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COHAFA 81 RELEX 1303 INTER-REP 98

#### **NOTE**

From:	General Secretariat of the Council		
To:	Delegations		
Subject:	Protection of humanitarian and medical personnel		
	- presentation by INSO		

Following the meeting of the Working Party on Humanitarian Aid and Food Aid (COHAFA) on 14 and 15 October 2025, delegations will find in Annex the presentation made by INSO <sup>1 2</sup>.

International NGO Safety Organisation, identification number in the EU Transparency Register: 2983112100754-33.

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# **Protecting Humanitarians**

Threats to NGOs in 2025























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




### Threats to Humanitarians – At a Glance

#### Trends in global data

Incidents with a serious impact on humanitarians (2025)





- Despite growth of fatalities globally, humanitarians are still far more likely to be injured or wounded
- Increasing hostility of states to humanitarians means arrests often resemble abductions


### Threats to Humanitarians – At a Glance

Trends in global data

Share of humanitarian fatalities by Country (2025) Share of humanitarian fatalities by Affiliation (2025) Share of humanitarian fatalities by Act (2025)







- Five contexts account for 72% of humanitarian fatalities in 2025
- National staff, including of INGOs, face the most severe risks
- The mechanisms matter less than underlying drivers of risk



# Situating Humanitarian Risk into a Global Landscape

Geopolitical trends driving humanitarian risk

Reduced UN peacekeeping	Sovereignty as defining principle		Declining respect for Global Norms and International Law		Weak accountability mechanisms
capacity					Increased militarisation
Transactional global politics	Rise of regional powers & localised diplomacy	Erosion of UN legitimacy and effectiveness	Actor proliferation	Governance vacuums	Contested information landscapes



## The Impact of Defunding

Aid cuts degrade risk management capacity

**UNHAS** flights

Forums and UNHAS in a number of contexts

UNHAS has been the primary pain

UNHAS flights being affected.

Flights reduced in frequency to a number of our projects

UNHAS flights have been reduced that has had an impact on our ability to safely work in remote areas.


UNHAS flight impacted in some locations, all travel for forum cancelled.

Testimony from partners on the effects of defunding (INSO Survey on Defunding Impacts on NGO Security Risk Management Capacity and Acceptance 2025)

- Defunding crisis is not a key driver of risk according to NGOs
- Less than 1% of NGO incidents this year are related to cuts
- Cuts are instead impacting NGOs' ability to manage risks
- Critical enablers and internal support functions are under pressure




#### Ukraine



- Drone use has expanded globally, but is a defining feature in Ukraine
- Short-range drones deliberately target
  NGO vehicles near frontlines
- Clear disregard for IHL by main conflict actor
- NGOs must decide how to counter threat in principled manner



#### Palestine




Violence at distribution sites in oPT in 2025

- ➤ Israeli forces are responsible for 25% of global humanitarian deaths in 2025
- Physical risks to staff are matched by systemic challenges to principled action
- GHF exemplifies politicised and securitised aid
- Co-option by bad faith actors endangers acceptance



#### DRC




- M23 have perpetrated nearly 10% of NGO incidents globally in 2025
- Proliferation of conflict actors is a major obstacle to access
- Hardening of access regimes between M23 and government-held areas
- NGOs may be forced to align, risking neutrality and acceptance



#### Sudan

Areas of Influence in Sudan (Current)



- Sudan's scale incorporates several key trends
- State and quasi-state actors present acute threats
- Territorial control hardening between a series of armed actors
- Presence of non-traditional aid groups complicates relations with partners



#### Information under attack

Safeguarding a key enabler of effective response

**Funding Gaps** 

Politicisation, Criminalisation and Declining Acceptance

[We commit to] Provide support that allows international, national and local humanitarian personnel to access timely and relevant information, training and systems, to promote measures to support the physical and mental well-being of humanitarian personnel


21.3c Declaration for the Protection of Humanitarian Personnel



# **Policy Recommendations**

- Continue to **strengthen accountability** for violations of international law and support broader collective action on protection of civilians.
- Take concrete actions towards the **decriminalisation of aid work**, including the adoption of humanitarian exemptions into domestic legal frameworks, counter-terrorism legislation and sanctions regimes.
- Maintain and strengthen **coordinated diplomatic engagement** during crises. Absence of diplomatic support leaves humanitarian actors more vulnerable.
- Support and defend Independent information services on humanitarian safety through both continued funding but also political support.
- Support stronger humanitarian leadership to defend humanitarian space including coordinated action when such leadership is threatened.
- Push within the Humanitarian Reset for the stronger **integration of safety and security of aid workers** into humanitarian architecture.
- Continue to support ECHO's efforts to support the implementation of the IASC Risk Sharing Framework.
- Ensure structured financial support to critical field enablers.

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