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From: European External Action Service (EEAS)  
To: Political and Security Committee (PSC)  
Subject: Annual 2016 CSDP Lessons Report

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Delegations will find attached document EEAS(2017) 252.

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EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE



Deputy Secretary General

**Working document of the European External Action Service**

**of 12/05/2017**

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<b>To [and/or GSC distribution acronyms]</b>	<b>Political and Security Committee (PSC)</b> <b>COPS</b> <b>RELEX</b> <b>CIVCOM</b> <b>POLMIL</b> <b>COSDP</b> <b>CSDP/PSDC</b>
<b>Title / Subject</b>	<b>Annual 2016 CSDP Lessons Report</b>
<b>[Ref. prev. doc.]</b>	

Delegations will find attached the Annual 2016 CSDP Lessons Report for discussion and endorsement.

**ANNUAL 2016 CSDP LESSONS REPORT**

**Executive summary**

Steady progress was made in 2016 with the implementation of key lessons and recommendations identified in previous years. During the year the EEAS issued guidelines on how to draft a PFCA (2014.1) and on coordination and cooperation between CSDP missions/operations, EU Delegations and EUSR (2014.5), with good feedback on initial implementation. The EEAS also started work on an internet-based unclassified lessons database (2013.5) but subsequently halted this work because of staffing problems within its IT department.

Despite the progress noted, much more work is still required on previous lessons, in particular on pre-deployment training (2013.2), secure communications (2014.4) and intelligence dissemination (2015.4).

Key lessons from 2016 are:

1. Development of an **information strategy** at the outset of a crisis.
2. Alignment of **mission budget cycles** with mission mandates.
3. Establishing a **gender focal point system** to improve gender mainstreaming.

This report makes recommendations related to the lessons identified, whose implementation will be monitored and included in the next annual report together with that of the previous lessons.

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### **References**

- A. Suggestion on a way forward on the implementation of lessons learned, including in field operations (EEAS 02065/13), dated 7 October 2013, endorsed by the PSC on 5 November 2013.
- B. Annual 2013 CSDP Lessons Report (EEAS 00407/14), dated 12 March 2014 with key lessons and recommendations endorsed by the PSC on 11 June 2014.
- C. Annual 2014 CSDP Lessons Report, EEAS (2015) 256, dated 23 February 2015 with key lessons and recommendations endorsed by the PSC on 12 May 2015.
- D. Annual 2015 CSDP Lessons Report, EEAS (2016) 536, dated 21 April 2016 with key lessons and recommendations endorsed by the PSC on 5 July 2016.

### **Background**

Based on the 2013 EEAS "Suggestion on a way forward on the implementation of lessons learned, including in field operations" (Ref. A), the CSDP Lessons Management Group (LMG) chaired by EEAS Deputy Secretary General Serrano monitored the implementation of the key lessons and recommendations identified in 2013, 2014 and 2015 (Ref. B, C and D).<sup>1</sup> The EU Delegations in Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Georgia, Libya, Mali, Niger, Ukraine, Somalia, and in the West Bank and Gaza strip also sent contributions on the implementation of the key lessons and recommendations. A number of the lessons in question linked with broader work across the EU to take forward the EU Comprehensive Approach and with the implementation of the Joint Communication on Capacity-Building in support of Security and Development.<sup>2</sup>

In addition, the LMG has identified three additional key lessons for 2016 based on observations recorded in the EUMS Lessons Management Aid (ELMA), reports from CSDP missions and operations, contributions from LMG members and the contributions from the EU Delegations mentioned above. In the light of the key lessons identified, the LMG has also made the recommendations listed below.

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<sup>1</sup> The LMG was established on the basis of Ref. A. It is chaired by a member of the EEAS Corporate Board and composed of CMPD, EUMS, CPCC, INTCEN, the relevant EEAS geographical and thematic departments, the CivCom, EUMC and PMG chairs, as well as the Commission's DG DEVCO, ECHO, FPI and NEAR. The LMG is assisted by a Lessons Working Group at expert level.

<sup>2</sup> Capacity building in support of security and development - Implementation Plan - Non-paper by the EEAS and Commission services, EEAS (2015) 1586 of 10 November 2015, items 2.2 (Coordination between EU delegations and CSDP missions, linked to Key Lesson 2014.5) and 2.4 (PFCA, linked to Key Lesson 2014.1).

**Implementation of the key lessons identified in 2013, 2014 and 2015**

The following key lessons and recommendations were closed for the reasons explained in last year's report: 2013.1.8, 2013.3.2, 2013.3.3, 2013.4 and 2014.3.5. The present report will only address the remaining lessons and recommendations.

**2013.1**        **A Comprehensive Approach** improves efficiency and sustainability of mission results.

*2013.1.1        The EEAS should ensure that shared analysis informs the planning process.*

Since 2013 shared analysis can take the form of Political Frameworks for Crisis Approach (see 2014.1 below). Several PFCAs were drafted in 2014-2015. A further PFCA was drafted in 2016 in the framework of the Multi-Layer 2016 (ML16) exercise and was based on shared analysis as were its predecessors. In addition, broad consultation of EEAS and Commission stakeholders ensured shared analysis in the planning process of the only mission launched in 2016, EUTM RCA. This recommendation has been satisfactorily implemented for three years and can therefore be closed.

*2013.1.2        The EEAS should ensure that planning documents provide an indication of tools needed, including equipment, and of the possible sources of funding.*

In March, the Crisis Management Concept for EUTM RCA pointed out that equipment is crucial for delivering and maintaining the mission's education and training objectives but recognised that the EU itself will not be able to equip the host country's armed forces before the Capacity Building for Security and Development initiative is implemented. The mission's operational planning documents only contemplate the provision of equipment for mission and operation personnel, and not for host country personnel. As far as CSDP mission/operation personnel and awareness of the need for early planning are concerned, this recommendation can be considered as implemented and therefore closed. As for tools needed for host country personnel, please refer to key lesson 2015.1 on equipment and infrastructure projects.

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*2013.1.3 From an early stage, the EEAS should start outlining an exit/transition strategy based on shared conflict analysis and also involving Commission, Member States, host countries and other actors as appropriate.*

In March, the Crisis Management Concept for EUTM RCA envisaged for the end of the mission a handover to the CAR authorities, MINUSCA and /or the International Community, based on shared conflict analysis also involving the relevant actors. All new Operational Plans now include a paragraph on a transition/exit strategy. The practice of outlining exit/transition strategies based on shared conflict analysis at an early stage seems to be now well established and this specific recommendation can therefore be closed. However, the effective implementation of such strategies needs further improvement.

*2013.1.4 The EEAS should post experts on a temporary basis to EU Delegations in countries at risk of conflict to help Delegations suggest possible response options based on the situation on the ground. To help identify such countries, the EEAS should use its new Early Warning System and INTCEN analysis.*

In May, the Guidelines on political reporting for EU Delegations highlighted that EU Delegations should also report on security matters. The counterterrorism expert at the EU Delegation to Iraq helped suggest possible response options for the July Iraq options non-paper, which confirmed the usefulness of security experts in Delegations. In the course of the year, additional counterterrorism experts were deployed to BiH, Chad, Lebanon, Libya and Pakistan. These experts made useful contributions to conflict analysis and to suggesting possible response options based on the situation on the ground. Overall, the experience with security and security-development experts in EU Delegations has been very good and this practice should be extended.

*2013.1.5 The EEAS should coordinate centrally all fact-finding / technical assessment missions (FFM / TAM).*

A number of fact-finding and technical assistance missions took place in 2016, for instance to Kosovo, Niger, Mali and the Horn of Africa. Coordination took place through the relevant geographical desks and was satisfactory. Therefore this recommendation can be considered as closed.

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2013.1.6 *EU Delegations should help map out the various EU actions in their host countries as well as relevant non-EU actions, with a view to ensuring consistency and identifying synergies already at the planning stage. They should also help fine-tune missions and programmes during the implementation phase to better reflect the situation on the ground.*

Mapping of assistance is a time-consuming exercise and requires additional human resources.

Nevertheless, EU Delegations helped map out the various EU actions in their host countries as well as relevant non-EU actions in 2016, for instance in the framework of strategic reviews.

This recommendation was implemented for three years to the fullest extent possible and can therefore be closed. Mapping of assistance will be addressed in the context of the implementation of the July Joint Communication on security sector reform.<sup>3</sup>

2013.1.7 *The EEAS should ensure that missions' and operations' reports are circulated to the relevant EU Delegations, to other missions and operations in the same region (e.g. Sahel, Horn of Africa) and to other missions and operations that have similar tasks (e.g. Border Management, Police Training) as well as to the relevant EU services at HQ. EU Delegations should systematically circulate their reports, including EU Heads of Missions' reports, to the relevant missions and operations.*

This recommendation has been implemented to the fullest extent possible given the current state of secure communications and can therefore be closed. Secure communications are addressed by Key Lesson 2015.4 below.

2013.1.8 *Key recommendation closed*

2013.1.9 *The EEAS should consider better ways to compile, analyse, coordinate and disseminate intelligence and information products in Brussels and in the field.*

In 2016, the two EU intelligence bodies INTCEN and EUMS INT continued to coordinate effectively. However, the compilation, analysis and dissemination of intelligence both within Brussels and beyond faced limits due to the lack of a common Intelligence Analysis Platform, an issue addressed under 2015.4.2. Therefore this broader recommendation can be closed, and the more specific issue of an Intelligence Analysis Platform addressed under 2015.4.2.

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<sup>3</sup> JOIN (2016) 221 final of 5.7.2016 "Elements for an EU-wide strategic framework to support security sector reform, p.9 "Coordinate EU support".

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*2013.1.10 The EEAS and Member States should seek ways to improve the sharing of intelligence to allow the EU to anticipate and respond to crises more rapidly and appropriately.*

As pointed out in last year's report, more detailed intelligence would be useful for operational planning, for instance intelligence on personalities, relationships and strength of security and armed forces in the countries concerned. However, this key recommendation appears to be implemented to the fullest extent possible and can therefore be closed.

**2013.2** A common foundation of **pre-deployment training** for all CSDP mission staff can greatly enhance mission effectiveness and coherence.

*2013.2.1 Member States and the EEAS should ensure that all contracted and seconded CSDP mission staff receive a common foundation of pre-deployment training including, inter alia, human rights and gender issues. Furthermore, they should explore ways to improve pre-deployment training for all CSDP mission staff in a systematic manner.*

Pre-deployment training sessions continue to take place regularly in Brussels on a monthly basis and are open to all seconded and contracted personnel deploying to both civilian and military CSDP missions and operations. However, too few contracted staff undergo pre-deployment training. The EEAS will address this issue based on the new CSDP Training Policy that should be adopted in the first half of 2017.

*2013.2.2 The EEAS should ensure that the Internet Distance Learning pre-deployment training which is currently being developed addresses the issues of human rights, personal ethics, sexual harassment and gender, as well as the issue of EU standards, including the areas of Rule of Law and policing where relevant.*

The relevant materials are now in regular use as part of the residential pre-deployment training and other mission-related training. The European Security and Defence College has e-learning modules in place on both gender human rights (e.g. AKU 11A, and 16). In addition, it is currently developing together with the EEAS an e-learning module based on the Generic standards of behaviour in CSDP missions and operations (including inter alia code of conduct, sexual exploitation and abuse).



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**2013.3 Ownership and support by the host country** is necessary if the mission is to be truly successful and sustainable.

*2013.3.1 The EEAS should ensure that CSDP missions as part of an EU Comprehensive Approach respond to local needs. The EEAS should devise targeted messages to strengthen local ownership at an early stage.*

In 2016 the EEAS continued to ensure that CSDP missions were part of an EU Comprehensive Approach and to devise targeted messages to strengthen local ownership at an early stage, notably in the case of EUTM RCA. This recommendation can be considered as implemented and can therefore be closed.

*2013.3.2 Key recommendation closed*

*2013.3.3 Key recommendation closed*

*2013.3.4 The EEAS, through CSDP missions and EU Delegations, should survey the opinion of the local population about CSDP missions and monitor support by the host country authorities.*

In 2016, CSDP missions and EU Delegations monitored support by the host country authorities in their regular reporting in a satisfactory way. Most of them did not have the resources to conduct opinion surveys of the local population. This recommendation has been implemented to the fullest extent possible and can therefore be closed. Opinion surveys will be further explored in the context of the implementation of the July Joint Communication on security sector reform,<sup>4</sup> also taking into account the results of the ongoing research projects funded under the Horizon 2020 programme on EU crisis management.

*2013.4 Key lesson closed*

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<sup>4</sup> JOIN (2016) 221 final of 5.7.2016 "Elements for an EU-wide strategic framework to support security sector reform, p.10 "Measure progress: monitor and evaluate".

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**2013.5**        **Lessons should be taken into account systematically** when planning new missions.

*2013.5.1        The EEAS should take steps to ensure that civilian lessons, including those from missions, are learnt systematically. This will permit lessons to drive changes in standard practices, allowing all personnel to learn the relevant lessons.*

In the second half of 2016 work started toward a new internet-based application for the recording and processing of both civilian and military unclassified lessons, including the implementation status of each lesson and recommendation. In addition, the new application would serve as a repository of closed lessons. It would be accessible to all members of the CSDP Lessons Working Group and to all CSDP missions and operations in the field as well as to all Member States. The EEAS IT department drew up a Business Case for the new application in November but subsequently halted work on this project due to staffing problems, delaying rectification of this lesson still further.

**2014.1**        **The Political Framework for Crisis Approach (PFCA)** showed its potential but could be further improved.

*2014.1.1        The EEAS together with the Commission should develop a PFCA early on during the development of a crisis or conflict, considering all available tools and not awaiting a formal PSC tasking.*

A PFCA was drafted in 2016 in the framework of the ML16 exercise in response to a fictitious PSC tasking. However, awareness of the purpose of a PFCA needs to be raised further within the EEAS (see 2014.3.3 below). The EEAS together with the Commission developed reflection and options non-papers with elements of a PFCA for Iraq in July and for Somalia in December. In the case of Somalia, the EEAS and the Commission developed their joint non-paper upon their own initiative.

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*2014.1.2 The EEAS should reflect on whether the PFCA format prescribed by the Crisis Management Procedures can be usefully adjusted or not, on how to improve the inter-service PFCA drafting process and on how a PFCA can continue to be used as a strategic framework after its initial discussion with Member States.*

In the first half of 2016 the CSDP Lessons Management Group, which includes both EEAS and Commission services, completed a Guidance note on drafting a PFCA. The Guidance note was circulated to the EEAS geographical departments in September. It was already used as a reference document for methodology for the Somalia non-paper mentioned above. The Guidance note is intended to be a living document and to be reviewed on the basis of experience with PFCAs as well as with similar analysis and options documents.

*2014.1.3 The EEAS should consider setting up a task force for methodological support to geographical desks who are responsible for drafting PFCAs. This task force should be composed of experienced colleagues from EEAS and Commission services.*

In June, the CSDP Lessons Management Group set up a simple methodological support network that would provide advice, training, coaching and practical support to colleagues involved in developing any PFCAs in the future. This recommendation can therefore be closed.

*2014.1.4 The EEAS should ensure that PFCAs draw on the other relevant EU documents for consistency, without however being bound by them in their analysis. This includes the EU strategic documents foreseen by the Comprehensive Approach Action Plan. Shared analysis of crisis and crisis risk situations and collaborative planning between the EEAS and the Commission should continue to be explored via PFCA and other mechanisms including conflict analysis products, the Early Warning System and country programming documents.*

A PFCA was drafted in 2016 in the framework of the ML16 exercise following a fictitious PSC tasking. This PFCA and the Somalia non-paper mentioned above presented a shared analysis by the EEAS and the Commission services, whereas the Iraq non-paper drew on previous analysis to propose various options for action. The PFCA and the two non-papers also drew on other relevant EU documents for consistency and reflected collaborative planning between the EEAS and the Commission.

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*2014.1.5 The EEAS should ensure that PFCAs help avoid duplication and promote synergies between EU actions. PFCAs analysis should inform mission planning.*

A PFCAs was drafted in 2016 in the framework of the ML16 exercise bearing in mind the need to avoid duplications. It helped plan a fictitious CSDP civilian mission as well as a fictitious CSDP military operation. The Somalia and Iraq non-papers mentioned above provided some relevant experience and showed that synergies between EU actions could be improved. The non-papers helped inform the PSC discussion about enhanced EU support to the security sector in these two countries.

**2014.2** The revised **Crisis Management Procedures (CMP)** proved their worth but need further analysis to avoid delays in mission launch.

*2014.2.1 The EEAS should further analyse and discuss with Member States the reasons for structural delay in mission launch, including force generation aspects.*

Speed of launch and force generation concern both military and civilian missions/operations and ultimately depend on Member States' willingness to grant approval and to provide the necessary manpower or assets. Military force generation processes are well understood between EEAS and MS. Two presentations and follow up discussions were held in 2016 on launch and force generation of civilian missions. As a result, the EEAS introduced measures to speed up the recruitment of civilian staff including shorter advertisement of posts. In September, the EEAS circulated to Member States the document "Force Generation for the civilian CSDP missions: A planning guide for Member States Seconding Authorities". This document should help Member States recruit the necessary personnel in advance and respond more rapidly to calls for contributions to civilian CSDP missions. This recommendation can be considered as implemented, and therefore closed.

*2014.2.2 Member States and EEAS should reach a shared understanding of the Crisis Management Procedures agreed in 2013, notably regarding the fast track process.*

A discussion on the fast track process took place in CivCom in February 2016. There was no further development. There now appears to be shared understanding on this issue for both military and civilian missions/operations. This recommendation can therefore be closed.

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**2014.3** Staff in Brussels and in EU Delegations would benefit from more systematic CSDP training.

*2014.3.1 The EEAS, CSDP missions, other EU services and Member States should better explore and make use of existing training opportunities on all relevant CSDP aspects, in particular those offered by the European Security and Defence College (ESDC). This also includes the courses developed jointly by ESDC-and Commission (DEVCO) on fragility, security and development.*

In the academic year 2015-2016, the ESDC carried out 77 different training activities for a total of 3.750 participants from EEAS, CSDP missions and operations, other EU services and Member States as well as from third countries. In the same period, about 150 people were trained by the Commission (DEVCO) on fragility, security and development, of which 40 jointly with the ESDC. Despite these good numbers, more training could be made available for participants with a broad range of profiles in many areas related to CSDP.

*2014.3.2 For the military, the EEAS should offer training in core institutional and comprehensive working practice not only to EUMS staff but also those nominated on the EU OHQ augmentation lists. Specialised training should also be made more available to senior personnel who have the potential to be considered for Commander/Head of Mission roles.*

The ESDC EU Senior Mission Leaders course and CSDP High Level Course aim at 1/3 participation from the military. No Senior Mission Leaders course was organised in 2016. The CSDP High Level Course had 42% military participation (31 out of 71 participants in the academic year 2015-2016, and 30 out of 70 in 2016-2017). Systematic training about CSDP and about the institutional practice of the EU continues to be necessary in particular for newly appointed commanders of CSDP missions and operations.

*2014.3.3 The EEAS should offer training on PFCA also others than those in the CSDP structures, to help create a better understanding of the value of a PFCA and of how to draft it.*

During 2016 the EEAS including the ESDC offered training courses on security sector reform, conflict analysis, conflict prevention and mediation in cooperation with the Commission.

Participants included a broad range of staff from different departments of the EEAS, Commission services and Member State administrations. All these courses included elements on how conflict analysis can feed into a PFCA.

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*2014.3.4 The EEAS should include a standardised training module on CSDP in the pre-posting training for EU delegations staff working in the potential crisis areas.*

In summer 2016, the EEAS included a training module on CSDP in the annual pre-posting training for EU delegations staff working in the potential crisis areas. This module will become a standard part of pre-posting training in the coming years. Therefore this recommendation can be considered as implemented and closed.

*2014.3.5 Key recommendation closed*

**2014.4** There is insufficient **secure communication** capability.

*2014.4.1 The EEAS should determine what is required to improve secure communications and how it may be provided in the field, between Brussels and operations/ missions and within Brussels.*

In the course of 2016 the EEAS started rolling out secure voice equipment at Brussels HQ and in EU Delegations. As for CSDP missions, in November the EEAS concluded a Service Level Agreement with EUAM Ukraine for the provision of central key services concerning secure voice communication. Similar agreements are under preparation for other CSDP missions and operations. The relevant equipment is funded from the ATHENA or the CFSP budgets.

The review of the EU Concept for Communication and Information Systems (CIS) for EU-led military operations and missions, mentioned in last year's report, is now due to be completed in spring 2017. The review includes support for deployed Force HQs/Mission HQs in the absence of a lead/framework nation.

The EDA-led "EU SatCom Market" framework contract is now scheduled to be expanded in summer 2017 with an additional component offering CIS assets/services in the field (in-theatre communication). The contract benefits both civilian and military CSDP missions and operations as well as participating Member States and troop-contributing countries.

Following an unsuccessful procurement procedure in the course of 2016, the EEAS Corporate Classified Communication and Information System will now be developed in-house by the EEAS. The project should start to be rolled out in 2018. This system will replace the current multiple systems in use for secure communication in Brussels HQ and EU delegations. At a later stage, it is expected to extend a thin client connection to CSDP Missions.

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*2014.4.2 The EEAS should define the classification level of secure communications and subsequent CIS architecture.*

In July 2015, the EEAS services responsible for secure communications agreed on the systematic definition of a classification level of secure communications and subsequent CIS architecture. There was no further development. Therefore, this recommendation can be closed.

**2014.5 Coordination and cooperation between EU Delegations and CSDP missions** can be enhanced.

*2014.5.1 The EEAS should consider ways to improve coordination and cooperation between EU Delegations and CSDP missions, inter alia in regard to mission relocation, SOMA and understanding of CSDP.*

Following the work done in 2015, the CSDP Lessons Management Group produced Best Practice Guidelines on Coordination and Cooperation between CSDP missions/operations, EU Delegations and EU Special Representatives, and circulated them to all relevant actors in September 2016 (EEAS(2016)937). In November, EU Delegations reported on the initial implementation of the guidelines, which showed a good level of coordination and cooperation with CSDP missions/operations and EUSR. The Group will further monitor the implementation of these guidelines.

**2015.1 Equipment and infrastructure projects in favour of the host country** are beneficial to missions and operations but remain limited.

*2015.1.1 The EEAS and the Commission should further elaborate and clarify the regulations pertaining to the Project Cells with a view to ensuring responsiveness in line with the applicable procedures and operational mandates.*

Following a workshop in June, in November the Commission services (FPI) sent a guidance note to all CSDP civilian missions on funding for Project Cells. The note clarifies the process of project identification and implementation, local coordination with EU Delegations and constraints stemming from Articles 40 and 41 (2) TEU. The Commission services will address possible implementation challenges jointly with the EEAS, on a case-by-case basis. This recommendation can therefore be considered as implemented and closed.

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*2015.1.2 The EEAS should identify the expertise to be provided by Member States so that missions can run the Project Cells appropriately.*

The September EEAS document "Force Generation for the civilian CSDP missions: A planning guide for Member States Seconding Authorities" included job descriptions for Head of Project Cell and Planning Cell Officer, which identified the relevant expertise to be provided by Member States. This recommendation can therefore be considered as implemented and closed.

*2015.1.3 The EEAS and the Commission services should undertake better coordination to find a way to answer project requests appropriately. A comprehensive approach should be set from the start of a crisis through closer cooperation between EEAS and the Commission experts within Crisis Planning Teams, based on good practice between EEAS and Commission (ECHO).*

The strategic planning documents for EUTM RCA gave guidance to the Mission Commander to establish close coordination and liaison with all EU services on the ground. Coordination was good but did not lead to the funding of any equipment and infrastructure project. In the Crisis Platform Implementing Group established under the ML16 exercise, cooperation between EEAS and Commission was satisfactory. Good practice seems now to be established and this recommendation can be closed.

**2015.2 Mission support** issues should be better reflected in training activities.

*2015.2.1 The EEAS should include mission support issues, primarily concerning finance, procurement and internal audit into the CSDP training curricula*

In October, the Commission services (FPI) organised a successful training seminar focused on procurement rules for civilian CSDP Missions, with 17 personnel from missions attending. This seminar will be repeated annually.

*2015.2.2 The EEAS should discuss with Member States the need to increasingly opt for contracted positions based on a sound employment regime in order to get access to the necessary expertise.*

In 2016, the EEAS discussed this need several times with Member States in the RELEX working group when considering the budgets for civilian CSDP missions. However, this issue remains open and may become more urgent in the context of the improvement of the EU response capabilities, not least as several categories of staff are not always available through secondments.



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**2015.3** The **association of Third States** still requires attention.

*2015.3.1 In the absence of a Security of Information Agreement, or of a Framework Participation Agreement, or of an ad-hoc Participation Agreement, the EEAS should as appropriate implement the procedures provided for in Part V of Annex V to the Security rules of the EEAS on the exceptional ad-hoc release of EUCI, while complying with the principle of originator control.*

The EEAS did not need to activate the procedures for the exceptional ad-hoc release of EUCI to Third States in 2016. An EEAS User Guide to EU classified information (EUCI) and an on-line course for the mandatory briefing on protecting EUCI are under preparation. These two tools will explain the procedures to be followed for the existing legal frameworks governing the release of EUCI, thus creating awareness of such procedures, which should help reduce delays in communication with partner countries that may be associated to missions and operations in the future.

**2015.4** An **EU civilian-military intelligence analysis tool** should be considered.

*2015.4.1 The EEAS should consider setting up a Military Intelligence Support System (MISS). With the agreement of Member States, such system could eventually be enlarged to become a common EU civilian-military intelligence analysis tool database.*

The option of a Military Intelligence Support System was considered but discarded in the first half of 2016, because its functionalities would be included in the planned Intelligence Analysis Platform (see below). Therefore this recommendation can be closed.

*2015.4.2 When the EC3IS is extended to CSDP missions, the EEAS should consider implementing the new Intelligence Analysis Platform (IAP) locally within the mission network. Since the EC3IS will not be extended to military operations, the IAP should be installed into the EU Operational Wide Area Network so that operations can benefit from it.*

The IAP will be part of the EC3IS when this system is rolled out, and will be extended to the main HQ of each CSDP mission. The IAP will allow both analysis of intelligence locally and dissemination of intelligence from the EU intelligence bodies in Brussels. However, this system is experiencing delays (see 2014.4.1 above). Dissemination of intelligence remains limited both within Brussels and beyond.

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**2015.5**      **Security support** for CSDP missions at central level should be enhanced.

*2015.5.1      The EEAS should explore measures to further enhance the security of CSDP missions, including reinforcing central security capabilities at CPCC.*

In the course of 2016, the EEAS took measures to reinforce the security of CSDP missions particularly in the Sahel (Niger and Mali) and in Somalia. Furthermore, the EEAS revised the Field Security Handbook and intends to circulate it to missions in 2017. With a staffing of two, the capabilities of the CPCC security office in Brussels remain limited.

*2015.5.2      The EEAS should explore measures to enhance coordination and mutual support mechanisms between its CPCC department responsible for the security of missions and its department responsible for the security of EU Delegations.*

Each security visit conducted by the EEAS CPCC security office in 2016 was prepared through a meeting with the EEAS field security office responsible for EU Delegations. Further measures are being elaborated to improve coordination and mutual support between the two offices.

**Key lessons identified in 2016**

**2016.1**

An **information strategy** should be developed at the outset of a crisis.

As set out in the Crisis Management Procedures, the EEAS should develop an Information Strategy including Lines to Take (LTT) and Master Messages in first phase of identification of a crisis and development of an overall EU approach.<sup>5</sup> Experience shows the importance for such strategy to be devised early on in the process leading to a CSDP mission and operation, to include contributions from all relevant CSDP stakeholders and to remain relevant and consistent over time.

**2016.2**

The **mission budget cycle** should be aligned with the mission mandate.

Civilian mission budgets usually run for a year at a time, which poses a challenge to the overall planning and conduct of missions with typical, two-year mandates. One-year budgets can hamper the procurement of necessary equipment, especially when tenders fail. They also affect human resource management, as any contract signed by the mission cannot exceed the duration of the budget. A budget cycle that is aligned with the mission mandate would eliminate these difficulties and would also allow project cell activities to be implemented over a longer time-span, thus improving their effectiveness.

**2016.3**

A **gender focal point system** improves gender mainstreaming.

There is widespread unawareness among CSDP staff as to what it means concretely to integrate a gender perspective in their day-to-day duties. To address this, the EU can build on the successful experience of EULEX Kosovo with its specific gender focal points structure. Since 2015, trained focal points in different departments of EULEX enhanced the gender perspective of the mission both internally (e.g. disaggregated data collection) and externally (e.g. handling cases of sexual and gender-based violence) in support of mission goals.

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<sup>5</sup> Suggestions for crisis management procedures for CSDP crisis management operations (7660/2/13 of 18 June 2013), p. 17.

**Key Recommendations**

- 2016.1. 1     *At the outset of a crisis, the EEAS should establish an Information Strategy Team, led by the STRATCOM Division, with the participation of CSDP Subject Matter Experts, EEAS geographical desk, other EEAS departments, Commission services and EUSR as relevant. This team should contribute in a timely fashion to the Crisis Management Concept for a CSDP mission or operation, as foreseen in the Crisis Management Procedures. It should monitor periodically the implementation of the Information Strategy and ensure it remains relevant and consistent with the overall EU message.*
- 2016.1.2     *The EEAS should revise the 2002 Draft guidelines for ESDP Crisis Response Information Activities (13817/02 of 18 November 2002) to reflect the new institutional setup and to take into account the lessons identified in this field.*
- 2016.2.1     *The EEAS and Commission services should discuss with the Council a well-grounded proposal for a budget cycle that is aligned with the mandate of a civilian mission.*
- 2016.3.1     *The EEAS should build on the experience of EULEX Kosovo and extend a system of gender focal points to other missions and to Brussels Headquarters. This system should include training modules for new staff that are appointed as focal points.*

**Way forward**

If the PSC agrees, the LMG will follow up on the recommendations and report on their implementation in the next annual CSDP lessons report.

Enclosures:

1. CMPD contribution.
2. CPCC contribution.
3. EUMS contribution.

**CMPD Contribution**

1. Strategic Reviews – Follow-up

Following the Horn of Africa strategic review, the working groups' advice to PSC offered general guidance without listing specific deliverables to direct focussed operational planning for EUTM Somalia. As a result, operational planning had to address policy issues and became more challenging.

- Recommendation: the EEAS and the Member States should strive to define clear and unambiguous deliverables for missions and operations.

2. Capacity-Building for Security and Development (CBSD)

2.1 Manage expectations

Among mission and operation staff as well as in Brussels, there is confusion about what CBSD can actually deliver. Expectations exceed the capability of the so-called CBSD "instrument" and this misunderstanding often extends to host-country interlocutors.

- Recommendation: the EEAS should send regular updates on the state of play of CBSD, including what it can and cannot deliver, to staff dealing with CSDP-related matters in Brussels, in missions and operations and in EU Delegations.

2.2 Coordination mechanism

There is no specific coordination mechanism to oversee CBSD in the EEAS and to contribute to the identification of needs. The 2015 Joint Communication on Capacity building in support of security and development called for an EU-wide strategic framework,

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shared by both CSDP and development cooperation policy, for Security Sector Reform.<sup>6</sup> In 2016, the Joint Communication on SSR created such framework and set up a "permanent informal inter-service SSR taskforce" to promote "coherence and complementarity of EU SSR activity and support the planning and design of SSR development cooperation projects and CSDP planning documents."<sup>7</sup>

- Recommendation: CBSD should be coordinated by the "permanent informal inter-service SSR taskforce".

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<sup>6</sup> JOIN(2015) 17 of 24.4.2015.

<sup>7</sup> JOIN(2016) 31 final of 5.7.2016, p. 12.

**CPCC contribution**

**Executive Summary**

The contribution of the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) to the Annual 2016 Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) Lessons Report results of contributions from within the CPCC and from the Missions. For this year's exercise, a decision was taken to integrate fewer lessons, and to structure existing and new lessons following a thematic approach. This was done for the following reasons: 1) a thematic approach allows to merge related lessons, which improves readability as well as follow-up, and 2) many lessons have already been documented, are in the process of being addressed, or have been implemented. Implementation remains a priority. Of note, lessons that are being reported within the remit of the main report are not necessarily repeated in this annex, even if the lesson originates from CPCC.

The structure of the report is thematic. Both new and previous lessons are presented by theme and topic. There are four themes, and all have a section with the state of play in relation to previously identified lessons, followed by a section with - if available - new lessons identified. The four themes are: 1) Planning, 2) Conduct of Operations, 3) Mission Support and 4) Horizontal issues.

Proper Operational **Planning** is essential for Missions. There are a total of six previously identified and still open lessons in the area of planning, of which three are closed. For this year, there are no new lessons on planning activities yet formulated, but lessons are expected to follow the Multilayer exercise (ML16), reported separately, as well as to be drawn from the experiences from the re-launching of EUBAM Libya, that is now focusing on planning for possible future civilian CSDP engagement in Libya.

The **Conduct of Operations** phase refers to the time a Mission is operational on the ground in theatre. Most of the lessons are identified during this phase; however, many will be recorded as either Mission Support or a Horizontal issue. Lessons directly connected to mandate implementation in need of Mission specific actions in theatre are recorded under this theme. There are a total of nine previously recorded lessons in this area, of which seven are closed. Two new lessons were recorded within this area:

*1) A Gender focal point system in Missions improves gender mainstreaming in operational activities and supports efficient mandate implementation; 2) Finding a good balance between strategic advice and other operational activities has a positive impact on a Mission's efficiency.*

Functional **Mission Support** is crucial to support effective mandate implementation. Over the years several lessons have been observed, analysed and subsequently learnt. However, mainly due to financial constraints, not all Mission Support related lessons can be followed up at this time. Regarding Mission Support, there were a total of nine previously identified lessons of which four are closed. Five new lessons were recorded within the theme of Mission support this year:



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1) A budget cycle that is aligned with the mandate would be beneficial for planning and conduct of Missions; 2) National constraints as well as conditions in the field may limit the number of candidates for CSDP Head of Mission (HoM) positions; 3) Civilian Response Team (CRT) calls do not always provide the desired outcome with regards to number of staff and timely deployment; 4) A minimum Mission Support Staffing needed to start-up and deploy new Missions and Field Office should be defined; 5) A lack of specific software applications for operational activities in Missions hampers follow-up and analysis of activities.

As **Horizontal issues** span over more topics than the other themes, this part is the largest. There are 23 previously identified lessons in this area, of which seven are closed. Three new lessons are identified this year:

1) Support from EU CSDP Missions with expertise and technical advice to other EU programmes enhances comprehensive approach on the ground; 2) Common CSDP Mission minimum standards for medical assessments should be developed; 3) Using an exchange of letters referring to the ToR in a SOFA instead of a proper SOMA in conformity with the existing template, is not recommendable.

### 1 Planning

#### 1.1 Implementation of previously identified lessons

##### 1.1.1 CONOPS/OPLAN

- *It is worth exploring ways of ensuring more hands on input from the field whilst developing the OPLAN and BIS.(2014)*

CPCC is systematically accompanying Core Teams during Mission start up by sending one planner on the ground to inform CONOPS and OPLAN drafting. This is also the case when amending planning documents of already established Missions. This has become a best practice, and hence this lesson is closed.

- *Generic concepts to replace Mission support annexes should be considered.(2014)*

All annexes relating to Human Resources in the OPLAN have been standardised and the text has been discussed with EU MS. A general Code of Conduct and Discipline, for all civilian Missions was developed and is currently being implemented. With regards to other areas, texts have been harmonised to the extent it was useful and possible. Hence this lesson is considered learnt and is closed.

- *Systematic early cooperation and coordination with the Commission and other relevant stakeholders, including through a field visit, increases the efficiency of OPLAN revisions. (2015)*

Commission services and other relevant stakeholders are systematically involved and/or consulted as appropriate when amending Missions' OPLANs. They are also, when relevant, associated with CPCC visits in theatre. Hence this has become a best practice and the lesson is closed.

- *Frequent strategic reviews with consequent development of new OPLANs hamper Mission delivery.(2015)*

Strategic reviews are a necessary tool to reflect regularly on Missions' mandate implementation and the way ahead. They are particularly relevant when planning assumptions have significantly changed and/or when substantial mandate changes are under consideration. They necessitate a long preparation process and are usually followed by OPLAN revision, updated operational planning and recruitment. The

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timeframe required for a strategic review to be completed can sometimes impact negatively on mandate implementation and possibly lead to some confusion among Mission members and local authorities. Missions' Six-Monthly Reports are also to be used to seek MS' guidance regarding potential Mission's mandate (more limited) re-focusing/evolution, without having to launch a full-fledged strategic review process. This approach should continue to be used as appropriate.

- *Excessive fragmentation of Missions' units/ departments within the Operations Department binders mandate delivery. (2015)*

The excessive fragmentation of the organigram at Operations level can hinder the capacity of a Mission to 'speak with one voice' and can lead to overall lack of internal coordination and consistency of action. A 'silo-mentality' is somehow sponsored by this excessive fragmentation with slowing-down effects on the capacity of a Mission to deliver against expected results. Improvement of Mission's planning and monitoring (in particular through the Mission Implementation Plan) aims at ensuring a greater coherence of Mission's overall action and can help to mitigate these effects. In addition, an increasing trend in Missions was noted, whereby Missions established cross-components teams/task forces jointly working on specific focus areas, thus mitigating the risk of a silo approach. Such joint approaches will be discussed with Missions, not least at the occasion of the yearly CPCC-led Operational Seminar.

### 1.1.2 Transition

- *There is a need for a comprehensive package of SOPs for administrative issues in relation to closing a Mission. (2013)*

So far this has been guided by a set of guidelines issued by CPCC and FPI. Additional guidelines on *Document Management* and *Procedures for the Transfer of Closed Archives to EEAS headquarters* were developed and disseminated in 2016. Policy document/SOP on Mission start-up and Mission Liquidations (they are inseparable) will be developed by the Mission Support Platform in 2017, also defining the responsibility of each actor during a Liquidation phase.

## 2. Conduct of Operations

### 2.1 Implementation of previously identified lessons

#### 2.1.1. Mentoring and Advising

- *Bottom-up approach can help to by-pass deadlocks at political/ strategic level. (2014)*

This lesson has been identified in several Missions. Practice has shown that such an approach can be used, depending on the local circumstances to mitigate to a certain extent host State authorities' reluctance/lack of buy-in of engaging in strategic level reforms. Should there be a lack of political support at central level for certain activities, Missions should analyse the feasibility of providing support/conducting activities at a more operational/local level. However, this approach remains limited, as also shown in several theatres of deployment of civilian CSDP Missions, with some key strategic level changes/reforms being usually required for any sustainable reform, even at an operational level. Political leverage, in coordination with the EU Delegation, the EUSR where existing and EU MS, might eventually be needed to progress on the reforms required at strategic level. This has become a best practice and this lesson is closed.

### **2.1.2 Training (as mandate implementation)**

- *To link training to mentoring and ensure local ownership is good practice. (2014)*

This lesson originated in the need to not only train, but also follow up training with mentoring and train-the-trainers to strengthen local ownership and ensure full implementation. Further, there is a need of a minimum of order and structure at the institution/authority of the individuals being targeted. These principles are now taken into consideration when CPCC is drafting Operational Guidelines, and local ownership is a main point in the generic principles for Operational Guidelines. Hence this can be considered a best practice and the lesson is closed.

- *Training curricula for local authorities should be better shared between the Missions.(2015)*

Civilian CSDP Missions implement their mandates either through MMA activities and/or training sessions. For trainings, Missions support the development by host State authorities of new/revised training curricula. Experience and/or relevant curricula developed by other Missions have previously not been taken into account in this development process, and Missions often have developed products that were already available in other Missions. In order to allow Missions to save time, the Crisis Management Platform (Wiki) is now utilised to share curricula among Missions, and can be used as a basis to be adapted to local specificities. This lesson is therefore considered learnt and is closed.

### **2.1.3 Cooperation with national authorities**

- *The establishment of a framework for partnership with national authorities facilitates the implementation of the mandate.(2015)*

Local ownership is the basic fundamental principle of a successful civilian CSDP Mission in any country. During the Mission set up phase it is crucial to engage the authorities to whom strategic advice and capacity building is targeted. Therefore, the development of a Partnership framework with the relevant national authorities provides a clear understanding of what the Mission will provide and what is expected from the counterparts in the process of Mission mandate and activities implementation. This has been done successfully in several Missions and can be considered a best practice and the lesson is closed.

- *Human resources management should be improved within national security and defence forces to avoid a high turnover of staff and ensure appropriate effect and durability of training.(2015)*

High turnover of security and defence forces, inappropriate allocation of resources due to a lack of professional human resources management has a negative impact on the sustainability of the training provided by CSDP Missions. More generally, human resources management systems (recruitment, career, planning, training, deployment policy, etc.) need to be improved and supported to ensure, among other things, the appropriate effect and durability of training activities provided by Missions. This is a key enabler for successful and sustainable mandate implementation. Missions' support to Human Resources management is now considered an important part of Missions' operational activities and is now included in relevant OPLANs. This can therefore be considered a best practice, and the lesson is closed.

#### **2.1.4 Project cells**

- *The concept of Project Cells in the civilian CSDP Missions needs to be further strengthened. (2015 Key lesson)*

Project Cells in civilian CSDP Missions, aiming at financing specific projects in direct support of the mandate implementation, have proven to be of real added value, both for the Mission's credibility and for the host country's own capabilities. The Missions, through their daily contacts with local counterparts, are well placed to assess specific needs and identify potential gaps. As the demand for financing projects through the Project Cells, including from EU Member States and Third States, can be expected to grow, it is paramount to ensure that the Missions dispose of the proper capacity and expertise to handle such activities. In 2016, CPCC and Missions further reflected on ways to make the work of and processes related to Project Cells more structured and harmonised amongst Missions and subsequently more efficient.

- *A harmonised approach in the establishment and operationalising of Project Cells would increase consistency in CSDP Missions. (2015)*

When the project cells were established in Missions, it was noted that Missions actively had to gather relevant documentation and tools from other Missions, as well as that an overall SOP for Project Cells would be beneficial. In addition, the organisational “positioning” of the Project Cell varied from Mission to Mission, which can create different understandings about the role of the Cell and related chain of command to which the Project Cell is subject to. In view of developing this, CPCC organised a specific seminar on the issue of Project Cells in spring 2016 and the issue was also discussed during the annual Mission Support days as well as in an informal CivCom with Member States in June. Regarding the funding for Project Cells, FPI has circulated a guidance note, clarifying the process of project identification and implementation, as reported in the main text. SOPs for the operational side are expected to be developed in 2017.

- *The absence of a programmatic approach to design operational project documents for tasks and priorities assigned to the Mission hampers operational delivery and local counterparts' buy-in. (2015)*

The absence of a programmatic approach to design Missions' operations, segmented in specific activities, including for projects that are being run under the Project Cells, designed in consultation with the Mission's relevant counterparts, does not allow for a coherent implementation of the mandate and can create a lack of buy-in by counterparts. It further impedes Missions from measuring mid-to-long term impact. As a remedial action, a new result-oriented template for the Mission Implementation Plans (MIP) has been launched, providing for a more structured approach with regards to planning, conduct and measurement of results. In addition, in order to enhance political buy-in and local ownership, close consultations with Host State authorities when planning activities are now common practice in Missions. Hence, this lesson can be considered learnt and is closed.

#### **2.1.5 Reporting**

- *The good practice of flash reporting to the EU family and other stakeholders should be applied on time-sensitive developments.*

Flash reporting by Missions can have a high impact leading to timely, coordinated and informed response at the political and operational levels, both on the ground and in Brussels. Flash reporting is understood to include a mutual and timely exchange of information between the Mission and other EU

players as well as the Mission's involvement in relevant time-critical work processes, e.g. formulating public and private messages to stakeholders. Flash reporting to the EU family and other relevant stakeholders on time-sensitive developments has proven beneficial to the effective handling of a situation. It is assessed that flash reports are sent from Missions when needed and hence this lesson, originating from the good practice of EUMM in Georgia during 2015, can be considered best practice and the lesson is closed.

## 2.2 New lessons identified

- **A Gender focal point system in Missions improves gender mainstreaming in operational activities and supports efficient mandate implementation**

**Lesson observation:** In 2015, EULEX Kosovo started a process to operationalise its Gender Focal Point structure. With a focus on '*activity based gender mainstreaming*', the effort aimed to increase the outreach of gender advisers, and to include gender expertise directly in the Mission's respective units. Upon request from the Mission, the Swedish government agency FBA (the Folke Bernadotte Academy) supported the process of training sessions at three different occasions with the focal points working on concrete gender mainstreaming initiatives in between. Since the system became active, Gender Focal Points have supported and assisted the Mission with more than 20 gender mainstreaming activities. The results increased the gender perspective in the Mission's activities; internally e.g. with regards to data collection, and externally e.g. in strengthening the Kosovo rule of law institutions in handling cases of sexual and gender based violence. All in all this has improved EULEX's implementation of key EU policy commitments on gender mainstreaming and the women, peace and security agenda. Though there are Gender Focal Point systems in other Missions, the experience in Kosovo had a unique set-up

**Lesson analysis:** In order to be effective, gender mainstreaming needs to be context-specific and broken down into concrete steps so that it answers to the question of how it should be done practically. The challenge often is how to integrate concretely a gender perspective and to translate it into the day-to-day duties. A well-functioning Gender Focal Point structure is one way to address this. The experiences gained so far in EULEX Kosovo can be built upon in order to continue developing gender mainstreaming strategies both within the Mission and in a wider CSDP context. In EULEX Kosovo, the combination of external training in several sequences combined with the implementation of concrete initiatives proved to be successful. The action-oriented approach proved efficiently to support the transformation of gender mainstreaming policy into practice while providing concrete examples of what gender mainstreaming can look like in a Mission such as EULEX. Another success factor was the support from senior management, and the process further emphasised the importance of supporting Mission leadership to take a proactive role. One of the challenges has been the high turnover of staff. Hence, it is necessary also to set up internal training/modules to train new focal points (staff) to make the system sustainable.

- **Finding a good balance between strategic advice and other operational activities has a positive impact on a Mission's efficiency**

**Lesson observation:** EUAM Ukraine started with a broad mandate of giving strategic advice within the security sector. As such the Mission struggled with achieving local buy-in, with counterparts not very susceptible to receiving advice. In the process of the strategic review, the mandate was adapted to be more focused, and in addition to strategic advice the Mission now also provides training within the areas the advice is given. Furthermore, the Mission has a project cell with the possibility to provide

some equipment within the same areas. With these changes, the local buy-in for the Mission has increased significantly, as has the possibility to deliver on its core task, providing strategic advice.

***Lessons analysis:*** A Mission focusing exclusively on strategic advice sometimes experiences difficulties with local buy-in. This can be addressed by adding a more operational dimension, leading to short-term concrete and visible outputs, which in turn have a positive impact the strategic advisory role. It is also important to be prepared to be flexible and adapt to challenges.

### ***3. Mission Support***

#### **3.1 Implementation of previously identified lessons**

##### **3.1.1 Procurement**

- *Need to further accelerate procurement capacity at Mission start-up.(2014)*

Effective procurement in the start-up phase is crucial, as is the swift and correct identification of equipment needs, followed by the elaboration of a thorough and comprehensive procurement plan. This should be drafted by the Mission in close co-operation with CPCC, as CPCC is responsible for preparing the relevant Technical Specifications. At HQ level the issue is mainly handled by FPI, as it tackles the use of Framework Contracts (FWC - signed by the EC on behalf of the CSDP Missions) and the Warehouse. The new Warehouse concept (Warehouse 2.0), is addressing some of these issues (see update on Warehouse below), but it still remains a challenge to achieve timely effective procurement, the availability of sufficiently qualified staff is also a dimension of this issue.

##### **3.1.2 Logistics**

- *A conceptual rethinking of the CSDP Warehouse is needed.(2014)*

This exercise was done, and the new concept (CSDP Warehouse 2.0) was developed to deliver on the needs of civilian CSDP Missions also during the whole life cycle of the Missions, rather than the earlier Warehouse that could only be used in the set-up phase. In addition, the new warehouse will be able to absorb surpluses of assets across the Missions. It will also include a central Enterprise Resource Management System for assets management connected to all Missions and provide additional services such as procurement, refurbishment of assets and vehicles or their disposal. This is expected to be fully operational in 2017, under a new Warehouse contract.

##### **3.1.3 CIS**

- *CIS network complementarity is needed.(2014)*

CPCC is supporting the current initiatives led by EEAS Managing Directorate Resources (MDR) to setup a joint classified CIS network. In parallel, CPCC tried to ensure that the Missions can have access to SECEM through the registration of the Head of Missions in SYSPER. Meetings on this topic with EEAS MDR have been held, proposals on SECEM are being discussed; however, a final solution on joint classified CIS is still pending.

- *Software for reporting could usefully be obtained. (2014)*

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The CPCC-led IT feasibility study included options regarding centralisation and integration of a mandate implementation software based on the MIPs. In October 2014, the IT study was presented to Member States. The recently created Mission Support Platform is in the lead of the centralised information management system project. A project proposal shall be presented to Member States in the beginning of 2017.

- *Providing all key staff in civilian CSDP Missions with EEAS Outlook accounts would make communication faster and more effective. (2015)*

At the initiative of CPCC Ops, civilian CSDP HoMs were attributed EEAS Outlook accounts in 2015/2016, which led to tangible improvements in the interaction, communication, cooperation and the command and control between Mission and the EEAS. This has become a best practice and the lesson is closed.

### **3.1.4 Human resources**

- *Visiting experts concept (2013)*

An updated concept for Visiting Experts was discussed and approved in Council Working Groups in 2016, also allowing Visiting Experts from other EU Agencies or international and intergovernmental organisations to participate, aiming to increase synergies and to strengthen the Comprehensive Approach as well as the FSJ/CSDP cooperation. This lesson is considered implemented and closed.

- *Need to further pursue the standardisation of job descriptions. (2014)*

This lesson was identified as the number of Job Descriptions in civilian CSDP proliferated to almost 1,000, as did inconsistencies between them. During 2016 CPCC reviewed and revised the Job Descriptions, with a focus on standardising functional roles within Missions. This led to a reduction in the number of Job Descriptions and increased clarity of purpose for each and consistency within and between them for comparable functions across the Missions. The result of this work was the '*Force Generation Planning Guide for Member States Seconding Authorities*', finalised and distributed in September 2016. This *Planning Guide* details 61 general and specific functional profiles that will be required by the Missions, enabling seconding authorities to develop their own pool of persons who are ready to apply for positions in the civilian CSDP Missions. The purpose of this *Planning Guide for Member States Seconding Authorities* is, on a policy level, to enable early force sensing, to improve recruitment procedures and increase transparency, and, on a practical level, to assist Member States with forward planning in terms of providing personnel to the Missions. With the development of this planning guide, this lesson is considered implemented and is closed.

- *An EU concept for the rapid and temporary increase of civilian CSDP Missions should be developed. (2015)*

There are no agreed mechanisms for a significant rapid temporary increase of civilian CSDP Missions. However, it is possible to attempt this through CRT calls or using the Visiting Experts concept. In line with the Council conclusions on the implementation plan on Security and Defence from November 2016, and the December European Council conclusions, services are looking into possibilities to enhance rapid deployment and responsiveness in general, and results from this process can also be valid for specific cases.

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- *Limited autonomous capacity of a Mission may be compensated by exchange of staff with other CSDP Missions provided relevant procedures are in place. (2015)*

The exchange of staff between Missions has proven to be an effective tool and a CivOpsCdr instruction was issued in 2014 on this topic. CPCC has since then made sure that this procedure is integrated in the work of the Mission Support and Operations Divisions. Furthermore, creation of the Mission support platform presents substantial progress in this respect as the experts of the CPCC and FPI in the MSP cell are to be used as 'floaters', deployed for shorter periods to meet urgent needs of the Missions in the areas of logistics, CIS, HR and procurement. Even if staff levels at the MSP remain limited, this lesson can be considered implemented and is closed.

### 3.2 New lessons identified

- **A budget cycle that is aligned with the mandate would be beneficial for planning and conduct of Missions**

**Lesson observation:** Civilian Mission budgets typically run for a year at a time, which poses a challenge with regard to overall planning and conduct in Missions with a two year mandate. The EEAS and the Commission services should propose ways to the Council, to enable a budget cycle that is aligned with the mandate.

**Lessons analysis:** A one year budget can hamper the procurement of necessary equipment, especially if a tender fails. It is also an issue with regards to human resources, as contracts signed by the mission cannot exceed the duration of the budget. In addition, a budget cycle that is aligned with the mandate would allow project cell activities to be planned and implemented throughout the mandate, thus improving their effectiveness, and would facilitate several human resource issues (such as the requirement for contracted staff to take up all leave before the end of the mandate).

- **National constraints as well as conditions in the field may limit the number of candidates for CSDP Head of Mission (HoM) positions**

**Lesson observation:** The number of candidates nominated for Head of Mission positions is in general rather low. In some cases there have been no applicants at all. During 2016, four HoM positions were advertised, of which three had two applicants each and one had to be re-advertised (finally also receiving two applicants).

**Lessons analysis:** The reasons for the low number of nominated candidates for Head of Mission positions are likely to be numerous and can also differ from country to country. One issue is that persons with a HoM profile (a senior person able to lead and manage a large organisation in a complex political and operational context) are also in high national demand. Another factor may be that information does not reach potential candidates, in particular in line ministries (MoI/MoJ). As all civilian CSDP Mission are non-family Missions, this is a documented reason why suitable candidates decide not to apply. This topic merits further discussion with Member States.

- **Civilian Response Team (CRT) calls do not always provide the desired outcome with regards to number of staff and timely deployment.**

**Lesson observation:** During 2016, CPCC launched 6 calls for CRT deployments, the bulk of which in relation to the planning Mission for Libya. These were partially successful: the requests concerned 25



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staff of which 16 actually deployed. In some cases there were no candidates, or not enough staff could deploy. In a specific case, staff were selected but did not deploy due to security restrictions previously unknown to CPCC.

**Lessons analysis:** This requires further analysis in the context also of the follow-up to the November 2016 Council Conclusions on CSDP. This work will be taken forward in 2017 on the basis of an overall analysis of CRT calls in relation to effective deployment and the use of the pool of experts/national rosters.

- **A minimum Mission Support Staffing needed to start-up and deploy new Missions and Field Office should be defined**

**Lesson observation:** EUBAM Libya is a high-risk and high-profile Mission. Three Mission Support positions were planned and subsequently authorised by EU MS, to deploy before the re-launching of the Mission. However, the Mission has faced difficulties specifically in the areas of Logistics, CIS and Procurement. Challenges were also identified in other Missions where crucial Mission Support functions have not been filled, resulting in delays in several areas.

**Lesson analysis:** The recent experience with the preparation for re-deployment of the EUBAM Libya shows the importance of enabling functions. Without crucial Mission Support positions, sound financial management and/or duty of care cannot be ensured. The lack of minimum Mission Support staffing creates delays in deployment and/or problems once the Mission deploys. This can additionally cause security risks and hamper mandate implementation. By having a minimum figure set, this issue can more easily be properly planned for and deployment can be more rapid, while problems and security risks can be limited. It is then equally important actually to recruit this minimum staff and ensure deployment before launching the Mission.

- **A lack of specific software applications for operational activities in Missions hamper follow-up and analysis of activities**

**Lesson observation:** There are no full-fledged software systems in Missions to use for tracking of information or ensure effective execution of the Mission Implementation Plan and follow-up.

**Lessons analysis:** As refined systems are resource-intensive to develop (both with regards to cost and staff) as well as costly to buy (with off-the shelf products usually not ideal for purpose), most Missions do not have sufficient systems in place. This issue goes back to lack of resources in CIS/IT, and can only be solved through addressing the resource gap. The MSP, and related efforts in this area, aims at solving similar challenges in Mission support (e.g. on financing, Human Resources systems etc.), but will not include systems connected to operational activities.

## 4. Horizontal issues

### 4.1 Implementation of previously identified lessons

#### 4.1.1 Conduct and discipline

- *A common Code of Conduct and Discipline for all civilian CSDP Missions should be developed (2013)*

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In July 2016 a new common Code of Conduct and Discipline for all civilian CSDP Missions was endorsed by the FAC. At the moment it is being implemented across the Missions and a central system for follow-up is being developed in CPCC.

### 4.1.2 Methodology and Operational Capability

- *Cross-fertilisation and knowledge sharing between Missions should be improved (2013)*

Since this lesson was identified, several improvements have been made. Currently CPCC hosts annual thematic seminars with Heads of Missions, Deputy Heads of Mission, Heads of Operations, Rule of Law advisers, as well as with Gender and Human Rights advisers and Press and Public Information Officers. A Mission Support Information Days Seminar is organised on yearly basis to discuss MSD-related issues with key Mission Support staff from the Missions. The first ever legal adviser seminar was held in December 2016, and Capacity enhancement officers in Missions have the opportunity to meet in the margins of the yearly training conference organised by CMPD. Furthermore, the Crisis Management Platform (WIKI) has been extended to also include subject related to operational activities. Hence, this lesson is considered implemented and is closed.

- *The lack of essential SOPs hampers CSDP Missions mandate implementation.(2015)*

When EUAM Ukraine was launched, a set of fundamental SOPs was lacking. This raised the issue of making reference material from other Missions available at the early stages of new Missions, as well as the need to produce standardised key SOPs (or, at least, common templates), facilitated by CPCC. During 2016 the CPCC has reviewed the common MIP template, currently used and tested by Missions, and a common Code of Conduct has been developed and agreed by MS. Furthermore, CPCC Operations Division regularly organises seminars, where representatives from all Missions are invited to share experiences, incl. on Missions' internal processes. On that basis, additional SOPs will be developed during 2017.

- *The Rule of Law activities should be less conducted 'in isolation' from one Mission to another. (2015)*

Members of a Mission working on Rule of Law related issues (Rule of Law advisers, anti-corruption experts, judicial experts, police-prosecutor experts, etc.) were previously not considered to be sufficiently intertwined with colleagues in other Missions working on the same thematic area. The CPCC Rule of Law Component, created in 2015, is now working towards compiling best practices more systematically and linking up Mission colleagues with each other. In that respect, a Rule of Law seminar gathering Rule of Law/Justice Advisors from the Missions now takes place on a yearly basis, where issues of common interest are discussed and best practices shared. In addition, the CPCC Rule of Law Component is taking part in the overall CPCC drafting exercise of Operational Guidelines to provide guidance to the Missions on recurrent issues (e.g. ongoing development on legislative drafting and a planned guidance on police-prosecution cooperation). CPCC Rule of Law experts are also better integrated in the daily work of CPCC Operations Division. Further work in that regard is expected in 2017.

- *Thematic operational guidelines should enhance mandate delivery and consistency across the Missions.(2015)*

This lesson was identified as it was observed that various approaches were sometimes applied to the same topics in civilian CSDP, and as Missions expressed the need for better operational guidance on how to implement the "Lines of Operations" detailed in the planning documents. In order to facilitate

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and streamline the work of CPCC, a more coherent approach was identified as required, to guide on how to actually implement strategic concepts. To address this, CPCC has initiated the work of developing thematic Operational Guidelines. During 2016, guidelines on Border management, Legislative drafting, Maritime security and Public Order policing were drafted and are due to be distributed to CPCC internally and to civilian CSDP Missions shortly. Hence, while more guidelines are to be developed, this lesson can be considered implemented and is closed.

- *Transfer of knowledge between Missions in the field of project identification can lead to increased efficiency. (2015)*

This lesson originated in EUCAP Sahel Mali and Niger and concerns the fact that a transfer of knowledge from one existing structure (i.e. Project Cell) to another Mission for the creation of a similar structure in this Mission is valuable. By doing so, supporting documents used by one civilian CSDP Mission do not have to be reinvented, and experience sharing is transferred through in-person contacts between both Missions' staff members. Experiences were shared amongst Missions at the occasions of the CPCC-led seminars for Operations and Project cells in 2016. SOPs on the subject will be further developed in 2017.

- *The lack of monitoring and evaluation (M&E) framework for Missions impedes progress tracking. (2015)*

The need to equip all the Missions with a reliable and standardized framework that enhances the capacity to deliver result-based planning, implementation, reporting, and tracking of Mission operations has been observed in several Missions. The existence and use by Missions of a Mission Implementation Plan template is one first answer to this identified need. More structured/overall M&E tools could also be developed, incl. with regard to (long term) impact assessment.

### 4.1.3 Security

- *Civilian CSDP Mission evacuation planning is to take into account all possible scenarios. (2014)*

Drafting and updating an Emergency Evacuation and Relocation Plan (EERP) is mandatory and is included in the Mission Security Plan. Hence, this lesson can be considered implemented and is closed.

- *Limits of Private Security Company services need addressing. (2014)*

Due to recorded challenges with using Private Security Companies, the possibility of contributions by Member States to provide security as part of the planning process is now always considered through consultations in CIVCOM. In parallel, the identification and verification of the key points of the tender process when launching tenders for security provision is always carried out with caution. Hence, this lesson can be considered implemented and is closed.

- *Security support for CSDP Missions at central level should be further enhanced. (2015 Key lesson)*

CSDP Missions are facing increased security risks, in particular in High and Critical Risk environments (e.g. in the Sahel and in Afghanistan). Whereas the CPCC has responded to those challenges by strengthening the security offices in the Missions and by streamlining some support initiatives, further progress could be made. In addition, security policies and training activities pertaining to CSDP Missions and EU Delegations could be better aligned and coordinated, by reinforcing the cooperation between CPCC and EEAS security offices, including common standards whenever possible with

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respect to the mandates. On this topic, CPCC has contacted EEAS Field Security to develop a common roadmap that would outline the appropriate coordination and mutual support mechanisms. In some Missions adequate reinforcing security measures have been taken. Regarding doctrine/policy for Missions, there have been several updates. Close cooperation is in place at both theatre and Brussels levels (regular meetings, MoUs, and sharing of security information, provisions for mutual assistance in emergency situation and services). In addition, CPCC has revised the 'Field Security Handbook', which is planned to be launched to Missions in 2017. Further improvements are being elaborated.

### 4.1.4 Legal issues

- *Obtaining the letter of invitation on time is critical as is the privileges and immunities paragraph.(2014)*

CPCC is contributing to raise awareness of this issue in the early stages of the planning process, despite the outcome not being in CPCC's direct mandate. The lesson is closed.

- *More concerted action to help the conclusion of a SOMA is at times needed as is a timely analysis of the legal and political implications of the SOMA.(2014)*

As a principle, a SOMA should be finalised before the deployment of staff. In line with this, CPCC is contributing to raise awareness of this issue in the early stages of the planning process, despite the outcome not being in CPCC's direct mandate. The lesson is closed.

- *The legal status of a temporarily relocated Mission needs to be addressed in advance in order to avoid any legal vacuum.(2015)*

When a Mission is temporarily relocated (which in some cases can last for a prolonged period), the Mission itself does not have legal status in the country of residence, and it is legally questionable whether a relocated civilian CSDP Mission can continue operating from the 'temporary' host country without the agreement of the local authorities. As a SOMA as such cannot be used in the 'temporary' host country another legal solution should be defined, as there are many legal, financial, administrative and technical aspects that need to be tackled. So far there has been no general progress, but Mission members are included on the diplomatic list in the “temporary” host country.

- *The procedures to conclude Ad-Hoc Participation Agreements with Third States should be improved to allow for faster deployment of selected personnel.(2015)*

Experience has showed that the lengthy procedural processes pertaining to the Ad-hoc Participation Agreements with Third States can lead to a considerable delay in deployment of the selected experts in the respective Missions and therefore stretch the capacity of the concerned Departments/Sections in the Missions in their efforts to deliver their mandate. However, this issue is not within the remit of CPCC and is therefore closed.

- *An inter-Mission legal network should be created under the auspices of CPCC.(2015)*

Due to the increasing number of legal actions against the civilian CSDP Missions at the courts in the EU and due to their complexity, there is a need to have a better coordination and exchange of information on legal cases in order to ensure the coherence and consistency in CPCC's approach. Furthermore, some actions are not only against the Missions but also against the EU institutions. Apart from legal actions there are other legal issues to be discussed with the Missions. Hence it was decided to

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establish an inter-mission legal network. A first meeting of this network was held in December 2016 in Brussels, where amongst other things staff cases against the Missions, Data Protection issues, disciplinary procedures and overall legal strategy in CSDP were discussed, in close cooperation with the EEAS Legal Division and the FPI.

### 4.1.5 Comprehensive approach

- *Cooperation with the UN, OSCE and AU can yet be increased.(2014)*

Overall, the last few years the cooperation with UN has improved in several areas. EEAS expertise has been involved in the UN-led development of the Strategic Guidance Framework on International Police Peacekeeping (SGF), finalised in 2016. The objective has been to form a shared understanding of fundamental principles, tasks and approaches of police in peacekeeping and crisis management. Furthermore, in particular with regard to Mali, there has been close cooperation in the planning phase, to enhance cooperation and avoid duplication. When planning for a potentially enlarged Mission in Libya, EEAS does so in full compliance with universally agreed UN standards, to enable other IC actors to benefit from the work. For OSCE, EEAS supports their work with developing guidelines. In all specific operational guidelines that CPCC is developing, related to policing and civilian crisis management, this work is done in consultation with UN DPKO/Police Division and the OSCE.

- *Coordination in the field of justice should be improved within the EU family.(2015)*

Coordination of civilian CSDP activities, in the field of justice, with Community-funded programmes has at times been challenging. However, the recent development of a wide Rule of Law Commission's programme for Ukraine, show increased cooperation and coordination within the EU family. The programme is designed with the support from EUAM's staff and is planned to be implemented with staff from the Mission embedded in the programme, providing strategic advice. The Ukrainian example, if successful, could pave the way for a generalised practice for CSDP Missions to be more actively involved in Community-funded programmes.

- *Current financial, administrative and political arrangements hamper CSDP civ-mil synergies.(2015)*

An ad hoc emergency agreement was concluded between EUCAP Sahel Mali and EUTM Mali during the Ebola crisis to allow ESM staff to benefit from EUTM Mali Role 2 facilities. A permanent agreement on the use of the Role 2 is still being negotiated between the two Missions. Regarding security and protection, EUTM Mali has capacities but they are conceived to fit EUTM purposes only. Seeking synergies between EUCAP Sahel Mali and EUTM Mali in the fields of security, medical, logistics, procurement, etc., in addition to mandate-related synergies, would save costs and increase efficiency and provide better medical and security coverage for the civilian Mission. While it seems reasonable to build synergies between civilian and military CSDP Missions in the same theatre, existing financial, administrative and political arrangements maybe pose a certain number of challenges which cannot always be overcome, especially as military operations are financed in a different manner than civilian ones. Hence, this lesson falls out of the remit of CPCC and is closed.

- *Synergies with EU Member States and international organisations programmes would enhance mandate implementation and mitigate limited resources for smaller Missions.(2015)*

This lesson was identified in EUBAM Rafah, where it was shown that the creation of synergies with EU Member States and international organisations programmes (e.g. European Gendarmerie Force,

World Customs Organisation, FRONTEX, Member States Customs) are a key enabler for mandate implementation in Missions with limited resources. In addition, the revision of the Visiting Experts concept will enable increased cooperation with EU agencies and facilitate this type of support. Hence, this lesson can be considered implemented and is closed.

#### **4.1.6 Information and Communication Strategy**

- *The visibility of CSDP Missions in the field should be strengthened (2013)*

When this lesson was recorded in 2013, the visibility of CSDP missions was stronger in some theatres of operation than in others, leaving room for improvement, including at Headquarters. With time, the visibility in the field has increased. Eight out of ten Missions had their own Press and Public Information Office in 2016, and nine out of ten had a specific budget line for visibility, producing up to 10 media and/or communication products, and posting them on up to 15 platforms, in 12 languages. On the whole, the Missions are successful in their respective theatres, with high visibility and high impact on their key audiences locally: institutional partners, the host government, civil society, and the public. It is concluded thus that in this area of public communications, while details can always be improved, things generally work well. However, there is still a challenge with regards to the visibility of CSDP Missions collectively, in member states and within the institutions. In order to address this, CPCC has made a strong effort to increase its visibility. In 2016 CPCC made a concerted effort to post news stories from Headquarters and the Missions on the EEAS intranet, and on the CPCC page of the EEAS external website, which it did on a weekly basis. Furthermore, to address internal and institutional communication, CPCC Director sends a biweekly message – an update of Mission and Headquarters activities – to all Mission staff (circa. 2,500) as well as Member States (CivCom) and key EEAS and Commission personnel. This mechanism works as both a real-time-information and accountability tool. Furthermore, in 2016, CPCC collated for the first time an Annual Report showcasing the achievements and activities of all EU Missions and Operation, which will be published in 2017. Keenly cognisant of the role of strategic communications as set out in the Global Strategy and European Council Conclusions of 2016 and previously, CPCC will continue to identify platforms on which to promote the work of the Missions, both individually and collectively.

#### **4.1.7 Training (of staff)**

- *Pre-deployment training (PDT) for contracted personnel needs to be further addressed. (2014)*

The current draft of the new Training Policy sets the principle that PDT is mandatory for all international staff members, including contracted ones. The ESDC is conducting PDT on a regular basis, which can facilitate the attendance of future Mission members. Nevertheless, the issue of training costs, especially for contracted staff still needs to be resolved, including expenses related to accommodation, travel and daily allowances. In addition, in order to facilitate the organisation of PDT and Mission induction training, an agreement should be reached on one or two fixed deployment dates every month (e.g. 1<sup>st</sup> and 15<sup>th</sup> each month). Once the Training Policy is agreed, CPCC should take contact with FPI to facilitate the implementation of the above mentioned solution.

- *Specific in-mission training sessions could be opened to staff from other Missions to mitigate rotation losses. (2015)*

To increase the Mission capacity and capability, as well as to mitigate rotation losses, Missions when organising training on specific topics using external experts should also invite staff deployed in other

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Missions. Based on the positive experience from such trainings being organised in Missions previously, MSD has issued instructions to Missions regarding how to facilitate this. Hence this lesson is considered learnt and is closed.

- *Mission induction training has to be standardised and better linked to Pre-deployment training (PDT). (2015)*

Mission induction training curricula vary from one Mission to another. In order to ensure more coherence while respecting the specific needs of every Mission, CPCC is working on harmonising Mission induction training and setting minimum standards that should be followed by every Mission, including through the drafting of certain presentations of horizontal nature. This will also help mitigate the risk of duplication with the PDT that is now being conducted on a more systematic basis.

### 4.2 New lessons identified

- **Support from EU CSDP Missions with expertise and technical advice to other EU programmes enhances a comprehensive approach on the ground**

**Lesson observation:** EUCAP Sahel and EUTM in Mali are working in close cooperation with one another, supporting the EU Delegation with technical advice and expertise when identifying and developing EU financed projects and programs, carried out through various financial tools (IcSP, EUTF). EUCAP Sahel Niger is providing similar expertise, supporting EU programmes such as WAPIS and, more generally, the Trust Fund programmes related to the security sector. This type of cooperation in the field has allowed for a regular dialogue and exchange of views, enabling a more comprehensive work on security sector reform in general, and border management programmes in particular. At HQ level, it has reinforced consultation, planning and synergies between the EEAS and relevant Commission services. In the case of EUAM Ukraine, both FPI (through IcSP) and SGUA/EU Delegation have agreed, following a joint programming involving EEAS and the Mission, to launch a Commission project supporting community policing, public order and fight against corruption. Experts hired to the project will be co-located with the Mission. The project will work in tandem with the Mission and strong complementarity and mutual reinforcement will be ensured.

**Lesson analysis:** This type of activities creates several interesting synergies between Missions and EU programmes, both at country and HQ level. Addressing several institutions through different programmes confronted to similar issues can foster synergies and a common professional culture, as well as support a required interoperability to address common challenge and reinforce a message of “one EU”. Currently specific administrative arrangements are being drafted in the respective Mission areas, formalising this type of technical support. The cooperation undertaken in Mali, Niger and Ukraine can also be relevant to other countries and regions.

- **Using an exchange of letters referring to the ToR in a SOFA instead of a proper SOMA in conformity with the existing template, is not recommendable**

**Lesson observation:** In the case of EUCAP Sahel Mali an exchange of letters based on the existing EUTM Mali SOFA was used in place of a proper SOMA. This was done in order to save time in the setup process.

**Lessons analysis:** When planning a Mission and writing the CMC and the CONOPS, provisions need to be made to put a SOMA in place. There is a template that easily can be adapted. Using an exchange of letters may be quicker in the short term, but the ToR in a SOFA is not legally fit for purpose, and

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does not match with the operational reality of civilian Missions. This practice can cause serious problems, amongst others due to the fact that local security forces do not recognise its value when confronted with it. E.g. in the case of Mali, it has caused problems related to obtaining visas and passing check points.

- **Common CSDP Mission minimum standards for medical assessments should be developed**

***Lesson observation:*** At the moment civilian CSDP Missions have no common minimum standards for medical assessments. This is an issue connected to duty of care, and with regards to contracted staff the responsibility lies with CPCC.

***Lessons analysis:*** The EEAS medical service has a minimum standard for staff going to delegations, which is currently under revision. The EEAS are planning to finalise the new version in the first half of 2017. This standard could then serve as a basis to develop a CSDP minimum standard and apply for contracted staff.



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**ENCLOSURE 3**  
**to EEAS (2017) 252**  
**dated 21.02.2017**

**EUMS CONTRIBUTION**

**References**

- A. EEAS 02422/6/14 REV6 - EU Military Lessons at the Political Strategic Level Concept, dated 8 July 15.
- B. EUMS 8562/11 - EU Military Lessons Learned (LL) Concept dated 1 July 2011.
- C. EEAS 02065/13 - Suggestion on a way forward on the implementation of lessons learned, including in field operations dated 07 October 2013.

**INTRODUCTION**

- 1. This report presents the EU Military Lessons that have been observed or/and closed during 2016. Lessons have been collected from within the EUMS, from Operation, Mission and Force Headquarters, and from other institutions and Third States engaged with the EUMS during operations and exercises.
- 2. In accordance with Reference A, Lessons presented in this paper are only those at the political-strategic level that have CSDP implications. Lessons at other levels are held as appropriate to allow further analysis and implementation but are not presented here.
- 3. New lessons observed have been validated by Deputy Director General EUMS on behalf of Director General EUMS. For Lessons with serial number above 1464, their closure has been proposed to the EUMC according to new concept (Ref. A). Closed Lessons with serial number below 1464 have been approved at EUMS Director and Deputy Director General level, according to the former concept (Ref. B).

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4. In accordance with Ref C, the Annual CSDP Lessons Report requires contributions describing relevant Lessons during the reporting period. In addition to the mandate placed on the EUMS at Ref A. to provide a report of military Lessons and best practices annually to the EUMC, this report also forms the required contribution for the 2016 CSDP Lessons Annual Report.
5. The CSDP Lessons Annual Report lists, for the attention of the Political Security Committee and as a core element of the report, up to five key recommendations. To inform these recommendations, this EUMS Annual Lessons and Best Practices Report 2016 provides key military recommendations to be taken into account during the drafting of the CSDP Lessons Annual Report. These key military recommendations derive from cornerstone lessons or from repetitive lessons provided by operations/missions or drawn from CSDP Crisis Management Exercises.
6. In order to provide a document that is clear, concise and unclassified, simple Lesson descriptions have been thematically grouped under the three essential tasks mandated to the EUMS: Early Warning and Advance Planning; Situation Assessment; Strategic Planning. These themes are supplemented where Lessons are significant but do not fall within the EUMS mandated tasks.
7. For ease of future reference, each validated Lesson is preceded by its reference number.

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### SUMMARY

1. Lessons received in 2016 show areas of potential improvement over those raised last year.
2. This is particularly true when it comes to considering the Capacity Building in Support of Security and Development (CBSD) initiative, especially where the EU is engaged in EUTM-like capacity building missions. Capacity Building remains a challenge for military non-executive Missions, though this issue remains crucial in ensuring the sustainability of EUTM's efforts towards the Host Nation Armed Forces. Without a proper 'Equip' pillar, the EU credibility is at stake: efficient training and advice are difficult to achieve in the mid and long term without a solid and coordinated equipment component and hence its need for funding.
3. Secondly, key recommendations from previous years are still pertinent. This is particularly the case for the previously highlighted insufficient classified communication capability in the field, within Brussels, between Brussels and the Operation/Mission (CSDP 2014.4 key recommendation), and also the need for a common EU civilian-military intelligence analysis tool (CSDP 2015.4 key recommendation). As a member of the CSDP Lessons Working Group, the EUMS is reemphasizing the need for comprehensive action on these issues. Although the EUMS doesn't own the "*maîtrise d'ouvrage*" of the overarching and delayed EC3IS project, EUMS Directorates are striving to have these requirements fully taken in account. This requires continuous efforts.
4. A compendium of Lessons and Best Practices regarding non-executive Missions has been passed to the ad-hoc working group, led by Spain, which is drafting a handbook providing EU Guidance for a Generic EUTM/EUMAM.
5. Finally, the EUMS created in November 2016 an AGORA (web-based) repository (read-only) of unclassified CSDP Military Lessons and Best Practices, accessible on request (EUMS Unclassified Lessons Portal (EULP)-ARES(2016)6171846), with a view to socialise the Lessons environment. It will complement but not duplicate the on-going EEAS IT project of a workable internet-based lessons database for CSDP structures.

**KEY MILITARY RECOMMENDATIONS**

1. **Non-executive military missions.** Non-executive military missions are suffering from the absence of a superior military authority with deep experience and operational planning and conduct capabilities. During the establishment of several EU CSDP non-executive Missions, weaknesses have been ameliorated using in-house EUMS experience. Here EUMS has been acting as an OHQ key nucleus, but with limited capacity (time and personnel) and no formally agreed authority. The need for support has been particularly evident in specialist domains such as Plans, Logistics, Communications, Intelligence, Legal and Medical. Moreover, many of these OHQ-like tasks passed to EUMS have been conducted with reliance on previous experience of EUMS Action Officers. Notwithstanding the evolution of the EEAS structures, and especially the EUMS, by dedicating personnel to direct mission support therefore alleviating these shortcomings, it should be borne in mind that such specialization requires a deepened job analysis. Furthermore, such EUMS adaptation to the task will also encompass physical building and offices reorganisation.
  
2. **Manning of Operations and Missions.** Job descriptions of the Provisional Statement Of Requirements (PSOR), in areas such as competencies and language, are not always followed scrupulously by Troops Contributing Countries (TCC). This has led to the absence of qualified personnel at key postings in several missions and operations, and this has proved to be a major capability gap. On the one hand, remedial actions require precise job descriptions from the OPS/MSN (background experience, language skills, technical skills), and on the other hand TCCs to abide by these job descriptions. More attention should be paid by MS when screening and sending personnel as the credibility and the overall performance of CSDP OPS/MSN are at stake. Moreover, not all personnel receive comprehensive and tailored pre-deployment training before arrival in the OHQ/MHQ.
  
3. **Information Strategy.** The development of an Information Strategy is a key element of the CSDP planning process and needs to be initiated at the outset of any crisis. A formal Information Strategy Team in the EEAS, led by STRATCOM Division and with the participation of EUMS Subject Matter Experts and other EEAS actors in information environment, should be established from the beginning of the planning process in order to

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draft it. This team should start working in order to contribute timely to the Crisis Management Concept, as foreseen in the Crisis Management Procedures. The constitution of this team will allow improving the coordination between all EU actors in the information environment. Therefore, military inputs will be incorporated to the document in the early phases of the process and the EUMC will be able to provide direction and guidance to OHQ from the outset of planning process in the information environment. The initial messages will be then consistent and coherent.

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### NEW MILITARY LESSONS OBSERVED AND BEST PRACTICES, 2016

#### Early Warning and Prudent / Advance Planning

- M001624. As Cyberspace has become a new domain in warfare, Cyber Defence (CD) measures and means have to be considered as part of an overall strategy.
- M001623. Absence of adequate support to military CSDP non-executive Missions from a higher military authority.

#### Situation Assessment

- M001625. EUMS Intelligence Directorate procedures and capacities.

#### Strategic Planning

- M001646. Advanced Planning Team access to KO building.
- M001645. Ideal period to conduct planning exercises.
- M001644. Information Strategy in the planning process.
- M001638. Coordination for deployment.
- M001633. CIS contract for the Mission.
- M001634. CIS preparation for the Mission.
- M001627. Early deployment of Third State LNO.
- M001626. EU security clearance for non-member TCN nations.
- M001620. Incorporation of Cyber Defence considerations into the planning for CSDP Ops/Msn.

#### Operations / Missions

- M001643. No capacity building to help the country where the MHQ is deployed.
- M001642. No budget available for morale and welfare for the sake of HQ cohesion.
- M001641. Constraint for HOTO.

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- M001640. A 2 weeks reconnaissance for J8 must be planned for an initial mission.
- M001639. The early deployment of J8 must be a general rule.
- M001637. To prepare and to finalise the contracts was much more difficult than expected.
- M001636. To prepare and to obtain the budget was much more difficult than expected.
- M001635. Request for financial eligibility.
- M001632. IT liaison with EUMS.
- M001629. CSDP Contributing Third States' involvement in the EU Lessons Process.
- M001628. Force protection MHQ Bamako.
- M001622. The creation of a dedicated EUTM budget for quick impact projects would save time and energy, whilst also realising a targeted effect where and when it is required.
- M001621. Management of the Military Camp / Running a military facility with Operation employed personnel.



**MILITARY LESSONS CLOSED DURING 2016**

**Early Warning and Prudent / Advance Planning**

M001483. Cross-references in mil and civ planning documents and terminology / abbreviations used.

**Situation Assessment**

M001464. With no Intel capabilities provided, the deficiency of autonomous Intel assets dramatically affected the situational awareness and risk assessment, resulting in EUFOR RCA's dependence on other friendly Forces.

**Strategic Planning**

M001505. Force Protection requirements.

M001500. Transit Cell reinforcement.

M001499. Overlapping period with EUFOR.

M001496. Usefulness of a project cell.

M001494. Place for planning the Mission.

M001493. Dedicated core staff for the planning phase.

M001492. Coordination of MS comments to OPLAN.

M001486. Lack of procedures determined some delays with providing secure communications equipment.

M001485. CPCC-prepared civilian statement of requirements (SOR) for military planners.

M001484. Shared civilian-military mission analysis.

M001482. Adaptation of the Athena mechanism to the Fast Track procedure.

M001472. One set of ROEs should be used in EUFOR and should encompass all operational.

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- M001459. Procedures for Hand Over / Take Over between EUMS and EU OHQ.
- M001457. CMC production and revision.
- M001455. Use of military strategic planning tools agreed between EUMS and OHQ.
- M001425. During the planning phase for CAR Operation there was no Security Policy expertise available in the CPT.
- M001421. The transmission of EUCI to third states is complex.
- M001419. Procedures for OHQ activation and handover of planning responsibility.
- M001398. Appointment of double hatted personnel in MILEX.

### **Operations / Missions**

- M001502. Real Life Supply autonomy.
- M001501. Human Resources database significance for SSR.
- M001498. Security clearances for non-EU participating Countries.
- M001495. Knowing the EU mechanisms for liaison and financial aspects.
- M001490. Some augmentees were not prepared for their position.
- M001473. Ex-Gratia payments inclusion into common funded costs decided by OpCdr.
- M001471. There is no money for compensation payments in case of accidental destruction of civilian property during operations.
- M001415. Need for coordination on provision of equipment to MALI.
- M001412. Lack of Brussels know-how and planning capacity.
- M001023. Sensitive information used throughout all phases of Libya crisis circulated on unclassified IT systems.
- M000943. The outsourcing of two different contracts for both Role 2 support and facilities created its own difficulties.
- M000666. Standardisation of definitions of medical facilities.
- M000665. Requirement for EUNAVFOR forces to carry blood.

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- M000632. Essential mutual understanding of the constraints and restraints of various IO stakeholders.
- M000563. Individual Medical Records.
- M000562. Limited Field Laboratory capability in theatre.
-