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from : Former German Presidency
to : Finnish Presidency

– Article 36 Committee/EU/Iceland and Norway Mixed Committee
– Strategic Committee on Immigration, Frontiers and Asylum/EU/Iceland and Norway Mixed Committee

Subject : 1998 Annual Report on the implementation of the Schengen Convention

1. INTRODUCTION

The Schengen Convention, which has been brought into force in Belgium, Germany, France, Italy Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal and Spain but hitherto only partially in Greece, again proved its worth in 1998.

With the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam and the integration of Schengen into the European Union, the Schengen message, now that the Schengen regulatory framework has been applied for several years, is as follows: the abolition of internal border checks to permit the free movement of persons in Europe is justified provided it is accompanied by efficient compensatory measures to safeguard security. Many millions of people have crossed the open borders freely without any apparent adverse effects on internal security in the Schengen area.

By helping to achieve unrestricted freedom of movement for persons while at the same time ensuring their protection from cross-border crime, and in contributing decisively to the fact that Europe is also perceived as a security community, Schengen cooperation has performed an historic service.

Examples that provide concrete evidence of the Schengen success story are the measures taken to perfect external border security, the optimal use made of the Schengen Information System with its 40 000-plus search terminals, the collective enforcement of the common visa arrangements, the high degree of police cooperation and the determined action taken to combat illegal immigration networks and improve mutual judicial assistance.

However, the Schengen achievements are not yet complete and need to be refined and updated. Nevertheless, the Schengen instruments pave the way and provide a basis for further developments within the European Union, where they will help to inaugurate a new policy era in matters relating to freedom of movement and security. The opportunity is there – it must now firmly be seized.

2. ABOLITION OF INTERNAL BORDER CHECKS

Internal border checks have been abolished in nine of the ten Contracting States in which the Schengen Convention has already been brought into force. However, in **Greece**, where the Convention was initially brought into force in part in December 1997, this was not the case during the reporting period: maritime and air traffic between Greece and the other Schengen States are still subject to border police checks. In accordance with a report by the Ad Hoc Committee which visited Greece in the autumn of 1998, the Executive Committee decided in 16 December 1998 that, given the circumstances, it did not appear possible at this stage to bring the Convention fully into force for Greece. The aim was to take a decision by the end of 1999, if possible.

France continues to invoke the derogation provided for in Article 2(2) of the Schengen Convention at its borders with Belgium and Luxembourg, on the grounds that Dutch drugs policy jeopardises its ability to guarantee its internal security. Both Belgium and Luxembourg remain concerned at the retention of checks at their land borders with France.

3. EFFECTIVENESS OF CHECKS ON PERSONS AT THE INTERNAL BORDERS

On 16 September 1998 the Executive Committee gave instructions for a **plan on the coordinated deployment of document advisers at airports and seaports and at consular representations in third countries** to be drafted, together with a list, to be updated as necessary, of those locations to which, depending on an assessment of the situation, document advisers could be seconded. The Executive Committee approved the plan at the meeting on 16 December 1998. Concrete steps to second officials commenced in 1999.

The Executive Committee also gave instructions, likewise on 16 September 1998, for a **plan on the reciprocal secondment of liaison officers to advise and assist with the performance of security and control tasks at the external borders** to be drawn up. However, it did not prove possible to finalise the plan in the year under review.

A separate report on the situation at the External Borders is being drafted. It will be submitted to the Mixed Committee at ministerial level.

4. OPERATION OF THE SCHENGEN INFORMATION SYSTEM

The operation and use of the Schengen Information System was judged to be positive in 1998. The system's technical stability and its availability remained at a very high level. In the year under review, the number of hits clearly demonstrated once again the efficiency of the SIS in the context of international cooperation to safeguard internal security and combat cross-border crime. This underlines the importance of the SIS as one of the principal measures taken to compensate for the abolition of internal border checks in the Schengen area.

The participation of Italy, Austria and Greece in the operation of the SIS since the end of 1997 led to a marked rise in **SIS alerts** on identity documents being recorded in 1998. A perceptible increase in the number of alerts is evident in other alert categories. Only in the case of alerts issued under Articles 98 and 99 of the Schengen Convention was there a downward trend. All in all, the number of alerts rose from 5,59 million at the end of 1997 to 8,69 million by the end of 1998.

Furthermore, an equally high number of hits was recorded in the Schengen area. Despite the fact that specific features of the methods used by individual Schengen States for counting hits differ, there has been a clear increase overall in **the number of hits** recorded (see Annex). This can be unreservedly regarded as a success. A comparison of the number of hits with the number of alerts shows that the efficiency of the SIS in connection with Article 95 of the Schengen Convention (arrest for the purpose of extradition) is particularly high.

However, a detailed **analysis of the entries in the SIS** reveals that, as regards use of the system, there is still reserve capacity in specific search categories. The Schengen States must therefore not relax their efforts to improve the situation with regard to the issue of alerts. One of the instruments for achieving this objective is the Grotius Project, which started in 1998 and which is intended to help effect an increase in the number of alerts issued in connection with Article 95 of the Schengen Convention.

The year under review saw the start of the **SIS 1+ project**, which comprises a new hardware and software platform for resolving the year 2000 problem, alleviating the maintenance situation and extending the system to create the preconditions for the Nordic States to participate in the SIS. Initial difficulties led to the project falling behind schedule, although the delay did not prove critical, and the project has now stabilised. In the meantime, the Nordic States strengthened their efforts to create the preconditions for participating in the SIS. Work in connection with the study of the architecture for **SIS II** was completed. The results of the study are being analysed in 1999.

As regards Sirene and Vision traffic, the **Sirene Phase II network** is proceeding satisfactorily. To improve the quality and speed with which fingerprint sheets and photographs are exchanged in the future, the Sirene Image Transfer Project (SIRPIT) has been launched. In the framework of the DES project, a start has been made on converting the database alignment by exchanging data files between the C.SIS and the N.SIS via the Sirene Phase II network (besides the possibility of exchange via encrypted data carriers). In view of the plan to switch SIS traffic to the Sirene Phase II network, a study of methods for improving the monitoring of this network was initiated.

Finally, the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam on 1 May 1999 has influenced SIS activities. Experts from the SIS Steering Committee participated in EU fora to discuss arrangements for the **transfer of the SIS to the European Union**.

5. MOVEMENT OF PERSONS

The free movement of persons is another area that merits a positive appraisal. On the basis of the rules contained in the Schengen Convention regarding measures to facilitate travel that are applicable to holders of Schengen visas or residence permits, it is a principle that can be described as working very well indeed.

Considerable progress was achieved in **harmonisation of the common visa policy**. Article 9 of the Schengen Convention obliges the Schengen States to make continued efforts at harmonisation. This applies to

- rules on countries whose nationals are required to hold a visa
- the use of uniform visa stamps, and
- the uniform implementation of the Common Consular Instructions (administrative rules on the application procedure, and on examining and deciding on applications and issuing the common Schengen visa).

On 16 December 1998 the Executive Committee continued the **procedure for taking decisions on the abolition of the Grey List** that had commenced in Vienna in 1997. Only one State now remains on the List. Of paramount political significance in this respect is the decision to **abolish the visa requirement for the Baltic States**. After the security shortcomings in these three States had been analysed, steps to remedy the situation taken and readmission agreements concluded, the way was clear politically to exempt nationals of the three States from the visa requirement. The Schengen States linked the decision to exempt Baltic State nationals from the visa requirement with a request to these States that they accede to the Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons of 28 September 1954. Accession to this Convention signifies that stateless persons are to be provided with a recognised travel document. Once the Schengen States are willing to waive the visa requirement for stateless persons as well (a decision requiring a separate agreement), possession of such a document will become a pre-requisite for visa-free entry into the Schengen area.

Of far-reaching importance is the Executive Committee's decision of 16 December 1998 on the **Revision of the Common Consular Instructions and their Annexes**. The experience gained in recent years and, in particular, the reflections distilled from visits paid by the Schengen States to selected consular representations, are all elements that entered into this decision. Visits were paid to Schengen State representations in Moscow, Istanbul, Karachi, Beirut and Bucharest.

The general conclusion was that the Common Consular Instructions are applied with great scrupulousness and that, basically, cooperation between the Schengen representations is working. However, there are possibilities for improving cooperation further. These relate in particular to the further harmonisation of procedures for examining and deciding on visa applications (and the documents that need to be submitted with an application). Measures such as joint training programmes that included "counter staff" and improved coordination of information policy were proposed. In general, more effective action is to be taken to combat the trend known as "visa shopping" step by step. The revision of the Common Consular Instructions – the last decision on updating was taken by the Executive Committee on 28 April 1998 – should provide a modern set of rules for issuing community visas. The Common Consular Instructions embody the comprehensive, detailed arrangements for issuing Schengen visas.

In 1998 it proved possible to finalise the intensive work carried out by the Schengen States over many years to produce a **handbook of documents to which a visa may be affixed**. Part I of the Handbook, based on work that spanned several years, was completed. This meant compiling and examining all passports issued throughout the world to which a visa may be affixed and putting them together as a collection of documents. Work on the other parts – Part II (Schengen State aliens passports to which a visa may be affixed), Part III (List of travel documents issued by international organisations) and Part V (Information concerning known fictitious passports) swiftly commenced and was finalised on 28 April 1999 by a Decision of the Executive Committee. At the same time, the first amended version of Part I (Passports to which a visa may be affixed) was submitted to the Executive Committee.

Work on compiling a documentary record which contains copies of the original passports and includes a description of security features and information on how to screen the documents, will commence once work now underway in the European Union is complete and will be inserted into the Handbook in due course.

A breakthrough was also achieved in connection with the harmonisation of **Airport Transit Visa** requirements. Following on from the results attained in Vienna in December 1997, the decision to harmonise the exceptions to the Airport Transit Visa requirements was drafted. This will simplify matters both for the officials responsible for conducting checks at the border and for travellers since it standardises and clarifies transit visa requirements.

The Schengen rules and regulations provide a solid basis for practical cooperation in cases of readmission. In its declaration of 16 December 1998, the Executive Committee again highlighted the particular importance of **readmitting third country nationals** who do not fulfil the conditions for entering or staying in the territory of the Schengen States. These third country nationals must in principle be readmitted to their country of origin or, if this is not possible, to a state outside the Schengen area.

The formulation of practical rules for the voluntary departure of third country nationals who are required to leave a Schengen State and the Schengen area by transiting the territories of other Contracting Parties is another objective. Among the measures conceived in this context is the proposal for drafting a border crossing certificate for use by Schengen States, if they so desire, as **proof of the voluntary departure of third country nationals**. This proposal has been approved by the Central Group.

In view of the Treaty of Amsterdam's entry into force on 1 May 1999, it was decided to continue the discussions on a **readmission agreement between the Schengen States and a third country** in the competent EU fora.

In addition, the Schengen States have consistently pursued their policy of concluding **bilateral readmission agreements** with numerous countries of origin and transit countries. As before, however, a number of these countries present problems when it comes to readmitting their own and third country nationals. The Schengen States will have to adopt a coherent policy in the framework of the European Union, involving further measures against countries which are unwilling to cooperate.

6. MEASURES TO COMBAT DRUG TRAFFICKING

In 1998 Schengen cooperation again faced major challenges in the fight against drug-related crime. Drugs detected and their distribution in the Schengen States was again worryingly high. Cannabis remains the most common illegal substance on the market – and also the most commonly grown within the Schengen area. Heroin and cocaine are also widespread. At the same time, the market for heroin is declining in a number of Schengen States, while cocaine dealing is on the increase. The production, illegal trafficking and misuse of synthetic drugs continue to rise and will also be a priority in the fight against drug-related crime in the future.

The Balkan route also played a prominent role in 1998. The changes that have been observed in methods of transporting drugs, i.e. taking advantage of the increase in goods and passenger traffic with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe to carry smaller consignments from central warehouses in Eastern Europe, was analysed during the period under review.

Drug tourism as a regional problem in the Schengen States is a phenomenon that must be countered with stronger measures, in particular by using proven forms of cooperation, e.g. in the framework of the Hazeldonk Group and, in the future, in the context of regional route projects according to the relevant guidelines that have been worked out.

In 1998 a range of initiatives was devised to further improve cooperation between the Schengen States in the fight against drug-related crime. The **Project on Drug Routes**, which was planned in the second half of 1997 and prepared and implemented during the first six months of 1998, was a focal point. This was the first joint drug-related routes project conducted by the Schengen States. The operation had very positive consequences for the development of a common working method at national level between the various police forces and customs services and at regional and international level with regard to the amount of information exchanged. However, given the results of the project, it was thought that future projects ought preferably to be organised at regional level. Based on the results of the route project, guidelines have been developed for future joint monitoring operations conducted by the Schengen States in the drugs field. The guidelines were adopted by the Executive Committee on 16 December 1998.

Also during 1998, a **Manual on bogus drug deals** for operational use was drafted and information exchange about the activities of other international organisations was stepped up. The phenomenon of raves was investigated, and a regional approach to this problem was discussed.

In view of Schengen's integration into the European Union, the common standard thus far achieved in the fight against drugs has been extensively documented as the Schengen acquis. In order to step up the exchange of information on current legal developments in the drugs field, it was agreed that exchange should be conducted reciprocally on a continuous basis. In the particularly sensitive area of investigation using informers, the **General Principles governing the Payment of Informers were drawn up**. These guidelines should rule out the possibility of "informer tourism".

Another important topic was the determination of the **present standard of external border checks with regard to drugs**. Using a standard questionnaire, the Schengen partners gave a detailed account of the checks carried out at their external borders and the efforts made to improve these checks. The summary report on the situation at the external borders that is to be drafted on the basis of these contributions will also be of critical importance for the European Union, inter alia as a "snapshot" of the situation for use in drawing up an external border manual on drugs.

The work was on the whole directed towards implementing the relevant provisions of the Schengen Convention in an effort to improve measures to combat drug-related crime and, at the same time, take the harmonisation of legal practice and the legal situation with regard to drugs a step further.

The focus was also on the protocol integrating the Schengen acquis into the framework of the European Union. In this regard the States were continually aware that the standard of Schengen cooperation achieved remains intact and is capable of further improvement under the auspices of the European Union. This means that the fight against drugs must continue to be dealt with in a competent forum after the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam.

7. POLICE COOPERATION

During the reporting year, the **Handbook on Cross-border Police Cooperation**, was thoroughly revised and approved by the Executive Committee at the meeting on 16 December 1998. At the same time, the Executive Committee decided that the Handbook should be incorporated by the Schengen States in the relevant national directives and forwarded to the police for implementation. The previously separate manual on cooperation in the field of public order and security, which the Executive Committee approved in 1997, has been incorporated in the Handbook on Cross-border Police Cooperation. The revised Handbook has basically had the effect of clarifying police practice, bringing it up to date, facilitating procedures and eliminating impractical obstacles to cross-border cooperation.

In October 1998 the second pilot project in the reporting period was undertaken. The essential aims of the **Project on the Routes used for Illegal Immigration and Immigrant-smuggling** were achieved, i.e. a lasting improvement in cross-border Schengen-wide cooperation between the police forces responsible for combating illegal immigration and crime related to immigrant-smuggling, and the increased exchange of information based on the Schengen Convention and the respective national legal systems. Furthermore, police reports gave a snapshot of the scale of illegal immigration flows and crime related to immigrant-smuggling, thus enhancing the picture of the overall situation. The increase in the number of arrests of smugglers and illegal immigrants, or third-country nationals who were being smuggled in, also justifies the High Impact Operation being considered a success.

The measures were concentrated in areas that the Schengen States had previously pinpointed as main routes for illegal entry and crime related to people smuggling, in particular at land borders (at authorised crossing points and "green" borders), maritime borders (at seaports), in trains and railway stations and at airports. The emphasis was on tackling organisations or individuals who aid and abet illegal immigration.

Altogether, over 5 000 people were detained either on illegal entry, in attempting illegal entry, or when illegally resident on the territory. Approximately 500 of these were shown to have been smuggled in. A further 100 or so smugglers were also apprehended. Roughly three quarters of the people who had entered illegally had no identity papers of any kind on them.

In the framework of **mutual assistance for the purpose of preventing and investigating criminal offences (Article 39(1)-(3) of the Schengen Convention)**, not all the Schengen States compiled statistics on the number of incoming and outgoing requests. This is the reason why no concrete statistics could be compiled on the actual number of requests received or sent. However, the number of requests sent/received this year is estimated to be appreciably in excess of last year's figures.

Direct communication can on the whole be described as good; basically, there have been no grounds for criticising cooperation between the Schengen States. Most requests could usually be dealt with swiftly and satisfactorily. There has been a slight improvement in the speed and content of the answers given. The clearer and more detailed the question, the more precise the response.

There have been legal problems with the scope of Article 39 of the Schengen Convention owing to the differing powers of the police services in the Schengen States. While in a few States the police can to a large extent send requests and process incoming requests without having to call upon the judicial authorities, in the remaining States it is in many cases only the judicial authorities which can send or process incoming requests. These States frequently return requests on the grounds that they cannot be processed without letters rogatory. This wastes time and makes police cooperation more difficult.

To help alleviate existing problems affecting police cooperation under Article 39 (1) – (3) of the Schengen Convention, steps were taken to **draw up a joint list of measures**. The list contains activities which the police forces can request and carry out in cases where the prior consent of the judicial or administrative authorities is not required and which do not involve coercive measures. It did not prove possible to finalise this plan during the year under review.

Some Schengen States with a common land border have in addition set up jointly-manned police stations/headquarters at their borders for the purpose of improving police cooperation, particularly when it comes to combating illegal immigration, immigrant-smuggling and drug smuggling (Spain/Portugal and France/Italy). Other States have carried out joint police patrols in the border areas (Germany with France and the Netherlands), joint controls (Germany/the Netherlands) and joint exercises (Germany with Austria and France). The results can generally be termed good. Language courses or exchanges have been introduced to resolve language problems arising in connection with cooperation.

The Schengen States carried out a total of 370 **cross-border surveillance** operations in 1998. The breakdown is as follows: Belgium (23), Germany (125), France (40), Greece (0), Luxembourg (6), Italy (13), the Netherlands (161), Austria (1), Portugal (0), Spain (1).

Compared with 299 in 1997, the total number of cross-border surveillance operations (excluding the new Schengen States, for which the Convention was only brought into force in the last quarter of 1997) rose by over 20%. The performance of surveillance operations can basically be described as satisfactory. In individual cases letters rogatory were sent directly to the relevant justice ministry, not the central authority laid down in Article 40(5) of the Schengen Convention. Occasionally, the police forces and judicial authorities concerned experienced problems with regard to coordination. In some cases there were communications difficulties of a technical nature owing to the use of incompatible radio systems.

In addition, permission for cross-border surveillance was occasionally not forthcoming due to the fact that the target was not accused of any offence but was a contact of the perpetrator. While this is in keeping with the wording of Article 40(1), it once again shows that the relevant provisions of the Schengen Convention do not yet fully correspond to the tactical requirements of the police.

Joint exercises and exchanges could contribute to improving awareness of legal provisions, training, equipment and capabilities and thereby facilitate cooperation in individual cases of cross-border surveillance.

In the year under review, the Schengen States carried out a total of 39 **cross-border pursuits**. The breakdown is as follows: Belgium (13), Germany (22), France (1), Luxembourg (1), Italy (0), the Netherlands (no figures available), Austria (2), Portugal (0) and Spain (0).

Compared to 1997 (36), the total number of cross-border pursuits (excluding the new Schengen States, for which the Schengen Convention was only brought into force in the last quarter of 1997) rose by barely 10%.

As in previous years, the following legal and technical problems should be highlighted:

- No right of arrest for pursuing officers in some States,
- Lack of uniform rules on the motivating offences and the arrangements for pursuit,
- Inadequate rules for the use of special rights and rights of way,
- No rules on the use of aircraft, and
- Lack of radio compatibility with some Schengen States.

The above findings concerning the number, trends, speed and quality of information exchange pursuant to Article 39(1)–(3) apply by analogy to the **exchange of information to prevent crime and safeguard public order**. In other words, cooperation pursuant to Article 46 of the Schengen Convention is satisfactory on the whole. However, in the opinion of some States, it could be stepped up.

The **secondment of liaison officers** in the Schengen States (Article 47 of the Convention) during the year under review was again described by the Schengen partners as extremely efficient and useful for daily police practice, and, to a certain extent, for judicial practice. It makes a large contribution to building confidence as well as simplifying and accelerating cross-border cooperation between police forces. The States have only seconded their liaison officers on a long-term basis; there have been no temporary secondments nor have any liaison officers reciprocally represented another State in third countries pursuant to Article 46(4) of the Schengen Convention.

As far as **cooperation in the area of telecommunications** (Article 44 of the Convention) is concerned, the Schengen States have continued to improve direct communication between police and customs authorities in the border areas by coordinating radio frequencies, exchanging radio equipment and connecting up radio networks. During the reporting year, efforts aimed at developing cross-border digital radio systems were continued; preliminary technical investigations were carried out, various digital radio systems were tested for interoperability (giving effect to the Central Group mandate of 27 May 1998), and a comprehensive "TETRA three-country project" was prepared in the Belgian-German-Dutch border area. The aim of the tests is to find out whether the TETRA 25 standard meets the special performance requirements of the security authorities.

The **exchange of information on weapons** pursuant to Article 91 of the Schengen Convention and the procedure laid down for the Contracting Parties to exchange information via their central authorities was also developed further in the new Schengen States in 1998. This exchange of information is also provided for in the framework of the European Union pursuant to Directive 91/477/EEC of 18 June 1991.

The States agreed to compile and evaluate the relevant intelligence from national sources once a year in the future with a view to detecting illegal transfers of weapons in the Schengen area and preparing for joint police operations to combat these illegal activities. This work will be continued in the European Union.

8. JUDICIAL COOPERATION

As regards the application of Articles 52 and 53 of the Schengen Convention (**judicial assistance in criminal matters**), the number of incoming requests fell hardly if at all during the reporting year by comparison with 1997. This is probably due to the fact that compliance with the direct channel pursuant to Articles 52 and 53 led in previous years to a marked reduction in the number of requests for legal assistance directed to the justice ministries. However, not all Schengen States kept records of such requests.

Only one Schengen State reported a request under Article 57 of the Schengen Convention (application of the **ne bis in idem** principle). The number of **extradition requests** pursuant to Chapter 4 of the Convention fell slightly compared to 1997. Those involving neighbouring states, for example the Netherlands and Germany, were identified as a clear focal point, with a relatively high number of extradition requests passing between them. However, not all the Schengen States kept records of extradition requests either. Requests made under Article 68 of the Schengen Convention (**Transfer of the enforcement of criminal judgements**) were not systematically recorded.

On the whole, application of the Schengen Convention by the judicial authorities was considered positive. However, the scope for speeding up cooperation, in particular by using the direct channel, is not yet fully utilised by all the Schengen States. This applies in particular to using the direct channel.

Distribution of the directories of legal districts and the simplified lists elicited a critical response. The directories were regarded as awkward to use and inconsistently arranged; in contrast to the directories, which are more comprehensive, the simplified lists were of no practical help.

9. OTHER ASPECTS

On 16 September 1998 the Executive Committee decided to set up a **Schengen Standing Committee on Evaluation and Implementation**. The Committee was given a two-fold task: firstly, to examine whether an applicant country fulfilled the de iure and de facto preconditions for bringing into force the Schengen Convention and secondly, to monitor whether the Schengen States were effectively implementing the Schengen rules and regulations. On 16 December 1998 the Executive Committee accepted Germany's offer and instructed the Standing Committee to visit that country first. As Germany held the Schengen Presidency for the first six months of 1999 (a period which included the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam on 1 May), Belgium was authorised to chair the Committee on an ad hoc basis.

The activity report of the **Joint Supervisory Authority** was studied in detail. In adopting a position on the report, recourse was had largely to previous replies to JSA questions. Cooperation between the SIS groups and the JSA was stepped up.

On 16 September 1998 the Executive Committee discussed the further development of relations between Schengen and **Switzerland**, given that country's special position as an enclave within the Schengen area. Several delegations expressed political misgivings about bringing Switzerland closer to the Schengen cooperative framework at the present time. Conversely, other States took the view that practical police cooperation with Switzerland was in Schengen's interest. It was therefore impossible for the Contracting Parties to reach agreement on how Switzerland should be brought closer to Schengen.

Note from the SIRENE Sub-Group to the SIS Steering Committee
Table of hits recorded by the SIRENE Bureaux
Period : 1 January 1998 to 31 December 1998

	Art95		Art96		Art97		Art98		Art99 Persons		Art99 Vehicles		Art.100 Vehicles		Art.100 Firearms		Art.100 Blank documents		Art.100 Identity documents		Art.100 Bank notes		TOTAL		
	INT	EXT	INT	EXT	INT	EXT	INT	EXT	INT	EXT	INT	EXT	INT	EXT	INT	EXT	INT	EXT	INT	EXT	INT	EXT	INT	EXT	
NL	121	75	431	51	65	50	208	6	125	5	85	59	943	704	15	0	89	54	42	605			2124	1609	
(a)	198	178	89	524	105	76	63	210	10	126	11	22	23	1004	683	11	1	84	78	92	708			2327	1771
BEL	82	143	1416	47	65	87	264	50	72	32	5	1	1399	1664	18	5	15	390	61	6				3397	2425
1998	52	129	732	18	47	69	127	56	46	15	4	2	1373	823	7	3	74	68	83	4				2545	1187
DE	99	266	725	3999	64	74	480	68	260	55			984	2163										2612	6625
(a, c, d)	128	345	2193	5273	118	164	724	137	415	141			1065	2447										4643	8507
LU (**)	14	7	13	5	472	29	39	42	8				363	220										909	303
(c) (e)	22	12	1	8	19	275	55	50	2	7			191	311										290	663
ES	155	18	640	188	77	36	428	6	158	1	18	2	611	203	19	14								2106	468
1998	197	11	673	210	103	70	489	19	210	7	20	2	1235	275	5	2	2	13	12	1	0	0	0	2946	610
FR	112	183	5756	373	157	102	410	936	205	475	18	52	2025	994	31	9	78	3	234	15	3	1	9029	3143	
(b)	141	186	6392	383	318	105	571	759	440	516	43	45	2641	1009	25	12	170	3	395	55	3	1	11139	3074	
IT (*)	25	12	67	433	2	13	16	226	14	210			12	1										136	895
1998	120	163	898	1121	90	122	46	594	60	828	4	20	790	1395			192	606	61	211				2261	5060
PT	8	6	290	13	4	3	17	2	7				77	84	3					1	2			404	113
1998	5	3	156	10	8	4	11	13	9				62	160	3		1	121	5					257	314
GR (*)			143	16			16		7				7							9				182	16
(d)	40	10	2164	516	16	14	119		129		2		166	21	3	5	394	49						3033	615
AU (*)	11	20	158	42	1	1	102	4	56		4		11	5			4		34					381	72
(a)	68	105	2129	403	51	26	500	159	530	6	6	1	212	123	2	1	176	6	436	27				4110	857
A	627	730	9639	5167	907	395	1980	1340	912	778	130	114	6432	6038	83	31	186	447	381	628	3	1	21280	15669	
1998	951	1053	15862	8047	846	912	2852	1797	1967	1531	101	93	8739	7247	53	27	1093	944	1084	1006	3	1	33551	22658	

** INT. : Hit recorded internally in response to an alert entered abroad
 * EXT. : Hit recorded abroad in response to a national alert
 (*) Italy has been operational since 26.10.97, Austria since 1.12.97 and Greece since 08.12.97
 (**) There is no specific distinction between alerts entered pursuant to articles 99 and 100
 (a) Does not include hits at external borders
 (b) Does not include hits recorded internally in response to national alerts
 (c) Owing to system constraints, all hits pursuant to Art. 100 must be entered under "Art. 100 vehicles"
 (d) Does not make distinction between blank documents and identity documents
 (e) Statistics on Article 97 were compiled differently from 1998.