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Delegations will find attached document EEAS(2018) 626 REV 3.

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EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE



European Union Military Staff

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<b>From</b> <b>To</b>	<b>European Union Military Committee (EUMC)</b> <b>European Union Military Committee (EUMC)</b>
<b>Title / Subject</b>	<b>EU Concept for Logistic Support for EU-led Military Operations and Missions</b>
<b>[Ref. prev. doc.]</b>	<b>ST15040/14</b>

Delegations will find attached the **EU Concept for Logistic Support for EU-led Military Operations and Missions**, which was agreed by the EUMC on 28 September 2018, by silence procedure. This document supersedes document ST15040/14.

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**EU CONCEPT  
FOR LOGISTIC SUPPORT FOR  
EU-LED MILITARY OPERATIONS AND MISSIONS**

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- HH. Suggestions for crisis management procedures for CSDP crisis management operations (76601/1/13, dated 18 June 2013)
- II. Presidency Conclusions of Nice European Council meeting, 7- 9 December 2000 (SN 400/1/00, REV 1, dated 17 January 2001);

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### A. INTRODUCTION

1. The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) supports the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in order to strengthen the European Union (EU) contribution to international peace and security. Furthermore, one of the strategic priorities of the Global Strategy (Ref. A) for the EU Foreign and Security Policy in the area of Security and Defence is the response to external conflicts and crises, by conducting civilian and military operations and missions more effectively and rapidly. Europeans must be ready to rapidly respond to crises in full compliance with the United Nations (UN) Charter. The strategy calls upon the EU to become more active, capable, credible and more coherent, and to work closely with partners. To achieve a higher degree of responsiveness, European forces must be better equipped, trained and organized to contribute decisively to collective efforts, as well as to act autonomously if and when necessary. Enhanced cooperation between Member States (MS) and with Partners should be explored, and might lead to a more structured form of cooperation, making full use of the Lisbon Treaty's potential, as the Permanent Structured Cooperation. The Treaty on the European Union (TEU) (Ref. B) lists the potential missions and tasks including joint disarmament operations, support for third countries in combating terrorism and security sector reform. The success of CSDP EU-led military operations and missions is highly dependent on the capability to generate, deploy, sustain and redeploy EU-led Forces<sup>1</sup>.
2. This concept reflects the political aspirations within the military dimension of CSDP as well as the practical military experience gained over the EU-led military operations and missions. It should be updated when necessary in the light of the experience gained from operations and missions but also regarding technological developments in all areas and dimensions, which could influence the logistic support of future military operations and missions. All actions listed in this concept will be pursued in an inclusive and transparent way in full respect of the EU's Institutional Framework.

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<sup>1</sup> This includes EU military organisations, groups, bodies or other entities specifically set up for the operation



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### B. AIM

3. The aim of this document is to establish the overarching concept for logistic support for the entire spectrum of EU-led military operations and missions.

### C. SCOPE

4. This document details EU logistic principles and guidelines, primarily at the Political and Strategic level but also at the Military Strategic and Operational levels, to foster common understanding and co-operative logistic planning for the Director of the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC), any EU Operation Commander (OpCdr), Force Commander (FCdr) and Mission Force Commander (MFCdr) and the respective levels in the EU MS. It provides sufficient flexibility for EU military Commanders (Cdrs) to closely co-operate with NATO, UN, OSCE, relevant International Organisations (IOs), Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and non-EU Troops Contributing Nations (non-EU TCNs) which might take part in EU-led military operations. It takes into account challenges deriving from the Headline Goal 2010 (Ref. C), the specific challenges related to a Rapid Response Capability (RRC) (Ref. D), the EU Battlegroups (EU BGs) (Ref. E) and the logistic lessons learnt during EU-led military operations. The concept facilitates closer cooperation with EU-led civilian missions and covers all the different options for the execution of logistics functions. In coherence with NATO, this document has taken into account relevant Alliance logistic documents to the extent possible. All acronyms and definitions comply with Ref. F. Hereinafter, for the purposes of this concept the term "operations" includes military executive and non-executive operations and missions.

### D. DEFINITION AND PRINCIPLES

#### I. Definition<sup>2</sup>

5. Logistics is the science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive sense it is the aspects of military operations which deal with:
  - a. Design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, modification, evacuation and disposal of equipment and materiel;

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<sup>2</sup>This definition takes into account that some Member States have a different definition of a logistic function and its related areas.

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- b. Transport of personnel;
  - c. Acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities;
  - d. Acquisition or furnishing of services and
  - e. Health and Medical (H&M) support.
6. The term logistics, if not otherwise stated, comprises all the logistic functions and logistic related areas, although materiel management and procurement logistics are beyond the scope of this document.

## II. Principles

### a. Primacy of Operational Requirements

7. All the logistic support efforts, regardless of their nature, origin or composition, must be focused on meeting the operational requirements necessary to contribute to the success of the operation in all its phases.

### b. Collective Responsibility

8. The responsibility for the provision of resources and for planning the support of national forces remains ultimately with the contributing states. Nevertheless, EU military Cdrs and contributing states have a collective responsibility for logistic support of EU-led military operations. This collective responsibility for logistics reflects the fact that EU military Cdrs and contributing states bear an obligation to cooperate in such a way that their common effort meet the overall requirement, taking into account each other's requirements and constraints
9. Interoperability; standardisation of procedures, material and equipment; sharing the provision and use of logistic capabilities and resources; and common logistics Command and Control (C2) structures are the basis to support the force effectively and, whenever possible, efficiently.

### c. Authority

10. There is an essential interdependence between responsibility and authority. The responsibility assigned to any EU military Cdr must be matched with the transfer of authority (TOA) by TCNs to allow the adequate discharge of responsibilities. The EU military Cdrs at the

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appropriate level must be granted appropriate authority to synchronise, prioritise and integrate logistics functions and activities in the Joint Operations Area (JOA) to accomplish the assigned mission, in accordance with pre-agreed terms and conditions.

### **d. Cooperation and coordination**

11. Multinational cooperation over all functions of logistic support between EU military Cdrs, TCNs, EU actors, and other organisations is essential for an optimal use of limited resources. Multinational cooperation may accelerate force deployment, enhance operational effectiveness and generate logistics capabilities beyond the means of any individual nation.
12. Co-ordination of logistic support between EU military Cdrs, relevant EU actors and TCNs, Third States, IOs and other organisations operating in the same JOA is essential and must be conducted at all appropriate levels. Generic and pre-arranged contracts, agreements and/or arrangements are key elements in early planning, and valid tools to facilitate logistic coordination and Force Generation (FG). Overall responsibility for logistic coordination lies with the EU military Cdrs and should be conducted as a matter of routine.
13. Establishing an effective logistic support structure requires extensive and continuous planning and coordination between EU military Cdrs, TCNs and other EU actors in the area during all phases of the operation and non-EU actors in the area during the conduct of the operation.
14. TCNs can increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the logistic support of EU-led military operations by the establishment of multinational logistics structures and solutions. To ensure an effective and efficient multinational logistic support, each TCN contribution should be based on its specific logistic capabilities strengths to cover other TCN shortfalls while the overall multinational logistic support concept and capabilities are developed, negotiated, and agreed at the earliest stages of the planning process and implanted prior to the deployment phase of the operation.
15. Multinational and national logistic command and control elements and capabilities should be established before the starting of the deployment of forces and should remain fully operational until the operation has ended and the forces have been re-deployed.

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### **e. Assured Provision**

16. TCNs, either individually or through co-operative arrangements, must ensure the provision of logistic resources to support national forces and capabilities.

### **f. Sufficiency**

17. Logistic support must be available in the necessary quantity and quality when and where it is required throughout the full spectrum of operations and missions. It must be ensured for any EU-led operation continuously for the duration required to accomplish the mission.

### **g. Flexibility**

18. Logistic support must be proactive, adaptable and responsive to accomplish the mission. Planning that considers potential changes in circumstances enhances flexibility.

### **h. Simplicity**

19. Simple plans and orders and uncomplicated mission-oriented logistic organisations, structures and procedures minimise confusion. They help to ensure that the support provided meets the operational requirements. Furthermore, simple reporting mechanisms ensure the accurate and efficient dissemination of information.

### **i. Effectiveness/Efficiency**

20. Logistic resources have to be used as effectively and as efficiently as possible, to satisfy the operational requirements. Mutual support structures and mechanisms, such as multinational logistic organisations, Host Nation Support (HNS), and Contractor Support to Operations (CSO)<sup>3</sup> should be considered from the outset of the planning process and implemented to decrease costs, eliminate duplication of logistic efforts, reduce the operational logistics footprint and improve the overall quality of support while always fulfilling the operational requirements.

### **j. Visibility and Transparency**

21. Visibility and transparency of the availability of logistic resources and capabilities are

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<sup>3</sup> In accordance with the CSO Concept, *inter alia*, recalling that the use of CSO must not jeopardise the allocation of capabilities by TCNs through the force planning process, and their commitment through the Force Generation Process.

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essential for effective logistic support. EU military Cdrs require timely and accurate information from TCNs concerning logistic assets, capabilities and arrangements to achieve synchronised, integrated and effective support to EU-led Forces.

### **E. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS AND FACTORS**

#### **I. General Characteristics**

22. The integrated approach of the EU CSDP missions may require the development and implementation of logistic support solutions other than the sole employment of military logistic support capabilities to fulfill the logistics requirements of the execution of potential non-military tasks.
23. EU-led military operations are usually executed beyond EU territory requiring the use of long Lines of Communications (LOCs), and in an operational environment involving austere conditions, difficult terrain and/or large areas of operations, hostile climate, scarcity of basic facilities and limited or non-existent HNS.
24. EU-led military operations are likely to be ad hoc in nature, rapid, expeditionary (Ref. D and E), combined and joint. In addition, more than one EU-led military operation may occur at the same time, anywhere in the world, possibly involving more than one host nation (HN) and lasting for protracted periods. In this environment, in the initial stages, it is probable that austere conditions will exist. Therefore a robust logistic support structure will be required to overcome these austere conditions, especially for the provision of Real Life Support (RLS).
25. To adequately deploy and sustain the force in this demanding scenario, the logistic planning process for EU-led military operations will require extensive preparation, critically dependent on timely, accurate and consistent logistic situational awareness within an integrated picture. The analysis of the area of operations, in close coordination with Intelligence experts, should assure appropriate logistics related intelligence.

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### II. Factors Affecting Logistic Support

#### a. Civil-Military Interaction

26. EU-led military operations are often conducted alongside civilian activities that could commence well ahead of the decision to launch an operation and may extend into the immediate post crisis period (Ref. G). The EU must therefore have a logistic support system able to cope with the requirements arising from such a situation. EU-led military operations could also be conducted alongside civilian EU missions. In this case additional support may be required for this civilian mission and synergies should be sought on issues such as combined headquarters and logistics, in particular in strategic transport, medical support and infrastructure. Such an approach should be, wherever possible, more cost-effective.
27. In exceptional circumstances, only in a last resort and within means and capabilities, EU-led military operations may be tasked to support local or displaced persons. Such tasks may include, among others, provision of food and drinking water, medical support and construction projects. The logistics capabilities and resources required to fulfill these tasks should be taken into account during the planning process. Where EU-led military operations should provide logistic support to civilian activities of EU institutions, IOs and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), this support will require specific TCNs authorisation and agreements, including funding issues.
28. When an EU-led military operation is executed concurrently with a UN military or civilian mission in the same area of operations or the EU-led military operation is undertaken in support of a UN operation, EU logistic support needs to be closely coordinated with UN agencies and forces both during the planning phase and on the ground. Both organisations should co-ordinate their logistic activities and, when possible, to optimise respective organisations resources, by providing mutual logistic support to address each organisation shortfalls. Already deployed UN forces support to the EU-led force could be especially useful during the EU force deployment phase when the full EU logistic chain of support is unavailable. A support arrangement has to be agreed governing the mutual use of assets, services and/or installations, including service standards and funding implications.

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29. Appropriate management and timely distribution of logistic information is critical to operational success. Collaborative logistic planning, exchange of logistic information including Liaison Officers, Combined Fact Finding Teams and shared logistic databases between EU-led military operation and the UN should be established from the outset of the operation and at all relevant levels.
30. To prevent competition for limited resources and services HNS arrangements and local market contracting activities should be coordinated between all stakeholders (EU actors, IO, NGOs and national operations) present in the JOA. Close contact should be established early in the planning process and maintained during all phases of the operation to enable the exchange of relevant logistic information and further cooperation between all actors in the JOA.

### **b. Availability of Resources**

31. The availability of military logistics resources and capabilities to support an EU-led military operation will depend on the commitments made by EU MS and Third States during the Force Generation process.
32. Operation logistic support requirements must be matched against available resources. Logistic planners have to take into account logistic support limitations. Logistic support plans should consider all possible alternatives to produce efficient solutions, including logistic cooperation with strategic partners operating in the same JOA. Pre-established multinational support agreements and/or contracts should be considered from the outset in the planning process as a pre-identified source of resources to contribute mitigating force generation shortfalls if any.
33. Contracting has become an increasingly important tool to balance a lack of HNS and shortfalls in the force generation process. The early planning of CSO (Ref. H) will increase contractor support availability, operational flexibility and cost effectiveness. EU contract integrator capability for the benefit of all contributing MS, embedded at all levels, may be considered from the very beginning in the planning process.
34. On the date of the approval by the Council of the Crisis Management Concept (Ref. I), the Preparatory Phase starts and financial resources could be made available by the Athena

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mechanism (in accordance with Ref. J) to enable Fact Finding Missions (FFM) in the JOA. FFM are used for gathering information to establish a Mission/Operation Reference Amount – the estimate of common costs for whole duration of the Operation.

### c. Readiness

35. The availability and readiness levels of logistic units and resources, including commercial support solutions, must match the readiness state of forces available for EU-led military operations and in particular the rapid response formations, in line with the EU Military Rapid Response Concept (Ref D).
36. EU MS logistics plans must ensure that the sufficient quantity and quality of logistics resources and capabilities are available at least at the same readiness category as the forces they support, taking into account the time requirements for the FG process and procedures. (Ref. K).

### d. Legal Aspects

37. EU-led military operations are to be conducted in accordance with their legal framework, laid down in a Council decision, which is normally spelled out in each Operation Plan (OPLAN).

### e. Human Rights and Gender

38. The mainstreaming of human rights and gender (Ref. L) within EU-led military operations may have some impact on logistic requirements. It could imply the fulfillment of the specific needs of women and children<sup>4</sup>, the promotion of gender equality and cognisance of the role of women in post conflict situations.

### f. Interoperability

39. A coherent and coordinated development of compatible equipment, procedures, command and control arrangements and planning processes, including military, civilian and civil-military aspects, will increase the interoperability degree of EU-led forces. A high interoperability

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<sup>4</sup> This refers to women participating in EU-led military operations; to women and children, who are or have been members of armed forces of parties of a conflict; as well as to women and children who are members of the civil society within the JOA



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level between these forces will enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of multinational logistic support structures established in the JOA.

### **g. Standardisation**

40. Standardised equipment, resources, services and procedures are essential to reach a high degree of interoperability and increase the effectiveness of multinational logistic support. Definition and implementation of common standards for EU MS and potential Third States should be encouraged as much as possible. Whenever appropriate, EU standards should match those used by other organisations being potentially involved in operations in the same JOA (e.g. NATO, UN).

### **h. Logistic support system resilience**

41. The materialisation of a hybrid threat acting on the logistic support system should be taken into account from the outset of the planning process to ensure that the logistics system is able to resist and recover from its effects. The combination of conventional and unconventional means, overt and covert activities, including cyberattacks on the critical national infrastructures may severely restrict the capabilities of the TCNs and the HN to provide logistic support to the EU forces. The effects of those attacks on the ability to provide logistic support to the EU forces and the mitigation measures to be implemented to ensure the continuity of the logistic support should be identified from the outset of the planning process.

### **i. Protection of the Logistic Chain and Facilities**

42. In non-permissive operational environments, the protection of all the elements of the logistic support structure, including employed/deployed civil personnel and contractors' personnel when so directed, becomes essential to ensure the continuity of the logistics flow. Requirements for additional Force Protection (FP) capabilities, including Medical Force Health Protection (MFHP), should be considered from the outset of the planning process and addressed properly in the Statement of Requirements (SOR).

### **j. Environmental Protection**

43. While TCNs bears the ultimate responsibility for the adverse environmental impacts from the actions of its national forces, EU-led forces should follow the principles and regulations

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established for environmental protection during EU-led military activities (Ref. M).

44. During the logistic support planning process, several factors related to Environmental Protection (EP) should be taken into account. Those factors include host nation environmental laws, pollution prevention and remediation, waste management and energy efficiency.
45. The effect the before mentioned factors have on the logistic support structure may result in the need to allocate additional logistics resources to comply with HN EP regulations mainly in the areas of infrastructure building and management, waste disposal and energy production. The additional resources needed may be provided by military logistics capabilities committed by the TCNs during the FG process or provided through CSO or HNS agreements. EU-led forces EP staffs should contribute to the development of requirements and standards that should be applied at all levels, by military forces and civilian contractors during the execution of all their activities. Additionally, continuous cooperation and coordination should be maintained with the HN during the whole operation, to assure the compliance with its environmental regulations.

### **k. Energy Efficiency**

46. Energy supply is essential for any military operation, relying almost entirely on fossil fuels and primary batteries to produce the required energy. The supply of the resources needed to satisfy the energy requirements poses a heavy burden on the logistic support structure that has to devote logistics (fuel and other resources transport, storage and distribution) and combat (force protection for logistics facilities and convoys) resources and capabilities to ensure their timely delivery. Additionally a significant share of the military operations overall cost corresponds to the fuel procurement and management.
47. Therefore a more efficient approach to sustainable energy supply should be implemented in EU-led military operations to reduce their logistic support requirements, costs, and its dependency to fuel supply. Improved energy efficiency includes organisational, behavioural and technological enhancements. They should encompass energy supply (including the introduction of new and renewable energies and efficient storage and distribution systems) and energy handling (incorporating automated energy management systems and infrastructure structural improvements).

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### F. EU GENERAL LOGISTIC SUPPORT GUIDELINES

#### I. Resources

48. The approach to logistic support should focus on responding quickly and adequately to evolving logistic needs without accumulating excessive stocks that unnecessarily increase the footprint of the Force in the JOA. This could be implemented through continuous sensing of the logistic status of units and responding timely to any request anticipating their needs
49. The appropriate logistic support structure for each EU-led military operation has to be identified early in the operational planning process, considering multinational solutions to the maximum extent possible. Supplies and services provided by Nations, if necessary, may be augmented by HNS, contracting and/or by multinational coordinated provision as agreed among TCNs.
50. TCNs will retain control over their own logistic resources, until such resources are transferred to the EU military Cdrs according to the TOA arrangements. Once contributed, resources should not be withdrawn without appropriate notice.
51. EU military Cdrs require clearly defined authority to establish a support organisation to meet the operational requirement. TCNs should provide the EU military Cdrs at the appropriate level, with the authority to support the forces by using logistic resources in the JOA. The EU military Cdrs coordinate support among TCNs and with the HN(s) and retain the responsibility to coordinate the overall logistic effort even when participating nations rely solely on national logistics.
52. On EU-led military operations, it is essential that the EU military Cdrs have the means and the authority to co-ordinate all logistic resources having a direct impact on the support of the operation, the strategic deployment of forces, the sustainment effort and redeployment of both common and specific resources. In any case, close cooperation with TCNs, HN(s), EU civilian missions, UN, NATO, other IOs, NGOs and other civilian activities in the JOA will be required.
53. To avoid competition for scarce resources among TCNs and other actors in the JOA, and to prevent counterproductive influence on the local market, the acquisition of scarce local

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resources at theatre level should be conducted in accordance with operational priorities, as defined by the EU military Cdr.

54. The EU military Cdrs will be kept informed of the logistic levels of sustainability and availability by TCNs. The deployment of stocks in-theatre may begin prior to or concurrently with the flow of units and personnel, depending on the nature of the operation. Appropriate planning, early establishment of logistic infrastructures and C2 organisations, and a dedicated Logistic Information System (LOG IS) will be essential to properly manage the Reception, Staging, Onward Movement (RSOM) process. Pre-deployed logistic assets by TCNs in theatre will significantly increase the rapid response logistic capabilities.

### II. Sustainability

55. TCNs are responsible for meeting sustainability requirements established in the OPLAN. The provision of logistic capabilities and resources must meet the anticipated intensity and duration of the operation. The additional requirements needed for the rotation of units must be considered early in the planning process. Austere operational environments may cause increased attrition levels, requiring the provision of additional resources. Furthermore, requirements to support the local population, EU-led civilian missions, IOs or NGOs may increase the logistic support capabilities needed in the JOA.
56. An operation sustainability statement developed by the EU military Cdr and agreed at the earliest stage by TCNs, will provide common criteria for the designing of national logistic support elements, including the logistic order of battle, supplies stockpiles, maintenance and medical policies. This operation sustainability statement should be revised regularly to ensure it is permanently adapted to the operation evolution.

### III. Delineation and Transfer of Authority

57. TCNs will retain full command over their logistic forces. TCNs will, in the TOA arrangements, specify the command relationships of logistic units within the national force contribution to the EU military Cdr. In a multinational logistic organisation, EU military Cdrs will be granted sufficient control over logistic resources dedicated to the multinational role. This logistic control should be extended over the National Support Elements (NSEs) to allow the EU military Cdrs to co-ordinate, prioritise and deconflict logistic issues. Despite

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nationally-owned resources normally remaining under national command and control, the terms of the TOA may establish Logistic Control (LOGCON<sup>5</sup>) over these resources by the EU military Cdrs.

#### IV. Reallocation of resources

58. Although TCNs have first call on the logistic resources integral to their forces, EU military Cdrs in accordance with terms and conditions agreed at the TOA, in exceptional circumstances may call for the reallocation of national logistic resources to overcome unanticipated deficiencies.
59. Reallocation is not intended to redress national stockpile shortages, but to increase EU military Cdrs logistics flexibility offering him the possibility to transfer logistic resources within forces under their command, for a specific objective, within a limited time, in response to a critical operational need.
60. Logistic resources and capabilities held by units under EU military Cdrs Operational Control (OPCON)/LOGCON are subject to reallocation within the limitations established in the TOA arrangements. Resources within the NSE, or any other logistic resources declared unavailable by TCNs are not subject to reallocation. However, this does not preclude EU military Cdrs from requesting assistance from a national contingent or NSE Cdrs when deemed necessary.
61. If time allows prior to effecting resources reallocation or as soon as practical afterwards, the EU military Cdrs will advise the affected national authorities and higher EU military Cdr of the calls for reallocation. Upon determination that reallocation is required, the EU military Cdrs may direct Cdrs of NSE to effect the transfer of the logistic resources. Details will be included in the TOA related documents. As soon as the operational situation permits, the logistic resources transferred under this authority will be compensated as laid down in appropriate arrangements.

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<sup>5</sup> That authority granted to an EU military Commander over assigned logistics units and organisations in the JOA, including National Support Elements (NSE), that empowers him to synchronise, prioritise, and integrate their logistics functions and activities to accomplish the joint theatre mission. It does not confer authority over the nationally-owned resources held by an NSE, except as agreed in the Transfer of Authority.

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### V. Legal Aspects

62. All aspects of EU-led military operations logistic support (e.g. financial issues and plans, contracting, claims) must incorporate the whole applicable legal framework during all their phases.
63. Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), transit and HNS arrangements, and other technical arrangements (TA), are particularly important for the logistic support of the force.
64. Ad-hoc agreed SOFA(s) with Third States will ensure an adequate legal status for forces in their territory. Such negotiations will be based on the draft Model SOFA (Ref. N). Within the limits of their applicability, SOFA(s) provide a legal basis for subordinate arrangements (i.a. Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), TA(s), HNS Arrangement and Letters of Intent).

### VI. Modularity

65. A modular approach may enhance logistic flexibility without reducing the level of ambition. It involves generation of standardised capability-based component modules of personnel and equipment able to be integrated, combined, replaced or interchanged easily to meet specific operational requirements. Modularity benefits can be optimised by considering it from the early outset of the planning process.
66. Modules are most likely to be used as building blocks of functions designed to tackle all the assigned tasks. Modules composition will depend on the characteristics and requirements of the operation and should be scalable, adaptive, mission tailored and interoperable.

### VII. Component support

67. Each component, due to the nature of their mission, has conceptual peculiarities in implementing multinational logistic option. An overview of component support is provided in the following paragraphs:
  - a. **Maritime Component:** support to a deployed EU Maritime Force could be divided in:
    68. Afloat Support, which consists of one or more support ships to provide Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants (POL), ammunition, dry cargo including food and supplies, repair parts, medical facilities, repair capabilities and other necessary service support facilities to operating forces

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either underway or at anchor. Afloat Support is the responsibility of the Commander at sea who controls all assigned logistic assets in the force afloat.

69. Shore Support, which comprises all land based logistic activities in support of a EU Maritime Force. It should be based on appropriate shore logistic support structure, to be identified and agreed at the earliest operational planning process, which include multinational solution as well as CSO and HNS, if required/appropriate. In order to maximize its effectiveness, Shore Support structure must be responsive to the requirement of the Commander at sea

### **b. Land Component**

70. In the layout of the JOA, there must be a clear understanding among the nations that national logistic organisations exist in a multinational framework in support of combined joint operations. Modern operations are conducted in a nonlinear, non-contiguous way. Over the entire spectrum of conflict, current military operations make flexibility and mobility key aspects of successful operations.

71. The land component support concept is designed to ensure the support of either national or multinational forces, taking their different structures and multinational composition into account. Logistic support will be based on national provisions and may include degrees of multinational support as agreed by those nations. While each nation takes ultimate responsibility for the provision of support to its forces, HNS if available lead nation, role specialist nation, mutual assistance, use of multinational logistic organisations and civil agencies may be employed when considered to be more advantageous.

### **c. Air Component**

72. Air power has the unique ability to concentrate force and manoeuvre over long distances at great speed; however, the successful use of this ability will depend, among others, on the availability of adequate logistic support and infrastructure, and will require large amounts of high quality fuel. Furthermore, air forces' weapons systems are increasing in their technical complexity and sophistication. The logistic concept must take account of these logistic characteristics of air power. Nations should therefore accommodate these characteristics by careful peacetime provisioning and the optimum distribution of logistic assets and conflict consumables. They should also retain the ability to resupply and reinforce to ensure timely and continuous support. An air logistic support concept, structure and procedures must be

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tailored to the air units and their related employment options. At the same time consideration has to be given to compatibility and interoperability with the other components' logistic support systems.

### **d. Special Operations Component (SOC)**

73. Effective logistic support is fundamental to the success of special operations forces (SOF) and must be an integral part of operations planning. It should address logistic support, supplies, infrastructure, deployment, reception, staging, and onward movement of forces, transportation, sustainment, maintenance, and medical support. SOF operating within adversary-controlled territory or operating theatre-wide in small elements often apart from established logistics support areas cannot expect normal sustainment; therefore, SOF are expected to be self-sufficient. The SOC may have to obtain HNS agreements, contractor support to operations, and tailored support arrangements. Resupply of deployed SOF elements in remote or denied areas is planned and executed as operational tasks and frequently requires the use of SOF aviation assets.

## **G. LOGISTIC FUNCTIONS**

### **I. General**

74. Efficient logistic support depends on the co-ordination and synchronisation of the logistics functions and activities below.

### **II. Supply**

75. This logistic function encompasses timely provision of all classes of supply necessary to ensure the sustainability of forces. It covers the determination of stock levels, provisioning, timely distribution and replenishment. The classes of supply for EU-led military operations are:

- Class I: Items of subsistence;
- Class II: Supplies for which allowances are established by tables of organisation and equipment (e.g. clothing, weapons, vehicles, etc.);
- Class III: Petroleum, oil and lubricants (POL) for all purposes, e.g. gasoline, fuel, oil, grease, coal and coke;
- Class IV: Supplies for which initial allowances are not prescribed by approved issue



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tables. Normally includes fortification and construction materials, as well as additional quantities of items identical to those authorised for initial issue (Class II) such as additional vehicles;

- Class V: Ammunition, explosive and chemical agents of all types;
- Other Supply Items: Pharmaceutical and medical supplies.

76. The provision of supplies to assure an adequate sustainment of EU-led Forces is a national responsibility. However, multinational supply solutions should be encouraged from the outset of the operation planning process. At all stages of the operation it is necessary to integrate, coordinate and synchronise the overall flow of units and resources into the JOA.

### III. Maintenance

77. Maintenance includes all actions taken to retain equipment or material in/or to restore it to a specified condition. This includes inspection, testing, servicing and classification as to serviceability, repair, rebuilding and reclamation. Maintenance embraces all supply and repair action taken to keep a force in condition to accomplish its mission.

78. Interoperable equipment increases the possibility of establishing maintenance multinational solutions. In this respect, bilateral or multilateral agreements should be sought, whenever equipment is used by more than one TCN. The collocation of multinational maintenance capabilities in theatre, e.g. battle damage repair capabilities, could also facilitate technical assistance, enhance cooperation and optimise the logistic effort.

79. The use of HN(s) and/or contracting support services to augment limited military maintenance capabilities to meet the operational requirements should be considered if security permits.

### IV. Services/ Real Life Support (RLS)

80. Includes all functions required to provide personnel deployed into the JOA with safe and adequate living and operating conditions (e.g. housing, accommodation, laundry, canteen, moral and welfare, etc.), by promoting sufficient quality for personnel health and safety. The services to be provided will vary from austere conditions (i.e. only critical services are delivered, especially at the initial stages of one operation) that could be improved to increase the efficiency, safety, durability, morale and health conditions depending on the operational

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environment.

81. RLS provision is a national responsibility but to enhance efficiency and effectiveness multinational solutions should be considered from the outset of the planning process and generic and technical standards defined (see Ref. O and P), especially for contracting purposes.

### V. Movement and Transportation

82. Movement & Transportation (M&T) includes the whole spectrum of activities regarding the planning of capabilities, infrastructure, organisation, facilities and equipment necessary for the deployment, follow-on-forces deployment, force rotation, sustainment, redeployment and evacuation of EU-led Forces during the preparation and execution of an operation.
83. TCNs are ultimately responsible for obtaining transportation resources and for planning and coordinating the movement to deploy, sustain, redeploy and evacuate their forces and other forces if applicable. The responsibility for the deployment of multinational Headquarter(s) (HQs) and units with a high degree of multinationality may be assigned to a Framework Nation (FN) or a Logistic Lead Nation (LLN.)<sup>6</sup>. They are to ensure that the appropriate arrangements or contracts are in place to fulfil this responsibility.
84. For EU-led military operations involving long distances and/or prolonged periods of operations, sufficient strategic and intra-theatre lift assets must be available. Without such assets, the development and subsequent execution of an OPLAN might be severely restricted. Where TCNs strategic lift assets are not available through Force Generation it may be necessary to activate civilian/military pre-planned arrangements or contracts to provide strategic air transport capability for EU-led military operations and missions. These arrangements should take into account the need for cooperation, coordination and economy. Cooperation and coordination among MS is strongly encouraged.
85. Onward movement within the theatre along the chain from Port(s) of Disembarkation (POD) through strategic and operational nodes and LOCs into final destination must have the infrastructure, material handling equipment and means of transport necessary to deliver the

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<sup>6</sup>LLN is defined in section I.II.b. paragraphs 110 to 113

forces and their associated logistic support. All these needs must be identified as early as possible in the planning process. Intra-theatre M&T arrangements should also allow for the timely reverse flow of material and personnel.

86. Within the framework of the mission, the EU military Cdr at the military strategic level is responsible for coordinating, prioritising and deconflicting Force Headquarters (FHQ), Mission Force Headquarters (MHQ) and national deployments, transportation for sustainment (resupply), redeployment and evacuation of national force contingents at the operational level. This work requires a specialised M&T coordination element and should be carried out by the EU Movement Coordination Centre (EUMCC) in conjunction with the participating TCNs concerned, using appropriate co-ordination bodies at all levels, provided the participation of all EU MS in these bodies is ensured.
87. M&T principles and policies are further elaborated in the EU Concept for Strategic Movement and Transportation for EU-led Military Operations (Ref. Q).

## **VI. Military Engineering Support to Logistics**

88. Military Engineering (MILENG) Support to Logistics, as a specific area of the MILENG support to sustainability, encompasses the following actions: monitoring, maintaining, restoring and if necessary providing infrastructure, mostly associated with RSOM and sustaining the force. Particular areas of expertise are infrastructure development, real estate management, mobility support and environmental protection. For additional details on MILENG support to EU-led military operations, see the Military Engineering Concept for EU-led military Operations (Ref. R).
89. MILENG may be provided by the deployed EU-led force, HN(s), units of the NSE(s) or contractors. From the outset of the planning process and at all levels, logistics and engineer staff must work in close coordination to ensure that MILENG requirements, assets and capabilities to support the logistics effort are addressed. The priorities established for MILENG within the theatre of operations will also be taken into account in HNS agreement negotiations, civil-military cooperation (CIMIC), public information operations, budgeting and contracting activities. The identification of infrastructure shortfalls to support the operation should be done at the initial stages of the planning process, to ensure that the

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funding necessary to address those shortfalls is available as soon as possible.

### VII. Health and Medical Support<sup>7</sup>

90. Health and Medical (H&M) support includes the activities of primary health care, medical force health protection, medical evacuation, pre-hospital and hospital emergency care, medical logistics and medical C2 necessities for minimising morbidity and mortality by the maintenance of health and the prevention of disease, treatment and evacuation of patients and resupply of pharmaceuticals and medical supplies.
91. TCNs retain the ultimate responsibility for the provision of H&M support to their deployed personnel. Medical Staff will, on behalf of the EU military Cdrs plan, coordinate and conduct efficient H&M support at their level. Coordination, and in some circumstances, integration of medical assets and capabilities will optimise the use of limited resources and prevent unnecessary redundancies. On TOA, the EU military Cdrs will be responsible for the H&M support of assigned forces as delegated.
92. The planning of medical resources, based on the medical intelligence risk assessment, casualty estimates timelines and capability factors should fulfil as a minimum the following medical planning timelines (10-1-2 medical planning timelines):
- Enhanced first aid within 10 minutes of wounding.
  - Damage Control Resuscitation (DCR) for initial stabilisation within one hour of wounding by emergency trained medical personnel (doctors, nurses or paramedics).
  - Damage Control Surgery (DCS) within one hour but not later than two hours, providing surgery for initial stabilisation of critically injured patients.
93. The H&M support must meet common standards (see Ref. S, T and U) acceptable to all TCNs and as close as possible to prevailing peacetime standards. CJMED, as the senior Medical Advisor, is responsible for setting the Commander's medical policy and providing medical input to logistic planning. TCNs are encouraged to seek multinational coordination in providing medical support in order to standardise, optimise and efficiently implement scarce medical resources, avoiding duplication and enabling synergetic utilisation.

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<sup>7</sup>This takes into account that some MS have a different definition of a logistic function and its related areas.

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94. General logistic principles also apply to the H&M support function, taking the special requirements on medical supply into account. However, the planning and conducting of H&M support is governed by specific medical principles and guidelines (see Ref. V). These are inter alia related to the code of medical ethics and national and international laws and standards including the law of armed conflict, when applicable.

### H. LOGISTIC RELATED AREAS

#### I. Reception, Staging, Onward Movement (RSOM<sup>8</sup>)

95. Collective Responsibility (concerning EU HQs and TCNs), Unity of Effort and Synchronisation are the most important principles of RSOM. The military strategic level Headquarters EUMCC, in coordination with the TCNs, has primary responsibility for the development of the Multinational Detailed Deployment Plan (MNDDP) including RSOM considerations, while the operational level HQ/RSOM Cdr, in coordination with the TCNs/NSEs, is primarily responsible for the detailed planning and execution of the RSOM. Collective Responsibility encourages TCNs and EU HQs to share the provision and use of logistic capabilities and resources on a cooperative basis so as to support the force effectively and efficiently. Unity of effort is achieved through a defined chain of command of RSOM activities and synchronisation through the integration of the RSOM plan into the operational planning process. Synchronisation ensures that the appropriate balance of forces are flowed in a coordinated manner into the JOA and that they are supported effectively and efficiently in order to become capable and fully integrate within the Commander's Required Date (CRD).
96. RSOM is directly related with M&T, mainly at the strategic deployment and redeployment stage. There must be close co-ordination between the designated EU HQ(s) and TCNs to ensure that strategic deployment meets the requirements established in the EU military Cdrs'

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<sup>8</sup>RSOM (Reception, Staging and Onward Movement) is part of the RSOI (Reception, Staging, Onward movement and Integration) which is part of the process that enables deploying forces, consisting of personnel and materiel arriving in the JOA, to become capable and fully integrate within the Commander's required Date (CRD). RSOI consists of: Reception, staging, onward movement (RSOM) which are logistic activities and integration which is a J3 task. The sequence of the elements of RSOI can differ according to the operational environment. The term RSOM&I (RSOM and I) is also used in some EU documents and by some MS for the same 4-step process. This terminology will be incorporated in the revision of related EU Concepts, replacing RSOM&I thus harmonising the acronym with NATO. RSOM is also a valid term for the 3-step process of Reception, Staging and Onward Movement of forces and materiel from a POD to the FD.

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OPLAN.

97. The capability to manage RSOM activities with the flexibility to adjust the planned schedule as a result of incidents during the total process is one of the keys to success. Software tools which provide robust en-route visibility and reporting capability of Ports of Embarkation (POE) and POD are vital to plan, coordinate, execute and monitor the state of EU-led Forces along the RSOM continuum.
98. Planning for redeployment, recovery and recuperation is an essential element of the overall planning process and must begin before initial deployment. Where strategic transport assets are shared between TCNs for deployment, this capability should also be planned into the recovery phase of the operation. These are key planning requirements, considering the potential for conflicting demands upon limited resources.
99. The principles and policies are further elaborated in the EU Concept for Reception, Staging, Onward Movement & Integration for EU-led Operations (Ref. W).

## **II. Financing and Budgeting**

100. The TEU, article 41, sets the principles of expenditure for military operations. Under article 41 (1) of the TEU, “administrative expenditure which the provisions relating to the areas referred to in this title entail for the Institutions shall be charged to the EU budget”. Under article 41 (2) of the TEU, operating expenditure arising from operations having military or defence implications shall be charged to the MS. MS have established a permanent financial mechanism, called ATHENA (Ref. J), with the necessary legal capacity to administer the financing of the common costs of EU operations having military or defence implications.
101. There is a precise list of common costs related to each phase of operation (preparatory, active, winding-up) for which the funds can be used. EU Operation Cdr and the Director of the EU MPCC have the overall responsibility delegated by Athena Administrator and Athena Special Committee as highest management bodies to use these funds in accordance with existing rules (Ref. J).
102. Other areas where Athena Mechanism could be used are related to the management of

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expenditures which are not defined as common, but from practical and economic reasons considered to be useful and profitable and to be managed and pre-financed commonly are expenditures mostly related to Forces RLS (lodging, messing food and water, POL, etc.). These expenditures are identified as Nation Borne Costs (NBC) and are charged in the end to TCNs based on their consumptions. Athena Mechanism could be also used to manage other financial contribution provided by a third party or a Member State to the expenditure arising from operation (contribution is used according to its purpose specified in administrative arrangement).

103. Further, EU military operations use expenditures provided by TCNs which are not included in NBC and are identified as other cost managed by the contributing nation.
104. In some specific circumstances, other financial contributions in the area of Capacity Building in Security for Development, neither managed by Athena nor by the contributing nations, might be provided for specific projects within military operations through concrete instruments, both from European institutions or outside the EU. EU military Cdrs should be aware of all the possible available financial sources that could contribute to the operation objectives.

### **I. MODES OF LOGISTIC SUPPORT**

105. The modes of logistic support available to EU-led military operations range from a fully multinational logistic support to purely national support.

#### **I. National Logistic Support**

106. TCNs have the ultimate responsibility for the provision of the logistic support to their forces, individually or by cooperative arrangements.
107. TCNs could deploy national support elements (NSEs) to provide logistic support to their national forces deployed in the JOA. Although NSEs remain under the command of their national authorities they should coordinate and cooperate with the EU FCdr or EU MFCdr and the HN(s). To facilitate the coordination and integration of NSEs activities in the EU operation logistic support structure, LOGCON over the NSEs should be granted to the EU

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FCdr or EU MFCdr.

### II. Multinational Logistic Support

108. Multinational logistics has proven to enhance effectiveness and efficiency, optimising the costs, footprint and use of logistics resources in operations. Multinational logistics solutions should be planned, prepared and implemented prior to an operation, to deliver optimal effect and efficiency. EU OpCdr or Director EU MPCC is responsible to address multinational logistics options through FG/LOG Conferences.

#### a. Framework Nation

109. FN is defined (Ref. X) as "A member State or a group of Member States that has volunteered to, and that the Council has agreed, have specific responsibilities in an operation over which EU exercises political control. A FN provides the OHQ/FHQ/MHQ and the core of the military chain of command, together with the Staff support, the Communications and Information Systems (CIS) and the logistic framework, and contributes with a significant amount of assets and capabilities to the operation".

#### b. Logistic Lead Nation and Logistic Role Specialised Nation

110. A LLN assumes the overall responsibility for organising and coordinating an agreed broad spectrum of logistic support for all or part of the multinational force, including headquarters, within a defined geographical area for a defined period of time. The LLN could concurrently provide capabilities as Logistic Role Specialised Nation (LRSN).

111. One TCN assumes the responsibility of LRSN when it accepts the responsibility for procuring and providing a specific logistic capability and/or service for all or part of the multinational force within a defined geographical area for a defined period of time. The LRSN will be compensated for the resources and support provided to the entire force, or a portion of the force

112. During the operation planning process, when identifying a LLN or LRSN, each TCN requiring support will determine the exact range of responsibilities of LLN/LRSN to ensure that the SOR provides sufficient freedom of action to carry out the Cdr's Plan. Subjects to be



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defined during the process should include the legal framework, duration of the task, C2, quality and level of support based on standards pre-defined or defined during the FG process and the Logistic Conferences.

113. The LLN should, among others:

- Consider all applicable regulations affecting the logistic support to be provided to other TCNs forces;
- Assume the lead in coordinating HN tasks and responsibilities, to the extent permitted by HNS arrangements, or if no recognised HN authority exists, by the FCdr, in consultation with participating TCNs;
- Assume the lead in performing specific tasks as identified by OHQ Logistic Coordination Centre (OHQ LogCoC) or the EU MPCC;
- Assume responsibility to establish the logistic C2 structure.

114. A LRSN should, among others:

- Consider all applicable regulations affecting the logistic support to be provided to other TCNs forces;
- Define the compensation/reimbursement mechanism for services and/or capabilities provided, subject to agreements between the parties involved.

### **c. Multinational Logistic Arrangements**

115. TCNs should consider entering into bilateral or multilateral arrangements aimed at sharing logistic resources to resolve logistic shortfalls or to optimise the use of logistic support resources.

116. The authority, responsibility and funding for multinational logistics arrangements should be defined prior to and during the operational planning process, as well as the establishment of the arrangements themselves. Existing and pre-defined multinational support arrangements will enable the early availability of logistic support capabilities, facilitating the rapid deployment of the EU-led military forces and their early sustainability.

117. At the request of TCNs, multinational logistic support arrangements may be coordinated by operation logistic command and control structures: a Logistic Coordination Centre (LogCoC)

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at the military strategic level, a LogCoC at the operational level or a Joint Logistic Support Group Headquarters<sup>9</sup> (JLSG HQ) at the tactical level.

### III. Host Nation Support (HNS)

118. HNS is civil and military assistance, rendered by a HN to another state and/or organisation which has forces located on, operating on/from, or in transit through the HN's territory<sup>10</sup>. The basis of such assistance arises from bi- and/or multilateral HNS arrangements. HNS principles and policies are further elaborated in the HNS Concept for EU-led military Crisis Management Operations (CMOs) (Ref. Y).
119. HNS seeks to provide deployed forces with support in material, transportation assets, facilities and services, including area security, and administrative support. HNS does not include local contracting.
120. HNS may facilitate the movement and sustainment of forces in the JOA by providing essential support to the reception, staging, onward movement and integration (RSOI) process. The level of HNS depends on the capability and willingness of the HN(s) and the availability of local resources to support an EU-led Force. Whenever possible, full advantage should be taken of logistic resources available under HNS agreements/arrangements hence it potentially may help to reduce the required logistic effort to deploy, sustain and redeploy the EU-led Force.
121. HNS planning is an integral part of military logistic support planning. It has an impact on the FG process. When appropriate, the HN(s) may provide national logistic experts for the relevant phases of logistic planning and execution.
122. HNS planning should be as specific as possible and its procedures standardised to enable the HN(s) to evaluate and respond efficiently and flexibly to operational requirements. However, the variety of tasks in the entire range of possible EU-led military operations will require a generic approach to be taken towards HNS planning.

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<sup>9</sup> For more information on the JLSG See paragraph 185.

<sup>10</sup> Territory: The extent of land, airspace and interior of the earth above and below this extent of land, and the territorial waters adjacent to a coastal state.

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123. If HNS agreements/arrangements do not already exist, the EU military Cdr at strategic level is responsible for establishing requirements, in consultation with TCNs. These responsibilities may include initiating and participating in bilateral and multilateral negotiations and, where appropriate, for concluding HNS arrangements on his own (possibly common funded) or, subject to their prior concurrence, on behalf of TCNs. All or part of this activity can be delegated to the FCdr/MFCdr.
124. In-theatre local resources may be scarce and HNS arrangements limited or even non-existent, therefore, military logistic planning must take particular account of the specific political and economic situation. The risk of overloading the local market and increasing competition amongst TCNs and other actors in the JOA on scarce local resources has to be prevented. Therefore, coordination within the EU CSDP environment should be achieved. Whenever possible, this coordination should be expanded to other actors in the JOA.

#### **IV. Contractor Support to Operations (CSO)**

125. CSO is complementary to integral military capabilities. It enables competent commercial entities to provide a part of the support to the military, meeting the EU military Commander's operational requirements. It should be considered, on a case by case basis, if Member States have failed to provide the necessary support or when it is considered more efficient. Contractor support in EU-led military operations mainly focusses on logistic support functions; but, in general, it can provide an essential part of the support to the military (Ref. H).
126. Planning and financial implications of contractor support must be deliberate and an integral part of the planning process. As early as possible in the planning process, TCN together with the EU OpCdr/Director MPCC will identify the assets, services and/or products that can or cannot be outsourced and the standards to be met for outsourcing options. Coordination and cooperation, in this subject, amongst TCNs are essential to gain economies of scale and avoid escalation of prices.
127. Pre-mission support solutions will facilitate planning and deployment, and empower the EU OpCdr/Director MPCC to meet support requirements for rapid deployment. In order to shorten the lead time in setting up contracts, MS are encouraged to establish binding generic minimum support standards/requirements (such as Refs O, P, S, T and U).

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128. Whilst military capabilities should always be the foremost option, available instruments within the Athena mechanism (Administrative Arrangements, Framework Contracts), European Defence Agency (EU CSO Platform, Effective Procurement Methods, and Framework Arrangements), multinational partnerships (e.g. EATC, SALIS) or mutual support solutions with strategic partners need to be considered from the very beginning during the planning process.
129. During the planning process, there are a number of considerations influencing decisions on employment of contractor support. The creation of a temporary CSO planning cell including Subject Matter Experts know how related to CSO (e.g. Athena, EDA, and Contract Integrator) will provide an accurate assessment of CSO options to the EU OpCdr/Director MPCC.
130. Contract management requires robust and rapidly deployable teams quickly established in theatre in time to coordinate contract issues to avoid uncoordinated and competing contracting activities with other EU and non-EU actors in the JOA. The designation of a single point of contact within TCNs and the designation of a Contract Integrator may facilitate this process.
131. The use of contractors to support military operations includes a risk of contract failure to deliver the contracted support. Therefore, a thorough risk analysis must be executed by the EU OpCdr/Director MPCC/TCNs and Contingency Plans (incl. a military fall-back position) are to be prepared to mitigate identified operational risk (Ref Z).
132. The use of CSO should become part of the lessons learnt process (Ref. AA). This applies especially for the performance and reliability of contracted commercial operators.
133. The legal framework has to be considered as well. Special consideration needs to be given to the governing law of the contracts, contractors' status and constraints dealing with Private Security Companies. In regard with CSO in the medical area, consideration must be given to legal aspects of medical liability and malpractice insurance
134. Contracting may be carried out by TCNs on a national basis, the Athena Administrator or the EU military Cdrs following the Athena mechanism rules for procurement for common costs and NBC.

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### J. MULTINATIONAL LOGISTIC ORGANISATIONS

#### I. Multinational Integrated Logistic Unit and Multinational Logistic Unit

135. Multinational Integrated Logistic Unit (MILU) and Multinational Logistic Unit (MLU) are military units formed by two or more TCNs to provide logistic support to a multinational force under a single command.
136. The main difference between a MILU and a MLU is that a MLU normally remains under national command, ideally under LOGCON of the FCdr/MFCdr, while a MILU is under OPCON of the FCdr/MFCdr.
137. The use of MILUs and MLUs could be an appropriate solution to reduce the logistics footprint, achieve economies of scale, improve efficiency and resolve logistic shortfalls. The MILU and MLU concept is particularly important as a FG tool, particularly in low intensity operations or operations with a prolonged duration where logistic force contributions would be difficult to generate without cooperation. These multinational logistic units are designed to provide specific logistic support where national forces cannot provide it, or could be better utilised to support the operation overall logistic support plan. They are an important mechanism by which some TCNs may contribute more effectively to the overall operational effort.
138. The MILU and MLU Cdrs should have clear authority over sub-units, normally OPCON/LOGCON. This support option might be particularly attractive when a single TCN is capable of providing the nucleus of the unit and/or the command structure around which the whole unit can be formed by augmentation and/or the addition of complementary units from other nations. One nation should be in charge of setting up the unit by providing the C2 structure and CIS framework. Specific C2 and operational arrangements will be negotiated between participating TCNs.
139. A MILU and MLU have the general tasks defined hereunder:
- Acquire the agreed supplies and/or services as directed by the FCdr/MFCdr or appropriate authority;
  - Provide agreed supplies and services to an EU-led Force as directed by the FCdr/MFCdr

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or appropriate authority.

### II. Modular Combined Petroleum Unit

140. Modular combined petroleum units (MCPU) provide a solution for rapid deployment of petroleum specialists in a wide range of environments and are capable of operating on a small scale and able to rapidly build to a larger scale when needed.
141. MCPU include military capabilities complemented by outsourced capabilities as appropriate and will provide class III supply operational support and will consist of multinational specialist modules from TCNs and relevant stakeholders.

### II. Multinational Modular Medical Unit

142. A Multinational modular medical unit (M3U) is a medical treatment facility where normally a single MS or non-EU TCN is providing the nucleus and the structure and that is capability based in a modular approach supplemented/augmented by other MS and non-EU TCNs.
143. Medical procedures, protocols standards and professional qualifications should be common, mutually agreed, trained and complied with by all contributors to a M3U.

### K. DIMENSIONS

144. A number of different options for the execution of logistic functions (from the sea, from the land, and from the air) can be envisaged during the different phases of an operation, regardless of its predominant nature (land, air, sea). The election of the most suitable option and therefore the location of the Theatre Logistic Base (TLB) will be part of the Logistic Support Concept of any EU-led military Operation.
145. Operational environment features such as security conditions, assured provision of supplies, availability of warehousing capabilities, HNS and the nature of the operation, etc. may recommend the adoption of one or a combination of the options for each phase of the operation. Changes in the operational environment will require the adaptation of the options initially adopted.

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146. Seaborne Logistic support (SBLS) is the use of maritime<sup>11</sup> platforms to provide logistic sea-based support to project and sustain EU-led joint military forces. Such platforms could be located over the horizon, in sight of shore, in-port or use a combination of all three options.
147. A EU Air Deployable Operating Base (DOB) (Ref. BB) can support the logistic effort through the execution of RSOM activities, serving as basing facility for a Forward Support Base or selected elements of it, and by the provision of adequate warehousing for critical logistic assets to be deployed at short notice.

### L. LOGISTIC INFORMATION SYSTEM (LOG IS)

148. TCNs and EU military Cdrs at all levels have a collective responsibility to ensure timely access to relevant and updated logistic information from the outset of the planning process and throughout the whole operation. This exchange of logistic resources information is essential for an efficient planning, execution and optimisation of the operation logistic support.
149. The LOG IS should fulfill the following requirements: be interoperable, cover all logistics functions, support the different levels with required information and be available to all EU MS.
150. Providing it covers all the requirements mentioned in the previous paragraph, the NATO LOG IS will be the preferred system to be used in EU-led military operations. This system will support the planning, execution and monitoring of several vital logistic functions. TCNs and EU military Cdrs are collectively responsible to ensure that all the logistic functions information requirements are fulfilled, including those logistic functions not included in the NATO LOG IS.
151. Logistics staff personnel should follow a LOG IS regular training programme to ensure a full and effective use of the system.

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<sup>11</sup> (not only naval platforms - e.g. Ships Taken Up From Trade (STUFT))

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### M. LOGISTIC PLANNING

152. Military logistic planning at the political and strategic level will be developed within the framework of the European Union Military Staff (EUMS)-conducted advance and crisis response planning, including inputs to the development of the Crisis Management Concept (CMC), Military Strategic Options (MSOs) and Initiating Military Directive (IMD) (Ref. CC).
153. Military logistic planning and its subsequent execution in support of EU-led military operations should be carried out and coordinated on a comprehensive way, including combined, joint and military/civil logistic requirements.
154. Military logistic planning must be versatile and fully integrated with the overall Operational Planning Process (OPP). Close interactions with other functional areas, especially in regard with medical planning, during all planning stages are of paramount importance. At the earliest stages of the OPP, Logistic Planning aims to elaborate a sound assessment of the logistic support requirements, opportunities and limitations (e.g. existing infrastructure in the JOA, identification of reliable outsourcing solutions and/or eventual logistic partnerships with IO, level of HNS available, contribution to the operation's cost estimate, etc). This assessment, along with the EU Military Lessons Learnt (Ref. AA), will be the basis for the development of suitable and feasible logistic support solutions.
155. Military logistic staff members need to be involved from the outset of the planning process, including Force Sensing and FG, and must be included in area reconnaissance/site survey activities and FFM.
156. Military logistic planning is an iterative process that provides essential inputs to the development of operation courses of action. It integrates EU and non-EU actors and TCNs, involving military and civil authorities while encompassing all the logistic functions and logistic related activities.
157. In the event of EU taking over an ongoing operation, existing logistic plans and arrangements should be reviewed thoroughly and amended as necessary at all appropriate levels of command. A logistic directive should be issued at military strategic level as a part of the



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OPLAN or as a stand-alone document.

158. Logistic Planning Conferences are an essential asset to achieve logistic planning coordination and transparency. The type of planning will dictate the timing and frequency of conferences. Specialist conferences, H&M Support, M&T, HNS, Contracting, RSOI, etc., may also be necessary.
159. Logistic FG will be integral part of the overall FG process. Non-EU TCNs should be brought into the FG Process (Ref. K) at the earliest possible stage and their logistic capabilities should be identified.
160. The transition phase of a military operation or mission may result in the termination of the mission, the issue of new tasks to the current organisation or the handing over to a new organisation. This transition should be addressed in an early stage and be closely coordinated at the operation strategic and operational levels. All the actors involved should ensure the coordination in all logistical functional areas including, inter alia, infrastructure, stocks, contracts and agreements, and environmental issues.

## **N. COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURE. TASKS AND RESPONSIBILITIES**

### **I. General**

161. C2 structures should be tailored to the specific needs of an EU-led military operation, based on the principles listed in chapter D. Levels of command are defined in the EU Concept for Military Command and Control (Ref. DD). In addition, generic procedures are developed for EU-led military executive operations at the OHQ and FHQ/MHQ levels (see Ref. Z), and at the MPCC level for EU-led military non-executive missions (see Ref. EE).

### **II. Political and Strategic Level**

#### **a. Troop Contributing Nations**

162. The responsibilities of TCNs are to:
  - a. Plan and conduct the logistic support of their forces, and national components of multinational forces, to meet the requirements defined at the military strategic level;

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- b. Provide logistic resources for the support of their force through bilateral or multilateral arrangements;
- c. Identify national logistic resources available for cooperative use to meet identified shortfalls in military operational logistics plans;
- d. Operate and control national military and civil logistic resources;
- e. Provide national logistic experts to augment the EU logistic coordination bodies during all phases of logistic planning and execution;
- f. Identify those logistics capabilities and services able to be provided under the role of LLN or LRSN;
- g. Provide periodical LOG IS training to their logistics staff;
- h. Implement updates on the LOG IS;
- i. Support the military strategic and operational levels in implementing additional tools/procedures to cover all logistics information exchange requirements;
- j. Maintain a timely, relevant and correct flow of logistics information and data into and within the LOG IS as detailed by the military strategic and operational levels.

163. The contribution of non-EU TCNs will be defined by a participation agreement, which can be generic or specific to one operation. The EU has developed a draft model Framework Participation Agreement (Ref. FF) and a (operation specific) draft Model participation agreement (Ref. GG).

### **b. Other Contributions**

164. Any states not committing forces to the operation may offer support, assets and/or funding for the operation. Where appropriate, they may provide national logistic experts to support the logistics planning and execution.

### **c. Council and Council Bodies**

165. The responsibilities of the Council and Council bodies, the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and EU Military Committee (EUMC) are set out in the TEU as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon (Ref. B), in relevant Council Decisions and in the Suggestion for crisis management procedures for CSDP crisis management operations (Ref. HH). These responsibilities take their basis from the Nice European Council Conclusions (Ref. II).

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166. Athena Mechanism

Athena mechanism's responsibilities are described in the corresponding Council Decision (see Ref. J), establishing a mechanism to administer the financing of the common costs of European Union operations having military or defence implications.

**d. European Union Military Staff**

167. The EUMS, through the Logistic Directorate, will:

- a. Monitor and take initiatives for the development of logistic concepts, procedures and technical requirements in the field of multinational logistic support for EU-led military operations and missions;
- b. Consult with all relevant actors (e.g. MS, Third States and IOs) in accordance with Ref. JJ and convene logistic experts meetings;
- c. Develop advanced logistic planning at the strategic level for crisis response, especially in developing advanced logistic assessments, facilitating upstream options for logistic support with strategic partners, evaluating the effectiveness of potential outsourced solutions and contributing to the reference amount estimate for operations;
- d. Actively participate in the Crisis Planning Team (CPT) created for advanced planning within the EUMS;
- e. Develop and update, following EUMC guidance, the logistic elements of generic and/or contingency plans, MSOs, IMD and evaluate, from the logistic point of view, the concept of operations (CONOPS)/OPLAN developed by the military strategic level;
- f. Handover to the military strategic level staff the outcomes from EUMS advance planning including information and conclusions drawn from FFM;
- g. Provide coordinated inputs assessments and support to the military strategic level staff, and draft military advices on all logistic affairs throughout conduct of an EU-led military operation.
- h. Participate in the Mission Monitoring Teams (MMT) in direct support of EU OpCdr/Director MPCC and the EU HQ.

168. EU Movement Planning Cell (EUMPC)

Embedded in the Resources Support Branch of the Logistics Directorate of the EUMS, it is the main source of M&T expertise at the political-strategic level. EUMPC will provide

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support to the military strategic level staff in the movement and transport areas.

### III. Military Strategic Level

#### a. Executive operations

169. Executive operations are those operations mandated to conduct actions in replacement of the host nation (Ref. KK).

#### Operation Commander (OpCdr)

170. The OpCdr has the following logistic responsibilities:

- a. Draft CONOPS/OPLAN including the logistic annexes;
- b. Plan and coordinate the strategic deployment including RSOM, sustainment and redeployment of EU-led forces. On TOA the OpCdr is responsible for the coordination of the overall logistic support. Responsibilities and procedures will need to be refined throughout the OPP;
- c. Develop all the operational requirements for logistic planning and execution necessities for comprehensive logistic support including a sustainability statement to be issued as part of the OHQ Logistic Directive;
- d. Establish requirements, initiate and participate in bilateral and multilateral negotiations, and, where appropriate, conclude MOUs, TAs and other HN(s) arrangements on behalf of TCNs within the limits of his authority;
- e. Implement and control contracting functions within the limits of his authority;
- f. Conduct resources reallocation (if required) under the provisions agreed at the TOA;
- g. Provide staff organization and support for the OHQ LogCoC;
- h. Act as coordinating authority in the field of logistics through the OHQ LogCoC;
- i. Provide LOG IS refresher training to meet operational needs;
- j. Implement new versions of LOGF IS for the EU-led forces;
- k. In coordination with TCNs, implement required additional tools/procedures to cover the logistic information requirements, if not covered by LOG IS.

#### OHQ Logistic Coordination Centre.

171. The OHQ LogCoC may be established at the OHQ. It would be composed of OHQ logistic staff, logistic experts from TCNs and a temporary EUMS liaison element. It may also include NATO Logistic experts, when the operation is conducted under the "Berlin Plus" arrangements.

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172. The OHQ LogCoC has the following tasks:

- a. Serve as a primary logistic Point of Contact (POC) for TCNs;
- b. Assist the OpCdr in drafting the logistic input to the CONOPS/OPLAN;
- c. Coordinate, prioritise and deconflict national and multinational logistic support issues, in accordance with strategic requirements;
- d. Coordinate the allocation of the support, assets and/or funding for the operation offered by other than MS, non-EU TCNs and Third States;
- e. Development of the MNDDP.

### **EU Movement Control Centre**

173. The EUMCC contributes to the development of the CONOPS and OPLAN development. As the deployment and redeployment of forces is fundamentally a national responsibility, the EUMCC maintains an overarching coordination and monitoring role to ensure that TCNs contingent's movements are appropriately synchronised and deconflicted. The EUMCC is, therefore, responsible for constructing the MNDDP and for the initiation, prioritisation, coordination and deconfliction of the deployment including the RSOM, transportation for sustainment (resupply) and redeployment of forces.

### **b. Non-executive Missions**

174. Non-executive missions are those operations mandated to support the host nation limited to an advisory role only (Ref. KK).

### **Director of the EU MPCC**

175. The Director MPCC is responsible for the operational planning and conduct of EU non-executive military missions at the military strategic level, including logistics operation planning, risk assessment, force generation, budget and procurement and logistic direction and guidance (Ref. JJ).

176. The Director of the MPCC, in assuming the functions of missions' commander, shall exercise the responsibilities of the operation commander.

### **Military Planning and Conduct Capability**

177. The MPCC shall support the Director of the MPCC function as missions' commander, including the building up, launching, sustaining and redeploying EU forces, including the construction of the MNDPP with the MS.

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178. The logistics staff in the MPCC, supported by EUMS expertise, is responsible for the planning and coordination of the missions' logistic support and maintaining the logistics link between the military strategic level and the operational level.
179. MPCC CJ4 main tasks are:
- a. to develop and conduct the logistics planning, related to all logistics functions and its synchronisation and integration throughout all the phases of the operation;
  - b. to collaborate closely with other MPCC CJs, especially CJ1, CJ5, CJ8 and CJMED;
  - c. to develop, propose, control and manage, if so decided, multinational solutions;
  - d. to provide continuous assessment, advice and guidance on the logistic support to the operation.
  - e. to provide logistic situation visibility

#### IV. Military Operational Level

##### a. Force Commander (FCdr) and non-executive missions Mission Force Commander (MFCdr)

180. The FCdr/MFCdr has the following logistic responsibilities:
- a. Develop logistic inputs and plans as applicable to OPLAN/OPORD/Mission Plan (MPLAN);
  - b. Assist in development of the Sustainability Statement developed by the OpCdr/Director MPCC;
  - c. If tasked, establish requirements, initiate and participate in bilateral and multilateral negotiations, and, where appropriate, conclude MOUs, TAs and other HNS arrangements on behalf of TCNs within the limits of the authorisation given to them in advance;
  - d. Coordinate the activities of the NSEs through the JLSG or FHQ/MHQ LogCoC;
  - e. Conduct reallocation of logistics resources under agreed provisions (if required);
  - f. Coordinate all aspects of multinational logistic sustainment in the JOA;
  - g. Control and establish procedures for intra-theatre movements;
  - h. Control multinational integrated logistic support including MILUs;
  - i. Recommend to the OpCdr/Director MPCC any necessary changes concerning force deployment (desired order of arrival or commander's required date, inter alia.), transportation for sustainment (resupply) and redeployment;

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- j. Implement common funding under the authority of the OpCdr/Director MPCC;
- k. Conduct the RSOM process in the JOA.
- l. Support the OpCdr/Director MPCC in implementing the LOG IS and manage it, as directed by the OpCdr/Director MPCC.

181. At FHQ/MHQ level, the logistic structure could be as follows:

### **b. FHQ/MHQ Logistics Co-ordination Centre**

182. When a JSLG HQ is not established, a FHQ/MHQ LogCoC may be activated. It will be composed of logistic experts from TCNs (usually from their NSEs) and other organisations. The centre will be responsible for the co-ordination and deconfliction of logistics in the theatre of operation in accordance with operational requirements.

### **c. National Support Element**

183. A NSE is a national organisation that supports national forces which are part of EU-led Forces. NSEs should coordinate and cooperate with the EU operational level military commander and the HN(s). Cooperation and centralisation of services among NSEs can produce significant savings. The SOFA concluded with the HN will normally cover NSEs.

184. The NSEs have the following responsibilities:

- a. Coordinate with the EU-led force logistic organisation in-theatre;
- b. Support RSOM, transportation for deployment/redeployment and sustainment of national forces;
- c. Report critical operational assets and activities;
- d. Manage costs, handing over, settlement of claims of properties and real estate occupied by national troops;
- e. Provide assistance, if requested and within means and capabilities, to other national contingents or the EU-led force according to agreed arrangements;
- f. Be prepared to support reallocation requirements in accordance with paragraphs 58 to 61.

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**V. Military Tactical Level**

**a. Joint Logistic Support Group**

185. The JLSG is a multinational logistic organisation responsible for the co-ordination and/or management of common logistic functions at theatre level. The JLSG HQ mission is to provide C2 for all theatre-wide logistic functions and includes the capability to deploy, sustain and redeploy. JLSG may also provide actual logistic support with assigned units and it must also support the military strategic level to set up the joint logistic posture for any operation.


186. A JSLG HQ has the following responsibilities:

- a. Assist the FCdr/MFCdr in conducting RSOM in the JOA
- b. Assist the FCdr/MFCdr in coordinating logistic support within the force, including the creation and control of multinational integrated logistics and commonly funded resources;
- c. Assist the FCdr/MFCdr in coordinating movement, logistic support and other military functions between the components, NSEs, HNs, IOs and NGOs, when tasked to do so;
- d. Coordinate the implementation of HNS agreements;
- e. Coordinate the implementation of CSO contracts;
- f. When appropriate, and as authorised by TCNs, coordinate and arrange the provision of common supplies and services;
- g. Coordinate and administratively support national, NGO and HN(s) liaison staffs within the JLSG according to specific arrangements;
- h. Establish and manage local contracts;
- i. Manage the real estate in the Joint Logistic Support Network (JLSN).




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## VI. Structure Outline



(1) CEUMC acts as a primary POC



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ANNEX A

### ACRONYMS

#### A

AMSCC Athens Multinational Sealift Coordination Centre

#### C

C2 Command and Control  
Cdr Commander  
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy  
CIMIC Civil-Military Cooperation  
CIS Communication and Information System  
CMC Crisis Management Concept  
CMO Crisis Management Operation  
CONOPS Concept of Operations  
CPT Crisis Planning Team  
CRD Commander's Required Date  
CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy  
CSO Contractor Support to Operations

#### D

DCS Damage Control Surgery  
DCR Damage Control Resuscitation  
DOB Deployable Operating Base  
DSACEUR Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe

#### E

EATC European Air Transport Command  
EP Environmental Protection  
EU European Union

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EU BG	EU Battlegroup
EUMC	EU Military Committee
EUMCC	EU Movement Coordination Centre
EUMPC	EU Movement Planning Cell
EUMS	EU Military Staff

### F

FCdr	Force Commander
FFM	Fact Finding Mission
FG	Force Generation
FHQ	Force Headquarters
FN	Framework Nation
FP	Force Protection

### H

HN	Host Nation
HNS	Host Nation Support
H&M	Health and Medical

### I

IMD	Initiating Military Directive
IO	International Organisation

### J

JLSG	Joint Logistic Support Group
JLSN	Joint Logistic Support Network
JOA	Joint Operations Area

### L

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## LIMITE

LLN	Logistic Lead Nation
LOC	Line of Communication
LogCoC	Logistic Coordination Centre
LOGCON	Logistic Control
LOG IS	Logistic Information System
LRSN	Logistic Role Specialised Nation

### M

M3U	Multinational Modular Medical Unit
MCPU	Modular Combined Petroleum Unit
MILENG	Military Engineering
MILU	Multinational Integrated Logistic Unit
MFCdr	Mission Force Commander
MFHP	Medical Force Health Protection
MHQ	Mission Headquarters
MLU	Multinational Logistic Unit
MMT	Mission Monitoring Team
MNDDP	Multinational Detailed Deployment Plan
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MPCC	Military Planning and Conduct Capability
MPLAN	Mission Plan
MS	Member State
MSO	Military Strategic Option
M&T	Movement and Transportation

### N

NBC	Nation Borne Costs
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NSE	National Support Element

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### O

OpCdr	Operation Commander
OPCON	Operational Control
OPLAN	Operations Plan
OPP	Operations Planning Process

### P

POC	Point of Contact
POD	Port of Disembarkation
POE	Port of Embarkation
POL	Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants
PSC	Political and Security Committee

### R

RLS	Real Life support
RRC	Rapid Response Capability
RSOI	Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration
RSOM	Reception, Staging and Onward Movement

### S

SALIS	Strategic Airlift International Solution
SBLS	Seaborne Logistic Support
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement
SOR	Statement of Requirements

### T

TA	Technical Agreement
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TEU	Treaty on the EU
TCN	Troop Contributing Nation
TLB	Theatre Logistic Base
TOA	Transfer of Authority