps
Female	8.1	8.7	8.6	8.8	8.3	-0.5 pps
10 - **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	27.2	28.7	29.7	30.1	30.5	0.4 pps
Male	9.7	10.5	11.3	12.2	12.3	0.1 pps
Female	46.9	49.2	50.3	50.1	50.5	0.4 pps
11 **Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	2.5	2.6	2.3	2.0	2.0	0.0 pps
12 - **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	6.0	6.2	4.8	5.1	5.2	0.1 pps
Young (15-24)	10.5	11.0	9.5	10.4	10.3	-0.1 pps
Prime age (25-49)	5.0	5.8	4.3	4.6	4.8	0.2 pps
Older (55-64)	4.0	5.2	3.7	4.1	3.7	-0.4 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	12.5	14.0	11.6	12.0	11.6	-0.4 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	5.0	5.8	4.2	4.7	4.8	0.1 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	3.4	4.1	3.2	3.4	3.6	0.2 pps
Nationals (15-64)	4.1	4.9	3.7	3.9	3.9	0.0 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	11.6	11.9	9.1	9.9	9.8	-0.1 pps
Male	6.1	6.3	4.9	5.3	5.6	0.3 pps
Female	5.9	6.1	4.5	4.9	4.7	-0.2 pps
13 - **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	24.5	31.5	25.3	22.3	21.5	-0.8 pps
14 - **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	39.7	39.6	39.6	39.2	39.9	1.8 %
Male	39.6	39.5	39.5	39.3	39.7	1.0 %
Female	36.4	36.9	36.8	37.1	37.1	0.0 %
15 - **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
Agriculture	1.9	2.6	-3.5	-7.7	-1.3	6.4 pps
Building and construction	0.4	4.6	1.6	-1.3	-2.8	-1.5 pps
Services	-3.7	2.3	4.2	1.0	-0.5	-1.4 pps
Manufacturing industry	-0.8	0.4	2.3	0.9	-1.4	-2.3 pps
16 - **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
Compensation per employee	1.7	2.9	4.9	6.8	8.4	1.6 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP	-1.0	0.8	-0.5	:	:	: pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	5.9	0.5	5.4	8.4	8.1	-0.3 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	6.1	0.6	5.3	8.1	7.8	-0.3 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	-4.8	2.7	2.6	-1.8	-1.2	0.6 pps

Poland	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2024-2023
1 - **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	37166	36973	37779	37630	37492	-0.4 %
2 - **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	24070	23780	23516	23301	23123	-0.8 %
(% of total population)	64.8	64.3	62.2	61.9	61.7	-0.2 pps
3 - **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	17106	17340	17318	17363	17280	-0.5 %
Male	9447	9476	9393	9355	9285	-0.8 %
Female	7659	7864	7925	8008	7995	-0.2 %
4 - **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	71.1	72.9	73.6	74.5	74.7	0.2 pps
Young (15-24)	32.0	31.3	31.7	32.4	31.9	-0.4 pps
Prime age (25-54)	85.8	87.5	87.9	88.6	88.8	0.2 pps
Older (55-64)	53.0	56.1	57.6	59.2	60.3	1.1 pps
Nationals (15-64)	71.0	72.9	73.6	74.4	74.6	0.2 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	80.6	86.0	82.3	80.9	82.3	1.5 pps
Male	78.4	79.6	79.7	80.1	80.1	0.0 pps
Young (15-24)	36.1	35.8	36.1	36.1	34.5	-1.6 pps
Prime age (25-54)	92.1	92.6	92.2	92.6	92.8	0.2 pps
Older (55-64)	65.4	69.3	71.0	71.7	72.5	0.8 pps
Female	63.7	66.3	67.5	68.9	69.4	0.5 pps
Young (15-24)	27.7	26.6	27.1	28.4	29.3	0.9 pps
Prime age (25-54)	79.3	82.4	83.6	84.5	84.6	0.1 pps
Older (55-64)	41.8	44.1	45.4	47.8	49.0	1.3 pps
5 - **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	68.8	70.4	71.5	72.4	72.5	0.2 pps
Young (15-24)	28.5	27.6	28.3	28.7	28.5	-0.2 pps
Prime age (25-54)	83.4	85.0	85.7	86.5	86.6	0.1 pps
Older (55-64)	51.9	54.7	56.5	58.1	59.0	0.9 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	24.1	24.7	24.4	23.0	21.3	-1.8 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	68.9	70.6	72.1	72.1	72.0	-0.1 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	88.1	90.0	90.4	90.7	90.9	0.3 pps
Nationals (15-64)	68.7	70.4	71.4	72.3	72.4	0.1 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	76.7	82.3	77.2	77.4	79.4	2.0 pps
Male	75.9	76.8	77.4	77.8	77.8	0.0 pps
Young (15-24)	32.4	31.7	32.3	31.9	30.8	-1.2 pps
Prime age (25-54)	89.7	90.0	90.0	90.5	90.8	0.3 pps
Older (55-64)	63.7	67.4	69.5	70.3	70.7	0.4 pps
Female	61.6	64.0	65.5	66.9	67.2	0.3 pps
Young (15-24)	24.5	23.3	24.0	25.3	26.1	0.8 pps
Prime age (25-54)	77.0	79.9	81.4	82.4	82.2	-0.1 pps
Older (55-64)	41.1	43.2	44.7	47.0	48.3	1.3 pps
6 - **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	16557.0	16742.9	16811.0	16865.1	16771.3	-0.6 %
7 - **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	0.2	2.9	1.1	0.1	-0.7	-0.8 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	0.0	1.1	0.4	0.3	-0.6	-0.9 pps
Male	0.2	0.0	-0.3	-0.3	-0.7	-0.3 pps
Female	-0.1	2.5	1.3	1.1	-0.4	-1.5 pps
8 - **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	17.8	17.9	18.2	18.6	17.8	-0.8 pps
Male	22.4	22.3	22.6	23.5	22.5	-1.0 pps
Female	12.1	12.6	12.9	12.8	12.3	-0.5 pps
9 - **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	18.5	14.9	15.3	15.3	14.9	-0.4 pps
Male	17.5	14.5	14.4	14.2	13.8	-0.4 pps
Female	19.6	15.4	16.3	16.3	16.0	-0.3 pps
10 - **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	5.9	5.3	5.4	5.7	5.7	0.0 pps
Male	3.4	3.3	3.4	3.4	3.5	0.1 pps
Female	9.0	7.6	7.8	8.4	8.4	0.0 pps
11 **Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	0.8	0.8	0.6	0.7	0.6	-0.1 pps
12 - **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	3.2	3.4	2.9	2.8	2.9	0.1 pps
Young (15-24)	10.8	11.9	10.8	11.4	10.8	-0.6 pps
Prime age (25-49)	2.8	2.9	2.5	2.4	2.4	0.0 pps
Older (55-64)	2.1	2.4	1.8	1.8	2.1	0.3 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	8.8	8.4	8.1	7.1	9.0	1.9 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	3.5	4.1	3.5	3.7	3.7	0.0 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	2.0	1.8	1.4	1.3	1.4	0.1 pps
Nationals (15-64)	3.2	3.4	2.9	2.8	2.9	0.1 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.3	3.5	-0.8 pps
Male	3.1	3.4	2.8	2.8	2.7	-0.1 pps
Female	3.3	3.4	2.9	2.9	3.1	0.2 pps
13 - **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	19.8	26.4	30.0	26.9	27.0	0.1 pps
14 - **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	39.6	40.7	40.4	40.3	39.9	-1.0 %
Male	40.5	41.6	41.3	41.2	40.7	-1.2 %
Female	38.6	39.2	39.4	39.2	38.9	-0.8 %
15 - **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
Agriculture	4.7	0.8	-1.3	-4.2	-15.4	-11.2 pps
Building and construction	2.3	1.4	-0.8	-4.2	-1.0	3.2 pps
Services	-0.6	4.8	1.6	2.5	-0.4	-2.9 pps
Manufacturing industry	-3.1	-1.0	1.8	-3.4	2.1	5.5 pps
16 - **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
Compensation per employee	4.9	4.7	12.3	14.4	12.3	-2.1 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP	1.0	-0.6	-1.4	:	:	: pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	5.2	7.9	12.9	12.1	11.0	-1.1 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	5.2	7.9	12.8	12.1	11.0	-1.1 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	-2.2	3.9	4.1	0.2	3.7	3.5 pps

Portugal	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2024-2023
1 - **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	10385	10408	10469	10578	10683	1.0 %
2 - **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	6614	6601	6624	6662	6706	0.7 %
(% of total population)	63.7	63.4	63.3	63.0	62.8	-0.2 pps
3 - **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	4903	4937	5046	5167	5228	1.2 %
Male	2467	2485	2536	2593	2627	1.3 %
Female	2437	2452	2510	2574	2601	1.0 %
4 - **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	74.1	74.8	76.2	77.6	78.0	0.4 pps
Young (15-24)	30.4	30.1	31.4	35.4	34.7	-0.7 pps
Prime age (25-54)	89.4	90.1	91.0	91.4	91.7	0.3 pps
Older (55-64)	63.9	65.7	68.5	70.2	71.4	1.2 pps
Nationals (15-64)	74.0	74.7	76.0	77.4	77.8	0.5 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	78.6	80.6	82.0	80.7	79.9	-0.8 pps
Male	76.8	77.4	78.6	79.8	80.3	0.5 pps
Young (15-24)	32.5	33.0	33.8	37.3	36.2	-1.1 pps
Prime age (25-54)	91.7	91.7	92.9	93.5	94.0	0.5 pps
Older (55-64)	69.7	72.2	73.6	74.2	75.7	1.5 pps
Female	71.6	72.3	73.9	75.4	75.7	0.2 pps
Young (15-24)	28.3	26.9	28.9	33.4	33.1	-0.3 pps
Prime age (25-54)	87.3	88.5	89.2	89.4	89.5	0.1 pps
Older (55-64)	58.8	60.0	64.0	66.8	67.7	0.9 pps
5 - **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	68.8	69.6	71.4	72.4	72.8	0.4 pps
Young (15-24)	23.6	23.0	25.4	28.1	27.2	-0.9 pps
Prime age (25-54)	84.0	84.9	86.0	86.3	86.7	0.4 pps
Older (55-64)	60.2	62.0	65.0	66.4	67.6	1.1 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	60.0	59.9	60.5	61.3	60.7	-0.5 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	69.3	69.4	72.2	73.8	74.3	0.5 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	84.5	85.8	87.1	87.6	87.4	-0.3 pps
Nationals (15-64)	68.8	69.6	71.3	72.4	73.0	0.6 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	68.4	72.2	71.7	71.5	69.5	-1.9 pps
Male	71.4	72.2	73.9	74.7	75.3	0.6 pps
Young (15-24)	25.6	26.1	27.7	29.5	28.7	-0.9 pps
Prime age (25-54)	86.5	86.8	88.1	88.8	89.3	0.6 pps
Older (55-64)	65.1	67.7	70.3	70.5	71.8	1.3 pps
Female	66.4	67.2	68.9	70.2	70.4	0.2 pps
Young (15-24)	21.6	19.8	23.0	26.7	25.6	-1.0 pps
Prime age (25-54)	81.6	83.1	84.0	84.0	84.1	0.1 pps
Older (55-64)	55.8	57.1	60.3	62.9	63.9	1.0 pps
6 - **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	4552.5	4596.6	4727.0	4823.0	4882.2	1.2 %
7 - **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	-2.0	1.4	3.7	1.0	1.6	0.6 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	-2.4	1.0	2.8	2.0	1.2	-0.8 pps
Male	-2.8	1.1	2.9	1.8	1.4	-0.4 pps
Female	-2.0	0.8	2.8	2.3	1.0	-1.2 pps
8 - **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	13.5	13.3	12.9	12.6	13.1	0.5 pps
Male	16.3	16.0	15.7	15.0	15.7	0.7 pps
Female	10.6	10.6	10.1	10.2	10.4	0.2 pps
9 - **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	17.9	17.2	16.7	17.5	16.0	-1.5 pps
Male	17.6	17.1	16.7	17.1	15.8	-1.3 pps
Female	18.2	17.2	16.7	17.9	16.3	-1.6 pps
10 - **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	7.6	6.9	6.8	7.3	7.3	0.0 pps
Male	5.0	4.7	4.6	4.6	4.8	0.2 pps
Female	10.1	9.2	9.1	10.0	9.7	-0.3 pps
11 **Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	3.4	2.8	2.7	2.9	2.6	-0.2 pps
12 - **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	7.1	6.7	6.2	6.5	6.5	0.0 pps
Young (15-24)	22.5	23.4	19.2	20.5	21.6	1.1 pps
Prime age (25-49)	6.1	5.7	5.5	5.6	5.5	-0.1 pps
Older (55-64)	5.9	5.6	5.1	5.5	5.4	-0.1 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	7.0	7.0	7.1	7.7	7.7	0.0 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	8.5	8.2	7.1	7.6	7.4	-0.2 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	6.0	5.5	4.6	4.6	4.8	0.2 pps
Nationals (15-64)	6.9	6.8	6.1	6.4	6.2	-0.2 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	12.9	10.3	12.6	11.5	12.9	1.4 pps
Male	6.9	6.5	5.8	6.2	6.1	-0.1 pps
Female	7.2	7.0	6.6	6.9	6.9	0.0 pps
13 - **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	32.8	42.6	44.8	37.3	36.7	-0.6 pps
14 - **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	39.1	39.3	39.2	39.0	38.9	-0.3 %
Male	40.4	40.4	40.3	40.0	40.0	0.0 %
Female	38.0	38.3	38.2	38.1	37.8	-0.8 %
15 - **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
Agriculture	-1.5	-2.7	-3.3	-14.6	6.6	21.2 pps
Building and construction	1.8	3.9	7.1	5.3	3.5	-1.8 pps
Services	-4.1	1.2	5.3	2.6	1.7	-0.9 pps
Manufacturing industry	-3.2	0.5	1.1	-0.1	-0.6	-0.5 pps
16 - **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
Compensation per employee	1.8	5.9	5.6	8.0	7.6	-0.5 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP	-0.5	3.1	0.7	:	:	: pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	7.6	2.0	5.1	5.6	6.5	0.9 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	8.5	1.3	4.8	5.3	6.5	1.2 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	-6.3	4.1	3.1	1.5	0.3	-1.2 pps

Romania	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2024-2023
1 - **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	19296	19140	19053	19065	19068	0.0 %
2 - **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	12611	12385	12256	12076	12189	0.9 %
(% of total population)	65.4	64.7	64.3	63.3	63.9	0.6 pps
3 - **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	8723	8125	8191	8067	8219	1.9 %
Male	5040	4752	4733	4638	4712	1.6 %
Female	3683	3373	3458	3429	3507	2.3 %
4 - **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	69.2	65.6	66.8	66.8	67.4	0.6 pps
Young (15-24)	29.7	26.8	25.5	23.9	25.3	1.4 pps
Prime age (25-54)	84.3	80.6	82.1	82.0	82.2	0.2 pps
Older (55-64)	50.2	45.6	48.4	53.1	54.7	1.6 pps
Nationals (15-64)	69.2	65.6	66.8	66.8	67.4	0.6 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	0.0	60.9	68.2	70.6	70.2	-0.5 pps
Male	78.7	75.6	76.1	76.3	76.3	0.1 pps
Young (15-24)	35.5	32.9	31.6	29.9	30.6	0.8 pps
Prime age (25-54)	93.6	90.7	91.3	91.3	91.1	-0.2 pps
Older (55-64)	62.5	57.9	60.4	65.4	66.2	0.8 pps
Female	59.3	55.3	57.3	57.2	58.3	1.1 pps
Young (15-24)	23.6	20.4	19.0	17.6	19.6	2.1 pps
Prime age (25-54)	74.5	70.0	72.4	72.3	72.8	0.5 pps
Older (55-64)	38.8	34.1	37.2	41.9	44.0	2.1 pps
5 - **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	65.6	61.9	63.1	63.0	63.8	0.7 pps
Young (15-24)	24.6	21.2	19.7	18.7	19.2	0.6 pps
Prime age (25-54)	80.6	76.9	78.3	78.1	78.4	0.3 pps
Older (55-64)	48.5	43.8	46.7	51.0	53.4	2.4 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	43.4	34.7	36.6	36.9	36.9	0.0 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	68.1	64.3	64.6	65.6	66.5	1.0 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	88.8	88.4	89.5	89.8	90.0	0.2 pps
Nationals (15-64)	65.6	61.9	63.1	63.0	63.7	0.7 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	0.0	59.2	65.9	64.7	67.0	2.3 pps
Male	74.4	71.1	71.5	71.7	72.0	0.3 pps
Young (15-24)	29.2	26.0	24.8	23.4	23.5	0.1 pps
Prime age (25-54)	89.3	86.2	86.7	86.7	86.7	0.0 pps
Older (55-64)	60.4	55.4	58.0	62.8	64.6	1.9 pps
Female	56.5	52.5	54.4	54.3	55.3	1.1 pps
Young (15-24)	19.7	16.1	14.3	13.7	14.7	1.1 pps
Prime age (25-54)	71.4	67.1	69.5	69.1	69.8	0.6 pps
Older (55-64)	37.5	33.0	36.1	40.3	43.0	2.6 pps
6 - **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	8272.2	7667.6	7728.3	7613.5	7771.4	2.1 %
7 - **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	-2.1	0.8	0.7	-1.5	1.8	3.3 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	-1.6	-7.3	0.8	-1.5	2.1	3.6 pps
Male	-1.2	-6.3	-0.4	-1.9	1.9	3.8 pps
Female	-2.2	-8.6	2.5	-0.9	2.4	3.2 pps
8 - **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	15.1	11.6	11.5	11.1	11.6	0.6 pps
Male	19.4	15.3	15.2	14.7	15.1	0.4 pps
Female	9.3	6.5	6.4	6.2	7.0	0.8 pps
9 - **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	1.2	2.4	2.2	2.5	1.8	-0.7 pps
Male	1.6	3.3	3.0	3.4	2.4	-1.0 pps
Female	0.8	1.1	1.0	1.3	1.1	-0.2 pps
10 - **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	5.9	3.7	3.3	3.4	3.0	-0.4 pps
Male	5.8	4.1	3.7	3.8	3.3	-0.5 pps
Female	6.0	3.0	2.8	2.9	2.5	-0.4 pps
11 **Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	3.4	2.4	2.0	2.0	1.7	-0.3 pps
12 - **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	6.1	5.6	5.6	5.6	5.4	-0.2 pps
Young (15-24)	17.3	21.0	22.8	21.8	23.9	2.1 pps
Prime age (25-49)	4.4	4.6	4.6	4.7	4.5	-0.2 pps
Older (55-64)	3.4	3.9	3.7	3.9	2.4	-1.5 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	9.0	14.0	14.6	14.9	15.4	0.5 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	5.2	5.1	5.2	4.9	4.4	-0.5 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	2.2	2.1	1.7	1.6	1.9	0.3 pps
Nationals (15-64)	5.2	5.6	5.7	5.6	5.5	-0.1 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0 pps
Male	6.3	6.0	6.0	5.9	5.7	-0.2 pps
Female	5.7	5.1	5.1	5.1	5.1	0.0 pps
13 - **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	29.9	36.5	38.5	38.5	33.5	-5.0 pps
14 - **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	39.7	40.3	40.1	39.9	39.2	-1.8 %
Male	40.3	40.7	40.4	40.3	39.5	-2.0 %
Female	39.4	39.8	39.7	39.5	38.8	-1.8 %
15 - **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
Agriculture	-5.2	0.1	-2.0	-1.0	-2.5	-1.5 pps
Building and construction	2.7	3.2	0.4	2.7	5.4	2.7 pps
Services	0.6	2.1	2.0	-0.9	4.9	5.7 pps
Manufacturing industry	-6.4	-0.2	1.4	-1.1	-1.6	-0.5 pps
16 - **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
Compensation per employee	4.0	6.4	13.7	18.1	16.6	-1.5 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP	-0.1	0.9	0.1	:	:	: pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	8.1	5.9	14.2	17.1	13.2	-3.9 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	7.8	6.0	14.5	17.3	13.2	-4.1 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	-1.7	4.8	3.2	4.0	-1.0	-5.0 pps

Slovenia	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2024-2023
1 - **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	2103	2108	2109	2121	2127	0.3 %
2 - **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	1362	1336	1322	1338	1340	0.1 %
(% of total population)	64.7	63.4	62.7	63.1	63.0	-0.1 pps
3 - **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	1016	1002	1007	1007	1017	1.0 %
Male	547	540	544	546	552	1.1 %
Female	469	462	463	461	465	0.9 %
4 - **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	74.6	75.0	76.2	75.2	75.9	0.7 pps
Young (15-24)	31.5	33.9	35.9	36.2	37.1	0.9 pps
Prime age (25-54)	92.4	92.2	92.9	92.1	92.6	0.5 pps
Older (55-64)	52.4	54.9	57.4	56.2	58.1	1.8 pps
Nationals (15-64)	74.4	75.0	76.1	74.9	75.5	0.6 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	78.4	76.3	77.1	78.7	79.4	0.7 pps
Male	77.1	77.8	79.2	78.2	78.7	0.5 pps
Young (15-24)	33.9	36.4	38.5	40.7	41.9	1.2 pps
Prime age (25-54)	94.2	94.1	95.1	94.1	94.3	0.1 pps
Older (55-64)	56.3	59.3	61.9	59.8	62.5	2.7 pps
Female	71.9	72.0	72.9	72.0	72.8	0.8 pps
Young (15-24)	28.7	31.0	33.1	31.1	31.6	0.4 pps
Prime age (25-54)	90.3	90.1	90.5	89.9	90.8	0.9 pps
Older (55-64)	48.5	50.6	52.8	52.6	53.5	1.0 pps
5 - **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	70.9	71.4	73.1	72.5	73.1	0.6 pps
Young (15-24)	27.0	29.6	32.2	32.6	33.0	0.4 pps
Prime age (25-54)	88.1	88.3	89.7	89.3	89.8	0.5 pps
Older (55-64)	50.5	52.7	55.2	54.3	56.3	2.1 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	30.4	31.4	32.0	36.4	36.3	-0.1 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	70.9	70.0	72.9	74.0	75.0	1.0 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	89.4	88.5	89.6	89.7	89.5	-0.3 pps
Nationals (15-64)	70.7	71.5	73.2	72.2	73.0	0.7 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	72.7	70.4	72.2	75.3	74.8	-0.5 pps
Male	73.7	74.5	76.2	75.4	76.0	0.7 pps
Young (15-24)	29.6	32.2	35.1	36.3	37.2	0.9 pps
Prime age (25-54)	90.4	90.6	92.0	91.5	91.9	0.5 pps
Older (55-64)	54.3	57.1	59.4	57.7	60.4	2.8 pps
Female	67.8	68.1	69.8	69.4	70.0	0.6 pps
Young (15-24)	24.1	26.5	29.0	28.4	28.1	-0.3 pps
Prime age (25-54)	85.6	85.7	87.1	87.0	87.5	0.6 pps
Older (55-64)	46.6	48.5	51.1	50.8	52.1	1.3 pps
6 - **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	964.7	954.3	966.6	970.4	980.4	1.0 %
7 - **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	-0.7	1.3	2.9	1.6	0.1	-1.5 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	-0.5	-1.1	1.3	0.4	1.0	0.6 pps
Male	-0.3	-1.1	1.3	0.6	1.4	0.8 pps
Female	-0.8	-1.1	1.3	0.2	0.6	0.4 pps
8 - **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	10.7	11.9	11.7	12.1	12.3	0.2 pps
Male	13.4	15.6	15.4	15.6	15.8	0.1 pps
Female	7.6	7.6	7.3	7.9	8.1	0.2 pps
9 - **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	10.8	11.8	11.6	11.2	10.6	-0.6 pps
Male	9.5	10.3	10.0	9.5	9.6	0.1 pps
Female	12.2	13.3	13.3	13.2	11.7	-1.5 pps
10 - **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	8.3	9.2	8.7	8.5	8.8	0.3 pps
Male	5.1	6.2	5.6	5.4	5.7	0.3 pps
Female	12.1	12.8	12.3	12.2	12.5	0.3 pps
11 **Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	0.5	0.9	0.7	0.6	0.4	-0.2 pps
12 - **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	5.0	4.8	4.0	3.7	3.7	0.0 pps
Young (15-24)	14.2	12.8	10.1	9.9	10.9	1.0 pps
Prime age (25-49)	4.6	4.2	3.5	3.0	3.0	0.0 pps
Older (55-64)	3.7	4.0	3.7	3.5	3.0	-0.5 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	11.5	9.5	9.6	9.0	8.3	-0.7 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	5.6	5.4	4.4	3.8	4.0	0.2 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	3.2	3.4	2.6	2.1	2.0	-0.1 pps
Nationals (15-64)	4.9	4.6	3.8	3.5	3.3	-0.2 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	7.3	7.6	6.3	4.4	5.8	1.4 pps
Male	4.4	4.3	3.8	3.6	3.5	-0.1 pps
Female	5.7	5.3	4.3	3.7	4.0	0.3 pps
13 - **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	38.8	39.2	39.2	38.3	31.4	-6.9 pps
14 - **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	40.4	40.2	39.9	39.6	39.5	-0.3 %
Male	40.9	40.6	40.3	40.0	40.0	0.0 %
Female	39.9	39.7	39.3	38.9	38.8	-0.3 %
15 - **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
Agriculture	-3.0	-1.2	-0.7	-1.0	-1.4	-0.4 pps
Building and construction	2.9	4.0	7.2	2.8	-0.5	-3.3 pps
Services	-1.8	0.6	3.6	2.3	0.5	-1.9 pps
Manufacturing industry	-2.0	1.7	2.3	0.5	-1.4	-1.9 pps
16 - **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
Compensation per employee	3.8	8.0	5.0	9.5	6.2	-3.3 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP	2.3	5.2	-1.5	:	:	: pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	1.9	6.3	7.8	10.4	7.4	-3.0 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	2.8	5.2	7.7	10.6	7.5	-3.1 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	-3.4	7.0	-0.2	0.5	1.4	0.9 pps

Slovak Republic	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2024-2023
1 - **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	5461	5441	5457	5457	5459	0.0 %
2 - **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	3689	3631	3589	3558	3538	-0.5 %
(% of total population)	67.6	66.7	65.8	65.2	64.8	-0.4 pps
3 - **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	2672	2709	2730	2722	2710	-0.4 %
Male	1459	1437	1445	1440	1438	-0.1 %
Female	1213	1272	1285	1282	1272	-0.8 %
4 - **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	72.4	74.6	76.1	76.5	76.6	0.1 pps
Young (15-24)	28.1	26.2	26.6	27.0	26.9	-0.1 pps
Prime age (25-54)	85.9	88.8	89.8	89.7	90.2	0.5 pps
Older (55-64)	61.3	64.1	67.1	69.3	68.4	-1.0 pps
Nationals (15-64)	72.4	74.5	76.0	76.4	76.6	0.1 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	70.9	88.0	89.8	86.6	76.4	-10.2 pps
Male	78.3	78.6	79.8	80.2	80.4	0.2 pps
Young (15-24)	34.9	31.9	32.7	32.7	32.3	-0.4 pps
Prime age (25-54)	92.2	92.4	93.3	92.9	93.8	0.8 pps
Older (55-64)	64.5	67.7	69.6	72.7	71.5	-1.2 pps
Female	66.4	70.6	72.3	72.8	72.7	-0.1 pps
Young (15-24)	21.0	20.2	20.2	21.2	21.3	0.1 pps
Prime age (25-54)	79.3	85.0	86.3	86.4	86.5	0.2 pps
Older (55-64)	58.3	60.7	64.8	66.2	65.4	-0.8 pps
5 - **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	67.5	69.4	71.3	72.0	72.4	0.5 pps
Young (15-24)	22.7	20.8	21.3	21.7	21.8	0.1 pps
Prime age (25-54)	80.6	83.2	84.7	84.8	85.8	0.9 pps
Older (55-64)	58.3	60.6	64.1	66.6	66.0	-0.6 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	18.2	13.7	15.4	16.2	16.4	0.1 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	73.3	74.9	76.4	76.8	77.5	0.7 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	80.2	85.4	86.9	87.9	88.0	0.1 pps
Nationals (15-64)	67.5	69.4	71.3	71.9	72.4	0.5 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	62.7	81.2	83.5	82.0	70.8	-11.2 pps
Male	73.3	73.3	75.0	75.5	76.5	1.0 pps
Young (15-24)	28.5	25.6	26.6	25.4	26.0	0.6 pps
Prime age (25-54)	86.9	86.8	88.3	88.3	89.9	1.6 pps
Older (55-64)	61.7	64.2	66.7	70.1	69.4	-0.7 pps
Female	61.7	65.6	67.6	68.4	68.3	-0.1 pps
Young (15-24)	16.5	15.8	15.8	17.8	17.3	-0.5 pps
Prime age (25-54)	74.0	79.4	81.0	81.3	81.5	0.2 pps
Older (55-64)	55.2	57.3	61.6	63.4	62.9	-0.5 pps
6 - **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	2490.9	2521.7	2559.9	2559.9	2562.6	0.1 %
7 - **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	-1.9	-0.6	1.8	0.3	-0.2	-0.5 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	-2.1	1.2	1.5	0.0	0.1	0.1 pps
Male	-2.2	-1.8	1.4	-0.2	0.9	1.2 pps
Female	-2.0	4.9	1.6	0.3	-0.8	-1.1 pps
8 - **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	14.7	14.6	14.6	14.8	14.6	-0.3 pps
Male	19.1	20.2	20.3	20.9	20.7	-0.2 pps
Female	9.4	8.3	8.2	8.1	7.5	-0.6 pps
9 - **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	6.5	4.1	4.3	4.2	3.8	-0.4 pps
Male	5.8	3.9	4.0	3.8	3.5	-0.3 pps
Female	7.3	4.3	4.5	4.7	4.1	-0.6 pps
10 - **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	4.6	3.1	3.1	3.3	4.0	0.7 pps
Male	2.7	1.8	2.0	1.8	2.3	0.5 pps
Female	6.8	4.6	4.4	5.0	5.8	0.8 pps
11 **Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	0.9	0.6	0.7	0.5	0.6	0.1 pps
12 - **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	6.7	6.8	6.1	5.8	5.3	-0.5 pps
Young (15-24)	19.3	20.6	19.9	19.8	19.2	-0.6 pps
Prime age (25-49)	6.2	6.3	5.7	5.5	5.0	-0.5 pps
Older (55-64)	4.8	5.4	4.5	3.9	3.4	-0.5 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	30.7	42.1	41.1	38.1	40.5	2.4 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	6.4	6.4	5.6	5.6	4.5	-1.1 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	3.5	3.0	2.4	2.0	2.1	0.1 pps
Nationals (15-64)	6.8	6.9	6.2	5.9	5.4	-0.5 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0 pps
Male	6.2	6.7	5.9	5.8	4.8	-1.0 pps
Female	7.1	7.0	6.4	5.9	5.9	0.0 pps
13 - **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	47.7	56.6	66.4	65.2	64.9	-0.3 pps
14 - **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	39.1	38.4	38.4	38.2	38.5	0.8 %
Male	39.5	39.1	39.1	38.9	39.5	1.5 %
Female	38.3	37.6	37.4	37.3	37.7	1.1 %
15 - **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
Agriculture	-2.3	-3.2	1.9	-2.7	-0.4	2.3 pps
Building and construction	-0.4	0.4	2.6	1.6	1.1	-0.5 pps
Services	-1.9	-0.7	1.6	0.5	-0.5	-1.0 pps
Manufacturing industry	-4.2	-0.9	1.3	-0.7	-1.2	-0.5 pps
16 - **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
Compensation per employee	3.8	6.9	5.9	10.3	7.3	-3.0 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP	1.5	4.4	-1.9	:	:	: pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	4.8	5.0	11.1	8.4	7.5	-0.9 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	8.5	5.3	7.2	9.1	5.9	-3.2 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	-0.7	6.3	-1.3	1.9	2.2	0.3 pps

Finland	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2024-2023
1 - **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	5531	5542	5557	5577	5617	0.7 %
2 - **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	3401	3399	3400	3421	3451	0.9 %
(% of total population)	61.5	61.3	61.2	61.3	61.4	0.1 pps
3 - **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	2662	2679	2714	2732	2739	0.3 %
Male	1377	1388	1393	1399	1409	0.7 %
Female	1285	1291	1321	1332	1329	-0.2 %
4 - **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	78.3	78.8	79.8	79.9	79.4	-0.5 pps
Young (15-24)	52.2	52.9	53.9	54.7	53.3	-1.4 pps
Prime age (25-54)	87.5	87.9	88.1	87.9	87.4	-0.5 pps
Older (55-64)	72.9	73.8	76.8	77.3	77.7	0.3 pps
Nationals (15-64)	78.6	79.1	79.9	80.1	79.8	-0.3 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	71.3	74.3	78.0	77.2	74.7	-2.4 pps
Male	80.0	80.3	80.6	80.4	80.3	-0.1 pps
Young (15-24)	53.1	53.1	53.3	52.9	52.2	-0.7 pps
Prime age (25-54)	90.0	90.0	89.4	89.2	89.0	-0.3 pps
Older (55-64)	72.4	73.8	76.9	76.7	77.7	0.9 pps
Female	76.5	77.2	79.0	79.3	78.4	-0.9 pps
Young (15-24)	51.3	52.7	54.6	56.6	54.4	-2.2 pps
Prime age (25-54)	84.9	85.6	86.8	86.4	85.7	-0.7 pps
Older (55-64)	73.5	73.9	76.8	77.9	77.6	-0.2 pps
5 - **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	72.1	72.7	74.3	74.0	72.6	-1.4 pps
Young (15-24)	41.1	43.8	46.3	45.9	43.3	-2.6 pps
Prime age (25-54)	82.4	82.3	83.3	82.8	81.2	-1.6 pps
Older (55-64)	67.5	68.4	71.2	71.7	71.7	0.0 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	36.6	41.0	43.3	43.3	38.8	-4.4 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	72.1	73.9	75.8	75.4	74.4	-1.0 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	86.2	87.3	88.1	88.2	87.9	-0.2 pps
Nationals (15-64)	72.6	73.3	74.7	74.7	73.6	-1.1 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	61.2	63.2	68.6	65.2	60.9	-4.3 pps
Male	73.4	73.6	74.7	73.9	72.8	-1.1 pps
Young (15-24)	40.7	43.7	45.6	43.9	41.9	-2.0 pps
Prime age (25-54)	84.7	83.7	84.4	83.5	82.1	-1.4 pps
Older (55-64)	66.6	67.9	69.9	70.0	70.3	0.4 pps
Female	70.7	71.7	73.9	74.1	72.4	-1.8 pps
Young (15-24)	41.4	44.0	46.9	47.8	44.6	-3.3 pps
Prime age (25-54)	80.0	80.8	82.1	82.0	80.3	-1.7 pps
Older (55-64)	68.4	68.8	72.5	73.4	73.0	-0.4 pps
6 - **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	2450.4	2469.5	2526.0	2532.0	2504.4	-1.1 %
7 - **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	-2.3	2.3	3.5	0.9	-0.6	-1.5 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	-1.5	0.8	2.3	0.2	-1.1	-1.3 pps
Male	-1.1	0.6	1.6	-0.4	-0.7	-0.3 pps
Female	-1.8	0.9	3.0	0.9	-1.5	-2.4 pps
8 - **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	11.8	12.2	11.3	11.0	10.5	-0.5 pps
Male	15.1	15.7	14.6	14.4	13.9	-0.5 pps
Female	8.2	8.5	7.9	7.4	6.8	-0.6 pps
9 - **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	14.6	16.0	16.0	15.4	15.2	-0.2 pps
Male	12.0	13.4	13.7	13.2	12.7	-0.5 pps
Female	17.1	18.5	18.3	17.5	17.6	0.1 pps
10 - **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	14.8	16.9	17.0	17.0	16.8	-0.2 pps
Male	10.2	11.0	11.3	11.5	11.8	0.3 pps
Female	19.8	23.2	23.0	22.7	22.1	-0.6 pps
11 **Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	4.8	5.3	4.4	4.2	4.6	0.4 pps
12 - **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	7.7	7.7	6.8	7.2	8.4	1.2 pps
Young (15-24)	21.4	17.1	14.2	16.2	18.8	2.6 pps
Prime age (25-49)	5.8	6.4	5.5	5.8	7.0	1.2 pps
Older (55-64)	7.5	7.4	7.3	7.2	7.7	0.5 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	20.0	17.6	15.7	16.8	21.2	4.4 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	9.1	8.2	7.3	7.8	8.9	1.1 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	4.4	4.7	4.0	4.0	4.6	0.6 pps
Nationals (15-64)	7.7	7.4	6.6	6.7	7.7	1.0 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	14.2	15.0	12.1	15.6	18.5	2.9 pps
Male	8.1	8.2	7.1	7.9	9.2	1.3 pps
Female	7.4	7.1	6.4	6.5	7.6	1.1 pps
13 - **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	15.7	23.7	23.0	22.7	21.1	-1.6 pps
14 - **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	38.2	37.8	37.4	37.2	37.2	0.0 %
Male	38.9	38.2	37.9	37.8	37.5	-0.8 %
Female	36.8	36.2	35.7	35.7	35.9	0.6 %
15 - **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
Agriculture	-4.5	-1.0	-0.8	-6.4	-1.7	4.7 pps
Building and construction	-2.6	1.0	0.2	-3.8	-5.7	-1.9 pps
Services	-4.1	3.1	5.2	0.8	-1.5	-2.3 pps
Manufacturing industry	-1.8	0.2	2.5	0.3	-2.0	-2.3 pps
16 - **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
Compensation per employee	0.6	4.1	2.5	3.4	0.5	-2.9 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP	-1.1	1.7	-2.7	:	:	: pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	0.2	3.7	2.6	3.4	1.8	-1.6 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	1.4	2.8	2.4	3.2	2.5	-0.7 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	-0.2	0.4	-2.7	-1.8	0.4	2.2 pps

Sweden	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2024-2023
1 - **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	10353	10416	10527	10599	10631	0.3 %
2 - **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	6443	6447	6492	6536	6553	0.3 %
(% of total population)	62.2	61.9	61.7	61.7	61.6	0.0 pps
3 - **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	5317	5327	5409	5489	5493	0.1 %
Male	2791	2790	2835	2865	2854	-0.4 %
Female	2525	2537	2574	2624	2639	0.6 %
4 - **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	82.5	82.6	83.3	84.0	83.8	-0.2 pps
Young (15-24)	52.1	54.0	56.8	57.5	56.8	-0.7 pps
Prime age (25-54)	91.2	90.9	91.5	92.2	92.1	-0.1 pps
Older (55-64)	82.4	82.0	81.5	82.4	83.0	0.6 pps
Nationals (15-64)	83.3	83.1	83.7	84.1	83.9	-0.2 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	75.5	77.8	79.8	83.4	83.2	-0.2 pps
Male	84.6	84.6	85.4	85.7	85.3	-0.4 pps
Young (15-24)	52.2	53.3	57.1	57.8	56.7	-1.1 pps
Prime age (25-54)	93.8	93.8	94.1	94.0	93.8	-0.3 pps
Older (55-64)	85.4	84.7	84.1	85.5	85.2	-0.3 pps
Female	80.3	80.5	81.1	82.2	82.3	0.1 pps
Young (15-24)	51.9	54.9	56.6	57.1	56.9	-0.2 pps
Prime age (25-54)	88.4	88.0	88.8	90.3	90.2	0.0 pps
Older (55-64)	79.4	79.3	78.7	79.2	80.7	1.4 pps
5 - **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	75.5	75.1	77.0	77.4	76.7	-0.7 pps
Young (15-24)	39.6	40.7	44.5	44.8	43.0	-1.8 pps
Prime age (25-54)	85.0	84.5	86.3	86.7	86.1	-0.6 pps
Older (55-64)	77.6	76.4	77.0	78.0	78.1	0.1 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	41.9	40.9	44.4	44.8	43.5	-1.3 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	81.0	80.0	80.6	81.1	80.6	-0.5 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	88.0	88.2	89.5	89.5	88.4	-1.2 pps
Nationals (15-64)	77.8	76.8	78.2	78.4	77.6	-0.8 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	56.5	59.3	65.5	67.8	67.8	0.0 pps
Male	77.4	77.1	79.2	79.1	78.1	-1.1 pps
Young (15-24)	39.2	39.9	45.6	44.8	42.6	-2.2 pps
Prime age (25-54)	87.7	87.7	89.1	88.8	88.1	-0.8 pps
Older (55-64)	79.8	78.0	79.3	80.7	79.9	-0.8 pps
Female	73.5	73.0	74.6	75.6	75.2	-0.4 pps
Young (15-24)	40.1	41.6	43.3	44.8	43.5	-1.3 pps
Prime age (25-54)	82.2	81.2	83.3	84.5	84.1	-0.4 pps
Older (55-64)	75.3	74.7	74.7	75.3	76.3	1.1 pps
6 - **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	4862.6	4841.9	4996.3	5059.0	5024.0	-0.7 %
7 - **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	-1.3	1.3	3.5	1.2	-0.3	-1.5 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	-1.5	-0.4	3.2	1.3	-0.7	-1.9 pps
Male	-1.1	-0.4	3.5	0.6	-1.2	-1.8 pps
Female	-2.0	-0.5	2.9	2.0	-0.1	-2.1 pps
8 - **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	8.6	8.5	8.5	8.5	8.2	-0.3 pps
Male	11.8	11.8	11.6	11.5	11.1	-0.4 pps
Female	5.0	4.8	5.1	5.1	5.0	-0.1 pps
9 - **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	14.8	14.5	14.8	13.9	12.6	-1.3 pps
Male	13.2	12.6	13.2	12.4	11.5	-0.9 pps
Female	16.5	16.4	16.5	15.5	13.8	-1.7 pps
10 - **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	22.3	20.4	20.3	20.0	19.5	-0.5 pps
Male	13.8	12.0	12.5	12.6	12.7	0.1 pps
Female	31.7	29.7	29.0	28.0	26.9	-1.1 pps
11 **Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	5.1	5.1	4.4	4.0	4.3	0.2 pps
12 - **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	8.5	8.9	7.5	7.7	8.4	0.7 pps
Young (15-24)	23.9	24.7	21.7	22.1	24.3	2.2 pps
Prime age (25-49)	6.8	7.1	5.7	5.9	6.4	0.5 pps
Older (55-64)	5.8	6.9	5.4	5.3	5.8	0.5 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	25.8	29.5	26.2	25.6	27.0	1.4 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	6.5	6.9	5.8	6.1	6.5	0.4 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	4.8	4.5	3.3	3.9	4.9	1.0 pps
Nationals (15-64)	6.7	7.6	6.6	6.7	7.5	0.8 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	25.2	23.8	18.0	18.7	18.6	-0.1 pps
Male	8.5	8.6	7.1	7.5	8.3	0.8 pps
Female	8.5	9.2	7.9	7.9	8.5	0.6 pps
13 - **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	14.4	22.0	27.6	22.5	21.5	-1.0 pps
14 - **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	37.7	38.4	38.3	38.1	38.1	0.0 %
Male	38.4	38.9	38.9	38.8	38.9	0.3 %
Female	36.8	37.4	37.5	37.3	37.2	-0.3 %
15 - **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
Agriculture	2.4	0.4	0.1	0.2	0.6	0.4 pps
Building and construction	-0.6	2.0	3.5	0.1	-4.4	-4.5 pps
Services	-2.7	1.2	5.6	1.5	-0.7	-2.2 pps
Manufacturing industry	-1.8	0.9	3.0	1.1	0.0	-1.1 pps
16 - **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
Compensation per employee	2.5	4.9	2.0	5.3	4.8	-0.4 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP	0.5	1.9	-3.0	:	:	: pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	0.5	4.4	3.4	3.6	4.6	1.0 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	2.1	2.8	3.4	4.7	4.2	-0.5 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	-0.7	3.9	-2.2	-1.4	1.3	2.7 pps

Euro Area	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2024-2023
1 - **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	346727	346875	348571	350774	352153	0.4 %
2 - **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	219868	219268	220105	221130	221947	0.4 %
(% of total population)	63.4	63.2	63.1	63.0	63.0	0.0 pps
3 - **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	159746	161414	163930	165909	167265	0.8 %
Male	85293	85882	87073	87969	88766	0.9 %
Female	74453	75532	76858	77940	78500	0.7 %
4 - **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	72.7	73.6	74.5	75.0	75.4	0.3 pps
Young (15-24)	38.7	40.7	42.3	43.0	42.8	-0.2 pps
Prime age (25-54)	84.9	85.7	86.3	86.7	86.9	0.3 pps
Older (55-64)	63.5	64.6	65.9	67.4	68.5	1.2 pps
Nationals (15-64)	73.0	74.0	74.9	75.5	75.8	0.3 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	70.0	70.6	71.7	72.0	72.4	0.5 pps
Male	77.7	78.4	79.2	79.6	79.9	0.3 pps
Young (15-24)	41.1	43.1	44.7	45.4	45.4	0.0 pps
Prime age (25-54)	90.5	90.8	91.4	91.6	91.7	0.1 pps
Older (55-64)	69.7	70.7	71.8	73.0	74.3	1.3 pps
Female	67.6	68.8	69.8	70.5	70.8	0.3 pps
Young (15-24)	36.1	38.2	39.8	40.4	40.0	-0.4 pps
Prime age (25-54)	79.4	80.5	81.2	81.8	82.2	0.4 pps
Older (55-64)	57.6	58.9	60.4	62.0	63.0	1.0 pps
5 - **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	66.8	67.8	69.4	70.0	70.5	0.5 pps
Young (15-24)	31.9	33.8	36.2	36.7	36.5	-0.2 pps
Prime age (25-54)	78.6	79.4	80.9	81.4	81.8	0.4 pps
Older (55-64)	60.0	60.8	62.5	64.0	65.3	1.3 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	45.5	45.9	47.8	48.4	48.4	0.1 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	69.7	70.4	71.9	72.4	72.7	0.3 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	82.9	84.0	85.0	85.4	85.6	0.3 pps
Nationals (15-64)	67.6	68.6	70.1	70.8	71.4	0.5 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	60.3	61.4	63.9	64.4	64.7	0.3 pps
Male	71.7	72.5	74.0	74.5	74.9	0.4 pps
Young (15-24)	33.9	35.8	38.2	38.6	38.6	0.0 pps
Prime age (25-54)	84.1	84.6	86.1	86.4	86.6	0.2 pps
Older (55-64)	65.8	66.5	68.1	69.5	70.9	1.4 pps
Female	62.0	63.2	64.7	65.5	66.1	0.5 pps
Young (15-24)	29.9	31.7	34.1	34.8	34.3	-0.5 pps
Prime age (25-54)	73.1	74.3	75.6	76.3	77.0	0.7 pps
Older (55-64)	54.4	55.3	57.1	58.8	60.0	1.1 pps
6 - **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	146968.5	148694.5	152646.9	154851.8	156446.1	1.0 %
7 - **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	-1.4	1.6	2.4	1.4	1.0	-0.4 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	-1.8	1.2	2.7	1.4	1.0	-0.4 pps
Male	-1.8	0.9	2.5	1.2	1.0	-0.2 pps
Female	-1.7	1.5	2.8	1.7	1.0	-0.7 pps
8 - **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	13.1	12.9	12.9	12.8	12.7	-0.1 pps
Male	16.2	16.1	15.9	15.7	15.6	-0.1 pps
Female	9.5	9.3	9.5	9.5	9.4	-0.1 pps
9 - **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	14.3	15.3	15.3	14.4	13.7	-0.7 pps
Male	13.7	14.6	14.5	13.7	12.9	-0.8 pps
Female	14.8	16.1	16.2	15.3	14.5	-0.8 pps
10 - **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	21.2	20.7	20.5	20.6	20.7	0.1 pps
Male	9.3	9.2	9.2	9.4	9.4	0.0 pps
Female	34.8	33.9	33.4	33.4	33.4	0.0 pps
11 **Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	5.2	4.9	4.3	4.0	3.8	-0.2 pps
12 - **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	8.0	7.8	6.8	6.6	6.4	-0.2 pps
Young (15-24)	17.4	16.9	14.6	14.5	14.6	0.1 pps
Prime age (25-49)	7.5	7.2	6.3	6.1	5.9	-0.2 pps
Older (55-64)	5.6	6.0	5.2	4.9	4.7	-0.2 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	14.2	14.0	12.3	11.9	11.4	-0.5 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	7.4	7.4	6.5	6.3	6.2	-0.1 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	5.4	5.1	4.4	4.3	4.3	0.0 pps
Nationals (15-64)	7.3	7.3	6.4	6.1	5.9	-0.2 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	13.9	13.0	10.9	10.5	10.7	0.2 pps
Male	7.7	7.4	6.4	6.2	6.1	-0.1 pps
Female	8.3	8.2	7.2	6.9	6.6	-0.3 pps
13 - **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	37.9	41.0	39.9	36.2	33.2	-3.0 pps
14 - **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	39.3	39.4	39.5	39.2	39.0	-0.5 %
Male	40.4	40.5	40.6	40.2	40.0	-0.5 %
Female	37.6	37.6	37.6	37.4	37.4	0.0 %
15 - **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
Agriculture	-2.3	0.5	-0.7	-2.1	0.0	2.1 pps
Building and construction	0.7	3.2	3.7	1.3	1.1	-0.2 pps
Services	-2.7	1.6	3.5	1.9	0.9	-1.1 pps
Manufacturing industry	-2.0	-0.1	1.2	0.8	-0.1	-0.9 pps
16 - **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
Compensation per employee	-0.4	4.3	4.5	5.3	4.5	-0.8 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP	-2.2	1.9	-0.2	:	:	: pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	2.4	0.9	5.3	5.1	4.4	-0.7 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	3.0	1.0	4.5	5.1	4.4	-0.7 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	-4.6	4.7	1.1	-1.0	-0.1	0.9 pps

European Union (27 countries)	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2024-2023
1 - **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	446095	445898	448666	450934	452216	0.3 %
2 - **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	283864	282618	282896	283420	284307	0.3 %
(% of total population)	63.6	63.4	63.1	62.9	62.9	0.0 pps
3 - **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	206565	208008	210684	212618	214258	0.8 %
Male	111116	111423	112538	113315	114145	0.7 %
Female	95448	96585	98146	99302	100113	0.8 %
4 - **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	72.8	73.6	74.5	75.0	75.4	0.3 pps
Young (15-24)	37.8	39.2	40.6	41.2	41.1	-0.1 pps
Prime age (25-54)	85.3	85.9	86.6	87.0	87.2	0.3 pps
Older (55-64)	62.8	64.0	65.4	67.0	68.2	1.2 pps
Nationals (15-64)	73.0	73.9	74.7	75.3	75.6	0.3 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	70.3	71.0	72.1	72.4	73.0	0.6 pps
Male	78.2	78.7	79.4	79.8	80.0	0.2 pps
Young (15-24)	40.6	41.9	43.4	43.9	43.7	-0.1 pps
Prime age (25-54)	91.0	91.2	91.7	91.8	92.0	0.1 pps
Older (55-64)	69.8	70.8	72.1	73.3	74.5	1.2 pps
Female	67.3	68.5	69.5	70.2	70.7	0.4 pps
Young (15-24)	34.9	36.4	37.8	38.4	38.2	-0.2 pps
Prime age (25-54)	79.5	80.6	81.4	82.0	82.4	0.4 pps
Older (55-64)	56.2	57.4	59.1	60.9	62.2	1.2 pps
5 - **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	67.5	68.3	69.8	70.4	70.8	0.4 pps
Young (15-24)	31.5	32.7	34.7	35.2	35.0	-0.3 pps
Prime age (25-54)	79.6	80.4	81.7	82.2	82.5	0.4 pps
Older (55-64)	59.6	60.4	62.3	63.9	65.2	1.3 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	44.0	44.1	45.9	46.4	46.3	-0.1 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	70.4	70.9	72.3	72.7	73.0	0.3 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	83.8	85.0	86.0	86.3	86.5	0.2 pps
Nationals (15-64)	68.2	69.0	70.4	71.1	71.5	0.4 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	60.5	61.7	64.2	64.8	65.2	0.4 pps
Male	72.8	73.3	74.7	75.1	75.4	0.3 pps
Young (15-24)	33.7	35.0	37.0	37.3	37.1	-0.2 pps
Prime age (25-54)	85.4	85.6	86.9	87.2	87.3	0.2 pps
Older (55-64)	66.2	67.0	68.7	70.1	71.4	1.3 pps
Female	62.3	63.3	64.9	65.7	66.2	0.5 pps
Young (15-24)	29.1	30.3	32.3	33.0	32.7	-0.3 pps
Prime age (25-54)	73.9	75.0	76.5	77.1	77.7	0.6 pps
Older (55-64)	53.3	54.3	56.2	58.0	59.4	1.3 pps
6 - **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	191681	193104	197470	199560	201338	0.9 %
7 - **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	-1.3	1.6	2.2	1.2	0.8	-0.4 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	-1.6	0.7	2.3	1.1	0.9	-0.2 pps
Male	-1.6	0.3	2.0	0.8	0.8	0.0 pps
Female	-1.7	1.2	2.6	1.4	1.0	-0.3 pps
8 - **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	13.4	13.1	13.1	13.0	12.9	-0.2 pps
Male	16.7	16.4	16.3	16.2	16.0	-0.2 pps
Female	9.5	9.3	9.4	9.4	9.3	-0.1 pps
9 - **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	13.5	14.1	14.1	13.4	12.8	-0.6 pps
Male	12.9	13.4	13.3	12.6	12.0	-0.6 pps
Female	14.2	14.8	14.9	14.3	13.6	-0.7 pps
10 - **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	18.2	17.7	17.6	17.8	17.8	0.0 pps
Male	8.4	8.2	8.2	8.4	8.5	0.1 pps
Female	29.6	28.7	28.4	28.5	28.6	0.1 pps
11 **Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	4.4	4.1	3.7	3.5	3.2	-0.2 pps
12 - **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	7.2	7.1	6.2	6.1	5.9	-0.2 pps
Young (15-24)	16.8	16.7	14.5	14.5	14.9	0.4 pps
Prime age (25-49)	6.6	6.5	5.6	5.5	5.4	-0.1 pps
Older (55-64)	5.2	5.5	4.8	4.6	4.4	-0.2 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	14.0	14.1	12.5	12.1	11.9	-0.2 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	6.5	6.6	5.8	5.7	5.6	-0.1 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	4.8	4.6	3.8	3.8	3.9	0.1 pps
Nationals (15-64)	6.6	6.6	5.8	5.7	5.5	-0.2 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	14.0	13.1	10.9	10.5	10.7	0.2 pps
Male	7.0	6.8	5.9	5.8	5.7	-0.1 pps
Female	7.5	7.4	6.5	6.4	6.2	-0.2 pps
13 - **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	35.8	39.3	38.7	35.2	32.4	-2.8 pps
14 - **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	39.1	39.3	39.3	39.0	38.8	-0.5 %
Male	40.3	40.5	40.6	40.2	39.9	-0.7 %
Female	37.8	38.0	38.0	37.8	37.7	-0.3 %
15 - **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
Agriculture	-1.5	-0.2	-1.2	-2.0	-3.2	-1.2 pps
Building and construction	0.9	3.1	3.0	0.9	0.9	0.0 pps
Services	-2.5	1.8	3.3	1.8	0.9	-0.9 pps
Manufacturing industry	-2.6	-0.1	1.3	0.1	-0.1	-0.2 pps
16 - **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
Compensation per employee	-0.1	4.5	4.8	6.0	5.3	-0.7 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP	-1.8	1.8	-0.6	:	:	: pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	2.6	1.4	5.6	5.6	4.9	-0.7 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	3.2	1.5	5.0	5.7	4.9	-0.8 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	-4.3	4.7	1.2	-0.7	0.2	0.9 pps