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Delegations will find attached document EEAS(2017) 1287 REV 7.

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**EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE**

European Union Military Staff

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<b>Title / Subject</b>	<b>EU Military Concept for Personnel Recovery</b>
<b>[Ref. prev. doc.]</b>	-

Delegations will find attached the EU Military Concept for Personnel Recovery, which was agreed by the EUMC on Wednesday 18 July 2018, by silence procedure.

**EU MILITARY CONCEPT FOR PERSONNEL RECOVERY**

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**REFERENCES**

- A. The Treaty on European Union.
- B. Headline Goal 2010 (6309/6/04 Rev 6, dated 4 May 2004).
- C. EU Concept for the Use of Force in EU-led Military Operations REV 2 (17168/2/09, dated 2 May 2011).
- D. EU Concept for Military Command and Control. REV 7 (5008/15, dated 5 January 2015).
- E. EU Framework Nation Concept (15494/15 dated 18 December 2015).
- F. EU Concept for Force Generation. REV 6 (14000/15, dated 11 November 2015).
- G. Suggestions for Crisis Management Procedures for CSDP crisis management operations. REV 2 (7660/2/13, dated 18 June 2013).
- H. EU Concept for EU-led Military Operations and Missions. REV 6 (17107/14, dated 19 December 2014).
- I. EU Concept for Military Intelligence Structures in EU Crisis Management and EU-led Military Operations/Missions, Rev. 2(16361/13, dated 18 November 2013).
- J. EUMC Glossary of Acronyms and Definitions, Revision 2017 (6460/18, dated 21 February 2018).
- K. Council Decision determining the planning and conduct arrangements for EU non-executive military CSDP missions (7592/17, dated 30 May 2017).

**A. INTRODUCTION**

- 1. The Treaty on the European Union established that the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) provides the Union with an operational capacity which may be used on tasks and activities outside the Union for peacekeeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security. The performance of these tasks is undertaken using capabilities provided by the Member States (MS). To support the MS to progressively improve their military capabilities, the European Defence Agency (EDA) identifies operational requirements and promotes measures to satisfy those requirements (Ref. A).
- 2. Depending on the nature of the crisis, EU-led military intervention in support of CSDP could have an executive mandate (operations, EUFOR-type) or a non-executive one (missions,

EUTM or EUMAM-type)<sup>1</sup>. Both executive CSDP operations and non-executive CSDP missions would be conducted in austere conditions, in an unstable security situation, with limited Host Nation support (HNS) and having extended lines of communications (LOC) or a combination thereof<sup>2</sup>. Either way, the isolation, capture and/or exploitation of EU personnel during their execution could have a significant negative impact on operations security, morale of personnel and public support. Moreover, the exploitation of an isolating event can have major impact at the political and military strategic levels. In order to mitigate the risks, the EU therefore requires a system to recover personnel, both military and civilian, in support of CSDP actions.

3. In June 2007 the EDA's Steering Board of Capability Directors decided that a Personnel Recovery (PR) conceptual framework should be developed. Consequently, participating Member States (pMS) agreed on 4 June 2009 to develop a Personnel Recovery (PR) Concept for CSDP operations. This has been the initiating step for this concept to be included as part of the integrated EU military concept development process.
4. As NATO carried out the revision of their PR doctrinal documents during 2016<sup>3</sup>, the EU Concept Development Implementation Programme 2016-2017 (7397/16, dated 29 March 2016) initiated the revision process of this Concept, accordingly. EDA's Project Team Personnel Recovery (PT PR) supported by the European Personnel Recovery Centre (EPRC) provided its expertise for the revision of this concept. This concept takes into account not only relevant and releasable documentation from NATO<sup>4</sup> and other organizations,<sup>5</sup> but also PR related projects such as the Multinational Capability Development Campaign (MCDC)/ Integrated Coalition Personnel Recovery Capability (ICPRC).
5. This revision supersedes the Concept for Personnel Recovery in support of the CSDP (ST 15408/11, dated 13 October 2011).

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<sup>1</sup> Reference H. Assumptions. Footnote 1: "Executive: the operations mandated to conduct actions in replacement of the host nation; non-executive: the operation is supporting the host nation with an advisory role only".

<sup>2</sup> Reference H. Assumptions.

<sup>3</sup> AJP 3.7 Allied Joint Doctrine for Recovery of Personnel in a Hostile Environment (Ed. A Version 1), as of February 2016.

<sup>4</sup> NATO approach in AJP 3.7 is focused only in recovery of personnel in hostile environment.

<sup>5</sup> European Personnel Recovery Centre (EPRC) and United States Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA).

**B. AIM**

6. This document provides a description of PR activities, fundamental principles for planning and conducting PR in EU CSDP military operations and defines PR in the EU environment, including guidelines for PR-related responsibilities at different levels of command.
7. Since MS may have differing PR policies, priorities and capabilities, this concept aims to facilitate unity of effort and enhance PR measures within EU CSDP military operations.
8. It also provides considerations in case of a PR event during the execution of a CSDP military mission (with a non-executive mandate).

**C. SCOPE**

9. This concept applies to both military and civilian EU personnel deployed in support of EU CSDP military executive operations and non-executive missions. Civilian personnel from other organisations or contractors are outside of the scope of this concept.

**D. DEFINITIONS**

10. In the interest of interoperability, it is recommended that for EU CSDP military operations the same definitions for PR are used as in NATO or other organisations, whenever possible.
11. Permissive Environment<sup>6</sup>. The term is normally used in case the force is called upon to operate in an area where there is no opposition to the EU-led force, be it when there is an explicit authorisation by the Host State or where there is de facto consent of all the parties.
12. Personnel Recovery (PR): The sum of diplomatic, military and civilian efforts to effect the recovery and reintegration of isolated personnel.
13. Isolated Personnel (ISOP): Military or civilian personnel who are separated from their unit or organisation resulting in a loss of positive and/or procedural control, that may require them to survive, evade, resist exploitation, and either have to make their way back to friendly control or require assistance to do so.

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<sup>6</sup> As per ref. J.

14. Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Extraction (SERE): A set of tactics, techniques, and procedures that is intended to give isolated personnel the skills to survive in any environment and to evade capture. Failing that, to resist exploitation by captors and, if the situation permits, escape captivity to finally support their own or assisted recovery and return with dignity.
15. Reintegration: The operational process of providing medical and psychological care to personnel recovered from isolation, and debriefing them for intelligence and lessons learned purposes.

## **E. PRINCIPLES**

16. The principles, tenets and guidance of this concept are in accordance with the Headline Goal 2010 (Ref. B).
17. The recovery of ISOP will be conducted within the limits of applicable national and international law. In particular, the relevant documents issued for each EU CSDP military operation, including the provisions governing the use of force and the rules of engagement, are to be observed (Ref. C).
18. Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations and Hostage Rescue Operations are not considered in this concept.
19. EU forces may conduct a wide variety of activities to include combat, support to humanitarian assistance, maintaining order and managing confrontation within the assigned Area of Operations (AOO). These activities must frequently be coordinated with other organisations. Regardless of the operational environment, EU forces should be trained and ready to respond to recovery missions across the operational spectrum. Commanders should be aware of the PR-related prerequisites prior to execution of any mission. Additionally, ISOP may encounter different levels of exploitation if captured and must be trained appropriately.
20. MS should identify personnel that could be assigned to a mission, duty or task where they could be at greater risk of isolation or exploitation if captured.
21. MS should ensure that personnel are trained and equipped in accordance with the operational requirements identified by the Force Commander (FCdr) of the EU CDSP military operation.



22. In any operational environment, intelligence adds substantially to the EU effort, especially when dealing with ISOP. Recovery forces are dependent on sufficient, timely and functioning intelligence support for their own safety and that of the ISOP. Consequently, an All-sources Analysis Intelligence Cell and HUMINT and SIGINT and IMINT capabilities should be part of the EU deployed forces and PR intelligence requirements need to be identified early in the operation.
23. PR is a system. It consists of the following three elements which interact in various ways according to the requirements of the situation:
- The commanders and staffs trained to integrate and synchronise PR planning and operations into all operational activities.
  - Recovery forces manned, trained and equipped to plan, exercise and execute PR missions. The nature of the required recovery force varies in line with the demands of the task.
  - The ISOP that may have different levels of training and equipment to be able to successfully endure an isolating event.

#### **F. PERSONNEL RECOVERY OPTIONS**

24. The EU or its MS may exercise diplomatic, military and civilian options, or a combination thereof, to recover ISOP; close coordination between military, diplomatic and civilian efforts is essential. The options are as follows:
- Diplomatic. The diplomatic option uses EU's own diplomatic means (EEAS or EU delegations) or MS' diplomatic channels to prepare for, support and possibly secure the recovery of ISOP. When appropriate, principles included in Ref. E. are to be considered.
  - Military. The military option includes the preparation, planning, and execution and adaptation of activities by commanders and staffs, recovery forces and ISOPs to report, locate, support, recover and reintegrate isolated personnel.
  - Civilian. Civilian efforts can include formal and non-formal interventions by intergovernmental organisations, non-governmental organisations, and influential private citizens. Because of their nature, civilian efforts could be conducted

independently by those organisations or individuals without the knowledge of the MS.

**G. RISK MANAGEMENT**

25. PR missions are subject to cost/benefit considerations and threat assessments in the same manner as any other military operation. Commanders at all levels must balance the value of retrieving isolated personnel against the potential costs. A thorough Threat Assessment is the foundation of an efficient Risk Assessment and Management. Therefore, all-Source Intelligence Collection (e.g. IMINT, SIGINT, HUMINT, ACINT, and GEOINT) processed by specialised staff together with an effective and efficient architecture<sup>7</sup> for timely and secure analysis enables that capacity. PR missions should therefore not:

- Unduly add risk to the ISOP or to the recovery forces.
- Preclude execution of higher priority missions.
- Allow the overall military or political situation to deteriorate.

26. The actual assessed level of risk should drive the capabilities and amount of assets to ensure mitigation of risk and economy of force.

The psychological impact of the effort on remaining personnel should be weighed against the risk to PR resources and the effect of diverting resources from the ongoing operations. Commanders at all levels should evaluate these factors when ordering or authorising a PR mission.

**H. PERSONNEL RECOVERY RESPONSIBILITIES**

27. Commanders and individuals at all levels are responsible, within their means and capabilities, for the recovery of their own personnel or themselves if they become isolated.

- Individual level. Individuals may be trained and equipped to facilitate or conduct their own recovery using one of two ways (Unassisted or Opportune) due to situations or environments that may preclude recovery forces to recover the ISOP:
  - (a) Unassisted recovery requires the ISOP to have at their disposal the capabilities enabling them to survive and independently evade capture back to friendly

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<sup>7</sup> Including an organisation, procedures and CIS equipment capable to process, store, exchange and disseminate classified information with secure means.

control. Evasion aids may be issued to support the ISOP to successfully avoid capture.

(b) Opportune recovery represents an assisted recovery whereby an isolated person takes advantage of an opportunity to use the aid of other means that are not normally considered in friendly force planning, following either an inadvertent discovery or a deliberate decision to seek help.

- Unit level. Unit commanders are responsible for PR in their assigned AOO and should have plans for PR based on their own capabilities. Should those capabilities be insufficient, they should request assistance from their next higher level of command. Commanders should appoint a PR Officer who is responsible for executing PR related tasks and efforts within the unit and coordinate with other units and the higher echelons.
- Tactical level. The commanders at this level are responsible for PR in their assigned AOO and should have plans for PR based on their own capabilities. Should those capabilities be insufficient, the recovery should be promoted one step up the chain of command. Component/tactical commanders should set up a Personnel Recovery Coordination Cell (PRCC) which is responsible for executing PR related tasks and efforts at component level and for coordinating with other components and the higher echelons.
- Operational level. The FCdr has overall responsibility for PR in the assigned AOO. At this level, either the setting of a Joint Personnel Recovery Centre (JPRC) or the designation of a component commander's PRCC acting as the JPRC, may be required.
- Military Strategic Level. The OpCdr exercises operational command or operational control over assigned forces and is responsible for the development of the CONOPS and the OPLAN<sup>8</sup>; pertinent content on PR should be included in both planning documents.


28. Reintegration of isolated personnel is a national responsibility and should be conducted by national representatives. However, Member States can request other nations or organizations to assist them with the reintegration process.

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<sup>8</sup> Ref. D.

**I. COMMAND AND CONTROL**

29. Rules and principles established in the EU Concept for Military Command and Control (Ref. D), supported by the Military Intelligence Structures (Ref. I), apply.
30. Transfer of Authority (TOA) for command and/or control of force elements from the national authorities to the military Operation Commander (OpCdr) is a key aspect of all operations (Ref. D). Ideally the forces for an operation should be committed without caveats. Nevertheless, MS are ultimately responsible for the conditions, including the PR related issues, in which their forces are made available to the EU.
31. The FCdr has overall responsibility for PR in the assigned AOO. A JPRC will usually be formed at the FHQ level to plan, conduct, coordinate and de-conflict all joint PR missions. The JPRC should also coordinate and de-conflict PR missions with other forces and organisations. In accordance with the relevant TOA, the FCdr exercises Operational Control (OPCON) over assigned PR forces; however, certain national PR forces will be made available under Tactical Control (TACON) only.
32. PR Officers are to liaise with other HQs/ units to discuss PR operations and improve common understanding of the PR network, including unit-level PR capabilities and potential caveats for the execution of PR missions.
33. The following diagram provides a notional command and control architecture for PR. Straight lines delineate command relationships and dotted lines delineate coordination authority. This diagram suggests a simple structure on how the FCdr can command and control PR in the assigned AOO. He may either establish his own JPRC or designate a subordinate PRCC as JPRC.



**Diagram 1.** Notional Command and Control Architecture for PR in executive CSDP military operations

## J. PERSONNEL RECOVERY METHODS

34. Different methods exist to conduct PR, which may carry varying names and use different Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs), depending on the MS or the service(s) conducting the operation. Recovery methods are related to factors such as, but not limited to, risk, complexity of operation, scale, environment, training/equipment level of the ISOP and availability/capability of PR assets.
35. The following terms<sup>9</sup> establish a broad understanding as to how different PR methods might be defined. Methods depicted hereby do not preclude other methods of recovery for ISOP.
36. Search and Rescue (SAR) is the recovery, by civilian or military means, of persons in distress in an environment where hostile interference is not expected. SAR is a national responsibility and is not applicable to this concept. According to International Organisations Agreements (ICAO, IMO, etc.), SRR area should as far as practicable be coincident with FIR.
37. Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) is the detection, location, identification and rescue of downed aircrew in hostile territory in time of crisis or war and, when appropriate, isolated

<sup>9</sup> Some Member States use different definitions for national purposes.

military personnel in distress, who are trained and equipped to receive combat search and rescue support.

38. Combat Recovery (CR) is the recovery of ISOP from a situation where hostile interference may be expected and either the recovery force, or the ISOP, or both, have not been trained or equipped in CSAR TTP.
39. Non-conventional Assisted Recovery (NAR) is the recovery of ISOP by surrogate/local forces led by special operations forces (SOF) and/or other government agencies, using pre-established indigenous networks.

## K. PERSONNEL RECOVERY PHASES

40. PR is conducted in four phases<sup>10</sup>:

- 1) Preparation. In PR, a key to success is the proper organisation, training, equipment, and employment of the involved forces to gain and maintain the ability to process relevant information and to take appropriate action.
- 2) Planning. Commanders and staffs must consider all available PR options and capabilities to successfully plan PR missions within their areas of operations. Options to recover ISOP include diplomatic, military or civilian options, or a combination thereof.
- 3) Execution. This phase is centred on the five PR execution tasks: report, locate, support, recover, and reintegrate.
- 4) Adaptation. Adaptation results from the continuous analysis of all aspects related to PR during preparation, planning and execution leading to improvements of and changes to the PR system when and where needed.

### K.1 PREPARATION

41. Education & Training


- Although, in principle, all personnel deployed in a EU CSDP military operation are at risk of getting isolated, some are at a higher level of risk than others. Depending on their risk of isolation and exploitation (low, medium, high), and of the severity of the

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<sup>10</sup> These four phases should not be confused with the phases during the execution of a PR mission.

consequences if isolated/exploited, personnel may be trained at any of the following SERE training levels:

- (a) Basic training (SERE Level A) comprises theoretical training in survival, evasion, recovery and Conduct After Capture (CAC) and is usually associated with Low Risk of Isolation and/or Exploitation (LRIE) and less severe exploitation consequences if captured.
- (b) Intermediate training (SERE Level B) comprises theoretical and in addition some practical training in survival, evasion, recovery and CAC, and is usually associated with Medium Risk of Isolation and/or Exploitation (MRIE) and more severe exploitation consequences if captured.
- (c) Advanced training (SERE Level C) comprises theoretical and additional extensive practical training in survival, evasion, recovery and CAC and is usually associated with High Risk of Isolation and/or Exploitation (HRIE) or when the consequences of exploitation are considered severe in case of capture.



**Diagram 2.** Required SERE training related to the anticipated risk of isolation/exploitation and operational consequences of exploitation

- Personnel should receive the appropriate level of training prior entering the Joint Operations Area JOA; SERE training should be a substantial part of this training.

- MS are responsible for PR education and training.
  - The level of training each individual has received is to be recorded on their Isolated Personnel Reports (ISOPREPs).
  - PR training should be included within exercises at component and combined joint level, PR incidents should be integrated into all exercise scenarios, and key personnel should be formally educated and trained.
  - Recovery forces should conduct both pre-deployment and in-theatre training, in accordance with their anticipated employment for PR missions.
  - Potential ISOP should conduct both pre-deployment and in-theatre training, in accordance with their required training level.
  - The FCdr, following consultation with contributing MS, may define PR levels of training and PR equipment as part of theatre entry requirements for all deployed personnel.
42. Equipment. The capability to recover and being recovered is enhanced by providing commanders and staffs, recovery forces and the potential ISOP with adequate PR equipment and products (some of which may be theatre or environment-specific).
43. Review of documents and PR guidance. Applicable PR guidance and documentation should be ready prior to any deployment as well as individual documentation like Evasion Plans of Action (EPAs) and ISOPREPs for designated personnel.

## **K.2 PLANNING**

44. PR must be part of the planning process for EU CSDP military operations. During the planning process, commanders continually assess operational PR requirements against the force PR capabilities. Assets that are capable of conducting PR should be integrated within the force and fully operational before the operations start.
45. The FCdr cannot control or, in many cases, influence the non-military options, but should ensure that all military efforts are coordinated, to the maximum extent possible, with any diplomatic and civilian options being planned.
46. Planning considerations for PR usually include, but are not limited to the following: environment, threat, ISOP number, status and training level, distances, recovery forces availability and capabilities, command and control structure, communications capabilities,



rules of engagement, and time constraints.

47. Details of the PR plan are to be specified in the FCdr's Operation Plan (OPLAN).
48. Prior to deployment to each mission, the applicable PR guidance should be reviewed, and the required documents to facilitate PR missions should be completed or reviewed.

### **K.3 EXECUTION**

49. Personnel Recovery Tasks: PR execution focuses on five tasks and supporting activities that must be accomplished once an isolating event has occurred<sup>11</sup>: report, locate, support, recover and reintegrate. The ability to complete the five PR execution tasks does not reside within a single entity, but instead resides among command and staff elements, forces, and ISOP.
  - a. Report. The report task consists of actions required to provide notification that personnel are or may have become isolated. The report task begins with the recognition of an isolating event and is a continuous task, which ends when the appropriate command and control authorities are informed that the ISOP is recovered.
  - b. Locate. The locate task involves the effort taken to determine the precise location and confirm the identity ("authentication") of ISOP. It starts upon recognition of an isolating event and continues until the isolated person is recovered. An accurate location and positive authentication are normally required prior to committing recovery forces in order to mitigate the risk.
  - c. Support. The Support task involves providing support to both the isolated person and to the isolated person's next-of-kin. Support efforts include establishing communications, increasing the isolated person's situational awareness, providing morale-building support, suppressing adversary threats, delivering subsistence and supplies, or providing directions to a cache. Providing the next-of-kin with psychological support and guidelines on how to handle media is a vital part of the efforts to support the ISOP.
  - d. Recover. The recover task involves the coordinated actions and efforts of commanders and staffs, forces, and ISOP to bring ISOP into the physical custody of a friendly organisation. The force designated to perform the recover task may range from a single entity to a complex task force, and may be dedicated or not.

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<sup>11</sup> In the execution of recovery of isolated personnel by other organization/ Host Nation, differences in these tasks can be expected.

- e. Reintegrate. The reintegrate task involves the use of systematic and controlled methods to process recovered ISOPs from the time they are recovered until they are fully reintegrated with their unit, their family, and society. The goal of the reintegrate task is to gather critical information from recovered ISOP, and among others to feed the process of lessons learned, while protecting their health and welfare and to allow them to return to duty as expeditiously as possible, physically and emotionally fit.
- f. For the PR execution tasks, different alert postures and response options may be used:
- Immediate. The PR tasks may be conducted by accompanying, on-scene or other assets that can be quickly launched or diverted.
  - Alert. PR execution tasks may commence from a dedicated ground or airborne alert posture.
  - Deliberate. This recovery response requires knowledge of the location of the ISOP. However, it could happen that previous options may not be possible due to environmental, political, or threat conditions. Deliberately planned missions give the PR forces the flexibility to utilise all necessary / available assets to conduct the recovery efforts.
  - Hold. A PR mission placed on “hold” status typically reflects a lack of confidence in the accuracy of, or amount of, data collected, and/or the outcome of the decision-making process does not meet the criteria to execute the mission.

#### K.4 ADAPTATION

50. PR specialists should be constantly aware of how to make PR better, safer, and more efficient. Not all implemented corrective actions will work in all situations, but recognizing a need when it occurs and passing along that observation, will improve overall PR performance. All information collected from a PR event should be forwarded to JPRC for dissemination/sharing, further assessment and analysis, and archiving.
51. Adaptation consists of:
- Analysing the information collected during operations or training events; through after action reports, mission logs, debriefings, oral interviews, reintegration of the recovered person, or observation reports. This form of adaptation with continuous analysis will collect, assess and implement the best practices and actions.

- Anticipating future actions and conduct the adequate preparation and planning to mitigate any risk to an operation.
- Improvising and taking immediate non-planned actions to react to unforeseen situation.

52. Adaptation contributes to:

- Continuously improving all other phases of the PR System
- Adjusting concepts, doctrine, organization, materiel, training, etc. to respond to a situation which has not been anticipated during the PR planning.

53. PR after action reports need to be completed and forwarded to the JPRC /PRCC as soon as practical in order for key lessons to be identified and forwarded to other PR units in the JOA. The JPRC / PRCC should forward the PR after action report to a higher level ensuring it to feed the LI / LL system / process.

54. As the non-specialised units may not be aware of PR information of interest, the JPRC-PRCC should educate their respective operation centres to forward any collected information from the unit reports and relevant to PR adaptation.

## **L. PR FOR NON-EXECUTIVE CSDP MILITARY MISSIONS**

### General

55. In non-executive CSDP military missions in support of the Host Nation, the military activities are limited to training (EUTM) and advisory roles (EUMAM). By principle, the HN is responsible to recover isolated personnel for both roles, in any situation, unless agreed otherwise with the HN. Should the PR capability provided by the HN be assessed insufficient either by the HN itself or by the MFCdr deployed in theatre, a clear delineation regarding the roles and responsibilities of affected Member States and the EU Chain of Command needs to be in place in order to ensure the PR capabilities in the specific missions as well as the recovery of ISOP.
56. In this case, where EU deployments may occur with austere conditions, limited support from the HN and the existence of long LOCs, the HN ability to manage a deteriorating security situation could not be ensured in all its territory; a degradation of the security situation in

some areas cannot therefore be ruled out; consequently, the EU personnel deployed could become isolated or captured at a certain moment, and this event could be exploited by the opposing forces.

57. The non-executive nature of the mandate under which CSDP military missions operate is neither related to the permissive environment expected in theatre, nor to the risk to their forces. To minimise the possibility of isolating event to the deployed forces, the Mission Force Commander will decide the mitigation procedures to be put in place.
58. Appropriate PR-specific ROE and Rules for the Use of Force (RUoF) will be designed as part of the mission planning and implemented to cater for PR events.

#### Command and Control

59. Appropriate C2 structures for PR must be created at every level, if required. Those will be detailed in the Mission PLAN (MPLAN).
60. At the Military Operational level (and Tactical level if appropriate) of command, an EU Mission Force Commander (MFCdr) is appointed. The responsibilities of the MFCdr regarding PR are to be included in the approved MPLAN and have to include the coordination and liaison with the Host Nation and the relevant MS. In theatre, a Mission Force Headquarters (MFHQ) shall assist the MFCdr<sup>12</sup>. The MFHQ will plan (and potentially conduct) PR events within means and capabilities.
61. The Director of the MPCC will be responsible for the planning and conduct of the non-executive CSDP military missions at the Military Strategic level. As such, he/she might have liaison, coordination and oversight responsibilities of PR events. In particular the Dir MPCC is the POC at strategic level to facilitate arrangements with MS for PR support which goes beyond the means and capabilities of the Mission Force Commander.

#### Planning and execution

62. Although the planning and execution of PR tasks remain in principle under MS responsibility, the Mission Force Commander has the responsibility to plan, coordinate and liaise for PR events. Previous coordination with the EU C2 structures in the field and the HN is necessary.

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<sup>12</sup> As per COUNCIL DECISION determining the planning and conduct arrangements for EU non-executive military CSDP missions and amending Decisions 2010/96/CFSP on a European Union military mission to contribute to the training of Somali security forces, 2013/34/CFSP on a European Union military mission to contribute to the training of the Malian armed forces (EUTM Mali) and (CFSP) 2016/610 on a European Union CSDP military training mission in the Central African Republic (EUTM RCA). ST 7592/17, dated 30 May 2017.

This does not preclude the need, for the commanders of those EU C2 structures, to produce relevant PR procedures.

63. The MCdr's Mission Plan (MPLAN) will include guidelines to follow in case of a PR event.
64. During the early stages of the Mission planning process, the possibility of planning and execution of PR tasks by MS beyond the execution by the Mission must be appropriately addressed in the Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA), in order to allow the execution of those tasks within this environment.
65. Liaison and integration of Host Nation PR capabilities during planning –using the aforementioned Diplomatic, Civilian and/or Military options- could be required previous to execute the recovery of ISOP.

#### Training

66. Requirements for deployment to EU CSDP non-executive military missions should include adequate PR training to maximise the awareness of a possible isolating event and to minimise the impact of exploitation in case of capture.
67. Basic SERE Level A training should be part of the pre deployment requirements of EU personnel to be deployed in support of the mission. MS and/or OpCdr could decide the extent of the personnel to be trained prior to deployment.

**M. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

ACINT	<b>A</b> Coustic <b>I</b> NTelligence
AOO	<b>A</b> rea <b>o</b> f <b>O</b> perations
CAC	<b>C</b> onduct <b>A</b> fter <b>C</b> apture
CR	<b>C</b> ombat <b>R</b> ecovery
CSAR	<b>C</b> ombat <b>S</b> earch and <b>R</b> escue
CSDP	<b>C</b> ommon <b>S</b> ecurity and <b>D</b> efence <b>P</b> olicy
EDA	<b>E</b> uropean <b>D</b> efence <b>A</b> gency
EPA	<b>E</b> vasion <b>P</b> lan of <b>A</b> ction
EPRC	<b>E</b> uropean <b>P</b> ersonnel <b>R</b> ecovery <b>C</b> entre
EUMAM	<b>E</b> U <b>M</b> ilitary <b>A</b> dvisory <b>M</b> ission
EUMC	<b>E</b> uropean <b>U</b> nion <b>M</b> ilitary <b>C</b> ommittee
EUTM	<b>E</b> U <b>T</b> raining <b>M</b> ission
FCdr	<b>F</b> orce <b>C</b> ommander
FHQ:	<b>F</b> orce <b>H</b> eadquarters
FN	<b>F</b> ramework <b>N</b> ation
GEOINT	<b>G</b> E <b>O</b> spatial <b>I</b> NTelligence
HN	<b>H</b> ost <b>N</b> ation
HRIE	<b>H</b> igh <b>R</b> isk of <b>I</b> solation and/or <b>E</b> xploitation
HUMINT	<b>H</b> U <b>M</b> an <b>I</b> NTelligence
IMINT	<b>I</b> magery <b>I</b> NTelligence
ISOP	<b>I</b> solated <b>P</b> ersonnel
ISOPREP	<b>I</b> solated <b>P</b> ersonnel <b>R</b> eport
JOA	<b>J</b> oint <b>O</b> perations <b>A</b> rea
JPRA	<b>J</b> oint <b>P</b> ersonnel <b>R</b> ecovery <b>A</b> gency
JPRC	<b>J</b> oint <b>P</b> ersonnel <b>R</b> ecovery <b>C</b> entre
LN	<b>L</b> ead <b>N</b> ation
LOC	<b>L</b> ines <b>O</b> f <b>C</b> ommunication
LRIE	<b>L</b> ow <b>R</b> isk of <b>I</b> solation and/or <b>E</b> xploitation
MFCdr	<b>M</b> ission <b>F</b> orce <b>C</b> ommander
MPCC	<b>M</b> ilitary <b>P</b> lanning and <b>C</b> onduct <b>C</b> apability
MPLAN	<b>M</b> ission <b>P</b> lan

**PUBLIC**

MRIE	<b>M</b> edium <b>R</b> isk of Isolation and/or <b>E</b> xploitation
MS	<b>M</b> ember States
NAR	<b>N</b> on- <b>C</b> onventional <b>A</b> ssisted <b>R</b> ecovery
OpCdr	<b>O</b> peration <b>C</b> ommander
OPCON	<b>O</b> perational <b>C</b> ontrol
PR	<b>P</b> ersonnel <b>R</b> ecovery
PRCC	<b>P</b> ersonnel <b>R</b> ecovery <b>C</b> oordination <b>C</b> ell
ROE	<b>R</b> ules <b>O</b> f <b>E</b> ngagement
RUoF	<b>R</b> ules for the <b>U</b> se of <b>F</b> orce
SAR	<b>S</b> earch <b>A</b> nd <b>R</b> escue
SERE	<b>S</b> urvival, <b>E</b> vasion, <b>R</b> esistance and <b>E</b> xtraction
SIGINT	<b>S</b> IGnals <b>I</b> NTelligence
SOMA	<b>S</b> tatus <b>O</b> f <b>M</b> ission <b>A</b> greement
TOA	<b>T</b> ransfer of <b>A</b> uthority
TTP	<b>T</b> actics, <b>T</b> echniques and <b>P</b> rocedures

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