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Subject: Contribution from Dr Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann, member of the Convention  
'Requirements for the Constitutional Treaty for a European Union capable of  
Peace'

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The Secretary-General of the Convention has received the contribution annexed hereto from  
Dr Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann, member of the Convention.

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Dr Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann

**Requirements for the Constitutional Treaty  
for a European Union capable of Peace**

Notes on the final report of European Convention Working Group VIII on Defence  
of 16 December 2002 (CONV 461/02)

The content and objectives of the common European security and defence policy (ESDP) are to be enshrined in the EU constitutional treaty as a firm component of the common foreign and security policy (CFSP). There is no doubt that this step has serious implications for Europe – for the development of the European Union, for its future international action and therefore, in the long term, also for its future viability.

**1. The European Union on the road to becoming a military power**

In accordance with the very wide scope of Article 17 of the Treaty on European Union, the ESDP includes 'all questions relating to the security of the Union, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy, [...] which might lead to a common defence, should the European Council so decide.'

The 'joint Franco-German proposals for the European Convention in the field of European security and defence policy' submitted by the French and German foreign ministers, Mr de Villepin and Mr Fischer, on 22 November 2002 (CONV 422/02 – CONTRIB 150) aim in this direction. They called for the 'development of the ESDP into a European Security and Defence Union.' The two ministers argued in favor of their proposal on the grounds that 'a Europe fully capable of taking action' was not feasible without 'enhancing its military capabilities'. That same concern underlies the Belgian initiative of March 2003, put forward after the beginning of the Iraq war and initially supported by Germany, France and Luxembourg. At the end of April these ideas, based on a 'military core Europe' and which extend the principle of 'enhanced cooperation' to the military field, are to be given more concrete form. It is stressed that other EU Member States may join in. Both the Franco-German proposals and the Belgian initiative are aimed at developing the European Union

into a military alliance that ensures 'the security of both its territory and its people' and is also capable of 'military intervention' in remote parts of the world independently of the USA and NATO. To that end, the EU is to set up its own command structures (European General Staff) and Rapid Reaction Forces with modern equipment in parallel to NATO.

The Franco-German Convention initiative (CONV 422/02) gained no support in the final report of the European Convention's Working Group VIII on Defence (CONV 461/02). The Convention confirmed by a majority that 'collective defence' was and would remain a matter for NATO. Similarly, on the question of forming a 'defence Eurozone' on the model of the monetary Eurozone, the working group's discussions tended to reflect the divergent positions of the EU Member States (CONV 461/02, point 54).

The final report concentrates on giving the EU a global military intervention capability – for the purpose of 'crisis-management action outside the Union' in all cases 'where NATO as a whole is not engaged'. The legal basis for this is regarded as Article 17(2), under which questions of security policy include what are known as military and civil 'Petersberg tasks', i.e. 'humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking'. Clearly, however, priority is given not to civil tasks in the sense of conflict prevention but, as emphasised in WG VIII's final report, to military tasks. Accordingly, many working group members were of the opinion that 'the development of the ESDP calls for the strengthening of military capabilities available to the Union' (CONV 461/02, point 66). This also makes it clear that the ESDP has set itself high ambitions, yet on the whole the results have remained rather modest.

As stated in WG VIII's final report, if the Union is to have a capacity for 'autonomous' action on the international stage, it must be backed up by 'credible military capabilities', which is why a multilateral military intervention force is to be set up by 2003, in accordance with the Helsinki Council's decision of December 1999. Although in terms of autonomy this certainly raises the question of the European Union's relations with the USA and NATO, the report does not go into this in any depth. It is an open secret, although the working group was careful not to discuss this any further, that the USA is following the development of the ESDP with some mistrust. That is probably the reason why point 25 of the final report explicitly states that for all EU Member States that are also NATO members 'their military capabilities must also allow them to play their full role in the framework of

NATO operations.'

The final report also points out (CONV 461/02, point 26) that the conclusion of an agreement guaranteeing the EU access to NATO's military capabilities 'will be of great importance to the implementation of the ESDP.' A day after the report was adopted, on 17 December 2002, the EU and NATO published a joint declaration to the effect that henceforth the Union will be given assured access to NATO's military capabilities. That means that in future it will be in a position to conduct military interventions worldwide, complementarily with NATO. In regard to military 'crisis management', the declaration refers to the 'strategic partnership' between the EU and NATO and paying 'due regard' to the decision-making autonomy and interests of the EU and NATO. However, the fact that the EU can draw upon NATO's military resources means that the ESDP is *de facto* subordinated to NATO. Although the USA is not an EU Member State, in future this leading military power could acquire a decisive influence over the ESDP. This raises the question whether – contrary to all the statements made in this regard in the final report – the concept of an independent ESDP with a capacity for autonomous action is not called into question by the EU-NATO cooperation agreement.

On 1 April 2003 the EU took over the military mission in Macedonia from NATO. This is the Union's first military operation in the framework of the ESDP in which all EU Member States apart from Denmark, together with 13 non-EU states, are taking part by contributing personnel and equipment.

All in all, the European Union is in the process of developing into a military power. Whether the Union will eventually turn to the threat of military force to safeguard or assert its economic and political interests, like the superpower the USA, remains an open question. In any case, this is not specifically excluded in the working group's final report.

## **2. Analysis of the threat and implications for the ESDP**

The tasks and objectives of the ESDP can be determined exactly only if they are based on a precise analysis of the threat. That is just what is missing in the final report. Both the mandate of Working Group VIII on Defence (CONV 246/02) and the final report itself (CONV 461/02) leave it very unclear, and therefore open to interpretation, where and how, i.e. as a result of which external conflicts, the security of the Union and its Member States would actually be at threat. The only explicit, albeit more than vague, reference is, with regard to 11 September 2001, to new kinds of threat that could result from terrorist action.

### **2.1. Conflicts in regions surrounding the EU**

The mandate of WG VIII (CONV 246/02) refers to the Cologne European Council decision (June 1999) 'to undertake a process of developing crisis-management capabilities'. According to the mandate this was prompted by 'the Balkan crisis' and 'the new geopolitical context', which meant 'that the security of our states was threatened by a series of conflicts in the regions surrounding Union territory.' This neither indicates the geographic location of the threat to the European Union nor identifies conflicts and the direct military threat they may pose in concrete terms.

Similarly, it does not further define the type of conflicts requiring military intervention to safeguard the Union's security. Yet the wording does suggest that Chechnya or the conflict in the Middle East may be meant. It remains entirely unclear to what extent such conflicts represent a direct military threat to the security of the European Union and in what way this presumed threat and the deployment of EU combat forces would be interrelated. It also remains unclear whether the intention is to intervene directly in such conflicts by deploying EU combat forces – which, for example, would mean a clash with nuclear powers in the above cases – or whether the deployment of EU combat forces is merely to act as a threatening military gesture with a view to 'pacification'.

Neither the mandate nor the final report of WG VIII explain in what respect the 'geopolitical context' of the Union has supposedly changed so gravely as to inevitably require military forces to be deployed for crisis management in accordance with the European Council decision. Moreover, the working group disregarded central questions that would be

decisive in justifying the deployment of EU combat forces and determining the objectives of doing so. These questions include the following:

- Is the vague term 'geopolitical context' intended as a means of marking out the Union's political and economic spheres of interest?
- If so, what role are the European forces that are also to be used in 'combat missions' intended to play?
- If not, what role do these combat missions of the European forces play in the Union's foreign policy conception?
- Is it ruled out that European troops could be deployed in the framework of the ESDP to assert geopolitical and geostrategic interests by military means?
- What is the justification of aiming to give the EU forces an operational range of 4000 km all round the territory of the European Union, i.e. a geopolitical operational area that includes the Arctic, central Russia, the Caucasus, parts of Central Asia, the Middle East, North, Central and East Africa?
- Do the considerations set out regarding the 'new geopolitical context' include global military protection of the Union's raw materials supply?

## **2.2. Terrorist threats**

In its final report (CONV 461/02, point 45) the working group states that the security situation on the basis of which the ESDP was developed in the 1990s 'has been overtaken by international events'. Without going into further detail, it notes that after 11 September 2001 'the threat is no longer defined solely by the risk of conflict between states or ethnic groups'. The situation is described as being more one of global insecurity characterised by less clear-cut risks, including those linked to international terrorist organisations or the use of weapons of mass destruction, which 'elude the provision made for conflict management in the traditional sense.'

Quite apart from the fact that the general presumption that terrorist groups will 'use [...] weapons of mass destruction' does not in itself prove that there is a concrete threat to the EU and its Member States, the nature of the scenario of 'global insecurity' that requires a global response using military means remains entirely unclear as well. Moreover, the above argument tends to suggest that international terrorism cannot be effectively countered by military means – let alone by an EU Rapid Reaction Force. This is probably also the reason why the working group admits in its final report (CONV 461/02, point 56) 'that this threat requires in response the combined use of the whole range of instruments available today to the Union, and in particular the Member States (military resources, intelligence, police and judicial cooperation, civil protection, etc.).'

WG VIII's mandate (CONV 246/02, point 3) states that the question arose 'as to whether certain actions, and if so which ones, could be undertaken by the other Member States under the Treaty in the event of a similar attack [to that of 11 September] or a biological or chemical attack against a Member State.' Here again, questions arise in regard to the analysis of the threat arising from terrorist action, which the final report again does not discuss adequately:

- Does the group seriously believe that a terrorist attack such as 11 September, which was carried out by suicide attackers using civil aircraft and allegedly entirely unexpectedly, can be countered by military means? Does the experience of individual EU Member States, such as the UK or Spain, not show that there is no military solution that can put an end to terrorism? Even if it does not share this well-founded view, what kind of scenario is required in concrete terms in order to counter such threats by military means?
- What kind of military response is envisaged to terrorist attacks using chemical and biological weapons? To what extent will there be checks on whether the know-how for such supposed attacks may have come from, among others, EU Member States? Is it being checked at all whether, and if so how, weapons exported from EU Member States can end up in the hands of terrorists? And what conclusions can be drawn from this?

- Is there any intention of deploying the EU Rapid Reaction Forces for 'preventive' purposes? If so, are their tasks to include the targeted killing of terrorists (which the Union has vehemently criticised as contrary to international law in the case of the Middle East)?

In its final report (CONV 461/02, point 46) the group states that after 11 September 2001 there is now also a need to ensure 'security within the European Union', particularly for the protection of the civilian population and democratic institutions. That is an thoroughly justified concern. Whether the ESDP's tasks should include internal security in the Member States is, however, another question altogether.

### **3. Establishing EU Rapid Reaction Forces**

As explained above, the existing, vague analysis of the threat does not justify creating EU Rapid Reaction Forces, which, according to the EU decision on force deployability of 2000, are to comprise up to 15 brigades (i.e. 50 000 to 60 000 soldiers), which can be moved and deployed to be ready for action globally within 60 days. Nor is there any plausible justification for the call in WG VIII's final report (CONV 461/02, point 11) for additional smaller units that can be moved and readied for deployment more rapidly. At any rate, these kinds of Rapid Reaction Forces would not be required for the conduct of the humanitarian tasks referred to in Article 17(2) or for rescue tasks in the framework of the ESDP.

Looked at realistically, it is unlikely that EU military forces could be ready for deployment by the end of this year. This raises the question why this project is still being so actively pursued given that the final report (CONV 461/02, point 18) lists a whole number of critical shortcomings (command, control and communications, strategic intelligence, surveillance and protection of troops in the field, strategic transport, effective engagement capacity). These shortcomings could only be remedied by investment, which would probably break the Member States' national budgets. So the illusionism (occasionally also reflected in the final report of Working Group VIII on Defence) that a European armament programme of this kind could be financed is almost incomprehensible.

#### **3.1. EU Rapid Reaction Forces and NATO Response Force**



The final report in no way explains why the European Union still needs to set up its own Rapid Reaction Forces, while calling on NATO material and NATO troops, given that the NATO Prague summit of 21 November 2002 decided to create what is called a NATO Response Force (NRF) with 21 000 soldiers (Prague summit declaration, point 4(a)). The NRF is to be set up not later than October 2004 and is intended to be fully ready for engagement not later than October 2006. The declaration also states that 'the NRF and the related works of the EU's Headline Goal should be mutually reinforcing while respecting the autonomy of both organisations.' The fact is, however, that the EU Rapid Reaction Forces, like the NATO Response Force, are to operate worldwide in crisis regions; they will conduct operations with identical objects, and will draw upon the same military units.

Basically, this mirrors the political competition between the USA and Europe. The working group did not, however, find any convincing answer to the question of how this competition between the NATO Response Force and the planned EU Rapid Reaction Forces is to be resolved.

### **3.2. Updating the Petersberg tasks**

The above-mentioned unresolved questions about the threat to the European Union provide no serious answer to Question 1 in the mandate of Working Group VIII on Defence: 'Apart from the Petersberg tasks, what defence remit could be envisaged for the Union?' (CONV 206/02). Nor did the discussion in the working group provide any further insights in relation to the analysis of threats that would justify a military response or the deployment of EU combat forces to avert global terrorist threats. This dilemma becomes evident once more in the final report (CONV 461/02, point 42).

It is incomprehensible why the tasks referred to in the final report (CONV 461/02, point 51) that are to supplement the Petersberg tasks should include those 'involving the use of military resources'. Conflict prevention, disarmament operations and stabilisation measures are tasks that should be carried out using civil, including police, resources. As a general rule, priority should be given to these resources – also and in particular in preference to any form of military assistance, which is subsumed in point 51 of the final report under the misleading term 'defence outreach'.

#### **4. The ESDP and the United Nations**

The final report states (CONV 461/02, point 27) that the European Union recognises 'the primary responsibility of the United Nations Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.' The wording here is ambiguous because it does not preclude EU Rapid Reaction Forces – like the allied, US-led forces in the third Gulf War that is now taking place – also being deployed without the assent or mandate of the Security Council. Yet this is contradictory to the UN Charter, in particular Article 1(1), Article 2(3) and (4) and Articles 39-48. These articles specifically do not refer to a 'primary' responsibility, which in individual cases could also allow alliances of states to intervene under their own mandate.

The UN Charter is one of the most important documents of international law. The principles it lays down derive, like the European Union's values, from the experience of war, fascism and genocide during two world wars with millions of deaths. To disregard the spirit and letter of the UN Charter is to negate the experience of 1945 and therewith the will of the peoples to embark on a new peaceful road. This is why the European Union must commit itself to unconditional respect for international law, as a vital component of a Union capable of peace.

#### **5. Financing**

The mandate of Working Group VIII on Defence (CONV 246/02, point 17) notes that 'the total defence budgets of the 15 Member States amount to EUR 170,754 billion (compared with \$285,257 billion for the United States defence budget).' The problem with these figures is that the combined expenditure of all EU Member States is being added up in purely quantitative terms. This means it also includes, for example, the military expenditure of Denmark, i.e. a country that in no way participates in the EU's military component. It also subsumes the expenditure on the nuclear armament of the UK and French forces. There is no qualitative assessment of individual military expenditure. That means it does not examine why any particular Member State allocates its military expenditure to specific areas. Nor is it meaningful to compare the military expenditure of several states with that of a single one (in this case the USA), since the structure of military budgets differs

considerably (e.g. in terms of personnel expenditure, investment expenditure, the costs of military operations, the maintenance of military bases, etc.). What is true, on the other hand, as stated in the final report (CONV 461/02, point 40), is that military expenditure is continuing to decrease in all EU Member States, with the exception of the UK and France.

The final report proposes (CONV 461/02, points 64 and 65) setting up a European Armaments Agency whose initial task would be to fulfil Member States' 'operational requirements'. Furthermore, regarding Member States' commitments in terms of contributing military capabilities to the Union, it calls for a 'mechanism' in order to 'evaluate and improve on the way in which Member States fulfil their commitments.' The evaluation is to cover the 'proportion of the defence budget in relation to GNP' together with 'force preparedness' including 'interoperability' (CONV 461/02, point 66). This task is to be entrusted to the Armaments Agency.

Apart from the fact that this kind of 'mechanism' could (and might even be intended to) trigger a new spiral in the arms race, it is more than questionable whether the specifically listed examples of European armaments cooperation are exemplary. For instance, the mandate of Working Group VIII on Defence (CONV 246/02, point 16) refers not only to 'cooperative arrangements between several European governments and the industries in their countries relating to certain major military equipment projects' but also specifically mentions the 'Eurofighter' jet in this connection. Today experts cite this project as a negative example *par excellence* because of various breakdowns and the enormous rate of price increases, and as a lesson never to be repeated. Against this background, it is incomprehensible why the Convention's Praesidium cites the Eurofighter as a successful project of European armaments cooperation.

Last but not least the working group did not adequately address the procurement and financing of the technologically sophisticated armament projects. Many questions are bound to arise in this connection, e.g.:

- Why does the working group not refer openly in its final report to the practical financing problems of major European equipment projects, which impose a further financial burden on national budgets?

- What is the proportion of expenditure on military compared with civil purposes with a view to crisis management in a global framework?
- Does the exorbitantly high expenditure on armaments not in itself restrict the financing options for civil conflict management and for social and civil conflict prevention so seriously as to make it virtually impossible to make any meaningful plans in this area?

## **6. The role of the European Parliament and the national parliaments**

Hitherto the European Parliament and the national parliaments have had very little democratic influence or control over the ESDP. They are virtually excluded from the decision-making processes. This central issue plays only a secondary role in the working group's final report, something that is democratically unacceptable.

Under the provisions of the EU Treaty, the Council and the Presidency of the European Council must inform the European Parliament of any further developments and the High Representative must keep it informed of the progress made and decisions taken in this area. Parliament's views are, however, merely to be taken into 'consideration'. This means the European Parliament is given as little right of assent or codecision in the ESDP area as it is any genuine right of scrutiny. In other words: when it comes to the vital question of war or peace, the European Parliament is to have no say.

It is indeed mentioned in the final report that national parliaments should exercise permanent scrutiny over their respective governments in the field of defence policy and that in the majority of Member States the national parliament approves the use of national forces in a military operation. Yet that is by no means enough. Firstly, in general the national parliaments' right of reservation covers only the decision to send out troops. Secondly, the reference to national parliaments is no substitute for a clear acknowledgement of the European Parliament's right of scrutiny. As in every parliamentary democracy, the European Union's constitution must ensure that no major decision can be taken in fundamental polity areas without or against the directly legitimated Parliament. This applies also and in particular to decisions in the area of the ESDP, which must at least be subject to the European Parliament's assent. When the decision-making

procedure is formulated, account must also be taken of the fact that national constitutions explicitly also require the assent of the respective national parliaments for certain decisions. This, however, can only supplement rather than replace participation by the European Parliament.

Furthermore, the working group did not even discuss the fact that the ECJ must have judicial control over the ESDP.

## **7. Alternatives for a forward-looking European security and defence policy**

The point of departure and guideline for developing a forward-looking ESDP should be that the creation of the European Union is in itself a successful example of crisis prevention by civil means. The EU can only maintain and consolidate peace and security for itself and its Member States in the long term if the ESDP is based on the concept of global, common and comprehensive security. This, as stated in the European Parliament's resolution A4-0162/97, is achieved by collaboration founded on the principles of equality, justice and reciprocity and has cooperation, confidence-building measures, transparency, permanent disarmament, conversion and progressive demilitarisation as a precondition. The fact is, however – as, sadly, the final report makes abundantly clear – that although the Helsinki summit's military decisions, such as the creation of EU Rapid Reaction Forces, are being transposed at high speed, virtually nothing or very little is happening in the field of civil conflict prevention, because that is not the political objective.

## **7.1. Towards a cause-oriented, preventive and civil security policy**

We need to move from a security system determined by military considerations to a civil security system that takes into account the political, economic, social and environmental causes of conflicts. First of all, we must pursue a preventive approach in order to defuse and resolutely combat the causes of predictable and acute conflicts before they degenerate into the use of armed force. Prevention must not be confused with defence against threats in the military sense. The determining aspects of crisis prevention include the removal of economic and social imbalances, strengthening democracy and the protection of human rights and individual minority rights in Europe and the world. They also include social and environmental restructuring worldwide and the defence and further development of international and bilateral disarmament systems. This is the only way also to combat terrorism effectively.

Given its security-policy approach, its composition, its democratic structure and its concentration on human rights issues, the OSCE offers the most appropriate framework for a comprehensive European security system. One of the central pillars of the ESDP should, therefore, be to revitalize and strengthen the OSCE.

No doubt, both in terms of real developments as also in the discussion about the form the ESDP will take, an attempt that has to be taken seriously is underway to emancipate Europe from the USA – although in the wrong area and with the wrong content. Political leaders keep stressing that if the European Union is to acquire an international say and influence, it must be capable of 'autonomous' military action worldwide. Strengthening the military component of the EU is seen as a way of loosening the EU's dependence on the USA in the area of security policy and demonstrating Europe's independence. It is to be feared, however, that this would have exactly the opposite effect, not least because it would further enhance the role of the military factor in international relations. This would tend to strengthen the position of the USA as the sole remaining superpower, a process that would be accompanied by the progressive undermining of the UN's central responsibility for security and peace and would severely weaken international law.

Moreover, it would be counterproductive for European and international security, as also for the economies of the existing and future EU Member States, if they took part in an

arms race with the United States. There is a gulf between the military and technical capabilities of the European Union and the USA that cannot be bridged, even in the long term.

The European Union and its Member States will achieve peace and security and strengthen their international positions only if they focus on their scientific, technical and economic strength, on their civil values and on their historical relations with countries throughout the world, rather than on strengthening their military capabilities and armaments potential.

Unfortunately, the final report of Working Group VIII on Defence takes scant account of considerations of this kind. It totally underestimates the importance of the fact that in today's globalised world security simply can no longer be understood in a narrow, military sense but only in comprehensive terms as protection of the very foundations of the European Union and its Member States in the framework of a just international economic order.

It reduces the ESDP almost exclusively to its military component. Civil conflict-management strategies and conflict prevention are clearly seen as subordinate, for in the end the objective is to acquire the capability to conduct war. Obviously, this is also why it is primarily the planned EU Rapid Reaction Forces that are to be deployed for purely civil conflict-management tasks.

It is of no avail to seek any reference in the final report to a clear EU commitment towards disarmament, conversion or arms control. So it remains unclear whether disarmament is to be promoted solely outside the EU or whether it is also one of the priorities of the ESDP within the EU. There is room for doubt here, because a majority of the working group unequivocally supported armament at European level.

## **7.2. Establishing a European Civil Peace Corps**

It should be noted that the Scandinavian EU Member States attach more importance to a civil, preventive and cause-oriented security policy, without, however, opposing the

ESDP's basic military approach. The European Parliament also calls occasionally for more emphasis to be placed on active conflict prevention and non-military crisis management. In a recommendation to the Council in January 1999 it called for a European Civil Peace Corps to be established (A4-0047/99). It justified this recommendation by underlining that 'such initiative' should be seen 'as a further instrument of the European Union to enhance its external action in the field of conflict prevention and peaceful resolution of conflicts'. As early as May 1995 the European Parliament had recognised that forming a European Civil Peace Corps would make a necessary contribution to reducing conflicts (Bourlanges/Martin report). The tasks of this corps are seen as conflict prevention, mediation, post-conflict confidence-building between the parties to the conflict and aid in the event of natural disasters. However, the European Council did not support these promising moves towards targeted, peaceful conflict management, nor did they come up for discussion at all in the Convention's Working Group VIII on Defence.

## **8. Conclusions: requirements for a constitutional treaty for a European Union capable of peace**

The progress of European integration does not require Europe to have the global capability to conduct war or to have military intervention forces acting worldwide, or to embark on an arms race. On the contrary, a vital requirement for a peaceful Europe that feels bound by existing international law is that it makes an unequivocal commitment to the UN Charter. Furthermore, an essential requirement for achieving a Europe that genuinely maintains peace and also rejects any external projection of military power is to incorporate in the constitutional treaty provisions that prohibit war and commit it to peace.

This means the following, specific requirements should be included in the draft constitutional treaty:

- A commitment to peace on the part of the Union.
- A commitment on the part of the Union to observance of the spirit and letter of the United Nations Charter.



- A ban without exception on aggressive and preventive wars and the threat or use of military force in international relations.
- Restricting the task of EU Member States' forces in the framework of the ESDP to the protection of their national territory. The reference to 'combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking' in accordance with Article 17(2) should be deleted. The deployment of EU combat forces against 'terrorist threats' – whether outside or within the Union – is to be rejected and should not be incorporated in the constitutional treaty.
- A treaty provision on recognition of and strict respect for the neutrality of Austria, Finland, Sweden and Ireland.
- A treaty provision committing the EU Member States to disarmament of their military capabilities with a view to making them structurally incapable of attack in the framework of the ESDP.
- A treaty provision banning the production, storage or use of ABC weapons in the framework of the ESDP.
- A provision to the effect that the disposal of all weapons of mass destruction stored on the territory of EU Member States is an objective that should be pursued.
- Revitalization and enhancement of cooperation in the framework of the OSCE.
- The establishment of a European Civil Peace Corps on the basis of the European Parliament's recommendation of January 1999 (A4-0047/99).
- A constitutional commitment to arms control and conversion.
- A treaty provision on concluding a European pact on reduction by Member States of their military expenditure.
- The establishment of a European Arms Control Agency and a European Office for

## Disarmament and Arms Conversion.

- A treaty provision on a European conversion and employment programme and the establishment of a European conversion fund.
- In the context of the ESDP, the European Parliament must have comprehensive rights of scrutiny and the assent procedure must apply at least for all major decisions.

