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From: General Secretariat of the Council

To: Permanent Representatives Committee (Part 2)

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Subject: Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Directive 2014/65/EU as regards information requirements, product governance and position limits to help the recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic

- Mandate for negotiations with the European Parliament

Delegations will find below the Presidency compromise text on the above-mentioned Commission proposal.

2020/0152 (COD)

Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Directive 2014/65/EU as regards information requirements, product governance and position limits and Directives 2019/878/EU and 2013/36/EU as regards their application to investment firms, to help the recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic

(Text with EEA relevance)

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 53(1) thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,

After transmission of the draft legislative act to the national parliaments,

Having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee,

Acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure,

Whereas:

(1) The COVID-19 pandemic is severely affecting people, companies, health systems and the economies of Member States. The Commission, in its Communication to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European economic and social committee and the Committee of the regions of 27 May 2020 entitled ‘Europe's moment: Repair and Prepare for the Next Generation’¹ stressed that liquidity and access to finance will be a continued challenge in the months to come. It is therefore crucial to support the recovery from the severe economic shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic by introducing targeted amendments to existing pieces of financial legislation. This package of measures is adopted under the label “Capital Markets Recovery Package”.

(2) Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and the Council² on markets in financial instruments was adopted in 2014 in response to the financial crisis that unfolded in 2007-2008. That Directive has substantially strengthened the financial system in the Union and guaranteed a high level of protection of investors across the Union. Further efforts to reduce regulatory complexity and investment firms’ compliance costs and to eliminate distortions of competition should be considered.

(3) As regards the requirements that were intended to protect investors, Directive 2014/65/EU has not fully achieved its objective to adapt measures that take the particularities of each category of investors (retail clients, professional clients and eligible counterparties) sufficiently into account. Some of those requirements have not always enhanced the protection of investors but at times rather, hindered the smooth execution of investment decisions. It is therefore necessary to amend certain requirements in that Directive to better balance the requirement to protect investors on the one hand and to facilitate the provision of investment services and the performance of investment activities on the other.

¹ COM/2020/456 final of 27.5.2020.

² Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in financial instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU (OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 349).

(4) Product governance requirements can restrict the sale of non-complex bonds. The issuance of bonds is crucial for companies to raise capital and to overcome the Covid-19 crisis. At the same time, non-complex bonds do not raise similar investor protection concerns like other financial instruments. It is therefore appropriate that the product government requirements applicable to more complex products should no longer apply to them where they are marketed or distributed on an execution-only basis. Furthermore, eligible counterparties have sufficient knowledge on financial instruments. It is therefore justified to exempt them from the product governance requirements applicable to financial instruments exclusively marketed or distributed to this category of clients.

(5) The call for evidence, launched by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), on the impact of inducements and cost and charges disclosure requirements under Directive 2014/65/EU and the public consultation of the Commission both confirmed that professional clients and eligible counterparties do not need standardised and mandatory cost information as they already receive the necessary information when they negotiate with their service provider. That information is tailored to their needs and often more detailed. Services provided to eligible counterparties and professional clients should therefore be exempted from those cost and charges disclosure requirements, except with regard to the services of investment advice and portfolio management because professional clients entering into portfolio management or investment advice relationships do not necessarily have sufficient expertise or knowledge to allow such services to be exempted from the costs and charges disclosures.

(6) Investment firms are currently required to undertake a cost-benefit analysis of certain portfolio activities in case of ongoing relationships with their clients in which financial instruments are switched. Investment firms are thereby required to obtain the necessary information from the client and to be able to demonstrate that the benefits of such switching outweigh the costs. As this procedure is overly burdensome with regard to professional clients, who tend to switch on a frequent basis, services provided to them should be exempted from this requirement. Professional clients would retain however the possibility to opt-in. As retail clients need a high level of protection, that exemption should be limited to professional clients.

(7) Clients with an ongoing relationship with an investment firm receive mandatory service reports, either periodically or based on triggers. Neither investment firms nor their professional clients find such service reports useful. Those reports have proved in particular unhelpful for professional clients in extreme volatile markets, as those reports are provided in a high frequency and number. Professional clients often react to those service reports either by not reading those reports, or by making fast investment decisions rather than continuing with a long-term investment strategy. Eligible counterparties should therefore no longer receive such service reports, Professional clients, however, should have the possibility to opt-in to those service reports.

(8) Directive 2014/65/EU introduced reporting requirements for trading venues, systematic internalisers and other execution venues on how orders were executed on terms most favourable to the client. Those technical reports contain large amounts of detailed quantitative information about the execution venue, the financial instrument, the price, the costs and the likelihood of execution. They are rarely read by firms or investors, as is evidenced by the very low numbers of views from the websites of the investment firms. As they do not enable users to make any meaningful comparisons on the basis of those data, the publication of those reports should be temporarily suspended.

(9) In order to facilitate the communication between investment firms and their clients and thus the investment process itself, investment information should no longer be provided on paper but should, as a default option, be provided electronically. Retail clients should however be able to request the continued provision of information on paper.

(10) Directive 2014/65/EU allows persons that trade in commodity derivatives, emission allowances and derivatives on emission allowances on a professional basis to make use of an exemption from authorisation as an investment firm when their trading activity is ancillary to their main business. Those persons applying for the ancillary activity test are required to notify the relevant competent authority annually that they make use of that possibility and provide the necessary elements to satisfy the two quantitative tests that determine whether its trading activity is ancillary to its main business. The first test compares the size of an entity's speculative trading activity to the total trading activity in the Union on an asset class basis. The second test compares the size of the speculative trading activity, with all asset classes included, to the total trading activity in financial instruments by the entity at group level. There is an alternative form of the second test, which consists of comparing the estimated capital used for the speculative trading activity to the actual amount of capital used at group level for the main business. Those quantitative tests are particularly complex and have not altered the status quo in terms of persons that are eligible for the exemption. Therefore, the exemption should rely solely on qualitative elements. Persons that are eligible for the exemption, including market makers, are dealing on own account or providing investment services other than dealing on own account, to customers or suppliers of their main business. The exemption is available for both cases individually and on an aggregate basis where this is an ancillary activity, when considered on a group basis. That exemption should not be available for persons who apply a high-frequency algorithmic trading technique or are part of a group the main business of which is the provision of investment services, or banking activities, or acting as a market maker in relation to commodity derivatives. All provisions regarding the quantitative elements should be deleted.

(11) Competent authorities currently have to establish and apply position limits on the size of a net position which a person can hold at all times in commodity derivatives traded on trading venues and in economically equivalent Over-The-Counter (EOTC) contracts. As the position limit regime has proved to be unfavourable for the development of new commodity markets, nascent commodity markets should be excluded from the position limit regime. Instead, the position limits should only apply to those commodity derivatives that are deemed significant or critical commodity derivatives and their EOTC contracts. Significant or critical derivatives are commodity derivatives with an open interest of at least 300 000 lots over a one-year period. Due to its critical importance for citizens, commodities that have an underlying that is food for human consumption, and their EOTC contracts, will remain under the current position limit regime. ESMA should be mandated to develop draft regulatory standards to define commodities with an underlying that is food for human consumption subject to position limits and critical or significant derivatives subject to position limits. For significant and critical derivatives, ESMA should take into account the number of market participants and the underlying commodity.

(12) Directive 2014/65/EU does not allow hedging exemptions for any financial entities. Several predominantly commercial groups who set up a financial entity for their trading purposes found themselves in a situation where their financial entity could not carry out all the trading for the group, as the financial entity was not eligible for the hedging exemption. Therefore, a narrowly defined hedging exemption for financial entities should be introduced. That hedging exemption should be available where, within a predominantly commercial group, a person has been registered as an investment firm and trades on behalf of that commercial group. To limit this hedging exemption to only those financial entities that trade for the non-financial entities in the predominantly commercial group, that hedging exemption should apply to those positions held by that financial entity that are objectively measurable as reducing risks directly related to the commercial activities of the non-financial entities of the group.

(13) Even in liquid contracts, only a limited number of market participants typically act as market makers in commodity markets. When those market participants have to apply position limits they are not in a position to be as effective as market makers. Therefore, an exemption from the position limit regime should be introduced for financial and non-financial entities for positions resulting from transactions undertaken to fulfil mandatory liquidity provisions.

(14) The current position limit regime does not recognise the unique characteristics of securitised derivatives. Securitised derivatives are caught by the transferable securities definition under Article 4(1)(44)(c). The securitised derivatives market is characterised by a large number of different issuances, each one registered within the central securities depository for a specific size and any possible increase follows a specific procedure duly approved by the relevant competent authority. This contrasts with commodity derivative contracts where the amount of open interest, and thereby the size of a position, is potentially unlimited. At the time of issue, the issuer or the intermediary in charge of the distribution of the issuance holds 100% of the issue, which challenges the very application of a position limit regime. In addition, most of securitised derivatives are then ultimately held by a large number of retail investors, which does not raise the same risk of abusing a dominant position or to orderly pricing and settlement conditions as for commodity derivative contracts. Moreover, the notion of spot month and other months, for which position limits are to be set under Article 57(3) of MiFID II, is not applicable to securitised derivatives. Securitised derivatives should therefore be excluded from the application of position limits and reporting requirements.

(15) Since the entry into force of Directive 2014/65/EU, no same commodity derivative contracts have been identified. Due to the concept of “same contract” in that Directive, the methodology for determining the other months’ limit is detrimental to the venue where the lower volume of open interest is recorded when trading venues are competing on commodity derivatives based on the same underlying and sharing the same characteristics. Therefore, the reference to “same contract” in Directive 2014/65/EU should be deleted. Competent authorities should be able to agree that the commodity derivatives traded on their respective trading venues are based on the same underlying and share the same characteristics, in which case the baseline for the other months’ limit on the most liquid market for that commodity derivative can be used as the baseline limit for setting the other months’ position limit for the competing contracts traded on the less liquid venues.

(16) Significant dissimilarities exist in the way positions are managed by trading venues in the Union. Therefore, position management controls should be reinforced where necessary.

(17) In order to ensure the further development of Euro denominated EU commodity markets, the power to adopt regulatory technical standards in accordance with Article 290 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union should be delegated to the Commission in respect of which commodity derivatives that have an underlying that is food for human consumption should be subject to position limits and which critical or significant derivatives should be subject to position limits, in respect of a procedure for which persons may apply for an exemption for positions resulting from transactions undertaken to fulfil mandatory liquidity provisions; in respect of a procedure for which financial entities that are part of a predominantly commercial group may apply for a hedging exemption for positions held by that financial entity that are objectively measurable as reducing risks directly related to the commercial activities of the non-financial entities of the group and in respect of the clarification of the content of position management controls. It is of particular importance that the Commission carries out appropriate consultations during its preparatory work, including at expert level, and that those consultations are conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in the Interinstitutional Agreement of 13 April 2016 on Better Law-Making³. In particular, to ensure equal participation in the preparation of delegated acts, the European Parliament and the Council receive all documents at the same time as Member States' experts, and their experts systematically have access to meetings of Commission expert groups dealing with the preparation of delegated acts.

³ OJ L 123, 12.5.2016, p. 1.

(18) The EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) is the Union's flagship policy for achieving the decarbonisation of the economy in line with the European Green Deal. Trading in emission allowances and derivatives thereof is subject to Directive 2014/65/EU and to Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 and represents an important element of the Union's carbon market. The ancillary activity exemption under Directive 2014/65/EU enables certain market participants to be active in emission allowance markets without having to be authorised as investment firms, provided certain conditions are met. In view of the importance of orderly, well-regulated and supervised financial markets, the significant role of the ETS in achieving the Union's sustainability objectives, and the role that a well-functioning secondary market in emission allowances has in supporting the functioning of the ETS, it is essential that the ancillary activity exemption is appropriately designed to contribute to those objectives. This is particularly relevant where trading in emission allowances takes place on third country trading venues. In order to ensure the protection of the Union's financial stability, market integrity, investor protection and the level playing field, and to ensure that the ETS continues to function in a transparent and robust manner to ensure cost-effective emission reductions, the Commission should monitor the further development of trading in emission allowances and derivatives thereof in the Union and in third countries, assess the impact of the ancillary activity exemption on the ETS, and where necessary, propose any appropriate amendment as regards the scope and application of the ancillary activity exemption.

(18a) In order to provide additional legal clarity, not create unnecessary administrative burden upon Member States, and ensure a uniform legal framework for investment firms which, as of 26 June 2021, will fall within the scope of Directive (EU) 2019/2034, it might be appropriate to postpone the date of transposition of Directive (EU) 2019/878 as regards the measures applicable to investment firms. In order to ensure a consistent application of the legal framework applicable to investment firms pursuant to Article 67 of Directive (EU) 2019/34, the transposition deadline for Directive (EU) 2019/878 with respect to investment firms should be extended until 26 June 2021.

(19) Directive 2014/65/EU should therefore be amended accordingly.

(20) The objectives pursued by this amendment aim at supplementing already existing Union legislation and can therefore best be achieved at Union level rather than by different national initiatives. Financial markets are inherently cross-border in nature and are becoming more so. Because of that integration, isolated national intervention would be far less efficient and would lead to the fragmentation of markets, resulting in regulatory arbitrage and distortion of competition. Since the objectives of this Directive, namely to refine already existing Union legislation ensuring uniform and appropriate requirements that apply to investment firms throughout the Union, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States but can rather, by reason of their scale and effects, be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Directive does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve those objectives.

(21) In accordance with the Joint Political Declaration of 28 September 2011 of Member States and the Commission on explanatory documents⁴, Member States have undertaken to accompany, in justified cases, the notification of their transposition measures with one or more documents explaining the relationship between the components of a directive and the corresponding parts of national transposition instruments. With regard to this Directive, the legislator considers the transmission of such documents to be justified,

HAVE ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE:

⁴ OJ C 369, 17.12.2011, p. 14.

Article 1
Amendments to Directive 2014/65/EU

Directive 2014/65/EU is amended as follows:

(1) Article 2 is amended as follows:

(a) in paragraph 1, point (j) is replaced by the following:

“(j) persons:

(i) dealing on own account, including market makers, in commodity derivatives or emission allowances or derivatives thereof, excluding persons who deal on own account when executing client orders; or

(ii) providing investment services, other than dealing on own account, in commodity derivatives or emission allowances or derivatives thereof to the customers or suppliers of their main business;

provided that

– for each of those cases individually and on an aggregate basis, the activity is ancillary to their main business, when considered on a group basis;

– those persons are not part of a group the main business of which is the provision of investment services within the meaning of this Directive, the performance of any activity listed in Annex I to Directive 2013/36/EU, or acting as a market-maker for commodity derivatives;

- those persons do not apply a high-frequency algorithmic trading technique; and
- those persons report upon request to the competent authority the basis on which they have assessed that their activity under points (i) and (ii) is ancillary to their main business.”;

(b) paragraph 4 is deleted;

(2) Article 4(1) is amended as follows:

(a) the following point (8a) is inserted:

“(8a) ‘switching of financial instruments’ means selling a financial instrument and buying another financial instrument or exercising a right to make a change in regard to an existing financial instrument;”;

(b) deleted

(b) the following point (62a) is inserted:

“(62a) ‘electronic format’ means any durable medium other than paper;”

(c) the following point (65) is inserted:

“(65) ‘Predominantly commercial group’ means any group for which the main business is not the provision of investment services within the meaning of this Directive, the performance of any activity listed in Annex I to Directive 2013/36/EU, or acting as a market maker in relation to commodity derivatives.

(3) The following Article 16a is inserted:

“Article 16a

Exemptions from product governance requirements

1. Investment firms are exempted from the requirements set out in the second to fifth subparagraphs of Article 16 (3) and in Article 24 (2) provided that the following conditions are met:

(a) the investment firm provides an investment service in accordance with Article 25(4); and

(b) the investment service relates to a bond as referred to in Article 25 (4) (a) (ii).

2. Investment firms are also exempted from the requirements set out in the second to fifth subparagraphs of Article 16 (3) and in Article 24 (2) when a financial instrument is marketed or distributed exclusively to eligible counterparties.”;

(4) Article 24 is amended as follows:

(a) deleted

(a) In paragraph 4, the following subparagraph is added:

“Where the agreement to buy or sell a financial instrument is concluded using means of distance communication, the investment firm may provide the information on costs and charges either in an electronic format or on paper where requested by a retail client without undue delay after the conclusion of the transaction, provided that all of the following conditions are met:

(i) the investment firm has given the client the option of delaying the conclusion of the transaction until the client has received the information;

(ii) the client has agreed to receive the information without undue delay after the conclusion of the transaction.”;

(b) the following paragraph 5a is inserted:

“5a. Investment firms shall provide all information required by this Directive to clients or potential clients in electronic format, except where the client or potential client is a retail client or potential retail client who has requested receiving the information on paper, in which case that information shall be provided on paper and free of charge.

Investment firms shall inform retail clients or potential retail clients that they have the option to receive the information on paper.

Investment firms shall inform existing retail clients that used to receive the information required by this Directive on paper about the fact that they will receive that information in electronic format at least eight weeks before sending that information in electronic format. Investment firms shall inform the existing retail clients that they have the choice to either continue receiving information on paper or to switch to information in electronic format. Investment firms shall also inform existing retail clients that an automatic switch to the electronic format will follow where they do not request the continuation of the provision of the information on paper within that eight weeks period.”;

(5) in Article 25(2), the following subparagraph is added:

“When providing investment advice or portfolio management services that involve switching of financial instruments, investment firms shall obtain the necessary information on the client’s investment and shall analyse the costs and benefits of switching financial instruments, and inform the client whether or not the benefits of such switching of financial instruments are greater than the costs involved in such switching.”;

(6) in Article 27(3), the following subparagraph is added:

“The reporting requirement to the public laid down in this paragraph shall however not apply until [date of entry into force of this amending Directive + 2 years].”;

(7) the following Article 29a is inserted:

“Article 29a

Services provided to professional clients

- (1) The requirements laid down in point (c) of Article 24(4), shall not apply to services provided to professional clients except for investment advice and portfolio management.
- (2) The requirements laid down in the third subparagraph of Article 25(2) and in Article 25(6) shall not apply to services provided to professional clients, unless those clients inform the investment firm in either in an electronic format or on paper that they wish to benefit from the rights provided for in those provisions.
- (3) Member States shall ensure that investment firms keep a record of the communication referred to in paragraph 2.”;
- (8) in Article 30, subparagraph 1 of paragraph 1 is replaced by the following:

“Member States shall ensure that investment firms authorised to execute orders on behalf of clients, to deal on own account, or to receive and transmit orders, have the possibility to bring about or enter into transactions with eligible counterparties without being obliged to comply with Article 24, with the exception of paragraph 5a, Article 25, Article 27 and Article 28(1), in respect of those transactions or in respect of any ancillary service directly relating to those transactions.”;

(9) Article 57 is amended as follows:

(a) paragraph 1 is replaced by the following:

“1. Member States shall ensure that competent authorities, in line with the methodology for calculation determined by ESMA in regulatory technical standards adopted in accordance with paragraph 3, set and apply position limits on the size of a net position which a person can hold at all times in commodity derivatives where the underlying is food for human consumption and critical or significant commodity derivatives that are traded on trading venues, and in economically equivalent OTC contracts. Commodity derivatives shall be considered as critical or significant where the sum of all net positions of end position holders constitutes the size of their open interest and is at a minimum 300 000 lots on average over one year. The limits shall be set based on all positions held by a person and those held on his or her behalf at an aggregate group level in order to:

(a) prevent market abuse;

(b) support orderly pricing and settlement conditions, including preventing market distorting positions, and ensuring, in particular, convergence between prices of derivatives in the delivery month and spot prices for the underlying commodity, without prejudice to price discovery on the market for the underlying commodity.;

The position limits shall not apply to:

(a) positions held by, or on behalf of, a non-financial entity, and which are objectively measurable as reducing risks directly relating to the commercial activity of that non-financial entity;

(b) positions held by, or on behalf of, a financial entity that is part of a predominantly commercial group and is acting on behalf of a non-financial entity of this predominantly commercial group and which are objectively measurable as reducing risks directly relating to the commercial activity of that non-financial entity;

(c) positions held by financial and non-financial entities for positions that are objectively measurable as resulting from transactions in commodity derivatives and emission allowances entered into to fulfil obligations to provide liquidity on a trading venue, where such obligations are required by regulatory authorities in accordance with Union law or with national laws, regulations and administrative provisions, or by trading venues;

(d) securities as referred to in point (44)(c) of Article 4(1) which relate to a commodity or an underlying as referred to in section C(10) of Annex I.”;

ESMA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to determine a procedure for financial entities that are part of a predominantly commercial group and who may apply for a hedging exemption for positions held by that financial entity that are objectively measurable as reducing risks directly related to the commercial activities of the non-financial entities of the group. ESMA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to determine a procedure setting out how persons may apply for an exemption for positions resulting from transactions entered into to fulfil obligations to provide liquidity on a trading venue.

ESMA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by [9 months after entry into force of this Directive].

Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the third subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010.”;

(b) paragraphs 3 and 4 are replaced by the following:

“3. ESMA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify the commodity derivatives where the underlying is food for human consumption and create a list with critical or significant commodity derivatives referred to in paragraph 1, and to determine the calculation methodology that competent authorities are to apply when establishing the spot month position limits and other months’ position limits for physically settled and cash settled commodity derivatives based on the characteristics of the relevant derivative concerned.

When specifying critical or significant commodity derivatives, ESMA shall take into account the following factors:

- (a) deleted
- (a) the number of market participants; and
- (b) the commodity underlying the derivative concerned.

When determining the calculation methodology referred to in the first subparagraph, ESMA shall take into account the following factors:

- (a) the deliverable supply in the underlying commodity;
- (b) the overall open interest in that derivative and the overall open interest in other financial instruments with the same underlying commodity;

- (c) the number and size of the market participants;
- (d) the characteristics of the underlying commodity market, including patterns of production, consumption and transportation to market;
- (e) the development of new derivatives;
- (f) the experience of investment firms or market operators operating a trading venue and of other jurisdictions regarding the position limits.

ESMA shall submit the draft regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph to the Commission by [9 months after entry into force of this Directive].

Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010.

4. A competent authority shall set position limits for commodity derivatives where the underlying is food for human consumption and for critical or significant commodity derivatives traded on trading venues based on the methodology for calculation determined in regulatory technical standards adopted by the Commission pursuant to paragraph 3. That position limit shall include economically equivalent OTC contracts.

A competent authority shall review position limits where there is a significant change on the market, including significant change in deliverable supply or open interest, based on its determination of deliverable supply and open interest, and reset the position limit in accordance with the methodology for calculation laid down in the regulatory technical standards adopted by the Commission pursuant to paragraph 3. ”;

(c) paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 are replaced by the following:

“6. Where the relevant competent authorities agree that commodity derivatives where the underlying is food for human consumption and critical or significant commodity derivatives that are traded on trading venues in more than one jurisdiction and are based on the same underlying and share the same characteristics, the position limit on the trading venue with the highest amount of open interest for that commodity derivative shall be used as the baseline figure for setting the position limit for the competing derivatives traded on the other trading venues with lower open interest. Competent authorities that do not agree that commodity derivatives are based on the same underlying and share the same characteristics shall state in writing the full and detailed reasons why they consider that this is not the case. ESMA shall settle any dispute arising from a disagreement between competent authorities in accordance with its powers under Article 19 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010.

The competent authorities of the trading venues where commodity derivatives where the underlying is food for human consumption and critical or significant commodity derivatives that are based on the same underlying and that share the same characteristics are traded, shall put in place cooperation arrangements, which shall include the exchange of relevant data, in order to enable the monitoring and enforcement of the position limit.

7. ESMA shall monitor at least once a year the way competent authorities have implemented the position limits set in accordance with the methodology for calculation established by ESMA under paragraph 3. In doing so, ESMA shall ensure that the commodity derivatives where the underlying is food for human consumption and critical or significant commodity derivatives based on the same underlying and sharing the same characteristics are based on the same open interest for setting the position limits, irrespective of where they are traded in line with paragraph 6.

8. Member States shall ensure that an investment firm or a market operator operating a trading venue which trades commodity derivatives apply position management controls, including powers for the trading venue to:

- (a) monitor the open interest positions of persons;
- (b) obtain information, including all relevant documentation, from persons about the size and purpose of a position or exposure entered into, information about beneficial or underlying owners, any concert arrangements, and any related assets or liabilities in the underlying market, including, where appropriate, positions held in commodity derivatives that are based on the same underlying and that share the same characteristics on other trading venues and OTC through members and participants;
- (c) require a person to terminate or reduce a position, on a temporary or permanent basis, and to unilaterally take action to ensure the termination or reduction of the position where the person does not comply with such request; and
- (d) require a person to provide, on a temporary basis, liquidity back into the market at an agreed price and volume with the express intent of mitigating the effects of a large or dominant position.

ESMA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify the content of position management controls, thereby taking into account the characteristics of the trading venues concerned.

ESMA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by [9 months after entry into force of this Directive].

Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010. ”;

(d) paragraph 12 point (d) to (g) are replaced by the following:

“(d) the methodology for aggregating and netting OTC and on-venue commodity derivatives positions to establish the net position for purposes of assessing compliance with the limits. Such methodologies shall establish criteria to determine which positions may be netted against one another and shall not facilitate the build-up of positions in a manner inconsistent with the objectives set out in paragraph 1 of this Article;

(e) the procedure setting out how persons may apply for the exemption under the second subparagraph of paragraph 1 of this Article and how the relevant competent authority will approve such applications.”

(10) in Article 58, paragraph 2 is replaced by the following:

“2. Member States shall ensure that investment firms trading in commodity derivatives or emission allowances or derivatives thereof outside a trading venue provide the national competent authorities, on at least a daily basis, with a complete breakdown of their positions taken in commodity derivatives or emission allowances or derivatives thereof traded as economically equivalent OTC contracts, as well as of those of their clients and the clients of those clients until the end client is reached, in accordance with Article 26 of Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 and, where applicable, of Article 8 of Regulation (EU) No 1227/2011. ”

(10a) in Article 58 paragraph 1, the following subparagraph is added

“Position reporting shall not be applicable to securities as referred to in point (44)(c) of Article 4(1) which relate to a commodity or an underlying as referred to in section C(10) of Annex I.”

(11) in Article 90, the following paragraph 1a is inserted:

“1a. Before 31 December 2021, the Commission shall review the impact of the exemption laid down in Article 2(1), point (j), with regard to emission allowances or derivatives thereof, and shall accompany that review, where appropriate, with a legislative proposal to amend that exemption. In this context, the Commission shall assess the trading in EU emission allowances and derivatives thereof in the EU and in third countries, the impact of the exemption under Article 2(1), point (j), on investor protection, the integrity and transparency of the markets in emission allowances and derivatives thereof and whether measures should be adopted in relation to trading that takes place on third country trading venues.”.

Article 1a

Amendment to Directive (EU) 2019/878

(1) The first subparagraph of Article 2(1) is replaced by the following:

“Member States shall adopt and publish, by 28 December 2020:

(1) the measures necessary to comply with the provisions of this Directive in so far as they concern credit institutions;

(2) the measures necessary to comply with Article 1, points (1) and (9) of this Directive as regards Article 2(5) and (6) and Article 21b of Directive 2013/36/EU, in so far as they concern credit institutions and investment firms.

They shall immediately inform the Commission thereof.”

(2) The following subparagraph is inserted after the 4th subparagraph of Article 2 (1):

“Member States shall adopt, publish and apply by 26 June 2021 the measures necessary to comply with the provisions of this Directive insofar as they concern investment firms, except for those measures mentioned in point (2) of the first subparagraph.”

Article 1b

Amendment to Directive 2013/36/EU

The third, fourth and fifth subparagraphs of Article 94(2) are replaced by the following:

“For the purpose of identifying staff whose professional activities have a material impact on the institution's risk profile as referred to in Article 92(3), except as regards staff in investment firms as defined in Article 4(1)(2) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards setting out the criteria to define the following:

- (a) managerial responsibility and control functions;
- (b) material business unit and significant impact on the relevant business unit's risk profile; and
- (c) other categories of staff not expressly referred to in Article 92(3) whose professional activities have an impact on the institution's risk profile comparably as material as that of those categories of staff referred to therein.

EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by 28 December 2019.

Power is delegated to the Commission to supplement this Directive by adopting the regulatory technical standards referred to in this paragraph in accordance with Article 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010. As regards regulatory technical standards applying to investment firms as defined in Article 4(1)(2) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, the empowerment laid down in Article 94(2) of this Directive as amended by Directive (EU) 2018/843 of the European Parliament and of the Council⁵ shall continue to apply until 26 June 2021.”

Article 2

Transposition

(1) Member States shall adopt and publish by [9 months from the entry into force of this Directive] the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive. They shall forthwith communicate to the Commission the text of those measures.

Member States shall apply those measures from [12 months from the entry into force of this Directive].

(2) Member States shall communicate to the Commission the text of the main provisions of national law which they adopt in the field covered by this Directive.

Article 3

Entry into force

This Directive shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in the *Official Journal of the European Union*.

⁵ Directive (EU) 2018/843 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2018 amending Directive (EU) 2015/849 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, and amending Directives 2009/138/EC and 2013/36/EU (OJ L 156, 19.6.2018).

Article 4
Addressees

This Directive is addressed to the Member States.

Done at Brussels,

For the European Parliament

For the Council

The President

The President
