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**Subject :** **Suggestions for procedures for coherent, comprehensive EU crisis management**

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In accordance with the PSC conclusions at its meeting on 7 March 2003, delegations will find attached the Crisis Management Procedures as revised by the Politico-Military Group in the light of EUMC and CIVCOM advice.

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**SUGGESTIONS FOR  
PROCEDURES  
FOR  
COHERENT, COMPREHENSIVE EU CRISIS MANAGEMENT**

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## INTRODUCTION

These crisis management procedures (CMP) have been drawn up to include crises of the highest degree of complexity. Although the widest range of activities during the crisis cycle is described and appears sequentially, this is only for ease of reference. Therefore, the CMP do not limit the EU to developing its approach to a crisis in the sequence set down here. On the one hand, many instruments and processes mentioned might be relevant in several or all phases of a crisis, on the other hand, some of the processes mentioned may be skipped altogether. In particular, recommendations concerning the identification and/or the appointment of an Operation Headquarters (OHQ) and an Operation Commander (OpCdr) may be made in the process at any suitable moment, and when appropriate, without prejudice to respective prerogatives and responsibilities. Furthermore, many of these processes, such as the development of a crisis management concept (CMC), are iterative in nature.

EU actions follow the principles of the UN Charter and, where appropriate, of the OSCE Charter for European Security, as well as the objectives of the EU, as outlined in the Treaty on European Union (TEU). The EU is engaged in stability promotion, early warning and conflict prevention and co-operates with the UN, the OSCE, NATO, the Council of Europe and other international organisations in a mutually reinforcing manner and throughout all phases of crisis management. The EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts is being implemented.

The approach adopted since Helsinki makes the Political and Security Committee (PSC) the linchpin of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP):

- The PSC will deal with all aspects of the CFSP, including the ESDP.
- Without prejudice to Article 207 of the Treaty establishing the European Community (EC Treaty), the PSC has a central role to play in the definition of and follow-up to the EU's response to a crisis.
- Within the scope of Title V (TEU), PSC shall exercise, under the responsibility of the Council, political control and strategic direction of crisis management operations.

Naturally, the PSC plays this central role throughout a crisis; this is a principle underpinning this document.

The Committee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper) exercises the role conferred on it by Article 207 of the EC Treaty and by Article 19 of the Council's Rules of Procedure. To this end, it will be informed in good time by the PSC.

The present suggestions are based on current Treaty provisions. They should also reflect developments in the EU-NATO arrangements following agreement on Berlin Plus as contained in the exchange of letters of 13 December 2002 between the Secretary-General/High Representative (whose letter reflects the Brussels European Council conclusions on participation of the non-EU European allies) and the NATO Secretary General as well as the joint EU-NATO declaration of 16 December 2002. The development of the ESDP will also lead to a genuine strategic partnership between the EU and NATO in crisis management with due regard for the two organisations' decision-making autonomy.

Police aspects, following from the Police Action Plan adopted by the Göteborg European Council, have been introduced in the CMP. These will be developed as appropriate as further work on and as consideration of these requirements is taken forward in the appropriate Council bodies by the Presidency, assisted by the Secretary General/High Representative.

The on-going development of civilian crisis management capacities other than police (i.e. in the area of rule of law, civil administration and civil protection) and the respective planning capability within the General Secretariat of the Council (hereinafter 'Council Secretariat') and the Commission, to be reinforced, will be reflected in the CMP as they evolve as foreseen inter alia in Annex III "New concrete targets for civilian aspects of crisis management" of the Presidency ESDP Report to the Göteborg European Council.

The European Council has also invited the Presidency, together with the Secretary-General/High Representative, to continue work within the Council on the practical modalities related to the implementation of the military and civilian aspects of crisis management, including civil-military co-ordination. Such modalities are being worked out inter alia on the basis of the Action Plan for the further strengthening of civil-military co-ordination in EU Crisis Management<sup>1</sup>. Further developments in this field will be reflected in the procedures.

The establishment and implementation of a co-ordinated information strategy is important throughout the EU's response to a crisis. The strategy will be formulated in line with the Guidelines for ESDP Crisis Response Information Activities (doc. 13817/02) and will be applied in all phases as from the crisis build-up.

A comprehensive exercise policy allows the testing of crisis management procedures and contributes to its further development. All relevant Council Secretariat services, the Satellite Centre (SATCEN), the Commission and the Member States participate in the crisis management exercises. Appropriate external actors may also participate<sup>2</sup>.

It is noted that Denmark recalled the Protocol on the position of Denmark annexed to the TEU and to the Treaty establishing the EC.

NB. References in the paper to the Council Secretariat include in particular the Directorate General E External and Politico-Military Affairs and its Police Unit, the EU Military Staff (EUMS), the Policy Unit, the Legal Service, but can also include other Directorates General as appropriate.

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


**SUMMARY/FLOWCHART OF KEY DECISION MAKING STEPS**Notes


- The flowchart is intended to be a tool to facilitate understanding and use of the present Crisis Management Procedures (CMP) by reflecting the key decision instances contained therein. It focuses on the internal EU decision-making process and in particular on key moments (i.e. either decisions or presentation of ‘products’) leading up to the approval of OPLANs and equivalent documents and the operation launch by Council (end of Phase 4). Text in the flowchart summarises text within the body of the CMP (including a reference to the appropriate paragraph); the latter text clearly has precedence.
- Other elements of the CMP may not be reflected in the present flowchart but clearly remain integral to crisis management. These include activities that are ongoing throughout the procedures, including for example assessments by the Policy Unit and the Joint SITCEN, information strategy activities, or regular information exchanges. Consultations or interactions with third parties, which take place at points in the procedures that can vary depending on the particular crisis, are not reflected.
- The processes within the CMP (and indicated in the flowchart) are indicative; not all will necessarily be taken during a particular crisis (e.g. an operation may include exclusively military or exclusively civilian instruments). Many of the processes included in the CMP, such as the development of a crisis management concept (CMC), are iterative in nature.
- It is understood that there is input to Council bodies and decision-making procedures from Council Secretariat and Commission services throughout the procedures and at all levels. Co-ordination between services is also an ongoing process. The grey backgrounds in the flowchart indicate stages at which there is a heightened co-ordination, i.e. to ensure the coherence of planning products.
- The arrows in the flowchart reflect a tasking or the forwarding of a ‘product’ and are not intended to reflect hierarchical relationships.

**Phase 1 - Routine Phase**


**Phase 2 - Crisis Build-up / Elaboration of the draft CMC**



**Phase 3 - Approval of the CMC and development of strategic options**



**Phase 4 - Formal decision to take action, development of planning documents**



**PHASE 1 ROUTINE PHASE****A. Monitoring and analysis of the situation, early warning<sup>3</sup>****- Work within the EU**

1. The Member States and the Commission carry out routine monitoring and exchanges of information within the Political and Security Committee (PSC), as well as within the relevant geographic and thematic Council working groups.
2. The Council Secretariat contributes to monitoring and early warning. This encompasses situation assessment and development of policy option papers.
3. The European Union Military Committee (EUMC) provides the forum for military consultation and co-operation between the EU Member States in the field of conflict prevention and crisis management. The EUMC assesses the risks of potential crises and provides military advice and makes recommendations to the PSC, at the latter's request or on its own initiative, acting within guidelines forwarded by the PSC.<sup>4</sup>
4. The Committee on Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) provides information, formulates recommendations and gives advice on civilian aspects of crisis management to the PSC and to the other appropriate Council bodies in accordance with their respective competencies. CIVCOM will give advice and recommendations, as appropriate, on civilian aspects related to potential crises.

**- Consultations and contacts**

5. The EU consults and co-operates with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in accordance with the provisions of the standing arrangements for consultation outside times of crisis<sup>5</sup>. The Presidency, the Secretary-General/High Representative (SG/HR) and the Council Secretariat, including the EU Military Staff (EUMS) acting under the direction of the EUMC, maintain regular contacts with NATO at the appropriate level.

6. The EU consults with non-EU European NATO members and other countries which are candidates for accession to the EU in accordance with the permanent consultation arrangements during non-crisis periods on involvement in crisis management operations.<sup>6 7</sup>
7. The EU conducts exchanges of information on the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and crisis management within the framework of political dialogue.
8. Contacts and appropriate co-operation as necessary with the United Nations (UN) and other international<sup>8</sup> and regional organisations (e.g. Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Council of Europe), as well as with non-governmental organisations (NGOs) etc. are maintained.

**B. Advance planning and preparatory actions, including civil-military co-ordination**

9. Co-ordinated advance planning is conducted by:
  - The EUMS for military aspects, including review of existing plans;
  - The Police Unit for police aspects;
  - Council Secretariat and Commission planning staff for other civilian aspects

working closely with other Council Secretariat and Commission services as appropriate.

10. On a regular basis, the Member States provide the Co-ordinating Mechanism for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management<sup>9</sup>, set up at the Council Secretariat and fully interacting with the Commission services (hereafter the “Co-ordinating Mechanism”), with information on Member States' civilian crisis management assets available, including their state of readiness or deployment and any bilateral contributions.

**C. Information activities**

11. The Presidency, SG/HR, Member States and the Commission carry out coherent information activities during the routine phase.

**PHASE 2 CRISIS BUILD-UP / ELABORATION OF THE DRAFT CMC**
**A. Detection of the crisis**

- *Work within the EU: analyses, policy options, first measures taken*
12. Once the attention of the PSC is drawn to a mounting crisis, the provision of information, including intelligence, from Member States and the Commission is intensified. If necessary, the PSC identifies specific areas or subjects on which additional information is required. The PSC should have access to all necessary information processed through agreed channels (including from NATO, UN, OSCE and other international organisations) and to all proposals and initiatives relating to the crisis.
  13. The EU SITCEN steps up the collection of information, processes it, and reports on the situation to the SG/HR and to the competent bodies for crisis management (in particular the PSC and the EUMC).
  14. Periodic joint assessment, on-going analysis through situation assessment and risk assessments are jointly prepared by the Council Secretariat and the Commission where relevant.
  15. The PSC meets to discuss the situation in the light of input from relevant actors with a view to developing a common political understanding of the crisis and to providing further policy guidance. PSC may request diplomatic Heads of Mission (HoMs) to give an assessment where relevant.

At the request of Director General of the EUMS (DGEUMS)<sup>10</sup>, parent HQs of potential OHQs and other strategic planning capabilities will provide advice and support.

16. The SG/HR provides impetus in the definition and follow-up to the EU's response to a crisis. As part of his contribution to policy formulation under Article 26 TEU, he may draw on on-going work to present to the PSC his views on the crisis.

17. The Commission informs the PSC of measures taken or under preparation and starts reflecting on the possible use of other instruments. Member States do likewise, informing the PSC of measures taken on a national basis.
  18. In accordance with its preliminary political assessment, the PSC may review its information requirements and request specific information or types of reports from the EU SITCEN, the Commission and from Member States. The PSC may ask competent bodies to provide further analysis of the crisis. The SG/HR may give operational direction to the SATCEN to closely monitor the identified crisis.
  19. The PSC may agree that joint Council Secretariat-Commission fact-finding missions (FFM) be dispatched to verify facts and assess the needs for further EU action and may initiate considerations on the appointment of an EUSR<sup>11</sup>.
- *Co-ordination, including civil-military co-ordination*
20. The Council Secretariat and the Commission continue co-ordinated planning. Joint teams at the level of services could be considered.
- *Consultations and contacts*
21. Contacts and meetings between EU and NATO are stepped up, from the level of relevant services (including military staffs) and bodies, to Ministers if appropriate, so that, in the interest of transparency, consultation and co-operation, the two organisations can discuss their assessments of the crisis and how it may develop, together with any related security problems.
  22. Dialogue and consultation with the non-EU European NATO members and other countries which are candidates for accession<sup>6</sup> to the EU are intensified at all levels, including ministerial level, in the period leading up to the Council decision. When a crisis develops, these intensified consultations will provide an opportunity for exchanges of views on situation assessment and discussion of the concerns raised by the countries affected, particularly when they consider their security interests to be involved.



23. Additional meetings with other potential partners<sup>12</sup> within the framework of political dialogue are organised if the Council deems it necessary.
24. Contacts and appropriate co-operation as necessary with the UN and other international and regional organisations (e.g. OSCE, Council of Europe), as well as with NGOs etc. are intensified.

**B. Consideration that EU action is appropriate: Development and finalisation of the crisis management concept**

- *Work within the EU, including civil-military co-ordination*

25. The PSC analyses the situation and considers that EU action is appropriate, triggering the development of a draft CMC<sup>13</sup>. To this end, the PSC provides guidance as appropriate. After consulting the Presidency and without prejudice to Article 18 of the TEU, the SG/HR may chair the PSC.
26. An ad hoc crisis response co-ordinating team (CRCT - see Annex 2) prepares the draft CMC.
27. In the iteration of the draft CMC, the Council Secretariat, in close co-operation with the Commission, proceeds to do the necessary preparation for the elaboration of a number of strategic comprehensive options comprising the different possible elements.

In this process:

- The EUMS, under the direction of the EUMC acting within guidelines forwarded by the PSC, will produce analyses and general military options in order to provide their military expertise to the development of the draft CMC, in particular to have the elaboration of politico-military objectives for any possible military activities. In this context, an OHQ suitable for the planning and command of a possible military operation may be indicated and recommended to the PSC by the EUMC after the consultation with Member States.
- The Police Unit produces analysis and general police options, in particular by identifying police objectives, requirements for any possible police activity and available police capabilities and capacities.

- As appropriate, planning for other civilian instruments takes place drawing on the updated information provided by the Member States to the Co-ordinating Mechanism.
- 28.** The SG/HR presents the draft CMC to the PSC. The Commission for its part presents the elements of the draft CMC which pertain to its competence. The draft CMC includes elements for a draft information strategy. The PSC:
- gives guidance for the further development of the draft CMC, including for the coherent development of the different civilian and military elements;
  - as appropriate, requests advice from the EUMC for the military aspects and from CIVCOM on the civilian aspects of the draft CMC.
- 29.** The EUMC provides advice to the PSC on the military aspects of the draft CMC including, if possible, an initial assessment of the potential availability of military capabilities and capacities based on first indication given by Member States. It is understood that any first indications are given on a voluntary basis and are not committal.
- 30.** CIVCOM provides advice to the PSC on all civilian aspects of the draft CMC. CIVCOM provides the PSC with a comprehensive overview of the civilian means available to the EU and the Member States.
- 31.** The PSC examines all the options that might be considered as the Union's response within the single institutional framework and without prejudice to the decision-making and implementation procedures established in the Treaties.

To this end, the PSC:

- makes the general political assessment, keeping in mind the totality of measures applicable, and,
- after further discussion, if needed in an iterative process, agrees the CMC and forwards it to the Council with its opinion identifying the political objectives to be pursued by the Union and suggesting a comprehensive course of action comprising the different possible elements aimed at contributing to the settlement of the crisis.

- Consultations and contacts

- 32.** The EU maintains intensified dialogue and consultations with NATO (see §21).
- 33.** The EU maintains intensified consultations with the non-EU European NATO members and other countries which are candidates for accession to the EU<sup>7</sup> (see § 22), in particular:
- a) possibility of extra meetings if circumstances require;
  - b) the EUMS holds information meetings for officers from non-EU European NATO Members and other countries which are candidates for accession to the EU serving as point of contact to the EUMS.

[N.B. To be updated in the light of further consideration of civilian points of contact.]

- 34.** Contacts with other potential partners<sup>12</sup> that are envisaging contributing to the management of the crisis are further intensified<sup>14</sup>.
- 35.** Contacts and appropriate co-operation as necessary with the UN and other international and regional organisations (e.g. OSCE, Council of Europe), NGOs etc. that are envisaging contributing to the management of the crisis are further intensified.

**PHASE 3 APPROVAL OF THE CRISIS MANAGEMENT CONCEPT AND DEVELOPMENT OF STRATEGIC OPTIONS**

**A. Approval of the crisis management concept**

- *Work within the EU*

**36.** The Council approves, on the basis of the opinion by the PSC, the CMC, comprising the general political assessment and a comprehensive course of action with its different elements.

Furthermore, the Council:

- a) invites the Commission to submit appropriate proposals or adopt the measures which pertains to its competence in order to pursue the political objectives thus selected;
- b) invites Member States to orient their action in accordance with the crisis management concept.
- c) may appoint an EUSR<sup>11</sup>.
- d) may note the availability of an OHQ suitable for the planning and command of a possible military operation.

**37.** On the basis of the CMC with a view to ensuring that strategic options developed are mutually coherent, the PSC:

- giving guidance as appropriate, requests the EUMC to issue a Military Strategic Options Directive (MSOD);
- upon recommendation of the EUMC, may identify possible OpCdr(s);
- gives guidance for the further development of the civilian instruments, including the possible police mission, and
- co-ordinates the information strategy to be implemented by the Presidency, the SG/HR, the Commission and the Member States. Any information related aspects of the strategic options will be based on the information strategy.<sup>15</sup>

- Consultations and contacts

**38.** The EU maintains:

- a) intensified dialogue and consultations with NATO (see §21, 32).
- b) intensified dialogue and consultation at all levels, including ministerial level, with the non-EU European NATO Members and other countries which are candidates for accession to the EU<sup>6</sup>, to exchange views on situation assessment and discusses the concerns raised by the countries affected, particularly when they consider their security interests to be involved (see also §22, 33).
- c) consultations with other potential partners<sup>12</sup> (see also § 23)
  - i) when a military operation is being considered, the Troika or the SG/HR assisted by the Chairman of the EUMC (CEUMC) in his capacity as his military adviser, as appropriate conduct such consultations<sup>16</sup>;
  - ii) Police and other civilian aspects will be included in the dialogue, co-operation and consultation on ESDP issues.
- d) intensive contacts and appropriate co-operation as necessary with the UN and other international<sup>8</sup> and regional organisations (e.g. OSCE, Council of Europe), as well as with NGOs etc (see also § 24).

**B. Development of the military and civilian elements of the EU approach**

- 39.** In order to ensure full coherence between the military strategic options (MSOs), police strategic options (PSOs) and other civilian strategic options (CSOs) at the planning stage including the appropriate sequencing, the necessary mechanisms are implemented, at staff level (CRCT) as well as in the relevant Council bodies (possible cross-representation).

The EUMS and other planning staffs within the Council Secretariat and the Commission services should take into account the need for overall planning coherence, including through joint meetings.

- Development of MSOs

40. The EUMC issues a MSOD to the DGEUMS to draw up and present prioritised MSO(s). The MSOD translates the PSC request into military terms.
41. The EUMS may base its planning on the HFC. In order to facilitate the development of MSO(s), Member States give preliminary indications to the EUMS on their intention to contribute to a potential operation and/or indications of possible non-availability.
42. As appropriate, building on previous contacts and without prejudice to a decision by Council (see §54f), interested third countries give preliminary indications to the EUMS of their intention to contribute to an EU-led operation.
43. The EUMS develops and prioritises MSO(s).

Based on the MSOD, the EUMS will draw as appropriate on planning support from the potential OHQs suitable for the planning and command of a possible military operation.

Developed and prioritised MSO(s) should include an assessment of feasibility and risk, a Command and Control (C2) structure including recommendations regarding an OpCdr, an OHQ, a Force Commander, a Force Headquarters, Force capability requirements and an indication of forces that might be made available by contributing states.

- Development of PSOs and other CSOs

44. Member States may be invited to give indications to the Co-ordinating Mechanism of their intention to contribute to a potential operation, including their state of readiness or deployment and any bilateral contributions.

CIVCOM and the Commission assist the PSC and other appropriate Council bodies to acquire a comprehensive view of the means available to the EU and to the Member States in order to improve co-ordination of resources of the EU and Member States through exchange of information.

45. The planning capacity of the Council Secretariat could be reinforced by the addition, on an ad hoc basis, of national experts.
46. The Police Unit develops and prioritises PSOs, which should include an assessment of feasibility and risk, a C2 structure including recommendations regarding a Police Head of Mission (Pol HoM) and an OHQ, as well as a Statement of Forces Requirement (SOR).
47. The appropriate planning procedure with specific planning documents is followed for other CSOs.

**C. Evaluation of MSOs, PSOs and other CSOs, Recommendation to Council**

48. The EUMC evaluates the prioritised MSO(s) and forwards them to the PSC, together with its evaluation and military advice.
49. CIVCOM evaluates the PSOs and other CSOs and forwards them to the PSC, together with its evaluation and advice.
50. The PSC:
  - based on advice from the EUMC and CIVCOM, evaluates the MSO(s), PSO(s) and other CSO(s) and their overall coherence. In this process, the Commission presents the measures it has adopted or is envisaging;
  - submits to Council a draft decision to take action, including the preferred options.

- Consultations and contacts

51. Consultations with the non-EU European NATO Members and other countries which are candidates for accession to the EU (which could be held at politico-military experts level)<sup>6</sup> take place with the aim of ensuring that the countries potentially contributing to an EU-led military crisis management operation are informed of the EU's intentions, particularly with regard to the MSO(s) being envisaged.

52. Consultations with non-EU states take place when the possibility of an EU-led civilian crisis management operation or component is under consideration. The aim of these consultations, which could be held at expert level, will be to ensure that the countries potentially contributing to such an operation are informed of the EU's intentions, particularly with regard to the PSOs and other CSOs being envisaged.<sup>17</sup>
53. Should the EU intend to look more closely at an option calling for pre-identified NATO assets and capabilities the PSC will so inform the North Atlantic Council (NAC).

Once the EU begins to examine in depth an option requiring the use of NATO assets and capabilities, particular attention will be paid to consultation of the six non-EU European NATO members and with Canada.



**PHASE 4 FORMAL DECISION TO TAKE ACTION, DEVELOPMENT OF PLANNING DOCUMENTS**

**A. Council decision to take action**

- 54.** The Council adopts the decision to take action (this decision could, where appropriate, take the form of a Joint Action in full respect of the single institutional framework and of Article 47 of the TEU).

Within that decision, the Council inter alia:

- a) defines the political context in which the Council decision is to be carried out;
- b) may authorise the PSC\* to take the relevant decisions concerning the political control and strategic direction of the crisis management operation, including if needed the establishment of a Committee of Contributors (CoC) at the appropriate time;
- c) decides on the MSO (including a proposed chain of command)\*\*, PSO, and other CSOs, inviting Member States to confirm, subject to national procedures, their readiness to support the selected options;
- d) invites the Commission to direct its action towards achieving the objectives and priorities of the Council decision, where appropriate by pertinent Community measures or notes that the Commission intends to do so;
- e) invites Member States to direct their action in support of the Council decision;
- f) decides whether third countries will be invited to contribute;
- g) determines the role of the SG/HR in the implementation of the measures falling within the political control and strategic direction exercised by the PSC. For such measures the SG/HR acts with PSC assent;
- h) where the operation requires, appoints an EUSR<sup>11</sup>.

In parallel the Council may adopt any new Commission proposals for additional measures falling under the EC Treaty. Such measures are agreed following normal procedures and in full respect of the role of Coreper.

\* The Council may authorise the PSC in accordance with Article 25 TEU at any other moment.

\*\* The MSO selected by the Council implies either an EU military operation without use of NATO assets and capabilities or an EU military operation with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities. (NB. The order of the cases does not imply a priority choice.)  
See below

<i>Case 1: EU military operation without use of NATO assets and capabilities</i>	<i>Case 2: EU military operation with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities</i>
<p>a) The Council:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• appoints the OpCdr and designates the OHQ;</li> <li>• designates the Force Commander, (the Force Headquarters and the Component Commands, if appropriate).</li> </ul> <p>b) Non-EU European NATO members and other candidates for accession to the EU having, upon invitation to give such indication, expressed a clear intention to participate in the operation, may deploy liaison officers to European operation headquarters, in order to enable the exchange of information on the operational planning and on the foreseen contribution.</p> <p>c) EU keeps NATO informed of the general progress in preparations.</p>	<p>a) Military Committees and Staffs of the two organisations, in close contact with DSACEUR, meet in order to assess the availability of NATO assets and capabilities considered for this option.</p> <p>b) The PSC addresses a request to NATO for the use of its assets and capabilities<sup>1</sup></p> <p>c) NATO assets and capabilities needed for the EU operation, as well as the modalities for their release, including the possible conditions for their recall, are identified at a PSC/NAC meeting.</p> <p>d) The Council, on the basis of responses from NATO and the Member States:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• appoints the OpCdr and designates the OHQ;</li> <li>• designates the Force Commander, (the Force Headquarters and the Component Commands, if appropriate);</li> <li>• approves on the basis of the "Berlin Plus" agreement the arrangements for hand-over and any recall conditions.</li> </ul> <p>e) The non-EU European allies will be involved in the planning according to the procedures laid down within NATO.</p>

## B. Development of Concept of Operations (CONOPS)

55. Planning staffs for military and civilian elements should take into account the need for overall planning coherence, including through joint meetings.

- Military (For case 1 and case 2)

56. The PSC sends such guidance as is necessary for the EUMC to direct the EUMS to draft the Initiating Military Directive (IMD). The IMD includes those directives required by the OpCdr to enable him to draw up the necessary planning documents (CONOPS, SOR, Operation Plan (OPLAN)). The PSC approves the IMD before its release is authorised by the EUMC.

<sup>1</sup> It is understood that the actions in sub-paragraphs a) and b) describe preparatory measures in order to validate the availability of NATO assets and capabilities for the respective operation.

57. On the basis of the IMD, the OpCdr prepares a draft CONOPS, including guidelines on the use of force, and an SOR.
58. Upon request of the PSC, the EUMC tasks the OpCdr, assisted by the EUMS, to present operational planning work and, as appropriate and in the compliance with the Council Security Regulations, documents to the non-EU European NATO members and candidates for accession to the EU which have expressed their intention in principle to take part in the operation. These and other third countries that have also expressed their intention in principle to take part in the operation provide the OpCdr with an initial indication of their contribution.

- Civilian

59. Following the PSC request to the SG/HR, the Police Unit develops the draft CONOPS and further elaborates the SOR.
60. If the use of other civilian instruments is envisaged, a similar planning procedure with specific planning documents is followed.
61. The operational planning work is presented to those non-EU states which have expressed their intention in principle of taking part in the operation to enable them to determine the nature and volume of their potential contribution.

**C. Approval of CONOPS**

62. Supported by an EUMS evaluation, the EUMC provides advice and recommendations to the PSC on the draft military CONOPS and the accompanying documents.
63. CIVCOM provides advice and recommendations to the PSC on the draft police CONOPS as well as planning documents for other civilian instruments.
64. Without prejudice to Article 47 TEU, the PSC agrees the military and police CONOPS as well as planning documents for other civilian instruments and submits them to the Council for approval.

65. The Council approves CONOPS including guidelines on the use of force as well as planning documents for other civilian instruments and invites third countries to participate in the operation.

**D. Force Generation/Activation, Call for assets**<sup>18</sup>

- *Military*

66. Upon request of the PSC, the EUMC tasks the OpCdr, in co-ordination with the EUMS, to conduct the Force Generation process.
67. Member States, NATO when appropriate, and other troop contributors confirm the level and quality of their contributions at the Force Generation Conferences.
68. A PSC/NAC meeting will confirm, if appropriate, the availability of pre-identified assets and capabilities and all the practical arrangements, including hand-over and recall.

- *Civilian*

69. The Pol HoM, supported by the Police Unit, conducts the Force Generation Process and elaborates as necessary the appropriate Rules of Engagement (ROEs).
70. The PSC issues a call for contributions to determine the other civilian assets that Member States will make available. The information is forwarded to the Co-ordinating Mechanism.<sup>19</sup>

**E. SOFA**<sup>18</sup>

71. When appropriate, the Council Secretariat prepares a draft Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). The draft SOFA is submitted to the Council by the PSC on the basis of the EUMC's advice on military aspects (given after consultation with the OpCdr) and/or CIVCOM's advice on civilian aspects (given after consultation with the Pol HoM and, as appropriate, HoMs for other Civilian Operations).

**F. Development of OPLAN**<sup>18</sup>

72. Planning staffs for military and civilian elements should take into account the need for overall planning coherence, including through joint meetings.

- *Military*

73. The OpCdr prepares a draft military OPLAN and the draft ROE.

- *Civilian*

74. The Pol HoM, assisted as necessary by a planning team and by the Police Unit, is responsible for the production of the draft police OPLAN including as appropriate the ROE.

75. If the use of other civilian instruments is envisaged, a similar planning procedure with similar planning documents is followed.

**G. Evaluation of military and civilian OPLANS**

76. The EUMC, supported by an evaluation by the EUMS, provides advice and recommendations to the PSC on the draft military OPLAN.

77. CIVCOM provides advice and recommendations to the PSC on the draft police and other civilian OPLANS (or equivalent documents).

78. The PSC considers the draft military and civilian OPLANS (or equivalent documents) and, without prejudice to Article 47 TEU, agrees them and submits them to Council for approval.

79. The PSC takes the necessary decisions to establish the CoC<sup>2</sup>, if authorised by the Council.

The PSC examines on ad hoc basis (in accordance with the needs of the specific operation in question) whether there should be a joint CoC for the military operation and for the other elements (police/other civilian).

## **H. Decision to Launch the Operation**

80. The Council:
- a) approves the military and civilian OPLANs (or equivalent documents) and the ROE;
  - b) decides to launch the operation once all preconditions such as the force generation/call for civilian assets are complete;
  - c) approves, where appropriate, the SOFA;

The CEUMC, supported by the OpCdr, attends the Council meeting acting as the spokesman of the EUMC.

## **I. Community Measures**

81. All Community measures are put forward by the Commission, and adopted and implemented in accordance with the relevant procedures.

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<sup>2</sup> The PSC may decide to convene the CoC before the finalisation of the OPLAN.

PM. A CoC for the civilian operation within Title V TEU would be established (in view of the size and type of the mission) unless the PSC decides otherwise.<sup>172</sup>

**J. Consultations and contacts**

**82.** The EU maintains:

- a) intensified dialogue and consultations with NATO (see in particular § 54, Case 1. c) and Case 2);
- b) dialogue and consultations with the non-EU European NATO Members and other countries which are candidates for accession to the EU (see also § 54, Case 1. b) and Case 2. e));
- c) contacts with other potential partners (including Russia, Canada, and Ukraine)<sup>12</sup>;
- d) contacts and appropriate co-operation as necessary with the UN and other international<sup>8</sup> and regional organisations (e.g. OSCE, Council of Europe), as well as with NGOs etc.

**PHASE 5 IMPLEMENTATION****A. PSC**

83. Under the authority of the Council, the PSC exercises political control and strategic direction of the crisis management operation. Without prejudice to the role of the Commission, the PSC supervises the implementation of all the measures taken and assesses their effect, recommending adjustments as necessary.

**B. Presidency**

84. The Presidency is responsible for the overall implementation of the Council decision. The Presidency takes the implementation measures entrusted to it and reports to the PSC.

**C. SG/HR**

85. The SG/HR takes the implementation measures entrusted to him in accordance with the terms of the Council decision (see § 54f) and reports to the PSC.

The SG/HR gives guidance to the Pol HoM and as appropriate to HoMs for other Civilian Operations, through the EUSR<sup>11</sup>. The Police Unit, acting as first point of contact, provides technical support to the Pol HoM.

**D. Commission**

86. The Commission keeps the PSC informed about the measures it has taken or envisages.

**E. EUMC**

87. The EUMC, supported by the EUMS:

- a) monitors the proper execution of military operations;
- b) reports regularly to the PSC on the military implementation of the operation; to that end, the CEUMC participates in the PSC;
- c) provides, in co-ordination with the OpCdr, information and assessments to the



PSC.

The CEUMC:

- a) represents the EUMC at the Council meetings, as appropriate;
- b) acts as the primary point of contact with the OpCdr.

#### **F. CIVCOM**

88. CIVCOM provides information, formulate recommendations and give advice to the PSC on the civilian aspects of the crisis management operation.

#### **G. OpCdr**

89. The OpCdr is responsible for the conduct of the military operation and reports to the EUMC on its progress<sup>20</sup>.

#### **H. EUSR/Pol HoM/HoMs for other Civilian Operations**

90. The EUSR<sup>11</sup> reports to the SG/HR and the PSC and provides advice to the SG/HR, the Presidency, and the Commission as necessary.
91. The Pol HoM and, as appropriate, the HoMs for other Civilian Operations are responsible to the PSC, via the EUSR<sup>11</sup>, and the SG/HR.

P.M. Modalities for co-ordination between the EU actors in the field as well as between the field and Brussels need to be developed. In addition, modalities for co-ordination in the field between the EU and international organisations, local authorities and NGOs need to be developed.

#### **I. Member States**

92. Member States report to the PSC on national measures.

**J. CoC(s)**

93. The CoC for the military operation\* deals with the various problems concerning the implementation of that operation, the use of forces, and all day to day management matters which are not exclusively, under the instructions he will have received, the responsibility of the OpCdr.<sup>21</sup>

The CoC for the civilian operation\* deals with the various problems concerning the implementation of the mission and all day to day management matters which are not exclusively, under the instructions he will have received, the responsibility of the HoM.<sup>17</sup>

The PSC takes account of the views expressed by the CoC(s).

\* There may be a joint CoC (see §79 second sub-paragraph).

**K. Consultations and contacts**

94. The EU maintains:

- a) contacts with NATO
  - i) In case of an EU operation without the use of NATO assets and capabilities, the EU keeps NATO informed of the general progress of the operation.
  - ii) In the event of an operation calling on NATO assets and capabilities, NATO will be kept informed of the use of its assets and capabilities throughout the operation, if necessary by convening a meeting of the PSC and the NAC. When NATO command options are being used, NATO will be informed of the development in the situation by appropriate EU bodies, in particular the PSC and the CEUMC.<sup>22</sup>
- b) contacts with the non-EU European NATO Members and other countries which are candidates for accession to the EU;
- c) contacts with other potential partners<sup>12</sup> as necessary;
- d) contacts and appropriate co-operation as necessary with the UN and other relevant international<sup>8</sup> and regional organisations (e.g. OSCE, Council of Europe), as well as with NGOs etc. dealing with the crisis.

**PHASE 6 REFOCUSING OF EU ACTION AND TERMINATION OF OPERATIONS**
**A. Refocusing of EU Action, including possible termination of operations**

NB. Activities are described here for ease of reference but may take place in earlier phases.

95. The PSC evaluates the necessity of refocusing EU action, including the possibility of terminating some or all elements of the action.

The refocusing of EU action may trigger a revised CMC, which would be developed following the procedures outlined in the previous phases. In this process:

- The SG/HR contributes a view to the PSC deliberations on a set of measures aimed at refocusing the EU action;
- The Commission provides the PSC, with a policy analysis and policy options for actions within its competence. It informs them of the nature and details of these plans as concerns those Community measures;
- The Member States continue on a regular basis to provide the Co-ordinating Mechanism with information on civilian crisis management assets available;
- EUMC and CIVCOM respectively advise the PSC on the military and civilian implications of continuing, changing or terminating elements of the operation;
- The CoC(s) provide opinions and recommendations on possible adjustments to operational planning, including possible adjustments to objectives, which may affect the situation of forces.

Should the envisaged refocusing of the EU action imply a termination of a military operation using NATO assets and capabilities, the PSC informs the NAC.

96. The PSC agrees and forwards to the Council its recommendation on the refocusing of the EU action and a comprehensive course of action comprising the different possible elements, including the possibility of terminating some or all elements of the action.

**B. Decision to refocus or terminate the operation**

97. The Council, as appropriate:
- a) decides to refocus the EU action, including possible termination of some or all of its elements;

- b) decides about the launching of further actions needed at this stage;
- c) invites the Commission to re-examine the measures falling under its responsibility, or to make the necessary proposals to that end;
- d) invites Member States to re-examine actions taken at national level, and if necessary, to adapt them.

- Consultations and contacts

98. The EU maintains:

- a) contacts with NATO (see in particular § 95 last subparagraph).
- b) contacts with the non-EU European NATO Members and other countries which are candidates for accession to the EU.
- c) contacts with other potential partners<sup>12</sup> where necessary.
- d) intensive contacts and appropriate co-operation where necessary with the UN and other relevant international<sup>8</sup> and regional organisations (e.g. OSCE, Council of Europe), as well as with NGOs etc.

### C. Lessons learned

99. The PSC:

- a) requests the EUMC to evaluate lessons learned on the basis of the reports by the OpCdr and the EUMS;
- b) requests CIVCOM to evaluate lessons learned in particular, on the basis of reports by the Police Unit and the Pol HoM and from other HoMs for other Civilian Operations;
- c) may request the CoC(s) to provide their assessment of the lessons drawn from the operation;

The Commission provides information to the PSC on lessons learned within its area of responsibility.

The PSC proceeds to an overall assessment.

## **Actors**

### Political and Security Committee (PSC)

The approach adopted at Helsinki makes the PSC the linchpin of the ESDP and of the CFSP: 'The PSC will deal with all aspects of the CFSP, including the CESDP...' Without prejudice to Article 207 of the EC Treaty, the PSC has a central role to play in the definition of and follow-up to the EU's response to a crisis. The PSC will deal with all the tasks defined in Article 25 TEU. It may convene in Political Director formation. After consulting the Presidency and without prejudice to Article 18 TEU, the SG/HR for the CFSP may chair the PSC, especially in the event of a crisis. *(For more detailed information see Council decision of 22 January 2001 setting up the PSC (2001/78/CFSP))*

### European Union Military Committee (EUMC)

At Helsinki, the European Council decided to establish within the Council, new permanent political and military bodies enabling the EU to assume its responsibilities for the full range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks defined in the TEU, the Petersberg tasks. As provided in the Helsinki report, the EUMC, 'established within the Council', is composed of the Chiefs of Defence (CHODs) represented by their military representatives (Milreps). The EUMC meets at the level of CHODs as and when necessary. This Committee gives military advice and makes recommendations to the PSC, as well as provides military direction to the EUMS. The CEUMC attends meetings of the Council when decisions with defence implications are to be taken. The EUMC is the highest military body established within the Council. *(For more detailed information see Council decision of 22 January 2001 setting up the EUMC (2001/79/CFSP))*

### Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM)

CIVCOM helps to ensure a higher degree of inter-pillar coherence in the civilian aspects of EU crisis management, and promotes improvements in the crisis response capabilities of the EU. It contributes to the setting-up of mechanisms for the exchange of information, co-ordination, and rapid reaction between the Union and the Member States. It assists the PSC and other appropriate Council bodies to acquire a comprehensive view of the means available to the EU and to Member States. *(For more detailed information see Council decision of 22 May 2000 setting up CIVCOM (2000/354/CFSP) and guidelines for the work of the Committee contained within doc. 8598/00)*

### Committee(s) of Contributors (CoC(s))

The CoC(s) for military and civilian aspects meet regularly during the operation.  
N.B. There may be a joint CoC (see §79 second sub-paragraph).

#### *Military*

The CoC for the military operation will be supplied with detailed information regarding the operation on the ground via the EU bodies responsible for follow-up. It receives regular information from the OpCdr who may be heard by the Committee. The CoC provides opinions and recommendations on possible adjustments to operational planning, including possible adjustments to objectives, which may affect the situation of the forces. Depending on the nature of its tasks, the Committee may meet in the appropriate format. For Member States, it may be comprised of representatives on the PSC and on the EUMC. The CoC will usually be chaired by a representative of the SG/HR or the Presidency, assisted by the CEUMC or his Deputy. The Director General of the EUMS and the OpCdr may also attend or be represented in the Committee. The Chairman of the CoC will be responsible for conveying the outcome of the Committee's discussions to the PSC and to the EUMC. *(For more detailed information see Nice European Council conclusions, Annex VI to ANNEX VI, point III.C)*

#### *Civilian*

The CoC will be the main forum for discussing all problems relating to the day to day management, having regard to the measures taken by the PSC in this field. The deliberations of the Committee will constitute a positive contribution to those of the PSC. The Committee will be supplied with detailed information regarding the mission on the ground via the EU bodies responsible for follow-up. It will receive regular information from the HoM who may be heard by the Committee. The Committee provides opinions and recommendations on possible adjustments to operational planning, including possible adjustments to objectives which may affect the situation of the deployed personnel. It will deal with various problems concerning the implementation of the mission and all day to day management matters which are not exclusively, under the instructions he or she will have received, the responsibility of the HoM. Depending on the nature of the tasks, the Committee may meet in the appropriate format. For Member States, it may be comprised of representatives on the PSC. It will usually be chaired by the Presidency or by a representative of the SG/HR. The Commission will also have a seat in the Committee. *(For more detailed information see doc. 15203/1/02 REV 1)*

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## CRCT

### Council Secretariat/Commission outline paper on the CRCT<sup>1</sup>

1. The idea of a "Crisis Response Co-ordination Team" (CRCT) was founded on the need to draw together, as a rule at a high level, Commission and Council General Secretariat services in a given crisis situation in order to help to ensure the necessary degree of coherence and comprehensiveness of draft planning products, including ongoing activities, for consideration by delegations.
2. According to the 'Suggestions for procedures for coherent, comprehensive EU crisis management', the function of the CRCT is to prepare the draft Crisis Management Concept (§ 26). It would also continue to work on planning as required as well as assist in ensuring full coherence between the civilian and military aspects of the EU action in the implementation phase.
3. Furthermore, the CRCT is a vehicle for inter-service co-ordination, not a standing structure, but a practical and effective way of ensuring at the working level that the Council and the Commission are in the position to ensure consistency that does not take decisions.
4. On this basis, the CRCT(s) that so far met had the following features:

#### **Composition**

5. To respect the ad-hoc nature and function of the CRCT, its composition needs to be flexible. It needs to reflect the nature of the given crisis situation and ensure that the best suited knowledge and expertise from the Commission and the Council Secretariat is made available. Based on this understanding, the CRCTs that have so far met generally consisted of representatives of the Commission, Cabinet, EUMS, DGE, incl. Police Unit, Policy Unit, Legal Service, SITCEN. The CRCT essentially meets at senior official level.

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<sup>1</sup> Based on doc. 14400/2/02 REV2, of 02.12.02.

### **Preparation and follow-up of meetings**

6. Experience has shown that it may be necessary for the CRCT to have the support from a team that does the preparatory work for the CRCT, incl. the necessary research and refinement of drafts. The work of the Council Secretariat representatives is directed by the SG/HR. For information purposes, the CRCT is supported by an Information Strategy Team consisting of Secretariat and Commission officials working in close contact with the Presidency.

### **Interval of meetings**

7. The meetings do not follow a pre-defined schedule: The intervals are very much driven by need.

### **Output**

8. So far, the CRCTs have been producing draft CMCs, e.g. the one for CME02 as well as the "General Concept" on Fox, which were both presented by the SG/HR to the PSC, the Commission each time presenting those parts pertaining to its area of competence. The PSC discussed those drafts extensively and provided guidance for their further development. Based on this guidance, the CRCTs prepared revised versions of the draft CMCs. The CME 02 CRCT in addition ensured the coherence of the CME 02 Draft Military and Police Strategic Options. To this end, staffs elaborating those drafts MSOs and PSOs provided the CRCT with detailed presentations on their respective approaches and progress made.
9. The Council Secretariat and Commission will keep the Presidency and the PSC closely informed from an early stage and in particular on issues requiring further political guidance. The Council Secretariat and Commission as appropriate will report to the PSC at regular intervals or at the request of the Presidency.
10. CRCT output is forwarded to delegations for consideration.



## CRCT

The ad hoc crisis response co-ordinating team (CRCT) is a vehicle for inter-service co-ordination in response to a given crisis.

It consists of officials from the relevant services in the Council Secretariat and the Commission.

It will not be a standing structure but will be pulled together when a particular crisis occurs.

As far as the Council Secretariat is concerned, the SG/HR will instruct the relevant services to participate in the team.

The ad hoc team is a practical and effective way of ensuring at the working level that the Council and the Commission are in the position to ensure consistency in the external activities of the Union, in accordance with Article 3 second subparagraph TEU.

The relevant co-ordination is between services, and is without prejudice to the prerogatives and obligations of the Institutions themselves.

The team would thus help to ensure close two-way co-ordination in the planning of military and civilian measures.

The team is not a Council working group.

A fortiori, it does not take decisions.

The SG can draw on its work so that the draft crisis management concept presented to the PSC is both coherent and comprehensive and encompasses all relevant civilian and military instruments.

In addition, through the participation of Commission officials, the Commission can also use this work as a reference point when taking initiatives within its area of responsibility.

This team would continue to work on planning as required in the light of the outcome of PSC meetings.

The team would also assist in ensuring full coherence between the civilian and military aspects of the EU action in the implementation phase.

For information aspects, the CRCT is supported by an Information Strategy Team consisting of Secretariat and Commission officials working in close contact with the Presidency.

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## CMC Template

### Template crisis management concept

The crisis management concept is an important tool to ensure the coherence and comprehensiveness of possible EU actions by taking into account the range and scale of the different instruments available to the Union.

This template sets out the draft structure on which a CMC could be developed for presentation to the PSC. However, the structure of the CMC will need to remain flexible and adaptable. The CMC that the PSC eventually will agree and forward to the Council with its opinion could have a different structure.

The Council Secretariat and Commission will keep the Presidency and the PSC closely informed from an early stage and in particular on issues requiring further political guidance. The Council Secretariat and Commission as appropriate will report to the PSC at regular intervals or at the request of the Presidency.

## EU CRISIS MANAGEMENT CONCEPT

I. **Executive Summary.** *This should set down the EU political interest and political objectives as well as broad options for an overall EU response to a crisis and highlight the recommended comprehensive course of action.*

### II. **General.**

#### A. **Facts.**

(a) **Situation.** *This should set down only those facts that are relevant to the development of options for an overall EU response to the crisis. This would focus on recent developments with regard to the positions taken towards the crisis by the local parties, neighbouring countries, relevant organisations – such as the UN, the OSCE and NATO -, by the non-EU European NATO Members and other countries candidates for accession to the EU, and by other potential partners of the EU.*

(b) **Existing EU Engagement.** *This should set down an outline of existing EU engagement in the crisis location that would include relevant factors such as formal agreements with the EU, the level of EU assistance and trade relations. Further detailed information should be provided for in annexes.*

#### B. **EU Approach.**

(a) **EU Political Interest.** *This should set down how the overall EU political interest is affected by the crisis, and how the EU political interest might be affected by or by not contributing more actively in the resolution of the crisis.*

(b) **Key Objectives and General Endstate.** *This should set down a coherent set of political objectives for EU-action as well as the desired general endstate. This would then constitute the overall frame for the formulation of different options to meet these objectives.*

C. **General Risk Assessment.** *This should set down a general risk assessment based on a general situation assessment.*

D. **Premises.** *This should set down the overall legal framework, practical and political factors that govern the possibility to act. These include a description of how EU objectives would relate to other international objectives in the overall international approach to solution of the crisis.*

III. **Description of Options for an Overall EU Response.** *This should present the options available to meet the political objectives. In order to ensure a real degree of choice and rapid decision-making the Member States should have more (if possible, at least three) realistic options to consider for EU action.*

A. **Option 1:**

1. **Description of the option.** *This should give a brief description of the main features of the option.*

2. **Assumptions.** *This should set down any specific assumptions for the preparation and execution of Option 1*

3. **Option specific objectives, including politico-military objectives.** *This should set down the option specific objectives based on the key objectives set out in para B(a). If a military role is identified in this option, this should also set down the politico-military objectives.*

4. **Endstate.** *As a further elaboration of the previous paragraph, this should explain what specific endstate to expect from this option and how this would meet the political and the politico-military objectives. It may also make an initial, early evaluation of the overall duration of a possible operation and may indicate how long the various measures should be employed for. It should also explain the interaction required between various measures and the possible sequence in which these measures should be employed within the overall scheme.*

5. Measures Envisaged in Option 1. *This should set down the application of crisis management instruments envisaged for option 1: the diplomatic, economic, civilian measures such as police, rule of law, civilian administration and civil protection<sup>1</sup>, and the military measures envisaged in Option 1. This would include any adjustments to existing Community and Member States' measures. These measures may also be separated into those envisaged in the short-term and those envisaged in the medium to long-term<sup>2</sup>. The humanitarian dimension (including aid through ECHO and bilaterally by Member States and other donors) should also be taken into account<sup>3</sup>.*
6. Risk Assessment for Option 1. *This should set down the specific risk assessment for Option 1, based on the assumptions and the measures envisaged. The risk assessment should include an estimate of the risk to EU personnel (civilian and military) employed in the crisis area under the measures envisaged and specific risks associated with an unsuccessful outcome of EU crisis management efforts under Option 1.*
7. Exit Strategy. *Here an exit strategy should be established – taking into account the full completion of the EU-action, as well as the possibility of only partly achievement of the established objectives.*
8. Co-ordination of EU activities for option 1, including co-operation with external partners. *This should set down the arrangements for co-ordination of the measures set out in para 4 between EU actors engaged.*

*This should also set down the envisaged elements of co-ordination and cooperation with other international organisations, the non-EU European NATO Members and other countries candidates for accession to the EU, and with other potential partners of the EU.*

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<sup>1</sup> This could include information from the Co-ordinating Mechanism on available crisis management assets.

<sup>2</sup> Member States' bilateral measures would be included in the Crisis Management Concept after consultation with Member States.

<sup>3</sup> In accordance with Council Regulation (EC) No 1257/96 of 20 June 1996 concerning humanitarian aid, humanitarian aid "the sole aim of which is to prevent or relieve human suffering, is accorded to victims without discrimination on the grounds of race, ethnic group, religion, sex, age, nationality or political affiliation and must not be guided by, or subject to, political considerations" (preamble), and is provided on a "non-discriminatory basis" (Article 1).

*The arrangements set out should take into account the need for co-ordination at political strategic level, with the field and within the field.*

9. Considerations Related To A Legal Framework. *This should set down considerations related to a legal framework for actions within Option 1.*
  10. Financial Considerations. *This should set down relevant financial considerations for Option 1.*
  11. Information Strategy. *This should set down the broad outline of an information strategy tailored to Option 1.*
- B. **Option 2**. *(additional option for an overall EU response following the same structure as for Option 1).*
  - C. **Option 3**. *(additional option for an overall EU response following the same structure as for Option 1).*
- IV. **Evaluation of the options**. *This should explain, in so far as is possible at an early stage in the planning process, the pros and cons of the options in relation to the political objectives. In this assessment evaluation of the costs, effectiveness, risks and feasibility should be included.*
  - V. **Opinion of the PSC**. *If not forwarded as a separate opinion, this should set down which comprehensive course of action the PSC recommends to the Council (cf. para 31 in the Crisis Management Procedures).*
  - VI. **Annexes**. *Annexes should provide detailed information on key activities and existing EU engagement in the crisis location such as Country Fact Files, EUMM mandates, Reports by Fact Finding Missions, HoMs, EUSRs and other relevant documents.*

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## Civilian Instruments

*Document to be inserted [at their joint meeting on 28 November 2002, the PMG and CIVCOM requested the Council Secretariat including the Legal Service and the Commission to work together on a comprehensive paper covering both Title V and EC instruments, inter alia on the basis of the Commission's paper presented to the PMG in November 2002. This work is underway and the comprehensive paper is to be finalised shortly.]*

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**List of Abbreviations / Endnotes****LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

C2	Command and Control
CEUMC	Chairman of the EUMC
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CGS	Council General Secretariat
CHOD	Chief of Defence
CIVCOM	Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management
CMC	Crisis Management Concept
CMP	Crisis Management Procedures
CONOPS	Concept of Operations
CoC	Committee of Contributors
Coreper	Committee of Permanent Representatives
CRCT	Crisis Response Co-ordinating Team
CSO	Civilian Strategic Option
DGEUMS	Director General of the EUMS
EC	European Commission
EC Treaty	Treaty establishing the European Community
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
EUMC	European Union Military Committee
EUMS	European Union Military Staff
EUSR	European Union Special Representative
FFM	Fact-Finding Mission
HFC	Helsinki Force Catalogue
HoM	Head of Mission
IMD	Initiating Military Directive
MSO	Military Strategic Option
MSOD	Military Strategic Options Directive
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OHQ	Operation Headquarters
OpCdr	Operation Commander
OPLAN	Operation Plan
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Pol HoM	Police Head of Mission
PSC	Political and Security Committee
PSO	Police Strategic Option
ROE	Rules of Engagement
SATCEN	Satellite Centre
SG/HR	Secretary-General/High Representative
SITCEN	Joint Situation Centre
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement
SOR	Statement of Forces Requirement
TEU	Treaty on European Union
UN	United Nations

## ENDNOTES

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- <sup>1</sup> Action Plan for the further strengthening of civil-military co-ordination in EU Crisis Management (doc. 13480/1/02).
- <sup>2</sup> Principles regarding participation and observation in EU exercises are set out in the Exercise Policy of the European Union (doc. 8373/1/01 REV 1, p. 8, §18-20).
- <sup>3</sup> The global overview discussion, held by the Council at the outset of each Presidency together with the watchlist, adopted and periodically reviewed by the PSC, is an instrument for the early warning activities in this section.
- <sup>4</sup> It is understood throughout the procedures that the EUMC, when providing advice and recommendations to the PSC, does so at the latter's request or on its own initiative, acting within guidelines forwarded by the PSC.
- <sup>5</sup> Meetings between the PSC and the NAC will be held not less than three times, and EU-NATO ministerial meetings not less than once, per EU Presidency. Either organisation may request additional meetings as necessary. Meetings between the EU and the NATO Military Committees may be held as required, at the request of either organisation with at least one such meeting during each Presidency. There may also be:
- meetings between subsidiary groups (e.g. Politico-Military Group/Policy Co-ordination Group or Military Committee working groups);
  - meetings in the form of ad hoc EU/NATO groups;
  - expert groups along Headline Task Force Plus lines.
- When necessary, and in particular where NATO capabilities and expertise are concerned, NATO representatives will be invited to meetings, in accordance with the provisions of the TEU and on a basis of reciprocity. This will apply to:
- the Secretary General of NATO for ministerial meetings, in particular those attended by Defence Ministers;
  - the Chairman of the NATO Military Committee for meetings of the Military Committee;
  - Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe for meetings of the Military Committee, in view of his responsibilities for the European pillar of NATO and his potential role in EU-led operations.
- <sup>6</sup> The PSC plays a leading role in the implementation of these arrangements, which include notably during each Presidency:
- a minimum of two meetings with the non-EU European NATO members and other countries which are candidates for accession to the EU as well as a minimum of two meetings with the non-EU European NATO members;
  - one ministerial meeting bringing together the non-EU European NATO members and other countries which are candidates for accession to the EU as well as the non-EU European NATO members;
  - a minimum of two meetings at Military Committee representative level, as well as exchanges at military experts level (in particular concerning the establishment of capability objectives).
- Each third country has appointed from its mission an ESDP interlocutor with regard to the PSC. Third countries wishing to be involved in EU military activities have appointed officers accredited to the EUMS to serve as a contact. A minimum of two information meetings are held during each Presidency for these officers from the non-EU European NATO members and other countries which are candidates for accession to the EU as well as with the non-EU European NATO members.
- <sup>7</sup> Annex II to the Presidency report to the Göteborg European Council contains provisions on contributions of non-EU states to EU police missions in civilian crisis management, and indicates that specific modalities would be further elaborated. Council has approved such modalities on 10 December 2002 ("Consultations and Modalities for the Contributions of non-EU states to EU Civilian Crisis Management Operations within Title V of the TEU", see doc. 15203/1/02).
- <sup>8</sup> See document "EU Co-operation with International Organisations in Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management" (Annex V to Presidency ESDP Report to the Göteborg European Council).
- <sup>9</sup> The European Council at Helsinki agreed that "a co-ordinating mechanism, fully interacting with the Commission services, should be set up at the Council Secretariat. It would run the database project and the different capabilities initiatives. In particular crises, depending on the EU's role, it may set up an ad hoc centre to co-ordinate the effectiveness of EU Member States' contributions. This should be a lean, efficient, non-bureaucratic structure permitting close interaction with the Commission." (Presidency conclusions, Annex 2 to Annex IV).
- <sup>10</sup> It is understood throughout the procedures that DGEUMS and the EUMS act under the direction of the EUMC acting within guidelines forwarded by the PSC.

<sup>11</sup> The mandate of the EUSR is set out by the Council in a Joint Action. The EUSR acts under the authority and operational direction of the SG/HR. The PSC will provide strategic guidance and political input to the EUSR within the framework of his mandate. The EUSR will receive strategic guidance and political input from the PSC.

In general, the EUSR will maintain an overview of the whole range of activities within an area of operations. To ensure the coherence of EU crisis management, the activities of the EUSR in the field will be closely liaised/coordinated with the Presidency, Commission and diplomatic Heads of Mission who will make best efforts to assist the EUSR in the implementation of the mandate. The activities of the EUSR will be closely co-ordinated with the Force Commander (without prejudice to the military chain of command), the Pol HoM and HoMs for other Civilian Operations, who will support/assist the EUSR in the implementation of his mandate. The EUSR will also liaise with other international actors in the field, including third states. The EUSR will report to the SG/HR and the PSC and will provide advice to the SG/HR, the Presidency and the Commission as necessary. He may report to the Council on the recommendation of the HR and the PSC.

<sup>12</sup> According to the Nice European Council, the expression “other potential partners” [that could be invited to take part in an EU-led operation] covers:

- Russia, Canada and Ukraine, for which the European Council at Seville agreed arrangements for consultation and co-operation on crisis management. In addition to the general references to “other potential partners”, particular arrangements with these three countries are specified either in the body of the CMP or in the endnotes;
- other European states with which the EU maintains political dialogue;
- and other interested states.

Russia, Canada and Ukraine have appointed contact persons to the EUMS in order to facilitate their involvement in the EU’s military activities.

(See also Presidency report to the Seville European Council, part B of Annexes IV (Russia), V (Canada), and VI (Ukraine).)

<sup>13</sup> Crisis management concept (CMC): a conceptual framework describing the EU's overall approach to the management of a particular crisis, addressing the full range of activities. (See Annex 3 for a draft CMC template.) The crisis management concept is an important tool to ensure the coherence and comprehensiveness of possible EU actions by taking account of the range and scale of the different instruments available to the Union.

However, the structure of CMC will need to remain flexible and adaptable, as the actual shape of each CMC will be determined by a number of variables, such as the stage of a crisis at which a draft CMC is developed and presented to the PSC and the nature and location of the crisis. It is likely, for example, that at the beginning of a crisis a CMC might consider a broader range of options reflecting the early stage of internal EU deliberations on that crisis. By contrast, a CMC that was designed to address a crisis that had been extant for some time might focus on a much narrower range of options, reflecting the more developed understanding within the EU about what type of action would be appropriate.

<sup>14</sup> With regard to Russia, Canada and Ukraine, such contacts allow for situation evaluation and mutual information.

<sup>15</sup> See doc. 13817/02. The information strategy may be adapted, as necessary, at any moment.

<sup>16</sup> With Russia, Canada and Ukraine such consultations serve to inform each of these countries of the EU’s intentions, particularly with regard to the military options envisaged.

<sup>17</sup> “Consultations and Modalities for the Contribution of non-EU States to EU Civilian Crisis Management Operations within Title V of the TEU” (doc. 15203/1/02 REV 1).

<sup>18</sup> Headings D, E, F in this phase should be seen as simultaneous processes.

<sup>19</sup> In the case of the EU Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the SG/HR issued the call for contributions to determine the police assets Member States could make available.

<sup>20</sup> The President of the Council and the Chairman of the PSC respectively may invite the OpCdr to the Council and the PSC.

<sup>21</sup> To the extent to which Russia, Canada and Ukraine deploy significant military forces for a EU-led operation, they will be invited to participate in the work of the CoC. In their capacity as contributing States, these countries will have the same rights and obligations as regards the day-to-day conduct of the operation as the participating EU Member States.

<sup>22</sup> In the case of an EU-led operation calling for a NATO command option, the entire chain of command must remain under the political control and strategic direction of the EU throughout the operation, after consultation between the EU and NATO. In that framework the operation commander will report on the conduct of the operation to EU bodies only.

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