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From:	Mr Mario DRAGHI, President of the European Central Bank
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To:	Mr Jeppe TRANHOLM-MIKKELSEN, Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union

Subject:	Opinion of the European Central Bank of 20 September 2017 on a proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a framework for the recovery and resolution of central counterparties and amending Regulations (EU) No 1095/2010, EU No 648/2012, and (EU) 2015/2365 (CON/2017/38)
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Delegations will find attached the above mentioned Opinion.



OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK

of 20 September 2017

on a proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a framework for
the recovery and resolution of central counterparties and amending Regulations
(EU) No 1095/2010, (EU) No 648/2012, and (EU) 2015/2365
(CON/2017/38)

Introduction and legal basis

On 7 and 24 February 2017 the European Central Bank (ECB) received requests from the Council of the European Union and from the European Parliament respectively for an opinion on a proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a framework for the recovery and resolution of central counterparties and amending Regulations (EU) No 1095/2010, (EU) No 648/2012, and (EU) 2015/2365¹ (hereinafter the 'proposed regulation').

The ECB's competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union since the proposed regulation contains provisions affecting the basic tasks of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) to define and implement monetary policy and to promote the smooth operation of payment systems pursuant to the first and fourth indents of Article 127(2) of the Treaty and the ESCB's task of contributing to the smooth conduct of policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system pursuant to Article 127(5) of the Treaty. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

1. General observations

- 1.1 The ECB strongly supports the Commission's initiative to establish a dedicated Union framework for the recovery and resolution of central counterparties (CCPs) as an integral component of the Union legislative framework for financial markets in which CCPs play a critical role as risk managers in many market segments. The continuity of their critical functions is essential both for the stability of the Union financial system and for the monetary policy transmission mechanism. The ECB fully supports the scope of the proposed regulation in terms of the mandates and powers of resolution authorities, CCP recovery and resolution plans and resolvability assessments, early intervention measures, resolution triggers, resolution tools and powers, including government stabilisation tools, and third country provisions. The ECB also agrees with the main thrust of the proposed regulation.
- 1.2 Nonetheless, the ECB considers that the proposed regulation could be further enhanced, especially in four areas.

¹ COM(2016) 656 final.

- 1.2.1 First, given the critical role of clearing participants in CCP recovery and resolution, clearing participants must be able to estimate reliably and manage their potential exposures under the proposed regulation. At the same time, the inherently implausible market events that lead to CCP recovery and resolution are impossible to foresee fully in advance, and resolution authorities therefore need sufficient flexibility for devising their actions. The ECB recommends that the proposed regulation better balances these two considerations by: (i) prioritising clearly measurable loss allocation tools in recovery; (ii) encouraging resolution authorities to consider entry into resolution where actions to restore a matched book and to allocate uncovered losses would result in significant and unpredictable losses for clearing participants; and (iii) providing greater ex ante transparency regarding resolution authorities' general approaches and decision-making processes when using their discretion in key areas of resolution. In principle, considering the overall aim of maintaining financial stability in the Union, resolution authorities should give due regard to the need to minimise adverse contagion to CCP participants and to the wider financial system.
- 1.2.2 Second, one key objective of CCP resolution is to ensure the continuity of the CCP's critical functions without incurring taxpayer losses. Robust arrangements to ensure the availability of adequate private sector funds, to fully allocate financial losses in resolution and to replenish CCPs' financial resources are therefore crucial. Conversely, any potential public sector support should only be considered as an absolute last resort and as a temporary measure, to avoid moral hazard and set appropriate ex ante risk management incentives. The ECB considers that the safeguards in the proposed regulation should be strengthened in the following ways: (a) when conducting resolution planning and resolvability assessments, resolution authorities should carefully assess the size and credibility of CCP resolution funding arrangements with specific regard to scenarios going beyond 'extreme but plausible' events and on the basis of a common criteria-based approach; (b) the potential use of government stabilisation tools as a last resort should be coupled with comprehensive and credible arrangements to recover the temporary funding in a timely manner; and (c) when implementing the 'no creditor worse off' principle to ensure that no clearing participant, CCP shareholder or creditor bears greater losses in resolution than it would have incurred under insolvency proceedings, realistic assumptions regarding the value of business continuity preserved through resolution should be applied.
- 1.2.3 Third, the arrangements for CCP recovery and resolution on a standalone basis should be complemented by horizontal cooperation to ensure their consistency and effective interaction:
- Significant risk externalities of CCP recovery and resolution arise not only with regard to each individual CCP for its immediate stakeholders (as recognised by the involvement of colleges of authorities for the purpose of recovery planning, resolution planning and resolvability assessments), but also across CCPs, including those operating in different jurisdictions, as a result of their reliance on a common set of banking groups acting as major clearing members and service providers. Furthermore, the severe market events associated with a CCP's failure in resolution scenarios related to member default could affect several CCPs at once. Against this background, credible recovery and resolution planning appropriate to safeguarding Union financial stability might not be achievable by focusing

solely on individual CCPs on a standalone basis, but should be coordinated across Union CCPs.

- There is also a need to acknowledge the close interdependencies between CCP recovery and resolution given that recovery planning is an integral part of CCP resolution planning. Furthermore, recovery planning may be directly affected by resolution planning through measures that aim to address possible impediments to resolvability. Recovery plans, and the related contractual agreements between CCPs and clearing participants, also play a key role in determining the 'no creditor worse off' in resolution insolvency counterfactual. Finally, it is impossible to fully delineate the boundaries between recovery and resolution in advance. Against this background, the ECB considers that the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) should be entrusted with developing a holistic perspective on the ability of the Union central clearing landscape to withstand potential system-wide market events going beyond 'extreme but plausible' conditions and involving both recovery and resolution scenarios. In performing this task, ESMA should cooperate closely with the ESCB, including the ECB when performing its prudential supervision tasks, and the European Banking Authority (EBA), given the significant implications of CCP recovery and resolution for central banks in their roles as central banks of issue and overseers as well as for banking supervisors.

1.2.4 Fourth, given the increasingly cross-border nature of central clearing and the high degree of market competition, a level playing field across CCPs is essential. While CCPs and resolution authorities should have appropriate flexibility and discretion in devising individual recovery and resolution plans, respectively, in line with their specific needs and circumstances, there is a need for consistency of recovery and resolution plans in terms of the comprehensiveness and rigour of the embedded approaches. Therefore, such plans should be in line with relevant international standards². Against this background, the ECB suggests enhancing the proposed regulation by better aligning the content of recovery and resolution plans and resolvability assessments for Union CCPs with what has been agreed and/or is under development at international level.

1.3 The proposed Regulation applies to all Union CCPs, regardless of whether or not they have a banking license. While the ECB in principle supports this approach, it would see merit, given the specificities of credit institutions, in further assessing whether some clarifications regarding the application of the regulation to CCPs with a banking license might be helpful, e.g. in view of potential issues arising with regard to the treatment of participant deposits protected by Directive 2014/49/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council³ in CCP recovery or resolution.

² For international standards on the recovery of financial market infrastructures, see the report by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures (CPMI) and Board of the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), 'Recovery of financial market infrastructures – Revised Report (2017)', available on the BIS website at www.bis.org. For international standards on the resolution of financial market infrastructures, see the guidance set out by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) in Appendix II-Annex 1 – Resolution of Financial Market Infrastructures (FMIs) and FMI Participants annexed to Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions (2014), available on the FSB's website at www.fsb.org. The FSB issued more granular guidance in 'Guidance on Central Counterparty Resolution and Resolution Planning' in July 2017. This document is also available on the FSB's website.

³ Directive 2014/49/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on deposit guarantee schemes (OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 149).

- 1.4 On 13 June 2017 the European Commission published a proposal for a regulation amending both Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council⁴ (the 'ESMA Regulation') and Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council⁵ (the 'EMIR Regulation') as regards the procedures and authorities involved in the authorisation and supervision of CCPs established in the Union, including strengthening the role of the central bank of issue for certain aspects of CCP supervision and establishing a CCP Executive Session of the ESMA Board of Supervisors⁶. The ECB underlines that this opinion is based on the current Union legislative environment and is without prejudice to the ECB's stance on possible future measures strengthening the CCP supervisory functions and responsibilities of the central bank of issue at Union level. That said, the ECB agrees that targeted modifications may be necessary to take into account the new role of the CCP Executive Session in colleges under the EMIR Regulation and subsequently in resolution colleges, and fully supports the approach that during the finalisation of the proposed regulation, the Commission, the Council and the European Parliament carefully assess the potential role of the CCP Executive Session in promoting the consistency and effective interaction of recovery and resolution plans across CCPs, and in monitoring and mitigating their aggregate risk implications for financial stability in the Union, as per the ECB's observations in paragraphs 1.2.3 and 1.2.4.

2. Specific observations

2.1 *Involvement of central banks in recovery and resolution*

2.1.1 *Arrangements for involving central banks*

A potential CCP failure implies significant financial risks that, if not managed in a timely and effective manner, could pose serious threats to interdependent financial market infrastructures and financial institutions participating in or providing services to CCPs, and ultimately could endanger both financial and monetary stability. Appropriate CCP recovery and resolution arrangements to ensure that these risks are averted in an effective and timely manner are therefore of direct relevance for central banks' responsibilities for defining and implementing monetary policy, promoting the smooth operation of payment systems, contributing to financial stability and, where relevant, supervising credit institutions. Furthermore, central banks should have a prominent role in both the design and execution of CCP recovery and resolution strategies in their capacity as: (a) overseers; (b) providers of critical payment and settlement services to CCPs; and (c) potential providers of liquidity to CCPs and/or major clearing members, which is provided at the discretion of the central banks concerned and in accordance with the relevant rules.

⁴ Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority) amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/77/EC (OJ L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 84).

⁵ Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories (OJ L 201, 27.7.2012, p. 1).

⁶ Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority) and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 as regards the procedures and authorities involved for the authorisation of CCPs and requirements for the recognition of third-country CCPs, COM(2017) 331 final.

The ECB stresses the need for ESMA to cooperate for the purposes of the proposed regulation not only with the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) and the EBA, but also with the ECB/ESCB in connection with the performance of the ESCB's tasks of defining and implementing monetary policy and of promoting the smooth operation of payment systems, and the ECB's tasks concerning the prudential supervision of credit institutions⁷. In this regard, EU central banks of issue and CCP overseers should be involved in the horizontal cooperation with regard to CCP recovery and resolution across Union CCPs, as explained in paragraph 2.2, and the development of regulatory technical standards (RTS) for the technical details of resolution plans, resolvability assessments, and the functioning of resolution colleges as set out in paragraphs 2.2, 2.4 and 2.5.

2.1.2 *Voting arrangements in resolution colleges*

Pursuant to Article 4(1) of the proposed regulation, the resolution authority must establish, manage and chair a resolution college that comprises, among other members, the 'central banks of issue of the most relevant Union currencies of the financial instruments cleared'⁸ and 'the competent authorities responsible for the supervision of the clearing members of the CCP that are established in the three Member States with the largest contributions to the default fund of the CCP'⁹.

Where the Eurosystem central banks, which together form the 'central bank of issue' for the euro, are represented by the ECB or a national central bank (NCB), and the prudential supervision of credit institutions that are significant CCP clearing members is performed by the ECB, separate votes should be attached to these two roles. As the ECB has already stressed¹⁰, these two functions are distinct and pursue different objectives, as is reflected in the operational separation between the ECB's monetary policy and prudential supervisory roles.

2.1.3 *Central banks as clearing participants*

The proposed regulation¹¹ lays down rules and procedures relating to the recovery and resolution of CCPs authorised in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 648/2012. By necessary implication, its provisions apply not only to CCPs but, also, to CCP clearing participants, meaning clearing members and clients¹². In connection with their operations under the Treaty and national legislation, the members of the ESCB may act both in the capacity of a clearing member and a client. If resolution authorities were to decide, at their discretion, to activate the position and loss allocation tools under the proposed regulation, this would imply that central banks acting as CCP clearing members or clients in connection with their statutory operations would participate in financial loss sharing. This would entail the risk that such losses could undermine a central bank's balance sheet position and compromise its reputation. Furthermore, the proposed framework should take account of the special features of central banks as CCP clearing participants, whilst

⁷ See Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 63).

⁸ See Article 4(2)(h) of the proposed regulation.

⁹ See Article 4(2)(c) of the proposed regulation.

¹⁰ See the ECB response to the Commission consultation on the review of the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR), available on the ECB's website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

¹¹ See Article 1 of the proposed regulation.

¹² See point (17) of Article 2 of the proposed regulation.

bearing in mind the root cause of a CCP's potential failure, namely the default of one or more of its clearing members. Central banks differ from other CCP clearing participants, as central banks are, by definition, solvent and not prone to failure, on account of their special status, which is linked to the public law nature of their mandate. Given the limited risks posed by central banks as CCP clearing participants, certain CCPs will allow central banks to be admitted as clearing members under modified conditions. It is, therefore, difficult to accept that CCP clearing participants such as central banks, which create no risks for the CCPs in which they participate, should bear costs associated with the failure of those CCPs, including in a resolution scenario. Finally, in terms of consistency with the objectives of the proposed regulation, it is important to avoid creating moral hazard issues or misperceptions with regard to the role of central banks. An increase in the exposures of the members of the ESCB to a failing CCP would contradict the underlying rationale of the proposed regulation, which is to prevent reliance on public money to preclude a CCP's failure. Consequently, the ECB proposes that the members of the ESCB should be exempted when acting as CCP clearing participants from the position and loss allocation tools set out in Articles 28 to 31 of the proposed regulation.

2.1.4 *Central banks as resolution authorities*

The proposed regulation provides that NCBs may be designated as resolution authorities for CCPs¹³. At the same time, NCBs have a statutory role to promote the smooth operation of payment systems and to contribute to the smooth conduct of policies relating to the stability of the financial system, in addition to providing relevant expertise on financial market infrastructures. Notwithstanding this existing statutory role, where, on the basis of the proposed regulation, a Member State designates an NCB as the resolution authority for CCPs, the specific details of the proposed conferral of that task on the NCB would have to be assessed by the ECB against the prohibition on monetary financing under Article 123 of the Treaty¹⁴.

In addition, although, according to the proposed regulation, an NCB (in its capacity as resolution authority) may own, wholly or partially, a bridge CCP¹⁵, the NCB may not assume or finance any of the bridge CCP's obligations. The NCB's role as owner of such an entity must, under all circumstances, remain consistent with the prohibition on monetary financing under Article 123 of the Treaty, and it must perform the role of owner without prejudice to its financial and institutional independence¹⁶. In the same vein, the ECB emphasises that, in line with Article 123 of the Treaty, which prohibits, inter alia, any financing of the public sector's obligations vis-à-vis third parties, NCBs may not finance any of the additional financing arrangements¹⁷ deemed necessary to ensure the effective use of resolution tools¹⁸. This is without prejudice to the competence of central banks to decide independently and at their full discretion, separately from their potential role as resolution

¹³ See Article 3(1) of the proposed regulation.

¹⁴ See paragraphs 2.2 and 2.3 of Opinion CON/2017/2. All ECB opinions are published on the ECB's website at www.ecb.europa.eu

¹⁵ See Article 42(2) of the proposed regulation.

¹⁶ See paragraph 3.3 of Opinion CON/2012/99 of the European Central Bank of 29 November 2012 on a proposal for a directive establishing a framework for recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms (OJ C 39, 12.2.2013, p. 1).

¹⁷ See Article 44 of the proposed regulation.

¹⁸ See paragraph 3.4 of Opinion CON/2012/99.

authorities, on the provision of central bank liquidity to solvent entities, in accordance with the relevant rules and within the limits imposed by the monetary financing prohibition under the Treaty.

2.2 *EMIR colleges, resolution colleges and the ESMA resolution committee*

The ECB supports the overall framework for the functioning of the EMIR colleges and of the resolution colleges for the purposes of cooperation on recovery planning, resolution planning, resolvability assessments and resolution. However, given the need for the effective involvement of central banks and bank supervisors both in the design and execution of CCP recovery and resolution strategies, the ECB recommends that the RTS specifying the functioning of resolution colleges should be developed in close cooperation with the ESCB, including the ECB when performing its prudential supervision tasks, and the EBA.

Furthermore, as stated in paragraph 1.2.3, the arrangements for colleges at the level of each individual CCP should be complemented with a horizontal structure to consider recovery and resolution arrangements across CCPs throughout the Union. In order to promote consistent approaches and the effective interaction of recovery and resolution arrangements across Union CCPs, ESMA should assess CCP recovery and resolution arrangements in terms of their aggregate effect on Union financial stability through regular stress-testing and crisis simulation exercises with respect to potential system-wide stress events. A combined assessment of the impact of CCP recovery and resolution arrangements is warranted in view of the peculiarities of the recovery and resolution process for CCPs. In contrast to the arrangements in place for banks, CCP resolution relies to the greatest possible extent on the recovery process. Under the proposed regulation, resolution authorities are required, subject to certain derogations, to enforce CCPs' existing or outstanding contractual obligations before using any resolution tools¹⁹. In addition, where a deviation from a CCP's operating rules in resolution has led to its clearing members being worse off than they would have been in liquidation, they will be entitled to compensation²⁰.

Unlike banks, CCPs do not take on financial risk themselves but manage it on behalf of their clearing members, while the position and loss allocation tools rely essentially on a CCP's clearing members. Against this background, the supervisors and resolution authorities for CCPs and banking supervisors should cooperate closely in recovery and resolution planning to ensure that banks can appropriately prepare for and manage related obligations, thereby also reducing the risk that CCP recovery and resolution could give rise to adverse contagion effects in the wider financial system. Similarly, there is a need to closely coordinate with central banks in their roles as central banks of issue and overseers, as set out in paragraph 2.1.1. Therefore, in performing its horizontal tasks with regard to recovery and resolution planning, ESMA should cooperate with the ESCB and banking supervisors, including the ECB when performing its prudential supervision tasks. Consistent with this, the proposed regulation should include more generally a requirement for ESMA to cooperate with the ESCB.

Finally, there may be a need to reconsider the ECB's position as to the authority which should be mandated with the horizontal assessment of CCP recovery and resolution arrangements once the

¹⁹ See Article 27(3) and (4) of the proposed regulation.

²⁰ See Article 27(5) of the proposed regulation.

current review of Union legislation on CCP supervision initiated with the Commission's proposal of 13 June 2017 will have been finalised.

2.3 *Recovery planning*

2.3.1 *Content of recovery plans*

The content of recovery plans under the proposed regulation requires more detailed specification. In particular, the key objective of recovery planning should be specified expressly in terms of ensuring the availability of a set of recovery tools that is comprehensive and effective in allowing a CCP to allocate any uncovered losses and cover liquidity shortfalls, address unbalanced positions and replenish financial resources, including the CCP's own capital, so that it can continue to provide critical services.

Broadly consistent with the proposed regulation's provisions on the content of resolution plans²¹, CCPs should as a minimum be required to differentiate, also in their recovery plans, between potential stress scenarios that are due to a clearing member's default and those that are due to other reasons, and to take into consideration a combination of these recovery scenarios and potential system-wide events. As regards default-related losses, it will be important to ensure that the scenarios reflected are sufficiently severe, and CCPs should therefore be required to take into account the potential default of more than two of their largest clearing members. As regards non-default losses, CCPs should, in line with the 2017 report on recovery adopted by the CPMI and IOSCO²², be required expressly to consider investment losses, general business losses and, where applicable, risks associated with the failure of a third party to perform a critical function for the CCP.

In addition, consistent with the proposed regulation's requirements for resolution plans²³, it should be expressly specified that recovery plans must assume not only the absence of extraordinary public financial support, but also the absence of central bank emergency liquidity assistance, or central bank liquidity assistance provided under non-standard collateralisation, tenor or interest rate terms.

The requirements for recovery plans to consider the interests of all stakeholders that are likely to be affected by the plan and to ensure that clearing members do not have unlimited exposures towards the CCP, should be moved from the annex to the main text of the proposed regulation, given the essential nature of these requirements.

Finally, the sequencing of loss allocation tools in recovery plans should be specified. Given how crucial it is that clearing participants are in a position to measure, manage and control their potential exposures in recovery to the greatest extent possible, tools which can be fully quantified ex ante (such as capped cash calls) should be prioritised over other loss allocation tools where the eventual amounts at stake will largely depend on market movements and positions held at an uncertain point in the future when recovery is initiated.

²¹ See Article 13(3) of the proposed regulation.

²² See footnote 2.

²³ See Article 13(4) of the proposed regulation.

2.3.2 *Assessment of recovery plans*

The ECB welcomes the role of the resolution authority in examining the recovery plan in order to identify any measures which may adversely impact on the resolvability of the CCP and making recommendations on those matters to the competent authorities²⁴. This is a critical safeguard considering that CCP recovery plans are taken as the starting point for CCP resolution. In order to ensure that this provision works effectively, the ECB recommends clarifying that the resolution authority's review may take place not only in the context of the initial approval of the recovery plan, but also at a later stage, when the resolution authority conducts or updates its assessment of the CCP's resolvability. This is important as resolution authorities are likely only to conduct their resolution planning and resolvability assessments after the CCP's recovery plan has been finalised.

2.3.3 *Coordination procedure for recovery plans*

The ECB considers that the voting procedure in relation to recovery plans, to be used by the colleges established under Regulation (EU) No 648/2012²⁵, should be aligned with the procedure for college opinions set out in Article 17(4) and 19 of that Regulation. To specify that voting of a two-thirds majority of the college will be needed to trigger ESMA mediation if a unanimous decision of the college cannot be reached within a predetermined period²⁶ is likely to be more effective in fostering timely decision-making by the college and reducing the need for mediation by ESMA in reaching a college opinion. Moreover, this approach would strengthen the involvement of all relevant competent authorities that could be affected by the college's decision.

2.4 *Resolution planning*

2.4.1 *Content of resolution plans*

In line with the ECB's suggestions for the content of recovery plans set out in paragraph 2.3.1, the ECB considers that resolution plans should further differentiate the failure scenarios not related to a clearing member's default²⁷. Similarly, in order to ensure that resolution plans are adequate for all relevant scenarios going beyond 'extreme but plausible' conditions, the resolution plan should, in terms of default-related failure scenarios, take into consideration not only the default of one or more of the CCP's clearing members²⁸, but also the default of at least the three clearing members to which the CCP has the largest exposures, considering that CCPs are already required under Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 to hold sufficient financial resources to withstand the potential default of at least the two clearing members to which the CCP has the largest exposures.

The ECB welcomes the requirement for a resolution plan not to assume extraordinary public financial support, central bank emergency liquidity assistance or central bank liquidity assistance provided under non-standard collateralisation, tenor and interest terms²⁹. At the same time, given

²⁴ See Article 10(4) of the proposed regulation.

²⁵ See Article 12(2) to (5) of the proposed regulation.

²⁶ This would imply that if a majority of two-thirds of college members have expressed a negative opinion on the recovery plan any of the authorities concerned may transfer the matter to ESMA for mediation.

²⁷ See Article 13(3) of the proposed regulation.

²⁸ See Article 13(3)(a)(i) of the proposed regulation.

²⁹ See Article 13(4) of the proposed regulation.

the importance of pre-empting potential taxpayer losses in resolution, the ECB recommends that the proposed regulation also expressly requires a resolution authority to make prudent assumptions about the financial resources that may be required to achieve resolution objectives and the resources that it expects to be available under the CCP's rules and arrangements at the time of entry into resolution.

In order to ensure better consistency between the key aspects of the resolution plan³⁰ and international standards, the ECB recommends adding the following items to the minimum content of resolution plans.

- An estimation of the timeframe for the replenishment of the financial resources of the CCP (i.e. default fund and regulatory capital).
- A description of the general approach and decision-making processes followed by the resolution authority in key areas of resolution with the objective of fostering ex ante planning and stakeholder transparency around prospective resolution actions³¹. This should include: (a) the resolution authority's prospective approach for triggering resolution, including key indicators that would influence the resolution authority's decision whether to put the CCP in resolution in different types of default and non-default related resolution scenarios; and (b) to the extent that the resolution authority needs to depart from the CCP's rules and arrangements, the general approach that the resolution authority would expect to follow in calculating and allocating losses, including the presumed choice and sequencing of different loss allocation tools, and how the resolution authority would expect to apply the 'no creditor worse off than in insolvency' safeguard and assess losses under the counterfactual for these purposes.
- A description of the information sharing arrangements within the resolution college during resolution³².

The ECB welcomes the fact that the proposed regulation provides for the development of RTS for the technical details of resolution plans³³. However, the ECB stresses that these RTS should be developed in close cooperation with the ESCB, including the ECB when performing its prudential supervision tasks, and the EBA. Involvement of the ESCB is particularly important, given the key role that central banks of issue play in facilitating continued access to critical payment and settlement services and in the provision of liquidity in accordance with their respective mandates.

2.4.2 Coordination procedure for resolution plans

In line with the ECB's suggestions for the coordination procedure for recovery plans set out in paragraph 2.3.3, the ECB considers that the voting procedure to be used by the resolution college in relation to resolution plans³⁴ should be aligned with the procedure set out in Article 17(4) and Article 19 of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012.

³⁰ See Article 13(6) of the proposed regulation.

³¹ See section 7.5 (i) and (v) of the FSB's 'Guidance on Central Counterparty Resolution and Resolution Planning'.

³² Ibid., section 7.5 (xii).

³³ See Article 13(8) of the proposed regulation.

³⁴ See Article 15 of the proposed regulation.

2.5 *Resolvability*

2.5.1 *Content of resolvability assessments*

The ECB considers that the technical aspects to be considered by the resolution authority when assessing the resolvability of a CCP should be set out in RTS and not in an annex to the proposed regulation³⁵. These RTS should be developed in close cooperation with the ESCB, including the ECB when performing its prudential supervision tasks, and the EBA.

The ECB welcomes the power of the resolution authority to require a CCP to set aside resources to increase the capacity for loss absorption, recapitalisation and the replenishment of pre-funded resources, should the available resolution funding be deemed insufficient³⁶. In order to give effect to this power, the RTS on the assessment of resolvability should specify minimum criteria to be considered by resolution authorities when assessing the adequacy of a CCP's resolution funding. This aspect is currently not covered by the proposed regulation³⁷. As a minimum the resolution authority should take into account the following elements³⁸:

- in the event of default-related resolution scenarios: (a) the risk characteristics, complexity and pricing uncertainties of the products cleared, and the related potential margin of error in initial and variation margin calculations; (b) the size, structure and liquidity of the underlying market in stressed conditions; (c) the number of clearing member defaults that would be covered by available pre-funded and committed resources under 'extreme but plausible' conditions; (d) the availability and potential impact on affected clearing participants of tools such as partial tear-up and variation margin gains haircutting; and (e) the credibility of unfunded arrangements in meeting the CCP's potential needs; and
- in addition, and for all types of loss, the substitutability of the CCP in the markets it serves, and the credibility of any additional arrangements, such as insurance agreements or parental guarantees, that may be available to address uncovered credit losses.

Furthermore, as any requirement by a resolution authority, in accordance with point (f) of Article 17(7), for a CCP to issue bail-in-able liabilities as a loss-absorbing instrument may be difficult to reconcile with the role and business model of CCPs as risk managers, a thorough impact assessment should be conducted before making use of this power.

Finally, in drafting the RTS on the assessment of resolvability, ESMA should take into account forthcoming assessments or reports drawn up by the FSB on financial resources for CCP resolution³⁹.

2.5.2 *Coordination procedure for resolvability assessments*

In line with the ECB's suggestions for the coordination procedure for recovery and resolution plans set out in paragraphs 2.3.3 and 2.4.2, the ECB considers that the voting procedure to be used by

³⁵ See Article 16(4) of the proposed regulation.

³⁶ See Article 17(7)(i) of the proposed regulation.

³⁷ See Section C of the Annex to the proposed regulation on matters that the resolution authority is to consider when assessing the resolvability of a CCP.

³⁸ See section 6 of the FSB 'Guidance on Central Counterparty Resolution and Resolution Planning'.

³⁹ The FSB will continue its work on financial resources for CCP resolution and, based on further analysis and experience gained in resolution planning, determine by the end of 2018 whether there is a need for any additional guidance. See the introduction to the FSB's 'Guidance on Central Counterparty Resolution and Resolution Planning'.

the resolution college in relation to the assessment of resolvability⁴⁰ should be aligned with the procedure set out in Article 17(4) and Article 19 of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012.

2.6 *Resolution*

2.6.1 *Resolution objectives*

The ECB considers that the resolution objective that refers to the protection of public funds by minimising reliance on extraordinary public financial support⁴¹ should be expanded to include an express reference to minimising the risk of potential taxpayer losses, given that temporary public funding arrangements could be designed in different ways in terms of their safeguards to reduce potential risks for taxpayers.

2.6.2 *Conditions for resolution*

As the boundary between recovery and resolution is very difficult to determine ex ante and well-timed entry into resolution is key to ensuring effective resolution and avoiding any unnecessary destruction of economic value, it is crucial that competent authorities and resolution authorities cooperate closely in the lead-up to resolution. Therefore, the ECB considers that the competent authority should provide the resolution authority, without delay and at its own initiative, with any information that may suggest that the CCP is failing or is likely to fail, and not act only in response to information requests from the resolution authority⁴².

Furthermore, given the objective of maintaining systemic stability, one priority in CCP recovery and resolution is to avoid unpredictable and significant losses for CCPs' clearing members. CCP recovery and resolution will not be effective if it is primarily based on the expectation that clearing members will be able to shoulder significant payment obligations. The potential failure of other clearing members due to sudden exposures they are unable to manage could also exacerbate existing strains within the financial system, especially given the interconnectedness of CCPs. The deployment of loss allocation tools associated with very significant, unpredictable costs for clearing members should therefore be exercised preferably by the resolution authority and not by the CCP itself during recovery. The resolution authority is likely to be in a better position than the CCP to weigh up the implications of a particular course of action for financial stability. Against this background, the ECB recommends clarifying in the proposed regulation that the resolution authority is authorised to take resolution action in cases where the CCP: (a) is or is likely to be unable to return to a matched book and to allocate uncovered losses; or (b) will only be able to return to a matched book and to allocate uncovered losses with recovery actions that may create significant and unpredictable losses for the CCP's clearing members.

2.6.3 *Resolution tools*

In order to pre-empt moral hazard and minimise potential taxpayer losses, the use of government stabilisation tools⁴³ should not only be subject to the condition of approval under the Union State

⁴⁰ See Article 18 of the proposed regulation.

⁴¹ See Article 21(1)(d) of the proposed regulation.

⁴² See Article 22(1) of the proposed regulation.

⁴³ See Article 27 of the proposed regulation.

aid framework⁴⁴, but should also be dependent on credible mechanisms for the timely and comprehensive recovery of any resources provided.

As regards position allocation tools, the ECB considers that partial tear-up should in principle be prioritised over full tear-up, given the key resolution objective of preserving the continuity of a CCP's critical functions. It therefore recommends that full tear-up be applied only in situations where the resolution authority considers that no other option would result in a better outcome for financial stability.

2.6.4 Resolution funding

Given the key objective of the proposed regulation to avoid taxpayer losses in CCP resolution, the ECB considers that the provisions on government stabilisation tools do not sufficiently clarify the necessary safeguards. As a minimum, and as set out in international guidance by the FSB⁴⁵, the proposed regulation should include as a last resort, among the conditions for the use of government stabilisation tools, a requirement for resolution authorities to: (a) define a clear timetable for the recovery of any resources provided; and (b) ensure that effective and credible arrangements for recovering these resources are in place. In this context, the ECB also considers that the recovery of expenses incurred in connection with the use of government stabilisation tools⁴⁶ should be broadened. The ECB supports the existing proposal that expenses should be recovered in the first instance from the CCP under resolution, its purchaser or from the proceeds generated as a result of the termination of a bridge entity. However, these sources may not be sufficient to cover all the expenses incurred. Therefore, resolution authorities should also be required to seek ex-post recovery of public funds from clearing members in accordance with the CCP's rules and arrangements, while mitigating risks to financial stability.

2.7 'No creditor worse off than in insolvency' principle

The 'no-creditor-worse-off-than-in-insolvency' (NCWO) principle is a critical safeguard to ensure that CCP participants, shareholders and other creditors would not be treated less favourably in resolution than under the hypothetical alternative scenario where the resolution authority would not have intervened and the CCP would have been liquidated under applicable insolvency law. At the same time, it is important that the valuation methodology underlying the application of the NCWO principle properly reflects the fair value of business continuity preserved by CCP resolution in order to avoid excessive compensation claims by relevant stakeholders. The need for a fair and balanced approach in this respect is underlined by the related risks for the public sector, with the financial burden ultimately being borne by taxpayers. Taking proper account of the fair value of business continuity preserved by CCP resolution is an essential consideration in the context of CCP resolution, which would only be envisaged to take place in exceptionally severe market

⁴⁴ This is understood, in accordance with the definition set out in Article 2(1)(53) of Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC, and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/66/EU, and Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 648/2012, of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 190), as the 'framework established by Articles 107, 108 and 109 TFEU and regulations and all Union acts, including guidelines, communications and notices, made or adopted pursuant to Article 108(4) or Article 109 TFEU'.

⁴⁵ See section 6 of the FSBs 'Guidance on Central Counterparty Resolution and Resolution Planning'.

⁴⁶ See Article 27(9) of the proposed regulation.

events, where the disruption of a CCP's critical functions would most likely be associated with a large-scale destruction of financial value and very limited opportunities for bilateral clearing alternatives.

Against this background, the ECB considers that a fair valuation of the CCP for purposes of the application of the 'no creditor worse off than in insolvency' principle would need to be not only carried out in terms of the assets and liabilities reflected on the CCP's balance sheet at the point in time when resolution is triggered, but would need to be based on a more comprehensive, realistic assessment of the CCP's value in the event of its liquidation, taking full account of losses, replacement costs, and the destruction of value that would result from service closure or the liquidation of the CCP.

2.8 *Technical observations and drafting proposals*

Where the ECB recommends that the proposed regulation should be amended, specific drafting proposals are set out in a separate technical working document accompanied by an explanatory text to this effect. The technical working document is available in English on the ECB's website.

Done at Frankfurt am Main, 20 September 2017.

[signed]

The President of the ECB

Mario DRAGHI

Technical working document

produced in connection with ECB Opinion CON/2017/38¹

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a framework for the recovery and resolution of central counterparties and amending Regulations (EU) No 1095/2010, (EU) No 648/2012, and (EU) 2015/2365

Drafting proposals

Text proposed by the European Commission	Amendments proposed by the ECB ²
Amendment 1	
Recital 12a (new)	
No text	(12a) The members of the ESCB may act as clearing members or clients of CCPs, and differ from other CCP clearing participants insofar as they are publicly chartered central banks, which do not present a risk of default for the CCPs in which they participate. When acting as clearing members or clients of CCPs, the members of the ESCB should therefore be excluded from the position and loss allocation tools under this Regulation.'
<u>Explanation</u>	
See paragraph 2.1.3 of the opinion.	
Amendment 2	
Recital 16a (new)	
No text	(16a) Since the establishment and

¹ This technical working document is produced in English only and communicated to the consulting Union institution(s) after adoption of the opinion. It is also published in the Legal framework section of the ECB's website alongside the opinion itself.

² Bold in the body of the text indicates where the ECB proposes inserting new text. Strikethrough in the body of the text indicates where the ECB proposes deleting text.

Text proposed by the European Commission	Amendments proposed by the ECB ²
	functioning of the resolution college is assumed to be based on a written agreement between all of its members, it is appropriate to give them the power to determine the college's decision-making procedures, given the sensitivity of the issue. Therefore, detailed rules on voting procedures should be laid down in a written agreement between the members of the resolution college. However, in order to balance the interests of all relevant market participants and Member States appropriately, the college should vote in accordance with the general principle whereby each member has one vote, irrespective of the number of functions performed in accordance with this Regulation. This principle should be without prejudice to Article 25 of Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013*, which requires the ECB to carry out the prudential supervision tasks conferred on it by Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 separately from its tasks relating to monetary policy and any other tasks. *Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 63).'
<u>Explanation</u> <i>This amendment seeks to ensure that the principle of separation between the ECB's supervisory and monetary functions, as laid down in Article 25 of Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013³, is reflected in the voting arrangements applicable to central counterparty (CCP) resolution colleges. The proposed</i>	

³ Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 63).

Text proposed by the European Commission	Amendments proposed by the ECB ²
<i>amendment is drafted in similar terms to the recital describing the voting procedure for colleges under Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council⁴ (also known as the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR)). It also aims to clarify the rationale behind Amendment 5 regarding Article 4 of the proposed regulation. See also paragraph 2.1.2 of the opinion.</i>	
Amendment 3 Recital 35a (new)	
No text	(35a) The resolution authority should consider whether to take a resolution action in cases where, in the opinion of the resolution authority, the CCP either (i) is or is likely to be unable to return to a matched book and allocate uncovered losses or (ii) will only be able to return to a matched book and to allocate uncovered losses with recovery actions that could create significant and unpredictable losses for the CCP's participants.'
<u>Explanation</u> <i>Suggested clarification in line with Article 22(3) of the proposed regulation according to which a resolution authority may take resolution action where it considers that the CCP applies or intends to apply recovery measures which could prevent the CCP's failure but could cause significant adverse effects to the financial system. See paragraph 2.6.2 of the opinion.</i>	
Amendment 4 Article 1(2) (new)	
'Article 1 <i>Subject matter</i> This Regulation lays down rules and procedures relating to the recovery and resolution of central counterparties (CCPs) authorised in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 and rules	'Article 1 <i>Subject matter</i> 1. This Regulation lays down rules and procedures relating to the recovery and resolution of central counterparties (CCPs) authorised in accordance with Regulation (EU)

⁴ See recital 54 of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories (OJ L 201, 27.7.2012, p. 1).

Text proposed by the European Commission	Amendments proposed by the ECB ²
relating to the arrangements with third countries in the field of recovery and resolution of CCPs.'	No 648/2012 and rules relating to the arrangements with third countries in the field of recovery and resolution of CCPs. 2. Articles 28 to 31 shall not apply to the members of the ESCB when acting as clearing participants.'
<u>Explanation</u> <i>In line with the exemption of central banks from Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 (see Article 1(4)), central banks should be excluded from the position and loss allocation tools, which could have a negative impact on central banks' balance sheets when acting as clearing participants in connection with the performance of their statutory tasks. See paragraph 2.1.3 of the opinion.</i>	
Amendment 5 Article 4(2a) (new)	
No text	2a. Where an authority has the right to participate in the college under more than one of points (c) to (h) of paragraph 2, it may nominate additional participants who shall have no voting rights, except that the ECB shall have separate voting rights when carrying out the separate tasks identified in points (c) and (h) of paragraph 2.'
<u>Explanation</u> <i>This amendment seeks to ensure that the principle of separation between the ECB's supervisory and monetary functions, as enshrined in Article 25 of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013, is reflected in the voting arrangements applicable to CCP resolution colleges. The principle that the members of the colleges set up under Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 should have a single vote where they participate in the college in more than one of the supervisory, oversight and central banking capacities listed in points (c) to (h) of Article 18(2) of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 has been established in Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 876/2013⁵. Given that the proposed regulation follows the structure of the EMIR colleges as regards the members of the college, it is appropriate to clarify this issue both as regards the colleges established under Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 (see Amendment 33 below) and</i>	

⁵ See Article 3(4) of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 876/2013 of 28 May 2013 supplementing Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory technical standards on colleges for central counterparties (OJ L 244, 13.9.2013, p. 19).

Text proposed by the European Commission	Amendments proposed by the ECB ²
<i>in the proposed regulation as regards resolution colleges. See paragraph 2.1.2 of the opinion.</i>	
Amendment 6	
Article 5	
1. ESMA shall create a resolution committee pursuant to Article 41 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 for the purpose of preparing the decisions entrusted to ESMA in this Regulation, except for the decisions to be adopted pursuant to Article 12 of this Regulation. The resolution committee shall promote the development and coordination of resolution plans and develop methods for the resolution of failing CCPs. 2. The resolution committee shall be composed of the authorities designated pursuant to Article 3(1) of this Regulation. Authorities referred to in points (i) and (iv) of Article 4(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 shall be invited to participate in the resolution committee as observers. 3. For the purposes of this Regulation, ESMA shall cooperate with the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) and EBA within the framework of the Joint Committee of the European Supervisory Authorities established in Article 54 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, Article 54 of Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010 and Article 54 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010. 4. For the purposes of this Regulation, ESMA shall ensure structural separation between the resolution committee and other functions referred to in Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010.'	'1. ESMA shall create a resolution committee pursuant to Article 41 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 for the purpose of preparing the decisions entrusted to ESMA in this Regulation, except for the decisions to be adopted pursuant to Article 12 of this Regulation. The resolution committee shall also promote the development and coordination of resolution plans and develop methods strategies for the resolution of failing CCPs. 2. The resolution committee shall be composed of the authorities designated pursuant to Article 3(1) of this Regulation. Authorities referred to in points (i) and (iv) of Article 4(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 shall be invited to participate in the resolution committee as observers. 3. ESMA shall promote the development and coordination of recovery plans and strategies for Union CCPs. 4. ESMA shall assess CCP recovery and resolution arrangements across the Union in terms of their aggregate effect on Union financial stability through regular stress-testing and crisis simulation exercises with respect to potential system-wide stress events. In exercising this role, ESMA shall cooperate closely with the ESCB and banking supervisors, including the ECB when performing its prudential supervision tasks. 35. For the purposes of this Regulation, ESMA shall cooperate with the ESCB, including the

Text proposed by the European Commission	Amendments proposed by the ECB ²
	ECB when performing its prudential supervision tasks, the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) and EBA within the framework of the Joint Committee of the European Supervisory Authorities established in Article 54 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, Article 54 of Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010 and Article 54 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010. 46. For the purposes of this Regulation, ESMA shall ensure structural separation between the resolution committee and other functions referred to in Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010.'
<u>Explanation</u> <i>This amendment aims to enhance the Union's institutional framework for CCP recovery and resolution by (i) complementing the college arrangements at the level of each individual Union CCP with a horizontal coordination of recovery plans and resolution plans across Union CCPs, including in view of the significant participant-based interdependencies across Union CCPs and the need to promote a Union level-playing field; (ii) ensuring the effective interaction of recovery and resolution plans across Union CCPs in safeguarding financial stability in the Union in the event of potential system-wide stress events, taking into account the close interaction of CCP recovery and CCP resolution and benefiting from the involvement of Union central banks and banking supervisors in performing this task.</i> <i>Moreover, since central banks and banking supervisors will be directly involved in and affected by CCP recovery and resolution, this amendment proposes the establishment of a general requirement for ESMA to cooperate with the ESCB and the ECB when performing its supervisory tasks in the context of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) under the proposed regulation.</i> <i>See paragraphs [1.2.3], 2.1.1 and 2.2 of the opinion.</i>	
Amendment 7 Article 9(1)	
'1. CCPs shall draw up and maintain a recovery plan providing for measures to be taken in order to restore their financial position following a significant deterioration of their financial situation or a risk of breaching their prudential requirements under	'1. CCPs shall draw up and maintain a recovery plan providing for measures to be taken in order to restore their financial position following a significant deterioration of their financial situation or a risk of breaching their prudential

Text proposed by the European Commission	Amendments proposed by the ECB ²
Regulation (EU) No 648/2012.'	requirements under Regulation (EU) No 648/2012. This plan shall include a set of recovery tools that is comprehensive and effective, allowing the CCP to allocate any uncovered losses and cover liquidity shortfalls, addressing unbalanced positions and replenishing financial resources, including the CCP's own capital, which are necessary for the CCP to maintain its viability as a going concern and to continue providing its critical services in accordance with Article 1(2) of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 152/2013* and Article 32(2) and (3) of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 153/2013**. * Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 152/2013 of 19 December 2012 supplementing Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory technical standards on capital requirements for central counterparties (OJ L 52, 23.2.2013, p. 37). ** Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 153/2013 of 19 December 2012 supplementing Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory technical standards on requirements for central counterparties (OJ L 52, 23.2.2013, p. 41).'
<u>Explanation</u> <i>This amendment proposes to include in the proposed regulation an express statement of the key objectives of recovery planning in order to ensure consistent and sufficiently stringent approaches across Union CCPs. See paragraph 2.3.1 of the opinion.</i>	
Amendment 8	

Text proposed by the European Commission	Amendments proposed by the ECB ²
Article 9(1 a) (new)	
No text	'1a. The recovery plan shall take into consideration at least the following: (a) the CCP's failure due to the default, in extreme market conditions, of at least the three clearing members to which the CCP has the largest exposures; (b) other reasons for the CCP's failure, including losses from its investment activities, general business risk, as well as, where applicable, risks associated with the failure of a third party to perform a critical function for the CCP; (c) the potential combination of default and non-default related failure scenarios. Furthermore, both idiosyncratic and system-wide stress scenarios shall be considered in the recovery plan, taking into account the potential impact of domestic and cross-border contagion in crises, as well as simultaneous crises in several significant markets.'
<u>Explanation</u> <i>This amendment seeks to clarify that the general requirements for the content of CCP recovery plans should be consistent with international standards as well as with the provisions on the content of resolution plans set out in the proposed regulation in order to ensure that the recovery plans of Union CCPs are comprehensive, sufficiently stringent and consistent. See paragraph 2.3.1 of the opinion.</i>	
Amendment 9 Article 9(1 b) (new)	
No text	'1b. The recovery plan shall not assume:

Text proposed by the European Commission	Amendments proposed by the ECB ²
	(a) extraordinary public financial support; (b) central bank emergency liquidity assistance; (c) central bank liquidity assistance provided under non-standard collateralisation, tenor and interest rate terms.'
<u>Explanation</u> <i>This amendment proposes specific requirements in line with the proposed regulation's provisions regarding resolution plans. See paragraph 2.3.1 of the opinion.</i>	
Amendment 10 Article 9(1c) (new)	
No text	(a) '1c. The recovery plan shall consider the interests of all stakeholders that are likely to be affected by the plan; (b) ensure that clearing members do not have unlimited exposures toward the CCP; (c) prioritise the use of tools that allow clearing members to fully quantify ex ante their potential exposures toward the CCP.'
<u>Explanation</u> <i>This amendment proposes to move certain key requirements for the content of recovery plans from the Annex to the articles of the proposed regulation, in view of their importance. See paragraph 2.3.1 of the opinion.</i>	
Amendment 11 Article 10(4)	
'4. The resolution authority shall examine the	'4. The resolution authority, in the context of the

Text proposed by the European Commission	Amendments proposed by the ECB ²
recovery plan in order to identify any measures which may adversely impact the resolvability of the CCP. The resolution authority shall make recommendations to the competent authority with regard to those matters.'	approval by the competent authority referred to in paragraph 1 and when conducting or updating its assessment of the resolvability of the CCP , shall examine the recovery plan in order to identify any measures which may adversely impact the resolvability of the CCP. The resolution authority shall make recommendations to the competent authority with regard to those matters.'
<u>Explanation</u> <i>This amendment aims to clarify the role of the resolution authority in relation to the recovery plan, in view of the fact that resolution authorities would typically conduct their resolution planning and resolvability assessments only after a CCP's recovery plan has been finalised. See paragraph 2.3.2 of the opinion.</i>	
12 Article 12(1)	
'1. The college shall reach a joint decision on all of the following issues: (a) the review and assessment of the recovery plan; (b) the application of the measures referred to in Article 9(6), (7), (8) and (9); [...]	'1. The college shall reach a joint decision on all of the following issues: (a) the review and assessment of the recovery plan; (b) the application of the measures referred to in Article 10 9(6), (7), (8) and (9); [...]
<u>Explanation</u> <i>The Union legislators are invited to consider whether the college referred to in Article 18(1) of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 should reach a joint decision on the application of the measures referred to in Article 10(6), (7), (8) and (9) and not Article 9(6), (7), (8) and (9) of the proposed regulation, given that the provisions of Article 10 lay down the specific measures to be taken by the resolution authorities.</i>	
Amendment 13 Article 12(3) to (5) (including (3a) (new))	

Text proposed by the European Commission	Amendments proposed by the ECB ²
'3. Where, after four months from the date of transmission of the recovery plan, the college has failed to reach a joint decision on the issues referred to in points (a) and (b) of paragraph 1, the competent authority of the CCP shall make its own decision. The competent authority of the CCP shall make the decision referred to in the first subparagraph taking into account the views of the other college members expressed during the four-month period. The competent authority of the CCP shall notify in writing that decision to the CCP, to its parent undertaking, where relevant, and to the other members of the college. 4. Where, by the end of that four-month period, any member of the college has referred to ESMA in accordance with Article 19 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 a matter in relation to the assessment of recovery plans and implementation of the measures pursuant to points (a), (b) and (d) of Article 10(9) of this Regulation, the competent authority of the CCP shall await the decision taken by ESMA in accordance with Article 19(3) of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 and decide in accordance with the decision of ESMA. 5. The four-month period shall be deemed to be the conciliation phase within the meaning of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010. ESMA shall take its decision within one month from the referral of the matter to it. The matter shall not be referred to ESMA after the end of the four month time period or after a joint decision has been reached. In the absence of an ESMA decision within one month, the decision of the competent authority of the CCP shall apply.'	'3. Where, after four months from the date of transmission of the recovery plan, the college has failed to reach a joint decision on the issues referred to in points (a) and (b) of paragraph 1, and without prejudice to paragraph 4, the college shall adopt a majority decision within the same period competent authority of the CCP shall make its own decision. The competent authority of the CCP shall make the decision referred to in the first subparagraph taking into account the views of the other college members expressed during the four month period. The competent authority of the CCP shall notify in writing that the college's decision to the CCP, to its parent undertaking, where relevant, and to the other members of the college. 3a. A majority decision of the college shall be adopted on the basis of a simple majority of its members. For colleges of up to and including 12 members, a maximum of two college members from the same Member State shall have one vote and each voting member shall have one vote. For colleges with more than 12 members, a maximum of three members from the same Member State shall have one vote and each voting member shall have one vote. ESMA shall have no voting rights regarding the decisions of the college. 4. Where, by the end of that four-month period, a joint decision as referred to in paragraph 1 has not been reached and a majority of two-thirds of the college have expressed a negative opinion, any competent authority of the CCP concerned, based on a majority of

Text proposed by the European Commission	Amendments proposed by the ECB ²
	two-thirds any member of the college, may, within 30 calendar days of the adoption of the decision of the college, has referred to ESMA in accordance with Article 19 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 a matter in relation to the assessment of recovery plans and implementation of the measures pursuant to points (a), (b) and (d) of Article 10(9) of this Regulation. The referral decision shall state in writing the full and detailed reasons why the concerned members of the college consider that the decision taken by the college does not meet the requirements laid down by this Regulation or by any other Union law. 4The college competent authority of the CCP shall await the decision taken by ESMA in accordance with Article 19(3) of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 and decide in accordance with the decision of ESMA. 5. The 30 calendar days four month period shall be deemed to be the conciliation phase within the meaning of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010. ESMA shall take its decision within one month from the referral of the matter to it. The matter shall not be referred to ESMA after the end of the 30 calendar days four month time period or after a joint decision has been reached. In the absence of an ESMA decision within one month, the decision of the college competent authority of the CCP shall apply.'

Text proposed by the European Commission	Amendments proposed by the ECB ²
<u>Explanation</u> <i>The proposed amendment aims to adapt the procedure for adopting college decisions regarding recovery plans to the procedure laid down in Regulation (EU) No 648/2012⁶. See paragraph 2.3.3 of the opinion.</i>	
Amendment 14	
Article 13(3) and (4)	
'3. The resolution plan shall take into consideration at least the following: (a) the CCP's failure due to: i. the default of one or more of its members; ii. other reasons including losses from its investment activities or operational problems; iii. broader financial instability or system wide events; [...] 4. The resolution plan shall not assume any of the following: (a) extraordinary public financial support; (b) central bank emergency liquidity assistance; (c) central bank liquidity assistance provided under non-standard collateralisation, tenor and interest rate terms.'	'3. The resolution plan shall take into consideration at least the following: (a) the CCP's failure due to: i. the default, in extreme market conditions, of at least the three clearing members to which the CCP has the largest exposuresone or more of its members; ii. other reasons including losses from its investment activities or operational problems, general business risk, as well as, where applicable, risks associated with the failure of a third party to perform a critical function for the CCP; iii. the potential combination of default and non-default related failure scenarios. Furthermore, both idiosyncratic and system-wide stress scenarios shall be considered in the resolution plan, taking into account the potential impact of domestic and cross-border contagion in crises, as well as simultaneous crises in several significant markets. broader financial instability or system

⁶ See Articles 17 and 19 of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012.

Text proposed by the European Commission	Amendments proposed by the ECB ²
	wide events; [...] 4. The resolution plan shall not assume any of the following: (a) extraordinary public financial support; (b) central bank emergency liquidity assistance; (c) central bank liquidity assistance provided under non-standard collateralisation, tenor and interest rate terms. A resolution authority shall make prudent assumptions regarding the financial resources that may be required to achieve the resolution objectives and the resources that it expects to be available in accordance with the CCP's rules and arrangements at the time of entering into resolution.'
<u>Explanation</u> <i>This amendment aims to ensure that resolution plans are based on assumptions and scenarios that are comprehensive and sufficiently severe. It also aims to further enshrine, in the context of resolution planning, the key objective of pre-empting taxpayer losses in resolution. See paragraph 2.4.1 of the opinion.</i>	
Amendment 15 Article 13(6)(d)	
'(d) an estimation of the timeframe for executing each material aspect of the plan;'	'(d) an estimation of the timeframe for executing each material aspect of the plan, including for replenishing the CCP's financial resources; '
<u>Explanation</u> <i>This amendment aims to enhance the safeguards for and the promotion of market confidence regarding the continuity of the CCP's critical functions in CCP resolution, in line with international standards on CCP resolution plans. See paragraph 2.4.1 of the opinion.</i>	

Text proposed by the European Commission	Amendments proposed by the ECB ²
Amendment 16 Article 13(6)(ja) (<i>new</i>)	
'The resolution plan shall include the following, quantified whenever appropriate and possible: [...]	'The resolution plan shall include the following, quantified whenever appropriate and possible: [...] (ja) a description of the resolution authority's prospective approach and decision-making processes, where relevant distinguishing between different types of resolution scenarios, for: (i) triggering resolution, including any key indicators that would impact on the resolution authority's decision as to whether to put the CCP in resolution; (ii) calculating and allocating losses in situations where the resolution authority would need to depart from the CCP's rules and arrangements as laid down in the recovery plan, including the choice and sequencing of different loss allocation tools, and how the resolution authority would apply the no-creditor-worse-off-than-in-insolvency safeguard and assess losses under the counterfactual for these purposes.'
<u>Explanation</u> <i>This amendment is aimed at fostering ex ante planning and stakeholder preparedness around prospective resolution actions, in line with international standards on CCP resolution plans. See paragraph 2.4.1 of the opinion.</i>	

Text proposed by the European Commission	Amendments proposed by the ECB ²
Amendment 17 Article 13(6)(p) (<i>new</i>)	
No text	'(p) a description of the arrangements for exchanging information within the resolution college prior to and during resolution, in line with the written arrangements and procedures set out in the regulatory technical standards referred to in Article 4(6).'
<u>Explanation</u> <i>This amendment aims to promote effective information-sharing between the relevant authorities prior to and during resolution, in line with international standards on CCP resolution plans. See paragraph 2.4.1 of the opinion.</i>	
Amendment 18 Article 13(8)	
'8. ESMA, after consulting with the ESRB and taking into account the relevant provisions of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) –/2016 supplementing Directive 2014/59/EU with regard to regulatory technical standards adopted on the basis of Article 10(9) of Directive 2014/59/EU, shall develop draft regulatory technical standards further specifying the contents of the resolution plan in accordance with paragraph 6.'	'8. ESMA, after consulting with the ESRB and taking into account the relevant provisions of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) –/2016 supplementing Directive 2014/59/EU with regard to regulatory technical standards adopted on the basis of Article 10(9) of Directive 2014/59/EU, shall develop, in close cooperation with the ESCB, including the ECB when performing its prudential supervision tasks, and the EBA, draft regulatory technical standards further specifying the contents of the resolution plan in accordance with paragraph 6.'
<u>Explanation</u> <i>This amendment aims to ensure that the detailed requirements for the content of resolution plans will be developed in close cooperation with the main Union authorities directly affected by and involved in CCP resolution. See paragraphs 2.1.1 and 2.4.1 of the opinion.</i>	

Text proposed by the European Commission	Amendments proposed by the ECB ²
Amendment 19 Article 15(5) and (6) (including (5a) (<i>new</i>))	
'5. Where, after four months from the date of transmission of the resolution plan, the college has failed to reach a joint decision, the resolution authority shall make its own decision on the resolution plan. The resolution authority shall make its decision taking into account the views of the other college members expressed during the four-month period. The resolution authority shall notify in writing the decision to the CCP, to its parent undertaking where relevant, and to the other members of the college. 6. Where, by the end of that four-month period, any member of the resolution college has referred to ESMA in accordance with Article 19 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 a matter in relation to the resolution plan, the resolution authority of the CCP shall await any decision that ESMA may take in accordance with Article 19(3) of that Regulation and take its decision in accordance with the decision of ESMA. The four-month time period shall be deemed to be the conciliation phase within the meaning of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010. ESMA shall take its decision within one month from the referral of the matter to it. The matter shall not be referred to ESMA after the end of the four month time period or after a joint decision has been reached. In the absence of an ESMA decision within one month, the decision of the resolution authority shall apply.'	'5. Where, after four months from the date of transmission of the resolution plan, the college has failed to reach a joint decision, and without prejudice to paragraph 6, the college shall adopt a majority decision within the same periodresolution authority shall make its own decision on the resolution plan. The resolution authority shall make its decision taking into account the views of the other college members expressed during the four month period.The resolution authority shall notify in writing the college decision to the CCP and to its parent undertaking where relevant, and to the other members of the college. 5a. A majority decision of the resolution college shall be adopted on the basis of a simple majority of its members. For resolution colleges of up to and including 12 members, a maximum of two college members from the same Member State shall have a vote and each voting member shall have one vote. For resolution colleges with more than 12 members, a maximum of three members from the same Member State shall have one vote and each voting member shall have one vote. ESMA shall have no voting rights regarding the decisions of the resolution college. 6. Where, by the end of that four-month period, a joint decision as referred to in paragraph 1 has not been reached and a majority of two-thirds of the college have expressed a negative opinion, any competent authority of

Text proposed by the European Commission	Amendments proposed by the ECB ²
	the CCP concerned, based on a majority of two-thirds, any member of the college may, within 30 calendar days of the adoption of the decision of the resolution college, has referred to ESMA in accordance with Article 19 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 a matter in relation to the resolution plan. The referral decision shall state in writing the full and detailed reasons why the concerned members of the resolution college consider that the decision taken by the resolution college does not meet the requirements laid down in this Regulation or any other Union law. 4The resolution college authority of the CCP shall await any decision that ESMA may take in accordance with Article 19(3) of that Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 and adapt take its decision in accordance with the decision of ESMA. The 30 calendar days four month time period shall be deemed to be the conciliation phase within the meaning of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010. ESMA shall take its decision within one month from the referral of the matter to it. The matter shall not be referred to ESMA after the end of the 30 calendar days four month time period or after a joint decision has been reached. In the absence of an ESMA decision within one month, the decision of the resolution college authority shall apply.'

Text proposed by the European Commission	Amendments proposed by the ECB ²
<u>Explanation</u> <i>The proposed amendment aims to adapt the procedure for adopting decisions of the resolution college on resolution plans to the procedure laid down in Regulation (EU) No 648/2012⁷. See paragraph 2.4.2 of the opinion.</i>	
Amendment 20	
Article 16(4)	
'4. For the purposes of the assessment of resolvability referred to in paragraph 1, the resolution authority shall, as relevant, examine the matters specified in Section C of the Annex.'	'4. For the purposes of the ESMA shall, in close cooperation with the ESCB, including the ECB when performing its prudential supervision tasks, and the EBA, develop draft regulatory technical standards specifying the matters to be considered by the resolution authority and the resolution college when conducting the assessment of resolvability referred to in paragraph 1, including any minimum common criteria to take into consideration when assessing the comprehensiveness and credibility of resolution funding the resolution authority shall, as relevant, examine the matters specified in Section C of the Annex. In drafting the regulatory technical standards, ESMA shall also take into account assessments or reports drawn up by international standard-setting bodies on financial resources for CCP resolution. ESMA shall submit the draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission 12 months following the entry into force of this Regulation. Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards

⁷ See Article 19 of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012.

Text proposed by the European Commission	Amendments proposed by the ECB ²
	referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with the procedure laid down in Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010.'
<u>Explanation</u> <i>This amendment recommends that the detailed requirements for resolvability assessments should be set out in regulatory technical standards and not in an annex to the proposed regulation, in order to make it easier to amend them in the future. The amendment also proposes that work on regulatory technical standards should be done in close cooperation with the main Union authorities directly affected by and involved in CCP resolution. Detailed requirements for resolvability assessments should also reflect international guidance on financial resources for CCP resolution. See paragraphs 2.1.1 and 2.5.1 of the opinion.</i>	
Amendment 21	
Article 18(3) and (4) (including (3a) (new))	
'3. Where, after four months from the date of transmission of the report provided for in Article 17(1), the college has failed to adopt a joint decision, the resolution authority shall take its own decision on the appropriate measures to be taken in accordance with Article 17(5). The resolution authority shall take its decision having taken into account the views of the other college members expressed during the four-month period. The resolution authority shall notify the decision to the CCP, to its parent undertaking where relevant, and to the other members of the college in writing. 4. Where, by the end of that four-month period, any member of the resolution college has referred to ESMA in accordance with Article 19 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 a matter referred to in points (j), (k) or (n) of Article 17(7), the resolution authority of the CCP shall defer its decision and await any decision that ESMA may take in accordance with Article 19(3) of that Regulation. In that case, the	'3. Where, after four months from the date of transmission of the report provided for in Article 17(1), the resolution college has failed to adopt a joint decision, and without prejudice to paragraph 4, the resolution college shall adopt a majority decision within the same period the authority shall take its own decision on the appropriate measures to be taken in accordance with Article 17(5). The resolution authority shall take its decision having taken into account the views of the other college members expressed during the four month period. The resolution authority shall notify the resolution college decision to the CCP; and to its parent undertaking where relevant, and to the other members of the college in writing. 3a. A majority decision of the resolution college shall be adopted on the basis of a simple majority of its members. For resolution colleges of up to and including 12

Text proposed by the European Commission	Amendments proposed by the ECB ²
resolution authority shall take its decision in accordance with the decision of ESMA. The four-month time period shall be deemed to be the conciliation phase within the meaning of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010. ESMA shall take its decision within one month from the referral of the matter to it. The matter shall not be referred to ESMA after the end of the four month time period or after a joint decision has been reached. In the absence of an ESMA decision within one month, the decision of the resolution authority shall apply.	members, a maximum of two college members from the same Member State shall have a vote and each voting member shall have one vote. For resolution colleges with more than 12 members, a maximum of three members from the same Member State shall have one vote and each voting member shall have one vote. ESMA shall have no voting rights regarding the decisions of the resolution college. 4. Where, by the end of that four-month period, a joint decision as referred to in paragraph 1 has not been reached and a majority of two-thirds of the college have expressed a negative opinion, any competent authority of the CCP concerned, based on a majority of two-thirds, any member of the college may, within 30 calendar days of the adoption of the decision of the resolution college, has referred to ESMA in accordance with Article 19 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 a matter referred to in points (j), (k) or (n) of Article 17(7) of this Regulation. The referral decision shall state in writing the full and detailed reasons why the concerned members of the resolution college consider that the decision taken by the resolution college does not meet the requirements laid down in this Regulation or any other Union law. 4. The resolution college authority of the CCP shall defer its decision and await any decision that ESMA may take in accordance with Article 19(3) of that Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010. In that case, the resolution college authority shall adapt take its decision in accordance with the

Text proposed by the European Commission	Amendments proposed by the ECB ²
	decision of ESMA. The 30 calendar days four month time period shall be deemed to be the conciliation phase within the meaning of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010. ESMA shall take its decision within one month from the referral of the matter to it. The matter shall not be referred to ESMA after the end of the 30 calendar days four month time period or after a joint decision has been reached. In the absence of an ESMA decision within one month, the decision of the resolution college authority shall apply.'
<u>Explanation</u> <i>The proposed amendment aims to adapt the procedure for adopting resolution college decisions on resolvability assessments to the procedure laid down in Regulation (EU) No 648/2012⁸. See paragraph 2.5.2 of the opinion.</i>	
Amendment 22 Article 21(1)	
'1. When using the resolution tools and exercising the resolution powers, the resolution authority shall have regard to all the following resolution objectives and shall balance them as appropriate to the nature and circumstances of each case: [...] (d) to protect public funds by minimising reliance on extraordinary public financial support; [...].'	'1. When using the resolution tools and exercising the resolution powers, the resolution authority shall have regard to all the following resolution objectives and shall balance them as appropriate to the nature and circumstances of each case: [...] (d) to protect public funds by minimising reliance on extraordinary public financial support and the potential risk of losses for taxpayers;
<u>Explanation</u> <i>This amendment proposes a specification of the resolution objectives in view of the importance of minimising the potential risk of losses for taxpayers even in situations where temporary public funding</i>	

⁸ See Article 19 of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012.

Text proposed by the European Commission	Amendments proposed by the ECB ²
<i>may be used. See paragraph 2.6.1 of the opinion.</i>	
Amendment 23	
Article 22(1)	
'1. The resolution authority shall take a resolution action in relation to a CCP provided that all of the following conditions are met: (a) the CCP is failing or is likely to fail as determined by any of the following: i) the competent authority, after consulting the resolution authority; ii) the resolution authority after consulting the competent authority, where the resolution authority has the necessary tools for reaching that conclusion; (b) there is no reasonable prospect that any alternative private sector measures or supervisory action, including early intervention measures taken, would prevent the failure of the CCP within a reasonable timeframe, having regard to all relevant circumstances; (c) a resolution action is necessary in the public interest to achieve the resolution objectives where winding down the CCP under normal insolvency proceedings would not meet those objectives to the same extent. For the purposes of point (a)(ii), the competent authority shall provide without delay any relevant information that the resolution authority requests in order to perform its assessment.'	'1. The resolution authority shall take a resolution action in relation to a CCP provided that all of the following conditions are met: (a) the CCP is failing or is likely to fail as determined by any of the following: i) the competent authority, after consulting the resolution authority; ii) the resolution authority after consulting the competent authority, where the resolution authority has the necessary tools for reaching that conclusion; (b) there is no reasonable prospect that any alternative private sector measures or supervisory action, including early intervention measures taken, would prevent the failure of the CCP within a reasonable timeframe, having regard to all relevant circumstances; (c) a resolution action is necessary in the public interest to achieve the resolution objectives where winding down the CCP under normal insolvency proceedings would not meet those objectives to the same extent. For the purposes of point (a)(ii), the competent authority shall provide, without delay and on its own initiative, any information that may suggest that the CCP is failing or is likely to fail and, upon request, any relevant information that the resolution authority requests in order to perform its assessment.'
<u>Explanation</u>	

Text proposed by the European Commission	Amendments proposed by the ECB ²
<i>This amendment seeks to foster effective information-sharing between the relevant authorities in the lead up to resolution in order to promote adequate and timely decision-making on the potential entry of a CCP into resolution. See paragraph 2.6.2 of the opinion.</i>	
Amendment 24 Article 27(2)	
'2. In the event of a systemic crisis, the resolution authority may also provide extraordinary public financial support by using government stabilisation tools in accordance with Articles 45, 46 and 47 on the condition of prior and final approval under the Union State aid framework.'	'2. In the event of a systemic crisis, the resolution authority may also provide extraordinary public financial support by using government stabilisation tools in accordance with Articles 45, 46 and 47 on the condition of prior and final approval under the Union State aid framework and the design of credible mechanisms for the timely and comprehensive recovery of the funds provided.'
<u>Explanation</u> <i>This addition is proposed in view of the key resolution objective of minimising the risk of potential taxpayer losses, and in line with international guidance, see paragraphs 2.6.4 and 2.6.5 of the opinion.</i>	
Amendment 25 Article 27(9)	
'9. The resolution authority may recover any reasonable expenses incurred in connection with the use of the resolution tools or powers or government financial stabilisation tools in any of the following ways: [...].'	'9. The resolution authority may recover any reasonable expenses incurred in connection with the use of the resolution tools or powers or government financial stabilisation tools in any of the following ways: [...]; (d) from the CCP's clearing members, where any measure resulting in a loss allocation tool affecting the CCP's clearing members under the CCP's rules and arrangements, including under its recovery plan, has not been exercised, or has not been exercised in full prior to the entry into resolution.'

Text proposed by the European Commission	Amendments proposed by the ECB ²
<u>Explanation</u> <i>This addition is proposed in view of the key resolution objective of minimising the risk of potential taxpayer losses, in line with international standards. See paragraph 2.6.5 of the opinion.</i>	
Amendment 26 Article 29(1)	
'1. The resolution authority may terminate certain or all of the following contracts : (a) the contracts of the clearing member in default; (b) the contracts of the affected clearing service or asset class; (c) the contracts of the CCP in resolution.'	'1. The resolution authority may terminate certain or all of the following contracts: (a) the contracts of the clearing member in default; (b) the contracts of the affected clearing service or asset class; (c) the contracts of the CCP in resolution. The resolution authority shall terminate the contracts referred to in points (b) or (c) only if the resolution authority considers this to be the best available option for ensuring the stability of the financial system.'
<u>Explanation</u> <i>This amendment is proposed in view of the key resolution objective of ensuring the continuity of critical functions and in line with international standards. See paragraph 2.6.4 of the opinion.</i>	
Amendment 27 Article 45(1)	
'1. The resolution authority may use the government stabilisation tools in accordance with Articles 46 and 47 for the purpose of resolving a CCP where the following conditions are met: [...].'	'1. The resolution authority may use the government stabilisation tools in accordance with Articles 46 and 47 for the purpose of resolving a CCP where the following conditions are met: [...]; (e) the resolution authority has defined comprehensive and credible arrangements for recovering in a timely manner the funds

Text proposed by the European Commission	Amendments proposed by the ECB ²
	provided.'
<u>Explanation</u> <i>This addition is proposed in view of the key resolution objective of minimising the risk of potential taxpayer losses, and in line with international guidance. See paragraph 2.6.5 of the opinion.</i>	
Amendment 28	
Article 55(3)	
'3. The resolution authority shall not exercise the power referred to in paragraph 1 to payment and delivery obligations owed to systems or operators of systems designated for the purposes of Directive 98/26/EC, including other central counterparties, and central banks.	'3. The resolution authority shall not exercise the power referred to in paragraph 1 to payment and delivery obligations owed to systems or operators of systems designated for the purposes of Directive 98/26/EC, including other central counterparties, and central banks
<u>Explanation</u> <i>This exemption should be aligned with Article 69(4)(b) of Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council⁹, which refers to central banks in a more comprehensive way, and with recital 70 of the proposed regulation. This alignment is also necessary as without it the exemption of ESCB members from the scope of the proposed regulation would only cover central banks as clearing participants (i.e. clearing members and/or clients).</i>	
Amendment 29	
Article 56(2)	
'2. The resolution authority shall not exercise the power referred to in paragraph 1 in relation to any security interest of systems or operators of systems designated for the purposes of Directive 98/26/EC, including other central counterparties, and central banks over assets pledged or provided by way of margin or collateral by the CCP under resolution.'	'2. The resolution authority shall not exercise the power referred to in paragraph 1 in relation to any security interest of systems or operators of systems designated for the purposes of Directive 98/26/EC, including other central counterparties, and central banks over assets pledged or provided by way of margin or collateral by the CCP under resolution.'

⁹ Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC, and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/60/EU and 2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 648/2012, of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 190).

Text proposed by the European Commission	Amendments proposed by the ECB ²
<u>Explanation</u> <i>This exemption should be aligned with Article 70(2) of Directive 2014/59/EU, which refers to central banks in a more comprehensive way, and with recital 70 of the proposed regulation. This alignment is also necessary as without it the exemption of ESCB members from the scope of the proposed regulation would only cover central banks as clearing participants (i.e. clearing members and/or clients).</i>	
Amendment 30 Article 57(2)	
'2. The resolution authority shall not exercise the power referred to in paragraph 1 in relation to systems or operators of systems designated for the purposes of Directive 98/26/EC, including other central counterparties and central banks.'	'2. The resolution authority shall not exercise the power referred to in paragraph 1 in relation to systems or operators of systems designated for the purposes of Directive 98/26/EC, including other central counterparties and central banks.'
<u>Explanation</u> <i>This exemption should be aligned with Article 71(3) of Directive 2014/59/EU, which refers to central banks in a more comprehensive way, and with recital 70 of the proposed regulation. This alignment is also necessary as without it the exemption of ESCB members from the scope of the proposed regulation would only cover central banks as clearing participants (i.e. clearing members and/or clients).</i>	
Amendment 31 Article 61	
'3. For the purpose of calculating the treatments referred to in paragraph 2, the valuation referred to in paragraph 1 shall disregard any provision of extraordinary public financial support to the CCP under resolution. 4. The valuation referred to in paragraph 1 shall be distinct from the valuation carried out under Article 24 (3). 5. ESMA, taking into account any regulatory technical standards developed in accordance with Article 74(4) of Directive 2014/59/EU, shall develop	'3. For the purposes of calculating the treatments referred to in paragraph 2(a), the valuation referred to in paragraph 1 shall be based on the losses, including replacement costs, that would have been realistically incurred if the CCP had been put into liquidation. In this context, the CCP's own pricing methodology shall be disregarded should this methodology not aim to reflect the effective market conditions referred to in paragraph 1 shall disregard any provision of extraordinary public financial support to the CCP under

Text proposed by the European Commission	Amendments proposed by the ECB ²
draft regulatory technical standards specifying the methodology for carrying out the valuation referred to in paragraph 1. ESMA shall submit those draft regulatory standards to the Commission by [PO please insert the date 12 months from entry into force of the Regulation]. Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with the procedure laid down in Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010.	resolution. 4. The valuation referred to in paragraph 1 shall be distinct from the valuation carried out under Article 24(3). 5. ESMA, taking into account any regulatory technical standards developed in accordance with Article 74(4) of Directive 2014/59/EU, shall develop draft regulatory technical standards specifying the methodology for carrying out the valuation referred to in paragraph 1 including in particular the calculation of the losses, including replacement costs, that would have been realistically incurred if the CCP had been put into liquidation. ESMA shall submit those draft regulatory standards to the Commission by [PO please insert the date 12 months from entry into force of the Regulation]. Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with the procedure laid down in Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010.
<i>Explanation</i> <i>The valuation underlying the application of the ‘no creditor worse off than in insolvency’ principle should be based on a comprehensive, realistic assessment of the losses that would have resulted from the liquidation of the CCP in order to avoid excessive compensation claims by relevant stakeholders. The need for a fair and balanced approach in this respect is underlined by the related risks for the public sector, with the financial burden ultimately being borne by taxpayers. Taking proper account of the fair value of business continuity preserved by CCP resolution is an essential consideration in the context of CCP resolution, which would only be envisaged in exceptionally severe market events, where the disruption of a CCP’s critical functions would most likely be associated with a large-scale destruction of financial value combined with very limited opportunities for bilateral clearing alternatives. Against this background, the ECB considers that a fair valuation of the CCP in order to apply the ‘no</i>	

Text proposed by the European Commission	Amendments proposed by the ECB ²
<i>creditor worse off than in insolvency/ principle would need to be not only carried out in terms of the assets and liabilities reflected on the CCP's balance sheet at the point in time when the resolution is triggered, but would need to be based on a more comprehensive and realistic assessment of the CCP's value in the event of its liquidation, taking full account of resulting losses, replacement costs, and the destruction of value that would result from service closure or the liquidation of the CCP. See paragraph 2.7 of the opinion.</i>	
Amendment 32 Point (1a) of Article 80 (new) – Amendment of Article 18 of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012	
No text	(1a) In Article 18, the following paragraph 2a is inserted: “2a. Where an authority has the right to participate in the college under more than one of points (c) to (h) of paragraph 2, it may nominate additional participants who shall have no voting rights, with the exception of the ECB, which shall have separate voting rights when carrying out either of the separate tasks identified in points (c) and (h) of paragraph 2.”
<u>Explanation</u> <i>This amendment seeks to ensure that the principle of separation between the ECB's supervisory and monetary functions, as enshrined in Article 25 of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013, is reflected in the voting arrangements applicable to EMIR colleges. Recital 54 of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 states that 'the college should vote in accordance with the general principle whereby each member has one vote, irrespective of the number of functions it performs'. The principle that the members of the colleges should have a single vote even if they participate in a college in more than one of the capacities listed in points (c) to (h) of Article 18(2) of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 is further specified in Delegated Regulation (EU) No 876/2013 establishing regulatory technical standards on colleges for central counterparties. As previously noted by the ECB in the context of the review of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012¹⁰, the latter should be amended in order to appropriately reflect the role of the SSM. This would involve explicitly recognising that, by virtue of the separation principle, two different votes should be allocated in CCP colleges where the ECB is represented both as the supervisor of the most</i>	

¹⁰ See the reply to question 1.3 in the ECB's response to the European Commission's consultation on the review of the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR), available on the ECB's website at www.ecb.europa.eu.

Text proposed by the European Commission	Amendments proposed by the ECB ²
<i>important clearing members and as the central bank of issue. Given that the proposed regulation introduces certain amendments to Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, it is appropriate to resolve this issue in relation to EMIR colleges in the context of the proposed regulation and not in a subsequent amendment of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012.</i>	
Amendment 33 Section C of the Annex to the proposed regulation	
'SECTION C MATTERS THAT THE RESOLUTION AUTHORITY IS TO CONSIDER WHEN ASSESSING THE RESOLVABILITY OF A CCP When assessing the resolvability of a CCP, the resolution authority shall consider the following: (1) the extent to which the CCP is able to map core business lines and critical operations to legal persons; (2) the extent to which legal and corporate structures are aligned with core business lines and critical operations; (3) the extent to which there are arrangements in place to provide for essential staff, infrastructure, funding, liquidity and capital to support and maintain the core business lines and the critical operations; (4) the extent to which the service agreements that the CCP maintains are fully enforceable in the event of resolution of the CCP; (5) the extent to which the governance structure of the CCP is adequate for managing and ensuring compliance with the CCP's internal policies with respect to its service level agreements; (6) the extent to which the CCP has a process for transitioning the services provided under service	'SECTION C MATTERS THAT THE RESOLUTION AUTHORITY IS TO CONSIDER WHEN ASSESSING THE RESOLVABILITY OF A CCP When assessing the resolvability of a CCP, the resolution authority shall consider the following: (1) the extent to which the CCP is able to map core business lines and critical operations to legal persons; (2) the extent to which legal and corporate structures are aligned with core business lines and critical operations; (3) the extent to which there are arrangements in place to provide for essential staff, infrastructure, funding, liquidity and capital to support and maintain the core business lines and the critical operations; (4) the extent to which the service agreements that the CCP maintains are fully enforceable in the event of resolution of the CCP; (5) the extent to which the governance structure of the CCP is adequate for managing and ensuring compliance with the CCP's internal policies with respect to its service level agreements; (6) the extent to which the CCP has a process for

Text proposed by the European Commission	Amendments proposed by the ECB ²
level agreements to third parties in the event of the separation of critical functions or of core business lines; (7) the extent to which there are contingency plans and measures in place to ensure continuity in access to payment and settlement systems; (8) the adequacy of the management information systems in ensuring that the resolution authorities are able to gather accurate and complete information regarding the core business lines and critical operations so as to facilitate rapid decision making; (9) the capacity of the management information systems to provide the information essential for the effective resolution of the CCP at all times even under rapidly changing conditions; (10) the extent to which the CCP has tested its management information systems under stress scenarios as defined by the resolution authority; (11) the extent to which the CCP can ensure the continuity of its management information systems both for the affected CCP and the new CCP in the case that the critical operations and core business lines are separated from the rest of the operations and business lines; (12) where the CCP benefits or is exposed to any intra-group guarantees, the extent to which those guarantees are provided at market conditions and the risk management systems concerning those guarantees are robust; (13) where the CCP engages in back-to-back transactions, the extent to which those transactions are performed at market conditions and the risk management systems concerning those	transitioning the services provided under service level agreements to third parties in the event of the separation of critical functions or of core business lines; (7) the extent to which there are contingency plans and measures in place to ensure continuity in access to payment and settlement systems; (8) the adequacy of the management information systems in ensuring that the resolution authorities are able to gather accurate and complete information regarding the core business lines and critical operations so as to facilitate rapid decision making; (9) the capacity of the management information systems to provide the information essential for the effective resolution of the CCP at all times even under rapidly changing conditions; (10) the extent to which the CCP has tested its management information systems under stress scenarios as defined by the resolution authority; (11) the extent to which the CCP can ensure the continuity of its management information systems both for the affected CCP and the new CCP in the case that the critical operations and core business lines are separated from the rest of the operations and business lines; (12) where the CCP benefits or is exposed to any intra-group guarantees, the extent to which those guarantees are provided at market conditions and the risk management systems concerning those guarantees are robust; (13) where the CCP engages in back to back transactions, the extent to which those transactions are performed at market conditions

Text proposed by the European Commission	Amendments proposed by the ECB ²
transactions practices are robust; (14) the extent to which the use of any intra-group guarantees or back-to-back booking transactions increases contagion across the group; (15) the extent to which the legal structure of the CCP inhibits the application of the resolution tools as a result of the number of legal persons, the complexity of the group structure or the difficulty in aligning business lines to group entities; (16) the extent to which the resolution of the CCP could have a negative impact on another part of its group, where applicable; (17) the existence and robustness of service level agreements; (18) whether third-country authorities have the resolution tools necessary to support resolution actions by Union resolution authorities, and the scope for coordinated action between Union and third-country authorities; (19) the feasibility of using resolution tools in such a way which meets the resolution objectives, given the tools available and the CCP's structure; (20) any specific requirements needed to issue new instruments of ownership as referred to in Article 33(1); (21) the arrangements and means through which resolution could be hampered in the cases of CCP that have clearing members or collateral arrangements established in different jurisdictions; (22) the credibility of using resolution tools in such a way which meets the resolution objectives, given possible impacts on clearing participants, other counterparties and employees and possible actions	and the risk management systems concerning these transactions practices are robust; (14) the extent to which the use of any intra-group guarantees or back to back booking transactions increases contagion across the group; (15) the extent to which the legal structure of the CCP inhibits the application of the resolution tools as a result of the number of legal persons, the complexity of the group structure or the difficulty in aligning business lines to group entities; (16) the extent to which the resolution of the CCP could have a negative impact on another part of its group, where applicable; (17) the existence and robustness of service level agreements; (18) whether third country authorities have the resolution tools necessary to support resolution actions by Union resolution authorities, and the scope for coordinated action between Union and third country authorities; (19) the feasibility of using resolution tools in such a way which meets the resolution objectives, given the tools available and the CCP's structure; (20) any specific requirements needed to issue new instruments of ownership as referred to in Article 33(1); (21) the arrangements and means through which resolution could be hampered in the cases of CCP that have clearing members or collateral arrangements established in different jurisdictions;

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that third-country authorities may take; (23) the extent to which the impact of the CCP's resolution on the financial system and on financial market's confidence can be adequately evaluated; (24) the extent to which the resolution of the CCP could have a significant direct or indirect adverse effect on the financial system, market confidence or the economy; (25) the extent to which contagion to other CCPs or to the financial markets could be contained through the application of the resolution tools and powers; (26) the extent to which the resolution of the CCP could have a significant effect on the operation of payment and settlement systems.'	(22) the credibility of using resolution tools in such a way which meets the resolution objectives, given possible impacts on clearing participants, other counterparties and employees and possible actions that third country authorities may take; (23) the extent to which the impact of the CCP's resolution on the financial system and on financial market's confidence can be adequately evaluated; (24) the extent to which the resolution of the CCP could have a significant direct or indirect adverse effect on the financial system, market confidence or the economy; (25) the extent to which contagion to other CCPs or to the financial markets could be contained through the application of the resolution tools and powers; (26) the extent to which the resolution of the CCP could have a significant effect on the operation of payment and settlement systems.'
<u>Explanation</u> <i>The technical details regarding the matters that the resolution authority is to consider when assessing the resolvability of a CCP should be laid down in regulatory technical standards and not in the text of the proposed regulation, in order to facilitate their future adaptability. See paragraph 2.5.1 of the opinion.</i>	