COVER NOTE
From: European External Action Service (EEAS)
To: Political and Security Committee (PSC)
Subject: Exercise Instructions (EXINST) for the 2019 EU Crisis Management Military Exercise (MILEX 19)

Delegations will find attached document EEAS(2019) 636.

Encl.: EEAS(2019) 636
Delegations will find attached the Exercise Instructions (EXINST) for the EU Crisis Management Military Exercise in 2019 (MILEX 19), which was agreed by the EUMC by Silence Procedure on Tuesday 04 June 2019.
EXERCISE INSTRUCTIONS (EXINST)
FOR THE
EU CRISIS MANAGEMENT MILITARY EXERCISE
IN 2019 (MILEX 19)

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ANNEX: ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
SECTION 1

ORGANISATION
A. BACKGROUND

1. Name:

2. Logo:

3. Type:
Exercise involving Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) concentrating on military aspects of crisis management at the military strategic and operational levels for an envisaged EU-led CSDP military operation without recourse to NATO common assets and capabilities.

The exercise concentrates on decision making and planning at the military strategic and operational levels to launch an autonomous CSDP Military Operation within the framework of an EU Integrated Approach. The exercise focuses on the interaction between the EU Operation Headquarters (OHQ), the EU Force Headquarters (FHQ) and the EU Military Staff (EUMS), and as appropriate, other services from the European External Action Service (EEAS).

4. Form:
Command Post Exercise (CPX).

5. Training Audience (TA):
The EU Exercise Operation Commander (OpCdr) and the EU OHQ provided by Greece. This HQ will be designated as the EL EU OHQ in the exercise documentation and will be reinforced with augmentees from EU Member States.

The EU Exercise Force Commander (FCdr) and the EU FHQ provided by Greece. This HQ will be based on the HELBROC Battle Group HQ (EL EU FHQ). It will be designated as the EL EU FHQ in
the exercise documentation. This EL EU FHQ will be reinforced by augmentees from EU Member States, and other Troops Contributing Nations (TCNs) to HELBROC BG package.

6. **Dates:**

The exercise will be conducted from 04 (Monday) to 15 (Friday) November 2019.

7. **Location:**

Directing Staff of the exercise (DISTAFF) at Brussels, EL EU OHQ at Larissa (EL), and EL EU FHQ at Nea Santa Kilkis (EL).

8. **Official Scheduling the Exercise (OSE):**

High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy / Vice-President of the Commission, Ms. Federica Mogherini.

9. **Official Conducting the Exercise (OCE):**

Director General EUMS, Lieutenant General Esa Pulkkinen.

10. **Exercise Director (ExDir):**

Director of EUMS Concepts and Capabilities Directorate, Brigadier General Heinz Krieb.

11. **Exercise OpCdr:**

Commander Hellenic First Army and EL EU OHQ, Lt General Konstantinos Floros.

12. **EL EU OHQ Chief of Staff:**

Chief of Staff EL EU OHQ, Maj General Pantelis Katsaitis.

13. **Exercise FCdr:**

Commander 71 Airmobile Brigade and EL EU FHQ. Brigadier General Georgios Bosmalis.

14. **EL EU FHQ Chief of Staff:**

Chief of Staff EL EU FHQ, Colonel Konstantinos Moditsis.

15. **Deputy Exercise Director (DExDir):**

Exercises, Training and Analysis branch chief of the EUMS Concepts and Capabilities Directorate, Col (ES) Anselmo Martin Segovia.
16. **Officer with Primary Responsibility (OPR) and official POC:**

Lt Col (ES) Pedro Perez Dueñas. He will be replaced in July by Lt Col (DE) Wolfgang Peiffer Exercises Training and Analysis Branch,

EUMS Concepts and Capabilities Directorate.

Email: MILEX19@eeas.europa.eu. Tel: +32 2 584 5771

17. **Concept:**

MILEX 19 is a CSDP planning exercise at the military strategic and operational levels. It includes a Preparation Phase and a Conduct Phase.

The EUMS will establish cross-functional teams to organise and direct the whole exercise. Entities from the wider EEAS and the EU Commission (CION) were invited to contribute to and support the organisation of the exercise. The UN was invited to participate in the exercise.

For the Preparation Phase, the EUMS has established an Exercise Planning Team (EPT) to carry out the detailed organisation of MILEX 19, including the elaboration of prescript documents in cooperation with the EL EU OHQ. This EPT will be composed of planners from all EUMS Directorates. It will be reinforced with other experts from the EEAS, EU CION and other relevant stakeholders.

For the Conduct Phase, the EUMS will establish a DISTAFF under the authority of the ExDir. DISTAFF will integrate the EPT. DISTAFF will monitor, control and direct, the Conduct Phase in order to facilitate the Training Audience achieving the exercise aim and objectives. A DISTAFF element will be deployed to the EL EU OHQ to materialise the continued EUMS's support to the EL EU OHQ.

Response Cells (RCs) will be set-up within the DISTAFF to contribute to the generation of responses and reactions necessary for the execution of the exercise. RCs will be composed of representatives of the EEAS and EU CION, as well as UN, with a view to enhancing the realism of the EU Integrated Approach to crisis management.
B. REAL LIFE FINANCIAL ISSUES

18. Legal basis and authorities:

In accordance with Article 16 of the Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/528 *establishing a mechanism to administer the financing of the common costs of European Union operations having military or defence implications (Athena)*, the common costs of the exercise shall be financed through Athena following rules and procedures similar to those for EU military operations.

Subject to the approval of the Special Committee, the Conduct Phase, for financial expenditures, will commence 20 days prior to STARTEX and conclude 10 days after ENDEX.

Exercise common costs shall not include costs related to capital acquisitions, including those related to buildings, infrastructure and equipment; planning and preparation phase of exercise, transport, barracks and lodging for forces unless approved by Athena Special Committee.

The EU Exercise OpCdr will carry out his duties on behalf of Athena Mechanism in relation to the financing of the exercise common costs. He implements the appropriations relating to the exercise common costs. As authorizing officer, he may award contracts and enter into contracts as well as open a bank account on behalf of Athena for the exercise. He may delegate his duties as authorising officer to the OHQ ACOS J8 and to the FCdr.

ACOS J8 OHQ and ACOS J8 FHQ are the authorizing officers by delegation (sub-delegation) and have specific roles under the Athena Financial rules.

19. Requirements for common budget:

Participants in MILEX 19 related to the budget are:

DISTAFF, Brussels.

EL EU OHQ, Larissa

EL EU FHQ, Nea Santa Kilkis.

The establishment of the Communications and Information Systems (CIS) for communication between the OHQ / FHQ and DISTAFF and the interrelated training of the CIS personnel is one of the objectives of the exercise (see EXSPEC point 22 and 23).
The Transport/travel costs to deploy the CIS experts and equipment to the FHQ for the purpose of establishing and maintaining the links to the OHQ and the costs for the additional bandwidth for the Satellite Communication have to be financed through the common budget (Athena).

The costs for travels and accommodation of liaison officers and DISTAFF officers and those of the Operation Commander and Force Commander for their duties will be financed through the common budget (Athena) as well as the travels and accommodation of J8 personnel for the closure of the accounts 5 days after the ENDEX.

A Distinguished Visitors Day is planned to take place during the conduct phase. For these requirements, the incurred expenditures for hospitality and representation are to be provided.

20. **Instructions:**

EL EU OHQ ACOS J8 is responsible for the preparation, presentation, conduct and closure of the budget on behalf of the EU Exercise OpCdr. The budget proposal is to be submitted to the Athena Administrator NLT 30 June 2019.

EL EU OHQ J8 and FHQ J8 will use the Athena accounting software ATRIUM.

Management of the dedicated MILEX 19 budget title approved by the Athena Special Committee will be the main part of the practice of the financing of the EU military crisis response and management activities through the Athena mechanism (in all financial areas) at both OHQ and FHQ level. Interaction between OHQ J8 Cell and FHQ J8 Cell will be practised.

The training on the ATRIUM system for the J8 personnel involved in the exercise will be provided by the Athena Secretariat prior to the conduct of the exercise.

Preparation of the Concept for funds management and indication of areas for contracting support to the Operation will be practiced during the conduct of the exercise.
C. COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS (CIS)

References:


21. GENERAL

MILEX 19 CIS will be implemented according to the EU Concept for CIS for EU-led Military Operations, (Ref B).

The exchange of information between Brussels and the EL EU OHQ will be based on:

- EU Operations Wide Area Network (EU OPS WAN) for EU classified information (EUCI); and
- Open Internet for unclassified information.

The exchange of information between the EL EU OHQ and the EU FHQ will be based on:

- OHQ Classified Mission Network (OCMN), extended to EL EU FHQ for classified information; and
- Open Internet for unclassified information.

22. SECURITY

In accordance with Ref. C, regular rules will be applied for the exchange of EU Classified Information (EUCI). MILEX 19 specifics are described in Section III – A – Information Management.

All EU CIS used in the MILEX 19 should have undergone the appropriate accreditation process to guarantee that all the security measures have been implemented and that a sufficient level of protection of EUCI and CIS has been achieved in accordance with the regulations.

In accordance with the security rules, MILEX 19 participants have to use encrypted information systems or tools to send or receive EUCI.
Transfer of information between CIS of different security domains will be accomplished by an "Air Gap" interface. Transfer of EUCI between two security domains is only possible if the recipient system is bearing a security accreditation at least the same classification level as the classification level of the document to be transferred.

23. **MILEX 19 CIS ARCHITECTURE**

For EUCI up to and including **SECRET UE/EU SECRET**:

The EU OPS WAN is the main communication interface for the exchange of EUCI between the EUMS and the EL EU OHQ. Information can be exchanged via e-mail with attachments and via the web based Information Management Application, Collaborative Application for Management of EU-led Operations (CAMEO) within the MILEX 19 Shared Data Area (SDA).

The EU OPS WAN supports Secure VTC (SVTC), e.g. between EUMS (DISTAFF in Brussels) and EL EU OHQ.

In case of the need for new CAMEO accounts, a request must be sent to the MILEX 19 CIS POC at least 1 month prior to the start of the exercise (STARTEX).

The procedure for granting access to the CAMEO's MILEX 19 SDA can be initiated by sending a request at least three weeks prior to STARTEX to: MILEX19@eeas.europa.eu

The request must contain a list of the functional/personal accounts that are foreseen to need access to the MILEX 19 SDA.

The OHQ Classified Mission Network (OCMN) is the main classified LAN to be used in the EU EL OHQ. The OCMN will be extended to the EL EU FHQ and will provide the main communication mean for the exchange of EUCI between the EL EU OHQ and the EL EU FHQ. Information will be exchanged via e-mail with attachments and through the access to common file server. OCMN supports SVTC.

For unclassified information including **LIMITE**:

An Internet connected workstations/LANs can be used for the exchange of unclassified data including LIMITE. An online collaboration system (AGORA) will facilitate the exchange of information and will host the MILEX 19 dedicated Website as described in Section III – A – Information Management.
24. DISTAFF NETWORKS

For classified information up to SECRET UE/EU SECRET

The Secure Office Local Area Network (SOLAN), up to SECRET UE/EU SECRET, will be used for the exchange of EUCI within the EUMS/EEAS and with the EL EU OHQ. SOLAN is interconnected with the EU OPS WAN.

For unclassified information including LIMITE:

The Internet can be used for the exchange of unclassified data including LIMITE for EU internal networks.

25. EL EU OHQ NETWORKS

For classified information up to and including SECRET UE/EU SECRET:

The OHQ LAN, up to SECRET UE/EU SECRET, will be used for the exchange of EUCI with the EUMS. The OHQ LAN is connected to the EU OPS WAN and provides its services to all its users.

The OCMN will be used for the exchange of EUCI between the EL EU OHQ at Larissa and EL EU FHQ at NEA SANTA (KILKIS). The OCMN, extended to the EL EU FHQ over a Satellite link, will provide a limited number of workstations to the EL EU FHQ personnel. The OCMN is not connected to the EU OPS WAN.

OCMN will be up to SECRET UE/EU SECRET system.

For unclassified information including LIMITE:

The Internet will be used for exchange of unclassified data including LIMITE.

26. EL EU FHQ NETWORKS:

For classified information up to and including SECRET UE/EU SECRET:

The OCMN will be used within the EL EU FHQ at NEA SANTA (KILKIS) and for the exchange of EUCI with the EL EU OHQ.

For unclassified information including LIMITE:
The Internet can be used for exchange of unclassified data including LIMITE.

27. **VOICE:**

Classified Voice will be available only between the EL EU OHQ and the EL EU FHQ.

Unclassified Voice will be available between the DISTAFF and the EL EU OHQ.

28. **CIS RESPONSIBILITIES:**

**EUMS CIS DIR:**

EUMS CIS DIR will support EL EU OHQ for all CIS requirements related to the EU communication systems.

EUMS CIS DIR will coordinate all DISTAFF CIS requirements.

For all the above mentioned actions EUMS CIS DIR will coordinate with the EEAS BA.SI.3/BA.BS.3.

**EL EU OHQ:**

EL EU OHQ will coordinate all EL EU OHQ CIS requirements.

EL EU OHQ will be responsible for the OCMN and its extension to the EL EU FHQ, and for the coordination of all EL EU FHQ CIS requirements.

**EL EU FHQ:**

EL EU FHQ will be responsible for the CIS at its level and will provide the secure environment for the OCMN extension to the EL EU FHQ in accordance with the OCMN SECOPS.

29. **CIS SUPPORT:**

**Operational and Technical Support on EU OPS WAN and SOLAN:**

The MILSAT (Military Security Administration Team) of the EUMS CIS Directorate in Brussels will be the Single Point of Contact for the first line technical support of SOLAN and EU OPS WAN between Brussels and the EL EU OHQ, as well as for their corresponding services (E-mail, CAMEO, ELMA and SVTC).

The MILSAT will try to identify the source of the problem and either solve it up at their level of responsibility or escalate it to the next line of support.
The MILSAT will be available during working days/hours (08.00 – 18.00, Brussels time) in the EUMS Kortenbergh 150 building. Outside working days/hours, a NCO duty officer will arrive upon urgent request within 2hrs.

Phone number: +32 2 584 2828

Email: (unclassified): EUMS - SIC SAT (eums.sat@eeas.europa.eu)

Email (EU OPS WAN): MIL-SAT

Operational and Technical Support on EEAS-Net and AGORA:

The EEAS IT HELPDESK will provide first line support for all EEAS-Net and Agora related issues during the working hours (08.00 – 18.00, Brussels time)

Phone number: +32.2.584 33 33

Email: EEAS-IT-HELPDESK@eeas.europa.eu

Operational and Technical Support on OCMN:

The EL EU OHQ is responsible for providing first and second level technical support for any incidents related to the provided services both in the location of the EL EU OHQ and the EL EU FHQ.

30. CIS TESTING

Prior to STARTEX, a communication test will be conducted in order to check the CIS connectivity between the different entities and to confirm the identity of the distant end users.

The test, commonly scheduled between the EUMS DISTAFF and the EL OHQ, and before STARTEX, will focus on the ability to exchange information between DISTAFF, EL EU OHQ and EL EU FHQ personnel using the EU OPS WAN and the OMN.

31. DEPLOYABLE PACKAGE (DP)
During MILEX 19, the EU OPSCEN CIS Deployable Package v.2.0 will be evaluated for its capability to connect and exchange information over the EU OPS WAN through dedicated satellite links and Internet connection, thus proving its role as a critical CIS supporting asset.

To achieve the MILEX 19 objectives, dedicated DP training will qualify MS augmentees to be able to deploy, use and maintain all DP related systems. At the end of the training the augmentees should be able to operate the system autonomously.

The estimated duration of all DP related activities comprises ten (10) working days. The first part will focus on the required theoretical background, which will permit the augmentees to become familiar with all aspects of the system. This knowledge will then be exercised and evaluated during the second part.

As a final stage of the training, an exchange of information over the EU OPS WAN is expected, in order to verify the successfully completion of the training and the achievement of the exercise objectives.

The training will be provided by specialised instructors from British Telecom, EEAS and presumably EUROSHELTER.

The DP will participate from its current (storage) position at Quartier Major HOSIAU military base in PEUTIE (BELGIUM). Up to two DP shelters, constituting one full DP set, will be fully activated and connected to the DP Central Node in BRUSSELS and eventually to the EU OPS WAN.

MS will be invited by EUMS CIS Directorate to offer qualified personnel as augmentees, who will participate in the afore-mentioned activities. Under the prerequisite of a successful evaluation, these personnel should be included in the EU OPSCEN Primary Augmentees Database.
D. MILEX 19 GEOSPATIAL SUPPORT

32. General aspects for the exercise:

To improve the knowledge of the Geospatial support provided by SATCEN (GeoINT products, Geohub) and Multi National Geospatial Support Group (Geospatial Information) is one of the objectives of the exercise (see EXSPEC point 22). Dedicated training and information on Geospatial support to EU Operation will be organized before and during the conduct phase.

The "EU Concept for Geospatial Information" (11124/08, dated 25 June 2008) will form the basis for the GEOSPATIAL Support in the exercise.

33. Geospatial support prior to the conduct phase:

A dedicated Geospatial data package containing harmonized geospatial database and geospatial products will be produced by both EU Satellite Centre (EU SATCEN) and the Multi-National Geospatial Support Group (MNGSG) and provided before the start of the conduct phase. Geospatial support necessary for the exercise will be also preventively agreed with the OHQ.

During the preparation of the exercise, the EU SATCEN will provide access to a Geo web portal on the Internet (Geohub). The instructions on how to request the access to Geo web portal will be provided by EU SATCEN.

34. Geospatial support during the conduct of the exercise:

OHQ and FHQ will have, in addition to what received in the Geospatial package, direct access to SATCEN and MNGSG products through the Geohub web platform that will be available to support the planning activities. The optimal distribution and access to data in the Geohub is limited by the networks on which the training audience is operating. The access to Geo web portal can be request from EU SATCEN.
E. INTELLIGENCE

35. General intelligence background:

The "EU Concept for Military Intelligence Structures in EU Crisis Management and EU-led Military Operations/Missions" (REV2 EEAS 01846/13, dated 15 November 2013) and the "EU SOP OHQ/J2" will form the basis for the planning and conduct of the military Intelligence for MILEX.

36. Special aspects for the exercise:

For MILEX 19 purposes, due to the time compression and exercise artificialities, a response cell for intelligence purposes will be established within the DISTAFF to handle intelligence injects and to provide replies to RFIs to exercise participants. Intelligence RFI will be addressed to the DISTAFF as appropriate.

GEOSPATIAL intelligence support will be provided during this exercise as described in the previous paragraph "D. MILEX 19 GEOSPATIAL SUPPORT".
F. CONDUCT PHASE

This paragraph presents the organization of the conduct of the exercise in a more detailed manner than the EXSPEC.

37. PRIOR TO THE CONDUCT OF THE EXERCISE

All scenario documentation will be available to MS and Training Audiences (TA) prior to the conduct of the exercise through the MILEX 19 AGORA website.

The EPT is in charge of the elaboration of prescript documents in cooperation with the EL EU OHQ.

The Initiating Military Directive (IMD) will be uploaded in the MILEX 19 AGORA website prior STARTEX.

38. DISTAFF

For the conduct of the exercise a DISTAFF will be established under the authority of the OCE and led by the ExDir. This DISTAFF is to direct, monitor and control the exercise, in order to create the environment that will allow the TAs the achievement of the aim and objectives of the exercise. Details of the DISTAFF organisation, functions and arrangements will be presented in the DISTAFF Instructions (DI-INST).

The DISTAFF will be mainly composed of:

- An Exercise Direction cell, responsible for the overall event coordination;
- Two DISTAFF Liaison Elements, at the EL EU OHQ and the EL EU FHQ, in charge of the monitoring and control of the exercise at the level of each TA;
- An EU SATCEN support element, to be deployed to the EL EU OHQ and EL EU FHQ;
- A DISTAFF- Crisis Planning Team (CPT), to be sent to the EL EU OHQ to portray the handover of the planning responsibilities from the EUMS to the EL EU OHQ;
- A Situation Centre, in charge of following the exercise play and of injecting additional supporting information, incidents and/or simulated responses, including responses to Requests for Information (RFI).

39. CONDUCT OF THE EXERCISE.

In order to achieve the above aim and exercise objectives, MILEX 19 Conduct Phase will be as follows:
Two DISTAFF Liaison elements will be deployed to the EL EU OHQ and EL EU FHQ for the complete duration of the conduct of the exercise, in order to monitor the exercise conduct at the OHQ and FHQ level and the military planning process at the respective levels, as well as to report to the DISTAFF.

An EU SATCEN representative will be deployed to both the EL EU OHQ and EL EU FHQ, prior the conduct phase and for the complete duration of it in order to ensure proper access of the TA to the exercise Geospatial Dataset (See paragraph D), to support the EL EU OHQ in all technical aspect of the use of Geospatial tools, and to provide the necessary clarification or answers to all the issues regarding the geospatial dataset for the fictitious region.

- From 04 to 05 November, the in-processing and Work Up Staff Training (WUST) will be organised in each HQ. A EUMS DISTAFF-CPT will be deployed to the EL EU OHQ in order to portray the handover of the planning responsibilities, from the EUMS to the EL EU OHQ;

- On 06 November, the EUMS DISTAFF-CPT will deliver the Initiating Military Directive (IMD) and other exercise planning documents to the EL EU OHQ. This will be considered the STARTEX of the Conduct Phase. The EUMS DISTAFF-CPT will provide support to the EL EU OHQ until the 08 November.

- From 06 to 13 November the operational planning at the military strategic level will be developed by the EL EU OHQ and operational level by the EL EU FHQ.

- In parallel, from 06 to 07 November, representatives from EU partners will observe the exercise. They will be escorted by a EUMS officer that will be supported by elements of the EL EU OHQ. (See paragraph G).

- On 14 November, the EL EU OHQ will organise a Distinguished Visitors Day (DVD). The OpCdr will present his draft CONOPS and provisional Statement of Requirements (PSOR) to the OCE at OHQ location and the FCdr will present his draft CONOPS to the OpCdr. The CONOPS and PSOR will be sent to the ExDir (ENDEX).

- From 14 to 15 November. Hot Wash Up (HWU) and out-processing.

40. CONDUCT ORGANISATION SCHEMATICS:
G. EU PARTNERS PARTICIPATION AND OBSERVATION

Reference

A. Exercise Policy of the European Union under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) (Doc. 8909/14, dated 11 April 2014)

B. Agreement between the EU and the NATO on the security of information, Council decision 2003/211/CFSP of 24 Feb 2003.


41. EU Partners observation

EU Partners' observation of MILEX19 will be organised in accordance with the relevant agreed security arrangements.

Before the conduct of the exercise, informal staff-to-staff contacts are foreseen to finalise the observation arrangements.

During the conduct of the exercise, representatives of EU partners will be invited to observe the planning handover between the EUMS and the EL EU OHQ. This observation will include specific briefings on the scenario, the state of play and the eventual actions to be taken, in support of, and at the request of, the fictitious countries. It will be coordinated by the EUMS, with the support of the EL EU OHQ and eventually of additional EU Staff.

42. NATO observation of MILEX 19

Arrangements for NATO observation of MILEX 19 may be implemented in accordance with paragraph I.21 of the EU Exercise Policy (Ref. A).

NATO may be invited to observe MILEX 19, on the basis of reciprocity regarding NATO exercises. As part of this observation, it is envisaged that NATO would be involved in informal staff-to-staff contacts before the Exercise. During the Conduct Phase, NATO may be invited to a specific briefing on the scenario, the state of play and the range of actions being, or envisaged to be taken, in support of and at the request of the affected fictitious countries. The involvement of NATO
representatives will be in accordance with the relevant EU - NATO documents, including the NATO-EU Security Agreement (Ref. B).

For organisation purposes, this observation will be limited to 3 observers.

43. UN participation in or observation of MILEX 19

Paragraph I.24 of the EU Exercise Policy (Ref. A) enables possible participation and observation by the United Nations. Participation in or observation of the MILEX 19 conduct could be an opportunity to explore ways of growing EU - UN cooperation.

The UNs' participation in or observation of MILEX 19 will be performed in accordance with article 3 of the HR decision of 19 April 2013 on security rules applicable to the EEAS (Ref. F). The involvement of UN representatives will be in accordance with the relevant EU - UN documents (Ref. C).

LIMITE documents produced in the framework of this exercise may be released to UN, in accordance to the para H Information managements and based on the need to know of the UN.

For organisation purposes this observation will be limited to 3 observers.

44. Partner Countries participation in or observation of MILEX 19

Partner Countries - such as non-EU European NATO members, Candidates for accession to the EU and States engaged in political dialogue with the EU - will be invited to participate in MILEX 19 or its Observation period in accordance with paragraph I.22 and I.23 of the EU Exercise Policy (Ref. A), providing that the related Framework Participation Agreement and Permanent Security Information Agreement with the EU are in force.

Partners' participation in or observation of MILEX 19 will be performed in accordance with article 3 of the HR decision of 19 April 2013 on security rules applicable to the EEAS (Ref. D).

For organisation purposes this observation will be limited to 2 observers from each country.
H. INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

References:

A. Council Security Rules (OJ L 274 dated 15/10/2013);


D. EUMS SOP on Information Management.

45. Internet online tool

In order to provide a permanent and comprehensive picture of the exercise to MS, the MILEX 19 AGORA webpage will compile all scenario related official messages and documents produced before and during the conduct of the exercise, in accordance with point 45.

MILEX 19 AGORA will be managed by DISTAFF.

An access can be granted on request to MILEX19@eeas.europa.eu

46. Type of documents and classification

Real life ("NO PLAY") messages or documents:

During the conduct of MILEX 19, messages and documents related to real events or persons are to be handled through the appropriate network using the lowest appropriate level of classification.

Each participant originating or receiving an EU Classified Information (EUCI) must apply the related EU Security Rules in place (Ref. A, B and C).

If needed the mention "NO PLAY" can be used.

Scenario related messages and documents:

In order to provide a permanent and comprehensive picture of the exercise to the MS, during the conduct of MILEX 19, all scenario related messages and documents will be put on the MILEX 19 AGORA webpage.
Therefore, the scenario related messages and documents:

- Must be marked EXERCISE – EXERCISE – EXERCISE at the top and bottom of each page.

- Will have the distribution mark LIMITE.

In the case of sensitive, non-public documents that could be shared with UN, the following marking must be used:

EXERCISE – EXERCISE – EXERCISE

MILEX 19

LIMITE

RELEASABLE TO UN

47. Use of networks

The information shall transit through the appropriate network regarding their supposed origin or classification in the real life.

48. Information flow architecture

From STARTEX to ENDEX, the exchange of information between the DISTAFF in Brussels and the EL EU OHQ will be based on the EU Operations Wide Area Network (EU OPS WAN) for classified and non-classified information related to conduct of the exercise.

The relevant nodal points for receiving official information are:

- MILEX 19 DISTAFF Information Management Cell (IMC);

- EL EU OHQ IMC;

- EL EU FHQ IMC.
I. POST-EXERCISE REPORTING

References:

A. EU Military Lessons Learnt at the Political Strategic Level Concept (Doc. 10692/15, dated 8 July 2015).

B. EU OHQ SOP Chapter 7, Lessons Learned Annex.

One of MILEX 19 objectives is to provide Lessons Observations (LO) with a view to improving the military contribution to CSDP. A comprehensive evaluation process will be conducted in accordance with the References in two phases; Reporting and Evaluation.

49. Reporting (FIRs/FER)

Immediately after conduct of the exercise, the ExDir, the OpCdr and the FCdr are to provide First Impression Reports (FIRs) to the OCE.

MS and supporting actors (EEAS bodies, the EU SatCen...) are encouraged to provide FIRs to the OCE. All FIRs must be addressed to the OCE according to the schedule depicted in Appendix 1 using MILEX19@eas.europa.eu. A FIR structure is provided in Appendix 2.

A compilation of all FIRs will then be circulated to the TA, MS and supporting actors. This FIRs compilation will provide the basis for a draft Final Exercise Report (FER). FER will be finalised in the post Exercise Discussion, in the format of the EUMC meeting, with the participation as appropriate of experts from the MS, and submitted to the PSC for endorsement.

50. Evaluation (Strategic level Lessons collection)

Each stakeholder is responsible for the collection of LO and the conduct of the analysis at its level:

- DISTAFF (EUMS/CONCAP/ETA, under the authority of the ExDir) for LO related to the preparation and conduct of the exercise, and at the political-strategic level

- EL EU OHQ (OHQ/J7, under the authority of the OpCdr) for LO at the military strategic level;

- EL EU FHQ (FHQ/J5, under the authority of the FCdr) for LO at the operational level.

Lessons relevant for the political-strategic level

EUMS (CONCAP/ETA) will collect LO at the political-strategic level, from both the ExDir and the TAs, and pass them through the EU Lessons Process in accordance with Ref A.
The capture of all LO should be done in accordance with the template provided in the Appendix 3 at the appropriate classification level.
## POST-EXERCISE REPORTING AGENDA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>EVENT</th>
<th>ACTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>By 29 Nov 2019 at the latest</td>
<td>First Impression Reports (FIRs) to OCE</td>
<td>ExDir, OpCdr, FCdr, MS and supporting actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06 Dec 2019</td>
<td>Compilation of FIRs to be distributed</td>
<td>EUMS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Dec 2019 at the latest</td>
<td>Initial draft Final Exercise Report (FER) to be drafted and distributed</td>
<td>EUMS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 January 2020 (TBC)</td>
<td>Post Exercise Discussion (PXD)</td>
<td>TA and exercise experts form the MS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No later than 5 weeks after PXD</td>
<td>Notation of FER with associated advice, exercise reporting process completed</td>
<td>PSC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
FIRST IMPRESSION REPORT (FIR)

1. GENERAL

2. INITIAL OVERVIEW

3. ACHIEVEMENT OF THE EXERCISE AIM

4. ACHIEVEMENT OF THE OVERALL EXERCISE OBJECTIVES

5. ACHIEVEMENT OF THE EXERCISE OBJECTIVES AT OHQ LEVEL (for EU OHQ)

6. ACHIEVEMENT OF THE EXERCISE OBJECTIVES AT FHQ LEVEL (for EU FHQ)

7. EXERCISE PLANNING ISSUES
   a. Planning organisation and meetings
   b. Planning documents
   c. Financing of the exercise
   d. Scenario
   e. Pre Exercise Activities
   f. Partner Countries participation

8. EXERCISE CONDUCT PHASE
   a. Military Planning Process
   b. Coordination
   c. DISTAFF activities
   d. Partners observation phase

9. COMMUNICATIONS ISSUES
   a. Information Management
b. Work with the different IT systems

10. RECOMMENDATIONS AND OTHER ASPECTS (AS APPROPRIATE)
LESSON OBSERVATION FORM

The level of classification of those lessons must be carefully considered.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lesson Observation</th>
<th>The Lesson Observation should be SMART:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Specific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Measurable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Attainable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Relevant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Time bounded</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>CSDP activity related to the Lesson.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Title</td>
<td>The title should reflect the domain covered and provide the main features of the Lesson.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Detailed description of the facts</th>
<th>This paragraph should answer the five questions:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Who? (Stakeholders involved)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What? (Action performed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Where? (Information on space, environment or location)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>When? (Information on time)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What for? (Rationale of the action performed)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description of the operational impact</th>
<th>This paragraph should depict the overall effect on the operational output:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In which extent?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In which manner?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
J. EL EU OHQ / FHQ MANNING AUGMENTATION

A Manning Conference based on the EL EU OHQ and EL EU FHQ augmentees' requirements was conducted during the MPM on 28 May 2019.

The outcome is provided in a separate document.

Further contacts and joining instructions are to be directly coordinated between the MS providing augmentees and the EL EU OHQ and EL EU FHQ.
SECTION 2

EXERCISE SCENARIO
K. INTRODUCTION TO THE SCENARIO DOCUMENTATION:

1. GEOSPATIAL DATA PACKAGE:

Geospatial data package comprising of geospatial database and geospatial products is created by EU Satellite Centre (EU Satcen) and Multinational Geospatial Support Group (MN GSG) from the scenario. They consist in maps of the African North region for illustration of the geographical environment and exercise scenario.

a. Access to MS:

During the preparation of the exercise, the EU SatCen provides access to Geo web portal (GISMO Geohub accessible via the Internet) to facilitate access to EU MS and exercise core planning to exercise geospatial data and products. The access can be requested to EU SatCen.

b. Access for the training audience:

During the conduct of the exercise, the main working networks being classified ones; data distributed on DVD will be the only reference to be used by the training audience.

2. EXERCISE SCENARIO:

In order to provide a permanent and comprehensive picture of the exercise conduct to EU MS, the MILEX 19 AGORA webpage will compile the scenario related official messages and documents produced before and during the conduct of the exercise, in accordance with paragraph H.

MILEX 19 scenario consists in the trail of documents to be found in this section.

For pedagogic purposes, all the agreed scenario documentation will be available to the MS and TA prior to the exercise conducts through the MILEX 19 AGORA website.

3. ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTATION PRIOR TO THE CONDUCT PHASE:

The OpCdr’s Advance Planning Team (APT), supposed in Brussels prior to the conduct phase, might be played, and the planning documents elaborated by the EPT (IMD and mission analysis brief) will be available to the EU EL OHQ through MILEX 19 AGORA website prior STARTEX, in accordance with paragraph H.
LIMITE

EXERCISE - EXERCISE – EXERCISE
L. TRAINING OBJECTIVES
## EL EU OHQ Training Objectives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>OHQ Training Objectives</th>
<th>Priority (1 – 3)</th>
<th>TA / CJ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>To test the hand – over process for the transfer of planning authority from the political strategic level (EUMS) to the military strategic level (OHQ).</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>All CJs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>To exercise a back-brief after the Hand-Over/Take over (HOTO) in order to test the understanding of the planning products that have been delivered by the EUMS.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>All CJs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>To establish links between the OHQ’s directorates/branches and the EEAS respective functional areas where necessary.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>All CJs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>To test the interaction between the EL EU OHQ and the EL EU FHQ during the parallel planning process.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>All CJs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>To exercise the Request For Information (RFI) procedure via the OHQ Information Management Cell (IMC).</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>All CJs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>To test the functionality of all the EL EU OHQ facilities</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>All CJs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>To test the OHQ sets of SOPs and IPs within the respective Directorates</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>All CJs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## OHQ Training Objectives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>OHQ Training Objectives</th>
<th>Priority (1 – 3)</th>
<th>TA / CJ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>To establish (including manning) and operate the EL EU OHQ</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CJ1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>To exercise the activation, build-up and the proper functioning of the EL EU OHQ</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CJ1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>To test the In processing procedure of Primary Augmentees (PA) personnel</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>CJ1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>To provide a full CE ORBAT</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CJ1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>To establish and test all personnel reports, returns and responses</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CJ1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>To provide guidance to the EL EU FHQ on personnel related issues</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>CJ1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>To provide and test personnel services and manpower management</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CJ1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>To exercise Personnel Plans, &amp; Operations according to the relatives SOPs and IPs.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CJ1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>To identify any shortfalls in the Manning of the OHQ and to provide them as part of the Lessons Learned process.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CJ1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>To test the Out processing procedure after ENDEX.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>CJ1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>OHQ Training Objectives</td>
<td>Priority (1 – 3)</td>
<td>TA / CJ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>To develop and maintain a detailed collection plan to address OpCdr’s Priority of Intelligence Requirements (PIR) and other intelligence requirements as appropriate.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CJ2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>To incorporate and manage all the geographic data and information provided by the GEO entities in planning issues on intelligence &amp; security</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CJ2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>To produce a final version of Rules of Engagement Requirements (ROEREQ) in close co-ordination with LEGAD</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CJ3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>To exercise the RFI procedure IOT develop and manage Commanders Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CJ3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>To exercise the creation of the Joint Integrated Prioritized Target List</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>CJ3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>To exercise the Logistic Planning, related to all logistic functions including Medical-Manning and Finance, in close coordination with the respective OHQ’s Directorates and Branches.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CJ4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>To exercise the development of the Multinational Detailed Deployment Plan (MNDDP).</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CJ4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>To form a functional and reliable Strategic Planning Group (SPG), in size and nature, according to the needs of the</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CJ5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>OHQ Training Objectives</td>
<td>Priority (1 – 3)</td>
<td>TA / CJ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>To Develop the Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) and the Measures of Performance (MOPs).</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>CJ5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>To establish a functional and realistic Battle Rhythm for the OHQ staff.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CJ5 (SPG)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>To establish a realistic Staffing timelines</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>CJ5 (SPG)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>To develop an Operational Design at the military-strategic level.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CJ5 (SPG)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>To develop a Strategic Planning Directive (SPD).</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CJ5 (SPG)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>To develop a Concept of Operation (CONOPS).</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CJ5 (SPG)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>To develop a Provisional Statement of Requirement (PSOR).</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CJ5 (SPG)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>To exercise the use of permanent and alternate Communications and Information Systems (CIS) links and services between the EL EU OHQ, the EL EU FHQ and the other EU bodies.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CJ6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>OHQ Training Objectives</td>
<td>Priority (1 – 3)</td>
<td>TA / CJ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>To exercise the permanent and alternate CIS procedures between the OHQ, FHQ and the other national and EU bodies.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CJ6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>To exercise Cybersecurity planning, concepts, incident coordination and management at the OHQ level.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CJ6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>To collect Lessons Observations (LO) in order to be exploited within OHQ level or to be submitted to EUMS for further analysis.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CJ7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>To present the budget proposal to ATHENA Special Committee and implement the accounting software ATRIUM for the budget execution, according to ATHENA Financial Rules.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CJ8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>To establish liaison between OHQ CIMIC personnel and all civil and military actors at all appropriate levels, providing a detailed list.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CJ9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>To monitor the Humanitarian Clusters in the AOO in order to provide all the necessary CIMIC Inputs/Assessment during the planning process (Development of CONOPS).</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>CJ9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### EL EU Training Objectives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>EL EU Training Objectives</th>
<th>Priority</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>FHQ activation (In/Out processing-Augmentees integration)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CJ1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Collection Plan development to cover all intelligence requirements</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CJ2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>FHQ activation / operation (facilities-infrastructure establishment)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CJ4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Development of the Multinational Detailed Deployment Plan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CJ4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>FHQ activation for Crisis Management Planning (CJOPG formation)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CJ5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Collection of Lessons Identified, in order to counter possible shortfalls</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CJ5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Practice the interaction between EL EU FHQ and the EL EU OHQ during the parallel planning process.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CJ5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Test operations planning procedures, establishing a functional and realistic Battle Rhythm</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CJ5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Development of a CONOPS</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CJ5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## EL EU Training Objectives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>EL EU Training Objectives</th>
<th>Priority</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Cyber security planning, incident coordination and management</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CJ6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Communication and Information Systems (CIS) deployment, establishment and exploitation between EL EU FHQ and EL EU OHQ</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CJ6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>FHQ activation (Augmentees training)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CJ7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Practice the procedures concerning the ATHENA mechanism, including all respective applications.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CJ8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Exercise and improve PIO integration within the planning process and establish procedures for crisis management and media handling.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>PIO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Practice the planning process according to the respective SOP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>All CJs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Staff procedures implementation, including Staff training on SOPs and IPs handling</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>All CJs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Decision making process implementation</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>All CJs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Exercise the Request For Information procedure</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>All CJs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
M. POLITICAL BACKGROUND
SECTION 2 - M - 1
ROADMAP TO REGION CRISIS
The Roppertan Revolution was an intensive campaign of civil resistance, including a series of street demonstrations taking place in Ropperta city, and led to the ousting of long-time president in January 2011. It eventually led to a thorough democratization of the country and free and democratic elections.

The demonstrations were caused by high unemployment, hyperinflation, corruption, the abuse of fundamental human rights such as freedom of speech by the state authorities' lack of political freedoms like freedom of speech, and poor living conditions. The protests constituted the most dramatic wave of social and political unrest in Ropperta in three decades and resulted in scores of deaths and injuries, most of which were the result of repressive action by police and security forces against demonstrators.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>EVENT</th>
<th>EXINST DOCUMENT RELATED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Before 2011</td>
<td>The Roppertan Revolution was an intensive campaign of civil resistance, including a series of street demonstrations taking place in Ropperta city, and led to the ousting of long-time president in January 2011. It eventually led to a thorough democratization of the country and free and democratic elections. The demonstrations were caused by high unemployment, hyperinflation, corruption, the abuse of fundamental human rights such as freedom of speech by the state authorities' lack of political freedoms like freedom of speech, and poor living conditions. The protests constituted the most dramatic wave of social and political unrest in Ropperta in three decades and resulted in scores of deaths and injuries, most of which were the result of repressive action by police and security forces against demonstrators.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 2011</td>
<td>End of Revolution. Election in Ropperta of a Constituent Assembly</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar 2012</td>
<td>The Constituent Assembly declared it will not support making SHARIA the main source of legislation in the new constitution, maintaining the secular nature of the state</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr 2015</td>
<td>NEXSTA kidnap 200 girls in South Loripa.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar 2015</td>
<td>Ratification of a new constitution of Ropperta Basing on illegal trafficking of oil and weapons with Loripa, as well as on support from international sympathizers, NEXSTA is able to get a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 2015</td>
<td>Presidential Elections in Ropperta. Begh CAOP ESVERTY was elected as the first president under the country's new constitution.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 2016</td>
<td>A new unity government in Ropperta continues to balance political cohesion with economic and social pressures.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb 2016</td>
<td>Corruption scandal leads to dismissal of the head of Police in Ropperta.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar 2016</td>
<td>Social unrest in the South of Ropperta demanding visible changes after the revolution.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun 2016</td>
<td>Radical political parties are welcoming Jihadists returning from Middle East in South Ropperta.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 2016</td>
<td>The porous border between Loripa and Ropperta, coupled with widespread corruption, make the control of cross-border illegal trafficking difficult.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 2016</td>
<td>Terrorist attack on three villages in South Ropperta perpetrated by NEXSTA. Hundreds of people are massacred.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 2016</td>
<td>ECHO report on the dire humanitarian situation in the region on North Africa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 2016</td>
<td>UNSC resolution condemning terrorist attacks and the dire humanitarian situation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb 2017</td>
<td>Situation in the South of Ropperta has significantly deteriorated as NEXSTA's attacks, operating from Loripa, have increased.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar 2017</td>
<td>Clash in Loripa/Ropperta border region between NEXSTA and Ropperta security forces results in dozens of military dead.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2017</td>
<td>Loripa is accused by the international community of trading oil and weapons with terrorist group NEXSTA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oct 2017</td>
<td>Outbreak of cholera of unknown origin in Ropperta</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dec 2017</td>
<td>Kronen reinforce ties with Loripa in the domain of Defence and Energy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Feb 2018</td>
<td>Terrorist attacks claimed by NEXSTA simultaneously in France and UK.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mar 2018</td>
<td>300 hundred people fleeing violence in Loripa lose their lives in the Mediterranean Sea.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>UN Resolution on the security situation in Loripa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Apr 2018</td>
<td>Assassination of an EU official in MENA region not claimed by any terrorist group.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Increase in the influx of migrants from Loripa and Ropperta towards Europe, due to the incursions of NEXSTA.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>NEXSTA attacks, using guerrilla tactics to spread terror and impose sharia law on villages that are not under the protective umbrella of Ropperta security forces, include the abduction of girls and women, who are even used as human bombs.</td>
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<tr>
<td>May 2018</td>
<td>Double terrorist attack in Brussels against the EU institutions. Initially claimed by NEXSTA but not confirmed. Evidence point to a different actor</td>
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<td>UNSC resolution condemns Loripa for permitting the proliferation of terrorist camps in South Loripa and the trafficking of weapons.</td>
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<td>A cyber-attacks against an EU delegation (Ropperta) communications networks (no internet connection for 72 hours).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jun 2018</td>
<td>Disinformation campaign by Kronen against the way EU is managing the migration crisis in the Mediterranean</td>
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</table>
## An ICRC report on the dire humanitarian situation in the South region (Loripa and Ropperta) shocks the international community.

### Sep 2018

- Disinformation coming from different sources and particularly from KRONEN against the EU "illegal intervention" in North Africa increases to the point of being the trend topic in social networks.
- General Mayimbe threatens the EU by tweeter with possible cuts of gas supply if the EU launches a military operation in neighbouring Ropperta. The markets react negatively to this statement.
- Intelligence reports leaked to the press show the presence of Kronen special operations forces in Loripa supporting terrorist training camps.
- Satellite images of brand new pick-ups delivered to NEXSTA in South Loripa are leaked through the net.

## NEXSTA able to permanently hold of some territory in the South of Ropperta.

### Feb 2019

- The president of Ropperta has sent several letters to the UN SG and the HR/VP requesting for external support, including the intervention of armed forces and police, to help Ropperta to address the situation.

## UNSC resolution on Ropperta authorising EU support.

### Apr 2019

- EU MS request that the HR/VP explores options for a possible CSDP deployment in Ropperta.
- The capacity of NEXSTA to attack objectives in South and Central Ropperta has substantially increased, since beginning of 2019 NEXSTA has been able to permanently hold of some territory in the South of Ropperta.

## Political Framework for a Crisis Approach in Ropperta is presented to PSC.

### Jun 2019
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tr>
<td>Sep 2019</td>
<td>Crisis Management Concept for a possible CSDP military operation and a civilian mission in Ropperta is presented to PSC.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Oct 2019| CSDP: The civilian mission and the military operation are established but not launched yet.  
Brussels fears a consular crisis. Any incident occurs in a MENA country putting at risk EU citizens.  
Around 80,000 Roppertans are moving northwards in October 2019, mainly women, children and elderly people, who are defenceless against the growingly aggressive attacks by NEXSTA.  
Roughly 1,000 people per day flee from South Lopipa towards Ropperta hoping to use it as a springboard towards the EU. |
SECTION 2 - M - 2

CRISIS SUMMARY
August 2017 - October 2019

A. GENERAL AND SECURITY SITUATION

ROPPERTA

1. Although relatively small, Ropperta has a rich history and used to be a country economically prosperous and culturally influential. 98% of the Roppertan population identifies as Muslim.

2. Since the revolution in 2011, and the fall of the precedent dictatorial regime, Ropperta has shown its determination to consolidate a democratic state capable of integrating and respecting all different political parties representing its society. The secular party has won the latest free and fair parliamentarian elections in November 2015 by a small majority. Begh CAOP ESVERTY was elected President of the Roppertan Government. The four years old government is developing huge efforts to maintain the cohesion of the population and its support to the democratic endeavour.

3. The rule of Begh CAOP ESVERTY, since the end of 2015, has brought relative political and economic stability to the country until the 2018. During this period 2015-18, Ropperta has advanced in the economic, political, social and cultural domains and has increased cooperation with its neighbours and overseas, particularly with the EU, which considers that Ropperta may become a key state capable to provide stability and prosperity to the whole region. Ropperta
has made important progress to income poverty, promoting gender equality and women empowerment reducing child mortality, ensuring environmental sustainability and developing a global partnership for development.

4. Ropperta has reinforced ties with the EU in the domain of security and defence. Several projects on advice, mentoring and training have been developed by the EU to support the Government led Security Sector Reform. Roppertan Defence Forces consists of Army, Navy and Air force, which are equipped with a relative modest mix of western and eastern capabilities. Armed Forces have been traditionally ineffective and subject to shortages in fuel and spares, with reduced training and periods where personnel have not been paid causing a certain level of unrest within them.

5. On the other side, institutional corruption hampers development, particularly regarding the rule of law. Unequal distribution of wealth, unavailability of social services and lack of the state presence in Southern provinces need to be addressed to counter the influence of radicalism promoted by NEXSTA in those areas.

6. Government of Ropperta is struggling in terms of security, especially since January 2017, when hundreds of people were massacred during a terrorist attack to three villages in South Ropperta perpetrated by NEXSTA. Since then, clashes in Loripa/Ropperta border region between NEXSTA and Roppertan security and armed forces results in dozens of police and military dead.

7. For the last years the terrorist organisation, NEXSTA, mainly operating from the neighbour country Loripa, continued producing great suffering in Southern Ropperta, including 100,000 of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and 50,000 refugees, who are not well protected and ill-equipped to deal with the most basic subsistence or get basic security needs. The hallmarks of the NEXSTA among this ten years period have been abduction of an estimated 1,000 children, brutal disfigurement of people, rape and murder. Tens of thousands of people are thought to have died.

8. The security situation has deteriorated significantly over the past months, once NEXSTA has been able to maintain permanent presence in Southern Ropperta, particularly in the province of
Tabaluga. Since January 2019, there have been numerous violent protests with riots that have been orchestrated mainly by NEXSTA and its political proxy. NEXSTA massacred 200 civilians in a village close to the Loripa border last February.

9. The terrorist activities of NEXSTA and the appearance of paramilitary groups who are imposing their "own security" in the region have successfully challenged Roppertan authorities directly. Attendance to school, especially that of girls, has dropped drastically. Some parts of the South have effectively become permissive environment for organised crime including trafficking of women, men, boys and girls. NGOs continue to operate in order to provide humanitarian aid to refugees and displaced population although there are tensions with local authorities on how and where to operate.

10. Government of Ropperta has pursued various initiatives to bring an end to NEXSTA campaign, including: the Reconciliation Act and military operations by the Roppertan Armed Forces.

11. Police, border guards and armed forces are increasingly stretched and ineffective, they are unable to fulfil their role in the South, and due to problems with the payment of salaries there are increasing stories of corruption, extortion and sexual gender based violence.

12. Relations between Ropperta and its neighbour to the west, Loripa, are tense, mainly due to the difficulty of managing a porous common border, especially in the South. Apart from the terrorist activities carried out by NEXSTA in the South, there is an increase in criminal organizations along the whole border taking profit of the rise of the substantial irregular migration flows, illegal traffic and smuggling, particularly of human beings. Relations between both countries remain strained though diplomatic relations are restores, mainly due to the pressure of the International Community.

13. On the other side, a relevant state actor in the region, Kronen, has publicly denounced the EU's efforts to support Ropperta, especially those ones aiming at developing more efficient, accountable and responsible Armed Forces that would operate in accordance with human rights, gender issues and International Humanitarian Law. The Kronen leadership has called upon Roppertans to resist this "illegitimate interference and return back to the old colonialism policies that ravaged the African countries".
NEWBORN EXTREMIST STATE (NEXSTA)

14. NEXSTA is a global terrorist group belonging to a religious sect, whose main political objective is to impose its radical ideas by persuasion, force and coercion in order to establish a worldwide dominion. Its ideology clashes with western culture, values and lifestyle, which it considers decadent and a threat to their fundamental religious values.

15. NEXSTA has a history on mounting terrorist attacks on civilian and military targets in the Middle East, Europe and Northern Africa, including embassy bombings, attacks on trade and finance centres, industrial facilities, tourist location, etc. It has approximately 10 000 members worldwide, including 4 000 members in Loripa and Ropperta and some 500 within the EU Member States. They are successful in enlisting greater support within an environment of high unemployment and economic problems, which are blamed on globalization and international organisations resulting in the erosion of prosperity and sovereignty.

16. As its stronghold in the Middle East has been severely targeted in the latest years by the intervention of the International Community, NEXSTA is now following a more decentralized strategy, spreading its fighters and networks all over the world. In this regard, the group is spreading its influence across North Africa and the Mediterranean Sea.

17. NEXSTA has continually looked for new strongholds, particularly in non-completely or weak stable states, like Loripa or Ropperta, to establish new bases of operations in order to continue its campaign. In parallel, NEXSTA’s terrorist attacks have also increased across Europe in the recent months.

18. Based on illegal trafficking of oil and weapons with Loripa, as well as on support from international sympathizers, NEXSTA was able to get a permanent safe sanctuary in South Loripa from mid-2016. For this purpose NEXSTA uses instruments such as strong ideological training, a security service, a media branch, a military division against Roppertan forces, an external service and the promotion of social care for the lower classes to attract new recruits for its fanatic cause.
19. The capacity of NEXSTA to attack objectives in South and Central Ropperta has substantially increased, since beginning of 2019 NEXSTA has been able to permanently control some territory in the South of Ropperta.

20. So far, NEXSTA has demonstrated rudimentary cyber knowledge. Nevertheless, in order to increase propaganda activities, NEXSTA has shown considerable interest in improving its cyber capabilities, including through the use of hackers for hire.

21. Relations of NEXSTA and the Government of Loripa are opportunistic and unsteady. Currently, both need each other to survive, although they are rivals in terms of controlling the Southern part of Loripa. In any case, NEXSTA needs to extend and consolidate this safe haven, even beyond Loripa territory, to spread its influence worldwide.

22. The links between NEXSTA and the tribal warlords in South Loripa, who control the illegal trafficking of humans, weapons and drugs, are strong. This mutual support has allowed NEXSTA to increase its military capacity with medium more sophisticated weapons, CIS and vehicles.

23. There are hints that the refugee camps have become centres of gravity for groups involved in trafficking in human beings and soft targets for NEXSTA to commit children abductions.

24. NEXSTA has also used the children as soldiers during the conflict. The children suffer hard seasons of training; in fact they are trained along with the adults. Later, they participate with others militants in the attacks against the Roppertan population and in the combats against the Roppertan Armed Forces; in some extreme cases, they have also been obliged to perpetrate terrorist attacks.
25. Kronen is a federal state with a strong centralized government. It is stable and relatively safe. It occupies 70% of the African continent. It’s a country increasingly assertive about its potential economic world power and military strength.

26. Kronen is ruled by the President Peter Norrase who has won repeatedly elections since 1990, in the face of an almost non-existent political opposition. Over the last decade, Kronen has been developing a much more assertive global posture, searching for an increased geopolitical role worldwide to overcome internal crisis and improve its international market trade.

27. However, its political and economic interests and values clash with those of the EU and the rest of the Western world. Kronen’s systematic violations of human rights and international law have been repeatedly criticised by the EU and the international community. Economic and diplomatic sanctions are already in place by the EU since 2014. These include travel bans for certain individuals, whose bank accounts in the EU have also been frozen. Furthermore, certain categories of goods are placed under sanctions.

28. North Africa represents the first priority for Kronen's geopolitical ambitions. The Government is taking advantage of the political void of some countries and is extending its reach up to the Mediterranean Sea. Kronen's armament industry is expanding and is aggressively exploring new market opportunities, including in countries which are on the brink of a civil war but for which the UN has still not imposed a weapons embargo. Kronen's energy supply companies are lobbying the Government to gain more influence over oil and gas terminals in the North African region to supply its growing and non-self-sufficient.

29. Kronen puts an emphasis on the orchestrated usage of all instruments of power for the achievement of its strategic goals. Kronen is frequently accused of being behind hybrid attacks to harass western countries, and to weaken their economic and geopolitical influence. It has as well been frequently suspected of as an aggressor in cyberspace, performing malicious cyber activities with security and economic implications for the EU. However, in many cases, attribution cannot be confirmed with a sufficient degree of certainty.

30. After NEXSTA was pushed out of the Middle East, Kronen changed strategy in the North African region. It has put in place an internal “zero tolerance policy” to avoid any return of
jihadist fighters back to Kronen. In a recent press conference, the President of Kronen declared war on all terrorist groups and stated that in the fight against terrorism, “Kronen will follow a hard-line policy against those who support - directly or indirectly - any terrorist groups of any kind including NEXSTA”.

31. Police is the responsible for law enforcement agency, upholding general law and social order, public safety and border security including covering smuggling and illegal immigration. NEXSTA groups hardly infiltrate in Kronen due to the heavy securitisation of the border and an extremely strict migration policy, which leaves hundreds of migrants stranded at the country's borders. Religious groups (other than the traditional Kronen religion), non-governmental organizations and international civil society organisations are closely scrutinized by the security forces. Several international human rights NGOs have been expelled and others prosecuted in the last years blamed for carrying out seditious activities.

32. In spite of the theoretical hard position against NEXSTA, Kronen is providing cover support to some radical elements close to NEXSTA that actively conduct cyber-attacks and disinformation campaigns against Roppertan administration and EU engagement in the region.

33. At the same time Kronen has facilitated the establishment of a new haven for terrorists in South Loripa by providing weapons to the country's Government and warlords, which have direct links with the terrorists group. Many analysts agree on the risk that Kronen might indirectly use NEXSTA as a proxy, in a future, to directly target Europe, through creating a flow of refugees in a wave of sectarian violence, or terrorist acts.

34. The reaction of Kronen to the possible intervention of the EU on African soil is publicly stated in all international committees and official forums. Peter Norrase, president of Kronen, accuses Ropperta of being powerless to manage its internal affairs and accuses the EU of seizing the opportunity to spread its influence in the neighbouring continent with the risk of destabilizing the fragile North African region.
35. Loripa is a dictatorship, ruled by General MAYIMBE who took over power after a coup d’état which ended a revolution fuelled by demands for social change in 1992.

36. During the nineties, MAYIMBE, in alliance with Kronen, openly supported rebel movements all around the world. Loripa is inclined to make deals with external powers, notably Kronen on the supply of weapons. In a bilateral defence cooperation framework agreement, Kronen’s armed forces have, during the recent years, been providing Loripa with weapons as well as training in several domains including special operations and cyber warfare. During public speeches, General MAYIMBE clearly expressed his intention to use cyber weapons against EU as this has been demonstrated to have a high impact if used against EU critical infrastructures and EU internal security systems.

37. The narrative of MAYIMBE, supported by few countries such as Kronen, is that Europe has been ravaging natural resources in Africa during the last two centuries and Loripa have never been able to develop due to the continuous exploitation of its people by western countries and interference of the European countries in Loripa’s politics.

38. After the coup, Loripa's relations with the EU have deteriorated due to the General's warm relation with his Southern neighbour Kronen, but still some important commercial ties with the EU remain, notably the export of gas from Loripa which represents 36% of the EU demand.

39. There is a network of oil and gas pipelines from the production facilities in the South of the country to the export terminals on the northern coast. Oil is refined in facilities on the coast before being exported, mainly to the EU. Loripa's government has on some occasions threatened to nationalise the oil and gas companies which are partly western owned.

40. The population in the North of Loripa lives under the strong repression of the militarized police and the Army, while the South of the country is completely ruled by tribal war lords, although they have sworn fealty to MAYIMBE. The tribal warlords are important actors to understand the cohesion of Loripa, as they are the warrants of the oldest traditions of the people in Loripa. They control the illegal trafficking of humans, weapons and drugs and have links to extremist groups including NEXSTA. The lack of state authority and services and the sporadic fighting between tribes in the South has contributed to a dire humanitarian situation with acute
malnutrition and food insecurity, displacement, poor water, sanitation and health (WASH) conditions and frequent flare-up of communicable diseases. This crisis is characterised by frequent attacks against civilians, including acts of sexual and gender based violence (SGBV).

41. Loripa’s initial reaction to the possible EU intervention in Ropperta is aligned to Kronen’s foreign policy, although Mayimbe’s strategy has a shorter vision focused on an energy monopoly and regional interests.

42. Loripa is accused by the international community of trading oil and weapons with the terrorist group NEXSTA.

RASOLIA

43. Rasolia is a regional and middle power. It supplies large amounts of natural gas to Europe, and energy exports are the backbone of the economy. The security situation in Rasolia is quiet.

Being Ropperta and Rasolia neighboring nations with common ethnic and Arabic heritages, the relationship between Ropperta and Rasolia is friendly but sometimes difficult. Ropperta is known to have some issues with Rasolia including political differences. Nonetheless, the two nations developed a strong connection, a part of their long, rich historical tie.

44. Rasolia has a strong control of the common border with Ropperta. For the time being, there is no NEXSTA presence or activities in Rasolia.

45. Rasolian Government has provided strong support to the UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) and EU approach to the Ropperta crisis, included to a possible launch of a CSDP military operation and civilian mission.

ENGAGEMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
46. After substantial debates, the UN Security Council decided that action was needed in an attempt to stop inexorable slide towards conflict in the region and to provide greater support to the Roppertan government. An UNSCR authorized the deployment of a multinational stabilization force within Ropperta. The UN Secretary General encouraged the readiness of the EU to consider the establishment of a military CSDP operation and a civilian CSDP mission, bridging for a UN peacekeeping operation that would take over at a later stage, in order to improve the overall security situation and facilitate the preconditions for a durable peaceful solution of the disputes.

47. During discussions, the EU committed to take the lead under this mandate to deploy an EU-led military CSDP operation and a civilian CSDP mission within Ropperta as a manifest of its intent and determination towards the security, stability and prosperity in the Northern African region and its commitment to the UN-EU Strategic Partnership.

48. The UN Ropperta Team currently deployed in the country to face the humanitarian crisis is composed of roughly 550 staff split in the following agencies: UN (including OCHA) 75 staff; UNHCR 176 staff; UNICEF 126 staff; WHO 53 staff; UNDP 48 staff; WFP 39 staff; FAO 9 staff; UN WOMEN 7 staff; IOM 4 staff; UNESCO 2 staff; UNFPA 5 staff; UNIDO 3 staff; and UNAIDS 3 staff.

49. The UN Ropperta HQ and most of the staff are based in Ropperta capital, but a significant part of at least UNHCR, UNICEF, WHO and WFP are distributed over the country, especially in and around the refugee and IDP camps, and staff travel through the country continuously.

50. The ICRC continues to support vulnerable families, particularly civilian who had been displaced by fighting, with basic household’s items, such as food and seed. UN OCHA is also present on the ground and is assessing how to reinforce its Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination function.

EUROPEAN UNION

51. Within the framework of the UN-EU Strategic Partnership on Peacekeeping and Crisis Management, both organizations are assessing how to best to act in complementarity during
the planning and execution of the military CSDP mission and operation and the civilian CSDP mission, as well as on the transition to a UN operation, with a view to developing common guidelines for UN-EU cooperation under in such circumstances.

52. Partnership on complementarity and transition is to link up missions and operations with programmatic activities, enhance synergies with other organisations deploying before, after, or alongside UN and EU missions and operations including the African Union (AU), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and others, while taking into account and building on each entity's capabilities.

53. Following the developments in Ropperta the EU has activated the EEAS Crisis Response Mechanisms. Additionally, the EU has decided to acknowledge the request of its President. After the approval of the corresponding UNSCR supporting the EU's intervention at the request of the Roppertan Government, EU Member States have agreed to the proposal of planning a CSDP civilian mission and military operation and that EEAS continues the strategic planning with the assumption that a military CSDP operation and a civilian CSDP mission starts working on its strategic planning could be established.

54. In coordination with the wider International Community, in the short and medium term, EU intends to improve the humanitarian situation in Ropperta, prevent atrocities against the population, support its government in order to restore order and security in the South of the country and deter potential risks to lines of communications and critical infrastructure. By avoiding escalation of the conflict, respecting the sovereignty of the country and its neighbouring countries and without interfering in the functions of the local government. EU action will contribute to ensuring the respect of human rights, in particular the protection of women, youth, children and minorities.

55. In the longer term, basing of its ability and credibility as a security provider, EU pretends to contribute to support the coordinating and stabilization efforts by the UN, including resettlement of the IDPs and refugees, effective security sector and border and migration management in order to achieve a sustainable settlement of the conflict in the whole region, as well as to reduce poverty and promote democratization and economic development.
The consequences of the EU getting involved in North Africa do not take long to appear. An increase in cyber-attacks of an unknown origin and a varying type start targeting EU delegations, CSDP communication networks, and some critical infrastructure of several EU Member States.

Disinformation coming from different sources and particularly from Kronen with the message against the EU "illegal intervention" in North Africa increases to the point of being a trend topic on social networks.

The threat of NEXSTA is more present with targeted attacks to EU interests in European soil, the Mediterranean and EU interests in Africa. The terrorist leader campaigns also against the intervention of any EU mission in Africa.

On top of this, Loripa seems to take profit of the situation trying to destabilise the EU markets and threatening the EU with gas supply reductions.

Ropperta has limited HNS capacity/capabilities and poor lines of communication in the South. Kronen, Loripa and NEXSTA oppose to an EU-led intervention in Ropperta.

While much of Ropperta might be considered as a permissive environment for an EU-led military force, the South of the country is non-permissive and even hostile where NEXSTA is in control.

Since 2017, the situation in the South of Ropperta has significantly deteriorated as NEXSTA's attacks, operating from Loripa, have increased. These attacks, using guerrilla tactics to spread terror and impose sharia law on villages that are not under the protective umbrella of Roppertan security forces, include the abduction of girls and women, who are even used as human bombs.
63. In fact, since the end of January 2019, NEXSTA has been able to hold some territory in the province of Tabaluga, South Ropperta, including two towns and appears to have some support from the local Roppertan population. From this zone, NEXSTA is operating more continuously against Ropperta and is able to target central parts of Ropperta, such as the area between Gabel and Mesuz, including critical infrastructure, such as harbours. NEXSTA's elements are settling more and more permanently in this territory in Ropperta and are preparing defensive posture. As a consequence, UN and other NGO,s has left from South Ropperta, this leads to an halt on basic food and health support in these areas.

64. In addition to the constant refugees flow from Loripa to Ropperta, part of the affected South Roppertan population, mallowish and unhealthy, is fleeing to safer provinces, where national security forces are more present. Around 80 000 Roppertans are moving northwards in October 2019, mainly women, children and elderly people, who are defenceless against the growingly aggressive attacks by NEXSTA. The massive displacement has led to the opening of three camps for IDPs in Ropperta, with 35 000 IDPs each, and three refugee camps, comprising 15 000 to 20 000 refugees each, but the government is unable to properly meet the IDPs' and refugees increasingly pressing needs. Refugee and IDP camps are also being specifically targeted by NEXSTA.

65. Roughly 500 people per day flee from South Loripa towards Ropperta hoping to use it as a springboard towards the EU.

66. The humanitarian situation keeps worsening along 2019, with civilians caught in the fighting between NEXSTA and government security forces. The fighting severely hinders the ability of international humanitarian organisations to access the people in need. Aid workers increasingly become targets of violent attacks.

67. As a result of this chaotic humanitarian situation, irregular migration flows from Loripa and Ropperta to the EU under the control of criminal organisations of human traffickers and smugglers have also increased, resulting in several hundreds of migrants losing their lives while trying to cross the Mediterranean.
68. The borders between Southern Loripa and Southern Ropperta are porous and checkpoints are inefficient. There is a steady and unhindered flow of illegal activity, including the smuggling of migrants, the trafficking of weapons, drugs, and oil products from Loripa to Ropperta.

69. The main oil and gas station in South Ropperta and the pipeline built to export them to Europe towards the Ghopk port yields important economic benefits for Ropperta, although have suffered several attacks in the recent months.

70. As a result of the deteriorating security situation in the country, migrant workers in Ropperta’s oil and gas industry are starting to look for opportunities to leave Ropperta.

71. The president of Ropperta has sent several letters to the UN Secretary General and the HR/VP requesting for external support, including the intervention of armed forces and police, to help Ropperta to address the situation.

72. The aim of the Roppertan government is to restore law in the country to provide a safe and secure environment allowing the safe return of the IDPs and the, to counter any threat against them and the refugees and to ensure the security of the humanitarian aid camps, mainly concentrated around the cities. Roppertan government strongly supports the return of refugees to Loripa. Regular forces under the functional government are trying to reverse the situation, but they have not full control over the area where refugees and IDPs are located. Corruption prevails; NEXSTA and other criminal groups are taking advantage of the situation executing atrocities against refugees and IDPs. Flow of refugees and IDPs exacerbates Roppertan population that shows more and more aggression against them.
EXERCISE - EXERCISE - EXERCISE

"EUROPE theatre"

"MARITIME theatre"

LORIPA (proxy)

ROPPERTA (EU friend)

NEXSTA

KRONEN (threat)

Consular crisis

(neutral)

(neutral)

(neutral)

Fictitious "AFRICA" theatre
SECTION 2 - M - 3
UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS
Resolution 1000 (2016)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 7816th meeting, on 18 November 2016

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Expressing its grave concern about continuous attacks by terrorist groups in Ropperta and Loripa, in particular against civilians, women and children, including sexual and gender-based violence,

Reaffirming that terrorism in all its forms and manifestations constitutes one of the most serious threats to peace and security and that any acts of terrorism are criminal and unjustifiable regardless of their motivations, whenever and by whomsoever committed,

Expressing serious concern about the insecurity and deteriorating humanitarian and human rights situation in the region, which is further complicated by the presence of terrorist groups and their activities, as well as by the proliferation of weapons, from within and outside the region, that threaten the peace, security and stability of regional States,

Expressing concern also at the increase in incidents of kidnapping and hostage taking by terrorist groups with the aim of raising funds, or gaining political concessions, and expressing the need for this issue to be addressed,

Expressing grave concern at the worsening of the humanitarian situation in Ropperta and Loripa and at the increasing number of displaced persons and refugees, and calling for increased mobilization of the international community to support humanitarian efforts, and for all parties in Ropperta and Loripa to allow for impartial, neutral, full and unimpeded access for humanitarian aid,
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. **Condemns** the recent and repeated terrorist attacks in Ropperta;

2. **Stresses the need** to prevent further deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Ropperta and Loripa and to facilitate unhindered access and delivery of assistance to all in need in the entirety of the territory of both states in accordance with humanitarian principles;

3. **Decides** to remain seized of the matter.
LIMITE

EXERCISE - EXERCISE – EXERCISE

2/2

16-02345
Resolution 1001 (2018)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 8424th meeting, on 12 December 2018

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolution 1000 (2016) concerning the dire humanitarian situation in Ropperta,


Recalling its previous resolutions on strengthening the effectiveness of the Security Council and the role of civil society in the prevention and resolution of armed conflict, particularly in Africa,

Welcoming the Unity Government in Ropperta and its efforts towards cohesion and development demonstrated since 2015,

Welcoming the support and investment of the International Community, and particularly the European Union, to the development and democratic progress of the Republic of Ropperta,

Reaffirming its respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and political independence of Ropperta, and recalling the importance of the principles of good-neighbourliness, non-interference and cooperation in the relations among States in the region,

Expressing its concern about the deteriorating security situation in the South of Ropperta and at its porous borders with Loripa,

Expressing its grave concern about continuous attacks of the so-called NEXSTA terrorist group, in particular against civilians, women and children, including sexual and gender-based violence,
Reiterating the vital role of women in conflict resolution and peacebuilding, the importance of their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security and their key role in re-establishing the fabric of societies recovering from conflict,

Underlining the need to continue prioritizing efforts and the importance of measures to rebuild confidence within and between the security forces and the population,

Mindful of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security under the Charter of the United Nations,

Reaffirming its determination that terrorism, in all forms and manifestations, constitutes one of the most serious threats to peace and security, Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Condemns Loripa for permitting the proliferation of terrorist camps in South Loripa
2. Condemns the recent and repeated terrorist attacks in the South of Ropperta;
3. Condemns the flows of arms and related materiel transferred to or from Loripa, including to NEXSTA and other terrorist groups in the region;
4. Urges member states to coordinate and combat by all means, in accordance with their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and other obligations under international law, including international human rights law, international refugee law and international humanitarian law, threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts;
5. Urges the international community, non-governmental organizations and civil society to increase humanitarian assistance to civilians affected by displacements in Ropperta;
6. Underscores that the governments in the region have a primary responsibility to protect their populations, including from attacks by militias and armed groups and stresses the importance of ensuring the full, safe and unhindered access of humanitarian workers to people in need in accordance with international law;
7. Authorises the international community, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, to take all necessary measures, to support and complement the peacebuilding and development initiatives required to sustain peace, security and stability in Ropperta;
8. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
Resolution 1002 (2019)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 8512th meeting, on 28 April 2019

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 1000 (2016) concerning the dire humanitarian situation in Ropperta, and 1001 (2018), condemning the proliferation of terrorist camps in South Loripa and repeated terrorist attacks in the South of Ropperta,

Reaffirming its respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and political independence of Ropperta, and recalling the importance of the principles of good-neighbourliness, non-interference and cooperation in the relations among States in the region,

Expressing deep concern at the continuing deterioration of the security situation in Ropperta and at its porous borders with Loripa, and further expressing its grave concern about the consequences of instability in Ropperta on region and beyond, and stressing in this regard the need for the international community to respond swiftly,

Expressing its grave concern about continuous attacks of the so-called NEXSTA terrorist group, in particular against civilians, women and children, including sexual and gender-based violence, and further expressing its grave concern about the proliferation of training camps of the so-called NEXSTA terrorist group in the region,

Reaffirming its support to the Unity Government in Ropperta and its efforts towards cohesion and development,

Welcoming the support and investment of the International Community, and particularly the European Union, to the development and democratic progress of the Republic of Ropperta,

Recalling the letter of its President dated 12 March 2019 requesting the Secretary-General to provide support to Ropperta to address the dire humanitarian situation,
*1903544*

S/RES/1002 (2019)

Reiterating the vital role of women in conflict resolution and peacebuilding, the importance of their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security and their key role in re-establishing the fabric of societies recovering from conflict,

Underlining the need to continue prioritizing efforts and the importance of measures to rebuild confidence within and between the security forces and the population,

Mindful of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security under the Charter of the United Nations,

Reaffirming its determination that terrorism, in all forms and manifestations, constitutes one of the most serious threats to peace and security,

Taking note of the letter from the Ropperta President dated 15 March 2019 on behalf of the Unity Government in Ropperta to the High Representative/Vice President (HR/VP) of the European Union, requesting specific support and assistance, including the intervention of armed forces and police,

Determining that the situation in Ropperta constitutes a threat to international peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. **Authorizes** the European Union to deploy an operation in Ropperta;

2. **Authorizes** the European Union operation to take all necessary measures within the limits of its capacities and areas of deployment from its initial deployment and for a period of one year from the declaration of its full operational capacity;

3. **Requests** the European Union to report to the Council on the implementation of this mandate in Ropperta;

4. **Calls upon** Member States, including neighbouring countries of Ropperta, to take appropriate measures to support the action of the European Union, in particular by facilitating the transfer to Ropperta, without obstacles or delay, of all personnel, equipment, provisions, supplies or other goods, including vehicles and spare parts, intended for the European Union operation;

5. **Invites** the Unity Government in Ropperta to conclude a status of forces agreements as soon as possible for the establishment of the European Union operation;

6. **Emphasizes** the need for all military and police forces in Ropperta, while carrying out their mandate, to act in full respect of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity of Ropperta and in full compliance with applicable international humanitarian law, human rights law and refugee law and recalls the importance of training in this regard;

7. **Decides** to remain actively seized of the matter.
SECTION 2 - M - 4

POLITICAL LETTERS
Ropperta City, 15 March 2019

Your Excellency, Mrs Mogherini,

The Republic of Ropperta has faced daunting challenges since the end of the revolution and more recently since the ratification of the new Constitution.

The Roppertan people are determined to build their own democracy, after years of political instability and social unrest. Our wish is strong, but we understand that we need to rely on the support of the international community to take the first steps towards the recovery of trust and the establishment of the foundations of our young democracy.

I am well aware of the important support the European Union has been providing to my country in terms of humanitarian assistance, civil protection, and development programs. On behalf of the Roppertan people, I would like to thank you once more for supporting Ropperta in its legitimate quest for a better future. The people of Ropperta are strong and resilient, but there are many burdens inherited from the past government and instabilities in the region that hinder our efforts.

Despite the unfailing effort of our strong security and armed forces, the length of our border with Loripa allows for hostile infiltrations of the so called NEXSTA group. The objective of this group is to spread violence and fear and to recruit our honourable citizens for their deplorable aims.

The Republic of Ropperta will not tolerate any kind of terrorist group operating on its territory and it will show the utmost determination to force back the terrorist threat in order to avoid a spill-over to the north.

We also strive to improve everyday security for all Roppertans, unfortunately, corruption and old structures inherited from previous regimes makes our efforts for reform difficult.

I need not remind you that resources are lacking and that our security forces need appropriate vehicles and equipment, as well as targeted Special Forces training in order to effectively provide security in the south and across the country.

We are fully aware of the importance of human rights and International Humanitarian Law, but we are lacking the trainers.
Finally, instability and provocations from the Lorian side have also led to large numbers of migrants crossing our border on their way to the EU. The Republic of Ropperta is doing its very best to provide these people with their utmost necessities, in full respect of their human rights and dignity. However, the young democracy of Ropperta cannot always be asked to solve the problems of other countries. We cannot carry this burden alone and need the commitment and financial support of the EU.

As you have stated in many occasions, there is no development without security, is for that reason that I come to you to request the support of the EU with all its means and tools to help improve our security which is threaten by the above mentioned issues. As friends of the EU, we act in your interest and we trust that you will support us with all means at your disposal.

I avail myself of this opportunity to express my gratitude for the EU efforts to support the proud people of Ropperta,

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Sincerely Yours,  
Begh CAOP ESVERTY
N. EU Planning documents
SECTION 2-N-1

POLITICAL FRAMEWORK FOR CRISIS APPROACH
ROPPERTA, a Political Framework for Crisis Approach

I. Background

1. As a consequence of the deterioration of the crisis in Ropperta, the EEAS has been tasked by the High Representative and Vice-President (HR/VP) to prepare a Political Framework for Crisis Approach (PFCA) on Ropperta, in view of Political and Security Committee (PSC) debate.

2. Its purpose aims at developing a common appreciation of the Ropperta crisis to all EU stakeholders and at assessing the impact of the crisis on EU interests, values and objectives.

3. It envisages possible lines of engagement and objectives for EU involvement in the short, medium and long terms and seeks synergies across instruments to a sustainable recovery from Ropperta crisis.

4. These considerations build on the existing EU-Ropperta political, security, development and economic cooperation and on the findings of the recent EEAS and European Commission (EU CION) joint conflict analysis work-shop, and are in line with the principles of EU's integrated approach to external conflict and crisis.

5. The paper has been developed under the lead of the EEAS MD MENA Geographical team with contributions from other EEAS services¹ and in co-operation with the EU CION². This collaborative process ensures that the EU's Integrated Approach is key for the EU response.

6. This paper is a direct response to:


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¹ MD CSDP-CR, EUMS, CPCC, MDR B Security.
² DG ECHO, DG DEVCO, DG NEAR.
II. Analysis and appreciation of the situation

Crisis Context Overview

7. Although relatively small, Ropperta has a rich history and used to be a country economically prosperous and culturally influential. Roughly 99% of the Roppertan population identifies as Muslim.

8. Since the revolution in 2011, and the fall of the precedent dictatorial regime, Ropperta has shown its determination to consolidate a democratic state capable of integrating and respecting all different political parties representing its society.

9. The rule of Begh CAOP ESVERTY, since the end of 2015, has brought relative political and economic stability to the country until the end of 2018. During this period, Ropperta has advanced in the economic, political, social and cultural domains and has increased cooperation with its neighbours and overseas, particularly with the EU, which considers that Ropperta may become a key state capable to provide stability and prosperity to the whole region.

10. Ropperta reinforced ties with the EU in the domain of security and defence. Several projects on advice, mentoring and training have been developed by the EU to support the Government led Security Sector Reform.
11. Simultaneously, Ropperta's Government is struggling with institutional corruption and weak rule of law, whereas there is a slow pace of implementation of required structural reforms.

12. Unequal distribution of wealth, unavailability of social services and lack of the state presence in Southern provinces need to be addressed to counter the influence of radicalism promoted by radical political parties with acknowledged presence of jihadists returning from the Middle East and joining the terrorist organisation NEXSTA.

13. Therefore, the security situation is particularly worrisome in the south of Ropperta, where flares of social unrest have regularly occurred with the support of radical political parties.

14. For the past few years, episodes of violence perpetrated by NEXSTA, mainly operating from the neighbouring Loripa, has caused extensive suffering in Southern Ropperta. Clashes at the Southern border between Loripa and Ropperta, between NEXSTA and Roppertan Security and Armed Forces have resulted in hundreds of casualties among the police and military.

15. The security situation has significantly deteriorated over the past months once NEXSTA gained the ability to maintain permanent presence in small areas of Southern Ropperta next to the border with Lorippa, particularly in the province of Tabaluga. Since January 2019, there have been numerous violent protests with riots throughout Ropperta some of which might be directly linked with the activities of NEXSTA.

16. The terrorist activities of NEXSTA and the appearance of paramilitary groups and militias, who are imposing their "own security" in the Southern region have successfully challenged Roppertan authorities directly. Attendance to school, especially that of girls, has dropped drastically.

17. Some parts in Southern Ropperta have effectively become a permissive environment for organised crime networks, including trafficking of women, men, boys and girls. Despite growing risks and the growing insecurity, international humanitarian NGOs continue to operate in the affected areas in order to provide humanitarian assistance to IDPs and refugees. At the same time, the Government is increasingly restricting access in areas where the Roppertan Armed Forces conduct their operations. This restrictive and fragile environment restricts (quite significantly in some specific areas) the overall contribution of EU’s humanitarian partners.
18. The Government of Ropperta has pursued various initiatives to try to respond to NEXSTA’s violence, including the Reconciliation Act and military operations by the Roppertan Armed Forces.

19. Police, border guards and Armed Forces are increasingly stretched and ineffective, unable to fulfil their mandate in Southern Ropperta, and due to issues with the payment of their salaries, corruption and extortion are on the rise. Episodes of abuses, including Sexual and Gender Based Violence (SGBV), have also been reported. Respect, promotion and compliance of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) remains a key challenge, and an area where the EU is collective focusing.

20. The severely deteriorating security environment in Southern Ropperta calls for immediate action. The infiltration of NEXSTA fighters from Loripa and the now established permanent presence of NEXSTA elements in parts of Southern Ropperta has put the government and Security and Armed Forces on the back foot, in dire need of support.

Political Situation

21. In 2015, the secular party won the latest free and fair elections, by a small majority and Begh CAOP ESVERTY was elected as the first President under the country's new constitution. His Government is aware of the efforts needed to balance political cohesion with economic and social development.

22. Relations between Ropperta and its neighbour to the West, Loripa, are tense, mainly due to the difficulty of managing a porous common border, especially in the South. Apart from the terrorist activities carried out by NEXSTA in Southern Ropperta, there is an increase in criminal organizations along the common border, profiting from the rise of illegal traffic and smuggling, including also of human beings.

23. On the other side, a relevant state actor in the region, Kronen, has publicly denounced the EU’s efforts to support Ropperta, especially those ones aiming at developing more efficient, accountable and responsible Armed Forces that would operate in accordance with human rights, gender issues and International Humanitarian Law. Kronen's leader has called upon Roppertans to resist this "illegitimate interference" labelling it and a “return back to the old colonialism policies that ravaged the African countries".
Rasolian Government backs Ropperta, and provides strong support to the UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) and EU approach to the Ropperta crisis.

Economic Situation

25. It is widely acknowledged that the Roppertan Revolution was triggered by high unemployment, hyperinflation, corruption, disregard for fundamental human rights, such as freedom of speech, by state authorities, and poor living conditions. The protests constituted the most dramatic wave of social and political unrest in Ropperta in three decades and resulted in scores of deaths and injuries, most of which were the consequence of repressive action by police and security forces against demonstrators.

26. Almost 8 years after the Revolution, unemployment remains the main challenge faced by Roppertan authorities in the short and medium term. The unemployment rate reached 28.5% at the end of 2018, and affects mainly young people, who represent more than 70% of the unemployed, affecting particularly disadvantaged regions. The urgent need to tackle this problem has been highlighted by the growing number of social unrest.

27. Although significant policy progress must be acknowledged, the pace of implementation of socio-economic reforms is still very slow. The economy grew by 1.3% in 2018. However, persistent macroeconomic imbalances require serious structural reforms – such as urgent fiscal consolidation measures, transparency of public finance management or strengthening of the legislative framework to the fight against corruption, with the aim of stimulating job creation and facilitating the integration of young people into the labour market.

Development Situation

28. The 2015-2025 Ropperta's Strategy towards a Sustainable Development for All (SSD4A) adopted on 20 February 2015, advocated for a new development model aimed at promoting inclusive growth and responding to expectations of a growing population (the Demographic and Society Observatory forecasts that by 2050 the population will double). The SSD4A focuses on four main areas: (a) good governance, administrative reform and the fight against corruption, (b) green economy and inclusive growth for a sustainable future, (c) human development and social cohesion, and (d) security stabilization of the neighbourhood. The Strategy estimates an increase in growth rate of 3.7% in 2025, which will be driven essentially by a significant change in private investment (increase of 56%) and by a major
29. The Government of Ropperta has focused on supporting the modernization of the administration, good governance and the fight against corruption as well as attempts to bringing closer disfavoured regions. However, more progress is needed to achieve a balanced development between regions.

30. The SSD4A stands for the improvement of economic governance, the development of a business climate enabling private and foreign investment, as well as the promotion of a green, innovative and sustainable development of economic sectors. However, public action and private initiatives that generate dignified and modern jobs, in particular for the young, are still slow-moving.

31. Bridging social and regional disparities, which were key factors in the 2011 revolution, is a major priority. Investment in public services and socio-economic infrastructure is much needed across country, as well as to narrow gap between the richest and the disfavoured regions.

32. The increased instability in border areas, the terrorist threat and the flourishment of illegal activities are posing an additional challenge to the Government of Ropperta to deliver efficiently and timely on development goals.

33. The EU is continuing to deploy its wide-range of means to support the political and socio-economic development in Ropperta.

Humanitarian Situation

34. The conflict provoked by NEXSTA has a significant regional spill over. Humanitarian needs, particularly to IDP and refugees, in Southern Loripa and Ropperta remain very high due to the combination of conflicts, widespread insecurity and natural hazards.

35. Public services in Southern Loripa and Ropperta, structurally underfunded and under threats can hardly maintain their presence and provide basic services to the populations.

36. In 2017, the European Commission allocated EUR 184.9 million in humanitarian assistance to the region. However, humanitarian needs remain largely uncovered and will not diminish without addressing efficiently their root causes.
37. The security situation in the south of Ropperta has severely deteriorated in recent months as NEXSTA gained permanent foothold on several areas on Roppertan territory. Attacks against civilians have substantially increased in the last few months, and include the abduction of girls and women, who are subject of Sexual and Gender Based Violence (SGBV).

38. Part of the affected population in the south of Ropperta is fleeing northwards to safer provinces where national security forces are more present. Around 80,000 people are on the move, including vulnerable groups (e.g. children, elderly and disabled people).

39. In addition, refugee flows of about 500 people per day from Southern Loripa towards Southern Ropperta continue. Some refugees hope to use Ropperta as a springboard towards the EU.

40. These refugee flows from Loripa and Ropperta to the EU have been exploited by some local criminal organisations of human traffickers and smugglers have also increased, exposing refugees to additional risks which have resulted in several hundreds of migrants losing their lives while trying to cross the Mediterranean.

41. The massive displacement has led to the opening of three Internally Displaced People (IDP) and three refugee camps, in order to host roughly 100,000 of IDPs and 50,000 refugees in Ropperta. However, the government is unable to properly meet the IDPs’ and refugees’ increasingly pressing needs in terms of shelter, protection, food security and Water, Sanitation and Health (WASH). Camps are already above their maximum reception capacity and more IDPs and refugees are expected to arrive from the South of Ropperta.

42. As clashes between NEXSTA and government security forces continue, international humanitarian organisations find accessing the people in need increasingly challenging.

43. In a direct breach of International Humanitarian Law, humanitarian aid workers are themselves more and more becoming targets of violent attacks. An ICRC report in July 2018 highlighting both the dire humanitarian situation in the south of Ropperta and Loripa, and the risks to which humanitarian workers are exposed, shocked the international community. The EU (both in Brussels and in New York, through the EU Delegation to the UN) has been increasing its advocacy and pressure to all parties to the conflict for the respect of ground International Humanitarian Law rules.
Security Situation

44. Protection needs are increasing, leading to gender based violence and child protection issues. The training of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and gender issues to national armed forces is of paramount importance. Effective Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (CMCoord) may also improve living conditions for the affected population, through the interaction and dialogue of the civilian and military actors, in full respect of the humanitarian space and principles. The Commission (DG ECHO) supports CMCoord through UN OCHA.

45. Since 2017, the situation in the South of Ropperta is rather unsafe and unsecure due to NEXSTA’s attacks operating from Loripa. Moreover, it has significantly deteriorated over the past months once NEXSTA has been able to maintain permanent presence in Southern Ropperta.

46. NEXSTA has been taken control of some territory in the province of Tabaluga, South Ropperta, and appears to have some support from the local population. From this area, NEXSTA has gained the ability to also target central provinces of Ropperta, including critical infrastructure, such as harbours. NEXSTA’s elements are settling more permanently presence in small areas of Southern Ropperta next to the border with Lorippa, and are preparing defensive posture.

47. In fact, since the end of January 2019, there have been numerous violent protests with riots, mainly in South Ropperta, that have been orchestrated mostly by NEXSTA.

48. The borders between Loripa and Ropperta in the south are porous and checkpoints are inefficient. There is a steady and unhindered flow of illegal activity, including the smuggling of migrants, the trafficking of weapons, drugs, and oil products from Loripa to Ropperta.

49. Despite having suffered several attacks in the recent months, the main oil and gas station in Southern Ropperta and the pipeline built to export the products to Europe through the Ghopk port still yields important economic benefits for Ropperta.

50. As a result of the deteriorating security situation in the country, migrant workers in Ropperta’s oil and gas industry are starting to look for opportunities to leave Ropperta.
51. The president of Ropperta has sent several letters to the UN Secretary General and the HR/VP requesting for external support, including the intervention of Armed Forces and police, to help Ropperta to address the situation.

52. The aim of the Roppertan government is to neutralise NEXSTA, regain control of the whole territory, and restore law and order in the country. The provision of a Safe and Secure Environment (SASE) around IDP and refugee camps remains also a main concern.

53. Roppertan Security and Defence Forces are heavily involved in the fight against NEXSTA. Regular forces under the functional government are trying to reverse the situation, but without any concrete and positive results.

**MAIN ACTORS: ROPPERTA, NEXTA, LORIPA, KRONEN, RASOLIA, (See Crisis Summary)**

**ROPPERTAN ARMED FORCES (RAF)**

54. The Ministry of National Defence is a government ministry office responsible for coordinating and supervising all agencies and functions of the government concerned directly with national security and the RAF.

55. The RAF consists of the Army, Air Force and Navy.

56. Ropperta has an Army of 40,500 personnel equipped with 84 main battle tanks and 48 light tanks. The Air Force has 4,000 personnel, 27 combat aircraft and 43 helicopters. The Navy numbered 4,800 operating 25 patrol boats and 6 other craft. Paramilitary forces consist of a 12,000-member national guard.

57. Despite government-led efforts in Security Sector Reform, also with EU support, the RAF remains underequipped and poorly trained. The population has not regained full trust in the RAF following their disproportionate use of force during the Roppertan revolution. Accusations of violations of International Humanitarian Law in the context of the current operations against NEXSTA in the south further undermined trust. Therefore, additional efforts in terms of training for the RAF, especially in international law, including human rights and International Humanitarian Law (IHL), are needed.

**ROPPERTA INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES (RISF)**

58. The internal security forces controlled by the Ministry of Interior (MoI) include the police, the
National Guard, the Judicial Police (which operates in the Ministry of Justice and the Courts but is controlled by the Ministry of Interior), the Intervention Forces (SWAT Forces), and the Presidential Guard Forces (PGF).

59. Whereas the police operate mostly in urban areas, the National Guard operates in the coastal and rural areas. The Judicial Police are part of the Ministry of Interior but work within the Judiciary. They are the investigative arm of the internal security forces and are responsible for collecting evidence, conducting investigations, and writing formal investigation reports for cases before the courts.

60. The Presidential Guard forces are also part of the Ministry of Interior. Their principal duty is to protect the President and his family.

61. The Police and National Guard are the first line of defence in the fight against terrorism. They require additional training and equipment to counter the newly-evolving terrorist threat. Moreover, the justice and corrections sectors are overwhelmed by an increased number of criminal cases and a surge in the number of individuals suspected of involvement in terrorist activity. The judiciary often struggles to bring cases to trial in a timely manner, and the prison system suffers from overcrowding.

**Human Rights and Gender Situation**

62. Throughout the conflict, human rights violations have been widespread and manifested largely in extrajudicial killings, violence against women and children, abduction and trafficking of children, recruiting child soldiers, arbitrary detention and torture. Freedoms of assembly and of expression have also suffered restrictions.

63. According to the Roppertan Demographic Household Survey (RDHS) 2015, the experience of physical violence by women in the conflict-hit Southern region is the highest in Ropperta. Child poverty is strikingly high in this part of the country; 52 per cent compared to the national average of 38 per cent. Adolescent girls (15-19 years) represent the most vulnerable segment of the population; and a large number have been physically or sexually abused. 40 per cent of all new HIV infections are contracted by adolescent girls.

64. In an effort to fight against violence and sexual abuse of women, the EU launched in 2015, a new set of actions aiming to better connect human rights activists/organisations to law enforcement agencies, such as the police and the judiciary, in order to provide high quality,
accountable and rights-based protection and remedy for sexual and gender based violence (SGBV) victims to break the culture of impunity of the perpetrators of such crimes.

65. Several international organisations and non-governmental organisations operating in the region have reported that since the beginning of the conflict, NEXSTA has committed widespread abuses against the local population, including also Sexual and Gender Based Violence (SGBV) and the forced recruitment of child soldiers.

66. There are hints that the IDP and refugee camps have become centres of gravity for organised crime groups involved in trafficking in human beings and soft targets for the NEXSTA to commit children abductions.

International Presence

67. Within the framework of the UN-EU Strategic Partnership on Peacekeeping and Crisis Management, both organizations are assessing how to best to act in complementarity.

68. The UN Ropperta Team currently deployed in the country to face the humanitarian crisis is composed of roughly 550 staff split in the following agencies: UN (including OCHA) 75 staff; UNHCR 176 staff; UNICEF 126 staff; WHO 53 staff; UNDP 48 staff; WFP 39 staff; FAO 9 staff: UN WOMEN 7 staff; IOM 4 staff; UNESCO 2 staff; UNFPA 5 staff; UNIDO 3 staff; and UNAIDS 3 staff.

69. The UN Ropperta HQ and most of the staff are based in Ropperta capital, but a significant part of at least UNHCR, UNICEF, WHO and WFP are distributed over the country, especially in and around the refugee and IDP camps, and staff travel through the country continuously.

70. Partnership on complementarity and transition is to link up missions and operations with programmatic activities, enhance synergies with other organisations deploying before, after, or alongside UN and EU missions and operations including the African Union (AU), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and others, while taking into account and building on each entity’s capabilities.

71. The EU has decided to acknowledge the request of Roppertan President. After the approval of the corresponding UNSCR inviting the international community, and in particular the EU, to support and complement the peacebuilding and development initiatives to sustain peace, security and stability in Ropperta.
The ICRC continues to support vulnerable families, particularly civilian who had been displaced by fighting, with basic household's items, such as food and seed.

The consequences of the EU getting involved in North Africa do not take long to appear. Disinformation coming from different sources and particularly from Kronen with the message against the EU "illegal intervention" in North Africa increases to the point of being a trend topic on social networks.

Loripa seems to take profit of the situation trying to destabilise the EU markets and threatening the EU with gas supply reductions.

III. Impact of the crisis on EU interests, values and existing objectives in the region

The deterioration of the security environment in Southern Ropperta is affecting not only Ropperta, but also its neighbouring countries in North Africa, with direct or indirect negative impact on the EU's strategic interests and its security.

The EU has a fundamental interest in peace, stability and prosperity in North African countries, including Ropperta. A stable and peaceful Ropperta would make hugely positive contribution to security and democratisation across the region.

For that reason, the EU is providing substantial support to the modernisation of the political apparatus and the acceleration of economic reforms on the path of inclusive economic prosperity in Ropperta, adhering to the universal values of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and to the principles of the rule of law and good governance. These are important conditions for further expanding political and economic – trade and investment – relations between the EU and the region.

Due to on-going violence and insecurity in Southern Ropperta, EU actions are jeopardised.

Without the restoration of stability it will be impossible to implement EU supported development programmes.

The delivery of humanitarian assistance is also severely hindered by the current security situation, with several hundred thousand people in need of aid. Furthermore, if instability in Southern Ropperta spreads, this would inevitably have a destabilising effect in the whole region.
country and more broadly in North Africa with negative implications for the EU's interests.

81. The improvement of security in the border areas aims to deter the infiltration of militants and criminal groups, and to facilitate management of migratory flows that could spill-over within the region.

82. Irregular flows of people from Loripa and Ropperta towards the EU under the control of criminal organisations of human traffickers and smugglers have also increased, resulting in several hundreds of migrants losing their lives while trying to cross the Mediterranean. Increased action against trafficking and organised crime networks is also an important aspect.

83. In addition to that, NEXSTA has a history on mounting terrorist attacks on civilian and military targets in the Middle East, Europe, Northern Africa, including embassy bombings, attacks on trade and finance centres, industrial facilities, tourist locations. It has approximately 10,000 members worldwide, including 4,000 members in Loripa and Ropperta and some 500 within the EU. Consequently, the threat of NEXSTA is more present with targeted attacks to EU interests in European soil, the Mediterranean and EU interests in Africa.

84. The consequences of the EU getting involved in Roppera has resulted during the latest years in an increase of cyber-attacks, of an unknown origin and a varying type, on EU delegations, CSDP communication networks, and critical infrastructure of several EU Member States.

85. Kronen's political and economic interests and values clash with those of the EU. Kronen's systematic violations of human rights and international law have been repeatedly criticised by the EU and the international community. Economic and diplomatic sanctions are already in place by the EU since 2014. Kronen is providing cover support to some radical elements close to NEXSTA that actively conduct cyber-attacks and disinformation campaigns against Roppertan administration and EU engagement in the region.

86. Loripa's relations with the EU have deteriorated due to Loripa's warm relation with his Southern neighbour Kronen, but Loripa maintains still some important commercial ties with the EU, notably the export of gas from Loripa which represents the 36% of the EU demand. Loripa's government has on some occasions threatened to nationalise the oil and gas companies which are partly western owned.
Following the developments in Ropperta, the HR/VP has activated the EEAS Crisis Response Mechanism.

Additionally, the EU has decided to acknowledge the request of its President. After the approval of the corresponding UNSCR supporting the EU’s intervention at the request of the Roppertan Government, EU Member States have agreed to the proposal of planning a CSDP military operation and civilian mission; and that EEAS continues the strategic planning with the assumption that a CSDP military operation and a civilian mission starts working on its strategic planning could be established.

IV. EU Strategic Objectives in Relation to the crisis

It is in the EU's strategic interest to contribute, together with other international partners, to the peace, stabilisation and prosperity in Ropperta.

In coordination with the wider International Community, in the short and medium term, the EU action is to:

- Contribute to maintaining a stable Ropperta through supporting transformation of the young democracy and ongoing efforts of social and economic reforms, ensuring the respect of human rights.

- Improve the security situation in Ropperta to avoid spill-over of the conflict to the region with the risk of new and increased migratory flows within the region or towards Europe.

- Deter potential risks to lines of communications and critical infrastructure, while respecting the sovereignty of the neighbouring countries and without interfering in the functions of the local government.

- Support the overall restoration of Ropperta’s authority in the south and re-establishing state control of the borders.

- Contribute to the creation of Safe and Secure Environment (SASE).

- Support Ropperta’s fight against terrorism and prevent radicalization and violent extremism.
Increase the resilience of Ropperta and contribute to build its capacities.

Support Ropperta’s efforts to reform its Security Sector.

Support the fight against corruption within Law Enforcement Agency (LEA).

In the longer term, capitalising on its role as a security provider, the EU intends to contribute to stabilization efforts by the UN, effective security sector and border and migration management in order to achieve a sustainable settlement of the conflict in the whole region, while promoting democratization and economic development.

V. Risks

91. The situation in Ropperta is increasingly volatile and requires EU engagement. Yet there are risks associated with each course of action:

92. EU not taking action:

- Instability spills over to the region with the respective political, social and economic negative consequences.

- The worsening of the humanitarian situation can trigger an unprecedented crisis in the region with massive unaddressed human suffering. This could, among other things, also result in a substantial increase in migratory flow towards Europe.

- Increased NEXSTA's ability to act in Europe.

- Kronen would increase its influence in the region.

- Reputational risks for the EU and its Member States.

93. EU taking limited action:

- A limited engagement would not achieve the desired objectives, while at the same time it would expose the EU for targeting.

- EU perceived as a non-relevant and non-reliable actor in the region.

- Continuation of migratory flows towards Europe.
- Less commitment of local authorities to fight against the situation.

- Long protracted engagement with unclear outcome.

94. EU undertaking a broad engagement through an integrated approach:

- Potential security risks for EU institutions, EU Member States and EU citizens due to the visibility of the EU intervention.

- Loss of EU credibility, if strategic objectives are not achieved.

VI. Strategic framework and Way Forward

95. Only through a broad action based on an EU integrated approach will allow the EU succeeds to enable progress on any of the specific problems identified in Ropperta bringing together multiple means of engagement.

96. To achieve the strategic objectives described in the section above, the EU is to carry out activities in the following fields: diplomatic, long-term development cooperation, crisis response projects, support for human rights, stabilization efforts, resilience building, and security, including CSDP. At the same time, as long as humanitarian needs continue to exist, the EU may be in need of continuing the delivery of its assistance.

97. In 2013, the EU adopted the EU strategy for security and development in the region, which reaffirmed the link between security and development and created a global framework for the EU action in the region.

98. Since them, several EU's actions plans have been adopted to contribute to fight against terrorism, trafficking and organized crime, to prevent radicalization and violent extremism. The Regional Task-force co-chaired by the EUSR for North Africa and MD MENA plays an important role ensuring smooth information exchange among all key institutional partners.

99. Together with some EU Member States, EU has consolidated the Alliance for the Region that has managed to mobilise regional Presidents alongside with the International Community to reaffirm their political will for engagement towards security and developments.

100. EU has supported some attempts to establish structures to promote regional cooperation in the fields of development and security.
101. Good governance, management and overseeing are key for a sustainable reform that is supported by Ropperta’s population. Sustainable development must aim at speeding economic reforms and boosting dignified jobs, as well as investing in basic services and infrastructure.

102. The EU also needs to take into account the relations between Ropperta and its neighbours to address grievances, strengthen inclusive development and human security.

103. It requires an integrated approach which understands all involved actors' dynamics and addresses the root causes of the crisis to gradually build on stability and prosperity in the whole region.

104. The conflict analysis tools will allow continuous and shared understanding of the situation, and of the various interests and roles of actors and stakeholders (Loripa, Kronen, NEXSTA; community leaders, diaspora, etc.) and of the relevant national, regional and international players.

Diplomatic

105. The EU will continue using its diplomatic tools, including EU Delegations, EU Member States' Embassies and the EUSR for North Africa, in order to support high level political dialogue.

106. Heads of the EU Delegations in the region, closely linked with EU Member States' Embassies, are to link the various EU interventions within the region and ensure complementarity and synergies between all the EU tools.

107. The EUSR, nominated in 2013, is mainly focused on the Regional Action Plan. EUSR is also helping in strengthening the link between the EU and its Member States with the Regional structures. Finally, EUSR is committed to the implementation of the Reconciliation Act, which is crucial for the Ropperta's stability.

108. If situation allows, it is not excluded that a field office in Southern Ropperta might be established in the future.

109. Therefore, in close coordination with other regional and international actors, EU's diplomatic activity aims at:

- Contributing to achieving a lasting peace and stability in Ropperta.
- Supporting the role and activities of regional organizations, including the AU, as well as promoting and supporting regional mediation efforts, and, conducting regular political dialogue with stakeholders.

110. The EU (particularly the EU Delegation and the EUSR for North Africa) will also assess how dialogue between the parties can be encouraged and supported, and how it can most effectively mobilise its mediation support capacities either through own initiatives or through support to other partners that might be better placed to mediate between the parties.

Security

111. EU is encouraging an initiative on security to support cross-border and cooperation within the existing regional structures and to enhance the national capacities of countries. It might include the deployment of EU security and defence experts in the EU Delegations of the region. The aim of this network is to provide the CSDP structures in Brussels with elements for establishing a Regional Implementation Plan.

112. In Rasolia, a new programme on security sector reform is also underway, preparing the ground for more structural support.

Development

113. Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) is also available for crisis response in the region. It focuses on security initiatives and peacebuilding activities, with a specific focus on crisis response and preparedness, conflict prevention and peace building.

114. The IcSP may also contribute to the response to the threat posed by NEXSTA with resilience and counter-terrorism/countering violent extremism programmes targeting former NEXSTA combatants and vulnerable communities.

115. The Commission is planning to adopt a two-pronged approach addressing both core developmental issues, including financial and economic reforms, and complementarity of such issues with the CSDP initiatives.

116. EU development cooperation is currently guided by National and Regional Indicative Programmes (NIP and RIP respectively) setting the priorities for the period 2014-2020. These programmes are set jointly with national governments and regional organisations.
117. NIPs focus on good governance, security and peacebuilding, rule of law, health, education, transport, food and nutrition security, resilience, sustainable agriculture, rural development, management of natural resources, support to civil society. Over the period 2014-2020 the EU committed more than EUR 2.4 billion under NIPs for countries in the region.

118. In accordance with the subsidiarity principle, some sectors are better addressed following a supra-national or regional approach. The RIP 2014-2020 is focused on regional economic integration, support for trade and resilience, food and nutrition security and natural resources (EUR 300 million).

119. In addition, the establishment of the “European Union Emergency Trust Fund” added a key instrument to address the root causes of instability by focusing on the fight against terrorism, drug and human trafficking, as well as irregular migration; the restoration of state authority and establishing a rule of law to promote stability, security and resilience; and the provision of basic services to the populations.

120. An EU short-term stabilisation action, in a specific area, might contribute to help the Government of Ropperta to regain control over its territory and to re-establish local administrations in the southern region. Its objective is to help set up the conditions for renewed stability in the region in accordance with international standards, therefore improving both the security situation and the provision of basic services to the populations.

Coordination with EU Member States

121. In order to ensure a coherent EU approach in the region, the EU must look for synergies and coordination with EU Member States involved in the region. This coordination takes place at regional level, as mentioned in the Diplomatic paragraph, and in Brussels, where the EU institutions and Member States communicate and collaborate through several fora including the Council Africa Working Party (COAFR), the Working Party of Foreign Relations Counsellors (RELEX), and the Political and Security Committee (PSC).

Coordination with African actors

122. The EU action in the region is driven by a will to help African Organisations, African governments and populations becoming actors of their own development. It is therefore essential to work with the governments of our partner countries, in order to help build their
resilience, make them primary actors of their security and development, and improve their capacity to deal with crises.

123. The EU is fully aware that African actors are very diverse and that dialogue with central governments is not enough. The EU and its Member States therefore also engage with sub-national authorities from communes to regions and provinces, in order to get closer to the populations and understand better their needs.

124. Beyond national governments, the African Union and its regional organisations have also shown their resolve and commitment to preventing and resolving conflicts on the continent. Sub-regional organisations play an essential role in strengthening States’ capacities and building regional cooperation and stability.

Possible CSDP contribution

125. Attending to the needs and request of Ropperta’s authorities and in line with EU interests and strategic objectives a potential CSDP engagement in support of Ropperta could contribute to the EU integrated approach to the conflict in the region. The envisaged CSDP action could consist of a CSDP Civilian Mission and a CSDP Military Operation, both deployed in Ropperta.

126. The CSDP Military Operation might contribute to;

- Improve the security situation in Southern Ropperta

- Restore of Ropperta’s authority in Southern and re-establishing state control of the borders.

- Support Ropperta’s fight against terrorism in the southern part of Ropperta and prevent radicalization and violent extremism.

- Increase the resilience of Ropperta and contribute to build its capacities.

- Support Ropperta’s efforts to reform its Security Sector, including training international law, human rights and International Humanitarian Law, and advising.

- Support humanitarian efforts in the South, upon civilian request and in close coordination with relevant EU and other non-EU stakeholders, in accordance with the internationally
agreed humanitarian civil-military guidelines and the recently agreed EU concept in support of effective civ-mil coordination in support of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

127. The Civilian CSDP mission could be deployed in Ropperta to provide advice to reform the Civilian Security Sector, with special attention to develop the mechanisms to fight against corruption within the law enforcement agencies (LEA). The Mission could also deliver capacity building activities with the aim to improve the capacities of LEA including in the fight against terrorism. A potential engagement in support of developing a proper Integrated Border Management would need to be assessed.

Resource Implications

128. Whereas some of the instruments already have funds allocated to them that could be mobilised through due process, others, such as military deployment, do not and would require substantial new funds to be allocated by Member States.

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3 Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (CMCoord) is defined as the essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency, and, when appropriate, pursue common goals. The Commission/DG ECHO is the lead EU service for the delivery of disaster relief and humanitarian aid. In close cooperation with the EU Military Staff, it also supports and promotes effective Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination within the EU.

4 Approved by the EUMC on 30 Jan 2019.
SECTION 2-N-2

PSC CONCLUSIONS ON PFCA
SUJET: COPOL – RELEVE des conclusions du COPS (Brussels, 26 June, 2019)

1. ROPPERTA

The PSC:

- Received a presentation by the EEAS and the Commission of the Political Framework Crisis Approach (PFCA) for the ROPPERTA crisis, as well as the update on the latest political developments and the security situation in the country;

- Welcomed the PFCA as a basis to guide the EU's way forward in the response to the ROPPERTA crisis;

- Invited the EEAS and the Commission services to take work forward urgently along the lines outlined in the PFCA as well as the PSC discussion and to create a Crisis Management Concept;

- Will revert to the implementation during autumn.
SECTION 2-N-3

CRISIS MANAGEMENT CONCEPT
Brussels 12 September 2019

(OR.en)

105/19

LIMITE

COPS 20
MD CSDP-CR 15
POLMIL 14
CIVCOM 17
EUMC 15

NOTE

From: Integrated Approach for Security and Peace Directorate
To: Political and Security Committe

Subject: Crisis Management Concept for a CSDP Action in Ropperta.
REFERENCES

2. Letter of the president of Ropperta to the EU HR/VP (15 Mar 2019)
5. PSC Conclusions on 11 July 2019 tasking the drafting of a CMC.

I. Background

1. In March 2019, the President of Ropperta officially requested support from the UN and the HR/VP. The EU has decided to acknowledge the request. The EEAS Crisis Response Mechanism has been activated with Crisis Meetings to assess the EU response.

2. The EU High Representative and Vice-President (HR/VP) H.E. Federica MOGHERINI requested for a PFCA to be presented to the PSC.

3. After analysing and discussing the PFCA, on the 26th of June 2019, the PSC approved the PFCA and tasked the EEAS to prepare a Crisis Management Concept (CMC) for a possible CSDP mission or operation for Ropperta.

4. The content of this CMC is based on the PFCA and the extensive fieldwork by the Fact Finding Mission deployed in August 2019 to continue exploratory work regarding the current situation in Ropperta and the likely Area of Engagement. It has been prepared by the Integrated Approach for Security and Peace (ISP) Directorate with the support and contributions from other EEAS services (EUMS, CPCC, Geographical Desk NFS, the EU SR in NFS region) and in cooperation with the European Commission (EU CION).

5. The CMC is in line with and supportive of the international response and firmly set in the framework of United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) 1001 and 1002 and the letter from the President of Ropperta to the High Representative/Vice President (HR/VP), dated 15th of March 2019, requesting specific support and assistance on behalf of the Government of Ropperta.

6. The CMC purpose aims at describing CSDP activity to address the Ropperta crisis within the EU Integrated Approach. It defines the political strategic objectives for CSDP engagement and provides CSDP options to meet EU objectives.

5 DG ECHO, DG DEVCO, DG NEAR
II. Analysis of the overall situation

7. The long term stability and prosperity of a democratic and reformed Ropperta is of strategic interest to the EU. It is a cornerstone of the EU neighbourhood policy in North Africa.

8. Since the revolution in 2011, and the fall of the previous dictatorship, the government of Ropperta has shown to consolidate a democratic state capable of integrating and respecting all different political parties representing its society.

9. The rule of Begh CAOP ESVERTY, since the end of 2015, has brought relative political and economic stability to the country until the end of 2018. During this period, Ropperta has advanced in the economic, political, social and cultural domains and has increased cooperation with its neighbours and overseas, particularly with the EU, which considers that Ropperta may become a key state capable to provide stability and prosperity to the whole region.

10. Ropperta has reinforced ties with the EU in the domain of security and defence. Several projects on advising, mentoring and training have been developed by the EU to support the Government-led Security Sector Reform.

11. Despite the strong signs of hope for Ropperta to become a key state capable of providing stability in the region, Ropperta's Government is struggling with institutional corruption and weak rule of law, whereas there is a slow pace of implementation of required structural reforms.

12. Unequal distribution of wealth, unavailability of social services and lack of the state presence in Southern provinces need to be addressed to counter the influence of radicalism promoted by radical political parties with acknowledged presence of jihadists returning from the Middle East and joining Newborn Extremist State (NEXSTA).

13. NEXSTA, a global terrorist group, has found a safe haven in neighbouring Loripa after the loss of its territory in the Middle East. Since 2016, insurgents are infiltrating the southern of Ropperta using guerrilla tactics to spread terror and impose sharia law on villages. The capacity of NEXSTA to attack objectives in Southern Ropperta has substantially increased, since beginning of 2019 NEXSTA has been able to control territory in small areas in Southern Ropperta.

14. The security situation has significantly deteriorated over the past months once NEXSTA gained control over small areas in Southern Ropperta, particularly in the province of Tabaluga. Since January 2019, there have been numerous violent protests with riots throughout Ropperta; some of which might be directly linked with the activities of NEXSTA. The security situation is particularly worrisome in Southern Ropperta, where flares of social unrest have regularly occurred.

15. The terrorist activities of NEXSTA and the appearance of paramilitary groups and militias, who are imposing their "own security" in the Southern region have successfully challenged Roppertan authorities directly.
16. Direct attacks by NEXSTA against the local population in the South of the country have resulted in high number of casualties. As consequence, violence has also caused massive displacement, as the population has tried to move northwards, in areas controlled by the government.

17. Some parts in Southern Ropperta have effectively become a permissive environment for organised crime networks, including trafficking of women, men, boys and girls. Despite growing risks and the widening insecurity, international humanitarian NGOs continue to operate in the affected areas in order to provide humanitarian assistance to Internal Displaced People (IDP) and refugees. At the same time, the Government is increasingly restricting access in areas where the Roppertan Armed Forces conduct their operations. This restrictive and fragile environment inhibits (quite significantly in some specific areas) the overall contribution of EU’s humanitarian partners.

18. Police and Armed Forces are increasingly stretched and ineffective, unable to fulfil their mandate in Southern Ropperta. Due to issues with the payment of their salaries, corruption and extortion are on the rise. Episodes of abuses, including Sexual and Gender Based Violence (SGBV), have also been reported. Respect, promotion and compliance of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) remain a key challenge, and an area where the EU is collectively focusing.

19. The gradually deteriorating security environment and the worsening humanitarian situation are causing substantial internal displacements within Ropperta.

20. In addition, roughly 500 people per day are crossing the porous border from Loripa into Ropperta hoping to use it as a springboard towards the EU. There is an increase in criminal organizations taking profit from the substantial migration flows and illegal traffic and smuggling, particularly of human beings, that is on the rise.

21. The Government of Ropperta has pursued various initiatives to try to respond to NEXSTA’s violence, including the Reconciliation Act and military operations by the Roppertan Armed Forces.

22. Nevertheless, the severely deteriorating security environment in Southern Ropperta calls for immediate action. The infiltration of NEXSTA fighters from Loripa and the control territory of some small areas in Southern Ropperta by NEXSTA have put the government and Security and Armed Forces on the backfoot, in dire need of support.

III. Situation

General

Political Situation

23. In 2015, the secular party won the most recent free and fair elections, by a small majority and Begh CAOP ESVERTY was elected as the first President under the country’s new
constitution. His Government is aware of the efforts needed to balance political cohesion with economic and social development.

24. Ropperta has steadily increased cooperation with its neighbours and overseas particularly with the EU.

25. Relations between Ropperta and its neighbour to the West, Loripa, are tense, mainly due to the difficulty of managing a porous common border, especially in the South. Apart from the terrorist activities carried out by NEXSTA in Southern Ropperta, there is an increase in criminal organizations along the common border, profiting from the rise of illegal traffic and smuggling, including also of human beings.

26. On the other side, a relevant state actor in the region, Kronen, has publicly denounced the EU's efforts to support Ropperta, especially those ones aiming at developing more efficient, accountable and responsible Armed Forces that would operate in accordance with human rights, gender issues and International Humanitarian Law. Kronen's leader has called upon Roppertans to resist this "illegitimate interference", labelling it a “return back to the old colonialism policies that ravaged the African countries”.

27. Rasolian Government continues supporting Ropperta, and provides strong support to the UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) and EU approach to the Ropperta crisis, included to a possible launch of a CSDP military operation and civilian mission.

**Economic Situation**

28. It is widely acknowledged that the Roppertan Revolution was triggered by high unemployment, hyperinflation, corruption, disregard for fundamental human rights, such as freedom of speech, by state authorities, and poor living conditions. The protests constituted the most dramatic wave of social and political unrest in Ropperta in three decades and resulted in scores of deaths and injuries, most of which were the consequence of repressive action by police and security forces against demonstrators.

29. Unemployment remains the main challenge faced by Ropperta in the short and medium term. The unemployment rate reached 28.5% at the end of 2018. This unemployment mainly affects young people, who represent more than 70% of the unemployed, affecting particularly disadvantaged regions. The urgency to tackle this problem has been highlighted by the growing number of social unrest. Significant population growth is likely to exacerbate this tendency. The population is expected to double by 2050.

30. Although significant policy progress must be acknowledged, the pace of implementation of socio-economic reforms is still very slow. The economy grew by 1.3% in 2018. However, persistent macroeconomic imbalances require serious structural reforms – such as urgent fiscal consolidation measures, transparency of public finance management or strengthening of the legislative framework to the fight against corruption, with the aim of stimulating job creation and facilitating the integration of young people into the labour market.

**Development Situation**
31. The 2015-2025 Strategy towards a Sustainable Development for All (SSD4A), adopted on February 20, 2015, advocated a new development model aimed at promoting inclusive growth and responding to expectations of a growing population (the Demographic and Society Observatory forecasts that by 2050 the population will double).

32. The SSD4A focuses on four main areas: (a) good governance, administrative reform and the fight against corruption, (b) green economy and inclusive growth for a sustainable future, (c) human development and social cohesion, and d) security stabilization of the neighbourhood. The Strategy estimates an increase in growth rate of 3.7% in 2025, which will be driven essentially by a significant change in private investment (increase of 56%) and by a major increase in foreign direct investment by 75% over the next years.

33. The SSD4A stands for the improvement of economic governance, the development of a business climate enabling private and foreign investment, as well as the promotion of a green, innovative and sustainable development of economic sectors. However, public action and private initiatives that generate dignified and modern jobs, in particular for the young, are still slow-moving.

34. The Government of Ropperta has focused on supporting the modernization of the administration, good governance and the fight against corruption, as well as attempts to bringing closer the less developed regions. However, more progress is needed to achieve a balanced development between regions.

35. Bridging social and regional disparities, which were key factors in the 2011 revolution, is a major priority. Investment in public services and socio-economic infrastructure is much needed all across country, as well as to narrow gap between the richest and the underdeveloped regions.

36. The increased instability in border areas, the terrorist threat and the growth of illegal activities are posing an additional challenge to the Government of Ropperta to deliver efficiently and in a timely manner on their development goals.

37. The EU is continuing to deploy its wide-range of means to support the political and socio-economic development in Ropperta.

Humanitarian Situation

38. The conflict provoked by NEXSTA has a significant regional spill over. Humanitarian needs, particularly to IDP and refugees, in Southern Loripa and Ropperta remain very high due to the combination of attacks, widespread insecurity and natural hazards.

39. Public services in Southern Loripa and Ropperta, structurally underfunded and under threats can hardly provide basic services to the populations.

40. In 2017, the European Commission allocated EUR 184.9 million in humanitarian assistance to the region. Despite this, a large part of humanitarian needs still remains to be addressed.

41. Part of the affected population in the Southern of Ropperta is fleeing northwards to safer provinces where national security forces are more present. Around 80 000 people are on the move, including vulnerable groups (e.g. children, elderly and disabled people).
42. In addition, refugee flows of about 500 people per day from Southern Loripa towards Southern Ropperta continue. Some refugees hope to use Ropperta as a springboard towards the EU.

43. These refugee flows from Loripa and Ropperta to the EU have been exploited by some local criminal organisations of human traffickers and smugglers, exposing refugees to additional risks which have resulted in several hundreds of migrants losing their lives while trying to cross the Mediterranean.

44. The massive displacement in Ropperta has led to the opening of three IDP and refugee camps, in order to host roughly 100 000 of IDPs and 50 000 refugees in Ropperta. However, the government is unable to properly meet the IDPs' and refugees' increasingly pressing needs in terms of shelter, protection, food security and Water, Sanitation and Health (WASH). Camps are already above their maximum reception capacity and more IDPs and refugees are expected to arrive from the Southern of Ropperta.

45. As clashes between NEXSTA and government security forces continue, international humanitarian organisations find accessing the people in need increasingly challenging.

46. In a direct breach of International Humanitarian Law, humanitarian aid workers are themselves more and more becoming targets of violent attacks. An ICRC report in July 2018 highlighting both the dire humanitarian situation in the Southern of Ropperta and Loripa, and the risks to which humanitarian workers are exposed, shocked the international community. The EU (both in Brussels and in New York, through the EU Delegation to the UN) has been increasing its advocacy and pressure to all parties to the conflict for the respect of International Humanitarian Law. The training of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and gender issues to national armed forces is of paramount importance.

47. Protection needs are increasing, leading to gender based violence and child protection issues. Effective Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (CMCoord) may also improve living conditions for the affected population, through the interaction and dialogue of the civilian and military actors, in full respect of the humanitarian space and principles. The Commission (DG ECHO) supports CMCoord through UN OCHA.

Human Rights and Gender Situation

48. Within this complex scenario, human rights violations have been widespread and manifested largely in extrajudicial killings, violence against women and children, abduction and trafficking of children, recruiting child soldiers, arbitrary detention and torture. Freedoms of assembly and of expression have also suffered restrictions.

49. According to the Ropperta Demographic Household Survey (RDHS) 2015, the experience of physical violence by women in the conflict-hit Southern region is the highest in Ropperta. Child poverty is strikingly high in this part of the country; 52 per cent compared to the national average of 38 per cent. Adolescent girls (15-19 years) represent the most vulnerable segment of the population; and a large number have been physically or sexually abused. 40 per cent of all new HIV infections are contracted by adolescent girls.
50. In an effort to fight against violence and sexual abuse of women, the EU launched in 2015, a new set of actions aiming to better connect human rights activists/organisations to law enforcement agencies, such as the police and the judiciary, in order to provide high quality, accountable and rights-based protection and remedy for SGBV victims to break the culture of impunity of the perpetrators of such crimes.

51. Several international organisations and non-governmental organisations operating in the region have reported that since the beginning of the crisis, NEXSTA has committed widespread abuses against the local population, including also SGBV and the forced recruitment of child soldiers.

52. There are hints that the IDP and refugee camps have become centres of gravity for organised crime groups involved in trafficking in human beings and soft targets for the NEXSTA to commit children abductions.

**Security Situation**

53. Since 2017, the situation in the Southern of Ropperta is rather unsafe and unsecure due to NEXSTA's attacks operating from Loripa. Moreover, it has significantly deteriorated over the past months once NEXSTA has been able to maintain permanent presence in Southern Ropperta.

54. NEXSTA has been taken the control of some small areas in the province of Tabaluga, Southern Ropperta, and appears to have some support from the local population. From this area, NEXSTA has gained the ability to also target central provinces of Ropperta, including critical infrastructure, such as harbours. NEXSTA's elements are settling more permanently presence in small areas of Southern Ropperta next to the border with Lorippa.

55. In fact, since the end of January 2019, there have been numerous violent protests with riots that have been orchestrated mainly by NEXSTA.

56. The borders between Loripa and Ropperta in the Southern are porous and checkpoints are inefficient. There is a steady and unhindered flow of illegal activity, including the smuggling of migrants, the trafficking of weapons, drugs, and oil products from Loripa to Ropperta.

57. Despite having suffered several attacks in the recent months, the main oil and gas station in Southern Ropperta and the pipeline built to export the products to Europe through the Ghopk port still yields important economic benefits for Ropperta.

58. As a result of the deteriorating security situation in the country, migrant workers in Ropperta’s oil and gas industry are starting to look for opportunities to leave Ropperta.

59. The president of Ropperta has sent several letters to the UN Secretary General and the HR/VP requesting for external support, including the intervention of Armed Forces and police, to help Ropperta to address the situation.

60. The aim of the Roppertan government is to neutralise NEXSTA, regain control of the whole territory, and restore law and order in the country. The provision of a Safe and Secure Environment (SASE) around IDP and refugee camps remains also a main concern.
61. Roppertan Security and Defence Forces are heavily involved in the fight against NEXSTA. Regular forces under the functional government are trying to reverse the situation, but without any concrete and positive results.

62. Ropperta is subject to the destabilizing influence of its neighbour Loripa, led by a dictatorship of General Mayimbe who took over power after a coup d'etat. Relations with the Government of Loripa with NEXSTA are complex and opportunistic. General Mayimbe has delegated the containment of NEXSTA to his Southern warlords in exchange of various favours. They appeared to have reached a coexistence arrangement.

63. To the South, Kronen plays a significant geo strategic role. It has a strong centralized government and occupies 70% of the African continent. It's a country increasingly assertive about its potential economic world power and military strength.

64. North Africa represents the first priority for Kronen's geopolitical ambitions. The Government is taking advantage of the political void of some countries and is extending its reach up to the Mediterranean Sea. Its political and economic interests and values clash with those of the EU and the rest of the Western world. Systematic violations of human rights and international law have been repeatedly criticised by the EU and the international community. Economic and diplomatic sanctions are already in place by the EU since 2014.

65. Kronen's energy supply companies are lobbying the Government to gain more influence over oil and gas terminals in the North African region, especially in Loripa, to supply its growing and non-self-sufficient national market demand.

66. Furthermore, many analysts agree on the risk that Kronen might in future indirectly use NEXSTA as a proxy to directly target Europe. Kronen has publicly denounced the EU's efforts to support Ropperta to develop more efficient, accountable and responsible Armed Forces that will operate in accordance with international law, in particular human rights, gender and IHL. The Kronen leadership has called upon Roppertans to resist this "illegitimate interference and return back to the old colonialism policies that ravaged the African countries".

**Engagement of the international community**

**UN**

67. Within the framework of the UN-EU Strategic Partnership on Peacekeeping and Crisis Management, both organizations are assessing how to best to act in complementarity.

68. The UN Ropperta Team currently deployed in the country to face the humanitarian crisis is composed of roughly 550 staff split in the following agencies: UN (including OCHA) 75 staff; UNHCR 176 staff; UNICEF 126 staff; WHO 53 staff; UNDP 48 staff; WFP 39 staff; FAO 9 staff; UN WOMEN 7 staff; IOM 4 staff; UNESCO 2 staff; UNFPA 5 staff; UNIDO 3 staff; and UNAIDS 3 staff.

69. The UN Ropperta HQ and most of the staff are based in Ropperta capital, but a significant part of at least UNHCR, UNICEF, WHO and WFP are distributed over the country, especially in and around the refugee and IDP camps, and staff travel through the country continuously.
Other Stakeholders

70. Partnership on complementarity and transition is to link up missions and operations with programmatic activities, enhance synergies with other organisations deploying before, after, or alongside UN and EU missions and operations including the African Union (AU), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and others, while taking into account and building on each entity’s capabilities.

71. The African Union backs Roppertan Government, and provides strong support to the UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) as well as EU approach to the Ropperta crisis, included to a possible launch of a CSDP military operation and civilian mission.

72. The EU has decided to acknowledge the request of Ropperta President. After the approval of the corresponding UNSCR inviting the international community, and in particular the EU, to support and complement the peacebuilding and development initiatives to sustain peace, stability and prosperity in Ropperta.

73. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) continues to support vulnerable families, particularly civilian who had been displaced by fighting, with basic household’s items, such as food and seed.

74. The consequences of the EU getting involved in North Africa do not take long to appear. Disinformation coming from different sources and particularly from Kronen with the message against the EU "illegal intervention" in North Africa increases to the point of being a trend topic on social networks.

75. Loripa seems to take profit of the situation trying to destabilise the EU markets and threatening the EU with gas supply reductions.

76. Rasolian Government supports Ropperta Government, the UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) and EU approach to the Ropperta crisis, included to a possible launch of a CSDP military operation and civilian mission

Existing EU engagement

77. The EU-Ropperta Association Agreement provides the political framework for EU relations with Ropperta.

78. Ropperta is reinforcing ties with the EU in the domain of security and defence. Since the current government came to power in 2015, several projects on advice, mentoring and training have been financed by the EU to support the Government, but at the moment there are no ongoing projects financed by the EU.

79. In the field of Counter-Terrorism and prevention of radicalization, the political dialogue, held for the first time in Ropperta in September 2015, saw the EU propose a list of additional support measures for the country.

Political Action
80. The EU is preparing its response to Ropperta’s requests for increased support as set out in the letter of the 12 May 2019 addressed by the President of Ropperta to the HR/VP. The EU has acknowledged the request of President CAOP ESVERTY.

81. EU actions are in line with the UNSCR 1002 (2019) adopted by the Security Council at its meeting on 28 April 2019, which invites the international community, and in particular the EU, to support and complement the peacebuilding and development initiatives to sustain peace, security and stability in Ropperta.

82. EU Member States have agreed to draw up a proposal for a CSDP engagement.

83. The EU will continue using its diplomatic tools, including through the EU Delegations and EU Member States’ Embassies, and in close coordination with other regional and international actors, with the strategic aims:

- To contribute to the peace, stability and prosperity in Ropperta;
- To support a regional approach.

84. The Commission has started to reflect in the context of the upcoming ad hoc mid-term review on re-assessing the assistance provided and adapting its interventions including support to political and economic efforts.

**Development Assistance**

**DEVCO**

85. DG DEVCO programmes/projects in Ropperta are managed through the EU Del in Ropperta.

86. Since 2011, the EU has more than doubled its financial contribution to cooperation with Ropperta. The country is the principal beneficiary, in the Southern Neighbourhood, of the ‘umbrella’ programme, which lends recognition to progress made in the field of democracy and human rights. The combination of grants (over EUR 1.2 billion), macro-financial assistance (MFA – EUR 800 million) and loans, including those from the European Investment Bank (EUR 1.5 billion), will bring total support to Ropperta from 2011 to 2016 to approximately EUR 3.5 billion.

87. The scale of the support reflects the EU’s firm commitment to the country. As well as increased support, the last five years have ushered in more diverse approaches and forms of assistance to address Ropperta’s needs in the wake of its historic democratic transition.


**Humanitarian Assistance**

**ECHO**

89. DG ECHO has a Regional Office based in the capital with technical experts covering both Northern and Southern Regions. One Country Office is based in the capital and one DG
Exercice

Exercice - Exercice – Exercice

ECHO “antenna” in SUNGO in the North following the implementation of ECHO-funded actions on the ground. DG ECHO Offices are independent from the EU Delegation and geographically separated.

90. DG ECHO continues to be the main provider of humanitarian aid in Ropperta in support of the affected population.

91. DG ECHO supports CMCoord through UN OCHA. An effective Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (CMCoord) can improve living conditions for the affected population, through the interaction and dialogue of the civilian and military actors, in full respect of the humanitarian space and principles.

IV. EU Approach

EU Political Interest

92. The EU, together with other international partners, has a fundamental interest in the peace, stability and prosperity in North Africa countries, including Ropperta. A stable and peaceful Ropperta would make significant contribution to security and democratisation across the region.

93. Improving the security situation, in particular in Southern Ropperta and the border areas, will deter the infiltration of NEXSTA operatives into Ropperta territory and prevent them from using Ropperta as a possible staging area for the preparation of terrorist activities against the EU.

94. Secured and stabilized borders will also play an important role in managing the regional migration flows that are currently spilling over into the EU.

95. The EU is concerned with the current humanitarian crisis in Ropperta, including refugees and IDPs.

96. The EU is also interested in the Prevention of Violent Extremism (PVE) particularly within IDP camps where it is believed radical groups are targeting young people. In this context, the EU is focused on reducing the risk of foreign terrorist fighters returning to Europe.

97. EU energy supplies are heavily dependent on North Africa. Regional stability will promote security of supply.

98. Finally, the EU has an interest in preventing Kronen from expanding its zone of influence in the European Neighbourhood.

EU Political Objective

99. The EU overall political objective is to support peace and democratisation efforts within Ropperta and to help establish the conditions for sustainable security as well as economic and social development.
100. The EU would promote the international core values of the rule of law, democracy and human rights and other relevant areas where it has comparative advantage or relevant experience. It also includes help the people of Ropperta to lasting peace and stability, and to build a prosperous country in which human rights are respected, the protection of all citizens assured. The stabilisation of the region will have a potential benefit for the global stability and the EU.

**EU Strategic Objective**

101. In coordination with the wider International Community, in the short and medium term, the EU action is to:

- Contribute to maintaining a stable Ropperta through supporting transformation of the young democracy and ongoing efforts of social and economic reforms, ensuring the respect of human rights.

- Contribute to the creation of Safe and Secure Environment (SASE) in Southern Ropperta to avoid spill-over of the conflict to the region with the risk of new and increased migratory flows within the region or towards Europe.

- Deter potential risks to lines of communications and critical infrastructure, while respecting the sovereignty of the neighbouring countries and without interfering in the functions of the local government.

- Support the overall restoration of Ropperta’s authority in the Southern and re-establishing state control of the borders.

- Support Ropperta's fight against terrorism and prevent radicalization and violent extremism.

- Increase the resilience of Ropperta and contribute to build its capacities.

- Support Ropperta's efforts to reform its Security Sector.

- Support the fight against corruption within Law Enforcement Agency (LEA).

102. In the longer term, capitalising on its role as a security provider, the EU intends to contribute to stabilization efforts by the UN, effective security sector and border and migration management in order to achieve a sustainable settlement of the conflict in the whole region, while promoting democratization and economic development.
103. In order to achieve EU Strategic Objectives, the envisaged CSDP actions will encompass a Military Operation and a Civilian Mission, complementary to each other, deployed in the territory of Ropperta in line with relevant UNSCR and the invitation of Roppertan authorities.

104. The final Mission Statement will be defined in the Civil and Military Strategic Options.

105. The Military CSDP Operation will contribute to:

- The stabilization of the Southern part of the country in order to create a safe and secure environment (SASE);
- A wider international coordination framework in support of Ropperta Defence Sector reform (DSR);
- Mainstreaming of human rights, gender and International Humanitarian Law (including through training) and anti-corruption within the main security actors.

106. The Civilian CSDP Mission will contribute to:

- A wider international coordination framework in support of Ropperta Security Sector Reform, in particular it will assist to strengthen capacity of Internal Security Forces and support counterterrorism framework across the institutions with the necessary instruments to continue fighting against terrorism.
- Mainstreaming of human rights, gender and anti-corruption within the main security actors;
- Strengthen the capacity and capability of the justice sector.

Assumptions

107. The CSDP response is conceived on the following assumptions:

- EU Member States will provide the necessary resources to plan and conduct the proposed action.
- The security situation in the potential areas of deployment within Ropperta is largely permissive in the North, but this is not the case in the South.
- The Government of Ropperta will continuously support the deployment and conduct of the EU CSDP military operation and civilian mission and co-operate with Operation and Mission staff.
- The Government of Ropperta will grant privileges and immunities to the members of the Operation and Mission in its territory until appropriate SOFA/SOMA are finalised.
- The Government of Ropperta will grant the security of the EU Civilian CSDP response.
- Rasolian Government remains supportive to the UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) and EU approach to the Ropperta crisis, included to a possible launch of a CSDP Military Operation and Civilian Mission.
- Lorippa and Kronen Government will not intervene directly in Ropperta.
- Continued European Public support for the Mission.
- Given the high threat level in the Southern of Ropperta, robust and extensive Rules of Engagement (ROE) will be granted to the CSDP Military Operation.

Location of the Mission and Operation

108. The territory of central North Africa will be the area of the CSDP Military Operation. The EU Operation Headquarters (OHQ) will be located in Europe and the EU Force Headquarters (FHQ) will be located in Ropperta, subject to further operational planning.

109. The Civilian Mission’s AOR will be limited to Ropperta and its territorial waters. The Mission HQ will be in Ropperta City. Field Offices could be established as appropriate. Initially, the Mission will not operate in the Southern part of the country. Mission personnel could travel or be temporarily deployed to other places in the region for coordination and liaison purposes, if deemed necessary, and security allows.

Tasks

110. The proposed military tasks would include:

- Contribute to the establishment of a safe and secure environment in the Southern and prevent spread of the NEXSTA threat to the north;
- Contribute to the restoration of Roppertan authority and control of Roppertan borders;
- Support Roppertan Armed Forces throughout Ropperta to manage IDP and refugees flows;
- Support and train the Roppertan Special Forces in order to be effective against the terrorist threat;
- Identify and contribute to disrupt the business model of smugglers and human traffickers operating in Southern Ropperta from Loripa;
- Provide training on Human Rights/Gender and International Humanitarian Law for the Ropperta Armed Forces;
- Advise Ropperta in Defence Sector Reform including capacity building;
- Be prepared to support humanitarian efforts in the South, in close coordination with EU or non-EU stakeholders, including the AU and UN (UN Ropperta Team) and in accordance with the internationally agreed humanitarian civil-military guidelines.

111. The proposed civilian tasks would include:

- Strategic advise within Civilian Security Sector Reform;
- Support to the enhancement of border security capacities of Internal Security Forces;
- Advise Ropperta to identify training and equipment needs (civilian) and support coordination of donors;

- Support Roppertan Internal Security Forces capacities to fight against terrorism in particular on measures to prevent radicalization and control the return of foreign fighters;

- The CSDP Civilian Mission will provide strategic advice to the Government and Border Management authorities on protection of civilians, including human rights.

112. Complementarity will be ensured between the CSDP Military Operation and Civilian Mission as well with other EU instruments in line with the EU Integrated Approach.

**Integration of Human Rights and Gender**

113. All Operation/Mission activities, training programmes and support to Ropperta national authorities will be pursued in strict compliance with the universal values of Human Rights, the UNSCRs 1325 (2000), 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009), 1960 (2010), 2106 (2013), 2122 (2013) and 2242 (2015), as well as with the related decisions and recommendations for CSDP missions agreed upon by the Council of the European Union on women, peace and security and gender-mainstreaming.

**Mission sequencing**

114. The estimated sequencing for the executive military operation would be:

- By the 4th November 2019: EU OHQ activated;

- First troops deployed in Ropperta 30 days after the decision of the Council to launch the Operation.

115. The estimated sequencing for the non-executive civilian mission would be 90 days after the decision of the Council to launch the Mission HQ established in Ropperta City and commencement of activities.

**Force Protection for the Military Operation**

116. Neutralising the terrorist threat in the Southern part of the country will be the most significant threat to personnel, so the EU Force must be capable of facing such a threat.

117. A detailed threat assessment and constant situational picture is needed to address these threats, which will be taken into account in subsequent operational planning.

**Security for the Civilian Mission**

118. Primary responsibility for the protection of the Civilian Mission and its facilities falls under the responsibility of the Host State. Depending on the security developments in certain regions of the country, special measures will have to be undertaken.

119. Threats to health and well-being, and exposure to situations of unrest or criminal behaviour would also represent the most significant risk to mission personnel. However, given the
political and volatile security situation in the country and identified opposition to Western intervention within some groups, the potential risk for international staff of being targeted cannot be ruled out.

120. A detailed threat assessment will need to address these threats, which will be taken into account in subsequent operational planning.

Mission assessment of CSDP Action

121. A holistic Strategic Review will be conducted mid-mandate. Based on the initial achievements of the CSDP engagement, it will have to assess progress towards the desired end state and identify options for further extending CSDP action within Ropperta as required.

End State

122. The desired military end state will be:

- Government of Ropperta control is re-established in the Southern part of the country;

- The NEXSTA threat is neutralized in Ropperta;

- The Roppertan authorities have developed efficient military capabilities to meet its primary requirement to protect its population and ensure basic respect for human rights.

123. The desired civilian end state will be:

- A civilian Security Sector Reform Strategy is developed and adopted;

- Ropperta has developed and is implementing an integrated border management strategy, in order to conduct effective and sustainable border security operations;

- The Government of Ropperta has developed a Counter Terrorism Strategy which includes Prevention of Violent Extremism (PVE), and measures to reduce the threat of radicalisation.

EU Transition Strategy

124. The Transition Strategy will consist of creating the conditions, in which Ropperta will be self-sufficient in terms of government capabilities, security providing a platform for sustainable economic growth. In long term, an UN bridging operation could be considered.

125. First of all, Ropperta Security Forces must be capable of ensuring Ropperta's sovereignty within its borders.

126. Furthermore, the Transition Strategy must lead to a number of activities, most of them parallel with these CSDP actions, which will be promoted and coordinated at the political and strategic levels to ensure the sustainability of the projects.

127. The sustainability of the projects launched by the CSDP Mission should be promoted and ensured by other EU instruments, in full compliance with the relevant competencies and related decision-making processes with an emphasis on local ownership.
Possible Timelines

128. The initial mandate of the CSDP Military Operation will be for 2 years, with a Strategic Review at mid-mandate.

129. The initial mandate of the CSDP Civilian Mission will be for 5 years with an Interim Strategic Review after 1 year.

Duration

130. Subject to further planning, it is estimated that the End State and the basis for lasting and tangible results could be achieved in

- 5-7 year time frame, for the CSDP Military Operation:

- 7-10 year time frame, for the CSDP Civilian Mission and possible follow on CSDP Non-Executive Military Mission.

Risks to Mission accomplishment

131. The following are considered risks to Mission accomplishment:

- Non-inclusive dialogue processes leading to fractures within the Government of Ropperta and subsequent loss of consensus in support of the EU action;

- A deterioration in the political and security situation within Ropperta could affect the EU engagement in the area;

- The security situation is tense, fragile and could deteriorate. An increased activity of NEXSTA could threaten the political and security situation and, therefore, the ability of the EU to perform their strategic and operational tasks;

- The deterioration in security limits the freedom of movement of the Operation/Mission personnel and consequently their ability to perform their tasks. Permanent monitoring of the regional situation and co-ordination with all actors will help to minimise the risk;

- The EU fails to generate Operation/Mission personnel with the required skills to deliver the mandate;

- Kronen might feel threatened by EU action in support of Ropperta. This could result in renewed support by Kronen for NEXSTA.

VI. Organisation and Resources

Command and Control
132. The Political and Security Committee (PSC) will exercise, under the responsibility of the Council and the HR/VP, the political control and strategic direction of the CSDP mission/operation.

133. The Military Operation Commander (OpCdr) will exercise command and control of the CSDP Military Operation at the military-strategic level.

134. The Force Commander (FCdr) will assume responsibility and exercise command and control of the CSDP Military Operation in theatre. He/she will exercise command and control over the personnel, teams and units from contributing states as assigned to him/her together with administrative and logistical responsibility over assets, resources and information put at the disposal of the mission.

135. The Civilian Operations Commander (CivOpsCdr) will exercise command and control of the CSDP Mission at the strategic level.

136. The Head of Mission (HoM) will assume responsibility and exercise command and control of the CSDP Civilian Mission at the theatre level. He/she will exercise command and control over the personnel, teams and units from contributing states as assigned to him/her by the CivOpsCdr together with administrative and logistical responsibility over assets, resources and information put at the disposal of the mission.

EU Coordination

137. The CSDP Operation and Mission will contribute to the EU Integrated Approach in the region and will be coordinated with other EU instruments including humanitarian aid, development funding as well as Instrument contributing to Security and Peace (IcSP) delivered in the framework of the EU-Ropperta Association Agreement.

138. Liaison should be established between the HoM, the FCdr and the EU Head of Delegation (HoD).

139. The HoM and the FCdr will inform the HoD about Operation/Mission activities that may have political implications. Conversely, HoD will inform the HoM/FCdr on political issues, which may impact on the conduct of the mission. The HoD will be briefed on relevant developments.

140. The Mission will work closely with Frontex, in accordance with the relevant guidelines of the European Council. Frontex may be invited to participate in the Mission through provision of a liaison officer.

Coordination and Cooperation with External Partners

141. The number of different actors makes it necessary to have a strong cooperation and an establishment of liaison mechanisms or coordination, especially with the UN and the AU, both during the planning and the conduct phases. This is also to avoid duplication and ensure effective action.

142. The UNSC has underlined the need for a coordinated and inclusive approach by all the main stakeholders to ensure a comprehensive solution to the problems of the region to properly address the security, development and humanitarian issues. Nevertheless, a proper coordination mechanism under UN leadership has yet to be established in the region. The
CSDP Military Operation and Civilian Mission will coordinate their activities in such a framework if established with full respect for Ropperta ownership and EU decision making autonomy.

143. In this respect the CSDP Military Operation and Civilian Mission will take particular care to avoid any functional overlap with the UN and is to establish robust de-confliction mechanisms with the AU. The CSDP Military Operation and Civilian Mission will liaise with UN Country Team and UN OCHA on Humanitarian Civil-Military Cooperation (CMCoord) and with the AU.

**Participation of Non EU-Countries**

144. Third States will not be invited to join the Military Operation and Civilian Mission at this stage. This situation will remain under review.

**Resources**

145. The exact number of EU Force and the organization of the CSDP Military Operation will be identified in further planning documents.

146. The exact number and job descriptions of the CSDP Civilian Mission personnel will be identified in further planning documents.

147. Logistic arrangements are to be met by a combination of new and available EU administrative assets held at the temporary warehouse. Life support options in Ropperta are available but limited and represent a key issue for mission planning.

**Indicative Composition**

148. The composition of the CSDP Military Operation will be subject of further military planning.

149. A ‘project cell’ able to identify, plan and implement supporting activities could be part of the CSDP Civilian Mission structure.

150. Depending on operational requirements, in addition to the permanent staff, the CSDP Civilian Mission personnel could be temporarily augmented to plan and conduct specific projects/operations, particularly in the training field and where specialist experts are required.

**Legal Framework**

151. The EU legal framework will be provided by respective Council Decisions establishing and the CSDP Military Operation and Civilian Mission, and will be based on:

- United Nations Security Council Resolution 1001 (22 May 2018);

- Letter of the president of Ropperta to the EU HR/VP (15 Mar 2019);

- United Nations Security Council Resolution 1002 (28 April 2019);
- Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA) and Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) to be concluded with Ropperta, in particular to provide privileges and immunities to the CSDP Military Operation and Civilian Mission and its personnel.

**Financing**

152. The common costs of the CSDP Military Operation, including preparatory phase, will be financed through the Athena Mechanism.

153. The preparation of Reference Amount shall commence without delay by relevant actors in order to be proposed to and approved by Council.

154. The CSDP Civilian Mission will be financed from the CFSP budget. The use of ‘Preparatory Measures’ of the CFSP budget could be considered provided that the Council confirms its effective intent to establish a CFSP mission.

**Information Strategy**

155. A coherent EU Information Strategy, including public master messages, should be crafted by the EEAS Strategic Communication Division in close cooperation and coordination with the EU Delegation, Geo Desk and in consultation with the Commission. EU bodies will aim to inform all local, regional and international audiences of the EU intentions, actions, and results.

156. A broader communication strategy should be developed and rolled out jointly with the Government of Ropperta.
SECTION 2-N-4

MILITARY ADVICE ON CRISIS MANAGEMENT CONCEPT
COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

Brussels, 25 September 2019

COVER NOTE

from: European Union Military Committee
to: Political Security Committee
Subject: Military Advice on Draft Crisis Management Concept (CMC) for CSDP Action in ROPPERTA.

Delegations will find attached the EEAS document with reference EEAS 1000/19

Enclosure: EEAS 1000/19.
Brussels, 19 September 2019

EEAS 1000/19

LIMITE

CSDP/PSDC

COSDP

NOTE

From: European Union Military Staff
To: European Union Military Committee
No. Prev. doc.:  
Subject: Military Advice on the Draft Crisis Management Concept (CMC) for CSDP action in ROPPERTA.

AO: Col .................., MAP/OPS

Delegations will find attached the Military Advice on the Draft Crisis Management Concept (CMC) for CSDP action in ROPPERTA.
References:

A. Crisis Management Concept (CMC) for CSDP action in ROPPERTA, dated 12 September 2019.

B. PSC Conclusions of 27 September 2019 tasking the EUMC for a Military Advice on the draft Crisis Management Concept for CDSP action in ROPPERTA.

A. INTRODUCTION AND AIM

1. This paper aims to provide Military Advice on the document at Reference A, as requested by the PSC on 27 September 2019 (Ref B), prepared by the EEAS Managing Directorate CSDP Crisis Response.

B. ADVICE

2. Operational Requirements: The EUMC acknowledges the deterioration of the security situation in Southern Ropperta, where Roppertan Armed and Security Forces are increasingly stretched and ineffective. The EUMC agrees that a Military CSDP operation, as reflected in Ref. A, is feasible from the military perspective and capable of contributing to the achievement of EU political and strategic objectives.

3. Tasks. The EUMC highlights that the demanding and diverse tasks presented in the CMC will be further analysed during the planning process to develop the Military Strategic Options (MSO). Supplementary implied tasks and associated force requirements will be determined by the Operation Commander (OpCdr) within the Operations Plan (OPLAN). While the Military CSDP operation is focussed on stabilization, support to Capacity Building and support to Humanitarian Assistance, the possibility of supporting Rescue/Evacuation operations also needs to be considered.

4. The EUMC emphasises that the proposed military tasks at Ref. A may need to be implemented in a non-permissive environment in Southern Ropperta. For their implementation, the EU military force is to establish and maintain a close, wide-ranging and continued cooperation with the Roppertan authorities and Armed Forces based on mutual
support, trust and confidence. In this context further assessments should be conducted on how to develop effective advisory activities at the highest military and defence ministerial levels.

5. **EU Integrated Approach.** The EUMC reiterates that the unity of the military chain of command must be maintained for all EU military force actions and personnel. In this context, the EU OHQ and the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC), as well as the civilian and military capabilities deployed to Ropperta, are to work together at the highest possible level.

6. The EUMC expresses the importance of close liaison and coordination between the EU military HQs and force with all other relevant EU instruments operating in Brussels and in theatre, including EU Delegations in the region. Specific arrangements may be required on a case by case basis.

7. The EUMC emphasises that a collaborative approach should be established between the EU FHQ and EU Delegation in Ropperta from the beginning of the planning of EU FHQ and maintained until the end of the Military CSDP operation as a precondition for success.

8. **Complex scenario.** The EUMC remarks that, while NEXSTA represents the most significant and immediate threat to security in Southern Ropperta, it is a global terrorist group that has increased its attacks in Europe in the recent months. In addition, the conflict in Southern Ropperta presents a number of hybrid features, ranging from migration and humanitarian aspects to energy security, that constitute an overall challenge to the EU. This general situation clearly portrays a nexus between the internal and external dimensions of European security.

9. The EUMC underlines that the Military CSDP operation is to consider the support received by NEXSTA from Loripa, including the links between NEXSTA and the tribal warlords in South Loripa, as well as support from other actors in the region.

10. Therefore, the EUMC stresses the need for comprehensive, updated and detailed threat assessments on the capacity of NEXSTA and the wide array of challenges the conflict poses to the EU military force.

11. The EUMC assesses that the Military CSDP operation is to contribute, within the framework of its military tasks and in coordination with all other EU actors in theatre, to the common EU effort in preventing Violent Extremism, including Sexual and Gender Based Violence, and in promoting respect and compliance of International Humanitarian Law.

12. The EUMC is cognisant of the poor living conditions and isolation of the population, the low
economic development, hostile geography and extreme climate in the likely Area of Responsibility (AOR). These aspects are to be further analysed during the initial reconnaissance in the AOR to accurately evaluate the:

a. Available Host Nation Support (HNS);

b. Capacity of the different lines of communications and logistic infrastructures;

c. Need to develop an autonomous and robust logistic support to the operation;

d. Means to provide timely medical support to the EU Force;

e. Need to generate efficient intelligence assets in order to increase early warning and action;

f. Generation of appropriate means to ensure and increase mobility,

g. Eventual use of air assets;

h. Establishment of an appropriate legal framework that grants appropriate privileges and immunities until a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) is in place, (preferably before the complete deployment of the EU military force).

13. **Force Composition.** The EUMC underlines the provision that Member States must commit to resource the Military CSDP operation with sufficient and appropriate means and personnel to match the tasks specified in the MSOs and OPLAN in the AOR.

14. **Force Sensing.** Until the OpCdr is formally appointed by the Council; the EUMC recommends that Force Sensing start immediately through the Military Committee in order to facilitate an early identification of a Framework Nation that will provide the EU FHQ. Due to the fact that the operation may be developed in a non-permissive environment in Southern Ropperta, and to ensure a minimum operating capacity, the EUMC acknowledges the need for the rapid deployment of a battalion to the AOR and for the early activation of the EU FHQ and the information campaign, but reiterates that additional military forces will be required.

15. **Legal Issues.** The EUMC underlines that detailed arrangements, with a clear delineation of responsibilities, are critical for the efficient cooperation with the Roppertan authorities and international actors in theatre, such as the UN in supporting the management of IDP flows and other humanitarian efforts.
16. The EUMC considers that, given the threat level, the Military CSDP operation will require a detailed set of extensive and robust Rules of Engagement for the accomplishment of the different tasks. A legal framework for the processing of detainees also needs to be clearly defined.

17. **C2. EU OHQ / EU FHQ.** In order to sustain the planning tempo, the EUMC recommends nominating the EL EU OHQ and the EL EU FHQ as the OHQ and FHQ for this operation. The EUMC acknowledges the importance of integrating EU OHQ and EU FHQ elements in operational planning activities at an early stage.

18. The EUMC takes note that NEXSTA has shown considerable interest in improving its cyber capabilities, including through the use of hackers, and therefore stresses the need for Cyber resilience throughout the whole EU military chain of command.

19. **Budget.** The EUMC acknowledges that funding is a key factor, especially in the initial phase of the operation. In view of this, the EUMC proposes that the EU Council approve an appropriate Reference Amount.

20. The EUMC recognises that the Roppertan Armed Forces' lack of capacity to properly equip and maintain their trained units limits their effectiveness and may potentially adversely affect the reputation of the EU military Force. The EUMC stresses the need for Quick Impact Projects using the amended regulation for the Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) in support of the capability building effort.

21. **Transition Strategy:** As no UN bridging military operation is envisaged in the short and medium term, the EUMC stresses that the CSDP military instrument is to contribute to the establishment of sustainable conditions in which the Roppertan Armed Forces must be capable of ensuring Ropperta's sovereignty, protecting its population and ensuring basic respect for human rights within the country.

22. The EUMC underlines that the duration of the Military CSDP Operation will be determined following analysis of the progress achieved in the assigned tasks as reported in the corresponding periodical reviews.


**C. RECOMMENDATION**

24. The PSC is invited:

   a. To note this military advice;
b. To agree that, given the operation's complexity and scope, the development of Military Strategic Options (MSO) subsequent to the CMC, is essential;

c. To agree on the early identification of the EU OHQ and EU FHQ as proposed above in order to facilitate the possibility of early intervention and force sensing as appropriate.
ANNEX

ACRONYMS and ABBREVIATIONS
LIMITE

EXERCISE - EXERCISE – EXERCISE
ABAL International Airport

AIA
Aero-Medical Evacuation

AIRMEDDEVAC
Athens Multinational Sealift Coordination Centre

AOI
Area of Interest

AOO
Area of Operations

AOR
Area of Responsibility

APOD
Airport of Disembarkation

APOE
Airport of Embarkation

APT
Advance Planning Team

ARE
Assessment and Review Element

ASO
Area Security Officer

AU
African Union

AU PSC
Peace and Security Council of the African Union

C2
Command and Control

CAER
Chief Administrator of the EIBA Region

CAMEO
Collaborative Application for EU-led Operations

CAS
Close Air Support

CASEVAC
Casualty Evacuation

CBT
Capacity Building and Training (CBT)

CC
Component Command

CCIS
Command and Control Information System

CCIR
Commanders Critical Information Requirement

Cdr
Commander

CE
Crisis Establishment

CEEAC
Communauté Économique des États de l'Afrique Centrale

CEUMC
Chairman of the EU Military Committee

EXERCISE - EXERCISE - EXERCISE
**LIMITE**

**EXERCISE - EXERCISE – EXERCISE**

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>CfC</td>
<td>Call for Contributions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG</td>
<td>Command Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>CGS</td>
<td>Council General Secretariat</td>
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<tr>
<td>CHIASMUS</td>
<td>Off-line encryption up to RESTREINT UE</td>
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<tr>
<td>CHOD</td>
<td>Chief of Defence</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIMIC</td>
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<td>CIMIC Centre</td>
<td>Civil-Military Co-operation Centre</td>
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<td>Comité Interministériel</td>
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<td>CIS</td>
<td>Communication and Information System</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civ OpCdr</td>
<td>Civilian OpCdr</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIVCOM</td>
<td>Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJ2</td>
<td>Combined Joint Intelligence Cell in an HQ</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJOPG</td>
<td>Combined Joint Operation Planning Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJS</td>
<td>Criminal Justice System</td>
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<tr>
<td>CM</td>
<td>Crisis Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMC</td>
<td>Crisis Management Concept</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMCoord</td>
<td>Civil-Military Coordination</td>
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<td>CML</td>
<td>Civil Military Liaison</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMO</td>
<td>Crisis Management Operation</td>
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<td>CMP</td>
<td>Crisis Management Procedures</td>
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<td>CMPD</td>
<td>Crisis Management and Planning Directorate</td>
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<td>CNO</td>
<td>Computer Network Operations</td>
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<td>CO</td>
<td>Chief Observer</td>
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</table>

**EXERCISE - EXERCISE - EXERCISE**
COA  Course of Action
COAFR  Council Africa Working Party
CONOPS  Concept of Operations
COP  Common Operation Picture
COREPER  Permanent Representatives' Committee, based in Brussels
COREU  Correspondence EU
COS  Chief of Staff
CP  Crisis Platform
CPA  Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CPCC  Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability
CPT  Crisis Planning Team
CPX  Command Post Exercise
CR  Combat Recovery
CRCT  Crisis Response Co-ordinating Team
CRS  Crisis Response System
CRT  Civilian Response Team
CSAR  Combat Search and Rescue
CSDP  Common Security and Defence Policy
CSO  1. Civilian Strategic Options - 2. Civil Society Organizations
CSP  Country Strategy Paper (CION)
DDP  Detailed Deployment Plan
DDRR  Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration
DEVCO  European Commission DG for Development and Cooperation -
DGEUMS  Europe Aid Director General of the European Union Military Staff
DIO  Defence Intelligence Organisation
LIMITE

**DISTAFF**

**EXERCISE - EXERCISE – EXERCISE**

Directing Staff

**DOOG**

Doctors of our Globe

**DP**

Deployable Package

**DPKO**

Department for Peacekeeping Operations (UN)

**DPRE**

Displaced Persons and Refugees (Des Personnes Déplacées et Réfugiées)

**DSMSO**

Deputy Senior Mission Security Officer

**DSR**

Defence Sector Reform

**DVD**

Distinguished Visitors Daz

**EBC**

EIBA Border Commission

**EC**

European Commission

**ECHO**

European Commission DG for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection

**EDF**

European Development Fund

**EEAS**

European External Action Service

**EEZ**

Exclusive Economic Zone

**EGF**

EIBA Gendarmerie Forces

**ELMA**

EUMS Lessons Management Application

**ENDEX**

End of conduct phase of exercise

**EOD**

Explosive Ordnance Disposal

**EPG**

Exercise Planning Guide

**EPT**

Enhanced Planning Team

**EQ**

Exercise Qualifier

**ERW**

Explosive Remnants of War

**ESDP net**

European Security and Defence Policy Network

**EU**

European Union

**EU DEL**

EU Delegation

**EXERCISE - EXERCISE - EXERCISE**
LIMITE

EXERCISE - EXERCISE – EXERCISE

EU EOM  EU Election Observation Mission
EU FHQ  European Union Force Headquarters
EU MS  European Union Member States
EU OHQ  European Union Operation Headquarters
EU Ops Centre  European Union Operations Centre
EU SATCEN  European Union Satellite Centre
EUFOR  European Union Force
EUMC  EU Military Committee
EUMS  European Union Military Staff
EUSR  European Union Special Representative
EW  Electronic Warfare
EXINST  Exercise Instructions
EXO  Executive Officer (in EUMS)
EXSPEC  Exercise Specifications
FA  Framework Agreement
FAO  Food and Agricultural Organisation (UN)
FC  Force Catalogue
FCdr  FCdr
FER  Final Exercise Report
FFM  Fact Finding Mission
FFMR  Fact Finding Mission Report
FHQ  Force Headquarter
FIR  First Impression Report
FL  Freedom League
FN  Framework Nation

EXERCISE - EXERCISE - EXERCISE
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<td>FO</td>
<td>Field Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>FOB</td>
<td>Forward Operating Base</td>
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<tr>
<td>FOC</td>
<td>Full Operational Capacity</td>
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<td>FOGC</td>
<td>Federal Oil and Gas Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>FP</td>
<td>Force Protection</td>
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<tr>
<td>FPI</td>
<td>Foreign Policy Instruments Service (EC)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FPM</td>
<td>Final Planning meeting</td>
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<tr>
<td>FPU</td>
<td>Formed Police Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>GAC</td>
<td>Global Assembly of Churches</td>
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<td>GAERC</td>
<td>General Affairs and External Relations Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>GEOC</td>
<td>Global Energy Operating Concern</td>
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<td>GIS</td>
<td>Geographic Information System</td>
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<td>GO</td>
<td>Governmental Organisations</td>
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<tr>
<td>GPAC</td>
<td>Global Programme Against Corruption</td>
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<tr>
<td>HC</td>
<td>Humanitarian Co-ordinator (UN)</td>
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<tr>
<td>HFA</td>
<td>Holy Fire Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>HIC</td>
<td>Humanitarian Information Centre</td>
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<td>HIPC</td>
<td>Heavily Indebted Poor Country</td>
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<td>HIV/AIDS</td>
<td>Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome</td>
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<td>HN</td>
<td>Host Nation</td>
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<tr>
<td>HNS</td>
<td>Host Nation support</td>
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<tr>
<td>HoD</td>
<td>Head of Delegation</td>
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<td>HoM</td>
<td>Head of Mission</td>
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<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>--------------</td>
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<td>HR</td>
<td>High Representative</td>
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<td>HUMINT</td>
<td>Human Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>HWU</td>
<td>Hot Wash Up</td>
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<tr>
<td>IC</td>
<td>International Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICAO</td>
<td>International Civil Aviation Organisation</td>
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<td>International Court of Justice</td>
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<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<tr>
<td>IcSP</td>
<td>Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDB</td>
<td>International Body on Development</td>
</tr>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internal Displaced Person</td>
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<tr>
<td>IEOD</td>
<td>Improvised Explosive Ordinance Disposal</td>
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<tr>
<td>IER</td>
<td>Information Exchange Requirements</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFRC</td>
<td>International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies</td>
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<td>IHL</td>
<td>International Humanitarian Law</td>
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<td>IMD</td>
<td>Initiating Military Directive</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>InfoOps</td>
<td>Information Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>INT</td>
<td>Intelligence (Division of EUMS)</td>
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<td>INTEL</td>
<td>Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>INTELSAT</td>
<td>the International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IO</td>
<td>International Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOC</td>
<td>Initial Operational Capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOLAN</td>
<td>Inter-building Office Local Area Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organisation for Migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPU</td>
<td>Integrated Police Unit</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIMITEXERCISE - EXERCISE – EXERCISE

IRC
International Red Cross

ISOP
Isolated Personnel

ISR
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance

IST
Information Strategy Team

ISTAR
Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance

IT
Information Technology

J1
Personnel (Military OHQ)

J2
Intelligence (Military OHQ)

J3
Operations (Military OHQ)

J4
Logistics (Military OHQ)

J5
Planning (Military OHQ)

J6
Communications (Military OHQ)

J7
Exercise/Training (Military OHQ)

J8
Budget - Financing (Military OHQ)

J9
CIMIC (Military OHQ)

JA
Joint Action

JDC
Joint Defence Committee

JHA
Justice and Home Affairs

JJC
Joint Justice Committee

JOA
Joint Operations Area

JPRC
Joint Personnel Recovery Centre

LAN
Local Area Network

LEA
Law Enforcement Agency

LEGAD
Legal Advisor

LN
Lead Nation

LO
Lessons Observations

LIMITEXERCISE - EXERCISE - EXERCISE
LIMITE

EXERCISE - EXERCISE – EXERCISE

Lines of Communication

Logistics (Division of EUMS)

Low Control

Linking Relief Rehabilitation and Development

Movement and Transport

Movement Coordination Centre Europe

Multi Donor Trust Fund

Medical Evacuation

Member of European Parliament

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Major General

Military Intelligence

Military Public Relations / Public Information

Military Advice

Military Representative

Ministry of Local Government

Mission Monitoring Team

Multinational Detailed Deployment Plan

Multi-National Geospatial Support Group

Measures of Effectiveness

Measures of Performance

Memorandum of Understanding

Maritime Patrol Aircraft

Member State

Mission Specific Minimum Security Operating Standards

1. Military Strategic Option
   -

2. Mission Security Officer

EXERCISE - EXERCISE - EXERCISE
LIMITE

EXERCISE - EXERCISE – EXERCISE

MSOS
1. Military Strategic Options
2. Minimum Security Operating Standards
MSP
Mission Security Plan
MTF
1. Medical Task Force
2. Medical Treatment Facility
NACSAP
National Anti-Corruption Strategic Plan
NCP
National Contact Person
NCRW
National Convention for Reform and Welfare
N-DIOs
National - Defence Intelligence Organisations
NEO
Non-combat Evacuation Operation
NEPAD
New Partnership for Africa's Development
NEXSTA
Newborn Extremist State
NGO
Non-Governmental Organization
NIC
National Intelligence Cell
NILO
National Intelligence Liaison Officer
NIP
National Indicative Programme
NSC
National Security Council
OAG
Other Armed Groups
OCE
Official Conducting the Exercise
OCHA
Office for Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN)
OHCHR
Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
OHQ
Operation Headquarters
OpCdr
OpCdr
OPCON
Operational Control
OPLAN
Operation Plan
OPORD
Operational Order

EXERCISE - EXERCISE - EXERCISE
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<td>OPS</td>
<td>Operations Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSE</td>
<td>Official Scheduling the Exercise</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSWAN</td>
<td>Operations Wide Network Area</td>
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<tr>
<td>PACC</td>
<td>Pan African Convention of Churches</td>
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<tr>
<td>PA</td>
<td>Pura Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCA</td>
<td>Permanent Court of Arbitration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFCA</td>
<td>Political Framework for Crisis Approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PI</td>
<td>Public Information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PGF</td>
<td>PRESIDENTIAL GUARD FORCES</td>
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<td>PMG</td>
<td>Politico-Military Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POC</td>
<td>Point of Contact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POL</td>
<td>Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLAD</td>
<td>Political Adviser</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPIO</td>
<td>Press and Public Information Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>PR</td>
<td>Personnel Recovery</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>Political Response Cell</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRCC</td>
<td>Personnel Recovery Coordination Cell</td>
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<td>PSC</td>
<td>Political and Security Committee</td>
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<td>PSOR</td>
<td>Provisional Statement of Requirements</td>
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<td>PSTN</td>
<td>Public Switched Telephone Network</td>
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<td>PSYOPS</td>
<td>Psychological Operations</td>
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<td>PVE</td>
<td>Prevention of Violent Extremism</td>
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<td>PXD</td>
<td>Post-Exercise Discussion</td>
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<td>RAF</td>
<td>ROPPERTAN ARMED FORCES</td>
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**LIMITE**

**EXERCISE - EXERCISE – EXERCISE**

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<th>Acronym</th>
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<tr>
<td>RDHS</td>
<td>ROPPERTAN DEMOGRAPHIC HOUSEHOLD SURVEY</td>
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</table>
| RELEX   | 1. External Relations DG (CION)  
          2. RELEX Counsellors Working Group |
| RFI     | Request for Information |
| RIP     | Regional Indicative Programme |
| RISF    | ROPPERTAN INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES |
| ROE     | Rule of Engagement |
| ROEReq  | Rules of Engagement Request |
| ROL     | Rule of Law |
| RoRo    | Roll on - Roll off |
| RPG     | Rocket-propelled grenade(s) |
| RRM     | Rapid Reaction Mechanism |
| SAR     | Search and Rescue |
| SASE    | Save and Secure Environment |
| SECTRA  | Secure Transmission |
| SG/HR   | Secretary General / High Representative |
| SGBV    | Sexual and Gender Based Violence |
| SIAC    | Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity |
| SIGINT  | Signals Intelligence |
| SITCEN  | Joint Situation Centre |
| SITREP  | Situation Report |
| SLOC    | Sea Lines of Communication |
| SMSO    | Senior Mission Security Officer |
| SMT     | Security Management Team |
| SOC     | Statement of Compliance |
| SOF     | Special Operation Forces |
**LIMITE**

**EXERCISE - EXERCISE – EXERCISE**

<table>
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<th>Acronym</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SOFA</td>
<td>Status of Forces Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOLAN</td>
<td>Secret Office Local Area Network</td>
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<td>SOMA</td>
<td>Status of Mission Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOP</td>
<td>Standard Operating Procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOR</td>
<td>Statement of Requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>Strategic Planning Directive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPG</td>
<td>Strategic Planning Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPOD</td>
<td>Sea Port of Disembarkation</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPOE</td>
<td>Sea Port of Embarkation</td>
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<td>SSD4A</td>
<td>Strategy towards a Sustainable Development for All</td>
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<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
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<td>STARTEX</td>
<td>Start of Exercise Conduct Phase</td>
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<td>STRATAIRMEDEVAC</td>
<td>Strategic Aero-Medical Evacuation</td>
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<td>TA</td>
<td>Training Audience</td>
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<td>TCA</td>
<td>Transitional Constituent Assembly</td>
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<td>TCN</td>
<td>Troop Contributing Nation</td>
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<td>TEU</td>
<td>Treaty on the European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOA</td>
<td>Transfer of Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOR</td>
<td>Terms of Reference</td>
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<tr>
<td>UAV</td>
<td>Unmanned air vehicles</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNAIDS</td>
<td>Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nation Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
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<td>UNHCHR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights</td>
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<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>United Nations Information Centre</td>
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<td>United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund</td>
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<td>UNIDO</td>
<td>United Nations Industrial Development Organization</td>
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<td>UNMAO</td>
<td>United Nations Mine Action Office</td>
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<td>UNODC</td>
<td>United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime</td>
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<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<td>UN Security Council Resolution</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>US Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>Video-teleconference</td>
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<td>Wide Area Network</td>
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<td>Water, Sanitation and Health</td>
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<td>World Bank</td>
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<td>World Food Programme</td>
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<td>World Health Organisation</td>
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<td>Watch-keeping Capability</td>
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<td>WR</td>
<td>Weekly Report</td>
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<td>Work Up Staff Training</td>
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