NOTE

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ALGERIA

1. GENERAL SITUATION

Since 2000, there have been a large number of seizures of cannabis resin in Algeria.

The official statistics, provided by the National Anti-Drugs and Drug Addiction Office at the Algerian Ministry of Justice, confirm that during the first six months of 2016 there was a 4.86 % increase in the quantity of cannabis resin seized by the Algerian security forces (the GN and DGSN) and customs officials in comparison with the same period in 2015. These statistical data can do no more than confirm trends, because it is impossible to check them against the statistics of each of the law enforcement bodies involved in the fight against drug trafficking.
During the reference period, **69 400.840 kg** of cannabis resin was seized, **71.37 %** in the interior of the country. The region with the highest level of drug seizures was the wilaya of Tlemcen, which is in north-western Algeria on the border with Morocco, the world's biggest cannabis producer. The region with the next-highest level of seizures is to the south, where surveillance is much more complicated.

The **Tlemcen route** is the favoured one for bringing drugs into Algeria, although the border remains closed and security there has been strengthened by the Algerian authorities in response to the rise in drug trafficking in that part of the country. Within Algeria, the roads linking **Ghardaïa** with **Ouargla** and Ouargla with **El-Oued** have witnessed a rise in seizures of large quantities of cannabis resin in transit.

The **routes identified** in Algeria by the enforcement authorities involved in fighting the drugs trade run from the west of the country to the borders with Tunisia and Libya.

The strong pressure within the country, including a considerable strengthening of security at the borders and across the road network, has led traffickers to bring drugs into Algeria from Morocco **by sea**, as can be seen from the seizures made by the Algerian coast guard and national gendarmerie. Such seizures are always of small packages of approximately 30 kg.

After cannabis, **psychotropic drugs** form the second largest category by volume of seizures, **up by 137.64 %** compared with the reference period in 2015. These drugs, which may be destined for the French market, are apparently transported using 'mules', who carry them in small quantities on commercial flights between Algeria and France.
The amount of cocaine and heroin in the country fell considerably in 2016 compared with 2015. The total amount of cocaine seized in the period referred to was 50 851.2606 g, a decrease of 40.17%.

The total amount of heroine seized in 2016 was 1 329.4436 g, a decrease of 47.40%.

It is estimated that there are over 300 000 drug addicts in Algeria, and the number is growing each year. It is therefore becoming increasingly common for some of the drugs entering the country to be destined for domestic consumption.

2. INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

In recent years the Algerian authorities have strengthened their mechanisms for combating drug trafficking and contraband in general by means of legislation. They continue to emphasise the close link between drug-trafficking networks and terrorism in the region and that the former is one of the main sources of funding for the latter, with terrorism, arms trafficking, money laundering, corruption and smuggling all closely connected. At the same time, Algeria appears to be a transit zone for sending drugs to the Middle East and Europe, though in recent years the number of people consuming drugs in Algeria has also risen.

Algeria is part of the MedNET Euro-Mediterranean cooperation network (Pompidou Group, Council of Europe), which was set up in 2006 with the aim of developing north-south cooperation plans and activities in order to combat drugs. Other members include France, Italy, Lebanon, Morocco, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Tunisia.
In this respect, the complexity of the Algerian institutions involved in combating drugs must be taken into account. On the one hand, control of the borders (border wilayas) is handled mainly by the units of the ANP, including the gendarmerie and its border guard, which are all part of the Ministry of National Defence, as well as the customs service under the Algerian Finance Ministry. Most of the organised crime and smuggling activities affecting Algeria originate in these extensive border areas. In the country's interior, operations are primarily handled by the DGSN and GN through their judicial police units.

Algerian legislation

In the situation described, the following laws have been passed:

– Law No 04-18 of 25 December 2004 on the prevention and suppression of the consumption and unlawful trafficking of drugs.

– Law No 05-01 of 6 February 2005 on the prevention and combating of money laundering and of the funding of terrorism. Supplemented on 13 February 2012.

– Law No 06-01 of 20 February 2006 on the prevention and combating of corruption. Supplemented on 20 August 2011.

– Ordinance No 12-02 of 13 February 2012 amending and supplementing Law No 5-01 of 6 February 2005 on the prevention and combating of money laundering and of the funding of terrorism.

3. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

In relation to Spain, cooperation with the Algerian authorities is organised within the framework of the protocols for cooperation between the Directorates-General of the Police and of the Guardia Civil with the National Security Directorate-General (Interior Ministry) and the National Gendarmerie Directorate-General and the National Coastguard Service of Algeria (the latter being Defence Ministry bodies).
The protocols address activities related to training and operational information exchange among the signatory bodies.

As regards **Portugal**, the judicial police under the Ministry of Justice responsible for investigations into international drug trafficking is currently working on a bilateral cooperation initiative with the DGSN/Directorate of the Judicial Police.

With regard to the **Netherlands**, there is good cooperation between the ports of Amsterdam and Algiers; this goes beyond the economic sphere and also addresses security issues at the level of the port authorities. The customs authorities of the two countries are starting to cooperate on security-related matters.

4. **EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

Evaluation

In the light of the above, it can be stated that:

- Seizures of cannabis resin on Algerian territory increased slightly in 2016 compared with the previous year, presumably owing to the gradual sealing of the border with Morocco through the increased deployment of personnel by the security forces engaged in combating drugs and smuggling, and support from army units.

- The international cooperation situation described in the previous point has evolved with the consolidation of narco-terrorism as a concept, it being a permanent and secure source of financing for armed groups operating in the Sahel region. Now that there is a clear link between terrorism and organised crime, Algeria has strengthened its legislation on combating money laundering and the funding of terrorism.
– As in previous periods, the fact that Europe has been identified as a destination for drugs transiting the country – given their proximity to Algeria, the countries in question are essentially Spain, France, Greece and Italy – means that closer analysis is needed of the foreign currency trafficking generated by this illegal activity and of the way in which such money is returning to the networks involved. In the case of Algeria, the existence of the informal market makes it easier to launder this money.

Recommendations

– Increase cooperation on training, operations and prevention to address the use of drugs and psychotropic substances, and step up cooperation on treating addiction. In this cooperation, it is very important to include the Sahel region, of which Algeria is part, through the existing regional cooperation mechanisms.

– Propose amending Algeria's legislation (the code of criminal procedure) to accommodate coordination mechanisms for developing controlled deliveries, in order to identify the structure of the networks operating at the points of departure, transit and final destination of drugs, and thus enable comprehensive action to be taken.

– Boost international coordination mechanisms for anti-drug operations in the Mediterranean, with particular emphasis on money laundering as the legislation in this area has recently changed.

Algeria, 4 October 2016.
In accordance with instructions received in its 1403, a meeting of the local mini Dublin group chaired by the Embassy Secretary, Ms Rossana Roselló Bas, and the Home Affairs Attaché, Mr Trinitario Sánchez, was held in this Embassy on Monday 26 September. The Egyptian chair was Brigadier Hesham Elzoghby, the director of the International Cooperation Department of the national anti-drugs agency (ANGA) under the purview of the Egyptian Interior Ministry. The meeting was also attended by representatives of Greece, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Norway, Poland, the Czech Republic, Romania and Sweden.

As has become customary, the ANGA representative focused his presentation on a primarily factual description of the seizures per substance since 1 January 2016, as well as some of the routes used. Following on from the information set out in the last report dated 10 May 2016, he reviewed the major developments.

1. **General situation**

(a) Egypt is considered a transit country for drugs, and not a producer country. This is reflected in the quantities seized, which are low in absolute terms and are only significant in the case of bango (a local variety of marijuana) and hashish, which are consumed mainly in the local market. According to ANGA, the low number of seizures was due to increased control at Egypt's borders as a result, in particular, of the political turmoil in recent years.

(b) Hashish is usually imported from Morocco and Lebanon over land and by sea. There is also a route from Pakistan via the Red Sea; there is no information as to the amount produced in the country. 12.7 tonnes were seized in 2015. According to ANGA's estimates, 75% of the drugs produced/imported are consumed in Egypt, while the remaining 25% are intended for export.
With regard to bango, which is produced mainly in the Sinai peninsula and southern Egypt, the ANGA representative noted that 49 feddans of crop (approximately 20 hectares) had been identified and 146 tonnes seized.

(c) With regard to psychotropic substances, the ANGA representative stated that they were replacing the consumption of traditional drugs. 10.8 million Captagon tablets were seized. The widespread use of Tramadol continues to be a problem, with pharmacies occasionally complicit in its illegal distribution. 49 million Tramadol tablets were seized, mainly of Indian origin.

(d) Heroin is not produced locally; it originates in Afghanistan and arrives in the Sinai peninsula by way of the Gulf of Aqaba. 363 kg were seized in 2016. Egypt carried out an operation in conjunction with authorities of the Arab Emirates on its southern border.

(e) Opium is produced locally in southern Egypt and Sinai, albeit in modest quantities. 122 kg were seized in 2016.

(f) Cocaine consumption is very low among the Egyptian population because of its price (around USD 100 per gram), although the market is beginning to open up. Images were shown of a number of operations in airports in Cairo and Alexandria, as well as in Nuewiba port in the eastern part of the Sinai Peninsula. The images showed traffickers – some of them Latin American — with two or three kilograms concealed on their bodies or in their luggage. A total of 10 kg has been seized this year.

(g) It was mentioned that Ecstasy is consumed among terrorist groups. 20 280 tablets have been seized this year.

2. Institutional framework

Trafficking of cocaine and heroin is subject to the death penalty, which can be commuted to life imprisonment for trafficking of other substances. No notable legal or institutional changes have occurred since the group's last meeting.
3. **International cooperation**

Brigadier Elzoghby referred to Egypt's commitment to investigation and cooperation in the fight against drug trafficking.

He mentioned on several occasions the cooperation with Italy, thanking it in particular for the invitation to attend a meeting at Europol's headquarters in the Hague in connection with an operation ('Lipegio') aimed at the trafficking by sea of hashish from Morocco.

Brigadier Elzoghby stressed the need for training, which he considered should be the real objective of the mini Dublin group. He mentioned that France also cooperated with the Egyptian authorities in helping Egypt to develop its capacities.

He also referred to the contacts of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the Indian government to express concern at the massive inflow of psychotropic substances, in particular Tramadol, from India.

4. **Recommendations**

(a) Despite the existing smooth cooperation, a more accurate analysis of the current situation would require going beyond quantitative exercises and examining other elements, such as drug-trafficking networks, their sources of funding, their relationship with other illegal networks and money-laundering methods.

(b) Also, we would again recommend reinforcing the preventive aspects – through social and educational awareness-raising – and improving mechanisms for treating and rehabilitating drug addicts, alongside the coercive and punitive operations/legislative amendments aimed at combating drug trafficking and production in the region.
MOROCCO

On 13 October 2016, the mini Dublin group met at the Spanish Embassy in Rabat to examine the latest data on problems associated with drug trafficking and consumption in Morocco, and international cooperation with Morocco in that field. The meeting was attended by representatives from the embassies of Austria, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Canada, Belgium, Portugal, the Czech Republic, France, Japan, Romania, Hungary, the Netherlands and Spain. Significant absences included the EU delegation in Rabat and the US Embassy.

As is customary, the meeting was divided into the following parts:

1. General situation

The meeting began with a brief presentation by the Spanish Embassy's Counsellor of the Interior, who reported that there had been a fall in the number of arrests in Spain related to drug trafficking. 7,158 foreign nationals were arrested for drug trafficking in 2015, a drop of 6.89% with respect to the previous year. Moroccans, who accounted for 44% of the total with 3,150 arrests, remain the largest group of foreign nationals in terms of arrests for drug trafficking.

Along with Afghanistan, Morocco remains the world’s largest producer of hashish/cannabis resin. Owing to its geographical location, Spain carried out 75% of the seizures of cannabis in EU territory in 2015, and 50% of seizures worldwide. Since 2014 there has been a slight upward trend in the quantities of hashish/cannabis resin seized (2015 saw an increase of 0.16% with respect to 2014, with a total of 380.36 tonnes). 47,890 kg of hashish were seized in Algeciras from a truck arriving from Morocco. The scale of this seizure led to dismissals and arrests by the Moroccan authorities at the port of Tangiers, through which the truck had passed without its load having been detected.
Those present at the meeting underlined the growing importance for drug trafficking towards Europe of the so-called 'Eastern Mediterranean route', which starts in southern Algeria and continues to the Libyan coast, from where the drugs are shipped to Europe. In 2015 six boats were seized at sea with 45 000 kg of hashish aboard, less than half of the 108 000 kg seized in 2014 from seven vessels. This route is old and well-established, and is headed by tribes based in the Sahara desert.

Of particular concern are the links that have been detected between drug trafficking networks and jihadist groups. There has been an increase in the consumption and trafficking of Captagon, known as the 'jihadists' drug', which is made from the amphetamine known as fenethylline; it produces euphoria and has become popular in war zones such as Syria.

The public debate on the possible modification of the legislative framework, with a move from punitive to regulatory legislation, recovered some impetus during the campaign for the Moroccan parliamentary elections on 7 October, but has not really had much influence within the national political bodies. The majority party in Morocco, the PJD, which won the elections again, is strongly opposed to any attempts to legalise or tolerate the use of drugs, even for therapeutic purposes. However, those present at the meeting agreed that there were no reliable figures as to the production of drugs, in particular cannabis, in the country. A displacement of the areas under cultivation towards the centre and south of Morocco has been observed, with a decline in traditional areas such as Larache and, in general, the north.

Even though the area under cannabis cultivation in Morocco has decreased in recent years according to the official figures, the level of production has remained stable owing to the introduction of high-yield varieties. This increase in productivity means that the trafficking of hashish to Europe continues to grow slowly but steadily.
The consumption of cocaine has increased in Morocco. In September, 200 kg of pure cocaine were seized in a laboratory run by a Frenchman and two Peruvians in Oujda in north-eastern Morocco. The Moroccan police authorities have suspicions that the drugs came from Algeria. The two main entry routes continue to operate: from Latin America on transatlantic flights, some of them via Lisbon, and through western Africa. The Sao Paulo-Casablanca flight is a frequent entry route. There are networks of Peruvian traffickers operating from Casablanca, though some of them have been dismantled. No increase in the level of seizures has been reported, but trafficking in cocaine continues.

The Canadian Embassy circulated a report on the harmful effects of the use of fentanyl, which comes mainly from China and is used to adulterate cocaine, causing over 500 deaths in 2015.

2. **Legislative amendments**

There have been no significant changes to the legislation on production, trafficking and consumption in Morocco. There is a perception that Morocco needs to continue its efforts to combat drug trafficking, and that both its police services and its judiciary require external support, in the form of training or exchanges, in order to improve their effectiveness. The country's revenues from the cultivation and trafficking of hashish are very significant, higher even than those it earns from tourism, so it is difficult for substitution crops to become established. There was consensus among those present at the meeting on the need to provide more assistance to Morocco in this field.

Within the framework of the 2011 Constitution, an in-depth reform of the Moroccan justice system remains pending; it should result in greater effectiveness in the fight against the cultivation and trafficking of drugs.
3. **International cooperation**

The level of cooperation between the Moroccan police authorities and the EU Member States has been maintained, though it could be stepped up even further. The absence of a Moroccan judicial police to facilitate the work of the judges continues to be felt. The creation of the Central Bureau of Judicial Investigation has improved the capacity to combat jihadist elements, the main official concern at the present time, sometimes to the detriment of increased efforts in the fight against the cultivation and trafficking of drugs.

4. **Recommendations**

Step up international cooperation, in particular with countries on the northern shore of the Mediterranean. These countries can help Morocco to combat the drug trafficking networks at source.

Better coordination is needed between the judicial services of the EU countries and those of Morocco, with the development of further training programmes.

Rabat, 13 October 2016

**MAURITANIA**

The most recent meeting of the mini Dublin Group in Mauritania took place in the Spanish Embassy in Nouakchott on 6 September 2016. The participants were France, Spain, Germany, the United Kingdom, the EU Delegation and Japan. There was no United States representative.

After discussions, the group approved the following report:

1. **General situation**

Mauritania is still a transit country for cannabis resin and cocaine, although seizures, particularly of cocaine, have remained rare and been on a small scale, presumably owing to a lack of equipment and technology. The issue has attracted more attention recently after some cases of cocaine use have had an impact on local elite families.
The country has no tradition of growing or processing drugs. Indian hemp is still the only drug consumed on a significant scale, and this is linked to traditional practices. No evidence suggests that laboratories producing synthetic drugs are operating in Mauritania. Consumption of cannabis resin remains low, while consumption of cocaine is negligible. However, trafficking in counterfeit medicines has recently become a serious problem for Mauritania.

It should be recalled that Mauritania has signed the principal international agreements on combating drug trafficking, including the Vienna Convention. The following anti-drugs laws exist: the law of 18 July 1993 which lays down very stiff penalties, including the death penalty, if the offence is repeated; and the law of 27 July 2005 which criminalises the laundering of the proceeds of drug trafficking. The set of legal instruments against trafficking in such products remained unchanged in 2015.

Mauritania was the driving force behind the creation of the 'G5 Sahel' group, whose members, apart from Mauritania, are Mali, Chad, Niger and Burkina Faso. The group became an international organisation when its members' Heads of State adopted its founding agreement in Nouakchott on 19 December 2014. Expressing their desire to strengthen cooperation on security matters, they created the platform for security cooperation: a shared space for dialogue and exchanges of operational information in the fields of security and border management (terrorism, illegal immigration, all types of trafficking).
2. **Trafficking trends.**

*Cocaine trafficking:* Mauritania is regarded as a *transit country for cocaine*. Several reports indicate that drug trafficking is closely linked to the funding of terrorism in northern Africa, but the current pattern of seizures offers no confirmation of that information.

It is nonetheless acknowledged that cocaine arrives from South America by air and sea at ports in the Gulf of Guinea (Guinea-Bissau, Guinea and Sierra Leone, Togo, etc.) and other West African countries such as Senegal and Cape Verde.

It is then transported to Mauritania by road or by boat, directly from Guinea, the east of Mali or Senegal. The cocaine is then transported primarily by sea for delivery in Europe via the ports of Nouakchott or Nouadhibou and the surrounding area, including the no-man's land in the south-west of Western Sahara.

Since 2008-2009, however, there have been no noteworthy seizures, probably as a result of the establishment of a security mechanism as part of the fight against terrorism. The group also posited that this may be due to the lack of training and professional incentives for Mauritanian customs staff.

*Cannabis trafficking:*

Mauritania is above all a *transit country* for cannabis originating from Morocco en route to the whole of West Africa, the Arabian Peninsula and the eastern Mediterranean.
More precisely, the cannabis resin comes mostly from the Moroccan Rif, bound for Egypt and Libya (via northern Mali and northern Niger) and for countries in the Arabian Peninsula (via Chad and Sudan). Upon entering Mauritania, two main routes are used, one in northern Mauritania and the Sahara along the border with Algeria, then via northern Mali and northern Niger, bound for Libya and later Maltese ports (which, according to our contacts, are a safer port of entry into Europe), and the other to the south-east via Nouakchott, following the 'road of hope' to the Malian border.

On the first route, drugs are apparently transported from the Sahara across the area controlled by the Polisario Front, which has nine allegedly easily bribed nahiya (area command posts) along the Mauritanian border. It is believed that convoys cross the Mauritanian border around Bir Moghrein and Ain ben Tili, after which they follow the Algerian and Malian borders into Libya. Temporary stores are said to have been set up in Mauritania around Bir Moghrein and Ain ben Tili.

However, the security measures put in place by the Mauritanian authorities since President Abdel Aziz came to power in 2009, as part of the fight against terrorism, also benefit the fight against drug trafficking, making it more difficult for drugs to transit. Since the Serval intervention in Mali, these measures have been considerably strengthened.

There has been an increase in trafficking of Indian hemp (marijuana) originating from Senegal but consumed in Mauritania, as well as an increase in Indian hemp consumption in Nouakchott.

OCLCTISS (Mauritania's Office for Combating Illegal Trafficking in Drugs) and the gendarmerie are beginning to provide more regular and reliable statistics.

The following official statistics are currently available:
First half of 2016

From the gendarmerie

• 90 kg Indian hemp
• 525 kg cannabis resin
• 13 people arrested

From OCLCTISS (January/August):

• 2550 kg cannabis resin
• 223 kg Indian hemp
• 11 vehicles seized
• 450 g cocaine
• 549 boxes of psychotropic drugs

3. Progress report on international cooperation.

French cooperation

France continues to work alongside the Central Office for Combating Illegal Trafficking in Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (OCLCTISS), in particular in providing staff training courses (four per year). The support and assistance project for the opening of branches of OCLCTISS has been approved. EUR 37 900 will be allocated to opening the first two branches in Nouadhibou and Rosso.

Spanish cooperation

The Spanish Guardia Civil's project within the EU's WEST-SAHEL Mauritania programme, to enlarge the dog-handling unit, continues. In 2015, eight new dog units were purchased and training for trainers and dog-handlers was concluded successfully.

Finally, the expansion of the unit to other places in Mauritania, including Aioun and Pk 55 (close to the northern frontier with the Sahara), was supported by Spanish cooperation.
European Union cooperation

The European Union continues to support the 'integrated border management system' in Mauritania, which contributes to the fight against drug trafficking, through support for the country's police and national gendarmerie.

In addition, a EUR 7 million project to strengthen the Sahel G5 regional structure is currently being implemented, which will have a very important role in coordinating border control in the Sahel region, with Senegal as an observer.

At regional level, the European Union has been developing the West African Police Information System (WAPIS) Cocaine Route programme, which has recently been extended to the Sahel G5. The aim is to combat (organised) crime and the threats posed by terrorism by setting up a regional police information system (WAPIS), and to establish a connection between the countries of the region and the rest of the world using Interpol's tools and services. Mauritania, though invited to participate, has still not given the green light for this system to be set up, but it will have to position itself as part of the Sahel G5.

German cooperation:

Since January 2016, the GIZ (German Agency for International Cooperation) has been implementing phase II of the project for capacity-building of the national police. This project is part of a programme funded by the German Federal Foreign Office to help improve the national police structures of several African countries (in particular Niger, Côte d'Ivoire, Chad and Nigeria). One of the programme's main objectives is to improve national and sub-regional (e.g. G5, Afripol) schemes for combating cross-border and organised crime.
In Mauritania, the GIZ's support is built around the following three lines of action: 1) the organisation of the national police training sector; 2) the modernisation of the public security police stations and 3) the strengthening of the capacity of the judicial police. In the context of the fight against drug trafficking, these measures should effectively contribute to 1) the improvement of the drug-detection skills of police officers posted at the country's border posts; 2) the improvement of coordination between the aforementioned border posts and the scientific crime detection laboratory; 3) the creation of a 'psychotropic substances and drugs analysis' department in the scientific crime detection laboratory in partnership with the GIZ police project in Côte d'Ivoire.

The implementation of all these measures is planned for the period 2017-2018.

**Japanese cooperation**

At the sixth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD VI) in Kenya in August 2016, the Japanese government announced that from 2016 to 2018, it would invest an overall amount of approximately USD 30 billion from the public and private sectors in the future of Africa.

In the context of TICAD VI, one of the three priority areas of Japanese cooperation in Africa is the 'promotion of social stability for shared prosperity', including issues relating to 'social stability and peace-building' and 'terrorism and violent extremism'.

This year, the three areas of interest in the Sahel region as regards the budget for cooperation with international organisations are the fight against terrorism (e.g. border management, legislation, strengthening anti-crime capacity and the fight against the financing of terrorism), social stability (education against radicalism, professional training for young people, etc.), and humanitarian aid for refugees and internally displaced persons, all those related to terrorism. Eleven projects run by nine international organisations have recently been assessed, and the results will be available at the end of the year. The UNDP, the HCR and the IOM were included in this assessment.
Furthermore, Japan recently added training in criminal justice in a third country to the Guidance for Economic Cooperation with the Republic of Mauritania.

4. **Operational recommendations.**

The members of the mini group have identified flaws in the investigation strategy. The authorities do not follow up cases where trafficking is detected and there is no subsequent analysis of drug seizures. Besides that, there is a significant shortfall in terms of judicial processing and a lack of coordination between the various police bodies involved in fighting this scourge (the national gendarmerie, the national police, customs and, most recently, the road security service or GSSR); for instance there is no common database. In addition, the public prosecutor should have a bigger role in supervision and coordination. Magistrates, investigators and the services monitoring the financial system and the health and pharmaceutical services all need specialist training.

Mauritania still has very significant needs in all areas, ranging from basic personnel training to logistical support. Both the Mauritanian police and the gendarmerie have repeatedly stressed the need for technical resources for surveillance, communications, investigation and toxicological analysis. Training is an absolute priority, starting with training for the instructors themselves.

Mauritania has no overall view of the drugs trade either locally or internationally. That makes it difficult to draw up a strategy to combat the phenomenon. The OCLCTISS (Central Office for Combating Illegal Trafficking in Drugs and Psychotropic Substances) does not centralise data on the subject sufficiently; the Mauritanian gendarmerie and customs do not keep it regularly informed of drugs cases. As a result, the OCLCTISS does not really know the full extent of drug trafficking.
Other more specific recommendations are listed below:

- Continue to raise the Mauritanian authorities' awareness of the need to step up their commitment to the fight against trafficking and against the laundering of the proceeds of trafficking.

- Promote and support the establishment of a central office for combating trafficking in drugs (for the coordination of the security forces) and a national drug-trafficking database with input from the police, the gendarmerie, customs and the army.

- Support the framing of a national anti-drug-trafficking policy on that basis.

- Improve and optimise the material resources of the Mauritanian security forces with responsibility in the area.

- Ensure the continuity of training by setting up a permanent centre with specialised professional trainers. Emphasise on-the-spot training for trainers. Encourage agents to specialise from the time they enter into service.

- Promote a regional cooperation framework, in particular by encouraging the work of the G5 Sahel security platform, which could become a new arena for regional cooperation in combating the drugs trade among the Sahel countries, and also the West African liaison officers' platform based in Dakar. Promote an evaluation of the national Interpol bureau and improve its capabilities, as a means of increasing international cooperation.

- Improve effective border control capacities and, in that context, encourage implementation of the Stability Instrument.

- In addition to the action taken, there should be a special focus on Mauritania's chief ports, Nouadhibou and Nouakchott, as there are few or no checks there and they are a major loophole in the anti-drug smuggling effort.

- Continue providing financial support to the Directorate-General for National Security in its effort to create branches of OCLCTISS in big cities and areas where there is increased activity by drug trafficking organisations.

- Schedule regular (perhaps even quarterly) meetings between the partners and the units of the security forces involved in the fight against drug trafficking (gendarmerie and customs), to coordinate work and avoid overlaps.