
At its meeting on 25 October 2018, the Political and Security Committee took note of the EU HEX-ML 18 (PACE) European Union Hybrid Exercise Multilayer 18 (Parallel and Coordinated Exercise) Exercise Instructions (EXINST).

COREPER is invited to take note of the EU HEX-ML 18 (PACE) European Union Hybrid Exercise Multilayer 18 (Parallel and Coordinated Exercise) Exercise Instructions (EXINST), as set out in Annex, and agree its release to NATO international staff, NATO international military staff, and NATO command structures, in accordance to the PACE concept.
EU HEX-ML 18 (PACE)

EUROPEAN UNION HYBRID EXERCISE MULTILAYER 18 (PARALLEL AND COORDINATED EXERCISE)

Exercise Instructions

(EXINST)
FOREWORD

1. The EXINST contains all the basic information and instructions for the Training Audience (TA) and participants in general concerning the conduct of EU HEX-ML 18 (PACE) as foreseen in the EXSPEC (Exercise Specifications).

2. EU HEX-ML 18 (PACE) is a double exercise containing a CSDP planning (ML) and an event driven (HEX) crisis management exercise, coordinated with and conducted in parallel with NATO.

3. The events required to drive the whole exercise will be injected in a timely way by the Directing Staff (DISTAFF) during the Lead-In and the conduct phases.

4. The EXINST will be distributed to the exercise participants as well as DISTAFF before the start of the exercise (STARTEX).

5. This EXINST is structured in two sections:

   • Section I – Organisation;
   • Section II – Exercise Scenario;

6. Section I deals with all real life issues and includes a detailed description of the conduct phase as well as of all involved participants. Furthermore, it covers all “administrative” issues needed by the participants of EU HEX-ML 18 (PACE) to successfully execute the exercise.

7. Section II contains information regarding the exercise scenario which can be released to the participants before the start of the conduct phase.
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8. In November 2016, EU Foreign and Defence ministers agreed on a number of key steps to upgrade cooperation on Security and Defence in line with the Global Strategy (Council conclusions). One of these is to increase protection for the EU and its citizens by strengthening the nexus between internal and external security, which needs to be adequately developed and thoroughly exercised.

9. The Council approved on 6 December 2016 the Common Set of Proposals to implement the Joint Declaration on EU-NATO cooperation by the leaders of the Institutions of EU and NATO of 8 July 2016 which i.a. stipulates that the parties should step up their "coordination on exercises, including on hybrid, by developing as the first step Parallel and Coordinated Exercises for 2017 and 2018". As follow-up, EU and NATO staffs have agreed the modalities for the implementation of Parallel and Coordinated Exercises (PACE) for 2017 and 2018. The PACE concept was endorsed by NATO's COEC (Council Operations and Exercise Committee) in December and was noted by PSC on 9 February 2017. The new Joint Declaration on EU-NATO cooperation of 10 July 2018 confirms this commitment.

10. In accordance with the PACE concept, each organisation holds their own exercise, with its own aims, scope and objectives, but basing it on a common geopolitical setting with interaction taking place between the staff of the two organisations. NATO took the lead in 2017 with their CMX-17, whereas the EU leads in 2018.

11. The cooperation with NATO will be carried out in full respect of the principles of inclusiveness and reciprocity, and of the autonomy of the EU’s decision-making. These exercises will allow testing the coordination of procedures focusing on respective arrangements and operational protocols (EU and NATO respective playbooks) for countering hybrid threats. It has also been agreed that each organisation will identify its own lessons and formulate recommendations that will be shared with the other organisation at staff level to the extent possible.
12. The EU HEX-ML 18 (PACE) Exercise Specifications (EXSPEC), define i.a. the aim, scope, objectives and the TA. For the ease of reference, the most important issues are summarised in this chapter.

13. The exercise is named **EU Hybrid Exercise Multilayer 18 (Parallel and Coordinated Exercise)** or EU HEX-ML 18 (PACE). It is a so-called comprehensive and combined exercise with a focus on crisis management and response in a hybrid threats environment. The EU HEX-ML 18 (PACE) will be conducted in accordance with the provisions of the EU Exercise Policy framework, and in full respect of the principles of inclusiveness, reciprocity and decision-making autonomy of the EU.

14. The EU HEX-ML 18 (PACE) conduct phase for the CSDP will **start on 05 Nov** and **end on 23 Nov 2018** (ENDEX). The hybrid event driven conduct phase will start on 19 Nov and end on 23 Nov. It will have a previous lead-in phase from 05 Nov to 18 Nov.

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18. The aim of the exercise is to improve and enhance, in a safe-to-fail environment, the EU’s ability to respond to a complex crisis of a hybrid nature with an internal and an external dimension, as well as to improve cooperation with NATO in accordance with the PACE concept.

19. The EU HEX-ML 18 (PACE) overarching objectives as stated in the EXSPEC are:
20. To enhance the capacity of the EU to respond to hybrid threats, including exercising decision making of Member States (MS) through a crisis response event-driven exercise, and spark a broader discussion on hybrid threats.

21. To exercise the EU decision making process, as appropriate, as well as the planning at political, politico strategic, strategic and operational levels, during a crisis affecting the internal and external security dimensions of the EU.

22. To improve the EU's ability to use its CFSP tools with an integrated approach, contributing to the overall response through the planning of a CSDP mission and operation.

23. To interact with NATO at staff-to-staff level, during the planning, conduct and reporting phases of the exercise in accordance with the 6 December 2016 Council Conclusions (15283/16), with the aim to improve the exchange of information and to identify modalities which seek to synchronize the two organisations’ parallel crisis response activities, in particular in a hybrid threats context including aggressive actions by state and non-state actors.

24. To increase the TA's awareness and the understanding of the overall EU approach to crisis response, as well as that of NATO.

25. The CSDP Exercise Objectives and the Event-driven Crisis Response Exercise Objectives are those set in the EXSPEC.

26. The EU HEX-ML 18 (PACE) specific Training Objectives (TO) are attached in ANNEX A.

B. TIMELINES OF THE EXERCISE

27. The EU HEX-ML 18 (PACE) consists of an event-driven crisis response exercise focusing on hybrid threats and a CSDP planning exercise at several levels (political, politico-strategic, strategic and operational). Both exercises will be designed to influence one another, using a geopolitical setting based in three connected theatres: Europe, Maritime (Mediterranean Sea, Atlantic and Baltic Sea) and Africa.

28. The EU HEX-ML 18 (PACE) will include a Preparation Phase (until 5 Nov), a Lead-In Phase (5 – 18 Nov) and Conduct Phase (5 – 23 Nov for CSDP and 19 – 23 Nov for event-driven).
29. During the Preparation Phase, from June to November thematic workshops will be carried out with the aim of preparing specific TAs, according with the Exercise Planning Guide (EPG). During this preparation phase there will be CSDP related workshops with the aim of prescripting the politico-strategic documentation required for the development of the CONOPS during the Conduct Phase. The main planning documents (PFCA, CMC) deriving from these workshops are annexed to this document. Similar workshops are being organised during the preparation phase to develop the Hybrid Event-Driven component of the scenario.

30. On 25-26 Oct 2018 will be an information briefing in Brussels for the TA on how the Conduct Phase will run. Council Committees will be updated on the fictitious crisis before the Conduct Phase.

31. During the Lead-in of the Event-Driven Phase the participants will start receiving messages related to the fictitious crisis.

32. The EU HEX-ML 18 (PACE) exercise conduct phase will comprise the conduct phases of both, the CSDP planning exercise and the event driven exercise.

33. The exercise activities will take place between 9am and 5pm CET. No injects will be sent after 4 pm CET.

C. PARTICIPANTS

1. EEAS

   a. TA: HR/VP, SG, PRISM, EUMS, CMPD, CPCC, IBS, SG. AFFGEN.1- Strategic, SECPOL, INTCEN, Geographical desk (AFRICA-MENA), POL.PSC, EUMC chair, GLOBAL, (EUNAVFOR MED as a response cell).

   b. SE: ESDC.

2. COMMISSION

   a. TA: SG, DG COMM/SPP, CERT-EU, DG CNECT, DG DIGIT, DG DEVCO, DG ECHO, DG ENER, DG GROW, DG HOME, DG HR, DG JRC, DG MARE, DG MOVE, DG NEAR, DG SANTE.

3. COUNCIL
b. TA: Office of the President of the European Council (PEC CAB), Office of the Secretary General (SG CAB), Presidency of the Council of the EU, Counter Terrorism Coordinator, COREPER II, PSC, EUMC, CIVCOM, PMG, RELEX and other relevant working parties as appropriate, General Secretariat of the Council, in particular the Directorate General Foreign Affairs, Enlargement, Civil Protection in particular the IPCR team, DG F Press Office, ATHENA Mechanism.

c. SE: BIC, DGA CIS.

4. MEMBER STATES

d. TA: EU EL OHQ, EU EL (F)HQ reinforced by augmentees from MS, Ukraine and the Republic of Serbia, MSs capitals and permanent representations.

5. 

e. 

f. SE: EDA.

6. NON-EU PARTICIPANTS:

g. Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Switzerland have been invited to participate in the planning and the conduct of the exercise.

h. NATO participation will be carried out in accordance with the EXSPEC.

i. UN and ICRC will be consulted during the preparation of the CSDP planning documentation.

A detailed list of all TA will be compiled as a separate document and updated on a regular basis. All TA are required to register online using this link: no later than 19 Oct.

DIRECTING STAFF (DISTAFF)

34. The DISTAFF will monitor, control and, if necessary, influence and steer the exercise play in accordance with the EU HEX-ML 18 (PACE) aims and objectives, as stipulated in the
LIMITE

EXSPEC and EXINST. The DISTAFF Instructions (DIINST) will be issued before the conduct of the exercise and will contain its structure, manning and detailed functions.
D. ASSUMPTIONS AND ARTIFICIALITIES OF THE EXERCISE

35. The DISTAFF of the exercise will inject events and observe the reaction of the TA by monitoring, to the extent possible, the exercise message traffic and other activities undertaken by the participants. If necessary, the DISTAFF will take corrective actions in case that the TA does not react to a certain event.

36. At the STARTEX the military operation and the civilian mission will be fictitiously established but not launched, therefore both the civilian and military HQ are expected to develop their respective CONOPS during the conduct phase and present it to the PSC at the end of the exercise.

37. During the conduct phase, and notably during the Event-Driven part (19-23 November) MS are expected to respond to different incidents that will be added to the already given scenario background. The depth of the reactions to these incidents within a MS is a responsibility of each MS. Movement of people or activation of real resources are not expected, just the fictitious responses through the normal established mechanisms to respond to the crisis. Besides to this reaction, a parallel report to the DISTAFF from the national focal point might be requested in order to track the overall reactions. The format of this report will be developed in the DIINST.

38. Based on the lessons observed in EU PACE17, infrastructure and logistics for EU-NATO liaison cells in EU institutions and NATO HQ will be facilitated for the use of the DISTAFF and TA which might require it.

39. Participants may need to balance exercise play with real-world emergencies. Real-world emergencies\(^1\) will take priority.

E. PUBLIC INFORMATION (as part of conduct)

40. The Council media team, the European Commission's Spokesperson Service (SPP) and the HRVP's SPP will determine the relevant master messages, the channels to be used and audiences to be targeted.

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\(^1\) Real world emergencies: These emergencies must be duly explained in the First Impression Report.
41. The Council media team, the European Commission's SPP and the HRVP's SPP will handle communication in the context of EU HEX-ML 18 (PACE) in cooperation with EEAS STRATCOM.

42. During the prescript of the CSDP planning documentation EEAS STRATCOM in close cooperation with SPP and EEAS geographical service will issue an information strategy on the CSDP civilian mission and military operation.

43. During the conduct phase DISTAFF will be assisted by EEAS STRATCOM expertise with the injection of events.

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G. EU HEX-ML 18 (PACE) LESSON LEARNED PROCESS AND EXERCISE REPORTING

52. Learning lessons from EU HEX-ML 18 (PACE) is fundamental to improving future EU crisis response and deepening EU-NATO cooperation.

53. The scale of EU HEX-ML 18 (PACE) will enable lessons to be learnt at the ministerial / departmental, national and EU tiers, and at all levels i.e. political, strategic, operational and tactical. In order to consolidate all these findings and drive coherent improvements, a broad framework for the lessons process has been devised.

3. EU HEX-ML 18 (PACE) Lessons Learned Process

54. EU institutions are responsible for addressing their internal lessons and related recommendations identified during EU HEX-ML 18 (PACE).

55. Recommendations from the exercise that cut across the European Commission, the General Secretariat of the Council and the EEAS and relate to either EU crisis response or EU-NATO cooperation will be followed up jointly by the informal network established for the planning of EU HEX-ML 18 (PACE), supplemented with relevant expertise. MS will be updated on progress through the PMG and FoP IPCR/SCI as well as other relevant groups and working parties.

56. MS and external organisations are encouraged to carry out their own lessons-learned procedures. They are invited to work with the relevant EU institution in relation to any recommendations on improving EU-level crisis response.
4. Lessons process within EU institutions:

57. All EU institutions / training entities should assign a TA Lessons Lead (TALL) that has experience of exercising and a good understanding of their TAs' roles and responsibilities. This person should be communicated to the exercise planning team by 1 Oct 2018.

58. TA Lesson leads should:

- Promote the importance of the lessons process to their TA and explain how it will be undertaken. This should be done well in advance of the exercise lead-in phase beginning 5 November.

- Identify and collate Lessons Observations (LO) about good and poor practice from individual TA members using the template at Annex E and submit these to the appropriate institutional OPR (Commission, EEAS, GSC).

  Observations essentially comprise of a description of what happened (e.g. Analysis Report was not shared with Agency A), a comparison of how this differed from the performance that was expected (Analysis Report should have been shared with Agency A), the impact of this action (Agency A response was delayed) and a recommendation on remedial action.

  Lessons Observations can relate to crisis response performance (e.g. information sharing between two EU entities was poor) or exercise planning (e.g. exercise documentation was released late). They can be positive or negative observations and can be submitted both during and one week post ENDEX.

- Conduct and record post exercise group discussions and evaluations of performance with exercise players, immediately or soon after the exercise has finished (commonly termed hot wash-up) and represent their TA at evaluation sessions with Lessons Leads of other TAs.

- Use the findings from lessons observations and post-exercise evaluation sessions to compile a First Impression Report (FIR) (see Annex F) that assesses performance against the overarching Exercise Aims and specific TA objectives, and submit this to the relevant EU Institution OPR (see timelines below).
5. **Lessons process within MS, third countries and external organisations**

59. The way in which MS, third countries and external entity TA undertake their lessons learned process is for them to decide. However, to facilitate the identification of common lessons relating to EU-level crisis response and cooperation with NATO, a structure similar to that detailed for EU institutions is recommended.

6. **Lessons process for EU HEX-ML 18 (PACE) DISTAFF**

60. DISTAFF has visibility over both crisis response performance and the planning and conduct of the exercise and is therefore well placed to identify lessons relating to both. A DISTAFF Lesson Lead should be assigned to collate lessons observations from DISTAFF personnel and share these with all OPRs.

7. **Exercise reporting - requirements and timeframes**

61. All Lesson Leads from EU institutional and DISTAFF entities must submit FIRs in the format provided in Annex F to their Lead-OPR by 21 Dec.

62. MS and external entities are also encouraged to share their observations and lessons relating to EU-level crisis response and cooperation with NATO with the respective EEAS OPR by 21 Dec.

63. FIRs, observations and post exercise discussions from all TA will form the basis of the EU HEX-ML 18 (PACE) Final Exercise Report (FER). This will summarise the overarching findings and lessons and recommendations for action from the exercise and will be discussed at a Post Exercise Discussion (PXD) held in the format of a PMG with FoP IPCR/SCI meeting. A classified annex with more detailed findings and lessons from all TAs will also be produced.

64. Once the FER has been agreed by PMG and FoP IPCR/SCI it will be sent to PSC and then COREPER for notation.
# Lessons Process and Reporting Timeframes

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<td>Prior to Exercise Lead-in phase starting on 5 Nov</td>
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<td>Identify lessons Observations (see Annex E)</td>
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SECTION II

SCENARIO

A. Crisis Summary

9. August 2017 - March 2018

j. Ropperta

92. Since the revolution in 2011, and the fall of the precedent dictatorial regime, the people of Ropperta have shown their determination to fight for a new democratic state capable of integrating and respecting all different political parties representing its society. The secular party has won the latest free and fair elections, in 2015, by a small majority. Knowing that 98% of the population identifies as Muslim, the three years old government is aware of the efforts needed to maintain cohesion.

93. The rule of Begh CAOP ESVERTY since 2015 has brought relative stability to the country. Ropperta has increased cooperation with its neighbours and overseas particularly with the EU, in the economic, political, social and cultural domains. There are strong signs of hope for Ropperta to become a key state capable to provide stability in the region.

94. Despite these winds of hope, the government of Ropperta is struggling in terms of security. Internally, institutional corruption is still seriously hampering development, particularly regarding the rule of law. Unequal distribution of wealth and unavailability of social services in Southern provinces are seen as urgent matters that need to be addressed to prevent the attractiveness of radicalism promoted by NEXSTA groups in the South. On top of this, NEXSTA has found a safe haven in neighbouring Loripa after the loss of its territory in the Middle East and since 2016, militants are infiltrating the south of Ropperta using guerrilla tactics to spread terror and impose sharia law on villages that are not under the protective umbrella of Ropperta security forces.

95. Relations between Ropperta and its neighbour to the west, Loripa, are tense mainly due to the difficulty of managing a porous border. Roughly 1000 people per day flee from Loripa towards Ropperta hoping to use it as a springboard towards the EU. There is an increase in criminal organizations taking profit of the migration flows and illegal traffic and smuggling, particularly of human beings, that is on the rise.
Ropperta is reinforcing ties with the EU in the domain of security and defence. Since the current government came to power in 2015, several projects on advice, mentoring and training have been developed by the EU to support the Government led Security Sector Reform.

Kronen has publicly denounced the EU’s efforts to support Ropperta to develop more efficient, accountable and responsible Armed Forces that will operate in accordance with international law, in particular human rights, gender and International Humanitarian Law. The Kronen leadership has called upon Roppertans to resist this "illegitimate interference and return back to the old colonialism policies that ravaged the African countries."

**European Union**

Since August 2017, EU delegations and CSDP communication networks have been attacked by several cyber-attacks. Likewise, a number of EU MS have been subject to cyber-attacks of different but concerning nature and intensity directed towards their critical infrastructures, particularly in the gas sector.

The competent authorities are currently investigating whether these attacks are due to criminal activities or orchestrated by a specific state actor or a non-state actor (a terrorist organization). To this point, the intelligence reports from INTCEN suggest that many of these cyber-attacks are possibly attributable to Kronen or Loripa given certain indicators, such as the functionality, motivation and execution of the attacks. Intelligence reports also suggest that the cyber-attacks are supported by fake news on social media with a view to creating distrust and chaos.

Terrorist attacks, perpetrated by the "Newborn Extremist State" (Nexsta) have increased across Europe in recent months, following its move into Loripa. Despite the geographic setbacks, the group is spreading its influence across North Africa and the Mediterranean Sea.

Kronen

Kronen is a federal state with a strong centralized government. It occupies 70% of the African continent. It’s a country increasingly assertive about its potential economic world power and military strength. Kronen is ruled by Peter Norrase who has won repeatedly elections since 1990, in the face of an almost non-existent political opposition.
102. Over the last decade, Kronen has been developing a much more assertive global posture, searching for an increased geopolitical role worldwide to overcome internal crisis and improve its international market trade. However, its political and economic interests and values clash with those of the EU and the rest of the Western world. Kronen’s systematic violations of human rights and international law have been repeatedly criticised by the EU and the international community. Economic and diplomatic sanctions are already in place by the EU since 2014. These include travel bans for certain individuals, whose bank accounts in the EU have also been frozen. Furthermore, certain categories of goods are placed under sanctions.

103. North Africa represents the first priority for Kronen's geopolitical ambitions. The Government is taking advantage of the political void of some countries and is extending its reach up to the Mediterranean Sea.

104. Kronen's armament industry is expanding and is aggressively exploring new market opportunities, including in countries which are on the brink of a civil war but for which the UN has still not imposed a weapons embargo.

105. Kronen's energy supply companies are lobbying the Government to gain more influence over oil and gas terminals in the North African region to supply its growing and non-self-sufficient national market demand.

106. Kronen is frequently accused of being behind hybrid attacks to harass western countries, and to weaken their economic and geopolitical influence. It has as well been frequently mentioned as an aggressor in cyberspace, performing malicious cyber activities with security and economic implications for the EU. In many cases, attribution cannot be confirmed with a sufficient degree of certainty and most of these attacks are well below the threshold of cyber warfare.

107. The Kronen government has very advanced offensive cyber capabilities and most likely supports groups of hackers and hacktivists. It also controls the national media. Some state or state sponsored groups of cyber criminals are believed to promote Kronen interests. Other groups' activities include disseminating propaganda, developing tools for intelligence agencies as well as hacking into networks and systems in support of Kronen security objectives. Kronen use of such proxies complicates attribution (making it harder to determine who is behind an attack), constraining potential cyber deterrence against government entities.
However several EU MS have shared the conclusions of their investigation, attributing some of the recent cyber-attacks directed towards their critical infrastructures to Kronen. These conclusions are shared by several EU like-minded states.

108. Kronen reportedly has also Social Media Manipulation capabilities, including a special unit in the Armed Forces that has dedicated personnel using content-BOTS to manipulate public opinion through Social Media posts.

109. Nexsta groups hardly infiltrate in Kronen due to the heavy securitisation of the border and an extremely strict migration policy, which leaves hundreds of migrants stranded at the country's borders. Religious groups (other than the traditional Kronen religion), non-governmental organizations and international civil society organisations are closely scrutinized by the security forces. Several international human rights NGOs have been expelled and others prosecuted in the last years blamed for carrying out seditious activities.

110. After Nexsta was pushed out of the Middle East, Kronen changed strategy in the North African region. It has put in place an internal “zero tolerance policy” to avoid any return of jihadist fighters back to Kronen. At the same time Kronen has facilitated the establishment of a new haven for terrorists in South Loripa by providing weapons to the country's Government and warlords, which have direct links with the terrorists group. Many analysts agree on the risk that Kronen might indirectly use Nexsta as a proxy, in the future, to directly target Europe, through creating a flow of refugees in a wave of sectarian violence, or terrorist acts.

111. In a recent press conference, the President of Kronen declared war on all terrorist groups and stated that in the fight against terrorism, “Kronen will follow a hard-line policy against those who support - directly or indirectly - any terrorist groups of any kind including Nexsta”.

m. LORIPA

112. Loripa is a dictatorship, ruled by General Mayimbe who took over power after a coup d'etat which ended a short revolution fuelled by demands for social change in 1992. During the nineties, Mayimbe, in alliance with Kronen, openly supported rebel movements all around the world.

113. General Mayimbe could not have succeeded without the support of the Oligarchs expelled from the Soviet Union by the end of the Soviet era in 1991. Particularly Jerome Tequilla a billionaire who, after being prosecuted for tax evasion and illegal enrichment, invested all his
fortune in oil and gas infrastructures in Loripa. Jerome Tequilla sponsored the dictator political party before the coup d'etat and in the following years became himself Minister of energy. The influence of Tequilla on General Mayimbe is still very high, being the richest man in Loripa and the president's strongest political advisor.

114. The personal interest of Tequilla is to exploit the hydrocarbon resources of Loripa to become the first gas supplier for Europe as new deposits have been discovered, however Loripa requires new investments and technology to exploit these resources and the competition with European and Eastern providers is high. Tequilla was sued on several occasions with charges related to extortion, espionage and even terrorist attacks against western interests without any conviction.

115. Loripa is inclined to make fast deals with external powers, notably Kronen on the supply of weapons and has on some occasions threatened to nationalise the oil and gas companies which are partly western owned. The population in the North of the country lives under the strong repression of the militarized police and the Army, while the South of the country is completely ruled by tribal war lords, although they have sworn fidelity to Mayimbe.

116. The tribal warlords are important actors to understand the cohesion of Loripa, as they are the warrants of the oldest traditions of the people of Loripa. They control the illegal trafficking of humans, weapons and drugs and have links to extremist groups including NEXSTA.

117. The lack of state authority and services and the sporadic fighting between tribes in the South has contributed to a dire humanitarian situation with acute malnutrition and food insecurity, displacement, poor water, sanitation and health (WASH) conditions and frequent flare-up of communicable diseases. The situation was worsened by the influx of Nexta fighters, which also led to a protection crisis. This crisis is characterised by frequent attacks against civilians, including acts of sexual and gender based violence (SGBV).

118. There is a network of oil and gas pipelines from the production facilities in the south of the country to the export terminals on the northern coast. Oil is refined in facilities on the coast before being exported, mainly to the EU. Gas is exported in the form of Liquefied Natural Gas from one terminal on the coast, with some 50% of the gas delivered to Kronen and the majority of the remaining 50% to the EU, principally to Spain and Italy where it represents roughly 4% and 5% respectively of total gas imports. Earnings from hydrocarbon exports are a major source of revenue for Loripa, accounting traditionally for 35% of GDP.
119. After the coup, Loripa's relations with the EU have deteriorated due to the General's warm relation with his southern neighbour Kronen, but still some important commercial ties with the EU remain, notably the export of gas from Loripa which represents the 36% of the EU demand.

120. The narrative of Mayimbe, supported by a few countries such as Kronen, is that Europe has been ravaging natural resources in Africa during the last two centuries and Loripa have never been able to develop due to the continuous exploitation of its people by western countries and interference of the European countries in Loripa’s politics.

121. The borders between Loripa and Ropperta are porous and checkpoints are inefficient. There is a steady and unhindered flow of illegal activity, including the smuggling of migrants, the trafficking of weapons, drugs, and oil products from Loripa to Ropperta.

122. In a bilateral defence cooperation framework agreement, Kronen's armed forces have, during the recent years, been providing Loripa with weapons as well as training in several domains including special operations and cyber warfare. During public speeches, General Mayimbe clearly expressed his intention to use cyber weapons against the EU as this has been demonstrated to have a high impact if used against EU critical infrastructures and EU internal security systems.

123. Relations of the Government of Loripa with Nexsta are complex and opportunistic. General Mayimbe plays the game of delegating the warlords in the south to contain and coexist with Nexsta in exchange of various favours.

n. **NEXSTA (Newborn Extremist State)**

124. Nexsta is a global terrorist group belonging to a religious sect, whose main political objective is to establish a worldwide dominion. Their ideology clashes with western culture, values and lifestyle which it considers decadent and a threat to their fundamental religious values.

125. Their primitive modus operandi is to gradually impose their radical religion and culture also on European countries by means of persuasion, force, or coercion.

126. Nexsta has previously demonstrated only rudimentary cyber knowledge and is currently focused on propaganda. They have shown considerable interest in improving their cyber
capabilities, including through the use of hackers for hire. EU cybersecurity entities are focusing on gathering technical details of their cyber tools.

127. As its stronghold in the Middle East has been severely targeted by the intervention of the international community, Nexsta is now following a decentralized strategy, spreading its fighters and networks all over the world. They look for new strongholds, particularly in weak and failed states like Loripa, to establish new bases of operations to continue their campaign. Intelligence reports hint at the risk that many NEXSTA fighters with an EU passport are returning to Europe.

128. Due to its access to finances (illegal trafficking of oil and weapons, as well as support it receives from international sympathizers), Nexsta was able to get a foothold in South Loripa through e.g. the promotion of social care for the lower classes to attract new recruits for its fanatic cause.

129. Relations of Nexsta and the Government of Loripa are opportunistic. Currently both need one another to survive, although they are rivals in terms of controlling the country. Nexsta needs a safe haven to re-settle and re-configure its strategy to spread its influence worldwide, while Loripa uses Nexsta as an exchange currency to please the tribes in the South and as a foreign policy tool to gain benefits from neighbouring countries, including European ones.

130. Current assumptions on the number of NEXSTA members are around 3000 in Loripa and roughly 400 in the south of Ropperta.

**o. AWG (ANTI-WESTERN GROUP)**

131. AWG is an international movement that is opposed to western interests. AWG is frequently using social media to pass propaganda messages, organizing riots disguised as demonstrations. AWG, which has ties to NGOs in several EU countries, is accusing EU MS of increased military presence in the Mediterranean Sea and North Africa. According to some intelligence sources, AWG receives financial support from several countries rather hostile to the EU, particularly Kronen, as well as cryptocurrency payments from anonymous private sponsors worldwide. They have showed low impact capabilities in cyber. There are suspicions that they are assisted by a more capable actor.

**p. MANTICORE**
132. MANTICORE is a relatively new cybercriminal actor. The main objective is the financial gain. They offer their services to others under payment. There is no political initiative. They cooperate with opportunistic hackers if they have a benefit.

q. APT CHIMERA

133. Advanced Persistent Threat CHIMERA, linked to Kronen is a cyber actor apparently specialising in industrial espionage and high value governmental targets. In order to achieve that they utilise occasionally cybercriminal entities.

134. It has recently shown a sharp increase in its cyber capacities and capabilities. Among their targets are the European defence (military data) and foreign affairs (delegations, embassies, think tanks) sectors. They have not managed to hack into protected military networks, but they attacked non-classified military networks of western and non-western nations relatively successfully and executed a cyber-operation against a Ministry of Foreign Affairs in a European country.

135. In addition, APT CHIMERA has been behind several security breaches in governmental and private companies of the energy sector. These security breaches are of a diverse nature, falsification of badges, exfiltration of personal data, hacking of salary payment systems, unauthorized access to IT equipment like scanners, access control systems, and electronic equipment related to physical security.

10. March - October 2018

r. ROPPERTA

136. The situation in the south of Ropperta has deteriorated as attacks from Nexsta, operating from Loripa, have increased. These attacks are increasingly including the abduction of girls and women who are even used as human bombs.

137. Part of the affected population is fleeing northwards to safe provinces where national security forces are more present. Around 40,000 people are on the move, mainly women, children and elderly people who are defenceless against the growingly aggressive attackers. The massive displacement has led to the opening of several IDP camps, with the government unable to meet IDPs' increasingly pressing needs.
138. It seems that Nexsta is trying to gain hold of some territory of Ropperta as these attacks are not anymore temporary and the rebels start settling in the villages and prepare defensive posture.

139. Nexsta fighters also continue to ferociously attack civilians in areas under their control, including through acts of SGBV. The humanitarian situation keeps worsening, with civilians caught in the fighting between Nexsta and government security forces. The heavy fighting severely hinders the ability of international humanitarian organisations to access the people in need. Aid workers increasingly become targets of violent attacks.

140. Criminal organisations of human traffickers and migrant smugglers are consolidating and expanding in Ropperta.

141. Meanwhile, the Government is struggling with corruption and poor leadership, particularly in the Police and Justice system that provokes social unrest and allows radicalism to flourish in the Northern provinces.

142. Migrant workers in Ropperta’s oil and gas industry are starting to look for opportunities to leave Ropperta as a result of the rapidly deteriorating security situation in the country.

143. The president of Ropperta has sent a letter to the UN SG and the HR/VP requesting for external support, including the intervention of armed forces and police, to help Ropperta to address the situation.

s. **EUROPEAN UNION**

144. The EU is suffering since March 2018 a reduction of 10%-15% in gas supplies from the East due to technical constraints. Gas supplies from the East normally represent 32% of EU demand for gas. The EU increasingly relies currently on the supply coming from the other two main suppliers, Norway (normally 32%) and Loripa (normally 36%). The EU has its contingency plans; current stocks of gas in the EU are below the average of previous years.

145. Following the developments in Ropperta, the EU has activated the EEAS Crisis Response Mechanisms. Additionally, the EU has decided to acknowledge the request of its president for support. EU MS have agreed to the proposal of planning a CSDP mission and operation and the EEAS starts working on its strategic planning.
146. The consequences of the EU getting involved in North Africa do not take long to appear. An increase of cyber-attacks of an unknown origin and a varying type start targeting EU delegations, CSDP communication networks, and some critical infrastructure of several MS.

147. Disinformation coming from different sources and particularly from Kronen against the EU "illegal intervention" in North Africa increases to the point of being a trend topic on social networks.

148. On top of this Loripa seems to take profit of the situation trying to destabilise the EU markets and threatening the EU with gas supply reductions.

149. The threat of Nexsta is more present with targeted attacks to EU interests in European soil, the Mediterranean Sea and EU interests in Africa. The terrorist leader campaigns also against the intervention of any EU mission in Africa.

t.  **KRONEN**

150. The reaction of Kronen to the possible intervention of the EU on African soil is publicly stated in all international committees and official forums. Peter Norrase, president of Kronen, accuses Ropperta of being powerless to manage its internal affairs and accuses the EU of seizing the opportunity to spread its influence in the neighbouring continent with the risk of destabilizing the fragile North African region.

151. Kronen publically rejects rumours being behind the disinformation campaign and the string of cyber-attacks that took place in the past, but "understands the reaction of social networks and people around the world who are fed up with the abuse of power and intervention by western countries in Africa's affairs."

152. Concerning the action of Nexsta in Ropperta and the late increase of terror attacks in the EU, Peter Norrase explains that this is a direct consequence of the permissive action of Ropperta, its deplorable policy to counter terrorism and the worrying policies by the EU. According to the president of Kronen, Nexsta is contained and isolated and this is thanks to the determined military action of Kronen at the border and its good relations with Loripa.

u.  **LORIPA**
153. Loripa's initial reaction to the possible EU intervention in Ropperta is aligned to Kronen's foreign policy, although Mayimbe's strategy has a shorter vision focused on an energy monopoly and regional interests.
B. ROADMAP TO THE CRISIS

(2011 - 5 Nov 2018)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>EVENT</th>
<th>EXINST DOCUMENT RELATED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Before 2011</td>
<td>The ROPPERTAN Revolution was an intensive campaign of civil resistance, including a series of street demonstrations taking place in ROPPERTA city, and led to the ousting of long-time president in January 2011. It eventually led to a thorough democratization of the country and to free and democratic elections. The demonstrations were caused by high unemployment, hyperinflation, corruption, the abuse of fundamental human rights such as freedom of speech by the state authorities' lack of political freedoms like freedom of speech, and poor living conditions. The protests constituted the most dramatic wave of social and political unrest in ROPPERTA in three decades and resulted in scores of deaths and injuries, most of which were the result of repressive action by police and security forces against demonstrators.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mar 2012</td>
<td>The Constituent Assembly declared it will not support making SHARIA the main source of legislation in the new constitution, maintaining the secular nature of the state.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Apr 2014</td>
<td>NEXSTA kidnap 200 girls in South Loripa.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mar 2015</td>
<td>Ratification of a new constitution of ROPPERTA.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oct 2015</td>
<td>Presidential Elections in ROPPERTA. Begh CAOP ESVERTY was elected as the first president under the country's new constitution.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jan 2016</td>
<td>A new unity government in Ropperta continues to balance political cohesion with economic and social pressures.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Month</td>
<td>Event</td>
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<tr>
<td>Feb 2016</td>
<td>Corruption scandal leads to dismissal of the head of Police in Ropperta.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mar 2016</td>
<td>Social unrest in the south of Ropperta demanding visible changes after the revolution.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jun 2016</td>
<td>Radical political parties are welcoming Jihadists returning from Middle East in south Ropperta.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oct 2016</td>
<td>The porous border between Loripa and Ropperta, coupled with widespread corruption, make the control of cross-border illegal trafficking difficult.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nov 2016</td>
<td>UN condemns the trafficking of weapons by Kronen in the region.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jan 2017</td>
<td>Terrorist attack on three villages in South Ropperta perpetrated by NEXSTA. Hundreds of people are massacred.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Feb 2017</td>
<td>Outbreak of cholera of unknown origin in Ropperta.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mar 2017</td>
<td>Clash in Loripa/Ropperta border region between NEXSTA and Ropperta security forces results in dozens of military dead.</td>
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<tr>
<td>May 2017</td>
<td>Loripa is accused by the international community of trading oil and weapons with terrorist group NEXSTA.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oct 2017</td>
<td>Kronen reinforce ties with Loripa in the domain of Defence and Energy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nov 2017</td>
<td>A cyber-attacks (Manticore, credential leaks (email address</td>
<td>password)) against an EU delegation communication networks in North Africa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 2017</td>
<td>Cyber-attack on hospital networks in Europe.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jan 2018</td>
<td>Terrorist attacks claimed by NEXSTA simultaneously in France and UK.</td>
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<td>Mar 2018</td>
<td>Kidnapping and subsequent torture and assassination of an EU official in ROPPERTA deployed on mission of political fact-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Source</td>
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<tr>
<td>Apr 2018</td>
<td>Police in south Ropperta hands over to the Armed Forces due to the frequent incursions of NEXSTA.</td>
<td>CSDP doc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2018</td>
<td>Letter from the President of Ropperta to the UN and the HR/VP requesting support. HR/VP diplomatic response expresses commitment to thoroughly study the request.</td>
<td>CSDP doc</td>
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<td></td>
<td>France Health and Agricultural Ministries informs that 7 children between the age of 1 and 2 were infected with E Coli. The infants consumed a type of fresh cheese. Authorities recalled the product from shops’ shelves.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jun 2018</td>
<td>EU MS agree to the HR/VP suggestion to explore options for a possible CSDP deployment in Ropperta.</td>
<td>CSDP doc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Proposed UNSC resolution, authorizing the EU intervention in Ropperta is aggressively contested by Kronen and Loripa. Kronen puts political pressure on non-permanent UNSC members to vote against the resolution.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jul 2018</td>
<td>UNSC resolution 1002 on Ropperta authorising international support, including EU intervention with any means, is adopted despite Kronen campaign with non-permanent UNSC Members. HR/VP announces that the EU is exploring options in support of the young democracy of ROPPERTA.</td>
<td>CSDP doc</td>
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<td>Aug 2018</td>
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<tr>
<td>An ICRC report on the dire humanitarian situation in the south region (Loripa and Ropperta) shocks the international community.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Demonstrations in Brussels instigated by AWG against any EU action in North Africa with anti EU messages (&quot;NO MORE COLONISATION&quot;, &quot;SELF-DETERMINATION NOW!&quot;).</td>
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<tr>
<td>At the midday briefing, journalists are told that &quot;EU is committed to promoting stability, security and development&quot; with partner countries.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Disinformation campaign against EU intervention in Africa by AWG, Kronen and Loripa.</td>
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<tr>
<td>A double terrorist attack attempt in Brussels was avoided by the Belgian and Military security forces. The plot was planned to attack EU institutions. Initial evidence points at NEXSTA but the terrorist organization has not claimed responsibility.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Statement of the EU spokespersons reassuring the employees of the European Institutions that their security remains a priority and that all possible measures will be taken in full cooperation with the Belgian authorities.</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN condemns Loripa for permitting the proliferation of terrorist camps in south Loripa.</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECHO report on the dire humanitarian situation in the region on North Africa.</td>
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<tr>
<td>A cyber-attacks against an EU delegation (Ropperta) communications networks (no internet connection for 72 hours).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Some newspapers in the EU report that cheeses from Ropperta</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
contaminated with E Coli have been introduced in the EU market and were identified in several supermarkets in France. Lack of control of EU food authorities become a trending topic on social media.

Press releases are issued by national authorities informing that cheese export from Ropperta to the EU (including France) is not authorised.

Political Framework for a Crisis Approach in Ropperta is presented to PSC.

A citizen from Ropperta, arriving in Paris, intends to enter the EU with several suitcases carrying fresh cheese at Orly airport. Airport authorities intercept the cheese and destroy it.

Crisis Management Concept for a possible CSDP military operation and a civilian mission in Ropperta.

A cyber-attack defaces the EU Military Staff social media sites (Twitter, Facebook) and the EEAS HQ website passing fake information about the implication of the EU in Ropperta.

A statement by the HRVP about the situation is also posted on social media.

Kronen denounces openly the political interference of the EU in Africa to the UN.

Persistent activities that could be associated to preparation of
setting up a terrorist cell in Romania have been detected.

Disinformation coming from different sources and particularly from KRONEN against the EU "illegal intervention" in North Africa increases to the point of being the trend topic in social networks.

General Mayimbe threatens the EU via twitter with possible cuts of gas supply if the EU launches a military operation in neighbouring ROPPERTA. The markets react negatively to this statement.

Intelligence reports leaked to the press show the presence of Kronen special operations forces in Loripa supporting terrorist training camps.

Satellite images of brand new pick-ups delivered to NEXSTA in South Loripa are leaked through the net.

Airport authorities intercept a piece of fresh cheese in the airport of Brussels.

Sudden and prolonged colder-than-usual weather across Europe, with temperatures 12°C below season average in many places. This leads to a significant increase in gas demand of around 25% compared to the average season levels. This is having a major effect on the gas markets, which causes average prices to rise significantly.

Twitter activity by NEXTA threatens the EU with attacks over coming winter while also demanding the stop of the EU interference in Ropperta.
Relatively low temperatures for the season persist across the EU coupled with announcements of higher demands for gas from third countries major gas consumers.

11. MAIN CRISIS EVENT LINES TO BE EXPECTED DURING THE EXERCISE

- CSDP: The civilian mission and the military operation, while in a fragile political momentum in which they are established but not launched yet, will have the challenge to continue their planning process while the EU is under hybrid attack.
- Energy: the supply of gas to the EU is already low; the new crisis in the south threatens to aggravate this situation.
- Cyber: the increase of unknown attacks against an EU delegation, CSDP communication networks and EU critical infrastructure jeopardize its resilience against a hybrid actor.
- Terrorism: New terrorist links appear on top of the known action of Nexsta, those of criminal groups contracted by Loripan oligarchs and special operations from Kronen which add confusion and difficulty of attribution.
- Other criminal activities: Threat of certain criminal organisations expanding and attempting to take advantage of a destabilised situation in Loripa and Ropperta.
- Maritime: Threat of terrorist actions against European ships and harbors in the Mediterranean and the Baltic Sea.
- Health: A new dimension exploited by Kronen, its proxies and NEXTA is used to create chaos, alarm the EU population, challenge health systems, collapse health and food related early warning systems and challenge the EU response mechanisms. These attacks using
the same biological agent simultaneously in different cities make difficult to distinguish who is behind and whose is the responsibility in each case.

- Disinformation: Cross cutting continuous disinformation will increase and try to create mistrust on all EU statements and reactions against the crisis.
- Consular crisis: An incident occurs in a MENA country putting at risk EU citizens.
Training Objectives (TO)

Training Objectives (TO) apply only to their respective TA.

CPCC Training Objectives

1. Deepen CPCC staff understanding of crisis management planning procedures at the political-strategic and operational level as established in the Crisis Management Procedures (CMP).

2. Contribute, on request, civilian CSDP expertise to the development of the PFCA, CMC and possible civilian advice (in format of workshops during the planning phase) in close cooperation with EEAS GEODesks, CMPD, EUMS and MPCC in accordance with Crisis Management Procedures (CMP).

3. Test functioning of CPCC OHQ in terms of operational planning including operations, security and all mission support areas (human resources, CIS and finance).

4. Test establishment and practise of core operational planning team in CPCC in close cooperation with other EU actors.

5. Test abilities to plan civilian CSDP mission addressing threats such as cyber, hybrid, terrorism and organised crime.

6. Ensure timely provision of CONOPS and CPCC presentation of CONOPS.

7. Test established Civilian Core Responsiveness Capacity in close cooperation with civilian CSDP missions.

8. Deepen civilian-military cooperation on operational planning including on interaction between operational planning teams facilitating the establishment of civilian and military CONOPS. Facilitating close daily cooperation between the relevant OHQs – CPCC in Brussels and military OHQ (to be established).

9. Support to EU HEX-ML 18 (PACE) DISTAFF.
LIMITE

EUMS Training Objectives

1. To provide military expertise and contributions for the development of the Political Framework of the Crisis Approach (PFCA) and the Crisis Management Concept (CMC), in close cooperation with the correspondent EEAS Geographical Desk, the Crisis Management Planning Directorate (CMPD) and the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) and in accordance with the EUMS Crisis Management Manual (CMM).

2. To produce Military Strategic Options (MSO) and IMD in close cooperation with CMPD, CPCC, EL EU OHQ and other relevant actors as appropriate, mainly from the Commission, in accordance with the EUMS CMM.

3. To contribute to activate and operate an EL EU OHQ and the EL EU FHQ, transferring them the operations planning responsibility, as well as all of existing and elaborated documents relevant for the operations planning, especially in the areas of manning, logistics, including military mobility, and budget.

4. To improve the knowledge and understanding of the EUMS TA on the crisis management planning procedures for CSDP crisis management operations at the political-strategic level, with specific focus on how to react to a changing situation once the Initiating Military Directive (IMD) is approved by the EUMC and disseminated to the EL EU OHQ.

5. To contribute to produce timely military advice on request by the EUMC.

6. To support the participation of the correspondent EU military authorities in the Crisis Response Mechanisms Process and Council Meetings during the events driven Exercise.

7. To validate EUMS INT contribution, in accordance with the revised 2018 Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity (SIAC) framework, to the situation awareness in the EU Crisis Mechanisms Process within a hybrid environment.
8. To contribute to ensure exchange of classified information between the EU and NATO by any possible communication means.

9. To validate draft procedures for cyber incident reporting on CSDP military operations in accordance with the EEAS Crisis Response Mechanism.
OHQ Training Objectives

1. To integrate OHQ Advance Planning Team in EUMS planning activities at an early stage in order to ensure coherence in the planning.

2. To activate the EL EU OHQ for Crisis Management Planning on the military-strategic level.

3. To exercise supporting aspects of the activation of the EL EU OHQ:
   - Manning;
   - Induction training;
   - Real life support;
   - Infrastructure;
   - CIS means.

4. To exercise activation and integration of Multi National (MN) Primary Augmentees into the planning process.

5. To test operations planning procedures and the handover of planning responsibilities from the political strategic level to the military strategic level.

6. To produce the exercise budget and present it to the “ATHENA” Special Committee for approval.

7. To exercise the latest set of EU Operations Headquarters Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs).

8. To conduct military strategic planning on the EL EU OHQ level, starting with the release of an Initiating Military Directive (IMD) to the OpCdr and leading to the presentation of a draft Concept of Operations (CONOPS) to the PSC.

9. To test operations planning procedures and the handover of planning responsibilities from the military strategic level (OHQ) to the operational level [(F)HQ]].

10. To exercise the reaction to a changing situation after the IMD is created adjusting the planning process.
11. To exercise and establish procedures on liaison and coordination with EEAS and NATO entities in the context of the combined deployment of a civilian/military CSDP mission/operation, within the PACE concept.

12. To practice and improve the CIS planning and information exchange/information management procedures, between and within the HQs (EUMS-OHQ-FHQ), in a threatened cyber environment taking into consideration the Functional Services (FS) supporting tools and procedures.

13. To exercise the permanent and alternate CIS and procedures between the OHQ, (F)HQ and the other national and EU bodies.

14. To exercise Cybersecurity planning, concepts, incident coordination and management at the OHQ level.

15. To develop and coordinate with EEAS entities a CONOPS, Provisional Statement of Requirements (PSOR) and draft Use of Force Concept (ROE) starting with the release of an Initiating Military Directive (IMD) to the OpCdr.

16. Execution of budget and all financial issues according to ATHENA Mechanism.
FHQ Training Objectives

1. To activate the (F)HQ for Crisis Management Planning on the military-operational level with the formation of the CJOPG.

2. To exercise supporting aspects of the activation of the (F)HQ:
   - Manning;
   - Induction training;
   - Real life support;
   - Infrastructure -CIS means.

3. To exercise activation and integration of Multi National (MN) Augmentees into the planning process.

4. To test operations planning procedures and the handover of planning responsibilities from the military strategic level to the military operational level.

5. To exercise the conduct military planning at operational level parallel to the EL EU OHQ.

6. To practice and improve the CIS planning and information exchange/ information management procedures, between and within the HQs (OHQ -FHQ), in a threatened cyber environment taking into consideration the Functional Services (FS) supporting tools and procedures.

7. To exercise the permanent and alternate CIS arrangements (links) and procedures between the OHQ and the (F)HQ.

8. To exercise Cybersecurity planning, concepts, incident coordination and management at the (F)HQ level.
Event Driven Specific Training Objectives

1. Test and advance the high level coordination amongst sectoral crisis management capabilities under the remit of the European Commission within the framework of ARGUS, as well as linkages with other EU mechanisms, notably the EEAS' Crisis Response Mechanism and the Integrated Political Crisis Response (IPCR) arrangements. Test the EU's internal preparedness in a challenging environment such as the operational coordination role of the Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC) and the possible activation of the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM).

2. Exercise IPCR activation, possibly as the result of a solidarity clause invocation (Art. 222 TFEU), related to event lines of the scenario.

3. Test the EU's ability to communicate externally in case of a hybrid crisis.

4. Test cyber threat assessment capacity and threat information exchange with other EU stakeholders (DELETED).

5. Test the capacity of the EU institutions DELETED to coordinate and to respond to large-scale cybersecurity incidents and crises at the operational and political/strategic level.

6. Assess the adequacy of the preparedness and response of the EU institutions DELETED following a terrorist attack.

7. Test the information exchange mechanisms between MS, DELETED and other relevant actors such as CSDP – EUNAVFOR MED Operation SOPHIA as a response cell and NATO MARCOM.

8. Test EU's response following a general breakdown of the Schengen Information System (SIS II) and interconnected IT systems after a cyber-attack.

9. Test the response of EU institutions, MS DELETED to multiple maritime threats and challenges (interception of vessels and terrorist threats), notably in the area of cooperation and information exchange, risk awareness and management, as stipulated in the relevant legal acts and agreements for the cooperation on coast guard functions. Test
the cooperation with NATO and EUNAVFOR MED Operation SOPHIA (as a response cell) on addressing security threats at sea.

10. Test the use of Copernicus for resolution of major and hybrid crisis, in particular the reactivity and availability of the services, the prioritization of requests and the coordination processes between the Entrusted Entities and the European Commission.

11. Test available crisis management mechanisms and protocols for energy-related events, DELETED.

12. Test the EU preparedness and response to health threats and food security and safety threats.

13. Test the response of the EU, MS DELETED to CBRN-related threats.


15. Raise the discussion on relevant Treaty provisions related to solidarity.
Exercise Qualifiers

The following EQs messages can be used:

- “DISTAFF EVENT”, from DISTAFF to players containing exercise related fictitious events;
- "DISTAFF EYES ONLY from DISTAFF to DISTAFF;
- "DISTAFF CONTROL", for controlling messages from DISTAFF to TA;
- "NO PLAY", from the OSEs or OCEs to "ALL EXERCISE PARTICIPANTS".

The following "NO PLAY" messages can be issued by:

- OSE: TERMINATION OF THE EXERCISE, incl. an EMERGENCY,
- OSE or OCE: TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF THE EXERCISE.
DELETED FROM THIS POINT UNTIL THE END OF Annex C (page 52)
Annex D

DELETED FROM THIS POINT UNTIL THE END OF Annex D (page 54)
# EU HEX-ML 18 (PACE) Observations Form

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Name and contact details</th>
<th>Training Audience</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Observation</th>
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<td>Mark as necessary. Observations classified at or above RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED must be sent by appropriately means</td>
<td>Name and email address</td>
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<td>Date of lesson observation</td>
<td>Short summary of observation e.g. Could not receive classified information from Agency A.</td>
<td>Provide a short factual statement to describe what happened and how that differed from expectations. Include where possible details around: § What? (Action performed or not performed) • Who? (Stakeholders involved) • Where? (Information on space, environment or location) • When? (Information on time) • Why? (Rationale of the action performed) The observation can be positive (i.e. something that was observed to work better than expected or a work around) or negative (i.e. something happened that should not have or something did not happen that should have). Observations should be restricted to single issues. Multiple issues should be divided into separate observations.</td>
<td>Brief description of the effect of observations on organizational performance and degree of impact e.g. we did not have full situational awareness and actions x and y were delayed. This had a significant impact upon organizational response.</td>
<td>• The recommendation should outline the suggested remedial action(s) by proving explicit advice on what must be done to repeat the success or to avoid and/or solve the problem. • Identify exactly what needs to be changed and how this should be done. • Propose a suitable lead or action body.</td>
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LIMITE
EU HEX-ML 18 (PACE) - First Impressions Report

Name of your Training Audience:

Overview

1. **Executive Summary.** [Provide a short non-classified summary of your Institution/Entity/Organisation's overall perception of EU HEX-ML 18 (PACE), on your Institution/Entity/Organisation performance in crisis management, and on key areas for improvement. The Executive Summary should be approved by your Institution/Entity/Organisation's hierarchy.]

   Click here to enter text.

2. **Exercise Participation.** [Provide details of your Institution/Entity/Organisation’s participation (numbers/organisation).]

   Click here to enter text.

Exercise aim

3. **In accordance with EU HEX-ML 18 (PACE) Exercise Specification (EXSPEC), the exercise aim was to improve and enhance, in a safe-to-fail environment, the EU’s ability to respond to a complex crisis of a hybrid nature with an internal and an external dimension, as well as to improve cooperation with NATO in accordance with the PACE concept.**

   | Achieved | Partially Achieved | Not Achieved |

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2 For the Commission, Entity/Organisation refers to the respective Directorate General.
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**Assessment** of Exercise aim

**Brief comment** on achievement of aim:

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**Overarching Exercise Objectives (OEOs)**

4. The following OEOs were established in the EXSPEC:

**A.** To enhance the capacity of the EU to respond to hybrid threats, including exercising decision making of Member States through a crisis response event-driven exercise, and spark a broader discussion on hybrid threats.

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**Brief comment** on achievement of overarching objective:

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**B.** To exercise the EU decision making process, as appropriate, as well as the planning at political, politico strategic, strategic and operational levels, during a crisis affecting the internal and external security dimensions of the EU.

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**Brief comment** on achievement of overarching objective:

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**C.** To improve the EU’s ability to use its CFSP tools with an integrated approach, contributing to the overall response through the planning of a CSDP mission and operation.

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**Assessment** of Exercise aim

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**Brief comment** on achievement of overarching objective:

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**D.** To interact with NATO at staff-to-staff level, during the planning, conduct and reporting phases of the exercise with the aim to improve the exchange of information and to seek to synchronize the two organisations’ parallel crisis response activities, in particular in a hybrid threats context including aggressive actions by state and non-state actors.

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**Assessment** of Exercise aim

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E. To increase the TA's awareness and the understanding of the overall EU approach to crisis response, as well as that of NATO.

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**Nothing to Report (NTR)**

**Assessment** of Exercise aim: 

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**Brief comment** on achievement of overarching objective:

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Event-driven Crisis Response - Specific Exercise Objectives

5. The following Specific Exercise Objectives (SEO) were established in the EXSPEC.

A. **Situational Awareness.** Exercise systems (structures, tools, methods, and procedures) to develop at EU level a common situational picture of a hybrid crisis; identify and test approaches to cooperate with NATO with a view to improve the situational pictures supporting both organisations respective decision-making processes. At the technical level, use the EU Hybrid Fusion Cell to trigger the EU Playbook in order to test the EU response to a hybrid threat scenario.

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**Assessment of Specific Objective**

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B. **Crisis Response:** Exercise the interaction of the Crisis Response Mechanisms of the EEAS (CRM), the Council (IPCR) and the Commission (ARGUS) and test and advance the high level coordination amongst EU sectorial crisis management capabilities ensuring coordination with NATO.

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Brief comment on achievement of specific objective:

C. Crisis Response: Within the framework of ARGUS and Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC); exercise the overall management of a complex crisis of a hybrid nature (notably terrorist attack as well as incident coordination and analysis of multiple cybersecurity events at the EU level) and participating MS, in various policy areas including migration, borders, maritime security, energy, health and protection of critical infrastructure, with a view to foster the exchange of information and coherence between participating MS', EU institutions crisis management activities.

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Assessment of Specific Objective

Brief comment on achievement of specific objective

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D. Crisis Response: Test the EU institutions’ and relevant reaction, in case the security of communication infrastructures and essential IT systems are compromised. Develop a better understanding of information channels, processes and procedures connecting situational awareness (sense-making), decision-making, and crisis communication (meaning-making), including, in particular, the operation and the interaction of the relevant crisis management mechanisms of the EU institutions, and participating MS.
### Assessment of Specific Objective

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**Brief comment** on achievement of specific objective:

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### E. STRATCOM:  

Exercise EU public communication and the relation to crisis communication activities by MS. Exercise EU - NATO coordination of public communication in a crisis situation.

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**Brief comment** on achievement of specific objective:

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F. CYBER: To trigger discussions within the Council (COREPER II, PSC, etc.) with a view to adopt possible measures in response to malicious cyber activities, including a possible joint diplomatic response; to test the capacity of the EU institutions deleted and MS to exchange information, coordinate and to respond to malicious cyber activities, possibly following aggression from an international actor, coordination with NATO as well as the coordination with a follow-up of cyber-attacks by law enforcement authorities.

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Assessment of Specific Objective

Brief comment on achievement of specific objective

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Training Audience Objectives

Training Audiences will have devised their own training objectives. Please provide an overview of what these were and a commentary on whether they were achieved.

A. Training Audience Objectives

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Assessment of training Audience Objectives
Comment on Achievement of Training Audience Objective:

Click here to enter text.

6. **DISTAFF aspects.** [Provide free-text comments on DISTAFF aspects, to include comments on its performance and also on your Institution/Entity/Organisation's interaction with it, during EU HEX-ML18 (PACE)]

7. **Additional Comments.** [Provide free-text comments on EU HEX-ML18 PACE Conduct if not satisfactorily covered in comments above].
EXERCISE PREPARATION

8. **Preparation.** [Provide free-text comment on the following topics]

   a. Exercise Planning and Meetings.

   b. Planning and Exercise Documentation.

   c. Exercise Scenario.

   d. Exercise Financing.

   e. Pre-Exercise Activities.

9. **Additional Comments.** [Provide free-text comments on EU HEX-ML18 PACE Preparation if not satisfactorily covered in comments above].

RECOMMENDATIONS

10. [Provide a list of key recommendations for the planning, conduct and evaluation of future exercises]
MULTILAYER 2018 (ML18)
Ropperta, a Political Framework for Crisis Approach
Ropperta, a Political Framework for Crisis Approach

v. Background

Why this PFCA has been produced

The EEAS was tasked by the High Representative and Vice-President (HRVP) to prepare a Political Framework for Crisis Approach (PFCA) on Ropperta in view of Political and Security Committee (PSC) debate. Its purpose is to provide a platform for a shared analysis of the situation in Ropperta, dynamics of conflict, challenges for the country, as well as the definition of how the EU can best contribute, over the short, medium and long term, to support political stability in Ropperta and its neighbouring. These considerations build on the existing EU-Ropperta Association Agreement.

The paper has been developed under the lead of the EEAS MD MENA Geographical team with contributions from other EEAS services³ and in co-operation with the EUROPEAN COMMISSION. This collaborative process ensures that the EU's integrated approach is key for the EU response.

This paper is a direct response to:

- The letter from the Ropperta President, Begh Caop Esverty, to the EU HRVP of 12 May, 2018, requesting support to the Government in the areas of good governance, rule of law and border management, and specific support to address a deteriorating security situation in the South;

- The EU High Representative and Vice-President (HRVP) H.E. Federica MOGHERINI request from 26 June 2018, for a PFCA to be presented to the PSC.

- UNSCR 1002 (2018) adopted by the Security Council at its meeting on 18 February, which invites the international community, and in particular the EU, to support and complement the peacebuilding and development initiatives to sustain peace, security and stability in Ropperta.

³ EUMS, CMPD, CPCC, CSDP, MDR B Security.
Crisis Context Overview

Since the revolution in 2011, and the fall of the precedent dictatorial regime, Ropperta have shown their determination to fight for a new democratic state capable of integrating and respecting all different political parties representing its society. In 2015, the secular party has won the latest free and fair elections by a small majority. Knowing that 98% of the population identifies itself as Muslim, the three years old government is aware of the efforts needed to maintain cohesion. Since the current government came to power in 2015, it has brought relative stability to the country.

Ropperta has increased cooperation with its neighbours and overseas particularly with the EU, in the economic, political, social and cultural domains. Ropperta is reinforcing ties with the EU also in the domain of security and defence. Since 2015, several projects on advice, mentoring and training have been developed by the EU to support Government led Security Sector Reform efforts.

Despite the strong signs of hope for Ropperta to become a key state capable to of providing stability in the region, the Government is struggling in terms of security and capacity to manage its Southern border with Loripa. Institutional corruption in Ropperta is still seriously hampering development, particularly regarding the rule of law. Unequal distribution of wealth and unavailability of social services in Southern provinces are seen as urgent matters that need to be addressed to prevent the attractiveness of radicalism.

On top of this, Newborn Extremist State (NEXSTA), a global terrorist group, has found a safe haven in neighbouring Loripa after the loss of its territory in the Middle East. Since 2016, militants are infiltrating the south of Ropperta using guerrilla tactics to spread terror and impose sharia law on villages that are not under the protective umbrella of Ropperta Internal Security Forces and Armed Forces. The gradually deteriorating security environment and the worsening humanitarian situation are causing substantial internal displacements. In addition, roughly 1000 people per day flee from Loripa towards Ropperta hoping to use it as a springboard towards the EU. There is an increase in criminal organizations taking profit of the substantial migration flows and illegal traffic and smuggling, particularly of human beings, that is on the rise.

Moreover, NEXSTA is spreading its influence across North Africa and the Mediterranean Sea. Terrorist attacks, perpetrated by NEXSTA have increased across Europe in recent
EU Delegation in Ropperta, have been subject to several cyber-attacks. At the same time a number of EU Member States have been subject to cyber-attacks of different but concerning nature and intensity directed towards their critical infrastructures, particularly in the gas sector. The cyber-attacks are supported by fake news on social media with a view to creating distrust and chaos. There are certain indicators that these attacks possibly orchestrated by a specific state actor with advanced offensive cyber capabilities and are attributable to Kronen or Loripa.

In May 2018, the President of Ropperta officially requested support from UN and the HR/VP. The EU has decided to acknowledge the request. The EEAS Crisis Response Mechanism has been activated with Crisis Meetings taking place to assess the EU response.

w. **Analysis and Appreciation of the Situation**

Since 2015 Ropperta enjoys relative political stability; however, consolidation of the democratic process is still in its infancy. The Government is struggling with institutional corruption and weak rule of law, whereas there is a slow pace of implementation of required structural reforms.

The gradually deteriorating security environment and the worsening humanitarian situation in the Southern of Ropperta are calling for immediate action. Infiltration of terrorists from Loripa and fighters from NEXSTA are challenging means and leadership of the Ropperta Internal Security Forces and Armed Forces. The situation keeps worsening and may likely resulting on an increased of internal displacements of people, including migratory flows to Europe.

**Political Situation**

a. In January 2011, the Ropperta Revolution was an intensive campaign of civil resistance, including a series of street demonstrations, namely in Ropperta City, and led to the ousting of long-time president. It eventually led to a thorough democratization of the country and to free and democratic elections.

b. In 2015, the secular party won the latest free and fair elections, by a small majority and Begh Caop Esveryt was elected as the first President under the country’s new constitution.
Knowing that 98% of the population identifies as Muslim, the three years old government is aware of the efforts needed to balance political cohesion with economic and social pressures.

c. The situation is particularly worrisome in the South, where occurrences of social unrest have regularly happened and show presence of radical political parties with acknowledged presence of Jihadists returning from Middle East and joining NEXSTA.

d. Ropperta has steadily increased cooperation with its neighbours and overseas particularly with the EU, in the economic, political, social and cultural domains. There are strong signs of hope for Ropperta to become a key state capable to provide stability in the region.

**Economic Situation**

a. It is widely acknowledged that the Ropperta Revolution was rooted in high unemployment, hyperinflation, corruption, the abuse of fundamental human rights such as freedom of speech by the state authorities and poor living conditions. The protests constituted the most dramatic wave of social and political unrest in Ropperta in three decades and resulted in scores of deaths and injuries, most of which were the consequence of repressive action by police and security forces against demonstrators.

b. Almost 10 years later, unemployment remains the main challenge faced by Ropperta in the short and medium term. The unemployment rate reached 28.5% at the end of 2017. This unemployment mainly affects young people, who represent more than 70% of the unemployed, and affects more particularly the disadvantaged regions. The urgency to tackle this problem has been highlighted by the growing number of social unrest events.

c. Although significant policy progress must be acknowledged, the pace of implementation of socio-economic reforms is still very slow. The economy grew by 1.3% in 2017. However, persistent macroeconomic imbalances require serious structural reforms – such as urgent fiscal consolidation measures, transparency of public finance management or strengthening of the legislative framework to the fight against corruption, with the aim of stimulating job creation and facilitating the integration of young people into the labor market.
Development Situation

a. The 2015-2025 Strategy towards a Sustainable Development for All (SSD4A) adopted on February 20, 2015, advocated a new development model aimed at promoting inclusive growth and responding to expectations of a growing population (the Demographic and Society Observatory forecasts that by 2050 the population will double). The SSD4A focuses on four main areas: (a) good governance, administrative reform and the fight against corruption, (b) green economy and inclusive growth for a sustainable future, (c) human development and social cohesion, and d) security stabilization of the neighborhood. The Strategy estimates an increase in growth, which will be driven essentially by a significant change in private investment (increase of 56%) and by a major increase in foreign direct investment (FDI) by 75% over the next years. It aims to achieve an average growth rate of 3.7% in 2025.

b. The Government of Ropperta has focused on supporting the modernization of the administration, good governance and the fight against corruption as well as attempts to bringing closer defavorised regions. However, more progress is needed to achieve a balanced development between regions.

c. The SSD4A stands for the improvement of economic governance, the development of a business climate enabling private and foreign investment, as well as the promotion of a green, innovative and sustainable development of economic sectors. However, public action and private initiatives that generate dignified and modern jobs, in particular for the young, are still slow-moving.

d. Bridging social and regional disparities, which were key factors in the 2011 revolution, is a major priority. Investment in public services and socio-economic infrastructure is much needed all across country, as well as to narrow gap between the richest and the defavorised regions.

e. The increased instability in border areas, the terrorist threat and the flourishment of illegal activities are posing an additional challenge to the Government of Ropperta to deliver efficiently and timely on development goals.

f. The EU is continuing to deploy its wide-range of means to support the political and socio-economic development in Ropperta.
**Humanitarian Situation**

a. The situation in the south of Ropperta has deteriorated as attacks from Nexsta, operating from Loripa, have increased. These attacks against civilians in areas under their control are increasingly including the abduction of girls and women who are subjected to acts of Sexual and Gender Based Violence (SGBV) and even used as human bombs. The humanitarian situation keeps worsening, with civilians caught in the fighting between Nexsta and government security forces. The deteriorating security environment severely hinders the ability of international humanitarian organisations to access the people in need. Aid workers are themselves increasingly becoming targets of violent attacks. An ICRC report in July 2018 on the dire humanitarian situation in the south of Ropperta and in Loripa shocked the international community.

b. Part of the affected population in the South of Ropperta is fleeing northwards to safe provinces where national security forces are more present. Around 100,000 people are on the move, mainly women, children and elderly people who are defenceless against the growingly aggressive attackers. The massive displacement has led to the opening of several Internal Displaced People (IDPs) camps, with the government unable to meet IDPs' increasingly pressing needs, especially in terms of water, sanitation and health (WASH), food security and protection. Camps are already above their maximum reception capacity and more IDPs are expected to arrive from the South.

c. Consequently, irregular migration flows from Ropperta to the EU could intensify under the control of criminal organisations of human traffickers and smugglers.

**Security Situation**

a. The security situation in the South Ropperta is rapidly deteriorating as attacks from NEXSTA, operating from Loripa, have increased. These attacks are increasingly including the abduction of girls and women who are even used as human bombs.

b. It seems that NEXSTA is trying to gain hold of some territory of Ropperta as these attacks are not anymore temporary and the rebels start settling in the villages and prepare defensive posture.
c. NEXSTA is spreading its influence across North Africa and the Mediterranean Sea. Terrorist attacks, perpetrated by the NEXTA have increased across Europe in recent months.

d. Since August 2017, EU Delegation in Ropperta has been attacked by several cyber-attacks. A number of EU Member States have been subject to cyber-attacks of different but concerning nature and intensity directed towards their critical infrastructures, particularly in the gas sector. The intelligence reports that many of these cyber-attacks are possibly attributable to Kronen or Loripa given certain indicators, such as the functionality, motivation and execution of the attacks. Intelligence reports also suggest that the cyber-attacks are supported by fake news on social media with a view to creating distrust and chaos.

Main Security Actors:

a. **Newborn Extremist State (NEXSTA)** is a global terrorist group belonging to a religious sect, whose main political objective is to establish a worldwide dominion. Their ideology clashes with western culture, values and lifestyle which it considers decadent and a threat to their fundamental religious values.

   Their primitive modus operandi is to gradually impose their radical religion and culture also on European countries by means of persuasion, force, or coercion.

   NEXTA is carrying out brutal attacks against civilians in Loripa and in the South of Loripa, while it found difficult to infiltrate in Kronen due to the heavy securitisation of the border.

b. **Anti-Western Group (AWG)** is an international movement that is opposed to western interests. AWG is frequently using social media to pass propaganda messages, organizing riots disguised as demonstrations. AWG has ties to NGOs in several EU countries. It is accusing EU Member States of increased military presence in the Mediterranean and North Africa. According to some intelligence sources, AWG receives financial support from several countries rather hostile to the EU, particularly Kronen, as well as cryptocurrency payments from anonymous private sponsors worldwide.

c. **Loripa** is a dictatorship which is inclined to make fast deals with external powers, notably Kronen on the supply of weapons and has on some occasions threatened to nationalise the oil and gas companies which are partly western owned. The
population in the North of the country lives under the strong repression of the militarized police and the Army, while the South the country is completely ruled by tribal war lords, although they have sworn fealty to general Mayimbe, president of Loripa. The tribal warlords control the illegal trafficking of humans, weapons and drugs and have links to extremist groups including NEXSTA.

Relations of the Government of Loripa with Nexsta are complex and opportunistic. General Mayimbe plays the game of delegating the warlords in the south to contain and coexist with Nexsta in exchange of various favours.

d. **Ropperta Armed Forces (RAF)**

The Ministry of National Defence is a government ministry office of the Republic of Ropperta, responsible for coordinating and supervising all agencies and functions of the government concerned directly with national security and the Roppertan Armed Forces.

The Roppertan Armed Forces consist of the Army, Air Force and Navy.

As of 2012, Ropperta had an Army of 40,500 personnel equipped with 84 main battle tanks and 48 light tanks. The Air Force had 4,000 personnel, 27 combat aircraft and 43 helicopters. The Navy numbered 4,800 operating 25 patrol boats and 6 other craft. Paramilitary forces consisted of a 12,000-member national guard. Ropperta participates in current United Nations peacekeeping efforts.

In accordance with Article 44 of the constitution, the supreme commander of the armed forces is the President of the Republic of Ropperta.

Despite government-led efforts in Security Sector Reform also with EU support, the RAF remain underequipped and poorly trained. The population has not regained full trust in the RAF following their disproportionate use of force during the Roppertan Revolution. Accusations of violations of International Humanitarian Law in the context of the current operations against NEXTA in the south further undermined trust. Therefore, additional efforts in terms of training for the RAF, especially in international law, including human rights and International Humanitarian Law (IHL), are needed.

e. **Ropperta Internal Security Forces (RISF)**

The internal security forces controlled by the Ministry of Interior (MoI) include the police, the National Guard, the Judicial Police (which operates in the Ministry of
Justice and the courts but is controlled by the Ministry of Interior, the Intervention Forces (SWAT Forces), and the Presidential Guard Forces (PGF).

Whereas the police operate mostly in urban areas, the National Guard operates in the coastal and rural areas. The Judicial Police are part of the Ministry of Interior but work within the Judiciary. They are the investigative arm of the internal security forces and are responsible for collecting evidence, conducting investigations, and writing formal investigation reports for cases before the courts.

The Presidential Guard forces are also part of the Ministry of Interior. Their principal duty is to protect the President and his family.

The Police and National Guard are the first line of defence in fight against terrorism. They require additional training and equipment to counter the newly-evolving terrorist threat. Moreover, the justice and corrections sectors are overwhelmed by an increased number of criminal cases and a surge in the number of individuals suspected of involvement in terrorist activity. The judiciary often struggles to bring cases to trial in a timely manner, and the prison system suffers from overcrowding.

f. Kronen is a federal state with a strong centralized government. It occupies 70% of the African continent. It’s a country increasingly assertive about its potential economic world power and military strength.

North Africa represents the first priority for Kronen's geopolitical ambitions. The Government is taking advantage of the political void of some countries and is extending its reach up to the Mediterranean Sea. Its political and economic interests and values clash with those of the EU and the rest of the Western world. Systematic violations of human rights and international law have been repeatedly criticised by the EU and the international community. Economic and diplomatic sanctions are already in place by the EU since 2014.

Its armament industry is expanding and is aggressively exploring new market opportunities, including in countries which are on the brink of a civil war but for which the UN has still not imposed a weapons embargo.

The Kronen government has very advanced offensive cyber capabilities and most likely supports groups of hackers and hacktivists. It also controls the national media. Some state or state sponsored groups of cyber criminals are believed to promote Kronen interests. Other groups’ activities include disseminating propaganda, developing tools for intelligence agencies as well as hacking into networks and
EXERCISE - EXERCISE - EXERCISE

systems in support of Kronen security objectives. Kronen use of such proxies complicates attribution (making it harder to determine who is behind an attack), constraining potential cyber deterrence against government entities.

Kronen reportedly has also Social Media Manipulation capabilities, including a special unit in the Armed Forces that has dedicated personnel using content-BOTS to manipulate public opinion through Social Media posts.

It is accused of being behind hybrid attacks to harass western countries, and to weaken their economic and geopolitical influence.

Kronen has put in place an internal “zero tolerance policy” to avoid any return of jihadist fighters back to Kronen, strongly securitising the border with Loripa – and thus leaving migrants stranded in Loripa. At the same time Kronen has facilitated the establishment of a new haven for terrorists in South Lori by providing weapons to the country's Government and warlords, which have direct links with the terrorists group. Many analysts agree on the risk that Kronen might indirectly use Nexsta as a proxy, in a future, to directly target Europe.

Hybrid Environment:

a. In January 2017, a terrorist attack on three villages in South Ropperta perpetrated by NEXSTA. Hundreds of people are massacred.

b. In February 2017, an outbreak of cholera of unknown origin in Ropperta was reported.

c. On March 2017, clash in Loripa/Ropperta border region between NEXSTA and Ropperta security forces results in dozens of military dead.

d. In May 2017, Loripa is accused by the international community of trading oil and weapons with terrorist group NEXSTA.

e. In November, 2017 cyber-attacks (APT Manticore, credential leaks (email address | password)) against an EU delegation communication networks in North Africa.

f. Since December 2017, security incidents start to spread in Europe; a cyber-attack on hospital networks in Europe in December, followed by terrorist attacks claimed by
EXERCISE - EXERCISE - EXERCISE

NEXSTA simultaneously in France and UK in January 2018, or the assassination of an EU official in MENA region not claimed by any terrorist group in March.

g. Since April 2018, there has been an increase of the influx of refugees from Loripa towards the north of Ropperta, due to the incursions of NEXSTA in South Ropperta. The situation became uncontrollable for the police in the South that had to hand over command of the operations to the Armed Forces. Armed Forces are now overwhelmed by the escalation of violence and are not trained in counter-terrorism matters.
x.  **Impact of the Crisis on EU Interests, Values and existing Objectives in the Region**

g.  The EU has a fundamental interest in the peace, stability and prosperity in North Africa countries, including Ropperta. A stable and peaceful Ropperta would make a hugely positive contribution to security and democratisation across the region. The improvement of security in the border areas deters the infiltration of militants and plays an important role in managing the migratory flows it could spill over within the region and towards EU.

h.  The EU is providing a substantial support to the modernisation of the political apparatus and the acceleration of economic reforms on the path of inclusive economic prosperity in Ropperta, adhering to the universal values of human rights and fundamental freedoms and to the principles of the rule of law and good governance. These are important conditions for further expanding political and economic – trade and investment – relations between the EU and the region.

i.  Due to on-going violence and insecurity in Southern Ropperta, EU actions are jeopardised and without restoration of stability it will be impossible to implement EU supported development programmes. The delivery of humanitarian assistance is also severely hindered by the current security situation, with several hundred thousand people in need of aid. Increased action against trafficking and organised crime networks is also an important aspect. Furthermore, if instability in South Ropperta spreads – as it has started to do – this would inevitably have a destabilising effect in the whole country and broadly in North Africa with negative implications for EU's interests. Generalised instability could also attract other radical groups – more than NEXSTA - from other parts of Africa and the world, with possible "blow-back" effects in EU.

j.  Since August 2017, EU Delegations has been attacked by several cyber-attacks. Likewise, a number of EU Member States have been subject to cyber-attacks of different but concerning nature and intensity directed towards their critical infrastructures, particularly in the gas sector.

k.  The competent authorities are currently investigating whether these attacks are due to criminal activities or orchestrated by a specific state actor or a non-state actor (a terrorist organization). To this point, the intelligence reports from SIAC suggest that many
of these cyber-attacks are possibly attributable to Kronen or Loripa given certain indicators, such as the functionality, motivation and execution of the attacks. Intelligence reports also suggest that the cyber-attacks are supported by fake news on social media with a view to creating distrust and chaos.

I. Terrorist attacks, perpetrated by the "Newborn Extremist State" (Nexsta) have increased across Europe in recent months, following its move into Loripa. Despite the geographic setbacks, the group is spreading its influence across North Africa and the Mediterranean Sea.

m. The EU is suffering since March 2018 a shortage of gas supply due to technical constraints on the supply from the East, which represents 32% of EU demand for gas. The EU relies currently on the supply coming from the other two main suppliers, Norway (normally 32%) and Loripa (normally 36%). The EU establishes its contingency plans; current stocks of gas in the EU are low below the standards.

n. Following the developments in Ropperta, the HR/VP has activated the EEAS Crisis Response Mechanism.

o. The consequences of the EU getting involved in North Africa result in an increase of cyber-attacks of an unknown origin and a varying type start targeting EU delegations, CSDP communication networks, and some critical infrastructure of several MSs.

p. Disinformation coming from different sources and particularly from Kronen against the EU "illegal intervention" in North Africa increases to the point of being a trend topic on social networks.

q. Beside this, the threat of Nexsta is more present with targeted attacks to EU interests in European soil, the Mediterranean and EU interests in Africa.

y. **EU Strategic Objectives in Relation to the Crisis**

The recent deterioration of the security environment in Southern Ropperta is affecting not only Ropperta but also its neighbouring countries in North Africa, with direct or indirect negative impact on EU's strategic interests and its security.
Therefore, it is in EU's strategic interest to contribute together with other international partners to the stabilisation in Ropperta.

The current assessment leads to the following overarching objectives as the focus of EU action:

r. Contribute to maintaining a stable Ropperta through supporting transformation of the young democracy and ongoing efforts of social and economic reforms.

s. Support the overall restoration of Ropperta authority in the South and re-establishing state control of the borders.

t. Improve the security situation in Ropperta, particularly in the South and in the border with Loripa so as to avoid spill-over of the conflict to the region with the risk of new and increased migratory flows within the region or towards EUROPE.

u. Contribute to improving the capability and equipment of the Ropperta Armed Forces (RAF) to deliver security independently.

v. Increase resilience of Ropperta and contribute to build its capacities.

w. Support Ropperta’s efforts to reform Security Sector.

x. Support the fight against corruption within Law Enforcement Agency (LEA).

y. Support Ropperta fight against terrorism and prevent radicalization and violent extremism.

z. Risks

The situation in Ropperta is increasingly volatile. Too much would be at risk, if the EU as a long-standing and close partner of Ropperta would ignore the current deterioration of the security and humanitarian situations and remain passive. Yet there are risks associated with each course of action:

I. EU not taking action:

   i. Instability spills over to the region with the respective political, social and economic consequences;
ii. The worsening of the humanitarian situation can trigger an unprecedented crisis in the region with massive unaddressed human suffering. This could, among other things, also result in a substantial increase in migratory flow towards Europe.

iii. Reputational risks for EU and its MS.

II. EU taking limited action:

i. A limited engagement would not achieve the desired impact, while at the same time it would expose the EU for targeting.

ii. Long protracted engagement with not clear outcomes.

III. EU undertaking a broad engagement through an integrated approach:

i. Potential security risks for EU institutions and citizens due to the visibility of the EU intervention;

ii. Loss of credibility if political objectives are not reached.

aa. The Way Forward

Only through a broad action based on integrated approach the EU will succeed to enable progress on any of the specific problems identified in Ropperta. To achieve the objectives described in the section above implies addressing diplomatic, development, security, humanitarian, cyber and health issues. Good governance, management and oversight are key for a sustainable reform that is supported by population. Sustainable development must aim at speeding economic reforms and boosting dignified jobs, as well as investing on basic services and infrastructures. Humanitarian aid is urgently needed to bring relief and assistance to the affected population, in particular the most vulnerable, in terms of shelter, food, water, health and sanitation (WASH) and medical aid.

The EU also needs to take into account the relations between Ropperta and its neighbours to address grievances, strengthen inclusive development and human security. It requires an integrated approach which understands all involved actors' dynamics and addresses the root causes of the crisis to gradually build on stability and prosperity in the whole region, is mindful of consequences (including unintended) of its interventions and works with the large spectrum of societal stakeholders, government and civil society, including non-state security providers, as appropriate.
Diplomatic

The EU will continue using its diplomatic tools, including through the EU Delegations and EU Member States' Embassies, and in close coordination with other regional and international actors, with the strategic aims of:

1. Contributing to consolidation of the political stability and socio-economic development in Ropperta.
2. Supporting a whole-of-regional approach.

Development

3. The Commission has started to reflect in the context of the upcoming ad hoc mid-term review on re-assessing the assistance provided and adapting its interventions including support to political and economic efforts. As such, it is planning to adopt a two-pronged approach addressing both core developmental issues, including financial and economic reforms, and CSDP initiatives are to be complementary.

Programmes addressing the capacity gap in developmental planning. Research will be conducted on best practices and expertise will be provided on specific sectors to be selected according to priority needs from public finance management, public infrastructure, electricity, rural development, employment generation, health, education, etc., with a clear objective of linking these actions with other Commission DGs – DG HOME, DG SANTE, DG ECHO, DG NEAR, FPI, and other actors' presence in the field.

Possible CSDP contribution

Attending to the needs and request of Ropperta’s authorities and in line with EU interests and political objectives a potential CSDP engagement in support of Ropperta could contribute to the EU integrated approach to the conflict in the region. The envisaged CSDP action could consist in a Civilian CSDP Advisory and Capacity building mission and a Military CSDP Operation, both deployed in Ropperta.

4. The Military CSDP Operation could contribute to improve the security situation in the South of the country with the aim to facilitate the restoration of Ropperta’s authority in the
whole territory including the control of its borders. The CSDP Military Operation could also include training - including on international law, human rights and International Humanitarian Law, and advisory component to assist and support Ropperta’s Defence Sector Reform. As appropriate, provision of humanitarian assistance through meaningful engagement in Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination⁴.

5. The Civilian CSDP Advisory and Capacity building Mission could be deployed in Ropperta to provide advice to reform the Civilian Security Sector, with special attention to develop the mechanisms to fight against corruption within the law enforcement agencies (LEA). The Mission could also deliver capacity building activities with the aim to improve the capacities of LEA including in the fight against terrorism. A potential engagement in support of developing a proper Integrated Border Management would need to be assessed.

g. **Resource Implications**

Whereas some of the instruments already have funds allocated to them that could be mobilised through due process others, such as military deployment, do not and would require substantial new funds to be allocated by Member States.

h. **Annexes**


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⁴ Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination is defined as the essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency, and, when appropriate, pursue common goals. The Commission/DG ECHO is the lead EU service for the delivery of disaster relief and humanitarian aid. In close cooperation with the EU Military Staff, it also supports and promotes effective Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination within the EU.
EU HEX-ML 18 (PACE)

Letter ROPPERTA – HR/VP to welcome CSDP Action
Ropperta City, 12 May 2018

Your Excellency, Mrs Mogherini,

the Republic of Ropperta has faced daunting challenges since the end of the revolution and more recently since the ratification of the new Constitution.

The Roppertan people are determined to build their own democracy, after years of political instability and social unrest. Our wish is strong, but we understand that we need to rely on the support of the international community to take the first steps towards the recovery of trust and the establishment of the foundations of our young democracy.

I am well aware of the important support the European Union has been providing to my country in terms of humanitarian assistance, civil protection, and development programs. On behalf of the Roppertan people, I would like to thank you once more for supporting Ropperta in its legitimate quest for a better future. The people of Ropperta are strong and resilient, but there are many burdens inherited from the past government and instabilities in the region that hinder our efforts.

Despite the unfailing effort of our strong security and armed forces, the length of our border with Loripa allows for hostile infiltrations of the so called NEXTA group. The objective of this group is to spread violence and fear and to recruit our honourable citizens for their deplorable aims.

The Republic of Ropperta will not tolerate any kind of terrorist group operating on its territory and it will show the utmost determination to force back the terrorist threat in order to avoid a spill-over to the north.

We also strive to improve everyday security for all Roppertans, unfortunately, corruption and old structures inherited from previous regimes makes our efforts for reform difficult.

I need not remind you that resources are lacking and that our security forces need appropriate vehicles and equipment, as well as targeted Special Forces training in order to effectively provide security in the south and across the country.

We are fully aware of the importance of human rights and International Humanitarian Law, but we are lacking the trainers.
Finally, instability and provocations from the Loripan side have also led to large numbers of migrants crossing our border on their way to the EU. The Republic of Ropperta is doing its very best to provide these people with their utmost necessities, in full respect of their human rights and dignity. However, the young democracy of Ropperta cannot always be asked to solve the problems of other countries. We cannot carry this burden alone and need the commitment and financial support of the EU.

As you have stated in many occasions, there is no development without security, is for that reason that I come to you to request the support of the EU with all its means and tools to help improve our security which is threaten by the above mentioned issues. As friends of the EU, we act in your interest and we trust that you will support us with all means at your disposal.

I avail myself of this opportunity to express my gratitude for the EU efforts to support the proud people of Ropperta,

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Sincerely Yours

Begh CAOP ESVERTY
PACE 2018 (ML-HEX 2018)
UN Security Council Resolution
1002 (2018)
Resolution 1002 (2018)

Adopted by the Security Council at its meeting, on

18 February 2018

The Security Council,


Recalling its previous resolution 1001condemning the dire humanitarian situation in the region (Loripa-Roperta) being one of the direct consequences of illegal trafficking in the region,

Recalling its previous resolutions on strengthening the effectiveness of the Security Council and the role of civil society in the prevention and resolution of armed conflict, particularly in AFRICA,

Welcoming the Unity Government in Roperta and its efforts towards cohesion and development demonstrated since 2015,

Welcoming the support and investment of the International Community, and particularly the European Union, to the development and democratic progress of the Republic of Roperta,

Reaffirming its respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and political independence of Roperta, and recalling the importance of the principles of good-neighbourliness, non-interference and cooperation in the relations among States in the region,

Expressing its concern about the deteriorating security situation in the South of Roperta and at its porous borders with Loripa,
Expressing its grave concern about continuous attacks of the so called Nexsta terrorist groups, in particular against civilians, women and children, including sexual and gender based violence;

Reiterating the vital role of women in conflict resolution and peacebuilding, the importance of their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security and their key role in re-establishing the fabric of societies recovering from conflict,

Underlining the need to continue prioritizing efforts and the importance of measures to rebuild confidence within and between the security forces and the population,

Mindful of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security under the Charter of the United Nations,

Reaffirming its determination that terrorism, in all forms and manifestations, constitutes one of the most serious threats to peace and security,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Condemns the flows of arms and related materiel transferred to or from Loripa in violation of the arms embargo, including to NEXTA and other terrorist groups in the region;

2. Condemns the recent and repeated terrorist attacks in the South of Ropperta;

3. Urges member states to coordinate and combat by all means, in accordance with their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and other obligations under international law, including international human rights law, international refugee law and international humanitarian law, threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts;

4. Urges the international community, non-governmental organizations and civil society to increase humanitarian assistance to civilians affected by displacements in Ropperta;

5. Underscores that the governments in the region have a primary responsibility to protect their populations, including from attacks by militias and armed groups and stresses the importance of ensuring the full, safe and unhindered access of humanitarian workers to people in need in accordance with international law;

6. Authorises the international community, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, to take all necessary measures, to support and complement the peacebuilding and development initiatives required to sustain peace, security and stability in Ropperta;

7. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
PACE 2018 (ML-HEX 2018)
Crisis Management Concept (Ropperta)
Annex H

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