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Delegations will find attached the declassified version of the above document.

The text of this document is identical to the previous version.

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


**COUNCIL OF  
THE EUROPEAN UNION**

**Brussels, 22 October 2007**

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## **NOTE**

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Subject:	Op ALTHEA – Consolidated Report on "Historical Lessons Identified" from the Execution of Operation ALTHEA

Delegations will find attached the Consolidated Report on "Historical Lessons Identified" from the execution of Operation ALTHEA, which was agreed by the EUMC on 22 October 2007.

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## References:

- A. EUMC Report on Operation ALTHEA Lessons Identified during the Planning Phase (8912/05), dated 13 May 2005.
- B. Co-ordination and Coherence between the EU Special Representative (EUSR), the EU Military Operation (EUFOR) and the EU Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) (December 2004- August 2006): Lessons Learnt (15376/06), dated 15 November 2006.
- C. Military Advice on Secretariat's Paper on Co-ordination and Coherence between the EU Special Representative (EUSR), the EU Military Operation (EUFOR) and the EU Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) (December 2004- August 2006): Lessons Learnt (16034/06), dated 30 November 2006.
- D. Operation ALTHEA-Historical Lessons Identified (SN 3745/07), dated 30 July 2007.
- E. Outcome of Proceedings EUMC 29 August (12497/07), dated 30 August 2007.

## **A. INTRODUCTION**

- 1. The EU Operation Commander offered, at Reference D, his strategic observations from the beginning of the Operation ALTHEA in December 2004 until the implementation of EUFOR transition in April 2007. The EUMC invited, at Reference E, Member States to provide their inputs in order that the EUMS can develop a consolidated report.

## **B. AIM**

- 2. The EUMC has already agreed the lessons identified during the planning phase of Operation ALTHEA at Reference A. This document aims to summarise the key military strategic lessons identified from the execution phase of the operation, drawing together the observations offered by the Member States and the EU Operation Commander in order to develop the full picture of the EU's military engagement in BiH from the military strategic perspective.

## **C. OBSERVATIONS**

- 3. This document does not take account of the political-military parameters of the operation with regard the deployment of different EU actors in BiH as it is assessed they are analysed satisfactorily at Reference B. Furthermore, the EUMC has stressed, at Reference C, the importance of an endeavour which will take into account the experience and expertise gained from all actors in theatre.

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4. As the political aspects of the operation are within the competence of the PSC, lessons requiring political decision are also not included in this document.
5. In addition, a number of military lessons at the operational level that have been identified during this process and which stem predominantly from the Member States' experience in theatre are also incorporated in this document.

## D. RECOMMENDATION

6. It is important to maintain a follow-up process once these lessons have been agreed. It is therefore proposed that the EUMS be tasked to maintain the management of these lessons in the newly established EUMS lessons management application (ELMA). This systematic approach would subsequently enable, at an appropriate juncture, the possible revision of relevant doctrines and concepts and could be conducive to the future planning of EU military operations.

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### Annexes:

- A. Lessons Identified Reflecting EU Operation Commander's Observations
- B. Lessons Identified Reflecting Member States' Observations

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## ANNEX A

### LESSONS IDENTIFIED REFLECTING EU OPERATION COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS

NO	FUNCTIONAL AREA	OBSERVATION	LESSON IDENTIFIED
1.	Plans primarily Operations also to be involved	<p>Berlin Plus works well at the military level and provides an efficient cost-effective model option for ESDP operations.</p> <p>Throughout the planning and execution of Operation ALTHEA, the EU has had access to NATO assets and capabilities under the Berlin Plus arrangements. The EU OHQ and EUCE were established at SHAPE and HQ JFC Naples respectively, as part of the EU Chain of Command for Operation ALTHEA, in accordance with the Specific Agreement outlining the NATO common assets that would be available in support of Operation ALTHEA. Locating the OHQ at SHAPE has allowed us to benefit from a well trained and coherent strategic headquarters with considerable corporate experience of planning and conducting operations in the Balkans. This was of undoubted advantage during the initial transfer of the operation from SFOR to EUFOR. The EU Operation Commander's double-hatted role as the EU Operation Commander and DSACEUR has lent the operation the appropriate level of authority.</p>	<p>The nomination of DSACEUR as the EU Operation Commander proved beneficial for the military benchmarks that had to be achieved for the successful planning and conduction of the operation. The harmonisation of all the practicalities related to the implementation of Berlin plus arrangement by the EU Operation Commander proved imperative to the overall success. The double-hatting of COS JFC Naples as Head EUCE added coherence between EU and NATO operations in the region. The consequent running of the operation was achieved using a small number of fully dedicated EU officers who had access to NATO assets and SHAPE officers' expertise.</p>

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NO	FUNCTIONAL AREA	OBSERVATION	LESSON IDENTIFIED
		<p>The EUCE at Naples has provided an effective linkage to JFC Naples, the NATO headquarters responsible for the Balkans joint operational area. Again, double- hatting the COS JFC as Head of the EUCE has allowed us to focus on the regional aspects of the operation and, in particular, coordinate the use of our shared reserves with NATO (see comment 3 below). Whilst acknowledging the current political difficulties associated with Berlin Plus, it is clear that it has provided an efficient mechanism for command and control of the operation and has been particularly cost effective: the entire command and control of the operation at the strategic and operational levels has been achieved using less than 30 EU staff officers.</p>	

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NO	FUNCTIONAL AREA	OBSERVATION	LESSON IDENTIFIED
2.	CIS	NATO communication and information system (CIS) services have been successfully provided to EUFOR. EUFOR CIS operations in BiH have been and, following the transition to Step 1, continue to be dependant upon timely and continuous support supplied by NATO under Berlin Plus. The Berlin Plus concept has proved invaluable and most successful in enabling efficient and effective CIS support for EUFOR operations since the commencement of the mission. The access to suitable NATO assets and relevant capabilities by EUFOR, on site and in sufficient quantities, with the availability of supporting NATO operation and maintenance (O & M) systems, has ensured EUFOR CIS success.	The use of NATO CIS assets was a pragmatic and cost-effective solution for the beginning of the EU operation and provided EUFOR with appropriate CIS support.
3.	Plans primarily Operations also to be involved	Shared Reserve Forces between EU and NATO have been successfully rehearsed and tested on operations. EU and NATO share Operational and Strategic Reserve Forces (ORF/SRF). JFC Naples and EUCE have played a major part in the employment and rehearsal of the ORF Battalions. In addition, there are arrangements for mutual support between KFOR and EUFOR using in-Theatre tactical reserve forces. EUCE, as the organisation responsible for decision on the use of ORF and TACRES Mutual Support, took the lead in developing a joint EU-NATO contingency plan for the employment of reserves.	The efficiency of the shared EU-NATO reserve mechanisms was tested and reduced significantly the burden sharing for the nations providing the ORF battalions.

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NO	FUNCTIONAL AREA	OBSERVATION	LESSON IDENTIFIED
4.	Plans, Operations and Logistics	<p>Use of SHAPE expertise has provided cost-effective specialist support.</p> <p>With the OHQ located at SHAPE, the EU has cost effective access to SHAPE specialist expertise. For example:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• SHAPE provides EU OHQ with public information support</li> <li>• The EU OHQ medical advisor is also the SHAPE medical advisor, providing a high degree of technical expertise</li> <li>• SHAPE financial controller is also the EU OHQ financial controller.</li> </ul>	For Berlin plus operations, specialist support required mainly in the logistic field can be provided from SHAPE and has not be sourced from Member States.



## RESTREINT UE

NO	FUNCTIONAL AREA	OBSERVATION	LESSON IDENTIFIED
5.	Operations and civilian/military co-operation	<p>Agreement on detailed delineation and deconfliction of tasks is best delegated to commanders and the relevant actors in Theatre.</p> <p>Operation ALTHEA has been conducted in a particularly complex politico-military environment. With a plethora of military and international community actors in Theatre, deconfliction and careful delineation of tasks and responsibilities was necessary from the outset of the operation in order to provide clear responsibilities and avoid duplication of effort. Within the EU family, coordinating guidance was provided in the Joint Actions for ALTHEA and for the EUSR and, in the case of the former, elaborated in my OPLAN. Subsequent refinement of mutual consultation mechanisms has been helpful. Between EUFOR and NATO HQ Sarajevo (NHQSa), attempting to deconflict in Brussels proved intractable, so it was delegated to the respective in-Theatre commanders, who took ownership of the problem and produced a mutually acceptable, and above all, workable solution. A detailed deconfliction matrix was produced which saw the problem solved pragmatically as a technical issue. Equally, common operational guidelines were established between EUFOR and EUPM at the end of last year to establish relevant responsibilities, especially in the fight against organised crime. Continuous close consultation between COMEUFOR and EUSR, Head EUPM and SMR NHQSa has minimised the scope for error.</p>	<p>Delegation to in-theatre commanders for deconflicting the problems arising from different chains of command is to be done where necessary in order to ensure maximum mutual understanding.</p>

## RESTREINT UE

NO	FUNCTIONAL AREA	OBSERVATION	LESSON IDENTIFIED
		For EU-NATO cooperation, the EU Operation Commander's role as NATO's military strategic coordinator has helped facilitate this.	
6.	Civilian military co-operation	<p>EUFOR coordination with the EU family in Theatre has supported a coherent EU approach within BiH. Efficient coordination between EUPM and other EU bodies (EUSR/HR, EUMM and EUPM) proved to be essential to ensure coherence and present a united EU front to the BiH authorities. EUSR/HR and EUPM coordinated their information campaigns, such that EUPM transition and OHR continuation did not appear contradictory. The cooperation between EUPM, EUPM and BiH local law enforcement agencies helped support the fight against organised crime and corruption. Close relations between EUPM and EUMM have helped to enhance situational awareness. Best practice could be reflected in the respected Joint Actions of each mission, without constraining the freedom of action of the EU actors involved.</p>	<p>With regard to the EU actors in theatre (EUSR/HR, EUMM, EUPM and EU Commission), the principle of <i>primus inter pares</i> is the most applicable model to describe the EUSR non-command relationship. EUSR should ensure maximum coherence through regular consultations without prejudice to the military chain of command.</p> <p>EUPM information activities are to be co-ordinated with the EU family.</p> <p>The adoption of Common Operational Guidelines between EUPM and EUPM with regard the fight against organised crime had an important complimentary role to the strengthening of operational capacity by the local law enforcement agencies (LEAs).</p>

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NO	FUNCTIONAL AREA	OBSERVATION	LESSON IDENTIFIED
7.	Operations	<p>Instructions to Parties (ITP) are a decisive tool for the Force Commander.</p> <p>Since the GFAP provisions are set out in general terms, there is a need for further interpretation and clarification. The ITP are a viable tool to define the Parties' responsibilities and obligations. Set out by the Force Commander, they ensure that the Parties are acquainted with the respective tasks set out by the GFAP and how to accomplish them.</p>	<p>Instructions to Parties (ITP) are a useful tool in order to hand over the residual joint military affairs (JMA) responsibilities to the local authorities.</p>
8.	Operations	<p>Early and sustained engagement with the member states, through the PSC (with appropriate EUMC advice) was fundamental in enabling a timely decision to reduce the force, without undermining its credibility and cohesion.</p> <p>At the outset of the operation, there was a political imperative to ensure a seamless handover from SFOR to EUFOR and thus effectively we conducted a relief in place, maintaining the status quo in terms of troop numbers (about 7000). During 2006, it became apparent that the security environment had become stable enough to allow the force to reposture. A transition concept was produced and its initial step and a revised OPLAN approved; the timing of this change was driven by events in Theatre and took into account the various aspirations of member states for continued contribution to the force. In this, the six-monthly review process proved a useful tool.</p>	<p>The six monthly review process through PSC, with appropriate military advice from the EUMC, proved valuable in preparing the ground for the political decision to reconfigure EUFOR.</p>

## RESTREINT UE

NO	FUNCTIONAL AREA	OBSERVATION	LESSON IDENTIFIED
9.	Operations	The time required for EUFOR transition planning and decision support should not be underestimated. Preparation for EUFOR transition in BiH lasted from Feb 06 to Feb 07. This timeframe broadly allowed sufficient time to identify and solve most of the transition related issues. Most key areas of operational and logistic significance had been addressed and analysed by the time formal decisions were taken in Feb 07.	Prudent military strategic planning by the EU OHQ, with the necessary guidance from the EUMC is needed prior the submission of the transition concept to PSC.
10.	Operations	Continuity of key staff is vital to the smooth planning and implementation of any transition process. Short tours and continuous "churn" of key planning staff slightly impacted on the efficient planning of EUFOR transition. Throughout the process, discontinuity of staff manifested itself in a certain degree of planning inertia within some functional areas.	Whilst acknowledging that the length of tours of duty remains the prerogative of TCNs, the extension of deployment time for key posts in order to ensure continuity and improve the operational efficiency of EUFOR, the deployment of appropriately qualified and trained personnel and the filling of staff vacancies is vital in order to underwrite the successful running of the operation.

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NO	FUNCTIONAL AREA	OBSERVATION	LESSON IDENTIFIED
11.	Operations	<p>Host Nation Support has a role to play in the latter stages of the operation.</p> <p>Progress made in the implementation of defence reform has enabled EUFOR to consider the armed forces of BiH (AFBiH) as "friendly forces". Based on this progress, EUFOR has been able to rely on the host nation to provide support to training activities, particularly through provision of local training facilities. AFBiH participation in future EUFOR training is being encouraged, although take-up has been slow to date.</p>	<p>The enhancement of co-operation with the AF BiH is indicative of the progress achieved in building up effective defence structures and their consequent capability to generate necessary resources/infrastructure, thus reducing the burden of EUFOR and TCNs.</p>

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## ANNEX B

### LESSONS IDENTIFIED REFLECTING MEMBER STATES' OBSERVATIONS

NO	FUNCTIONAL AREA	OBSERVATION	LESSON IDENTIFIED
1.	Plans primarily Operations also to be involved	The Berlin Plus agreement proved to work very well although the chain of command presented some ambiguities. Particularly, DSACEUR and COS JFC had both commanding functions on COMEUFOR and de-confliction measures between them had not been established in advance. It was only because the tempo of the operation did not require quick responses that all decisions were taken on time. Therefore, in order to cope with scenarios that require quick decisions it is essential to rely on a unique chain of command.	A clear delineation of the functions undertaken by EUCE (Co-ordination of reserves, regional view and provision of intelligence) as contained in the recently approved OPLAN has to be set from the outset of the operation in order to avoid unnecessary duplication and ensure that COMEUFOR can respond to any event on a timely manner.
2.	CIS	Although communications established under the Berlin Plus agreement worked well, mobile comms were scarce and often unreliable due to the use of often incompatible national systems.	Prudent planning is needed by CIS experts in order to identify workable solutions which will tailor the different national systems provided by the troop contributing nations.

## RESTREINT UE

NO	FUNCTIONAL AREA	OBSERVATION	LESSON IDENTIFIED
3.	Logistics	<p><u>Infrastructure</u></p> <p>Beginning with the planning of the assumption of the mission by the European Union the TF had to provide infrastructure for deploying forces. No TCN of the MNTF N was able to take over all the tasks, similar to the US, as a "Lead nation". In order to ensure conduct of the operation individual nations (FI, SE, AT) were forced to advance resources. For the financial burden sharing lengthy negotiations were necessary with a high amount of laboriously negotiated agreements.</p>	OHQ could facilitate the relevant preparations of TCNs in issues related to infrastructure and real estate in an effort to inform cost-efficient solutions.
4.	Logistics	<p>-Multinational Logistics</p> <p>NSEs are responsible for providing administrative and logistic support for their contingents. Six Monthly Reviews highlighted concerns over the number of support personnel under national control, as under the present command relationship COMEUFOR does not control 20% of the troops in theatre.</p>	<p>Concentrating units in multinational camps, where support can be shared saves both money and personnel and is to be commended and encouraged. Multi-National Integrated Logistic Units (MILU) may reduce assets in theatre.</p> <p>Multinational logistic arrangements under COMEUFOR's co-ordination authority should be encouraged in order to minimise the cost of logistic support.</p>
5.	Operations	In some cases the availability of NATO common assets and capabilities failed to be granted (Changes in cipher keys in SATCOM). That forced ATHENA to buy or contract the failing capabilities.	Presumption of availability need to be refined or defined with NATO in a closer way, mainly in CIS upgrades.

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NO	FUNCTIONAL AREA	OBSERVATION	LESSON IDENTIFIED
6.	Intelligence	The handover of the required NATO intelligence database was achieved not in December 2004 but in July 2005.	Practical aspects linked to the implementation of the Berlin Plus arrangement should be addressed early in the planning phase.

