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COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT

Accompanying the document

2026 Rule of Law Report

The rule of law situation in the European Union

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ABSTRACT

In Czechia, the new two-instance disciplinary procedure for judges, prosecutors and bailiffs is reported to function well. As of 1 January 2026, establishing judges' salaries reverted to a previous method, and debate is ongoing on the salaries of non-judicial staff. Amendments to the judicial map, aiming at reducing the number of district courts, are under preparation. Efforts to digitalise the justice system continued to face delays, particularly the rollout of the e-file system. Amendments to the Code of Administrative Justice aiming to improve efficiency of proceedings have given rise to discussion of their impact on procedural rights. The justice system continues to perform efficiently.

The implementation of the 2023-2026 Anti-Corruption Strategy is being finalised as preparations for a future Strategy begin. The number of corruption investigations, prosecutions and convictions remains stable, with good cooperation between relevant institutions. While the average length of proceedings continues to be an issue, some further steps were taken to improve procedural aspects and investigations and prosecutions continue, including in high-level corruption cases. No steps were taken to reinstate the revision of legislation on conflicts of interest, including as regards beneficial ownership. An Ethics Code for government members was adopted and technical work continues on assessing the rules on asset declarations and revolving doors. Implementation of the new legislation on lobbying is on track. The integrity framework for the Parliament was not taken further. New legislation on political party financing entered into force, while an expansion of the Supreme Audit Office's powers is being considered. Whistleblower protection system continues to operate, but its effectiveness is questioned by stakeholders. Corruption risks in public procurement remain an important point of attention for the authorities.

Draft legislation which would confer new powers on the media regulator and provide media companies with additional rights and responsibilities remains pending. A draft law presented by the government which aims to abolish license fees for public service media has raised concerns. No further steps have been taken on reforms relating to transparency of media ownership. Journalists continue to face serious verbal threats and harassment.

The electronic platform for drafting, commenting on and promulgating legislation is progressively becoming operational. 'Legislative riders' and other ways of limiting public consultation continue to impact the quality of legislative process. Implementation of the amendments to the Ombudsman Act establishing a National Human Rights Institution is ongoing. While civic space remains favourable, civil society organisations reported funding cuts and a change in the narrative regarding their role.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Overall, based on the recommendations in the 2025 Rule of Law Report, considering other developments that took place in the period of reference and in addition to recalling the relevant commitments made under the Recovery and Resilience Plan, the Commission concludes the following:

- As efforts to further digitalise the justice system continued to face delays, it is recommended to Czechia to *advance the digitalisation of the justice system, in particular by putting into operation the electronic file system.*
- Some further progress has been made on taking further measures to reduce the length of proceedings and ensure independence of investigation and prosecution in high-level corruption cases as steps were taken to improve procedural aspects and investigations and prosecutions continue, including in high-level corruption cases. However, as the average length of such proceedings continues to be an issue, it is recommended to Czechia to *take further measures to reduce the length of proceedings and ensure independence of investigation and prosecution in high-level corruption cases, including by reforming the criminal procedure.*
- No progress has been made on taking further measures to strengthen the integrity framework for all members of Parliament, as the integrity framework of Parliament was not taken further. As gaps in the rules on revolving doors remain for most public officials, it is recommended to Czechia to *take further measures to strengthen the integrity framework, in particular by complementing the existing rules as regards revolving doors.*
- No progress has been made on reinitiating the revision of legislation on conflicts of interest, including as regards beneficial ownership as no steps were taken. Therefore, it is recommended to Czechia to *reinitiate the revision of legislation on conflicts of interest, including as regards beneficial ownership.*
- As the use of legislative procedures circumventing public and stakeholder engagement, inter-departmental review and impact assessment has become more frequent, it is recommended to Czechia to *take measures to improve transparency of the legislative process and meaningful consultation of stakeholders, including by addressing the frequent use of fast-track procedure and the practice of legislative riders.*

As regards the other 2025 recommendations, the Commission concludes that:

- No progress has been made on further reforms relating to transparency of information on media ownership given that draft legislation remains pending in parliament and no fully functional transparency register has been formally established. Given that the topics of this recommendation are covered by provisions of the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA), while the Rule of Law Report will continue to monitor significant developments and report on their impact, further follow-up will be ensured as part of the Commission's support to Member States and enforcement of the EMFA.

I. JUSTICE SYSTEM¹

Independence

The level of perceived judicial independence in Czechia continues to be high among both the general public and companies. Overall, 70% of the general population and 60% of companies perceive the level of independence of courts and judges to be ‘fairly or very good’ in 2026². The perceived judicial independence among the general public has increased in comparison with 2025 (64%) and has significantly increased in comparison with 2022 (57%). The perceived judicial independence among companies has slightly decreased in comparison with 2025 (63%) and has increased in comparison with 2022 (55%).

The new two-instance disciplinary procedure for judges, prosecutors and bailiffs is reported to function well. With the reform’s stated aim to enhance the principle of legality by introducing a second instance, and the efficiency of disciplinary proceedings for judges, prosecutors, and bailiffs³, High Courts are functioning as the first-instance disciplinary bodies, with appeals heard by the Supreme Court and the Supreme Administrative Court⁴. This reform applies to cases initiated after January 2025 and established a ‘unifying disciplinary panel’ at the Supreme Administrative Court for ensuring consistent case law⁵. Also, the deadline to file a disciplinary motion was extended from six to nine months⁶. The reform is part of the commitments under the Czech Recovery and Resilience Plan (RRP) and responds also to a GRECO recommendation⁷. Stakeholders’ views continue to be positive about the introduction of the second instance⁸, although they consider it is too early to evaluate the implementation of the reform. Since 1 January 2026, the limitation period after which the disciplinary liability of a judge or a public prosecutor ceases was extended from three to five years⁹. As regards the reform of the public prosecution service, the implementation is ongoing with progressive selection procedures for chief public prosecutors and is generally viewed positively by stakeholders¹⁰.

¹ An overview of the institutional framework for all four pillars can be found [here](#).

² Figures 48 and 50, 2026 EU Justice Scoreboard and Figures 51 and 53, 2024 EU Justice Scoreboard. The level of perceived judicial independence is categorised as follows: very low (below 30% of respondents perceive judicial independence as fairly good and very good); low (between 30-39%), average (between 40-59%), high (between 60-75%), very high (above 75%).

³ Czech Government (2026), written input, p. 5.

⁴ Section 3 para. 2 of the Act on proceedings in the cases of judges, prosecutors and bailiffs. The Supreme Court hears cases about judges, while the Supreme Administrative Court hears cases about Supreme Court judges, administrative judges (except for judges of the Supreme Administrative Court), public prosecutors and bailiffs. See also 2025 Rule of Law Report, Czechia, p. 3.

⁵ Czech Government (2026), written input, p. 5. Other procedural novelties are for example the extension of the subjective time limit for filing a disciplinary petition from six to nine months.

⁶ Section 9 of Act No 7/2002 Coll., “The petitioner must file a motion to initiate disciplinary proceedings within 9 months of the date on which he or she became aware of the facts relating to the disciplinary offense that are relevant to the filing of the motion.”

⁷ Recovery and Resilience Plan: Reform 2 Strengthening the legislative framework and transparency in the areas of courts, judges, prosecutors and bailiffs, component 4.3. GRECO Fourth Evaluation Round – Evaluation Report, recommendation ix, introducing the possibility for judges to challenge disciplinary decisions including for dismissal before a court.

⁸ The first appeal case at the Supreme Court was heard on 18 March 2026. Country visit Czechia, Supreme Court, Union of Judges.

⁹ Czech Government (2026), written input, p. 6. Country visit Czechia, Union of Judges.

¹⁰ Czech Government (2026), written input, p. 5. Country visit Czechia, Office of the Prosecutor General and Union of Public Prosecutors.

Representatives of the judiciary reported an increasing number of public statements by politicians concerning the status of the judiciary, including by criticising individual judges and ongoing proceedings. Judicial stakeholders, including the Union of Judges and the Supreme Court, reported that such statements have become more frequent compared to previous years and expressed concerns that such statements risk undermining general trust in the justice system and may create a perception of political influence over the courts¹¹. The statements concern the status of the judiciary vis-à-vis other powers in general, but also concrete ongoing judicial proceedings and the judges deciding on them¹². According to European standards, while criticising judicial decisions is a normal aspect of democratic discourse, the executive and legislative powers should avoid criticism that undermines the independence of or public confidence in the judiciary¹³.

Quality

As of 1 January 2026, establishing judges' salaries reverted to a previous method, and debate is ongoing on the salaries of non-judicial staff. In response to a Constitutional Court ruling of May 2024, a law adopted in March 2025 reinstated, as of 1 January 2026, the prior method for calculating judicial salaries based on a multiplier¹⁴. However, for 2025, this law introduced a concrete nominal value for judicial salaries, which was also challenged before general courts and the Constitutional Court¹⁵. The Constitutional Court held in October 2025 that these provisions determining judicial salaries for 2025 were not in line with the Constitution, and the Government provided compensation to the affected judges¹⁶. Judicial stakeholders welcomed that the provisions applicable as of January 2026 are now in line with the original calculation method¹⁷. In 2025, the Ministry of Justice made some efforts to increase the budgetary resources for the salaries of support staff¹⁸. At the same time, salaries are reported as still not keeping pace with salaries in other public sector positions, which is considered to affect the recruitment and retention of qualified staff in the judiciary and prosecution services¹⁹.

¹¹ Country visit Czechia, Union of Judges and Supreme Court.

¹² Country visit Czechia, Union of Judges and Supreme Court. The Supreme Court acknowledged that the judiciary is not immune from criticism but stressed that it should be expressed through appropriate channels, such as legal publications or academic commentary, and in a manner consistent with the dignity of the judicial office. Union of Judges asked for restraint in comments by politicians. See also Union of Judges (2026).

¹³ Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, para. 18. See also Venice Commission (2013), CDL-AD(2013)038, paras. 21-22.

¹⁴ The salary is calculated on the basis of a starting amount (triple of the average salary in the country) modified according to the instance of the court of prosecutorial office, length of relevant experience and, where applicable, the exercise of a managerial position. Czech Government (2026) written input, p. 7. Constitutional Court, decision of 15 May 2024, Pl. ÚS 5/24.

¹⁵ See also 2025 Rule of Law Report, Czechia, p. 4.

¹⁶ Judgment of the Constitutional Court of 1 October 2025, Pl. ÚS 19/25. Country visit Czechia, Ministry of Justice, Supreme Court, Union of Judges and Supreme Administrative Court.

¹⁷ The rules for determining judges' remuneration must be objective, foreseeable, but also stable and transparent, so as to exclude any arbitrary intervention by the legislature and the executive, and the same requirements apply to any measures derogating from those rules. Judgment of the CJEU, joined cases C-146/23, Sąd Rejonowy w Białymstoku and C-374/23, Adoreiké, para 56, paras. 65 et seq. Stakeholders noted that further changes to the regime of salaries might be under consideration. Country visit Czechia, Union of Judges, Supreme Court and Supreme Administrative Court.

¹⁸ Czech Government (2026), written input, p. 7.

¹⁹ Country visit Czechia, Union of Judges, Supreme Court.

Amendments to the judicial map, aiming at reducing the number of district courts, are under preparation. The new Minister of Justice announced his plan to reform the judicial map by the end of 2027, which would include merging courts, with the stated aim of improving efficiency and the use of resources for the judiciary²⁰. The reform would not lead to the termination of any judicial posts²¹. Stakeholders acknowledged that limited and rational mergers of small courts could be appropriate in specific cases and noted that more significant changes should be based on a proper analysis of staffing needs and court workloads²². In the course of 2026, the Government will analyse the data collected in a study on staffing needs and will discuss it with the courts²³.

Efforts to digitalise the justice system continued to face delays, particularly the rollout of the e-file system. Following initiatives under the Recovery and Resilience Plan²⁴, the Ministry of Justice has taken steps to develop different digitalisation tools²⁵. However, many of the projects have been delayed or postponed²⁶ and other outstanding issues have not been tackled²⁷. An e-file system to enable parties to a dispute to access relevant documents has been in deployment since 2008 and faces further delays. The deployment of the electronic system for the public prosecution and its operation also depend on the e-file system²⁸. Stakeholders also pointed to the lack of interoperability between the existing digital systems specific for different courts²⁹ and the often incomplete or inconsistent publication of judicial decisions, despite this being a legal obligation³⁰. Stakeholders emphasised that the prevailing low level of digitalisation of the justice system is a significant challenge³¹, resulting in decreasing efficiency of the proceedings, with higher costs for citizens and the justice system, limited remote access and less transparency of judicial decisions³².

Amendments to the Code of Administrative Justice aiming to improve efficiency of proceedings have given rise to discussion of their impact on procedural rights. Through a reform adopted by Parliament in July 2025, several generally applicable provisions of the Code of Administrative Justice were amended³³ to introduce the possibility to review a binding decision by an administrative authority and additional rights, such as the right for costs to be paid by the losing party. The shortening of certain procedural deadlines and widening the standing of certain parties to the proceedings aim at enhancing the efficiency

²⁰ Country visit Czechia, Ministry of Justice.

²¹ *ibidem*.

²² Country visit Czechia, Union of Judges and Supreme Court.

²³ Czech Government (2026), written input, p. 7. Country visit Czechia, Ministry of Justice and Supreme Court. 2025 Rule of Law Report, Czechia, p. 6. The project is entitled “Strengthening the efficiency of the judicial system in the Czech Republic” supported by the Technical Support Instrument of the European Commission and aimed at determining the staffing needs at individual courts.

²⁴ Such as videoconferencing or Justice Portal.

²⁵ Czech Government (2026), written input, pp. 8-9.

²⁶ *ibidem*.

²⁷ League of Human Rights (2025); Glopolis (2026), written input, p. 9.

²⁸ Country visit Czechia, Office of the Prosecutor General.

²⁹ League of Human Rights (2025), p. 4, Country visit Czechia, Union of Judges.

³⁰ League of Human Rights (2025), p. 4, STEM-Network for the Protection of Democracy, written input, p. 10; Glopolis, written input, p. 9.

³¹ Office of the Prosecutor General, written input, p. 10; Czech Bar Association, written input, pp. 6 and 17, STEM-Network for the Protection of Democracy, written input, p. 10, Glopolis, written input, p. 9, Country visit Czechia, Union of Judges, Union of Prosecutors, Supreme Court.

³² League of Human Rights (2025), Czech Bar Association (2026), written input, p. 17, Glopolis (2026), written input, p. 9.

³³ Act No. 314/2025 Coll.

and quality of the administrative procedure³⁴. However, some stakeholders fear that these changes could discourage civil associations or citizens from taking part in the proceedings³⁵ and may adversely affect some vulnerable groups³⁶. Another set of draft amendments to the Code of Administrative Justice was tabled by a parliamentary group in December 2025, limiting the participation of civil society and further changing the scope of judicial review³⁷. The increase in court fees for administrative justice matters originally envisaged for adoption in 2025 has not been proposed in legislation so far³⁸.

Efficiency

The justice system continues to perform efficiently. The disposition time in civil and commercial cases at first instance remained at 126 days in 2024, among the lowest in the EU³⁹. While the clearance rate for administrative cases at first instance further decreased to 105% in 2024 (111% in 2023), the administrative courts kept resolving more cases than they received and the estimated time needed to resolve such cases continued to improve, decreasing to 202 days in 2024 (212 in 2023). The Ministry of Justice is intending to prepare the final analysis of the labour intensity of the courts in 2026, including the discussions on the results with the representatives of courts. In more narrow categories, the average length of proceedings regarding bribery at first instance courts in 2024 decreased to 380 days (541 in 2023) but remained among the longest in the EU⁴⁰.

II. ANTI-CORRUPTION FRAMEWORK

The perception among experts, citizens and business executives is that the level of corruption in the public sector remains relatively high. In the 2025 Corruption Perceptions Index by Transparency International, Czechia scores 59/100 and ranks 14th in the European Union and 39th globally⁴¹. This perception has improved over the past five years⁴². The 2026 Special Eurobarometer on Corruption shows that 79% of respondents consider corruption widespread in their country (EU average 71%) and 24% of respondents feel personally affected by corruption in their daily lives (EU average 30%). As regards businesses, 75% of companies consider that corruption is widespread (EU average 65%) and 45% consider that corruption is a problem when doing business (EU average 37%). Furthermore, 35% of respondents find that there are enough successful prosecutions to deter people from corrupt practices (EU average 38%), while 16% of companies believe that people and businesses caught for bribing a senior official are appropriately punished (EU average 31%)⁴³.

The implementation of the 2023-2026 Anti-Corruption Strategy is being finalised as preparations for a future Strategy begin. The action plan covering 2025-2026 is being

³⁴ Explanatory memorandum to Act No. 314/2025 Coll, p. 73.

³⁵ ENNHRI (2026), written input; Country visit Czechia, Glopolis.

³⁶ Country visit Czechia, Czech Bar Association and Glopolis.

³⁷ Print No. 67/0, draft amendment to the Construction Act; ENNHRI (2026), written input.

³⁸ Czech Government (2026), written input, p. 6. See also 2025 Rule of Law Report, Czechia, p. 6.

³⁹ Figures 1-14, 2026 EU Justice Scoreboard.

⁴⁰ Figure 21, 2026 EU Justice Scoreboard.

⁴¹ The level of perceived corruption is categorised as follows: low (above 79); relatively low (between 79-60), relatively high (between 59-50), high (below 50).

⁴² In 2021 the score was 54, while, in 2025, the score is 59. The score significantly increases/decreases when it changes more than five points; improves/deteriorates (changes between 4-5 points); is relatively stable (changes from 1-3 points) in the last five years.

⁴³ Data from Special Eurobarometer 573 (2026) and Flash Eurobarometer 582 (2026).

implemented and an evaluation shows that, with some important exceptions, the fulfilment of most tasks is on track⁴⁴. Preparations for a new Strategy starting in 2027 have begun⁴⁵. Some civil society stakeholders called for a more comprehensive and longer-term Anti-Corruption Strategy, deeming the current one insufficient to improve the overall anti-corruption framework⁴⁶. The Anti-Corruption Council, an advisory body to the government which includes civil society, met for the first time under the new Government in April 2026⁴⁷. The Conflict of Interest and Corruption Prevention Department of the Ministry of Justice is responsible for the implementation of the Anti-Corruption Strategy, processing of asset and interest declarations and whistleblowing reports. It continues to report a lack of resources despite an increase in tasks, including the implementation of the new lobbying legislation, leading it to focus only on core tasks and legal deadlines⁴⁸. A strategy to fight organised crime was adopted in June 2025 and takes into account the link with corruption, including through further encouraging joint cooperation between customs, police and tax authorities against economic crime⁴⁹.

The number of corruption investigations, prosecutions and convictions remains stable, with good cooperation between relevant institutions. In 2025 the authorities opened 243 corruption investigations (154 in 2024) and prosecuted 173 individuals for corruption offences (166 individuals in 2024)⁵⁰. A total of 162 persons were brought to court (141 in 2024)⁵¹, while 148 were convicted for corruption in 2025 (99 persons in 2024). 2025 saw 12 acquittals for corruption (13 in 2024). Most cases related to the offences of bribery⁵². Cooperation between the relevant law enforcement institutions remains good. The Ministry of Interior and the National Agency against Organised Crime (NCOZ) remain committed to improving the investigative capacities of the latter⁵³. As regards foreign bribery, updated statistics are not available. It continues to be the case that only a limited number of cases of foreign bribery are detected and prosecuted despite the legal framework being in place⁵⁴. Cooperation between the national authorities with the European Public Prosecutors Office

⁴⁴ Czech Government (2026), written input, p. 10 and Ministry of Justice (2026b). Notably, the three remaining tasks in the first pillar of the strategy on “an effective and independent public authority” have not been implemented. This includes in particular further work on GRECO’s recommendations and the introduction of a Code of Ethics for civil servants.

⁴⁵ Country visit Czechia, Ministry of Justice.

⁴⁶ Transparency International Czechia (2025a).

⁴⁷ Country visit Czechia, Ministry of Justice.

⁴⁸ No extra resources have been planned so far to be assigned to the responsible department in the Ministry of Justice, although an internal reorganisation of posts lead to some additional people in the department. Some civil society organisations consider this lack of resources puts at risk the broader implementation of the anti-corruption policy and the Anti-Corruption Council already issued a recommendation on this topic to the government in 2023. 2025 Rule of Law Report, Czechia, pp. 7-8 and Country visit Czechia, Transparency International/Lobbio and Ministry of Justice.

⁴⁹ Czech Government (2026), written input, p. 15.

⁵⁰ Ministry of Interior and National Agency against Organised Crime (NCOZ) (2026) and Public Prosecution Service (2026).

⁵¹ This includes indictments, motions for punishments, and agreements on guilt and punishment.

⁵² Public Prosecution Service (2026).

⁵³ For example, development of the uniform analytical tool - a digital solution to input data and analysis uncovered during investigations in a uniform and standardised manner - for investigators continues Czech Government (2026), written input, p. 2 and Country visit Czechia, National Agency against Organised Crime (NCOZ).

⁵⁴ As noted previously, in 2024 Rule of Law Report, Czechia, p. 12.

was reported as good⁵⁵. Of its open cases in 2025, the EPPO reported that six were related to corruption (4.41% of its total open cases)⁵⁶.

While the average length of proceedings continues to be an issue, some further steps were taken to improve procedural aspects and investigations and prosecutions continue, including in high-level corruption cases⁵⁷. Investigations, prosecutions and adjudications continue in cases of high-level corruption involving both former and current high-level officials and additional cases were detected⁵⁸. A targeted reform of the Criminal Code and Criminal Procedure Code entered into force on 1 January 2026. It is expected to improve a number of procedural aspects relevant also to high-level corruption cases, making it easier to discontinue criminal proceedings where the evidence is insufficient to support an indictment, and simplify certain procedural steps including in case of proceedings against shell companies. Legal persons would also be able to be put on probation during proceedings if they have taken steps to remedy the damage or institute compliance programmes⁵⁹. Concerns persist however over the average length of judicial proceedings in high-level corruption cases at all stages of the process⁶⁰, although the Government and public prosecution emphasise that there are important differences depending on the type of offence⁶¹. The process for lifting the immunities of high-level persons, such as ministers or members of Parliament, under investigation has been flagged by civil society as a barrier preventing investigations from moving forward⁶². There were no reports of undue interference into high-level corruption cases⁶³. On the basis of these developments, there has been some further progress on the recommendation.

There was no progress on the recommendation to reinstate the revision of legislation on conflicts of interest, including as regards beneficial ownership⁶⁴. A revised version of the legislation was proposed in the form of a bill by a Member of Parliament and approved by the Parliament. However, the Constitutional Court's decision of December 2024 annulled it on procedural grounds⁶⁵. Since then, no new initiatives have been taken by either the former or

⁵⁵ EPPO (2026), pp. 13-14.

⁵⁶ EPPO (2026a), Annual Report 2025, p. 21.

⁵⁷ The 2025 Rule of Law Report recommended to Czechia to "Take further measures to reduce the length of proceedings and ensure independence of investigation and prosecution in high-level corruption cases." Some progress was previously assessed on this recommendation in 2025 and 2024, and no progress in 2023.

⁵⁸ Examples of high-level corruption cases include the Dozimetr procurement scandal linked to Prague municipal transport, the Brno municipal apartments sales case, and corruption cases in the IKEM and Motol hospitals and cities of Olomouc and Pardubice. See 2025 Rule of Law Report, Czechia, p. 8.

⁵⁹ Czech Government (2026), written input, pp. 2-3 and Ministry of Justice (2026).

⁶⁰ The average length of bribery cases before first instance criminal courts was fourth longest in the EU (380 days on average in 2024). Figure 21, 2026 EU Justice Scoreboard. See also 2024 Rule of Law report, Czechia, pp. 11-12 and 2025 Rule of Law Report, Czechia, p. 8.

⁶¹ Ministry of Justice (2026) and Public Prosecution Service (2026), written input. According to data of the prosecution, the average length of proceedings from the start of investigation to the final verdict ranged between 70 to 772 days in 2025, depending on the corruption offence, although this data is not disaggregated between regular and high-level cases (compared to 614 to 854 days in 2024).

⁶² Country visit Czechia, Transparency International/Lobbio and Transparency International Czechia (2026), written input, pp. 17-18.

⁶³ Country visit Czechia, Union of Judges, Union of Prosecutors, Public Prosecution Office and Transparency International/Lobbio.

⁶⁴ The 2025 Rule of Law Report recommended Czechia to "Reinstate the revision of legislation on conflicts of interest, including as regards beneficial ownership."

⁶⁵ The 2023 Rule of Law report recommended to Czechia to "[c]omplete the revision of legislation on conflicts of interest, including by clarifying the definition of beneficial ownership." In 2024, this

current government to address the issue⁶⁶ and no broader reform of the legislation is planned⁶⁷. In June 2026, Members of Parliament tabled a draft revision of the conflicts of interest legislation⁶⁸. The draft includes revisions replacing the concept of a controlling person with that of a beneficial owner. The proposed draft would narrow the scope of the blanket ban on subsidies and public procurement contracts for companies controlled by members of government, by allowing such subsidies and contracts where they are not provided by a ministry under the direct responsibility of the relevant government member⁶⁹. In its opinion on the proposal, the government asked for further legislative and technical amendments to the proposal, as well as an expert discussion on it, including on the proposed changes to the ban on subsidies and public procurement contracts⁷⁰. An intense public debate on the enforcement of existing legislation on conflicts of interest and its overall efficiency, in particular as regards controls on specific business interests of high-level officials is taking place⁷¹. Exchanges between the Government and the European Commission on the overall audit and control system remain ongoing. As the outstanding concerns have not yet been addressed, no progress has been made on the recommendation.

The Government adopted an Ethics Code for members of the Government in March 2026. The Code reiterates existing legal obligations such as the importance of avoiding conflicts of interest, refraining from criminal conduct such as bribery or abuse of office and avoidance of gifts⁷². Civil society expressed doubts regarding future compliance with and enforcement of the code given its non-binding nature and its lack of anchoring in the broader legislative framework⁷³. As regards ethics in law enforcement, the police continues work to improve its ethics and integrity standards⁷⁴. Civil society highlights that the repeal and replacement of the Civil Service Act raises concerns over the effectiveness of the integrity system for civil servants, including their independence and impartiality in the management of public funds⁷⁵.

Technical work continues on assessing the rules on asset declarations and revolving doors. A planned study on revolving doors under the 2025-2026 action plan of the Anti-Corruption Strategy⁷⁶ is expected to be launched by the Ministry of Justice in 2026. The lack of broader rules on revolving doors for all categories of high-level officials has been flagged as a gap in the legal framework⁷⁷. A political decision on possible revisions to the asset

recommendation was considered fulfilled on the basis of the adoption of these legislative revisions. In 2025, following the ruling of the Constitutional Court, the recommendation was re-introduced.

⁶⁶ Czech Government (2026), written input, p. 5.

⁶⁷ As also indicated by civil society. Country visit Czechia, Transparency International/Lobbio.

⁶⁸ Parliamentary Bill No. 221.

⁶⁹ *ibidem*.

⁷⁰ Czech Government (2026c).

⁷¹ The debate was conducted widely, primarily through the media. See for example Seznam Zpravy (2026) and CT (2026). See also Glopolis (2026), written input, p. 17.

⁷² Czech Government (2026a).

⁷³ As the code is not created through binding legislation nor institutionally anchored, it has been considered by civil society to be a political initiative. Country visit Czechia, Transparency International/Lobbio. See also the statement of Transparency International in the media, Forum24 (2026).

⁷⁴ Country visit Czechia, Ministry of Interior and National Agency against Organised Crime (NCOZ). See also GRECO (2026a), recommendation xvii.

⁷⁵ See Pillars on the Other institutional issues related to checks and balances. Transparency International Czechia (2026a) and Trade Union of Authorities and Organizations (2026), written input.

⁷⁶ 2025 Rule of Law Report, Czechia, p. 9.

⁷⁷ Including for members of Parliament – see below. 2023 Rule of Law Report, Czechia, p. 14.

disclosure rule following a 2024 study⁷⁸ remains pending⁷⁹. As regards the verification of asset declarations, the Ministry of Justice established 779 failures to declare assets in 2025 (down from 1 277 cases reported in 2024 and 2 097 cases reported in 2023)⁸⁰. It conducted 42 in-depth verifications of declarations filled by public officials leading to 23 cases of administrative proceedings against public officials at municipal level⁸¹. Civil society continues to criticise the decentralised control of declarations, which risks - in their view - to result in uneven implementation of the legislation⁸².

The new law on lobbying entered into force in July 2025, and its implementation is on track. By the end of 2025, 555 lobbyists and 2 066 lobbied persons were registered in the transparency register⁸³. The first deadline to register declarations of lobbying was on 30 January 2026. The Ministry of Justice took steps to raise awareness among registered lobbyists on their reporting obligations in cases of erroneous or missing declarations⁸⁴. Both Government and stakeholders point to the importance of allocating sufficient resources in the relevant department in the Ministry of Justice to ensure effective implementation⁸⁵. The legislation remains broadly supported by stakeholders⁸⁶.

There was no progress to improve the integrity framework for the Parliament, particularly by complementing rules on revolving doors⁸⁷. Rules on revolving doors remain unchanged and a comprehensive framework is lacking in relation to gifts and benefits for members of Parliament⁸⁸. The Chamber of Deputies only has voluntary ethics rules for its members, while the Senate remains opposed to any such ethical rules⁸⁹. Therefore, no progress was made on the implementation of the recommendation.

New legislation on political party financing entered into force, while an expansion of the Supreme Audit Office's mandate is still being considered. New legislation on the financing of electoral campaigns came into effect on 1 January 2026⁹⁰. The law consolidates

⁷⁸ 2025 Rule of Law Report, Czechia, p. 9.

⁷⁹ Country visit Czechia, Ministry of Justice.

⁸⁰ 85 cases concerned failure to declare at the beginning of term, 620 involved annual declarations and 73 cases concerned the end of term declarations. Czech Government (2026), written input, p. 13.

⁸¹ *ibidem*.

⁸² Country visit Czechia, Transparency International/Lobbio. As control is generally carried out at the local level by small municipal offices where the relevant official has his main residence. See also 2025 Rule of Law Report, Czechia, p. 9.

⁸³ Czech Government (2026), written input, p. 11.

⁸⁴ Czech Government (2026), written input, p. 11 and Country visit Czechia, Ministry of Justice.

⁸⁵ Czech Government (2026), written input, p. 10 and Country visit Czechia, Transparency International/Lobbio and Ministry of Justice.

⁸⁶ Country visit Czechia, Glopolis/Transparency International/Lobbio and Business associations and Glopolis (2026), pp. 17-18. Conversely, a number of professional associations, including the Bar Association, have requested an amendment to the law to exempt them from registering as a lobbyist, due to perceived administrative burden concerns. Czech Bar Association (2026), written input, p. 21.

⁸⁷ The 2025 Rule of Law report recommended to Czechia to "Take further measures to strengthen the integrity framework for all members of Parliament, in particular by complementing the existing rules as regards revolving doors." No progress was previously assessed on this recommendation in 2025 and some progress in 2024.

⁸⁸ Czech Government (2026), written input, p. 3. See also 2025 Rule of Law report, Czechia, p. 10. The recommendations from GRECO to adopt a Code of Ethics in both chambers of Parliament likewise remain only partially fulfilled. GRECO (2023), recommendation ii, paras. 14-18 and GRECO (2026b), recommendation ii, paras 18-26 and GRECO (2026c), recommendation ii, paras 17-21.

⁸⁹ Country visit Czechia, Ministry of Justice and 2024 Rule of Law Report, Czechia, p. 15.

⁹⁰ Czech Government (2026), written input, pp. 11-12. See also 2025 Rule of Law report, Czechia, p. 10.

the existing framework on political party financing and introduces some changes, such as an extension on the ban on the use of public resources in electoral campaigns, clearer definitions, monitoring of financing, and tightening rules for accepting gifts and in-kind donations from legal entities⁹¹. A reform of the Supreme Audit Office (SAO)⁹² is included in the policy statement of the new Government⁹³. Debates on this draft reform, which requires amendment of the constitution, are ongoing in the Chamber of Deputies⁹⁴. As in previous attempts to reform the Office, it would seek to grant powers to the SAO to audit the Czech Radio and the Czech Television⁹⁵.

The whistleblower protection system continues to operate, but its effectiveness is questioned by stakeholders. Implementation and awareness-raising of the 2023 legislation on whistleblower protection by the Ministry of Justice continued⁹⁶. The Government reports that out of the 238 whistleblower reports received in 2025⁹⁷, employees of legal entities filed a total of 18 reports (6 in 2024), other citizens filed a total of 15 reports (13 in 2024) and there were 7 anonymous reports (the same as in 2024), with a link to corruption⁹⁸. The Government halted funding for a civil society-led anti-corruption programme which includes support for the Whistleblower Centre informing citizens of their rights⁹⁹. Overall, civil society assesses whistleblower protection as weak in practice, stating that potential whistleblowers do not come forward due to a lack of trust in the system¹⁰⁰.

Corruption risks in public procurement remain an important point of attention for the authorities. As regards public procurement, businesses' attitudes towards corruption in the EU show that 28% of companies in Czechia (EU average 30%) think that corruption has prevented them from winning a public tender or a public procurement contract in practice in the last three years¹⁰¹. 57% of businesses perceive the level of independence of the public procurement review body (The Office for the Protection of Competition) as very or fairly good, which has significantly increased in comparison with 2025 (43%)¹⁰². The Single Market and Competitiveness Scoreboard on access to public procurement in Czechia reports 41% of single bids for 2025 (EU average 27%)¹⁰³. Public procurement is seen as a main corruption risk area, including by law enforcement, particularly in cases of alleged collusion between a bidder and a contracting authority¹⁰⁴. The National Agency against Organised Crime (NCOZ) and the Office for the Protection of Competition work closely together to

⁹¹ Czech Government (2026), written input, pp. 11-12.

⁹² The law was broadly welcomed by stakeholders and was included in the Anti-Corruption Plan. See also 2025 Rule of Law report, Czechia, p. 10.

⁹³ Czech Government (2026), written input, p. 4.

⁹⁴ Supreme Audit Office (2026), written input.

⁹⁵ Supervision of local governments, which was also included in previously proposed amendments, would not be included. Supreme Audit Office (2026), written input.

⁹⁶ Czech Government (2026), written input, p. 13.

⁹⁷ For example: accepting bribes, bribery, manipulation in public procurement, public tenders, and public auction.

⁹⁸ Ministry of Interior and National Agency against Organised Crime (NCOZ) (2026).

⁹⁹ Transparency International Czechia (2026b).

¹⁰⁰ Glopolis (2026), written input, pp. 11-12 and Oziveni (2026), written input, pp. 2-3.

¹⁰¹ Flash Eurobarometer 582 on Businesses' attitudes towards corruption in the EU (2026). This is 2 percentage points below the EU average.

¹⁰² Figure 59, 2026 EU Justice Scoreboard.

¹⁰³ 2025 Single Market Scoreboard.

¹⁰⁴ Country visit Czechia, Ministry of Interior and National Agency against Organised Crime (NCOZ). See also 2025 Rule of Law report, Czechia, pp. 11-12.

address this issue¹⁰⁵. A proposed reform of the Office for the Protection of Competition was not approved by the previous Government, despite having been included in the Anti-Corruption action plan¹⁰⁶. This was criticised by civil society¹⁰⁷. The construction, health and defence sectors have also been flagged by stakeholders, including the NCOZ and the prosecution, as being at particular risk of corruption given the large amount of public funds at stake in those sectors, and they remain monitored by law enforcement¹⁰⁸.

III. MEDIA PLURALISM AND MEDIA FREEDOM

Draft legislation which would confer new powers on the media regulator and provide media companies with additional rights and responsibilities remains pending. The draft Law on Media Services remains pending. With a view to alignment with the European Media Freedom Act, the draft law aims to clarify the role of the media regulator when scrutinising market concentrations, give it a monitoring and oversight role to ensure that public bodies publish the amounts allocated for the purpose of state advertising, and expand the definition of media service providers to those providing online services. The Media Pluralism Monitor 2026 confirms its low-risk score in relation to the independence of the media regulator¹⁰⁹. In August 2025, the main media associations and public service media broadcasters adopted a self-regulatory Code of Conduct addressing editorial independence, transparency and professional standards, which was followed up with a ten-point Memorandum in January 2026¹¹⁰.

A draft law presented by the new Government which would abolish license fees for public service media has raised concerns. Last year's report noted that the 2025 amendments to the Act on Czech Television and the Act on Czech Radio and other related acts had positively reformed the financing system to ensure sustainability of public service media. On 15 June 2026, the new Government agreed on a draft law for the amendment of the Act on Czech TV and the Act on Czech Radio which would, if adopted, abolish licensing fees for public service media, leading to circa 15% less revenue overall as of 2027 compared to revenues for 2026. Concerns that these changes will seriously imperil the independence of public service media and capacity to carry out its tasks, have been voiced by stakeholders and prompted mass protests in the country from March to May 2026¹¹¹. The Media Pluralism Monitor (MPM) for Czechia considers that public service media has come under renewed political pressure, resulting in intensified efforts to influence editorial direction and personnel decisions, raising its risk level to medium-low¹¹². Alongside other aspects of the media market, industry stakeholders emphasise that diminishing advertising revenues, the lack of

¹⁰⁵ Country visit Czechia, Ministry of Interior and National Agency against Organised Crime (NCOZ) and Office for the Protection of Competition (2026) written input, p. 1.

¹⁰⁶ Oziveni (2026), written input, p. 1 and Office for the Protection of Competition (2026). See also 2025 Rule of Law report, Czechia, pp. 11-12.

¹⁰⁷ Transparency International Czechia (2026c) and Transparency International Czechia (2026d).

¹⁰⁸ Country visit Czechia, Office of the Prosecutor General, Union of Prosecutors, Office for the Protection of Competition (2026) and Transparency International Czechia (2026e).

¹⁰⁹ Media Pluralism Monitor (2026), pp. 15-16.

¹¹⁰ Country visit Czechia, Ministry for Culture and Council for Radio and Television Broadcasting, Council for Radio and Television Broadcasting (2026), written input, p. 1. The Memorandum seeks to replicate provisions of the European Media Freedom Act which can be implemented via self-regulation.

¹¹¹ European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF) (2026).

¹¹² Media Pluralism Monitor (2026), p. 27.

compensation for the use of media content published on online platforms, and the impact of Artificial Intelligence have become major challenges for the viability of media companies¹¹³.

Pending the adoption of draft legislation, significant challenges persist in relation to transparency of media ownership¹¹⁴. The draft Law on Media Services is expected to designate an authority responsible for the maintenance and monitoring of a media ownership transparency database. It also contains an exemption from limits to access to the beneficial owner database for journalistic and other legitimate purposes¹¹⁵. However, pending the enactment of this legislation, no fully functional transparency register has been formally established¹¹⁶. The MPM 2026 has increased its risk level from high-risk to very high risk for this area in the light of the fact that the Government has limited public online access to the register to authorities and selected professionals, while, pending the enactment of the draft law, all other individuals must demonstrate legitimate interest through court procedures,¹¹⁷. On this basis, no further progress has been made in relation to the recommendation.

Journalists continue to face serious verbal threats and harassment. Stakeholders continue to point to the prevalence of online harassment and threats against journalists as an ongoing phenomenon in the country¹¹⁸. The Safe Journalism Platform – which establishes a non-governmental online environment where journalists can report attacks and where they can access confidential consultation and legal assistance – was set up in September 2025¹¹⁹. A draft amendment to the Code of Criminal Procedure which would provide additional protection in terms of journalistic sources and confidential communications, remains pending. Stakeholders point to the use of strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) by politicians as an ongoing issue of concern¹²⁰. A draft law transposing the anti-SLAPP Directive which would cover both cross-border and domestic SLAPP cases is currently before Parliament. The MPM 2026 confirms its medium-low risk analysis for this area highlighting the fact that working conditions continue to be a concern and that the frequency of online attacks appears to be increasing¹²¹. The Council of Europe Platform to promote the protection of journalism and the safety of journalists received two new alerts since the publication of the last rule of law report, concerning the smearing of a journalist and the planned reforms to public service media mentioned above¹²². The Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR) mechanism flagged 27 alerts, the large majority of which concern cases of insults, delegitimization, threats of SLAPP cases by politicians or political ads targeting journalists¹²³.

¹¹³ Country visit Czechia, Czech Association of Public Broadcasters.

¹¹⁴ The 2025 Rule of Law Report recommended to Czechia to “[p]rogress with further reforms relating to transparency of information on media ownership.”. No progress was previously assessed on this recommendation in 2025, 2024, and some progress in 2023.

¹¹⁵ Such as by civil society organizations and non-governmental non-profit legal entities engaged in the prevention of, or the fight against, money laundering and related criminal activities. Czech Government (2026d).

¹¹⁶ Country visit Czechia, Council for Radio and Television Broadcasting, Czech Syndicate of Journalists, Lobbio and ECPMF.

¹¹⁷ Media Pluralism Monitor (2026), p. 18.

¹¹⁸ Czech Fund for Independent Journalism (2026), written input, p. 1.

¹¹⁹ Bezpečná žurnalistika (2026).

¹²⁰ Country visit Czechia, Czech Syndicate of Journalists and European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF).

¹²¹ Media Pluralism Monitor (2026), pp. 13-15.

¹²² Council of Europe, Platform to promote the protection of journalism and safety of journalists (2026).

¹²³ Media Freedom Rapid Response (2026).

IV. OTHER INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES RELATED TO CHECKS AND BALANCES

The electronic platform for drafting, commenting on and promulgating legislation is progressively becoming operational. The rollout of the eLegislation platform began in 2024 for international law instruments, since 2025 its use has been mandatory for drafting of implementing regulations, and since 2026 for new ordinary and constitutional laws, the Constitutional Court decisions, and the Senate legislation.¹²⁴ Deployment of the platform for amendments to ordinary and constitutional laws has been postponed until 2027, with an expected extension to 2029¹²⁵. Methodological materials for participation in the lawmaking process were adopted in 2025 and pilot testing was carried out¹²⁶. Stakeholders welcome the methodology¹²⁷ and underline that its actual impact will depend on its implementation by specific governmental bodies¹²⁸, while stressing the importance of tools for monitoring the compliance of draft laws with fundamental rights and international standards¹²⁹.

‘Legislative riders’ and other ways of limiting public consultation continue to impact the quality of the legislative process. The use of accelerated legislative procedures, often without justification, has become more frequent¹³⁰. At the same time the number of parliamentary proposals which circumvent public and stakeholder engagement, inter-departmental review and impact assessment, has increased as well¹³¹. According to the Government, the relatively high proportion of acts approved in fast-track procedures might have been linked to the end of the legislative term¹³². European standards stipulate that legislatures should avoid resorting to expedited adoption of legal acts on a regular basis and the legislative procedure needs to be transparent, inclusive and democratic, allowing for a meaningful public debate¹³³. Stakeholders raised concerns as regards the application of techniques circumventing public participation in cases of acts of significant importance¹³⁴. These include the draft law on State Employees which aims to remove civil service from public law and place it under a private-law regime, easing the conditions for dismissal of public employees, including independent regulatory bodies¹³⁵.

More than half of companies surveyed in Czechia express confidence in the effectiveness of investment protection. 64% of companies are very or fairly confident that investments are protected by law and courts, a figure which has slightly increased in comparison with 2025 (61%)¹³⁶. As regards authorities relevant for economic operators, 55% of companies perceive the level of independence of the national competition authority (The Office for the Protection of Competition) as very or fairly good, a figure which has significantly increased in

¹²⁴ Czech Government (2026), written input, p. 19.

¹²⁵ *ibidem*.

¹²⁶ Czech Government (2026), written input, p. 19.

¹²⁷ Glopolis (2026), written input, p. 16.

¹²⁸ Country visit Czechia, Office of the Government (civil society section) and Glopolis.

¹²⁹ Glopolis (2026), written input, p. 17.

¹³⁰ In 2025, out of 99 acts, 27 were adopted in a fast-track procedure.

¹³¹ In 2025, out of 99 acts, 14 were adopted based on the proposal of the members of Parliament.

¹³² Czech Government (2026), written input, p. 20.

¹³³ Venice Commission (2025), para. 34.

¹³⁴ ENNHRI, written input; Glopolis, written input, p. 16; STEM-Network for the Protection of Democracy, written input, p. 16; Country visit Czechia, *Změna k lepšímu*, Office of the Public Defender of Rights.

¹³⁵ Other examples comprise the Construction Act, Code of Administrative Justice, or Asylum Act.

¹³⁶ Figures 52 and 53, 2026 EU Justice Scoreboard. 26% and 23% of the surveyed investors respectively perceive concerns about quality, efficiency or independence of justice and frequent changes in legislation or concerns about the quality of the law-making process as a reason for the lack of confidence in investment protection.

comparison with 2025 (48%)¹³⁷. The Supreme Administrative Court has jurisdiction in several business-related cases, including in cases related to public procurement, public concessions, public contracts and economic regulation. A number of judicial mechanisms to improve efficiency are available in these cases, including the possibility to apply interim measures, joint examination of similar cases and the consolidation of multiple appeals¹³⁸.

Implementation of the amendments to the Ombudsman Act establishing a National Human Rights Institution is ongoing. Since July 2025, the Office of the Public Defender also comprises the mandate of the National Human Rights Institution (NHRI). In addition, the position of a Children's Ombudsperson was created and the process for the election of the Public Defender has been amended to include civil society representatives¹³⁹. Stakeholders welcome these changes¹⁴⁰. The Office of the Public Defender progresses with the adaptation to the new setup and the application for the GANHRI accreditation is envisaged for 2026¹⁴¹. At the same time, stakeholders highlighted uncertainty as regards the budget for the new institutional setup as more resources will be needed to cover the new competencies of the Office¹⁴².

On 1 January 2026, Czech Republic had 9 leading judgments of the European Court of Human Rights pending implementation, the same as the previous year¹⁴³. At that time, Czech Republic's rate of leading judgments from the past 10 years that had been implemented was at 62% (compared to 56% in 2025; 38% remained pending), and the average time that the judgments had been pending implementation was 2 years and 9 months (compared to 2 years and 8 months in 2025)¹⁴⁴. The oldest leading judgment, pending implementation for more than 18 years¹⁴⁵. As regards the respect of payment deadlines, on 31 December 2025 there were 2 cases in total awaiting confirmation of payments (compared to 1 in 2024)¹⁴⁶. By 17 June 2026, the number of leading judgments pending implementation had increased to 10¹⁴⁷.

While civic space remains favourable, civil society organisations reported funding cuts and a change in the narrative regarding their role. Civic space is considered by Civicus as 'open'¹⁴⁸. Stakeholders reported on a noticeable change of narrative as regards the role of the CSOs, including increased labelling of CSOs by Government representatives as "political

¹³⁷ Figure 60, 2026 EU Justice Scoreboard.

¹³⁸ Figures 66 and 67, 2026 EU Justice Scoreboard. The data presented reflects exclusively the mechanisms in place at the level of the highest administrative jurisdictions; the same or other mechanisms may be in place at lower instance administrative courts.

¹³⁹ In June 2026, the Parliament elected the new Public Defender. The Parliament's decision did not take into account the recommendation of the evaluating commission as regards the candidates for the Public Defender and the Children's ombudsperson issued in the beginning of 2026.

¹⁴⁰ STEM-Network for the Protection of Democracy, written input, p. 17.

¹⁴¹ Country visit Czechia, Office of the Public Defender of Rights.

¹⁴² Country visit Czechia, Office of the Government, Office of the Public Defender of Rights, Glopolis, STEM-Network for the Protection of Democracy.

¹⁴³ For an explanation of the supervision process, see the [website](#) of the Council of Europe.

¹⁴⁴ All figures calculated by the European Implementation Network (EIN) and based on the number of cases that are considered pending at the annual cut-off date of 1 January 2026. EIN (2026), written input, p. 3.

¹⁴⁵ Judgment of the ECtHR, 57325/00, *D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic*, pending implementation since 2007.

¹⁴⁶ Council of Europe (2026), p. 162.

¹⁴⁷ Data according to the online database of the Council of Europe (HUDOC).

¹⁴⁸ Rating given by Civicus, Czechia. Czechia's score is 87/100. Ratings are on a five-category scale defined as: open, narrowed, obstructed, repressed and closed.

agents”, which has according to them, impacted public trust in the CSOs sector¹⁴⁹. As per its Programme Statement, the Government is aiming at increasing the transparency of the CSO sector and introducing a register for all CSOs receiving public funds¹⁵⁰, which prompted concerns from stakeholders as regards unnecessary information disclosure, additional administrative burden and disproportionate sanctions in case of non-compliance¹⁵¹. Public funding for the CSO sector has been considerably reduced, with some domains of CSO action losing access to public funding altogether¹⁵².

¹⁴⁹ ENNHRI (2026), written input; Glopolis (2026), written input, p. 19; STEM-Network for the Protection of Democracy (2026), written input, p. 20, European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (2026), written input, p. 4

¹⁵⁰ Czech Government (2026b), written input, p. 4.

¹⁵¹ Transparency International and Glopolis (2026), additional written input.

¹⁵² This is the case for example for CSOs operating in the area of environment or foreign aid. Country visit Czechia, Office of the Government.

Annex I: List of sources in alphabetical order*

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Annex II: Country visit to Czechia

The Commission services held virtual meetings in March 2026 with:

- Administration of the Parliament (replies received in writing)
- Anti-Corruption Council of the Government
- Association of Small and Medium Enterprises
- Association of Private Broadcasters
- Constitutional Court
- Czech Bar Association
- Czech Syndicate of Journalists
- Council for Radio and Television Broadcasting
- Endowment for Independent Journalism (replies received in writing)
- European Centre for Press and Media Freedom
- League of Human Rights
- Lobbio
- Ministry of Culture
- Ministry of Interior
- Ministry of Justice
- National Agency against Organized Crime
- NeoN/Glopolis
- Network for the Protection of Democracy/STEM
- Office for the Protection of Competition (replies received in writing)
- Office for the Supervision of the Finances of Political Parties and Movements (replies received in writing)
- Office of the Government (civil society section)
- Office of the Prosecutor General
- Office of the Public Defender of Rights
- Supreme Administrative Court
- Supreme Audit Office (replies received in writing)
- Supreme Court
- Transparency International Czech Republic
- Union of Judges
- Union of Prosecutors
- Změna k lepšímu

* The Commission also met the following organisations in a number of horizontal meetings:

- Civil Liberties Union for Europe
- Civil Society Europe
- End FGM EU
- European Civic Forum
- European Partnership for Democracy
- Human Rights Watch
- ILGA-Europe

- International Federation for Human Rights
- Philea - Philanthropy Europe Association
- Transparency International EU