



**COUNCIL OF
THE EUROPEAN UNION**

Brussels, 13 July 2012

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LIMITE

**COSDP 620
PESC 944
CSDP/PSDC 450**

COVER NOTE

From: European External Action Service
To: Delegations
Subject: Report by the High Representative on CSDP (July 2012)

Delegations will find attached a Report by the High Representative on CSDP, an EEAS document with reference 01289/12.

Encl.: EEAS document 01289/12

EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE



**Crisis Management and
Planning Directorate (CMPD)**

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From:	Crisis Management and Planning Directorate
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Subject:	Report by the High Representative on CSDP (July 2012)

Delegations will find attached a Report by the High Representative on CSDP with a view to the Foreign Affairs Council on 23 July 2012.

REPORT BY THE HIGH REPRESENTATIVE ON CSDP

INTRODUCTION

In December 2011 the Council adopted a set of substantial and comprehensive Conclusions on CSDP, containing specific taskings and encouraging me “to continue to take work forward, in close cooperation with the Member States”, with the aim of making the EU a more capable global actor. The changing strategic context and expectations towards the EU to further increase its role as a security provider provide further stimulus to that work. At the Council’s request, this report sets out the progress that has been reached by the end of June 2012.

With soon fifteen missions and operations in the field, CSDP remains a visible, necessary and hands-on instrument in the wider EU toolbox. It demonstrates the Union’s will and ability to tackle the security challenges of our time. During the last months, we have prepared for the launch of three new CSDP missions that will help improve security and good governance in the Horn of Africa, in the Sahel and South Sudan. Other missions have been thoroughly reviewed to better target the needs, increase their added value and integrate them into the wider EU strategies. We have also strengthened cooperation with partner countries and international organizations.

If we want to continue to deliver and remain ready to act we need the necessary resources and capabilities. While some modest progress has been achieved in generating forces and enhancing European capabilities, much still remains to be done to address capability shortages, also regarding the EU Battlegroups. The case for highly capable and interoperable forces, available at very short notice for EU operations, is stronger than ever. At the same time the continuing pressure on budgets makes European cooperation all the more necessary. Doing better with less will continue to be the imperative.

With engagements in the Balkans, in Asia, in Africa and off the coast of Somalia, the EU acts as a provider of security. Our missions and operations are making a difference in turning the tide of instability, as evidenced, for example, by the decreasing number of successful piracy attacks thanks also to the operation ATALANTA. However, with challenges rising in the Sahel and in our Southern and Eastern neighbourhood there is an increasing demand to do more, in close cooperation with partners. In order to meet this demand, in the interest of European and global security, we need to ensure that CSDP is increasingly targeted, effective, and comprehensive.

Coherent action is one of our major strengths, with the EU's uniqueness in employing its multiple instruments as part of a comprehensive approach from conflict prevention, over crisis management to post conflict reconstruction. Progressively this is becoming a reality in the field, for example in the Horn of Africa. But more must and can be done.

Building on such progress, and in line with the EU level of ambition, I am committed to take work forward and to continue to improve CSDP's responsiveness and adaptability in addressing emerging and potential crises. I will do this in close cooperation with Member States, whose active support and direct engagement remain crucial to the success of CSDP.

I. MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

1. The growing number and diversity of CSDP missions and operations underlines the need to increase the efficiency and the focus on the added value of our operational engagement. CSDP activity needs to be planned and developed more smartly. We are doing this through various concrete improvements:

1.1 First, a more integrated approach to crisis management:

(i) Missions and operations are better embedded into wider EU regional strategies, which provide the political framework under which all EU activities to address a crisis should take place. In this logic the strategies for the Horn of Africa and for Sahel have been the basis for planning new missions (respectively EUCAP Nestor for regional maritime capacity building and the future police mission in Niger), and for reviewing existing missions (Atalanta, EUTM Somalia);

(ii) CSDP activities are being better integrated with other EU instruments (such as the Instrument for Stability, the European Development Fund, the Instrument for Pre-Accession). Such synergies create higher value for our missions in the Horn of Africa and in Niger and help better address the situation in the field. They have also been instrumental in developing exit strategies for CSDP missions – in Democratic Republic of Congo, in South Sudan, and in Bosnia Herzegovina (whilst closing down EUPM, the oldest CSDP mission, we will ensure a follow-on provided by a reinforced EUSR Office/EUDEL and specific Commission programs).

(iii) Enhanced cooperation with international partners has produced better synergies, more added value and more coherence of our CSDP missions with partners' actions. (See VI/"Partnerships").

1.2. Second, better focusing missions and operations on where they can provide real added value. EULEX now focuses on supporting the Kosovo authorities where they need it most and on the executive functions in combating corruption and prosecuting war crimes. In Iraq we are aiming at supporting local authorities to allow them gradually to take over the activities of our mission there. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the ALTHEA operation is now mainly focusing on capacity building and training in an effort to strengthen state institutions, in addition to its continuing executive mandate.

1.3. Third, actively seeking ways of getting more value for money from CSDP missions. The EUCAP Nestor mission will act as a catalyst to secure third states' contributions and support, reinforced by the EU/IMO strategic partnership and EU/UNDP/UNODC cooperation, demonstrating that joining-up activities allows the mission to "punch above its weight" in terms of money invested. The strategic review for the missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo sets out lines for greater cost-effectiveness.

2. This overall positive dynamic reinforces the need for continuous efforts to generate capabilities for our missions and operations. Clearly this remains a challenge especially in this time of austerity. Some are nearly fully staffed (EUPOL Afghanistan; EUTM Somalia; EUSEC RDC; EUJUST LEX Iraq; and EUNAVFOR Atalanta even if during holiday periods that proves to be a bit more challenging and some specific capabilities are still missing). Others are facing difficulties (EULEX Kosovo – in particular with regard to Formed Police Units; EUFOR Althea and EUMM Georgia – although the internal reorganisation there has mitigated the issue).

Overall, improvements are encouraging. But existing shortfalls must be addressed by force providers, and accompanied by other measures such as enhanced force sensing. It is clear that if shortfalls are not addressed, they will not only affect the capacity of the missions to fully deliver against their mandates, but also weaken the EU's credibility as a crisis management actor.

3. The demand for EU crisis management capabilities will continue to rise. A better use of CSDP in combination with other EU instruments will therefore be necessary. Prioritization will increasingly be required to manage scarce resources.

II. IMPROVING THE EU'S PERFORMANCE IN PLANNING AND CONDUCTING

1. The activation of the Operation Centre for the CSDP missions and operation in the Horn of Africa (in accordance with the Council Decision of March 2012) will contribute to making a more optimal use of existing resources in the (military) support of the EUCAP Nestor mission and thus greater efficiency through better information exchange and improved coordination with ATALANTA and EUTM and between our operations and Commission projects. A first review is due in September.

2. The Crisis Management Procedures are being reviewed to improve performance, delivery and integration of CSDP in the wider EU Comprehensive Approach to crisis planning and decision making. The general outline of the changes has been presented to Member States. Work will continue on that basis with the view to presenting more concrete proposals by the end of the year, using the Multi Layer 12 exercise to test certain elements of the new approach in order to come to a better informed decision.

3. The adoption of the benchmarking methodology and the mission model structure will greatly improve the efficiency of our planning/conduct and ultimately the delivery of our civilian missions.

4. Efforts with regard to Niger and Libya have shown once again that we probably will need to examine rules and financial regulations in order to adapt them to crisis management requirements.

5. We need to learn from experience to improve our action. A systematic lesson learned process is being developed across civilian and military missions/operations to ensure better implementation of lessons and greater efficiency.

III. STRENGTHENING CAPABILITIES

European capabilities, both military and civilian, need to match our operational engagement. Doing better with less remains an imperative.

1. Pooling and sharing military capabilities has become a necessity. If fully embedded in national planning, this response to critical European capability shortfalls should help Member States acquire and maintain together capabilities that are beyond their reach individually.

(a) With the help of the European Defence Agency and the EU Military Committee, proposals have been transformed into concrete projects. Work continues on the cooperative opportunities endorsed at the end of last year by Defence Ministers, who last March went a step further by: adopting a political declaration on Air-to-Air Refuelling, signing a Declaration of Intent on Medical Fields Hospitals, and supporting projects in the areas of Maritime Surveillance and Training.

(b) These efforts, well coordinated with NATO, were highlighted by the President of the European Council at the Chicago Summit on 20 May. At this occasion, President Obama expressed appreciation for the EU's commitment on air-to-air refuelling, hence confirming the US' interest in our work on Pooling and Sharing – which was also welcomed on other occasions by the NATO Secretary General. The close cooperation on Pooling and Sharing and Smart Defence – based on excellent staff coordination, has been successful in ensuring – in practice, non-duplicative, coherent and complementary activities. It needs to continue so as to maintain mutual reinforcing.

(c) Progress is encouraging, but we cannot be complacent. Although ad hoc projects will remain essential, cooperation needs to become a habit and sustainable if we want to preserve and develop capabilities in the long run. A more structured approach will help meet this objective, as emphasised in the March Council conclusions and reaffirmed by Defence Ministers at their

Informal meeting in April. In this regard the ideas put forward by Belgium, Finland, Greece and Luxembourg is a welcome contribution to this work. EDA is developing proposals for Ministers this autumn, notably on: “save and reinvest” so that savings generated by Member States are retained within defence; best practice and models for cooperation; impact of decreasing spending on capabilities in Europe; mapping of existing and forthcoming cooperation across the EU; provisions for assured access to pooled/shared capabilities; and harmonisation of qualification and certification to improve standardisation and interoperability. Furthermore, the steady decline in Research and Technology expenditure by Member States calls for a twin-track approach to underwrite future capabilities and maximise investment: increased R&T European cooperation; and reinforced synergies between EDA and the European Commission in dual-use technologies.

(d) To fulfil its potential, pooling and sharing requires long-term commitment. The engagement of individual Member States remains crucial, together with political will and strong leadership. There is a case for Heads of State and Government to address the issue, for strategic reasons but also because defence generates growth, innovation, and jobs across Europe.

2. Civilian capabilities equally need all our attention. Most of our missions are civilian – with numerous successes (Aceh, Georgia, Kosovo, Bosnia), and are particularly valued by our partners. Yet it remains difficult to mobilize and deploy the necessary civilian assets and capabilities. In this context the Multi-Annual Work Plan that has been approved by Member States aims at helping our missions to be staffed with highly qualified personnel and to enhance synergies with military capability development. Actions for this year and 2013 include: (i) drawing up an inventory of Member States’ “niche” capabilities of specialized personnel; (ii) exploring, in the light of the shortfalls in the Integrated Police Units in Kosovo, the possibility for a framework agreement with the European Gendarmerie Force which could facilitate rapid deployment (on case by case basis); (iii) creating additional incentives for Member States to second personnel; (iv) strengthening ties between CSDP and Freedom, Security and Justice so as to provide capabilities from the Rule of Law field to our missions and bring CSDP added value to the EU’s internal security. This will include working towards a cooperation agreement with INTERPOL. Overall, work is well underway. But in order to produce results this initiative requires Member States’ active involvement, including through a better mobilization of the relevant ministries and Council formations. We need to gain political momentum, by bringing civilian capabilities increasingly to the higher political level.

Also, training is vital to the success of our CSDP missions and operations. The first EU Senior Missions Leadership course (civil-military) was organized in April with a view to better preparing future personnel.

IV. RAPID RESPONSE

1. EU Battlegroups (BGs) remain important for CSDP, as the only military capabilities on stand-by for possible EU operations. In addition to providing the EU with a military rapid reaction tool, the BGs usefully contribute to transforming the effectiveness of European military capabilities. However, we are facing persistent gaps in 2013, 2014 (first semester) and beyond. Intense efforts have been made over the past months to assess Member States' constraints in filling the vacancies in the Roster. The analysis, based on their inputs, confirmed continuous political support for the BGs and the key principles of their Concept. We need to build on this support and this analysis to fill the gaps and increase the usability of BGs, including in support of current CSDP operations, by exploring pragmatic actions including: (i) developing a more systematic approach to filling the Roster with voluntary but recurring commitments; (2) exploring the use of specialized capabilities and encouraging interaction with civilian capabilities; (iii) improving the cost effectiveness of the BGs and addressing the concerns of Member States regarding the financial burden of a Battlegroup operation. The outcome of this work could be presented to Defence Ministers next November.

2. The need to advance on rules and procedures allowing for civilian rapid response remains high, once more illustrated when planning our mission in Niger and addressing security needs in Libya. Furthermore, apart from a possible agreement with the EGF above-mentioned we will examine how to enhance the effectiveness of the pools from which Civilian Response Teams and SSR experts are being recruited.

V. PARTNERSHIPS

The EU's comprehensive approach also requires working closely with partner countries and international organisations such as the UN, the AU and NATO. CSDP is an open project which

welcomes cooperation with third states and organisations, with whom we have been further strengthening our links.

1. Partner countries' contributions to CSDP remain much appreciated, both in terms of their participation in our missions and operations and their political support. Our expanding relations with them call for a reflection on how to sustain their support to CSDP and deepen co-operation, coupling the operational perspective with wider CFSP/CSDP objectives. A policy paper on partnerships is under preparation and will be presented to Member States.

In this context, efforts have also continued on facilitating tools, such as Framework Agreements for Participation in EU-led operations. Two new ones have been concluded since the end of last year, (Albania and New Zealand), while negotiations are finalised with Bosnia and Herzegovina and with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. New mandates for other partners are agreed (Moldova) or being considered (Georgia). Building on excellent concrete cooperation with the US (EULEX Kosovo, DRC, HoA/Somalia), we have continued our fruitful dialogue including at the recent High Level Seminar on CSDP in Washington. Security is becoming an increasingly important element of our dialogue with strategic partners, for instance on piracy.

2. Building partnerships in crisis management allows also for better “value for money” in our CSDP missions and operations, through optimised synergies. This is not only about burden sharing. It is also an important efficiency multiplier, as concretely demonstrated in a number of theatres: (i) In the case of our ATALANTA operation links have been strengthened with INTERPOL, EUROPOL and UNODC to ensure continuity between operational activities and judicial follow on, a key element to ensure overall efficiency of our global engagement. Excellent cooperation has also been developed with the African Union and AMISOM; (ii) Our partnerships with IMO, UNDP and UNDP for the new mission EUCAP Nestor in the Horn has been setting a ‘reference’ for other parties who are now willing to coordinate their activities with ours (including the UAE and Japan); (iii) our cooperation with the US, Uganda and the AU/AMISOM proves to be key to the success of our EUTM mission for training Somali security forces; (iv) In Afghanistan, effective coordination between the EUPOL mission and NATO ISAF continues; (v) in DRC, we cooperate with the UN on reforming the security sector.

3. In the context of EU-NATO cooperation we continue to move ahead in a pragmatic way, implementing the step-by-step approach shared in 2011 with the NATO Secretary General. There is no room for competition between the two organisations. We have to combine our different strengths in a complementary manner. At political level, the dialogue with the latter and Allies has been reinforced. Cross-briefings by NATO and EU staffs respectively to the Political Military Group and the DPCC have taken place (first exchange on cyber security). Last February we had a fruitful informal gathering of the “PSC+9” (with all non-EU Allies and candidate countries), which addressed Kosovo and Piracy in the Horn of Africa. In June, there was also a formal PSC meeting with the non-EU European NATO Allies and candidate countries on Atalanta and EUTM. Furthermore, efforts continue to convene a further informal PSC-NAC meeting, this time on Kosovo and possibly piracy, following last year’s meeting on Libya. At operational level, we continue to operate side-by-side in crisis management in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and against piracy from the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden. Furthermore, staffs continue to be in close contact on other theatres. Lastly, cooperation on military capability development (notably EU Pooling and Sharing and NATO Smart Defence) has proven effective, ensuring mutually reinforcement.

4. With the United Nations, the EU-UN Steering Committee is now reinvigorated as a high-level consultation forum, more oriented towards operational outcomes, enabling discussions on urgent and important crisis situations. Follow-on work to the successful EU-UN Steering Committee of last February focuses on South Sudan and Somalia, but also on civilian capabilities. An action plan is being implemented to facilitate EU support to UN peacekeeping notably: by allowing the Union to act as a clearing house for Member States willing to participate in UN operations; by facilitating coordination in the planning and conduct of EU missions deployed in support of UN operations; and through closer cooperation in cross-cutting areas (such as civilian capability, lessons learned). The EU is currently providing operational support to the UN observer mission in Syria, including information based on satellite imagery analysis.