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| From:      | European External Action Service (EEAS)   |
| To:        | Political and Security Committee (PSC)  |
|            | European Union Military Committee (EUMC)  |
| Subject:   | Military Advice on the Concept Note on Operational Planning and Conduct Capabilities for CSDP Missions and Operations |

Delegations will find attached document EEAS(2017) 157 REV 6.

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## EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE



#### EUROPEAN UNION MILITARY STAFF

Brussels, 16 February 2017

EEAS(2017) 157 REV 6

COPS CSDP/PSDC

| From:    | European Union Military Staff  |
|----------|--|
| To:      | Political and Security Committee   |
|          | European Union Military Committee  |
|          | EU Military Representatives  |
| Subject: | Military Advice on the Concept Note on Operational Planning and Conduct<br>Capabilities for CSDP Missions and Operations |

AO: EUMS/OPS/MAP

Delegations will find attached the Military Advice on the Concept Note on the Operational Planning and

Conduct Capabilities for CSDP Missions and Operations, which was agreed by the EUMC on 16

February 2017.

#### **References:**

- A. Council Decision 2008/298/CFSP, of 7 April 2008, amending Decision 2001/80/CFSP on the establishment of the Military Staff of the European Union, OJ L 102, 12.4.2008
- B. Suggestions for crisis management procedures for CSDP crisis management operations. ST 7660/2/13 REV 2 ARES (2013) 2270818, dated 18 June 2013.
- C. EU Concept for Military Command and Control, ST 5008/15 EEAS 02021/7/14 REV 7, of 5 January 2015.
- EU Concept for Military Planning at the Political Strategic Level (6432/15 EEAS 02246/8/14 REV 8, dated 23 February 2015).
- E. Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/528, of 27 March 2015.
- F. Military Input on CSDP Military Operations and Non-Executive Missions Support Requirements, ST 12817/16 – EEAS(2016) 441 REV 4, of 30 September 2016.
- G. Council Conclusions on implementing the EU Global Strategy in the area of Security and Defence, ST 14149/16, of 14 November 2016.
- H. European Council Meeting (15 December 2016) Conclusions, ST 00034/16, of 15 December 2016.
- I. Concept Note on the Operational Planning and Conduct Capabilities for CSDP Missions and Operations, of 31 January 2017.
- J. PSC tasking to the EUMC to provide a Military Advice on the Concept Note of 03 and 09 February 2017.

### A. INTRODUCTION

1. The aim of this paper is to provide Military Advice on ref. I based on the PSC tasking at ref. J.

### **B.** CONSIDERATIONS

- I. Advice on the Concept Note proposals of enhanced political-strategic level planning and oversight of missions and operations with particular emphasis on civ-mil synergies
- 2. The EUMC welcomes ref. I and appreciates the opportunity to provide military advice. The EUMC assesses that the proposals put forward on the improvement of the planning and oversight of missions and operations at the political-strategic level require military input and should lay out options and expected benefits and include options on a feasible adaptation of the current CSDP structures at the political-strategic level where appropriate, aiming at maximising the civilian and military synergies.

# II. Advice on the Concept Note proposals on a permanent operational planning and conduct capability at the strategic level for non-executive military missions.

- 3. The EUMC recalls its detailed investigation into the current deficiencies at ref. F. Therefore the EUMC welcomes the proposal to establish, as a short term objective, a permanent military planning and conduct capability at the military strategic level for non-executive military missions in Brussels (henceforth called a Military Planning and Conduct Capability, MPCC). This will introduce an additional entity in the chain of command that reports to the PSC and informs the EUMC and is capable of rendering the appropriate command, control and support to the non-executive military Missions in theatre.
- 4. The EUMC underlines that the implementation of the MPCC cannot compromise the current role and functions of the EUMS at the political-strategic level, including its support to the EUMC.
- 5. The EUMC assesses that the "Head of the MPCC" \* should assume the same role, tasks and command relationships as those attributed to a military Operation Commander (OpCdr), with the restriction that the Command authority is to be up to Operational Control (OPCON). The draft Terms of Reference (ToR) of the MPCC which are sketched in Annex 1 of Reference I were used as the main guidelines for the suggested ToR of "Head of the MPCC"\* which are outlined in Annex A to this Military Advice. The Mission Force Commander, who will act under the command of the "Head of the MPCC"\*, remains responsible for exercising the military functions at the operational and tactical levels in theatre.

The EUMC considers that the "Head of the MPCC"<sup>\*</sup> should exercise the responsibilities in relation to the Athena Mechanism which are currently exercised by Operation Commanders and Mission Commanders, including as Authorising Officers, supported by specialised staff.

6. The EUMC particularly stresses that the current procedures of appointing a commander and of exercising political control and strategic direction remain as stated in Article 38 TEU<sup>1</sup>, on the understanding that there will be only one "Head of the MPCC"<sup>\*</sup> for all EU military non-executive missions. The command and control relationships are outlined at Annex A.

<sup>\*</sup> whose functional title could be "Military Missions Commander and Director of the MPCC" or "Chief of Military Missions and Director of the MPCC".

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Article 38 TEU: "...Within the scope of this Chapter, the Political and Security Committee shall exercise, under the responsibility of the Council and of the High Representative, the political control and strategic direction of the crisis management operations referred to in Article 43...". See also ref. B, para: "44. Based on the PSC recommendation, the Council adopts a Decision establishing the mission/operation whereby it: a. sets out the objectives and the mandate of the mission/operation; b. appoints the military/civilian Operation Commander and designates the OHQ...".

- 7. The EUMC welcomes the proposal to establish a Joint Support Cell (JSC) with its intended tasks as mentioned in Ref. I in order to further enhance civil-military planning and conduct at the military-strategic level. The corresponding civilian and military resources of the CPCC and the MPCC should remain under their respective chains of command. During the implementation of the MPCC, the JSC will be based on a committee format with ToR to be agreed, working as a cooperative forum to enhance civ-mil synergies. This should be reviewed after an appropriate period of time. The working relationships between elements of the MPCC and CPCC within the JSC will require further clarification as part of the ToR to be developed in due course. The EUMC encourages the Director of the CPCC and the "Head of the MPCC"<sup>\*</sup> to look beyond the functions outlined in ref. I, especially in seeking further synergies in the planning of missions.
- 8. As regards resourcing the new entity the EUMC assesses that the first step of moving resources from the former Activated OPCEN to the EUMS at the end of December 2016 was crucial and must be followed by further generating those capabilities necessary to meet the new requirements to plan and conduct EU non-executive military missions at the military-strategic level. The resources for this new capability, especially in terms of personnel, will be generated by drawing on the following resources:
  - Personnel from the former Activated OPCEN HoA/Sahel (single-hatted and exclusively for the MPCC);
  - b) The existing expertise, including internally reassigning personnel (subject to the sending Member States` and/or EUMC approval as appropriate) across the EUMS (e.g. doublehatting, if feasible and sustainable);
  - c) An EU MS augmentation system, specifically providing MPCC with personnel either permanently (key staff) or on a non-permanent augmentation and time-limited basis (e.g. a surge requirement for planning phases);
  - d) The size and structures of current non-executive missions in theatre, thus identifying economies of scale to help create the new planning and conduct capability.
- 9. The EUMC highlights the requirement to update current Council approved documents to adequately reflect the creation of the new entity at the military-strategic level within the EEAS structures. Inter alia, this would include the current EUMS ToR at ref. A and Crisis Management Procedures at ref. B<sup>2</sup>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> E.g. ref. B, p. 31 (footnote 23): "The relevant aspects relating to the OpCdr and Force Commander (FCdr) will apply to a Mission Commander (MCdr) where one is appointed and combines the function of OpCdr and FCdr".

10. Recalling the detailed investigations of current deficiencies at ref. F, a "Head of the MPCC"<sup>\*</sup> with sole responsibilities at the military-strategic level is the desired military solution.

Given the current limitations of personnel, infrastructure and time and also in order to preserve the current functions and responsibilities of the EUMS, the EUMC advises that the following proposal represents a workable solution within means and capabilities:

- a) <u>Implementation</u>: In the short term, a small, nascent MPCC within the EUMS would deliver immediate effect, working jointly and ensuring integrated civilian-military CSDP engagement at the civilian military strategic level. The DG EUMS would be best placed initially to become responsible for the planning and conduct of all military non-executive missions at the military-strategic level. Whilst he will retain responsibility for the Missions, it is within his remit to delegate tasks as appropriate. The MPCC should be implemented in the first semester 2017.
- b) <u>Review</u>: This assessment should be based on the experience gathered during an appropriate duration in order to allow relevant and reliable outcomes: at the end of one year after the implementation of the MPCC but not later than the end of 2018 may be an appropriate horizon. A future review could assess the functioning, the efficiency and the organisational structure of the MPCC against the defined objectives, its possible future position within the EEAS structures and its ToRs.

The EUMC recognizes the potential of incompatibility of functions in the future MPCC, due to the merging of roles and responsibilities of MPCC staff, in particular regarding the position of "Head of the MPCC"<sup>\*</sup>. The way ahead should be subject to this review and further military advice from the EUMC and would not prejudge any political decisions to be taken.

11. The EUMC stresses that there is a need to ensure that the means available to the MPCC remain commensurate with the assigned tasks (ToRs – i.e. 24/7 tasks).

### C. RECOMMENDATION

- 12. The EUMC recommends that the PSC:
  - (a) agrees to this Military Advice;
  - (b) invites the EEAS to amend the concept note in line with the considerations above.

#### Terms of Reference of the "Head of the MPCC"<sup>\*</sup>

The "Head of the MPCC"<sup>\*</sup> for the non-executive military missions and Director MPCC will have the appropriate command authority (up to OPCON over forces by Transfer of Authority (TOA) from the contributing MS and non-EU TCN) to assume the necessary functions, roles and tasks in order to exercise command and control at the military strategic level for the planning and conduct all EU non-executive military missions, including:

- operation planning at the military strategic level (e.g. development of the CONOPS/OPLAN, ROE, SOR) and to perform his functions during the Force Generation Process (Ref. C);
- the mission conduct (execution) at the military strategic level of command ("current operations"), including:
  - the establishment and operation of the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC);
  - establish, in conjunction with the CPCC, a Joint Support Cell in order to further enhance civ-mil synergies;
  - the co-ordination of the deployment of forces, the termination of the non-executive military mission and the re-deployment of forces;
  - to report to the EUMC at regular intervals;
  - the direct responsibility vis-à-vis the Council to report to the PSC and the Committee of Contributors on all operational matters related to the missions. CEUMC remains as the primary point of contact as necessary;
  - the management and mitigation of risk, based, inter alia, on the existing permanent (24/7) threat and risk assessment and situational awareness capabilities;
  - the development of strategic direction and guidance to support the Mission Force Commanders at the operational and tactical level in theatre, as appropriate;

<sup>\*</sup> whose functional title could be "Military Missions Commander and Director of the MPCC" or "Chief of Military Missions and Director of the MPCC".

- the responsibility in relation to budget and procurement (responsibilities of Operation Commanders under the ATHENA mechanism) and conducting force generation (including third states' contributions);
- the mission assessment to continuously ensure the missions are operating in line with the military strategic desired end state and objectives;
- providing an input to the Lessons Learned database for EU Military CSDP operations/missions;
- supporting the coordination / improvement of synergies in the Areas of Operations (AOOs) with other relevant actors (transfer of current tasks of the Activated EU OPCEN (AOC) related to planning and conduct support at the military strategic level (and below) and the set of coordination functions);
- interface for coordination and liaison with relevant civ-mil stakeholders in crisis management matters outside the AOOs and at the EU institutional level, such as:
  - MS and non-EU TCNs,
  - CivOpsCdr/CPCC as required,
  - EUSR and EEAS,
  - EU SATCEN,
  - o IOs,
  - European Commission;
- the conduct, where mandated, of Key Leader Engagement (KLE) at strategic level with relevant EU and non-EU stakeholders, within means and capabilities;
- the request, as required, and in accordance with valid procedures, for intelligence support from EUMS INT (available SIAC products, liaison with MS Defence Intelligence Organisations, RFI flow facilitation, INT expertise).