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LEGISLATIVE ACTS AND OTHER INSTRUMENTS

Subject: COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2642 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia's destabilising activities

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2026/...

of ...

**implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2642 concerning restrictive measures
in view of Russia's destabilising activities**

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2024/2642 of 8 October 2024 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia's destabilising activities¹, and in particular Article 13(4) thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,

¹ OJ L, 2024/2642, 9.10.2024, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2642/oj>.

Whereas:

- (1) On 8 October 2024, the Council adopted Regulation (EU) 2024/2642.
- (2) On 16 September 2026 the European Parliament approved a report, in which it warned against increased hybrid threats against the Union and demanded a firmer Union response. The report pointed to Russia as the gravest hybrid-threat state actor targeting the Union.
- (3) On the basis of the review of Regulation (EU) 2024/2642, the Council considers that entries concerning eight natural person in the list of natural and legal persons, entities and bodies set out in Annex I to Regulation (EU) 2024/2642 should be amended, and that the entry concerning one natural person should be deleted from that Annex.
- (4) Regulation (EU) 2024/2642 should therefore be amended accordingly,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

Annex I to Regulation (EU) 2024/2642 is amended in accordance with the Annex to this Regulation.

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the *Official Journal of the European Union*.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at ..., ...

For the Council

The President

ANNEX

Annex I to Regulation (EU) 2024/2642 is amended as follows:

(1) the following entry is deleted from Table ‘A. Natural persons’:

‘11. Olga Alekseevna BELYAVTSEVA’;

(2) in Table 'A. Natural persons', entries 4, 6, 20, 23, 27, 28, 29, and 57 are replaced by the following corresponding entries:

	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
'4.	Andrey Vladimirovich AVERYANOV (Russian: Андрей Владимирович АВЕРЬЯНОВ)	Function: Deputy director of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU), Commander of GRU unit 29155, Major General DOB: 29.9.1967 POB: USSR (now Russian Federation) Nationality: Russian Gender: male Tax Identification Number (INN): 773378888007	Andrey Averyanov is a deputy director of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU). After the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin and the restructuring of the Wagner Group, the command of Russian military operations in Africa was restructured and placed under the Africa Corps under the umbrella of the Russian Ministry of Defence, and Averyanov was placed in charge of the operations. In many African countries, Russian forces provide security to military juntas that have overthrown legitimate democratic governments, gravely worsening the stability, security and democracy of the countries. In addition, Russian forces in Africa exploit the natural resources there to finance their operations. In the beginning of 2024, Russian forces took control of the Intahaka gold mine in Mali.	16.12.2024

	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
			Therefore, Andrey Averyanov is implementing actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in third countries by undermining the democratic political process in the African countries where Russian forces operate and by exploiting an armed conflict, instability or insecurity, including through the illicit exploitation or trade of natural resources and wildlife in a third country.	

	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
6.	Vladimir Vladimirovich SERGIYENKO (Russian: Владимир Владимирович СЕРГИЕНКО)	Function: Former assistant of Member of Bundestag Eugen Schmidt DOB: 23.5.1971 POB: Lviv, Ukrainian SSR (now Ukraine) Nationality: Russian / Ukrainian Gender: male	Vladimir Sergiyenko is a former parliamentary assistant of the Member of the German Bundestag, Eugen Schmidt. In parallel, Sergiyenko actively colluded with Russian intelligence officers seeking to leverage his privileged parliamentary and political access to the detriment of the democratic political process and constitutional order of the Federal Republic of Germany. He is also the host of the Russian radio programme “Eurozone” on Vesti FM and regularly hosts radio segments on Balt News. He uses those platforms to spread disinformation about the European Union and its member states. Therefore, Vladimir Sergiyenko implemented and supported actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law and security in the Union and its Member States by engaging in, directly or indirectly, the obstruction or undermining of the democratic political process, and by engaging in, directly or indirectly, and supporting the use of information manipulation and interference.	16.12.2024

	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
20.	Hüseyin DOGRU	Nationality: German Gender: male	Hüseyin Doğru is the founder and representative of AFA Medya A.Ş., which is a media company based in Istanbul. AFA Medya A.Ş. operates “RED”, which comprises a number of media platforms, and which has close financial and organisational connections with Russian state propaganda entities and actors, and shares deep structural ties, including interlinkages between, and rotation of, individual personnel with Russian state media organisations. RED has used its media platforms – often publishing under “redstreamnet” or “thered.stream” – to systematically spread false information on politically controversial subjects with the intent of creating ethnic, political and religious discord amongst its predominantly German target audience, including by disseminating the narratives of radical Islamic terrorist groups such as Hamas. During a violent occupation of a German university by anti-Israel rioters, RED personnel coordinated with the occupiers to disseminate images of their vandalism – which included the use of Hamas symbols – through their online channels, thus providing them with an exclusive media platform, facilitating the violent nature of the protest.	20.5.2025

	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
			Hüseyin Doğru continues to spread false information through AFA Medya A.Ş. as well as through his own social media accounts. Through AFA Medya A.Ş. and his personal social media accounts, Hüseyin Doğru thus supports actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability and security in the Union and in one or several of its Member States, including by indirectly supporting and facilitating violent demonstrations and engaging in coordinated information manipulation.	

	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
23.	Alina LIPP	Function: war correspondent DOB: 17.9.1993 POB: Hamburg Nationality: German Gender: female	Alina Lipp runs the blog “Neues aus Russland”, in which she systematically disseminates misinformation about Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, and delegitimises the Ukrainian government, especially with a view to manipulating German public sentiment as regards support for Ukraine. Those activities are supported by the Russian State. Furthermore, she is using her role as a war correspondent with the Russian armed forces in eastern Ukraine to spread Russian war propaganda. She regularly appears in troop entertainment and propaganda shows on the Russian military TV channel Zvezda. Thus, Alina Lipp is engaging in and supporting actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten security and stability in the Union and in a third country (Ukraine) through the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference, and through facilitating an armed conflict in a third country.	20.5.2025

	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
27.	Iurie NECULITI (Russian: Юрие НЕКУЛИТИ)	Function: CEO of Stark Industries Nationality: of the Republic of Moldova Gender: male Address: 71-75 Shelton Street, Covent Garden, London, United Kingdom; Chisinau, Republic of Moldova POB: Bender, Republic of Moldova	Iurie Neculiti was the CEO of Stark Industries Solutions Ltd., a web hosting service registered as a maildrop company in the United Kingdom. The company provided server hosting, with server locations all over the world. In 2025, Stark Industries Solutions Ltd.'s technical infrastructure was transferred to a newly established entity, WorkTitans B.V., which served as a front, while a second entity, MIRhosting, ensured the first was connected to the internet. Iurie Neculiti and Ivan Neculiti are named as the beneficiaries of the set-up, which is reported to reflect an attempt to obfuscate ownership and maintain hosting services under new legal and network entities. That network of entities enables various Russian state-sponsored and state-affiliated actors to conduct destabilising activities including coordinated information manipulation and interference and cyber-attacks against the Union and third countries by providing services intended to hide these activities from European law enforcement and security agencies.	20.5.2025

	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
			Therefore, as former CEO of Stark Industries Solutions Ltd., and as beneficiary of its front companies, Iurie Neculiti is supporting actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which threaten democracy and the rule of law, stability or security in the Union, in one of its Member States and a third country, by facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference and by facilitating actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest. Iurie Neculiti is associated with Ivan Neculiti, Stark Industries, WorkTitans B.V. and MIRHosting.	

	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
28.	Ivan NECULITI (Russian: ИВАН НЕКУЛИТИ)	Function: Owner of Stark Industries and PQ Hosting Nationality: of the Republic of Moldova Gender: male Address: 71-75 Shelton Street, Covent Garden, London, United Kingdom; Chisinau, Republic of Moldova POB: Bender, Republic of Moldova	Ivan Neculiti was the owner of Stark Industries Solutions Ltd., a web hosting service registered as a maildrop company in the United Kingdom. The company provided server hosting, with server locations all over the world. In 2025, Stark Industries Solutions Ltd.'s technical infrastructure was transferred to a newly established entity, WorkTitans B.V., which served as a front, while a second entity, MIRhosting, ensured the first was connected to the internet. Iurie Neculiti and Ivan Neculiti are named as the beneficiaries of the set-up, which is reported to reflect an attempt to obfuscate ownership and sustain hosting services under new legal and network entities. That network of entities enables various Russian state-sponsored and state-affiliated actors to conduct destabilising activities, including coordinated information manipulation and interference and cyber-attacks against Union and third countries, by providing services intended to hide these activities from European law enforcement and security agencies.	20.5.2025

	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
			Ivan Neculiti is associated with Iurie Neculiti, Stark Industries, WorkTitans B.V. and MIRHosting. Therefore, as the former owner of Stark Industries Solutions Ltd., and beneficiary of its front companies, Ivan Neculiti is supporting actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which threaten democracy and the rule of law, stability or security in the Union, in one of its Member States and in a third country, by facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference and by facilitating actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest.	

	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
29.	Andrei KHARKOVSKY (Russian: Андрей ХАРКОВСКИЙ)	Function: Leading member of the Union of Cossack Warriors of Russia and Abroad Nationality: Russian POB: Tomsk Region, Russia Gender: male Address: Germany	Andrei Kharkovsky is a Russian citizen living in Germany. Kharkovsky is a supporter of the Union of Cossack Warriors of Russia and Abroad and similar Russian Cossack organizations including by organising military gatherings for its members in Germany. The Union of Cossack Warriors of Russia and Abroad is an entity linked to the Government of the Russian Federation, and partaking in Russia's war of aggression and acts of violence in Ukraine in support of pro-Russian separatists under the premise of a "historical mission" to reinstate Russian control over southern and eastern Ukraine. Moreover, Kharkovsky is associated with Elena Kolbasnikova and Rostislav Teslyuk including by providing security services during events where fundraisers for Pro-Russian separatists in Ukraine took place.	20.5.2025

	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
			Andrei Kharkovsky is therefore supporting actions of the Russian Government which undermine the sovereignty and security of Ukraine by supporting the undermining of the public order and safety, including by attempting to overthrow the constitutional order of Ukraine. He also supports natural persons who support actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine the security of a third country (Ukraine) and which undermine the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security of a Member State through activities aimed at undermining the democratic political process in Germany.	

	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
57.	Jacques BAUD	Function: former colonel in the Swiss army; former strategic analyst, intelligence and terrorism specialist DOB: 1.4.1955 Nationality: Swiss Gender: male	Jacques Baud, a former Swiss army colonel and strategic analyst, is a regular guest on pro-Russian television and radio programmes. He acts as a mouthpiece for pro-Russian propaganda and makes conspiracy theories, for example accusing Ukraine of orchestrating its own invasion in order to join NATO. Therefore, Jacques Baud is responsible for, implementing or supporting actions or policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine democracy and threaten stability or security in a third country by engaging in the use of information manipulation and interference.	15.12.2025’.