



Council of the
European Union

Brussels, 8 July 2025
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LEGISLATIVE ACTS AND OTHER INSTRUMENTS

Subject: COUNCIL DECISION amending Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia's destabilising activities

COUNCIL DECISION (CFSP) 2025/...

of ...

**amending Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643 concerning restrictive measures
in view of Russia's destabilising activities**

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 29 thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy,

Whereas:

- (1) On 8 October 2024, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643¹.
- (2) The Union remains unwavering in its condemnation of Russia's malign activities directed against the Union, its Member States, international organisations and third countries.
- (3) On 26 June 2025 the European Council adopted conclusions, in which it condemned Russia's continued hybrid campaign, including sabotage, disruption of critical infrastructure, cyber-attacks, information manipulation and interference, and attempts to undermine democracy, including in the electoral process. The European Council underlined that it would make full use of all means available, including the EU hybrid toolbox, to specifically prevent, deter and respond to Russia's hybrid threats.
- (4) In view of the gravity of the situation, the Council considers that 9 natural persons and 6 legal persons, entities or bodies should be added to the list of natural and legal persons, entities and bodies set out in Annex I to Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643.
- (5) Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643 should therefore be amended accordingly,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

¹ Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643 of 8 October 2024 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia's destabilizing activities (OJ L, 2024/2643, 9.10.2024, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2024/2643/oj>).

Article 1

Annex I to Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643 is amended in accordance with the Annex to this Decision.

Article 2

This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its publication in the *Official Journal of the European Union*.

Done at ..., ...

For the Council
The President

ANNEX

Annex I to Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643 is amended as follows:

(1) the following entries are added under the heading ‘A. Natural persons’:

	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
‘39.	Andrey Yuryevich ROMANCHENKO (Russian: Андрей Юрьевич РОМАНЧЕНКО)	Function: General Director of the Federal State-owned Enterprise “Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Network” (RTRS) DOB: 16.10.1960 POB: Moscow, Russian SSR (now Russian Federation) Nationality: Russian Gender: male Russian Tax ID (ИНН): 771515786260	Andrey Yuryevich Romanchenko is the General Director of The Federal State-owned Enterprise “Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Network” (RTRS), a Russian federal unitary for-profit enterprise of strategic significance, operating terrestrial radio and television broadcasting infrastructure in Russia. Romanchenko, who was appointed as General Director by the Russian President, directs the RTRS, which plays a direct role in implementing policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation by providing the infrastructure and technical capabilities for the transmission of the so called “All-Russian mandatory publicly available television and radio channels” such as Pervyi Kanal or Rossiya 24 which disseminate Russian state propaganda.	+

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	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
			<p>Under Romanchenko's leadership, RTRS has played a key role in effectively replacing legacy Ukrainian broadcasting systems in occupied regions with a network that transmits content approved by the Government of the Russian Federation intended to suppress dissent, to align the local population with Russian policies and to delegitimise Ukraine's governance in the occupied territories. This directly undermines the ability of local populations to access diverse and independent information. The expansion of RTRS operations into the occupied territories is facilitated by the Government of the Russian Federation which grants RTRS the exclusive right to establish transmission infrastructure in the occupied territories. By overseeing and directing these operations, Romanchenko actively facilitates the obstruction of access to diverse and independent information, thereby assuming responsibility for the use of information manipulation.</p>	

	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
			Therefore, Romanchenko, as the head of RTRS, benefits from and implements policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy and stability in Ukraine, and which undermine the sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, through engaging in or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference.	

	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
40.	Vladimir NAIDENOV (Russian: Владимир НАЙДЕНОВ)	Function: Director of the Department for Coordination of Communications Infrastructure Development in New Territories of the Federal State-owned Enterprise “Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Network” (RTRS) Gender: male Nationality: Russian	Vladimir Naidenov is the Director of the Department for Coordination of Communications Infrastructure Development in New Territories at the Federal State-owned Enterprise “Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Network” (RTRS), a Russian federal unitary for-profit enterprise of strategic significance operating terrestrial radio and television broadcasting infrastructure in Russia. Vladimir Naidenov, is subordinated to the RTRS General Director Andrey Yuryevich Romanchenko, who directs the RTRS and plays a direct role in implementing policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation. RTRS provides infrastructure and technical capabilities for the transmission of the so called “All-Russian mandatory publicly available television and radio channels” such as Pervyi Kanal or Rossiya 24 which disseminate Russian state propaganda.	+

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	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
			<p>In his position within the RTRS, Vladimir Naidenov has played a key role in effectively replacing legacy Ukrainian broadcasting systems in occupied regions with a network that transmits content approved by the Government of the Russian Federation intended to suppress dissent, to align the local population with Russian policies and to delegitimise Ukraine's governance in the occupied territories. This directly undermines the ability of local populations to access diverse and independent information. The expansion of RTRS operations into the occupied regions is facilitated by the Government of the Russian Federation which grants RTRS the right to establish transmission infrastructure there.</p> <p>Therefore, Vladimir Naidenov, as the Director of the Department for Coordination of Communications Infrastructure Development in New Territories at RTRS, facilitates the obstruction of access to diverse and independent information by coordinating the RTRS infrastructure development in the occupied Ukrainian territories and thus implements policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy and stability in Ukraine, and which undermine the sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, through engaging in or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference</p>	

	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
41.	Dmitri BUIMISTRU	Function: TV presenter, actor; blogger DOB: 26.11.1992 POB: Chişinău, Republic of Moldova Nationality: Moldovan Gender: male	Dmitri Buimistru intentionally engages in coordinated information manipulation and interference by operating as a key propagandist on MD24, a Russia-based online TV channel created by Ilan Shor following license withdrawals from his previous stations for disseminating Russian disinformation. To that end, Buimistru deliberately spreads demonstrably false claims – systematically debunked by independent fact-checkers – regarding NATO drawing Moldova into conflict, imminent revocation of constitutional neutrality, “Romanization” of institutions, misrepresentation of the EU referendum’s constitutional implications, and fabricated trade statistics.	+

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			<p>Furthermore, his participation in synchronised cross-platform disinformation campaigns is evidenced by the July 2023 Russian embassy surveillance equipment scandal, where his messaging was perfectly coordinated with other pro-Kremlin outlets, demonstrating centralised orchestration. In addition, Buimistru's "SOSEDI" project has been identified as a key tool in a broader external influence operation. His systematic promotion of other pro-Russian information sources and deployment of consistent messaging tactics specifically designed to undermine Moldova's sovereignty, European integration, and democratic processes further confirms his deliberate engagement in coordinated information manipulation with a view to serving Russian destabilisation interests in Moldova.</p> <p>Therefore, Dmitri Buimistru is responsible for, implementing and supporting actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability in a third country through engaging in, directly or indirectly, the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.</p>	

	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
42.	Veaceslav VALICO	<p>Function: Activist</p> <p>DOB: 10.8.1977</p> <p>POB: Chişinău, Republic of Moldova</p> <p>Nationality: Moldovan</p> <p>Gender: male</p>	<p>Veaceslav Valico participated, alongside Anatolii Prizenko, a natural person listed by the Union, in the Russian destabilisation operation concerning the painting of the Star of David on the streets of Paris following the 7 October 2023 Hamas attack on Israel in exchange for financial compensation and in order to create tensions in French society.</p> <p>Moreover, Veaceslav Valico is involved in the systematic dissemination of disinformation in the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, as part of the Russian Federation's malign hybrid activities.</p> <p>Furthermore, Veaceslav Valico is associated with Anatolii Prizenko, who is an individual listed by the Union. Their association predates their collaboration in the Paris incident.</p> <p>Therefore, Veaceslav Valico is responsible for, implementing and supporting actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the stability in a Member State and therefore, in the Union, and in third countries, through planning, directing, and engaging in, directly or indirectly, the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.</p>	+

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	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
43.	Simeon BOIKOV	<p>Function: Pro-Russian blogger</p> <p>Date of birth: 15.2.1990</p> <p>Place of birth: Sydney, Australia</p> <p>Gender: male</p> <p>Nationality: Australian/Russian</p>	<p>Simeon Boikov is an Australian pro-Russian activist known by the pseudonym “Aussie Cossack”. He is recognised for disseminating pro-Kremlin narratives and misinformation, particularly regarding the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Boikov has also been implicated in spreading disinformation related to the 2024 U.S. presidential election, notably by paying an American influencer to post a Storm-1516 fabricated video falsely depicting voter fraud in Georgia.</p> <p>Therefore, Simeon Boikov is responsible for, implementing and supporting actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in third countries, by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.</p>	+

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	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
44.	Vitaly KULIKOV (Russian: Виталий КУЛИКОВ)	Function: Lieutenant Colonel in the Russian military, heading the Electronic Warfare (EW) center of the Baltic Fleet Nationality: Russian Gender: male	<p>Lieutenant Colonel Vitaly Kulikov is the commander of the Electronic Warfare (EW) center of the Baltic Fleet also known as the 841st Separate Electronic Warfare Center. Vitaly Kulikov oversees exercises of his EW troops in the Kaliningrad region.</p> <p>GPS signal failures in several European countries have been linked to electronic warfare activities from Kaliningrad, including jamming and “spoofing” of GPS signals, primarily affecting the Baltic States. These activities have disrupted civil aviation.</p> <p>The EW center of the Baltic Fleet, under Kulikov’s commands, has received jamming equipment and conducted exercises using advanced systems capable of disrupting communications over large areas, and is also involved in planning, supporting and executing coordinated information manipulation and interference that impacts Union Member States.</p> <p>Therefore, Vitaly Kulikov is responsible for planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference which directly affects Union Member States.</p>	+

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	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
45.	Yuri Illarionovich LASTOCHKIN (Russian: Юрий Илларионович ЛАСТОЧКИН Ukrainian: Юрій Ілларионович ЛАСТОЧКІН)	Function: Official of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation; Military Leader; General-Major/Lieutenant General; Chief of the Electronic Warfare Forces of the Russian Federation/head of Russian Defense Ministry's Radio-Electronic Warfare (REB) force DOB: 18.8.1967 POB: Rzhavka, Mogilev region, Belarusian SSR (now Belarus) Nationality: Russian Gender: male	Lieutenant General Yuri Lastochkin is the chief of the Electronic Warfare (EW) Forces of the Russian Federation. Yuri Lastochkin oversees actions and exercises of Russia's EW troops, including those of the 841st Separate EW center in the Kaliningrad region. Recently, GPS signal failures in several European countries have been linked to electronic warfare activities from Kaliningrad, including jamming and "spoofing" of GPS signals, primarily affecting the Baltic States. These activities have disrupted civil aviation. The 841st Separate EW center in the Kaliningrad region, under Lastochkin's commands, has received jamming equipment and conducted exercises using advanced systems capable of disrupting communications over large areas; it is also involved in planning, supporting and executing coordinated information manipulation and interference that impacts Union Member States. Therefore, Y. I. Lastochkin is responsible for planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference which directly affects Union Member States.	+

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	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
46.	Yevgeny Shevchenko (Russian: Евгений ШЕВЧЕНКО)	Function: Founder of TigerWeb Nationality: Russian Gender: male Tax identification number: 910202780107	Yevgeny Shevchenko is a web developer who has specialised in creating websites for many years. He is the founder of Tigerweb, the web-company that runs the informational manipulation set “Portal Kombat” which disseminates pro-Russian content and targets several Western countries, including France, on several so-called “informational portals”. Therefore, he is responsible for, implementing and supporting actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which threaten the stability and security in the Union, or in one or several of its Member States through engaging in or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.	+

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	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
47	<p>Aleksey Nikolayevich SHAVROV</p> <p>(Russian: Алексей Николаевич ШАВРОВ)</p> <p>a.k.a. Andrey PETROV</p> <p>(Russian: Андрей ПЕТРОВ)</p>	<p>Function: Military Intelligence Officer of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU)</p> <p>DOB: 12.12.1989</p> <p>Nationality: Russian</p> <p>Gender: male</p>	<p>Aleksey Shavrov is a GRU officer involved in Russian influence operations directed to destabilise the Union and its Member States. Aleksey Shavrov's malign activities include information manipulation and disinformation campaigns in the Czech Republic and other Union Member States. Through his concealed associate, Natallia Sudliankova, Aleksey Shavrov conducts influence campaigns, including by organising the dissemination of tailor-made articles in various European media outlets. Misleading or outright false narratives aim to support the foreign policy interests of the Russian Federation and to spread its influence. Moreover, the content is designed to further undermine public trust in the Union values and processes, democracy and Union cohesion. Articles also contain specific manipulative anti-NATO, anti-Ukraine and anti-NGO narratives. Aleksey Shavrov instructed Natallia Sudliankova to spread and disseminate those divisive messages through media to amplify their polarising content. Aleksey Shavrov provided financial rewards for accomplishing tasks and for publication of those custom-made pro-Russian media campaigns.</p> <p>Therefore, Aleksey Shavrov is implementing actions or policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union or in third countries by planning and directing the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.</p>	<p>“”;</p>

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(2) the following entries are added under the heading ‘B. Legal persons, entities and bodies’:

	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
‘10.	Federal State-owned Enterprise “Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Network” (RTRS); Федеральное государственное унитарное предприятие «Российская телевизионная и радиовещательная сеть»	Address: 13, Korolyov street, Moscow, Russia Website: https://moscow.rtrs.ru/ Place of registration: 13, Korolyov street, Moscow, Russia Date of registration: 30.11.2001 Registration number: ИНН: 7717127211; ОГРН: 1027739456084	The Federal State-owned Enterprise “Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Network” (RTRS) operates Russia’s terrestrial broadcasting infrastructure. It is directly subordinated to the Ministry of Digital Development, Communications and Mass Media of the Russian Federation and operates under the authority of a general director appointed by the Russian President. RTRS provides infrastructure and technical capabilities for the transmission of the so called “All-Russian mandatory publicly available television and radio channels” such as Pervyi Kanal or Rossiya 24. RTRS plays a key role in effectively replacing legacy Ukrainian broadcasting systems in occupied regions with a network that transmits content approved by the Government of the Russian Federation intended to suppress dissent, to align the local population with Russian policies and to delegitimise Ukraine’s governance in the occupied territories. This directly undermines the ability of local populations to access diverse and independent information. The expansion of RTRS operations into the occupied regions is facilitated by the Government of the Russian Federation which grants RTRS the right to establish transmission infrastructure there.	+

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	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
			Therefore, RTRS is implementing and benefiting from policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy and stability in Ukraine, and which undermine the sovereignty or independence of Ukraine, through engaging in or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference.	

	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
11.	841st Separate Electronic Warfare Center of the Baltic Fleet 841-й центр радиоэлектронной борьбы	Address: 238580, Kaliningrad oblast, Yantarny settlement, Balebin street, 09643 238580, Калининградская обл., пгт.Янтарный, ул.Балебина, в/ч 09643 Type of entity: Military unit Place of registration: Kaliningrad region, Russian Federation Phone number: 8(40153)37-244 Military unit 09643	The 841st Separate Electronic Warfare Center is at the core of one of the strongest electronic warfare groups in Russia. The centre is responsible for using technology to disorganise any system of shortwave communication, conducting electronic warfare exercises (EW) to disrupt enemy navigation and radio communications as well as for the collection and analysis of intelligence information obtained by observing electromagnetic radiation in the short and ultrashort wave ranges. Several European countries have experienced GPS signal failures, which have been attributed to electronic warfare activities by Russia, specifically from Kaliningrad. This includes deliberate jamming and “spoofing” of GPS signals, primarily affecting the Baltic States. Interference and manipulation of GPS signals has led to obstacles for landing civil planes. The 841st Separate EW Center in Kaliningrad has received jamming equipment and conducted exercises using advanced systems capable of disrupting communications over large areas.	+

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	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
			Therefore, 841st Separate EW Center, as part of Russia's military forces enabling the misuse of radio frequency sector, is responsible for engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference which directly affects Union Member States.	
12.	BRICS Journalist Association	Website: bricspress.live	<p>The BRICS Journalists Association (BJA) is a Russian NGO linked to the Foundation to Battle Injustice (R-FBI), created by Yevgeny Prigozhin, and headed by Oksana Vovk (Mira Terada). The BJA has been used as a vehicle to disseminate pro-Russian narratives and disinformation under the guise of independent journalism, including fake content originating from the Storm-1516 Information Manipulation Set (IMS).</p> <p>Therefore, the BJA is responsible for, implementing, supporting and benefitting from actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union, or in one or several of its Member States or in a third country through engaging in or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.</p>	+

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	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
13.	Center for Geopolitical Expertise Центр геополитических экспертиз, CGE	Website: cge.evrazia.ru, cge.su Place of registration: Ul. Dinamovskaya D.1a, Office 409, Moscow, RUS, 109044 Date of registration: 17.12.2002 Registration number: 1027739806940	The Center for Geopolitical Expertise (CGE) is a Moscow-based think tank founded by Aleksandr Dugin, and headed by Valery Korovin, accused of orchestrating disinformation campaigns aimed at targeting Ukrainian interests, discrediting Western political figures, and influencing electoral processes in Western countries. CGE and its director, Valery Mikhaylovich Korovin, are reportedly involved in creating and disseminating false information by utilising artificial intelligence tools to produce deepfake videos, and supporting a network of hundreds of fake news websites. CGE is alleged to have worked closely with Russia's military intelligence agency (GRU), receiving financial support to carry out these operations. Therefore, the CGE is responsible for, implementing, supporting and benefitting from actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in third countries, by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.	+

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	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
14.	Foundation to Battle Injustice	Date of creation: 23.3.2021 Website: fondfbr.ru	<p>The Foundation to Battle Injustice (R-FBI) is a fake human-rights defence NGO created in March 2021 by Wagner group founder Yevgeny Prigozhin. The R-FBI has been involved in numerous information operations targeting France and Ukraine, including a campaign accusing French soldiers of having kidnapped children from Niger just after the military coup d'état in 2023. Since the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin in August 2023, the R-FBI has been involved in the amplification of numerous Storm-1516's information operations.</p> <p>Therefore, the R-FBI is responsible for, implementing and supporting actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union, or in one or several of its Member States, or in third countries, by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.</p>	+

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	Name	Identifying information	Statement of Reasons	Date of listing
15.	Tigerweb	<p>Website: Tigerweb.ru</p> <p>Place of registration: 295000, Krim Republic, Simferopol City, Oktyabirskaya Street, 3, Office 408</p> <p>Date of registration: 2019</p> <p>Registration number: 1199112018973</p>	<p>Tigerweb is the Russian Crimea-based web-company that operates the informational manipulation project “Portal Kombat”, which disseminates pro-Russian content and targets several Western countries, including France, through various so-called “informational portals”.</p> <p>Therefore, Tigerweb is involved in the implementation of actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which threaten the stability and security in the Union, or in one or several of its Member States, or in third countries, through engaging in or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.</p>	+

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