Council of the European Union

Brussels, 7 October 2026
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From:	Swedish delegation
To:	Working Party on Frontiers / Mixed Committee (EU-Iceland/Norway and Switzerland/Liechtenstein)
No. prev. doc.:	8113/26
Subject:	Prolongation of the temporary reintroduction of border controls at the Swedish internal borders in accordance with Article 25a of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code)

Delegations will find attached a copy of the letter received by the General Secretariat of the Council on 6 October 2026 regarding the prolongation of the temporary reintroduction of border controls by Sweden at the internal borders from 12 November 2026 to 11 May 2027.

E-MAIL

Government Offices of Sweden

IM 5941 2026
06-10-2026

5 October 2026

Secretary-General of the Council
Thérèse Blanchet

Ministry of Justice
Minister for Justice

Dear Madam Secretary-General,

Please find enclosed our notification for a decision of the reintroduction of border control at the internal border in accordance with article 25a (5) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 (Schengen Borders Code).

The reintroduction of border control is due to hostile hybrid activities and events that constitutes a serious threat to public policy and internal security. The nature of the threat is further elaborated in the notification.

The decision will be in force as of 12 November 2026 for a planned duration of six months.

Yours sincerely,

Gunnar Strömmer

Telephone: +46 8 405 10 00
Fax. +46 8 24 46 31
Web: www.regeringen.se

Postal address: SE 103 33 Stockholm
Street address: Drottninggatan 3
E-mail. ju.registrator@gov.se

Notification of a temporary reintroduction or prolongation of border control at internal borders

1. Notification submitted by:

Sweden

2. Date of the notification:

October 6 2026

3. Date and duration of the planned reintroduction or prolongation of border control at internal borders (Article 27(1), point (d), of Regulation (EU) 2016/399):

The decision will be in force for a period of 6 months as of 12 November 2026 up to and including 11 May 2027.

4. Scope of the proposed reintroduction or prolongation of border control at internal borders, specifying at which part or parts of the internal borders border control will be reintroduced or prolonged (Article 27(1), point (b), of Regulation (EU) 2016/399)

The land border with Denmark at the exit for train- and motor vehicle traffic from the Öresund bridge will be the main scope and focus. Border checks will also occur at all seaports and airports in the cities of Stockholm, Gothenburg, Malmö, Helsingborg, Trelleborg and Ystad.

The Police Authority will receive a mandate within the framework of the decision to perform checks elsewhere if they based on a risk analysis, intelligence or other relevant information, consider it to be necessary to effectively address the serious threat. Border checks might therefore take place in other border regions than those mentioned above and include both sea, air, and land borders.

5. Notification for a:

☐first reintroduction of border control at internal borders (unforeseeable event): Article 25a(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399

X☐first reintroduction of border control at internal borders (foreseeable event): Article 25a(4) and (5) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399

☐prolongation of border control at internal borders (foreseeable event): Article 25a(4) and (5) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399

Period(s) of previous reintroduction(s) of border control at internal borders:

☐prolongation of border control at internal borders after 2 years, for major exceptional situation: Article 25a(6) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399

Period(s) of previous reintroduction(s) of border control at internal borders:

Please indicate the dates of previous reintroductions of border control at internal borders.

☐prolongation of border control at internal borders after 2 years and 6 months, for major exceptional situation: Article 25a(6) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399

Period(s) of previous reintroduction(s) of border control at internal borders:

Please indicate the dates of previous reintroductions of border control at internal borders.

☐reintroduction of border control at internal borders in accordance with a Council Implementing Decision: Article 28(1) and (5) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399

NB: A continuation of a reintroduction of border control at the internal borders does not have to be considered a prolongation if the serious threat to public policy or internal security upon which it is based is different from the serious threat that motivated the preceding reintroduction of border control at the internal border. If this is the case, please notify for a first reintroduction and specify the new and distinct nature of the serious threat to public policy or internal security under 7.

6. If the notification for a foreseeable event is made less than four weeks before the planned reintroduction or prolongation of border control at internal borders (Article 25a(4), (5) and (6) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399):

Please indicate when the circumstances giving rise to the need to reintroduce or prolong border control at internal borders became known.

7. Serious threat to public policy or internal security, consisting of:

☐terrorist incidents or threats, and threats posed by serious organised crime

☐ large-scale public health emergencies

☐an exceptional situation characterised by sudden large-scale unauthorised movements of third country nationals, within the meaning of Article 25(1), point (c), of Regulation (EU) 2016/399

☐ Large scale or high-profile international event

X☐Other

Russia's war of aggression and the support for Ukraine shown by the EU and it's Member States has led to an increased threat to Member States' security. Examples of hostile hybrid actions are the harmful use of drones, the activities of Russia's "shadow fleet", and the continued and increased attempts of instrumentalization of migration towards the Eastern Schengen-external border. The recent sabotage attempts in Leipzig, Germany shows an even more serious level of hostile action and that foreign state actors operate by moving freely within the Schengen area.

The events in Ceuta, Spain show signs of state involvement and also highlights the issue of control over the external borders.

Foreign state actors are also still involved in using and recruiting persons from the organised criminal gang environment to carry out acts of violence and other serious crimes.

The above-mentioned issues all raise serious concern regarding control over the external border, the policy of issuing visas to Russian citizens and the external border check procedure regarding persons that might pose a risk to the public policy and internal security of Member States.

This combination of factors and events has made the Government make the assessment that there is a serious threat to the public policy and internal security of Sweden.

8. Names of authorised border crossing points

Border crossing points primarily affected at this time will as mentioned above be:

- Toll and Customs station at Lernacken (vehicle exit from the bridge of Öresund, Malmö).
- Train station at Hyllie (first station for trains arriving via the bridge of Öresund, Malmö).
- Malmö Airport, Helsingborg, Trelleborg and Ystad seaports.
- Arlanda Stockholm Airport and seaports of Stockholm.
- Gothenburg Airport and seaports.
- Nyköping Skavsta Airport.

Border checks within the frame of the decision might also take place at other parts of the border with the Police Authority responsible for such operational decisions.

9. Measures taken by other Member States (if applicable)

Not applicable.

10. Assessment of necessity and proportionality under Article 26(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399

10.1. **Appropriateness: explanation how the reintroduction of border control at internal borders is likely to adequately remedy the threat**

A decision to reintroduce border control at the internal border increases the capability and effectiveness of the Police Authority in a way which at this time is not possible to fully achieve by other means. Being able to apply the flexible approach and tactics offered and made possible by reintroduced border control legislation is crucial.

10.2. **Explanation why the objectives pursued by the reintroduction cannot be obtained by:**

—*the use of alternative measures, such as proportionate checks carried out in the context of checks within the territory as referred to in Article 23, point (a), of Regulation (EU) 2016/399;*

—*the use of the procedure laid down in Article 23a of Regulation (EU) 2016/399;*

— *other forms of police cooperation provided for under Union law;*

—*common measures regarding temporary restrictions on travel to the Member States as referred to in Article 21a(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399.*

The Police Authority is now alternating between police checks in border areas based on national legislation and border checks performed on the basis of the Schengen Borders Code. This is however to be considered as a test phase at this time. After careful consideration and dialogue with the Police Authority and other relevant stake holders, the government has found that the reintroduction of border control at the internal border is therefore necessary to face the serious threat.

10.3. **Likely impact on the movement of persons within the area without internal border control and the functioning of cross-border regions**

	The effect on the movement of persons is minimal, and all possible attention is paid to ensuring that this continues to be the case. The Police Authority will be working in an intelligence and risk analysis-based way of operations, while occasionally also performing randomised spot checks. These are done as swiftly and non-disruptive to traffic flows as possible. Trains needing to stop at Hyllie station must do so for a few minutes. This has earlier been shown to have no or little effect on the number of travellers and commuters and their numbers have increased yearly.
10.4.	**If the serious threat consists of sudden large-scale unauthorised movements (Article 25(1), point (c), and 27(3) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399):**
	Please provide a risk assessment and information on the sudden large-scale unauthorised movements, including any information obtained from Union Agencies and data analysis from relevant information systems. *Please include quantitative and qualitative data, including for example the number of applications for international protection and unauthorised movements, as well as information on to the sudden nature of the large-scale unauthorised movement, the strain put on the resources and capacities of the competent authorities, the level of preparedness of the competent authorities, the likely risk to the overall functioning of the area without internal border control.*
10.5.	**Opinion of the Commission and consultation process (if applicable)**

11. If the notification concerns a prolongation of border control at internal borders after 6 months in accordance with Article 25a(5) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 (Article 27(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399)

11.1.	**Assessment of the necessity and proportionality based on the criteria laid down in Article 26(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399**
11.2.	**Scale and anticipated evolution of the serious threat**
	Please elaborate on the scale and anticipated evolution of the serious threat, in particular: *— how long the serious threat is expected to persist;* *— which sections of the internal borders may be affected;* *— information regarding coordination measures with other Member States impacted or likely to be impacted by the border control at internal borders.*

12. If the notification concerns a prolongation of border control at internal borders after 2 years, for a major exceptional situation (Article 25a(6) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399).

12.1.	**Assessment of the necessity and proportionality based on the criteria laid down in Article 26(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399**
12.2.	**Action taken in response to an opinion of the Commission issued in accordance with Article 25a(6) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 (if applicable)**
12.3.	**Action taken in response to a consultation process initiated in accordance with Article 25a(6) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 (if applicable)**

12.4.	**Substantiation of the continued threat to public policy or internal security**
12.5.	**Explanation why alternative measures are ineffective**
12.6.	**Presentation of mitigating measures**
12.7.	**Where appropriate: presentation of the means, actions, conditions and timeline with a view to lifting border control at internal borders**

13. Any further information (optional)

As mentioned under point 10.2 the Police Authority are now carrying out controls of persons and vehicles in accordance with national legislation for police checks in border areas. No set time limit has yet been decided for this test period and checks in accordance with the reintroduced border control will be carried out in parallel depending on the circumstances.

14. Withholding of information on grounds of public security (Article 27(5) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399)

Detailed and operational information has been withheld due to its relation to matters of national interest- and internal security as well as for reasons of ongoing criminal investigations.

15. Confidentiality of information (Article 35 of Regulation (EU) 2016/399)

No.