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COVER NOTE

From:	European External Action Service (EEAS)
To:	Political and Security Committee (PSC)
Subject:	Annual 2013 CSDP Lessons Report

Delegations will find attached EEAS document 00407/14.

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Encl.: EEAS document 00407/14

EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE

Deputy Secretary General

Brussels, 12 March 2014

EEAS 00407/14

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From:	Deputy Secretary General
To:	Political and Security Committee
Subject:	Annual 2013 CSDP Lessons Report

Delegations will find attached the Annual 2013 CSDP Lessons Report for discussion and endorsement.

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<u>**ANNUAL 2013 CSDP LESSONS REPORT**</u>

<u>**Executive summary**</u>

This report identifies five key lessons for CSDP from 2013:

1. A Comprehensive Approach improves efficiency and sustainability of mission results.
2. A common foundation of pre-deployment training for all CSPD mission staff can greatly enhance mission effectiveness and coherence.
3. Ownership and support by the host country is necessary if the mission is to be truly successful and sustainable.
4. The use of "preparatory measures" proved to be a useful tool.
5. Lessons should be taken into account systematically when preparing new missions.

Furthermore, it highlights the need for experts to be seconded to missions for longer periods of time. Finally, it makes recommendations related to the lessons identified, whose implementation should be monitored and included in the next annual report.

<u>**Background**</u>

Based on its "Suggestion on a way forward on the implementation of lessons learned, including in field operations" ("Way Forward Note")[1], the EEAS established a Lessons Management Group (LMG) under the chairmanship of Deputy Secretary General Popowski. The LMG is composed of CMPD, EUMS, CPCC, INTCEN, Security Policy and Conflict Prevention, MD CR&OC, CivCom, EUMC and PMG chairs, relevant geographic and thematic departments, as well as the Commission's DG DEVCO, ECHO and FPI. The LMG is assisted by a Lessons Working Group at expert level.

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[1] EEAS 02065/13 dated 7 October 2013, endorsed by PSC on 5 November 2013

The Way Forward Note requires the LMG to identify up to five key lessons every year and to report to the PSC. This report replaces the annual civilian-military lesson report[2] and is now submitted to the PSC for the first time. The LMG identified the following key lessons for 2013 based on observations recorded in the lessons databases, reports from CSDP missions and operations, contributions from LMG members and contributions from EU Delegations in Afghanistan, BiH, Djibouti, DRC, Georgia, Kosovo[3], Mali, Niger, Somalia, South Sudan and in West Bank and Gaza. In the light of the lessons identified, the LMG also made the following recommendations.

Key Lessons

1.

A **Comprehensive Approach** improves efficiency and sustainability of mission results. Such an approach involves a shared prior analysis and the coordinated use of all EU tools in line with the commitments of the Joint Communication "The EU's comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises".[4]

In the **planning** phase, the full range of options for EU action should be considered including both CSDP and other tools. Since mission planning in 2013 was conducted under the "fast track" procedure, no lesson could be observed in regard to the Political Framework to Crisis Approach (PFCA) introduced by the June 2013 Crisis Management Procedures.[5] As for the Crisis Management Concept (CMC), the inclusive approach adopted between the EEAS crisis management structures and the Commission proved beneficial.[6]

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[2] The last such report is document EEAS 00919/13 dated 24 April 2013

[3] This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.

[4] (JOIN(2013) 30 final)of 11 December 2013

[5] 7660/13 rev. 2 of 18 June 2013

[6] See also EEAS/Commission Guidance note on the use of Conflict Analysis in support of EU external action 2013, 29 October 2013, ARES (2013)3368902.

The deployment of experts to EU Delegations in countries at risk of conflict – such as the DRC, Kenya, Lebanon and Mali – proved useful to help identify possible options based on first-hand analysis. Delegations are well placed to map out the various EU actions, ensuring consistency and identifying synergies. There may also be complementarity between CSDP missions and other CFSP activities, such as conventional arms control and disarmament.

On the other hand, recent experience showed the need for better coordination of the numerous fact-finding/technical assessment missions (FFM/TAM) during mission planning. Uncoordinated visits place an unacceptable strain on the receiving host nation, causing confusion and some ambiguity of intent. Central coordination of such visits would show the EU in a better light, save money and favour more comprehensive planning.

In the same vein, greater investment is required in the coordination of efforts to compile, analyse and disseminate EU intelligence and information products in Brussels and in the field. This would increase our capacity to provide early warning and to plan more effectively. Greater sharing of intelligence between Member States and EEAS would also vastly improve the EU's ability to anticipate and respond to crises more rapidly and appropriately.

In the **implementation** phase, CSDP missions and EU Delegations have separate chains of command and their activities at times overlap, for instance in the fields of Rule of Law and Security Sector Reform. Informal coordination through regular meetings or formal liaison mechanisms between CSDP missions and Delegations have helped to mitigate the adverse effects of such overlap and to promote complementarity. The assignment of a liaison officer from the OPCEN for the Horn of Africa to the Commission's DG DEVCO was also useful in this regard. In some cases, the delivery of training by CSDP missions was affected by the lack of equipment relevant to the training objectives, and available to the trained forces. Discussions started in late 2013 on the possible provision of equipment to host-country security forces, also through the possible mobilisation of Commission-managed instruments, in full respect of the relevant regulations and eligibility criteria.

Furthermore, information relevant to CSDP missions was not always shared systematically among all relevant EU stakeholders. This hindered the effective coordination of all available EU tools.

Sustainability of mission results is best achieved through ownership and support by the host country (see lesson 3). Sustainability of mission results also requires the definition of clear strategic objectives upon entry and clear exit/transition strategies. Past experience and discussions on the transition and closure of missions underline the need for early and structured reflections on exit/transition strategies based on shared conflict analysis and encompassing relevant EU actors and Member States both at HQ and at field level.

2.

A common foundation of **pre-deployment training** for all CSPD mission staff can greatly enhance mission effectiveness and coherence.

Despite recent improvements, much remains to be done to ensure sufficient numbers of qualified personnel for CSDP missions. In particular, staff members have different levels of knowledge and awareness about the EU and its standards, including on human rights, ethics and gender issues. They may be very competent in their own profession but not be aware of the mentoring and advising techniques that are necessary for the training and capacity-building of mission beneficiaries. Furthermore, they often have different approaches to such training and capacity-building based on their respective national traditions. This is especially true in areas such as Rule of Law and police training. Such diversity of national approaches is a strength of the EU but may be confusing for beneficiaries in the absence of appropriate information and coordination.

Common EU pre-deployment training for CSDP staff could help address these issues. It could ensure all staff members have basic information about the EU and core EU standards, and that they are aware of different approaches among EU Member States and how to combine them

effectively. Internet Distance Learning offers some practical options in this regard. A common pre-deployment training module on human rights has already been developed and further modules on gender and on children and armed conflict are now in the pilot stage. The three modules will be rolled out to Member States in 2014 after endorsement by the PSC.

3.

Ownership and support by the host country is necessary if the mission is to be truly successful and sustainable.

Mission planning needs to be informed by local realities and support local solutions. As recognised internationally, discussion with local stakeholders and support by the authorities and by the population of the host country are necessary preconditions for the successful implementation of the mission. This includes the possible agreement of progress indicators with the host country. The Somalia Compact adopted in Brussels in September 2013 is an example of good practice.

In particular, local ownership allows early conclusion of a Status Of Mission Agreement (SOMA). This requires specific work during the planning process with early involvement of EU Delegations and geographic departments. Pending conclusion of a SOMA, the unilateral granting of privileges and immunities by the host country is a key enabler. Additionally, local ownership remains essential for successful exit/transition strategies and the sustainability of results for CSDP missions, as ideally it is host country authorities who should follow up und build on such results.

4.

The use of **"preparatory measures"** proved to be a useful tool.

The use of preparatory measures for the TAM of EUBAM Libya proved to be of value. Given the security and logistics situation, the costs of the TAM were extremely high and could not have been covered through the EEAS administrative budget. The preparatory measures were therefore crucial to ensure flexibility in the planning phase of the mission.

A further added value of preparatory measures in this case was the ability to deploy mission personnel for administration and security in theatre and to procure equipment during the planning phase. This helped create the conditions enabling the mission's set-up and functioning. Based on this experience, some improvements were identified and acted upon by the Commission's FPI (e.g. extension of the duration of preparatory measures up to 4 months, effective 1 January 2014). In addition, the CSDP Warehouse, operational since June 2013, was used for the first time in the case of EUBAM Libya and served to ensure the mission's logistical needs in the crucial start-up phase. Furthermore, a feasibility study was launched on setting up a possible Shared Services Centre. Procurement was another priority area; alongside the effect of increased procurement thresholds in the Financial Regulation, the introduction by the Commission/FPI of the crisis notion for procurement produced significant impact as it served to increase the flexibility and speed of the tendering procedures.

Despite progress achieved, areas for further improvement were identified inter alia by the Roadmap on improving civilian CSDP management.[7] In addition, work will pursue to ensure that the procedures and rules for civilian missions enable the Union to be more flexible and speed up the deployment of EU civilian missions in line with the December 2013 European Council Conclusions.[8]

5.

Lessons should be taken into account systematically when planning new missions. Lessons from previous missions and operations may be relevant to new missions and operations. For instance, some lessons from EUBAM Ukraine and Moldova (although not CSDP) and EUBAM Rafah may be relevant to EUBAM Libya. Lessons from other actors including international organisations may also be relevant. At the moment, knowledge of accumulated civilian CSDP experience is fragmented and there is no formal civilian system for the regular integration of lessons into planning.

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[7] PSC MD 88/13 of 16 July 2013
[8] EUCO 217/13 of 20 December 2013

Other lessons

Other lessons are listed in the annexes. In particular, one issue that was consistently highlighted by EU Delegations as well as by CPCC is the **short duration of secondment of experts** to CSDP missions. High staff turnover is detrimental to the achievement of mission results. Members States should consider ways to second fewer experts but for longer periods of time.

<u>Key Recommendations</u>

1.1. The EEAS should ensure that shared analysis informs the planning process.

1.2. The EEAS should ensure that planning documents provide an indication of tools needed, including equipment, and of the possible sources of funding.

1.3. From an early stage, the EEAS should start outlining an exit/transition strategy based on shared conflict analysis and also involving Commission, Member States, host countries and other actors as appropriate.

1.4. The EEAS should post experts on a temporary basis to EU Delegations in countries at risk of conflict to help Delegations suggest possible response options based on the situation on the ground. To help identify such countries, EEAS should use its new Early Warning System and INTCEN analysis.

1.5. The EEAS should coordinate centrally all fact-finding / technical assessment missions (FFM / TAM).

1.6. EU Delegations should help map out the various EU actions in their host countries as well as relevant non-EU actions, with a view to ensuring consistency and identifying synergies already at the planning stage. They should also help fine-tune missions and programmes during the implementation phase to better reflect the situation on the ground.

1.7. The EEAS should ensure that missions' and operations' reports are circulated to the relevant EU Delegations, to other missions and operations in the same region (e.g. Sahel, Horn of Africa) and to other missions and operations that have similar tasks (e.g. Border Management, Police Training) as well as to the relevant EU services at HQ. EU Delegations should systematically circulate their reports, including EU Heads of Missions' reports, to the relevant missions and operations.

1.8. EEAS HQ should consult EU Delegations at an early stage on Strategic Reviews of missions and operations, also seeking complementarities with programmes managed by Commission and Member States.

1.9. The EEAS should consider better ways to compile, analyse, coordinate and disseminate intelligence and information products in Brussels and in the field.

1.10.　The EEAS and Member States should seek ways to improve the sharing of intelligence to allow the EU to anticipate and respond to crises more rapidly and appropriately.

2.1. Member States and the EEAS should ensure that all contracted and seconded CSDP mission staff receive a common foundation of pre-deployment training including inter alia human rights and gender issues. Furthermore, they should explore ways to improve pre-deployment training for all CSDP mission staff in a systematic manner.

2.2 The EEAS should ensure that the Internet Distance Learning pre-deployment training which is currently being developed addresses the issues of human rights, personal ethics, sexual harassment and gender, as well as the issue of EU standards, including the areas of Rule of Law and policing where relevant.

3.1 The EEAS should ensure that CSDP missions as part of an EU Comprehensive Approach respond to local needs. EEAS should devise targeted messages to strengthen local ownership at an early stage.

3.2 The EEAS should invite key political figures of host countries to Brussels for face-to-face encounters with the PSC to raise the profile of CSDP missions and to underline the importance of political accountability.

3.3 In order to ensure privileges and immunities for a mission, the EEAS should start work on a SOMA as early as possible after the adoption of the CMC with the aim of concluding it before the deployment of the mission.

3.4 The EEAS through CSDP missions and EU Delegations should survey the opinion of the local population about CSDP missions and monitor support by the host country authorities.

4.1 The EEAS should ensure that the use of preparatory measures for planning activities remains an option before the approval of the first Council Decision, in particular in case of complex scenarios or when security or other costs are high.

4.2 The EEAS and the Commission/FPI should pursue the work undertaken at expert level, including in the context of the Roadmap on improving civilian CSDP management and as a follow up to the European Council on Defence, to ensure that the procedures and rules for civilian missions enable more flexibility and rapid deployment.

5.1 The EEAS should take steps to ensure that civilian lessons, including those from missions, are learnt systematically. This will permit lessons to drive changes in standard practices, allowing all personnel to learn the relevant lessons.

Way forward

If the PSC agrees, the LMG will follow up on the recommendations and report on their implementation in the next annual CSDP lessons report. Furthermore, it will publish a summary of the lessons annual report in the EEAS website and exchange relevant lessons with the United Nations Department of Peace Keeping Operations and other relevant partners as appropriate.

Annexes:

A.   CMPD contribution
B.   CPCC contribution
C.   EUMS contribution

CMPD Contribution

Lessons from planning new CSDP missions in 2013

Recommendation 1: Ensure support by the host country

Recommendation 2: Utilise the EU's Comprehensive Approach

Recommendation 3: Integrate lessons into planning

Lesson 1: Support by the Host Country is necessary if the mission is to be truly successful and sustainable.

Support by the authorities and by the population of the Host Country greatly facilitates the implementation of the mission and the achievement of mission results. Once the mission is over, its results will be sustainable only if local buy-in (co-ownership) has been ensured.

Recommendation: Engage Host Country authorities to discuss the CSDP mission during early planning (core business planning). EU support to a country should be presented as a package of all available tools, including CSDP missions. Establish contacts with government, with leadership of the local security institutions at different levels, and, as appropriate, with civil society. Be ready to work with a transitional government despite the complications. Explain the EU's message and stance with regard to stabilising the situation.

Ask the Host Country to define their security needs in a public document as in our own countries, i.e. in a national security strategy that could inform a credible security sector reform plan. Aim to be as transparent as possible in relation to the Host Country to avoid misunderstandings and strengthen the EU's position to influence, save for domains that require confidentiality. Survey the opinion of the local population, or specific groups of the population, about and how the mission is perceived, as a reality test of the effect achieved by the mission in the eyes of society at large. Monitor support by the host country authorities.

Lesson 2: Mission planning is more effective within a comprehensive approach.

A comprehensive approach that includes all relevant EU tools is more effective. In the countries where missions and operations take place, EU Delegations are a key resource and often have a better view of tools available from different EU sources (including EU development funding) and a better overall knowledge of the target country. They could be reinforced with staff having specific CSDP-related expertise.

At Headquarters, there is a lack of clarity on who does what within the services (an issue of mandate/ responsibility). There is also a lack of situational awareness about what has been agreed and is now considered policy. Mission planners sometimes lack knowledge of programming cycles of financial assistance managed by the Commission, which hinders a complementary use of CSDP missions and of such assistance. And desks dealing with other instruments including policy also lack proper understanding of the specificities characteristics and limitations of CSDP operations including the decision making process and methodology.

The Joint Communication on the EU's Comprehensive Approach stresses in particular the need to work collaboratively in the area of security and development. Consideration should be given to utilising the Political Framework for Crisis Approach (PFCA) and associating DEVCO to planning at the CMC stage as well as consultations on EDF planning when dealing with security matters. Further developments are expected in 2014.

Recommendation: Provided EU Delegations have the minimum resources needed to do so, let them support and inform the planning and facilitate contacts with Host Country authorities If possible, reinforce the Delegation with qualified staff on the example of the Delegations in DRC, Kenya, Lebanon and Mali.to inform and facilitate the planning of new missions by HQ. Consider ways to work with Member State embassies to alleviate the burden on EU Delegations. CSDP and development assistance managed by the Commission should be lined up, as current planning documents already try to achieve. Planning documents should address from the outset the issue of sustainability of mission results and the availability of complementary sources of funding. This implies working on follow-on EU actions already at the beginning of the planning process (see exit strategy paper).

To facilitate coordination of all those involved and complementarity between programmes managed by the Commission on the one hand and CSDP missions on the other, EEAS and Commission should communicate developments/ methodologies and policy effectively and tie this in with relevant training programmes. Furthermore, EEAS and Commission should set out concrete mechanisms to implement the comprehensive approach.

Lesson 3: Previous lessons should be taken into account systematically when preparing new missions and operations.

Lessons from previous missions and operations may be relevant to new missions and operations. For instance, some lessons from EUBAM Ukraine and Moldova (managed by the Commission) and EUBAM Rafah may be relevant to EUBAM Libya. Lessons from other actors including international organisations may also be relevant. However, not all lessons are necessarily relevant because of the different political and operational context of each mission and operation. Lessons should be systematically reviewed and taken into account as appropriate when planning new missions.

Recommendation: When the Crisis Management Procedures are next considered for revision, set out that previous lessons should be taken into account in the planning phase of new missions and operations. Such lessons should be drawn from previous similar EU missions and operations as well as from the experience of other actors including international organisations. They should be carefully assessed for relevance taking into account the different political and operational context of each mission and operation.

CPCC contribution to Lessons and Best practices 2013

1. Planning new missions

a) Policy considerations and comprehensive approach

- <u>EU political actors'</u> (Geo desk, EUSR, EUDEL) support is critical for preparing politically the ground for a possible CSDP activity, thus exploring local political buy-in even before the FFM and promoting the CSDP action as part of the EU policy towards the country/region throughout the planning process and beyond.

- During the planning process the <u>knowledge of the political and administrative context</u> and the operational dynamics of the local and the international actors, as well as an early identification of relevant actors and focal points is essential. Role of the EUDEL in providing this knowledge as well early identification of areas of cooperation and complementarity is crucial (also through contacts with DG DEVCO or DEVCO programme managers in theatre).

- Analysis, needs assessment and the <u>identification of priority areas</u> within different regional settings in the area of operations at an early stage are necessary to prepare the mission. Importantly, the services need time for such analysis to be solid. A PFCA for Libya is missing which we believe is wrong.

- <u>Adequate EUDEL support</u> at the appropriate level and with the necessary political and cultural insight is an absolute must for the success of the TAM and later the inception phase of a CSDP mission: temporary reinforcement of EUDELs that are not fit for purpose and specific training of EUDEL staff in CSDP-related matters should be considered.

- Consistent and appropriate contact at the political level in mission planning and start-up is required. A more critical and substantiated approach to host nation expressions of readiness and capability to receive and absorb the intended support could be prudent, thereby also ensuring a higher degree of coherence between findings of FFM/TAMs, CMC/CONOPS assumptions and the evolving situation on the ground once a mission is deployed. From the completion of a FFM/TAM to the actual deployment of a mission, a monitoring or "keep-in-touch" mechanism should be established with the aim of enabling the EU to be updated on the situation in theatre and appropriate subsequent adjustment and vice-versa for the local authorities to be aware of the developments of the EU planning (outlines of CONOPS/OPLAN). The revised CMP will allow for this. The EUDEL and EUSR role is also critical, see further below.

- A SOMA is a key agreement in the context of the duty of care, but also, to an important extent, as an expression of local political buy-in. It is important to at least secure the unilateral declaration providing a legal status to the mission personnel contained in the letter of invitation, pending the conclusion of a SOMA. The practice of extending an existing SOFA of a military mission to a civilian mission through a letter of the MFA does not necessary result in the full guarantees needed.

- The planning process must include not only Commission representatives, but, when possible, the Commission project managers themselves, to achieve practical results: we should make a wider use of existing projects, contacts, information available through Commission services. In accordance with the revised Crisis Management Procedures, the involvement of the relevant Commission services in the CSDP planning process should be encouraged COM briefings to the Planning team should only be a starting point.

- EU-UN coordinated planning has made good progress thanks to the policy paper now finalised that should help improve coordination in future planning efforts to avoid friction and/or risks of duplication. An early and proactive communication strategy would also support these efforts.

b) Operational Planning, including TAM (Technical Assessment Mission)

- <u>Ideally CPCC-lead operational planning builds on</u> comprehensive needs assessment and donor mapping. Clear political strategic objectives should be defined and the added value brought by CSDP within the overall EU comprehensive approach. It is paramount that – as captured by the new CMP, a "political framework" is also defined.

- <u>The systematic CPCC participation in the CMPD-led FFM</u> has been reconfirmed as good practice with a view to guarantee continuity/coherence.

- <u>Member States in CivCom did not sufficiently discuss intentions towards Libya which led to later difficult discussions on the draft CONOPS.</u> This is not how it should be. Important choices and priorities must be set prior to operational planning since operational planning implements political strategic choices set by Member States beforehand.

- <u>TAM composition</u> on the operational and mission support/security sides must be adequate to fulfil the assigned tasks. All strands of work for which the expertise is not ready available must be covered through CRTs: no profile missed. Clarity related to certain financial and logistical arrangements applying to the CRTs is needed. While CRTs have provided a valuable expertise in the area of mission support (logistics, CIS, procurement, finance, HR, engineers); it is thus equally important to include, in the CPCC led Planning teams, experts working in the Mission Support Division in CPCC, in order to ensure continuity between the planning and conduct phases.

- A CMPD member should by default be part of CPCC-led TAMs. Also, in order to ensure seamless transition from planning to conduct, the practice to have OPS colleague(s) identified early and be part of the entire PMS-led Planning team/process should stay standard practise.

- Consideration should be given to include from the start a security/construction engineer. This is especially the case if security upgrades are to be carried out in the identified HQ. We cannot rely on local construction companies. This has been a problem in Libya. It could have been a problem in South Sudan as well but, fortunately, there was a construction engineer from the start (though initially for other purposes).

- In the same logic, a cost study should be, whenever relevant, carried out between the upgrading of an existing building and the setting up of a container compound/HQ by a private company.

- The length of TAMs must be adaptable to requirements and change of circumstances. Critically, TAMs must take into account cultural aspects and delays caused by having to gain trust. It is needed to allow sufficient time for TAMs (absolute minimum is 14 days) and allow sufficient time after the TAM to finalise the draft CONOPS and Budget (minimum 2 weeks)

- <u>Leaving TAM members (Core team) in country (Libya)</u> proved to ensure the necessary continuity: this practice should be standardised where possible in future planning processes; it proved crucial for keeping the momentum with local counterparts and for gradually setting up physically the mission HQ. It would benefit the overall planning process to ensure continuity in some of the key positions from the planning missions through to the deployment of the core team. The revised CMP allow for this

- <u>Coordination with FPI</u> (Foreign Policy Instruments) is essential: an early and very open inclusion of the FPI in the planning in view of preparation of the BIS (Budgetary Impact Statement) proves to be very useful; the practice of having the FPI representative in charge of the budget as part of the TAM should be maintained. The BIS is made up of different planning outputs, including on the spot visits which are essential to identify logistic

options and costs. It is extremely difficult to create a budget when most of the information needed is not yet available. Planning assumptions should guide the budget conception, while evidence/supporting documentation from field visits will allow the budget preparation. The new CMP foresee the second BIS linked with OPLAN which should provide exactly this planning security – to be tested of course, inter alia during Mali planning.

- According to the new CMP, a first budget, namely 1st BIS, has to be included in the CD establishment, following the adoption of the Crisis Management Concept. This means that relevant information must be collected before a TAM. If the bulk of this information can be collected from other structures when existing (EUDEL, EU mission already deployed, IC counterparts if any), it appeared in the context of Mali planning that a Support-oriented visit (a first scoping team) was organized in order to fine-tune some support items. This might remain an option in future contingencies to be seen once Mali planning is done.

- With regards to operational planning documents, CPCC would prefer to first go through a series of written comments before concentrating finalising, as required, of specific paragraphs in CivCom – at least in the early stages of the Libya CONOPS Plus discussions in CivCom, this seems to have worked very well.

2. Mission Support

a) Administration and Budget

- Field visits are an essential phase of planning new missions. Due to both security and logistics constraints in most areas to be visited, these are at times rather expensive activities.

- The use of the <u>preparatory measure</u> for the TAM of EUBAM Libya proved to be a useful tool. Due to the security and logistics situation, the costs of the TAM were extremely high, and it would not have been possible to cover them by the EEAS administrative budget. The preparatory measures were then crucial to ensure flexibility in the start-up phase of the mission. The main added value of preparatory measures originally was the ability to deploy personnel for administration and security in theatre with a view to start procuring equipment still during the operational planning phase of missions. The purpose of having the administrative team and the key equipment in place is to set up the back bone of missions' functioning. The new Crisis Management Procedures with two BIS offer a new alternative and are currently being tested in the context of Mali planning. In accordance with the same procedures, the <u>use of preparatory measures remains an option which CPCC might judge relevant in</u> complex scenarios or when security or other costs are higher than the EEAS administrative budget can bear.

- <u>A budget to provide Core Team staff members with some basic equipment</u> (and software) to perform their functions upon deployment is needed: this should include, at a minimum, a basic ICT network, including routers, printers, scanners and firewalls; furthermore, funds should also be available for office equipment like a medium range photocopier, a projector and a high level protection shredder as well as email address The new Crisis Management Procedures foresee that the first Council Decision will include a BIS covering the expenditure related to the deployment of the Core Team.

- The missions currently receive guidance on Human Resources through the HR Handbook, and the CivOpsCdr instructions. In the area of procurement and contract management, guidance is provided by the Practical Guide to Contract Procedures for EU external action (PRAG) and by notes from the European Commissions. However, a comprehensive package of Standard Operating Procedures in the area of administration and missions support is still lacking. This should include general support services and CIS.

- The question of the transfer of the archives of the closing missions to EEAS has been addressed frequently, but standardised guidance on mission archiving should be updated. The elaboration of the EUJUST LEX-Iraq Final Report revealed a lack of credible, exhaustive, and easily accessible overview and storage of all relevant Mission-related documents, both in the Mission and EEAS archives.

- Mission closure process too needs some defined best practice and more detailed guidance.

- Internal support reviews and Code of Conduct is to be updated.

b) Adequate procedures in the field of procurement

- EU procurement rules for external action have currently to be applied for purchases of goods and services for CSDP missions. These are the same rules which apply to development projects which have a different time span and planning cycle. These rules have not always been conductive to CSDP-rapid deployment. To tackle these difficulties, CPCC and FPI have created Framework Contracts for supplying key equipment, and they have set up the CSDP permanent warehouse.

- In 2013, new procurement guidelines for CSDP missions have been adopted by FPI. According to the new guidelines, missions can ask for the application of the crisis situation notion according to article 268 of the Rules of Application referred to in article 190 of the Financial Regulation in order to be able to use the negotiated procedure for tenders. These rules aim at providing CSDP missions with a set of rules which are more flexible and suitable to the crisis management environment. It is, therefore, recommended that all missions ask FPI for approval for using such procedure on a regular basis, including possibly in the mission set-up phase.

- In spite of the improvement given by the application of the crisis notion, a structural limitation remains in the field of procurement, which is linked to the difficult market response in crisis and post-conflict countries. For instance, the currently applicable general conditions are not always accepted by local providers, who are accustomed to other analogous contractual practices. A possible solution could be to make it easier to derogate from the standard templates. Further improvements in the area of procurement are expected as a follow up to the European Council of December 2013[9]. Following the Council conclusions, it has been decided to set up an informal FPI-CPCC working group to analyse how to further improve financial and procurement procedures.

- A permanent CSDP Warehouse with the capacity to store strategic equipment primarily for effective rapid deployment of 200 personnel into the area of operation of a newly launched mission within 30 days from the approval of the Crisis Management Concept by the Political and Security Committee has been set up. A contract with the warehouse provider was signed by the European Commission, FPI, in December 2012. A Memorandum of Understanding between FPI and CPCC was signed; aiming to ensure CPCC provides technical and operational guidance while FPI maintains its financial and contractual competences. The warehouse has become operational in May 2013. It has been used to procure equipment for EUBAM Libya in the mission's crucial start-up.

- It is recommended that more use is made of the warehouse services and of available Framework Contracts for procuring key assets for CSDP missions. New Framework Contracts could also be developed, and contacts are ongoing between CPCC and FPI in this respect.

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[9] The Council Conclusions stated that "*The European Council invites the Commission, the High Representative and the Member States to ensure that the procedures and rules for civilian missions enable the Union to be more flexible and speed up the deployment of EU civilian missions*."

- A review of the operation modalities of the warehouse is planned in 2015, after two years of implementation of the current contract. This will be the occasion for FPI and CPCC to look at possible ways to improve the functioning of the warehouse, benefitting from the lessons learnt of the use of the warehouse in 2013 and possibly 2014. In the course of 2013, the CPCC has identified as possible areas of improvement: the set-up of stronger FPI-CPCC co-ordination mechanisms in the warehouse management, the possibility of using the warehouse also for existing missions (and not only in the set up phase), an increase in the type of goods procured by the warehouse.

c) Information management

- The absence of a coherent system of secure communications is of real concern, in particular when the situation degrades: a more efficient system for information and document sharing (including classified ones) should be set up: RUE could be the solution.

- IT CPCC software is inadequate for planning and other work, in particular MAC but also internal mission management; a fully dedicated CIS focal point within the CPCC should be established as a matter of priority.

- There is need for an operational database that can ensure secure storage and retrieval of data collected on operational issues.

- A specific internet-based IT platform - the Crisis Management Platform (WIKI) - connecting the missions and the CPCC has been developed and can facilitate mission start-up (provide templates, documents on administrative procedures, SOPs, guidelines etc.) and also sharing of documents between the missions and between the missions and the CPCC.

- Backup servers for all missions in Brussels would enhance security and facilitate archiving of closed missions

d) Human Resources

d1) Force Generation

- Recruitment of personnel for CSDP missions is not always successful, especially for a number of specialized posts in the new required fields of expertise (maritime security, aviation security, counter-terrorism). Posts could not always be filled in a timely manner, thus causing delays in the mission set up (for new missions) or affecting mission mandate delivery (for existing missions). The MS ambition is not always followed by a proportional contribution in term of human resources capabilities.

- In general, there are very few HoM candidates to choose from, and often they are not in possession of the right profile, which later leads to immense difficulties when the Mission meets management, operational and political challenges. As a way to increase the number of qualified candidates, the HR/VP opened the selection to EEAS staff; in September, for the first time, an EEAS official was selected as EUMM HoM. EEAS relevant expertise should also be available to missions through the opening of other senior positions in CSDP missions to EEAS staff, provided that the appointment of EEAS staff fulfils the relevant administrative conditions and within the limits of the established administrative circuit.

- The possibility to interview in person the candidates for all senior positions within the Missions should become a rule. Both, the candidates and the CPCC/Missions would benefit from this opportunity.

- Member States need to focus primarily on quality of their proposed contributions and bring forward only candidates who fulfil the general <u>minimum job requirements</u> (such as mastery of the English/French language, driving skills etc.), while paying due attention to safeguarding the gender balance and the balance of professional backgrounds (civilian, police, military). It is as important as professional qualification for the specific managerial/specialized posts. When no adequately qualified seconded candidate applies for a position, recourse to contracted candidates is envisaged, according to the current procedures.

- The availability of specific expertise in Member States should continue to be tested through a force sensing exercise, prior to launch a new mission. The result of such an exercise will allow CPCC for a better planning in terms of Force Generation process, especially for highly/new specialised profiles, by advertising positions as seconded/contracted <u>already from the first CfC</u> in order to compensate the possible lack of specific expertise in Member State.

- Missions need to attract <u>staff with senior experience</u> in areas such as leading organisational change and development, or with specialist skills in policy making in policing and RoL.

- It would benefit all involved if the <u>tour of duty</u> for certain positions such as mentors could be longer, as it takes time to develop the mentor/mentee bond. Effective implementation of the mandate of the Mission would be enhanced by greater flexibility in terms of the length of the tour of duty for the seconded staff, especially in activities based on relationship with host country counterparts. The limited duration of CSDP personnel detachment hampers long term relation-building

- Ways of reducing the time-span between identifying resources needed and actual deployments to the Mission need to be investigated.

- In case of executive tasks for judges, lawyers and prosecutors, we need to look at ways of retaining key personnel that can take cases from start to finish, or at least reducing turnover to the extent possible (see EULEX).

- <u>Mission organization charts</u> should be referred to as 'initial' and possibly showing offices/departments and levels of command without including numbers of how many people are in each of them.

- Any <u>reconfiguration and downsizing process</u> is bound to be challenging, time consuming and cause stress and operational disruptions. A closer synchronization of efforts between the Mission and CPCC / CivCom is needed – as well as a better awareness by staff members of the overall process, to ensure an understanding of the role of the MS in agreeing to proposals by the Head of Mission and of the need for a due process in the relevant fora.

- <u>Job Description standardisation</u> according to the CSDP real operational needs is a priority.

- The means of exercising <u>Health and Medical support</u> in the missions should consider the needs, constraints, circumstances and resources from Mission to Mission and should be met by the most effective compositions of resources available to the Mission, whether it be by medical staff employed as missions members and/or staff recruited as part of a service contract with a medical service provider. For example, in the Iraq context the lack of medical staff in-house created inefficiencies in the good conduct of the Mission. A framework contract for medical services should be pursued as a matter of priority.

- The new <u>selection procedures</u> increase the transparency of the process and give the Member States more detailed feedback regarding their candidates' performance. The MS should use the detailed feedback in order to better display the candidate's qualities.

d2) Staffing

- The role of Brussels Support Elements is important for both the missions and CPCC, but their status should be clarified, on a case-by-case basis depending on operational requirements.

- More attention should be paid to planning, evaluation and analytical capabilities in mission HQs since the start of the operational planning process.

- The HOM should ideally be recruited first and then assist the selection of his/her Core team. It would benefit the overall planning process to ensure continuity in some of the key positions from the planning missions through to the deployment of the core team. The new CMP allow for this.

- Mission Support staff should be deployed in the theatre of operations well in advance of other mission members; Libya was a good example of putting for the first time bigger numbers of Mission support experts in the field right at the start: international skilled personnel in Mission Support are needed from the beginning: this will guarantee a smooth implementation and maintenance of day to day routine.

- The lack of mission essential functional areas (i.e. Registry, MAC, LL, document Management) cannot be covered by double-hatting other personnel. The review of the Mission Model structure guidelines should take a look at this.

- Local experts engaged as part of the Mission's operational structure would be a significant asset in assessing the different branches of the target organisations and related procedures, to help the international experts navigate the local system. Also in the phase of mission draw-down and transition, the employment of local experts' role should be more seriously considered and enabled.

- A combined and shared experts' database could be an advantage, but the rosters should be maintained nationally by MS in the Registrar application of Goalkeeper.

d3) Training

Training for mission Staff

- Pre-deployment training and familiarisation for administrative functions greatly enhances capability of the administrative structure. This is particularly relevant for procurement and finance officers.

- A flexible and dynamic policy on experts could also develop a more cross functional capacity by which staff could take periods of training in procurement, general services as well as finance and thus could cover several roles in a start-up phase of a Mission.

- The knowledge of the overall accumulated civilian CSDP experience is fragmented and mostly stays with the people directly involved without achieving cross-fertilization; same mistakes are repeated and best practices are not acquired/acknowledged; a dedicated internal training capacity combined with a lessons function is required to feed a shared CPCC institutional culture.

- MMA and HR&G training should be integral part of induction package, as well as training on the overall EU foreign policy and understanding of other than CSDP tools (EC programmes, IfS, TAIEX, Twinning etc.) which could help in identifying gaps and proposing actions tailored to the situation on the ground. In the spirit of the comprehensive approach such induction training could be delivered by the EU Delegation in country.

- Ideally, if needed according to the security situation on the field, all <u>CRTs should attend a HEAT course prior to their selection</u> for a certain deployment. Ad-hoc such training courses have to be facilitated by Member States, in particular whenever they insist on rapid response mode planning. Consideration could even be given to have CPCC members needing a refresher to join in, also for teambuilding purposes.

- The <u>concepts manual</u> (chart overview + one pagers for every policy/concept/guideline/SOP/handbook) should be finalised as soon as possible and be part of every induction for mission key staff. Senior mission members need to have an overview which policies exist and so do CPCC newcomers.

<u>Training activities as part of mission tasks</u>

- A good prior understanding of the internal structures of the host country's institutions should be a precondition before launching sophisticated training programs.

- The use of local trainers/experts should be encouraged where possible and relevant. Particular emphasis should be put on finding high quality local experts as this increases the relevance of activities and contributes to capacity building. Where relevant and possible it is also important to hold courses in different locations, where possible and relevant, to respond to and address different needs.

- Gender balance in training remains crucial.

- Improved screening mechanisms should be put in place for training participants.

- The recruitment of MAC should occur in block (Head + analysts) to allow their envisaged orientation training in Brussels at the start of their deployment.

d4) Disciplinary cases

- There is a lack of standardized disciplinary procedures across the missions and a lack of clarity as to the role plaid by the CivOpsCdr/CPCC. Normally, clarity of such procedures leads to more confidence and actually tends to limit even disciplinary cases. Such standardization should be pursued by the CPCC as a matter of priority.

3. Conduct of Operations

- Mandates: short mandates often create anxiety about the existence of the mission, both in government and in civil society and contradict the mandate itself (in case of SSR). On the contrary, in monitoring missions, it is important to ensure a short term mandate, to keep all parties interested in determining sustainable solutions. The nature of the mission's mandate should be better reflected in the timeframe set for the accomplishment of its objectives.

- Apart from Strategic Reviews PSC provides strategic direction to CSDP missions, inter alia through discussions on the Six-Monthly Reports presented by the Heads of Mission and Civilian Operations Commander. To this effect Six-Monthly reports have been made more concise and focused on strategic elements of mandate implementation where guidance from the PSC is needed. The change was well received by MS. Adequate timing and presentation of Six-Monthly Reports versus Strategic Reviews needs to be decided on ad hoc basis in coordination with CMPD based on mission-specific situation.

- Reporting: Operational developments continue to be covered in Monthly Reports by the Missions, while Weekly Operational Slides reinforce situational awareness. The overall coherence as well as quality of the reports has been improved.

- Discussions in CivCom working group would benefit from a stronger focus on political aspects of mission mandates, objectives, and tasks in the context of the CFSP and the overall advancement of CSDP action.

- Rapid developments create serious challenges to the current procedures for CSDP missions, making it difficult to react in a timely manner to changing operational requirements. More operational flexibility for the HoM would ensure a better match of operational expectations and human resources allocation.

- In this context, ways of reducing the time-span between identifying resources needed and actual deployments to the Mission needs to be investigated.

- Visiting Experts concept was inter alia introduced to enhance flexibility and to reduce mission costs by having recourse to targeted experts temporarily embedded missions for mission mandate implementation. First experiences in utilizing the VE concept have shown however that transaction costs are high due to the fact that full calls for contributions have to be performed. Besides, for cases where operational needs arise from the change of situation on the ground the concept has been found not flexible (NB: visiting experts have to be planned as part of the mission's operational planning documents and BIS) enough and should therefore be examined with a view to possible revision in 2014.

- Cooperation with specialised agencies (Frontex) and international organisations (Europol) has been established on several occasions and will be further explored. Allowing Visiting Experts from other EU Agencies would increase synergies and strengthen the Comprehensive Approach.

- Cross-fertilisation and knowledge sharing between the missions remains difficult. CMPD and CPCC have invested in organising regular meetings in Brussels to bring together the Heads of Missions as well as mission members with similar expertise (yearly meetings of Human Rights and Gender experts, Rule of Law experts, Training Experts, Security Officers etc.). The practice was found useful by the missions and the CPCC and will be further developed. The Crisis Management Platform/'Wiki' will also support knowledge and best-practice sharing among the missions and between the Missions and CPCC.

- Following the COREPER agreement on the New Commission Communication (Special Adviser Communication"), CSDP missions renewed as from 1 July 2013 will have legal capacity. Nevertheless, the HoMs remain contractually bound to report to the Commission/FPI about the mission's financial management and budget implementation. The fact that HoMs need to consult the Commission/FPI on financial decisions which in certain cases might also have operational implications, falling within the remit of CPCC, at times complicates decision-making in the conduct of missions; the latter holds true in the mirror situation whereby operational guidance by the CPCC also entails financial implications. Continued mutual transparency and co-ordination between the missions, CPCC and the Commission/FPI would serve to mitigate the risk of complications and/or delays.

4. Comprehensive approach/Effective coordination/Inclusiveness

- CSDP activities are clearly part of the EU foreign policy toolbox serving the Union's overall objectives for the country/ region. The Joint Communication on Comprehensive approach from December 2013 consolidates the policy framework for cooperation between the different EU instruments. CSDP structures should be fully involved in its implementation.

- In order to implement the EU comprehensive approach in a regional setting, close contacts with the EUSR and with EU Delegations in the host countries are essential.

- Regular briefings, meetings, contacts, exchange of information are crucial Dedicated EU coordination mechanisms, when established, proved useful.

- The EUD, the EUSR Office (where applicable) and the Mission have different chain of command and reporting lines. While co-ordination on the ground has generally improved following the establishment of the EEAS, difficulties to bring together the full potential of these different actors to the EU decision making process remain. Due to persisting lack of shared secure communication lines reports produced by CSDP missions are not easily accessible to EU Delegations and the EU stakeholders in Brussels and vice versa. A lot of information sharing takes place informally.

- Cooperation and coordination among different actors and projects is crucial but remains difficult because of
    - lack of integration of policy approaches to different instruments (all programmes should be underpinned by a joint and shared EU country strategy),
    - different timing and decision-making procedures (long-term planning of EU instruments versus short to mid-term perspective for crisis management),
    - different implementation methods (EU programmes often implemented through partner organisations or contracted experts).

- In preparation of the new programming cycle, EC and EEAS cooperated in identifying priority sectors for funding including security-related areas. CPCC made an effort to become part of the planning process. This could overall improve the chances for better management of transitions from CSDP missions to other EU instruments, where relevant and with due regard to the distinct competences, decision-making and timelines of the EU external action.

- Engagement with Civil society is important and needs to be stepped up. For example, civil society representatives in DRC are often frustrated because EU support to SSR is seen as institution strengthening rather than transformation of institutions

5. Transitions and phasing out of CSDP missions

- <u>Coordination within the EU family on the ground</u> needs to be established early in the mission life-span so that all EU actors gain understanding of each other's activities, processes and limitations.

- <u>Planning for a mission closure</u> should start early and include relevant EU actors in theatre and in Brussels, as well as other relevant stakeholders, in order to ensure sustainability of results achieved. Best practice for mission closure lacks codification. FPI has issued a guidance note on the closure of missions (on the financial, contractual, logistic and administrative aspects).

- A plan for the period after the mission withdrawal should be clearly communicated to the host country authorities, as they assume ownership of the reform processes.

- In Bosnia, the <u>transition</u> model will serve as a good example to learn from and how to improve the transitions in the future. An early planning allowed for creation of a new specialised section within the EUSR's office (the Home Affairs and Public security Section, HAPSS) at the time of expiry of the EUPM's mandate, and a specific Law Enforcement Programme funded under the IPA 2010 was launched at the same time. This allowed for continuation of some aspects of EUPM work in both strategic advice and technical assistance. The interoperability of these two instruments (HAPSS and IPA) has already proven to be successful. It contributed to retain EUPM institutional memory and

the focus at the strategic level, and created synergies and complementarity between the project and the section. Finally it also helped design the means and tools to address the need for EU engagement, at strategic/political/technical and operational levels, thus advancing the EU roadmap and priorities in the framework of the pre-accession process. Deployment of sufficient number of staff for the necessary time period and with appropriate skills at EUD/EUSR combined with technical assistance projects in the field of Rule of Law could serve as a good example of exit strategy for other CSDP missions, thus ensuring a smooth transition between short to mid-term and long-term EU action in the field of RoL and security. However, the specificity of the Bosnia situation with its enlargement perspective and a strong EU presence – the biggest EU Delegation and a double-hatted EUSR with a large political office - must be pointed out. Use of a similar pattern in a different context would be problematic.

- In Iraq, the closure of EUJUST LEX showed the need to ensure that transition period is long enough to guarantee sustainability of achievements, something that could not be guaranteed in this case.

- CSDP decision making on mission closures should be flexible enough to reflect on changed circumstances (security situation, local needs and buy-in, delayed start of a follow-on instrument) requiring further engagement (extension).

- If a decision is made for another EU instrument to build upon the achievements of the CSDP missions' activities, a smooth and efficient handover with ideally a period of overlap of these instruments is crucial for continuity of efforts. A gap could also be potentially bridged by an Art 28 capacity (provided it is staffed by Mission personnel), although this is still an untried option which is assessed to result in further institutional complexity and one more transition between EU instruments.

- In case of <u>EUPOL and EUSEC missions in DRC</u>, it is important to ensure continuity of the key follow-on activities in the transition and hand-over periods of the missions. In particular, providing strategic police advice is necessary to consolidate EUPOL's achievements and their sustainability.

6. Information and Communication Strategy/Master messages

- A clear communication strategy towards the host country authorities must be in place to make sure that roles and responsibilities of different EU actors are clear and well understood, especially in countries where several EU actors and programmes act simultaneously.

- In the planning phase, the aim and purpose of FFMs must be clear for the local counterparts in order to avoid confusion: a CSDP <u>early</u> information strategy is warranted; there is thus a need to advance the development and agreement of an EU info strategy, ideally to the date of CMC adoption.

- An information and communications strategy for the Mission (appropriately coordinated with other EU and non-EU stakeholders) should be established at the <u>earliest possible moment following deployment</u>. Suitable guidance, SOPs and resources should be made available for this task.

- Visibility of CSDP missions and the result achieved should be improved. Mission PPIOs cooperate closely with the EEAS press office to this effect. Heads of Mission should be regularly invited to provide briefings and press points to the media when travelling to Brussels and encouraged to use the social media to increase mission's visibility (within the limitations due to security constraints).

- Briefings and updates on CSDP missions should be part of EEAS regional and country meetings and specific seminars (such as Heads of Delegation seminar, POLAD seminar etc.).

- Information and reports by the CSDP missions could also be more widely distributed, including to expert public and civil society where relevant. This would enhance further recognition of missions' work and expertise.

7. Methodology

- A number of areas where best practice has to be developed, standardised or updated have been highlighted already above

a) Benchmarking

- There is a lack of tools helping in implementing the agreed benchmarking methodology, including indicators.

b) Mission Structure

- As much as possible, civilian CSDP Missions should have a consistent structure, functions/positions and job descriptions. The structure of a Mission will depend on the different Mandate as regards the operational units, but the overall structure and set-up of a Mission should respond to agreed principles.

- The position of Human Rights and gender (HR&G) experts should be reinforced to guarantee successful mainstreaming of HR&G aspects into all Mission activities. This effort is hampered when HR&G experts are part of Operations Section on equal footing as other Mission experts who tend not to respect their special cross-cutting responsibility. HR&G experts should become advisors to HoM (or at least to Head of Operations)

8. Security

- EUBAM Libya had to be partly <u>re-located</u> and EUAVSEC South Sudan <u>evacuated</u> in 2013. Lessons will have to be drawn from this. Organisational aspects including dedicated staffing requirements within the CPCC that support the Civilian Operations Commander's role with regard to the discharge of the 'duty of care' will have to be addressed in this context.

- A tragic incident with a fatal shooting occurred in Kosovo on 19/9/2013. Standard Operation Procedure (SOP) for <u>Critical Incident Management</u> does exist and was to a large extent relevant; however, it has been reviewed in the light of experiences made during this incident and a new version will be released. A major challenge in dealing with the incident was information management – verified information is key to be able to communicate appropriately with the relevant affected persons/organisations/member states/committees. The mission also used the Counselling and Support Team (CAST) in order to deal with the mental burden of the case and it proved to be very valuable.

EUMS ANNUAL LESSONS AND BEST PRACTICES REPORT FOR 2013

AND

MILITARY CONTRIBUTION TO THE EEAS ANNUAL REPORT TO THE PSC ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF CSDP LESSONS, INCLUDING FROM OPERATIONS

References

A.   EUMS EU Military Lessons Learned Concept (EEAS 12322/11), dated 1 Jul 11.

B.   CMPD Suggestion on a way forward on the implementation of lessons learned, including in field operations (EEAS 02065/13), dated 7 Oct 13.

Introduction

1.   The new Common (Civ/Mil) Annual CSDP Lessons and Best Practices Report requires, as explained at Ref B., contributions describing the relevant lessons observed during the reporting period. As the EUMS is mandated by Ref A. to provide a report of military lessons and best practices to the EUMC, this report will form the substance of the required contribution for the new Common (Civ/Mil) Annual CSDP Lessons and Best Practices Report.

2.   This paper details the Lesson Observations and Lessons Learnt that have become manifest during 2013. These are declared under four sections: New Military Lesson Observations and Best Practices, 2013; Lessons of the Last Quarter 2013 Awaiting EUMC Validation; Military Lessons Closed During 2013; and Lessons that can only be taken forward by Member States. The lessons, from which this paper is derived, are only those that are at the strategic level and have implications on CSDP. Lessons at a different level are held as appropriate to allow relevant analysis and implementation.

3.   The Lesson Observations have been garnered from within the EU Military Staff, from Member States, from Operation, Mission and Force Headquarters and from other institutions engaged with the EUMS during operations and exercises.

4.   In order to provide a document that is clear and concise, the simple Lesson descriptions have been thematically grouped under the three essential tasks mandated to the EUMS; Early Warning and Advance Planning, Situation Assessment and Strategic Planning. These themes are supplemented where lessons are significant but do not fall within the EUMS mandated tasks.

5.   For ease of future reference, each validated lesson is preceded by its reference number.

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Contents

Summary

1. In previous annual lesson reports, full lists of new and closed lessons were shown. The lists continue to be included in this report but, to ease workloads, a few particular and significant points are drawn out to form the basis of this summary.

2. As usual, since the military activity in 2013 included a preponderance of strategic planning activity, there are a proportionally large number of lessons under planning rather than in other areas.

3. It became apparent that, during the course of planning for operations / missions, from the declaration of a crisis to the initiating of drafting Military Strategic Options, the military voice was losing strength. Several lessons refer to the absence of military input to either the Political Framework to Crisis Approach (PFCA) or the Crisis Management Concept (CMC), the result of which is the failure to consider some options available to the PSC. It is our contention that, to achieve a fully Comprehensive Approach to crisis planning, the EUMS, *inter alia*, must be involved at all stages.

4. During several of the most recent planning phases for operations / missions, the many early visits as part of preparatory measures were not well coordinated. This placed an unacceptable strain on the receiving host nation, causing confusion and some ambiguity of intent. A central coordination of all fact-finding / technical assistance missions (FFM / TAM) would show the EU in a better light, would save money and would ensure comprehensive planning at the initial stages.

5. With the disparate intelligence and information gathering capabilities within the EU, it is becoming clear that greater investment is required to compile, analyse, coordinate and report the relevant products. This would increase our capacity to provide early warning and to plan more effectively. Greater Member State intelligence sharing would also vastly improve the EU ability to respond to crises more rapidly and appropriately.

6.	A significant number of lessons are now considered 'learnt' after the publication of the 2013 versions of the EEAS 'Suggestions for Crisis Management Procedures for CSDP Crisis Management Operations' and the EUMS Crisis Management Manual. These documents now provide the updated structure required for crisis planning and, specifically for the EUMS Crisis Management Manual, allow a seamless link between the political strategic direction and operations planning.

7.	On several occasions lessons have been taken that describe the requirement to have early CSDP expertise on the ground. The utility of this function to both the crisis planners and the EU Delegation has become clear but the *ad hoc* arrangements to meet this requirement should be considered temporary until replaced by a more responsive and rigorous procedure is widely accepted and approved.

8.	MILEX 13 proved the activation of the EU OPSCEN. However, many fragilities were exposed that will require concerted action to alleviate. If the OPSCEN is to be viable for operations, effort will be required to support an updated operating procedure and a mandated allocation of preserved space and infrastructure (incl. CIS) within the Kortenberg building (KO 150 / 158). In addition, further work is required to improve the coordination of the handover of planning responsibility, between EUMS and the OPSCEN. These problems were exacerbated as the activation of the OPSCEN for MILEX 13 was in parallel to the EU Activated OPSCEN (HoA).

NEW MILITARY LESSON OBSERVATIONS AND BEST PRACTICES, 2013

Early Warning and Prudent / Advance Planning

Nil

Situation Assessment

1. M001324. Full and efficient sharing of intelligence to support operations is not yet supported by a mature framework arrangement.

2. M001329. <u>Best Practice</u>. The lack of CSDP expertise in relevant delegations can be tackled through the early deployment of an appropriately experienced officer. This can also be the case for providing a liaison officer to other organisations' operations headquarters.

3. M001346. The necessity and legality of the deployment of 'preparatory measures' causes confusion. This can reduce the information available for planning and increases the risk of delays in deployment.

4. M001338. The coordination of all required fact-finding missions (FFM) should be improved. Large numbers of FFM increase the burden on host nations and therefore reduce the efficiency of each FFM.

Strategic Planning

1. M001323. Intelligence support to strategic planning insufficiently coordinated to support the requirement. The development of the EUMS Crisis Management Manual detailed, *inter alia*, a process to ensure a mechanism for providing intelligence to strategic planning teams.

2. M001347. The development of the EU Crisis Information Strategy lags significantly behind the strategic planning process.

3. M001345. A definitive procedure for 'force sensing' is required to allow Operation and Force Commanders to conduct planning and initiate the Force Generation process.

4. M001337. Confusion between the tasks of Military Information Operations and Military Public Information / Relations can cause planning confusion.

5. M001333. A more efficient process to host visiting planning teams is required to prevent delays in activity.

6. M001322. Exercise planning documentation must include all detail to permit realistic training. This should include, in the Exercise Council Decisions, financial permissions such as the 'Reference Amount'.

7. M001321. During strategic level planning activity an EU Information Strategy is required to provide direction and information to further planning.

8. M001320. EU strategic planning requires a common process with which to train potential planners.

9. M001316. Financially responsible elements of EU OHQ and other EU planning staffs should have relevant ATHENA financial training.

10. M001311. Great difficulty is experienced in the distribution from EUMS of classified planning documents to Member States' Military Representatives through the absence of a suitable IT arrangement accessible to all concerned.

11. M001307. Best Practice. Although the use of the CIS Deployable Package uses over 90% of the exercise budget, it has proved essential for the testing of the equipment and the training of CIS Mil-SAT personnel.

12. M001299. Not detailed in EU military planning methodology, a campaign design is required to create a wide understanding of the detail of a crisis in order to develop coherent military strategic options.

13. M001298. A Crisis Information Strategy is required to inform planning during both real and exercise crises.

14. M001297. A comprehensive Strategic Estimate is required to inform planning during both real and exercise crises.

15. M001295. The drafting of a Political Framework for Crisis Approach for an exercise should be given as much attention as during a real crisis.

16. M001294. Timelines for the delivery of exercise documents (MSO and IMD) should be as realistic as possible.

17. M001291. The use of inexperienced personnel in key posts during exercises must be considered carefully to avoid significant delays in progress caused by a requirement to ensure appropriate training.

18. M001290. The late inclusion of additional exercise objectives causes delays in planning and additional training requirements on exercise participants.

Operations / Missions

1.   M001389. <u>Op ATALANTA</u>. Better coordination of structures supporting a comprehensive approach to regional activity is required. Initially, in Horn of Africa activity, coordinating staff talks have been initiated to determine how best to integrate, specifically; logistics, communications, finance and intelligence.

2.   M001388. <u>Op ATALANTA</u>. In order to align further counter-piracy activity to ensure synchronicity of effect and to eradicate duplication of effort better coordination, at the strategic level, is required between the three maritime counter-piracy missions (CMF, EU Op ATALANTA and NATO)

3.   M001387. <u>Op ATALANTA</u>. As the occurrence of pirate activity reduces, member States are less enthusiastic in the provision of maritime assets. Whilst the threat of a resurgence in piracy remains, Member States have to be encouraged to continue to allocate forces to maintain the force flow required by the CJSOR.

4.   M001283. <u>Op ATALANTA</u>. Due to the requirements of the EU Data Protection Act, the recording, storage and transfer of the personal details of suspected pirates is challenging. Methods to establish the details of suspected pirates regularly apprehended are needed.

5.   M001282. <u>Op ATALANTA</u>. Failure to meet the objectives aid out in the operational requirement (particularly the need for a refuelling ship) reduces the capability of the operational force to patrol the complete area of operation effectively.

6.   M001281. <u>Op ATALANTA</u>. Benchmarking and exit criteria should be determined during the drafting of the 2014 mandate for further counter-piracy activity.

7.   M001280. <u>Op ATALANTA</u>. Continuous effort is required to ensure that merchant shipping adheres to published Best Management Practice in order to reduce the risk of pirate attacks.

8.   M001279. <u>Op ATALANTA</u>. Failure to meet the objectives laid out in the operational requirement (particularly the need for sufficiently capable maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft) reduces the capability of the operational force to patrol the complete area of operation effectively.

9.   M001278. <u>Op ATALANTA</u>. Efforts to persuade nations bordering the operation area to permit local basing of maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft will significantly increase the ability to patrol the full extent of the operation area.

LESSONS OF LAST QUARTER 2013 AWAITING EUMC VALIDATION

1. <u>MILEX 13</u>. The EU activated OPSCEN terms of reference (2004) remain outdated and reflect neither the reduction in space allocation in the KO building nor the absence of a Service Level Agreement for the provision of life support services.

2. <u>MILEX 13</u>. Allocation of resources for the activation of the OPSCEN was proven extremely difficult, as some of the resources were not in the remits of the EUMS. Until 2007, the EUMS was the unique tenant of the KO building and the OPSCEN premises were preserved (6th floor and half of 5th floor). As other occupants arrived (CMPD, CPCC, SITCEN), the integrity of the OPSCEN space was progressively compromised. The EU OPSCEN layout over many floors in C150 and 158 leads to obvious difficulties and limitations in EU OPSCEN routine work. The planners and planning teams faced many technical issues in performing efficient staff work. This included a lack of adequate security arrangements. The activation was very complicated and involved many actors, most of them outside the control of the DG EUMS. In particular the furniture provision and movement and the IT arrangements and set up were challenging.

3. <u>MILEX 13</u>. Involvement in the exercise, for EUMS double-hatted personnel, lasted about 5 weeks (1-2 weeks for the EUCCIS course, 1 week for the MILEX13 preparatory planning course and 2 weeks of conduct phase). They were officially detached from the EUMS and placed under the authority of the Operation Commander, however, the transfer from EUMS to OpCdr was not clear enough to avoid 2 chains of command persisting. This situation was exacerbated by the EU OPSCEN layout since some officers remained in their normal offices. The OPSCEN activation also increases pressure on the EUMS production capability (i.e. as the double-hatted EUMS Geospatial Officer was allocated to the EU OPSCEN there was no Geo planning support left in the EUMS).

4. <u>MILEX 13</u>. <u>Best Practice</u>. The MILEX 13 preparatory planning course trained 37 people, 28 double hatted from the EUMS and 9 coming from Member States; this preparatory planning course proved vital. It constituted an opportunity to educate and train people on OHQ-level planning competencies and also to raise the comprehension of the exercise.

5. <u>MILEX 13</u>. Member States did not honour agreed contributions of suitably qualified and security cleared augmentees. A number of positions had to be re-advertised and significant appeals, written and verbal to the EUMC were made by EUMS DG. Additionally, Athena mechanism specialists, although included in the EU Activated OPSCEN manning list, are not in the EEAS.

6. <u>MILEX 13</u>. Due to the space limitation, the approach to the activation of the OPSCEN was based on unity of location, reach-back capacity and link to the directorate, in order to keep expertise together. The implication of space limitation was that CIS support, to personnel moving offices, became critical. This was complicated by the lack of a Service Level Agreement between EEAS IT, CGS and DIRCIS. There is also no single entity responsible for SOLAN hardware, cable connection and power availability.

7. <u>MILEX 13</u>. The LEGAD's advise is required for rules of engagement and transfer of authority issues. This is made more complicated through his being located in another building.

8. <u>MILEX 13</u>. Due to the summer rotation of personnel, key roles were taken by newcomers. The concurrent activity of conducting EUMS induction and staff training, attending the preparatory planning course and achieving the planning / conduct phases of the exercise, in a challenging work environment proved very testing organisationally and at an individual level.

9. <u>MILEX 13</u>. EU OPSCEN realised that some double-hatted personnel were absent on leave or on mission and that some were newcomers, inexperienced in EU activity or even their EUMS role. This was especially critical for unique specialist personnel who also continued to receive EUMS tasking.

10. <u>MILEX 13</u>. There is an urgent requirement to establish a pan-EUMS Cyber implementation working group. Cyber doctrine and training should be provided for personnel across all EUMS Directorates with EUMS CIS in the lead.

11. <u>MILEX 13</u>. Better clarity could be given in Exercise Planning meetings as to whether they are meetings on the planning of the exercise or meetings on the exercise planning function. These meetings should be focused on the substance of the PFCA, CMC, MSO and IMD.

12. <u>MILEX 13</u>. Although MILEX 13 provided an opportunity to test EUCCIS, technical and hardware issues undermined its utility. EUCCIS proved to be a very complex tool, relying on an external contractor and requiring significant training which, in this instance, proved insufficient to enable staff work during operational planning activities. The EU OPSCEN CIS build was developed independently from the CJ6. There was no opportunity for COS, CJ6 and the IM to discuss how the EU OPSCEN CIS would be used to enable the EU OPSCEN. There is no CIS Support element identified in EU OPCEN structure and EUMS capability is insufficient to meet this need.

13. <u>MILEX 13</u>. Once the IMD is approved, a formal hand over (presentation of Planning, Intel and Situation Awareness products) should be made to the OHQ by the EUMS, in accordance with the EUMS Crisis Management Manual (CMM).

14. <u>MILEX 13</u>. Exercise scenario documents were developed by the Exercise planners but external actors were generally reluctant to contribute to scenario development. To ensure continuity the DISTAFF should be the extension of the Exercise Planning Team. However, the appointment of newcomers and augmentees, requiring significant training, weakened this link. DISTAFF composition mirrored the EUMS organisation, instead of the EU OPSCEN and impinged upon an early response, even during the preparation phase, to requests for information.

15. <u>MILEX 13</u>. Accurate planning depends, *inter alia*, upon the full geospatial and meteorological process from Geospatial Requirements identification and management to the printing and distribution of mapping (strategic to tactical involvement) and relevant meteorological information. Greater Engineer support is also required in both the planning and logistic domains. EUMS is not manned to provide these capabilities.

16. <u>MILEX 13</u>. The lack of a fully coherent EU OPSCEN SOP did not provide clarity to the diverse use of planning methodologies. Instances were noted of the use of current and outdated NATO directives alongside the EUMS Crisis Management Manual. Without a dedicated environment from which to work the EU OPSCEN loses control of both working routines and unit security. Preparation of classified information and other vital documents becomes uncoordinated.

17. <u>MILEX 13</u>. <u>Best Practice</u>. Administrative planning for the arrival of augmentees has been reviewed and should be made procedural.

18. <u>MILEX 13</u>. The CIS Deployable package activation should be part of EU OPCEN activation process. Deployment in parallel will provide the link from OpCdr to deployed FCdr, ensuring timely set-up and preparation before deployment.

19. <u>Op ATALANTA</u>. Successful deterrence and disruption of suspected pirates (SP) requires Force Flow. Lack of SP success leads MS to conclude that forces are no longer required. This was demonstrated in the Force Generation conference (Nov 6, 2013) where the number of Autonomous Vessel Protection Detachments (AVPD) offered exceeded the requirement, however there was a shortfall in offers of surface combatants, support ships (inc R2) and MPRA.

20. <u>Op ATALANTA</u>. A robust co-ordination mechanism is required to synchronise the "Big 3" (CMF, EU, NATO) maritime missions with efforts ashore to efficiently progress towards the strategic end state.

21. <u>Op ATALANTA</u>. EUNAVFOR to embrace EUCAP NESTOR as LMCB lead authority by supporting their training plan and aims. Longer term strategy, in accordance exit plan, will be to devolve military planning from OHQ to EUCAP NESTOR HQ *in situ*.

22. <u>Op ATALANTA</u>. Insufficient co-ordination between CSDP missions regarding logistics, finance, communications and intelligence hampers the overall effective and efficient delivery of the missions.

23. <u>EUBG</u>. Readiness of the EUBG (5-10 days) may not be coherent with the time required for EU Decision making / consensus of political will. It is expensive to hold the EUBG to the required level of readiness, which is wasteful if the decision-making process is slower than the current readiness level allows for.

24. <u>EUBG</u>. Currently at regular Ministerial and Policy Directors meetings, capability development and ongoing operations are discussed, but not potential operations.

25. <u>EUBG</u>. The likely speed of EU decision making reduces the likelihood of an EUBG deploying in the last two months of standby, potentially leaving a period where there may be a dispute over which EUBG should deploy – the current BG with little time left on standby or the next BG that is not yet on standby. This is complicated by the voluntary 6 months on standby plus up to 4 months extra if deployed near the end of the standby period.

26. <u>EUBG</u>. The Netherlands have offered to provide 2018-1 and 2018-2. Would a formalised 12 month period of readiness help fill the roster and assist in readiness / deployability, or would this limit further the political willingness of MS to contribute forces? Would potential savings make this more attractive?

27. <u>EUBG</u>. Significant force tailoring is likely to the 'core' BG. The MS BG contributions vary widely in scale (1400 persons to 3000+ persons) and capability and some come with caveats.

28. <u>EUBG</u>. Any deployed force will need to be truly joint in nature. The FHQ must be capable of commanding in the Joint environment.

29. <u>EUBG</u>. The provision of Joint elements is on an *ad hoc* basis depending on MS BG structures.

30. <u>EUBG</u>. Specific operations will require tailored force packages, perhaps with niche capabilities which are not routinely part of the BG structure (CBRN, C-IED, UAV, civilian SMEs).

31. <u>EUBG</u>. Current training is MS led and varies considerably between BGs.

32. <u>EUBG</u>. Formal direction on training and structures may be too prescriptive for MS and may not be responsive enough to ensure relevance to crises of interest. Scenarios which look at possible areas of interest and support reinforcing extant EU missions would be advantageous. These could involve full or part deployment of the BG, either with other elements or as isolated elements, such as training teams.

33. <u>EUBG</u>. Exercising all core BG package elements collectively is essential.

34. <u>EUBG</u>. It is important to hold a POLEX with Ministers participating and regular Policy Director discussion to ensure decision making is agile.

35. <u>EUBG</u>. BG certification is a MS responsibility. A common certification process, if supported, could create a set of EUMS standards that might make feasible a form of peer review.

36. <u>EUBG</u>. There is a formal mechanism for the back brief of military BG issues and lessons to other MS at BG Community level. BGs also hold DVD and are encouraged by EUMS to be proactive in engaging with follow-on nations, encouraging their participation as observers on exercises and inviting them to SNR conferences. However, there is also a requirement at the political level to ensure that the BG baton is passed smoothly.

MILITARY LESSONS CLOSED DURING 2013

Early Warning and Prudent / Advance Planning

1. M001326. Insufficient early warning to allow advance planning. Addressed through the revision of the EEAS 'Suggestion for Crisis Management Procedures for CSDP Crisis Management Operations' and the revision of the EUMS Crisis Management Manual.

Situation Assessment

2. M001340. Early (pre-ATHENA approval) deployment of liaison officers requires EEAS CIS support. Incorporated into active lesson M001342.

3. M000946. The early involvement of Intelligence personnel in planning fora would increase planning capability. Addressed through the revision of the EUMS Crisis Management Manual.

Strategic Planning

1. M001343. SOLAN must be the only server used for planning processes. Incorporated into active lesson M001344.

2. M001341. Collaborative classified planning requires CIS support from EEAS. Incorporated into active lesson M001342.

3. M001336. Clarification between Core Planning Team (CPT) and Extended Planning Team (EPT) roles required. Addressed through the revision of the EUMS Crisis Management Manual.

4. M001335. EPT meeting were not held regularly enough to enable full situation awareness. Addressed through the revision of the EUMS Crisis Management Manual.

5. M001334. Information management not rigorously managed. Addressed through the revision of the EUMS Crisis Management Manual.

6. M001332. The use of proactive and anticipative staffing is essential to meet process timelines. Addressed through the revision of the EUMS Crisis Management Manual.

7. M001331. An creation of an Initiating Military Directive is essential. Addressed through the revision of the EEAS 'Suggestion for Crisis Management Procedures for CSDP Crisis Management Operations'.

8. M001330. Effect-orientated planning should be used in the place of task-orientated planning. Addressed through the revision of the EEAS 'Suggestion for Crisis Management Procedures for CSDP Crisis Management Operations' and the revision of the EUMS Crisis Management Manual.

9. M001328. The military instrument should be considered in all comprehensive crisis management operation planning. Addressed through the revision of the EEAS 'Suggestion for Crisis Management Procedures for CSDP Crisis Management Operations' and the revision of the EUMS Crisis Management Manual.

10. M001327. Strategic risks not mitigated through the use of contingency planning. Addressed through the revision of the EEAS 'Suggestion for Crisis Management Procedures for CSDP Crisis Management Operations' and the revision of the EUMS Crisis Management Manual.

11. M001325. Rapidity of planning time and short notice changes prevented full military input to Crisis Management Concept. Addressed through the revision of the EUMS Crisis Management Manual.

12. M001323. Insufficient intelligence analysis capacity during the planning process. Addressed through the revision of the EUMS Crisis Management Manual.

13. M001306. A balance should be achieved between experienced and newly joined personnel within planning teams. Addressed through the revision of the EUMS Crisis Management Manual.

14. M001305. The roles and responsibilities of different members of a planning team are unclear. Addressed through the revision of the EUMS Crisis Management Manual.

15. M001304. Language capabilities should be taken into account when establishing a planning team. Addressed through the revision of the EUMS Crisis Management Manual.

16. M001303. Procedures for EUMS planning teams require clarification. Addressed through the revision of the EUMS Crisis Management Manual.

17. M001301. Members of planning teams require a greater understanding of planning tools and procedures. Addressed through the revision of the EEAS 'Suggestion for Crisis Management Procedures for CSDP Crisis Management Operations' and the revision of the EUMS Crisis Management Manual.

18. M001300. Use of COPD proved the requirement of an EU planning methodology. Addressed through the revision of the EEAS 'Suggestion for Crisis Management Procedures for CSDP Crisis Management Operations' and the revision of the EUMS Crisis Management Manual.

19. M001296. The Crisis Management Concept did not reflect military advice and therefore Military Strategic Options proved essential. Addressed through the revision of the EEAS 'Suggestion for Crisis Management Procedures for CSDP Crisis Management Operations' and the revision of the EUMS Crisis Management Manual.

20. M001293. PSC conclusions (on an exercise CMC) did not contain the wording and decisions required to continue planning. Addressed through the revision of the EEAS 'Suggestion for Crisis Management Procedures for CSDP Crisis Management Operations' and the revision of the EUMS Crisis Management Manual.

21. M001292. Time to produce the required documents proved too short for the planning team. Addressed through the revision of the EEAS 'Suggestion for Crisis Management Procedures for CSDP Crisis Management Operations' and the revision of the EUMS Crisis Management Manual.

22. M001085. An exercise planning team was initiated with insufficient time to train in advance of the planning phases of the exercise. Exercise planning now includes early designated training periods.

23. M001084. Exercise planning team members failed to develop and maintain their situation awareness during the planning phases. Exercise planning now includes early designated training periods and personnel are nominated early to allow sufficient training.

24. M001083. Planning team members are insufficiently aware of the planning documents and methodologies used by the EU and EUMS. Addressed through the revision of the EEAS 'Suggestion for Crisis Management Procedures for CSDP Crisis Management Operations' and the revision of the EUMS Crisis Management Manual. Reinforced through planning training provided by EUMS personnel.

25. M001082. Exercise directing staff were unable to gain access to required meeting and exercise rooms in EU buildings. EUMS infrastructure has now allocated DISTAFF rooms and facilities to support future exercises.

26. M001081. The requirement for a cross institutional exercise coordination capability was highlighted. A cross institutional exercise coordination matrix was exercised and proved during ML12. This will incorporated in future exercises.

27. M001080. The responsibility for an exercise should not change once the exercise has been initiated. An exercise concept that determines the roles and responsibilities at the higher level has been agreed.

28. M001079. The exercise concept (2004) is out of date. The exercise concept and exercise policy have been updated and published, 2013.

29. M001078. Priority was not given to the exercise (CME 11). Personnel are now nominated early, trained as appropriate and instructed on the correct prioritisation of the exercise.

30. M001077. EUMS Crisis Management Manual (2004) is out of date. Addressed through the revision of the EUMS Crisis Management Manual.

31. M001076. EU crisis management methodology required updating to match the Lisbon Treaty changes. Addressed through the revision of the EEAS 'Suggestion for Crisis Management Procedures for CSDP Crisis Management Operations' and the revision of the EUMS Crisis Management Manual.

32. M001075. Planning team members were unaware of their responsibilities during the exercise. Addressed through the revision of the EEAS 'Suggestion for Crisis Management Procedures for CSDP Crisis Management Operations' and the revision of the EUMS Crisis Management Manual. Reinforced through planning training provided by EUMS personnel.

33. M001074. Specifics of the exercise battle-rhythm did not meet requirements. Exercise personnel are training in the requirements of the exercise and are advised to create a battle-rhythm that is not hampered by the planning constraints.

34. M001073. The Crisis Management Procedures are out of date. Addressed through the revision of the EEAS 'Suggestion for Crisis Management Procedures for CSDP Crisis Management Operations' and the revision of the EUMS Crisis Management Manual. Reinforced through planning training provided by EUMS personnel.

35.	M001071. <u>Best Practice</u>. The appointment of new members of the EUMS alongside experienced strategic planners within planning teams to ensure widespread understanding of EUMS planning methodology. Addressed through the revision of the EEAS 'Suggestion for Crisis Management Procedures for CSDP Crisis Management Operations' and the revision of the EUMS Crisis Management Manual. Reinforced through planning training provided by EUMS personnel.

36.	M001070. <u>Best Practice</u>. The requirement for a cross institutional exercise coordination capability was highlighted. A cross institutional exercise coordination matrix was exercised and proved during ML12. This will incorporated in future exercises.

37.	M01055. EU OHQ Generic Standard Operating Procedures are out of date and do not reflect local use of COPD. SOPs have been updated to include acknowledgement of use of COPD and are being further developed during EU OHQ coordination meetings.

38.	M001054. There is a lack of civilian involvement in planning exercises. Addressed through the publication of a revised EU Exercise Concept and Exercise Policy, 2013.

39.	M000975. <u>EUBG</u>. The integration of Third Party Logistic Services (TPLS) should be reviewed to integrate these enabling capabilities into the EUBG Concept. The development of the Concept for Contractor Support to Operations addresses this issue.

40.	M000919. The use of NATO planning tools (Guideline for Operational Planning - GOP and Comprehensive Operational Planning Directive) do not fully meet EU planning requirements. Addressed through the revision of the EEAS 'Suggestion for Crisis Management Procedures for CSDP Crisis Management Operations' and the revision of the EUMS Crisis Management Manual. Reinforced through planning training provided by EUMS personnel.

41.	M000917. Augmentees provided by Member States were not all fully trained or prepared to fill their roles within the EUMS planning teams. Member States have been reminded of the requirements and encouraged to provide suitable personnel and supplementary training in provided by EUMS on arrival.

Operations / Missions

1. M001283. Op ATALANTA. Due to the requirements of the EU Data Protection Act, the recording, storage and transfer of the personal details of suspected pirates is challenging. Implemented as far as possible within OPLAN Rev 4.

2. M001282. Op ATALANTA. Failure to meet the objectives aid out in the operational requirement (particularly the need for a refuelling ship) reduces the capability of the operational force to patrol the complete area of operation effectively (associated with Lesson M000961). Use of SHADE (Shared Awareness and Deconfliction) and the force generation process ameliorates this lesson.

3. M001280. Op ATALANTA. Continuous effort is required to ensure that merchant shipping adheres to published Best Management Practice in order to reduce the risk of pirate attacks. Action is regularly taken to ensure that merchant fleets are aware of best practice. Updates to Best Maritime Practice (BMP) is regularly publicised.

4. M001279. Op ATALANTA. Failure to meet the objectives laid out in the operational requirement (particularly the need for sufficiently capable maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft) reduces the capability of the operational force to patrol the complete area of operation effectively. Use of SHADE (Shared Awareness and Deconfliction) and the force generation process ameliorates this lesson.

5. M001278. Op ATALANTA. Efforts to persuade nations bordering the operation area to permit local basing of maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft will significantly increase the ability to patrol the full extent of the operation area. Due to an Omani legal prevention of immunity against prosecution, leading to an inability to agree a SOFA / MOU, this lesson can not be progressed further.

6. M001069. Op ALTHEA. TCNs should be willing to donate training equipment to AFBiH. Deleted from lessons list as it is not directly linked to EUFOR functions.

7. M001068. Op ALTHEA. The operation concept is too rigid to allow Force Commanders to deploy their personnel appropriately. Taken into account during OPLAN STR4.

8. M001066. EUTM Somalia. Common tactical training and instructional technique required to prevent trainee confusion and misunderstanding. Coordination of training packages and instruction has been implemented locally.

9.   M001064. <u>EUTM Somalia</u>. Local area network was not sufficiently protected against potential information attack. New IT infrastructure developed and implemented by EUMS MilSAT.

10.   M001062. <u>Op ATALANTA</u>. Short term (under 6 months) staff appointments hinder output and limit the development of corporate knowledge. Tackled through the Force Generation process.

11.   M001060. <u>Op ATALANTA</u>. Reduced capability to patrol full AOR should be tackled by basing MPA in Oman. Linked to lesson M001278; due to an Omani legal prevention of immunity against prosecution, leading to an inability to agree a SOFA / MOU, this lesson can not be progressed further.

12.   M001053. <u>Op ATALANTA</u>. The lack of permanent imagery analysis and geospatial expertise at the OHQ was highlighted. A Mil Geo Tech is now being provided to the OHQ.

13.   M001050. <u>Op ATALANTA</u>. The lack of HUMINT capability to support the OHQ was highlighted. This is now being addressed through the Force Generation process.

14.   M001047. <u>Libya</u>. The Engineer staff at the OHQ were undermanned. This has been addressed through revisions of the EU OHQ manning guide identifying an additional engineer position (associated with Lesson M001038).

15.   M001044. <u>Libya</u>. The lack, at OHQ level, of a Civ-Mil coordination capability. Addressed through the publication of the Concept for CIS for EU-led Military Operations.

16.   M001043. <u>Libya</u>. The lack of Intelligence Systems Support (ISS) was identified in the OHQ manning (associated with Lesson M001036). Lesson observation amalgamated into M000927.

17.   M001042. <u>Libya</u>. Arrangements for EU SATCEN operation funding not fully addressed. Funding issues now included in earliest budgetary planning to achieve ATHENA consideration (associated with active Lesson M001010).

18.   M001041. <u>Libya</u>. A gap in OHQ understanding of the Brussels political process brought confusion in the drafting of the OPLAN. Early involvement of OHQ planners in the drafting of the CMC / IMD and deployment of EUMS liaison staff to OHQs has been established within the EUMS Crisis Management Manual.

19. M001040. <u>Libya</u>. It was considered that there was insufficient linkage between the EU OHQ and NATO SHAPE and JFC Naples. Links at the institutional level are being progressed to allow better operational connections during operations.

20. M001038. <u>Libya</u>. The Engineer staff at the OHQ were undermanned. This has been addressed through revisions of the EU OHQ manning guide identifying an additional engineer position (associated with Lesson M001047).

21. M001037. <u>Libya</u>. Shortfall in operation intelligence support. Addressed through the Force Generation process and the publication of the concept paper Cooperation Framework Arrangement for Intelligence Support to the EU (CFAIS).

22. M001036. <u>Libya</u>. The lack of Intelligence Systems Support (ISS) was identified in the OHQ manning (associated with Lesson M001043). Lesson observation amalgamated into M000927.

23. M001035. <u>Libya</u>. Shortfall in operation intelligence database. Partially addressed through the publication of the concept paper Cooperation Framework Arrangement for Intelligence Support to the EU (CFAIS). Lesson observation amalgamated into active Lesson M000927.

24. M001033. <u>Libya</u>. OHQ experienced a shortfall of Intelligence support at the start of their planning process. Involvement of EUMS Intelligence personnel now established through the publication of the EUMS Crisis Management Manual.

25. M001031. <u>Libya</u>. Diverging understanding of the key UN document 'Guidelines on the use of Military and Civilian Defence Assets' (MCDA) caused confusion (associated with Lesson M001012). Consideration of significant documents is now made prior to the development of the CMC.

26. M001028. <u>Libya</u>. <u>Best Practice</u>. Planning documents were exchanged between NATO and EU to ensure cooperation and coordination of activity.

27. M001027. <u>Libya</u>. <u>Best Practice</u>. The exchange of information and between EUMS and DG ECHO proved critical to operation success.

28. M001022. <u>Libya</u>. Limited logistic related information, to inform planning, was available from Member State sources. Logistically based 'country books' are being created within the EUMS.

29. M001021. <u>Libya</u>. Shortfall in intelligence planning support. Addressed through the publication of the concept paper Cooperation Framework Arrangement for Intelligence Support to the EU (CFAIS).

30. M001020. <u>Libya</u>. Differences in understanding of the need for early notification of Intelligence requirements, leading to a delay in operation intelligence support. Addressed through the publication of the concept paper Cooperation Framework Arrangement for Intelligence Support to the EU (CFAIS) and the publication of the EUMS Crisis Management Manual.

31. M001019. <u>Libya</u>. <u>Best Practice</u>. The creation of an EUMS Intelligence Task Force to support operations answered the requirement for current intelligence for planning and decision making.

32. M001018. <u>Libya</u>. Shortfall in Intelligence support by Member States and EU entities. Addressed through the publication of the concept paper Cooperation Framework Arrangement for Intelligence Support to the EU (CFAIS).

33. M001015. <u>Libya</u>. Lack of EUMS planning templates delayed the planning process. Templates are now available through the EUMS Crisis Management Manual.

34. M001014. <u>Libya</u>. The composition of the EUMS planning teams was not flexible enough to respond to the planning requirements (associated with Lesson M001011). Addressed through the publication of the EUMS Crisis Management Manual.

35. M001012. <u>Libya</u>. The differences in understanding between providing a safe and secure environment and supporting humanitarian aid caused confusion (associated with Lesson M001031). Consideration of significant documents is now made prior to the development of the CMC.

36. M001011. <u>Libya</u>. The internal EUMS crisis management procedures did not fully meet the requirements of this operation (associated with Lesson M001014). Addressed through the publication of the EUMS Crisis Management Manual.

37. M001009. <u>Libya</u>. <u>Best Practice</u>. The creation of an EUMS Current Intelligence Fusion and Assessment Cell (CIFAC) answered the requirement for current strategic level military intelligence and quick assessments.

38.   M001008. <u>Libya</u>. During the planning phases, there was a absence of military useful information and intelligence from the ground and a lack of CSDP advice available to the delegation. In future, when considered necessary, CSDP advisors are deployed as a seconded national expert to act as advisor to the delegation and point of contact for EUMS.

39.   M001007. <u>Libya</u>. Absence of a capability to garner early warning from CSDP (Civ and Mil) experienced personnel led to an absence of any contingency planning. In future, when considered necessary, CSDP advisors can be deployed as a seconded national expert to act as advisor to the delegation and point of contact for EUMS.

40.   M000970. <u>Op ATALANTA</u>. Counter-piracy vessel borne detachments (VBD) provide a great utility but may not be used on vessels of all nations. The use of Autonomous Vessel Borne Detachments (AVBD) is now widespread and coordinated through EU OHQ.

41.   M000969. <u>Op ATALANTA</u>. There are only a limited number of countries neighbouring the area of operation that will allow the transfer of suspected pirates for prosecution. Further work is required to establish a greater number of Transfer Agreements.

42.   M000968. <u>Op ATALANTA</u>. The creation of a widely available EU Secure Mission Net for the dissemination of operation vital information is subject to national caveats. A temporary solution has been achieved through SHADE (Shared Awareness and Deconfliction) and the EUCWAN (EU Classified Wide Area Network), but this is not ideal.

43.   M000965. <u>Op ATALANTA</u>. A wider understanding of maritime Best Management Practice (BMP) to protect vulnerable ships against act of piracy is required. A successful information operation has been conducted and the latest edition, BMP 4, is now complied with widely.

44.   M000962. <u>Op ATALANTA</u>. Better liaison with national shore authorities and greater inter-force coordination is required to meet the counter-piracy mandate. Contacts have been established and regular coordination conferences are undertaken.

45.   M000961. <u>Op ATALANTA</u>. The lack of organic Role 2 medical capability substantially increases the risk of operation (associated with new Lesson M001282). Use of SHADE (Shared Awareness and Deconfliction) and the force generation process ameliorates this lesson.

46.   M000960. Op ATALANTA. Best Practice. The availability of two refuelling capable logistic ships allows for greater flexibility in force planning and concurrently greater patrolling capability.

47.   M000959. Op ATALANTA. Lack of medical arrangements / agreements with local nations increase risk within task force. Work undertaken by OHQ is progressing to be able to establish medical arrangements / agreements with countries bordering the area of operation.

48.   M000958. Op ATALANTA. Improved capability in Tactical Combat Casualty Care and Improved Forward Medical Treatment to consolidate Role 1 capability afloat. Addressed through the force generation process.

49.   M000954. Op ATALANTA. The FHQ Intelligence capability is undermanned. The force generation process now addresses this issue.

50.   M000952. Op ATALANTA. Vessels are often reduced in capability due to the requirement to hold suspected pirates for lengthy periods whilst a nation willing to prosecute is found. EU level activity has increased the number of nations willing to accept suspected pirates but more action would be beneficial.

51.   M000950. Op ATALANTA. The creation of a widely available secure (to SECRET) communications capability for the dissemination of operationally vital information is subject to national caveats. A temporary solution has been achieved through SHADE (Shared Awareness and Deconfliction) and the EUCWAN (EU Classified Wide Area Network), but this is not ideal.

52.   M000947. Op ATALANTA. The creation of a widely available EU Secure Mission Net for the dissemination of operation vital information is subject to national caveats. A temporary solution has been achieved through SHADE (Shared Awareness and Deconfliction) and the EUCWAN (EU Classified Wide Area Network), but this is not ideal.

53.   M000930. Op ATALANTA. EUNAVFOR's effectiveness is reduced when the CJSOR is not met. This is particularly apparent when the availability of refuelling capable logistics vessels or Role 2 medical vessels cannot be made available by Member States. Use of SHADE (Shared Awareness and Deconfliction) and the force generation process ameliorates this lesson.

Miscellaneous (Constraint / Restraint)

1. M001302. Exercises should not be timed to coincide with leave periods in order that key planners are not replaced with new members and that unrealistic planning gaps are prevented.

2. M001291. Exercises that require experienced personnel to prove new methodology or drive experimentation should not be dominated by new joiners requiring training.

3. M001290. Late inclusion of extra exercise objectives causes reduction in foreseen output.

4. M001013. <u>Libya</u>. Short notice planning deadlines limit full consideration of options and possibly lead to a reduction in standard of planning products.

5. M000991. <u>EUTM Somalia</u>. The absence of a meteorological / oceanographic officer in the EUMS to provide detailed analysis and chart information proved detrimental. This requirement still stands and will be further reviewed in the EU Concept for Geospatial Information.

6. M000921. EU exercise scenarios need to become more flexible in order to take into consideration all areas of possible activity, including civilian and all elements of military capability. EU exercise scenarios are now designed will comprehensiveness at the core.

7. M000512. The Athena mechanism determines that the OpCdr is responsible for both operation and exercise budgets. As the responsibility for the budget of a strategic level exercises would more suitably be allocated to the officer conducting the exercise (OCE) the Athena Council was approached to amend its procedures. This was rejected and would require Member State intervention to elicit a reversal of decision.

8. M000492. EU Battle Groups should form an element of EU strategic level exercises. From ML14, the EUBG will be included as part of the training audience.

LESSONS THAT CAN ONLY BE TAKEN FORWARD BY MEMBER STATES

Early Warning and Prudent / Advance Planning

1. M001007. <u>Libya</u>. Absence of a capability to garner early warning from CSDP (Civ and Mil) experienced personnel led to an absence of any contingency planning. Although in future, when considered necessary, CSDP advisors can be deployed as a seconded national expert to act as advisor to the delegation and point of contact for EUMS, a more formal and procedural method of achieving this requirement is needed.

Situation Assessment

1. M001008. <u>Libya</u>. During the planning phases, there was a absence of military useful information and intelligence from the ground and a lack of CSDP advice available to the delegation. Although in future, when considered necessary, CSDP advisors can be deployed as a seconded national expert to act as advisor to the delegation and point of contact for EUMS, a more formal and procedural method of achieving this requirement is needed.

Strategic Planning

1. M001345. A definitive procedure for 'force sensing' is required to allow Operation and Force Commanders to conduct planning and initiate the Force Generation process.

2. M000991. <u>EUTM Somalia</u>. The absence of a meteorological / oceanographic officer in the EUMS to provide detailed analysis and chart information proved detrimental. This requirement still stands and will be further reviewed in the EU Concept for Geospatial Information.

3. M000969. <u>Op ATALANTA</u>. There are only a limited number of countries neighbouring the area of operation that will allow the transfer of suspected pirates for prosecution. Further work is required to establish a greater number of Transfer Agreements.

4.   M000947. <u>Op ATALANTA</u>. EUNAVFOR's effectiveness is reduced when the CJSOR is not met. This is particularly apparent when the availability of refuelling capable logistics vessels or Role 2 medical vessels cannot be made available by Member States. Use of SHADE (Shared Awareness and Deconfliction) and the force generation process ameliorates this lesson.

<u>Miscellaneous</u>

1.   M001283. <u>Op ATALANTA</u>. Due to the requirements of the EU Data Protection Act, the recording, storage and transfer of the personal details of suspected pirates is challenging. Methods to establish the details of suspected pirates regularly apprehended are needed.

2.   M001279. <u>Op ATALANTA</u>. Failure to meet the objectives aid out in the operational requirement (particularly the need for sufficiently capable maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft) reduces the capability of the operational force to patrol the complete area of operation effectively.

3.   M001278. <u>Op ATALANTA</u>. Efforts to persuade nations bordering the operation area to permit local basing of maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft will significantly increase the ability to patrol the full extent of the operation area.

4.   M000968. <u>Op ATALANTA</u>. The creation of a widely available EU Secure Mission Net for the dissemination of operation vital information is subject to national caveats. A temporary solution has been achieved through SHADE and the EUCWAN, but this is not ideal.

5.   M000952. <u>Op ATALANTA</u>. Vessels are often reduced in capability due to the requirement to hold suspected pirates for lengthy periods whilst a nation willing to prosecute is found. EU level activity has increased the number of nations willing to accept suspected pirates but more action would be beneficial.

6.   M000917. Augmentees provided by Member States were not all fully trained or prepared to fill their roles within the EUMS planning teams. Member States have been reminded of the requirements and encouraged to provide suitable personnel and supplementary training in provided by EUMS on arrival.

7.   M000512. The Athena mechanism determines that the OpCdr is responsible for both operation and exercise budgets. As the responsibility for the budget of a strategic level exercises would more suitably be allocated to the officer conducting the exercise (OCE) the Athena Council was approached to amend its procedures. This was rejected and would require Member State intervention to elicit a reversal of decision.