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Delegations will find attached the report produced by the European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE) on "the Review of the implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action in the EU Member States: Gender Equality in Power and Decision-Making".

# Gender Equality in Power and Decision-Making 

Review of the Implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action in the EU Member States

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\text { Report, } 2015
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Country abbreviations

| AT | Austria |
| :--- | :--- |
| BE | Belgium |
| BG | Bulgaria |
| CY | Cyprus |
| CZ | Czech Republic |
| DE | Germany |
| DK | Denmark |
| EE | Estonia |
| EL | Greece |
| ES | Spain |
| FI | Finland |
| FR | France |
| HR | Croatia |
| HU | Hungary |
| IE | Ireland |
| IT | Italy |
| LT | Lithuania |
| LU | Luxembourg |
| LV | Latvia |
| MT | Malta |
| NL | Netherlands |
| PL | Poland |
| PT | Portugal |
| RO | Romania |
| SE | Sweden |
| SI | Slovenia |
| SK | Slovakia |
| UK | United Kingdom |
| EU-28 | 28 EU Member States |
| EU-27 | 27 EU Member States |

## Glossary

| BPfA | Beijing Platform for Action |
| :---: | :---: |
| CEO | Chief Executive Officer |
| CJEU | Court of Justice of the European Union |
| DG | Directorate-General |
| EC | European Commission |
| ECB | European Central Bank |
| EGC | General Court |
| EP | European Parliament |
| EU | European Union |
| EWL | European Women's Lobby |
| EPSCO | Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs Council (European Parliament) |
| FEMM | Committee on Women's Rights and Gender Equality (European Parliament) |
| IDEA | International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance |
| IPU | Inter-Parliamentary Union |
| ISCED | International Standard Classification of Education |
| MEP | Member of the European Parliament |
| MP | Member of Parliament |
| MS | Member State |
| PhD | Doctor of Philosophy |
| PR | Proportional Representation |
| R\&D | Research and Development |
| SMEs | Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises |
| UN | United Nations |
| WMID database | European Commission's Database on Women and Men in Decision-Making |

## Executive summary

Equality between women and men is a fundamental principle of the European Union. Despite increasing efforts to boost women's representation in decision-making in the last decades, women remain underrepresented in positions of power in all 28 EU Member States. In response, the European Commission expressed its commitment to address and eliminate the gender gap in political and economic representation in both the Women's Charter $\left(^{1}\right)$ and the Strategy for Equality between Women and Men (2010-2015) (EC, 2010a). The EU is also strongly committed to the implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action (BPfA), which seeks to enhance women's capacity to participate in, and have equal access to, power structures and decision-making processes. The European Pact for Gender Equality 2011-2020 reaffirms the Council's commitment to gender equality and also specifically seeks to 'promote women's empowerment in political and economic life' (Council of the European Union, 2011b).

The imbalance in the distribution of power and decision-making positions between women and men is a consequence of complex processes and of the interplay between multiple factors that are deeply embedded in social structures. Gender roles and stereotypes, gendered perceptions of leadership and the phenomena of the 'glass ceiling' and the 'glass cliff' are some of the underlying factors. In addition, institutional factors such as the design of electoral systems, internal policies and practices of political parties may either hinder or facilitate women's representation in decision-making positions.

EIGE's report presents the current situation and trends as regards women's and men's engagement in political, economic and social decision-making in the period from 2003 to 2014. It aims to highlight the gender gaps in leadership positions and to identify areas of decision-making where the notable progress was made. The report provides a brief review of the EU policy context and research on factors that support or hinder women's representation in decision-making. The analysis of data is based on the 18 indicators on political and economic decision-making endorsed by the Council in 1999, 2003 and 2008. The analysis is then extended to consider certain general trends in decision-making in other areas, such as academia and research institutions, media and sports organisations, where comparable data are available. It also presents examples of initiatives taken by the Member States to promote women's participation in leadership positions.

Women's representation in political decision-making is steadily moving towards gender balance. The data from 2003 to 2014 show an overall discernible increase in women's share of top leadership positions in legislative and executive political institutions and public administration. The longstanding commitment of policymakers and civil society to the democratic principle of equal representation partially explains the relative success of women in attaining greater parity in political decision-making (in contrast with economic decision-making). However, the persistence of gender-based stereotypes in the allocation of roles, both within political institutions and political culture in general, nevertheless continues to hinder progress towards equal representation. This is particularly apparent in the distribution of cabinet portfolios and senior administrative (non-political) positions in ministries. Men dominate portfolios relating to basic state functions such as defence, justice and foreign policy. Women are concentrated in ministries with socio-cultural functions, such as education, health and culture.

Some Member States have expressed strong commitments and adopted policies to promote women in political decision-making, including positive action (legislative or voluntary quotas) for public institutions
and governing bodies. Member States that implemented binding and voluntary quotas had, on average, $29 \%$ of women in their national parliaments in 2014, an increase of 10 percentage points since 2003.

In the economic sphere, progress in women's representation has been most pronounced on corporate boards. Since 2003 the proportion of women on the highest decision-making bodies in the largest publicly listed companies has gradually increased from $9 \%$ in 2003 to $20 \%$ in 2014, in particular among Member States where binding legislation is in effect. Over the last decade the representation of women has also slightly improved in workers' and employers' organisations at both European and national levels. However, in the financial sector, in particular at EU level, the rate of change has been very slow. Men dominate the governance of central banks and take up the majority of positions as presidents of boards. The reluctance to appoint women candidates to board positions is often rooted in gender biased recruitment and promotion procedures, a male-dominated business culture and the lack of transparency in board appointment processes. These elements all contribute to the problem known as the 'glass ceiling'.

The analysis of social decision-making focuses on academia and research, media organisations, and sports. In 2010, only a minority of institutions in the tertiary education sector were headed by women and around a third of their board members were women (EC, 2013C). Women constitute a minority at the top of the academic hierarchy, although the proportion of women at the different stages of academic career advancement is beginning to improve. The 'glass-ceiling' effect is also observed in media organisations, where the share of women in decision-making positions decreases in direct proportion to the level of seniority. In 2012, on average across the EU, women made up less than one fifth of the chairpersons and one third of the members of the highest decision-making bodies in the selected media organisations (EIGE, 2013b).

Gender equality in sports, particularly the engagement of women in sports, has recently gained more attention in the Member States. A few countries have launched initiatives to promote gender balance in leadership positions in sports governing bodies and sports organisations. Generally, the sports sector suffers from insufficient research and a lack of comparative statistics. The EIGE report provides data on the representation of women and men in the decision-making bodies of European and national sports organisations and briefly presents the main initiatives for gender equality in sport organisations at EU and Member State levels.

For a broader and more qualitative monitoring of progress in political and economic decision-making, three new indicators are proposed. One of them measures the gender composition of political party leadership in Member States, while the other two relate to economic decision-making: the proportion and number of women and men among executive and non-executive members of the two highest decisionmaking bodies of the largest national companies, and policies to promote gender-balanced participation in economic decision-making. Additionally, the existing indicators were updated in order to improve their compatibility with the Commission's Database on Women and Men in Decision-Making (WMID database).

## Introduction

Gender equality is one of the founding values of the European Union. Considerable progress has been achieved over recent decades in terms of gender equality in public life. Yet while women make up more than half of university graduates and their share in employment overall in the EU is steadily increasing, they remain underrepresented in leadership positions in political, economic and social areas across the EU. The Gender Equality Index - developed by the European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE) and first published in 2013 - revealed that political and economic decision-making were the most gender-unequal areas of decision-making in the EU-27 (EIGE, 2013a). Although the situation in power and decision-making has slightly improved, as shown by the Gender Equality Index 2015, men's overrepresentation in decisionmaking prevails in all Member States and at EU level (EIGE, 2015).

The EU commitment to gender equality in politics was affirmed in the European Commission's Third Action Programme on Equal Opportunities between Women and Men (1991-1995), followed by the Council Recommendation of 2 December 1996 on the balanced participation of women and men in the decision-making process. Since then, the issue of women in decision-making has remained high on the political agenda of the EU. Promoting equality in decision-making in general and increasing the number of women in leadership positions in the economic sector (company boards in particular) is one of the priorities of the European Commission Strategy for Equality between Women and Men 2010-2015, and is supported by the European Pact for Gender Equality 2011-2020.

At Member State level, the first attempts to address the unequal access of women and men to positions of power were made in the 1970 and 1980 . Born out of the democratic need for equal representation, these measures concerned the realm of political decision-making and often originated within political parties. Some Member States introduced legislated quotas and sanctions for political parties not following them, while other Member States used party voluntary quotas. In a number of countries, quotas are not present at all (Krook \& O'Brien, 2010).

At international level, the Fourth UN World Conference on Women in 1995 marked an important step in advancing women's access to decision-making positions. By adopting the Beijing Platform for Action (BPfA), the UN conference set out the first international agenda for the advancement of women's rights and gender equality, including strategic objectives and actions to be taken. 'Women in Power and Decision-Making' was identified as one of the 12 critical areas of concern. The BPfA seeks to ensure women's equal access to and full participation in power structures and decision-making and to increase women's capacity to participate in decision-making and leadership. It emphasises that 'achieving the empowerment and autonomy of women and the improvement of women's social, economic and political status is essential for the achievement of both transparent and accountable government and administration and sustainable development in all areas of life' (Article G181). It further defines two strategic objectives within this area, namely:

- G1: 'Take measures to ensure women's equal access to and full participation in power structures and decision-making';
- G2: 'Increase women's capacity to participate in decision-making and leadership'.

In the same year (1995), the European Council affirmed the EU's commitment to the BPfA and expressed its intent to review the implementation of the platform across the Member States on a yearly basis. Since 1999, quantitative and qualitative indicators have been developed by successive presidencies of the Council of the EU to monitor progress towards achieving the BPfA objectives.

Since 1995, Critical Area of Concern G 'Women in Power and Decision-Making' has been reviewed three times. In 1999, the Finnish Presidency of the Council of the European Union focused on women in political decision-making, followed by an assessment of women's access to economic decision-making by the Italian Presidency in 2003. Based on the reviews, a total of 18 indicators to evaluate progress in both areas were proposed by the Presidencies and endorsed by the Council. In 2008, the Slovenian Presidency of the Council analysed the progress in the area of political representation and reviewed nine existing indicators.

Following the request of Luxembourg, which holds the Presidency of the Council of the European Union in the second semester of 2015, this report explores the progress made with regard to women's access to political and economic leadership positions between 2003 and 2014. Chapter 1 provides an overview of the EU political context and presents a brief literature review of factors that influence women's access to power and decision-making positions. It also presents some initiatives taken by the Member States to promote women's participation in leadership positions. The analysis in Chapter 2 draws on the 18 indicators endorsed by the Council on political and economic decision-making. It focuses on the current situation and trends in terms of the participation of women and men in political and economic leadership positions, highlights the gender gaps and identifies areas that show the most substantial progress. The analysis is based on data from the European Commission Database on Women and Men in DecisionMaking (WMID database). In addition, the second chapter presents women's representation in some areas of social decision-making, such as research, media and sports, where comparable data are available. Chapter 3 proposes three new indicators on political and economic decision-making. The final list of indicators on political and economic decision-making is presented in its entirety in Table 1 in the Annex. Chapter 4 provides conclusions and recommendations.

## 1. Addressing gender inequalities in decision-making

Recently, the debate surrounding equal representation of women and men in decision-making has expanded considerably, supporting discernible progress in terms of the gender balance in leadership positions. Ultimately, how gender-equal representation in decision-making is addressed depends on how we understand both 'representation' and 'equality' (Dahlerup, 2005; Diaz, 2005; Phillips, 2004).

## Understanding representation

The idea that a government can effectively represent a society only if all groups and their interests are reflected in the decision-making process is a commonly accepted principle (Diaz, 2005). Generally, a distinction is made between two forms of representation: descriptive or substantive. Descriptive representation is based on the idea that the representative possesses a particular ascribed characteristic, for example sex, age or ethnicity, and by virtue of that identity will represent that group. Since women and men each make up roughly half of society, equal representation in descriptive terms will be achieved once women and men each hold more or less the same number of positions in a decision-making body.

Equal representation in numbers, however, does not necessarily lead to the actual representation of different interests (substantive representation). Nevertheless, a certain level of descriptive representation is necessary for substantive change to occur. Arising from the inter-linkage of descriptive and substantive representation, one of the central questions regarding women's representation is when it will make a difference. Three distinct proportions of women's and men's share of leadership positions are often referred to: critical mass (at least $30 \%$ ); gender balance ( $40 / 60$ ); and gender parity (50/50) (Dahlerup, 2006). On the other hand, various institutional barriers, socialisation processes or party whips might hinder the ability of women in leadership positions to effectively advocate for the interests of women (or a group of women), should they choose to do so. Therefore, understanding not only when but how women influence decision-making is crucial (Childs, 2006).

## Equality of opportunity and outcome in decision-making

A distinction can be made between two understandings of equality: the classic liberal idea of 'equality of opportunity' and the egalitarian notion of 'equality of outcome'. While equality of opportunity is a given once women have equal rights - for instance, the right to work or stand for election - equality of outcome goes beyond this by accounting for other factors leading to unequal outcomes, such as direct or structural discrimination (Dahlerup, 2005).

In the context of political representation, the idea of measuring equality in terms of outcomes rather than opportunities is commonly accepted (Phillips, 2004; Diaz, 2005). Recognising that structural and institutional barriers and discrimination hinder women's access to political decision-making, positive action measures (e.g. quotas, targets, etc.) have increasingly gained support among political parties and governments (Dahlerup, 2005). These measures seem to have contributed to the improvement of gender balance in the political sphere witnessed in Member States in recent years, as shown in the current report.

In contrast, the lack of gender balance in economic and social representation has long been interpreted as a result of perceived differences in women's and men's individual merit and their career choices. Recent political debates and policy initiatives on gender balance in leadership positions in the corporate sector involved broader perspectives and addressed structural inequalities. Directive COM(2012) 614 final on
'Improving the Gender Balance among Non-Executive Board Directors', for instance, refers to a 'reluctance to appoint women candidates to board positions', 'gender stereotypes', 'a male-dominated business culture' and a 'lack of transparency' as root causes of women's underrepresentation. The proposed directive recognises that these barriers - long acknowledged to negatively impact on women's access to political representation - are applicable to economic and social decision-making as well (Paxton, Kunovich, \& Hughes, 2007; EC, 2012b).

### 1.1. Supporting and hindering factors

The following section reviews research on some of the most important factors hindering or facilitating women's access to positions of power. First, the impact of social structures on women's representation is discussed, followed by an assessment of how gender stereotypes and perceptions of leadership impact women's chances of advancing to decision-making positions. Lastly, different approaches to quotas and their effectiveness are described.

### 1.1.1. Representation and social structures

Social structures have a significant effect on women's access to positions of power. In societies where women and men have equal or similar access to education and employment, women might have better chances of being equally represented in decision-making. For instance, while women are more likely to hold a tertiary degree, they are less likely to pursue a PhD and thus less likely to reach leadership positions (EC, 2013C). Women's lower representation among PhD candidates signals the presence of structural discrimination.

Education and employment provide individuals with important resources, both financial and interpersonal, which can be crucial for reaching top-level positions. For example, access to financial resources may facilitate running for political office. Furthermore, being able to draw on networks established in academic or professional settings is essential for reaching leadership positions across spheres (Paxton, Kunovich, \& Hughes, 2007; Britton, 2010).

## Gendered distribution of tasks

The distribution of tasks between women and men within societies considerably affects women's ability to participate in formal employment and to take up leadership positions across spheres. While the gender gap in formal employment has been narrowing, women's and men's engagement in caring and domestic tasks is highly unequal (EIGE, 2013a).

The fact that women are predominantly responsible for caring and domestic tasks perpetuates stereotypes about women's abilities as workers. It is often assumed that mothers will be less dedicated to their duties at work, and therefore women with children might be less likely to be promoted to decisionmaking positions (Sigle-Rushton \& Waldfogel, 2007).

One consequence of the gendered distribution of tasks is the overrepresentation of women in part-time work and precarious employment, which usually provide fewer opportunities for career progression. Moreover, the evidence suggests that women face considerable difficulties when attempting to move from part-time to full-time employment, both during and after periods of caring (EIGE, 2014).

Another important hindrance is the lack of quality provision for childcare and elderly care. As women shoulder most caring work, they depend more on flexible working hours. This, in addition to the long and unpredictable working hours the majority of leaders face, can have detrimental effects on women's ability to enter leadership positions (Jones, Charles, \& Davies, 2008; Britton, 2010).

## Gendered perceptions of leadership

Historically, leadership positions have been occupied primarily by men. The characteristics and skills expected of leaders - such as assertiveness, dominance or rational thinking - are derived from what are normatively understood as masculine characteristics and thus commonly associated with men. Consequently, we not only expect political leaders to be men, but also to exhibit these characteristics (Padamasee, 2008).

Due to the understanding of certain leadership traits as masculine, women leaders exhibiting them can be perceived negatively (Eagly \& Karau, 2002). Dominant or assertive behaviour in women stands in direct opposition to the gendered expectation that women should be nurturing and caring. This not only makes it difficult for women to navigate in male-dominated spheres, but also limits the understanding of leadership (Eagly \& Karau, 2002; Puwar, 2004; Werhane \& Painter-Morland, 2011).

Relatedly, research has found that women leaders in the political sphere are held to higher standards than their male colleagues (Puwar, 2004). As a result, it is assumed that women in general have less potential/capacity, causing a less favourable estimation of their abilities (Eagly \& Karau, 2002; Ryan \& Haslam, 2005). Women are expected to prove their abilities and competences in order to justify their presence - specifically when their accession to their post was supported by quotas - while men are presumed to already have the necessary skills and experiences (Murray, 2014).

Women's portrayal in the media further perpetuates gendered stereotypes of women leaders and hinders their advancement in decision-making in all spheres, from political to media representation (EIGE, 2013b).

## The 'glass ceiling' and the 'glass cliff'

The glass ceiling describes the phenomenon whereby women can progress in their careers only to a certain point, without reaching higher positions. Social structures, prejudices and stereotypes are part of those invisible barriers. The invisibility of the glass ceiling makes it difficult to fully understand the impact it has on the career prospects of individual women leaders and women in general. The structural and consistent underrepresentation of women in positions of power across societies emphasises the presence and effectiveness of these barriers (EC, 2013c).

The 'glass cliff' describes a situation in which women are more likely than men to be placed in precarious leadership positions. An assessment of women and men as leaders in the FTSE 100 companies, for instance, found that women were more likely to be appointed to the boards of companies which had been performing poorly in the five months prior to their appointment. Similar observations were made regarding political representation, with women being more likely than men to compete for unsafe or unwinnable seats in elections (Ryan, Haslam, \& Kulich, 2010). While limiting women's chances to achieve electoral or business success, the glass-cliff effect also increases women leaders' chances of failing, thus potentially serving to support common prejudices against women leaders as less competent.

### 1.1.2. Institutional factors

Despite the many similarities across areas of decision-making, equal representation in the political sphere is distinct in a number of ways. Firstly, overall progress has been greater in political representation than in other areas, which can be explained by the democratic principle of equal representation. Secondly, implementing policies to reach gender-equal representation in political decision-making is generally more accepted than in economic or social spheres, as it is directly connected to good governance. Lastly, the electoral, political and party systems constitute supporting or hindering factors unique to political representation.

## Electoral system

Comparative studies find that the type of electoral system in place has a strong impact on women's representation. For instance, plurality-majority or majoritarian systems were found to be least favourable in terms of enhancing women's representation. The implementation of quotas in these systems is difficult and depends on the willingness of male candidates to vacate their seats (Schwindt-Bayer \& Mishler, 2005). Currently, only two EU Member States rely on a purely majoritarian system for national parliaments, namely France and the United Kingdom.

In contrast, countries relying on proportional representation (PR) systems tend to have a higher representation of women, as they not only enable the adoption of quotas, but also encourage them (Caul, 2001). For instance, PR systems enable the adoption of a 'zipper system' quota, which requires parties to alternate between women and men candidates on their lists. PR systems are currently the most prevalent in EU countries (Figure 1.1).

Lastly, in mixed systems, women are considerably more likely to obtain seats via party lists, rather than winning individual seats (Paxton, Kunovich, \& Hughes, 2007).

Figure 1.1 Member States according to type of electoral system


Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2013.
In 2014, women represented more than 30 \% of Members of Parliament (MPs) in the lower or single houses of nearly half of the Member States with PR electoral systems. In seven countries with a PR system, women constituted less than $21 \%$ of MPs. In two countries with a plurality-majority system (FR, UK), women held less than $30 \%$ of the seats.

## Representation and gate-keeping

Women's opportunities to enter leadership positions often strongly depend on those controlling the selection and admission processes, often referred to as 'gate-keepers'. In the political sphere, these are political parties and party elites, whereas selection committees fulfil this function in social and economic decision-making.

Political parties determine the order of electoral lists and short lists for constituencies and define party structures and code of conduct. The culture of political parties impacts the ways in which women are involved and participate in political processes. An increased commitment to egalitarian ideals by political elites - often associated with a left-leaning orientation - has been identified as a positive factor contributing to enhanced women's presence in decision-making (Caul, 2001; Paxton, Kunovich, \& Hughes, 2007). Selection committees in the corporate or academic spheres may play the same gate-keeping function.

Furthermore, formal and informal networks within political parties are of utmost importance in reaching specific positions and maintaining party support, as well as in implementing specific policy changes. Informal networking after working hours is prone to be mostly practised by men. The presence of these networks in male-dominated spheres can help to sustain male dominance and leadership.

### 1.1.3. Binding regulation

Electoral gender quotas have been identified as one of the most effective tools to increase women's representation in political decision-making. While the degree of their success depends on many factors such as the type of quota, the presence and enforcement of sanctions, the willingness of political actors to implement quotas and the set-up of the system - they help disrupt the practices maintaining gender imbalances by transforming selection processes and making biases visible (Krook, 2009).

## Types of quotas

Commonly, a distinction is made between three types of quotas: voluntary, legislated or reserved seats. In the EU-28, quotas have been established in 23 out of 28 Member States. Voluntary party quotas are most commonly used (Figure 1.2). Legislated quotas, however, have gained support in recent years (Krook, 2009).

Figure 1.2 Member States by type of quota in political decision-making, 2014


Source: IDEA, 2015; Krook, 2009; Thames \& Williams, 2013.

Depending on the electoral system used in a country, the level at which the quota can be applied differs. Quotas can either be applied to aspirants or candidates. Aspirant or primary quotas are applied at the first step of the election process, the selection of candidates, and are commonly used in plurality-majority systems (e.g. UK). In contrast, countries with a PR list system rely on candidate quotas, which are applied to party lists. Candidate quotas commonly define a specific numerical target to be met.

In addition to the growing support for quotas in political decision-making, increased interest in quotas has been noted in the business world. These commonly aim at increasing the presence of women on company boards and management to reach a certain percentage - usually $20 \%, 30 \%$ or $40 \%$ - with some, such as the Norwegian boardroom quotas, aiming to reach the target within a defined framework of time (Word Bank, 2012). However, legislated gender quotas often only apply to certain types of companies, for instance to the largest companies listed on the stock exchange (see, for instance, the discussion in $\operatorname{COM}(2012) 614$ final)( ${ }^{2}$ ).

## Effectiveness of quotas

Studies assessing the effectiveness of quotas - voluntary and legislated - reach diverging results (European Parliament, 2013; Krook, 2009; Dahlerup \& Freidenvall, 2006). Their success in improving women's representation depends on a variety of factors related to implementation and context.

The Atlas of Electoral Gender Quotas, produced by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA, 2013), defines three characteristics of effective and meaningful quota implementation. Firstly, quotas need to define a 'specific [and] measurable numerical target'. Secondly, they must be 'accompanied by well-designed quota rules such as ranking-order rules or placement mandates relevant to the country's electoral system, ballot structure and list type'. Finally, the presence and enforcement of effective sanctions for non-compliance is essential in order to provide political party and economic elites with the incentive to implement the quota (IDEA, 2013, p. 16). Possible sanctions can include the rejection of party lists, financial penalties, financial incentives or a combination of these (EP, 2013). In the economic sphere, administrative fines and the annulment of appointments to top positions are two examples of sanctions (EC, 2012b). In addition, clear rules defining implementation and monitoring are important (Dahlerup \& Freidenvall, 2006).

Quotas have a high potential to transform political culture and enhance equal representation. However, while the set-up of quotas is crucial, it provides no guarantee that the target will be reached. The culture of parties or organisations and the unwillingness of elites to confront inequalities can be detrimental to the success of quotas.

In practice, the results achieved through the implementation of quotas have varied across Member States. While in some countries legislated quotas have led to higher representation of women, similar increases did not occur in others. In some contexts, voluntary political party quotas complemented an ideological change towards supporting a more egalitarian culture. Additionally, some Member States (e.g. Denmark) have reached a high number of women in national politics without the implementation of either type of quota (Dahlerup \& Freidenvall, 2006; Krook, 2009).

### 1.2. Policy development at EU and Member State levels

This section focuses on the main policy developments at the EU and Member State levels and looks at political, economic and social decision-making.

### 1.2.1. EU-level strategies

## Political and economic decision-making

The European Commission expressed its commitment to address and eliminate the gender gap in decision-making as one of the five priorities in both the Women's Charter and the Strategy for Equality between Women and Men (2010-2015). It announced its intention to initiate 'targeted initiatives to get more women into top jobs in decision-making' (EC, 2010a). As a horizontal issue, the Strategy also seeks to promote non-discriminatory gender roles in all areas of life, such as education, career choices, employment and sport. The European Pact for Gender Equality 2011-2020 reaffirmed the EU commitment to gender equality and specifically sought to 'promote women's empowerment in political and economic life' among other equality measures (Council of the European Union, 2011b).

In March 2011 the European Commission launched the 'Women on the Board Pledge for Europe' (EC, 2011b), calling publicly listed companies in the EU to sign a voluntary commitment to reach a level of representation of women of $30 \%$ by 2015 , increasing to $40 \%$ by 2020.

Within one year after launching the initiative, the Commission found very limited progress, except for a small improvement in the level of representation of women through self-regulation (EC, 2012c, p. 15). In November 2012, the Commission adopted a proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on improving the gender balance among non-executive board directors (EC, 2012b). Its main features included a minimum objective of a $40 \%$ presence of the underrepresented sex among nonexecutive directors, to be reached by 2020 for companies listed on stock exchanges and 2018 for listed public undertakings. The proposal for a directive was accompanied by the Communication 'Gender balance in business leadership: A contribution to smart, sustainable and inclusive growth' (COM(2012) 614 final; COM(2012) 615 final), which complements the proposed legislation with policy measures to address the root causes of gender imbalance in management (EC, 2012a). To support initiatives at Member State level, in 2013 the European Commission also launched a restricted call under the PROGRESS programme on gender balance in economic decision-making. In November 2013, the European Parliament backed the proposal for a new directive. Discussions within the Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs Council (EPSCO) are ongoing.

In 2003 the European Commission created its Database on Women and Men in Decision-Making (WMID database) (EC, 2014a). It helps to increase awareness of the underrepresentation of women in politics, economy and some spheres of social life and serves as a tool for EU institutions and Member States to monitor the progress of gender balance in decision-making positions, for example through specific reports such as Women and Men in Leadership Positions in the European Union, 2013 (EC, 2013b).

The European Parliament has also adopted several resolutions in this area ( ${ }^{3}$ ), conducted studies on the European elections from a gender perspective, and promoted campaigns enhancing women's participation as voters and as candidates in the European elections. For instance, in 2014, the European Women's Lobby (EWL), together with several political groups represented in the European Parliament,
organised the 50/50 Campaign to promote the equal representation of women and men in all European institutions and to put women's rights and gender equality high on the EU political agenda (EWL, 2014a).

## Social decision-making

Social decision-making considers the underrepresentation of women in decision-making positions in areas such as academia (science and research), media and sports.

There is a growing concern at the EU level about the issue of women and science, and more specifically, the underrepresentation of women in scientific careers. One of the main problems is the 'leaky pipeline', whereby women drop out of scientific careers in disproportionate numbers at every level. In 1999, the European Commission set up an expert group on women in science, known as the 'Helsinki Group on Gender in Research and Innovation'. It is mandated to promote discussion and exchange experiences on measures and policies devised and implemented at local, regional, national and European level, and to encourage the participation of women in scientific careers and research.

Currently, a number of measures in the EU research and innovation programme support gender mainstreaming. First, all Horizon 2020 advisory groups have a target of $50 \%$ for the underrepresented sex in expert groups and evaluation panels. Second, applicants for EU funding are encouraged to promote gender balance at all levels in their teams and in management structures. Additionally, the gender balance of research teams is taken into account when ranking proposals with the same evaluation scores. Moreover, in signing a grant agreement, beneficiaries must commit to promoting equal opportunities between women and men in the implementation of the project as well as to ensuring gender balance at all levels of personnel, including at supervisory and managerial level. These stipulations are very relevant in redressing gender imbalances, such as a minority of institutions in higher education headed by women and a stark gender inequality in obtaining research funding (EC, 2015b).

In the area of women and the media, the BPfA lays down a strategic objective 'to increase the participation and access of women to expression and decision-making in and through media and new technologies of communication' (United Nations, 1995). The Council Conclusions of 2013 on 'Advancing Women's Roles as Decision-Makers in the Media' took note of EIGE's report Advancing Gender Equality in Decision-Making in Media Organisations (EIGE, 2013b), highlighting evidence that 'an increased presence of women in decision-making roles in the media is likely to lead to more gender-sensitive media content and programming, presenting a more balanced picture of women's and men's lives and women's contribution to society, which would have a positive impact on public policies, private attitudes and behaviour' (Council of the European Union, 2013, p. 2).

In the field of women and sports, the BPfA calls on governments, educational authorities and other educational institutions to support the advancement of women in all areas of athletics and physical activity, including coaching, training and administration. In 2011 the European Commission adopted the Communication 'Developing the European Dimension in Sport', calling for support of transnational projects promoting women's access to leadership positions in sport as well as access to sport for disadvantaged women (EC, 2011a, p.7). Following this Communication, an EU conference on gender equality in sport took place in December 2013 in Vilnius, which resulted in the 'Call for Strategic Actions' in the field of gender equality in sport at national and European level. Drawing on the conclusions of this conference, the expert group developed a report in the field of gender equality and sport (EC, 2013a). It proposed measures relating to management, training, prevention of violence, improving the portrayal of women athletes in the media and changing recruitment policies for new posts in boards and staff. In May

2014 the European Council, in its Conclusions on Gender Equality in Sport, encouraged sports organisations to increase gender balance on executive boards and committees and in management and coaching, as well as to try to remove non-legislative obstacles preventing women from taking up such functions (Council of the European Union, 2014, p. 5).

In the context of the EU Work Plan for Sport (2014-2017), one of five expert groups deals with good governance in sport, including gender equality. The expert group, consisting of representatives from Members States and a wide range of international and EU sports organisations, will deliver guidelines or recommendations on gender equality in sport by the end of 2015. Gender equality in sport is also a priority in the funding programme Erasmus+: Sport ( ${ }^{4}$ ).

Several international and continental federations in Europe, responsible for the promotion and development of sports and the organisation of events and competitions, have shown commitment to gender equality. Nine of 28 of these federations have a gender quota for the highest decision-making body (executive committee, presidium, and board of directors). It is stipulated in their statues that they must have representatives of both sexes on their boards (see Table 1.1).

Table 1.1 Gender quotas in continental sports federations in Europe, 2015

| Gender quota for the highest decision-making body |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| At least one woman \& one man | United World Wrestling Europe (UWW-Europe) <br> European Fencing Confederation (EFC) <br> European Handball Federation (EHF) <br> European Shooting Confederation (ESC) <br> European Weightlifting Federation (EWF) <br> Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) |  |  |  |
| At least 2 women \& 2 men | European Hockey Federation (EHF) <br> FIBA Europe |  |  |  |
| At least 3 women \& 3 men | European Triathlon Union (ETU) |  |  |  |
| Gender quota for council, committees and commissions |  |  |  |  |
| European Handball Federation (EHF) <br> European Shooting Confederation (ESC) <br> European Table Tennis Union (ETTU) <br> European Taekwondo Union (ETU) <br> European Triathlon Union (ETU) |  |  |  |  |

Source: Data derived from the statutes of federations.
Note: The highest decision-making body includes the executive committee, presidium, and board of directors.

Additionally, five organisations have women's commissions or committees (European Boxing Confederation (EUBC), European Taekwondo Union (ETU), European Union of Gymnastics (UEG) FIBA Europe, and Union of European Football Associations (UEFA)).

### 1.2.2. Initiatives at Member State level

## Political decision-making

In November 2014, in all EU Member States, only four women held the office of prime minister (DK, DE, LV, PL) and two women were presidents (LT, MT). Women are underrepresented in political decisionmaking in all Member States, both at national and local level.

In order to increase gender balance in political decision-making, the Member States have implemented several measures: 1) measures aiming at empowering women and increasing their skills; 2) measures to increase awareness and combat gender stereotypes; 3) legislative measures and quotas.

Currently, 23 out of 28 EU Member States have established legislative and/or voluntary party quotas and the political parties tend to reach a baseline minimum percentage of the underrepresented sex (EP, 2014a). Nine countries apply legislated candidate quotas for elections of national parliaments (BE, IE, EL, ES, FR, HR, PL, PT, SI). Portugal and Slovenia serve as good examples of effective legislated quotas which facilitate gender-balanced parliaments. Portugal's electoral law was changed in 2006 to require all candidate lists for elections (including elections to the European Parliament) to have a minimum representation of $33 \%$ for women and men, with financial sanctions for non-compliance. After this law came into force, women's representation in the national parliament increased from $25 \%$ to $29 \%$, and thereafter to $31 \%$. In Slovenia, the Elections Act of 2006 introduced a $35 \%$ minimum candidate requirement for either sex, with the electoral commission empowered to reject any party list not meeting the quota target. Women's national parliamentary representation went from $17 \%$ in 2011 to $38 \%$ in 2012, and remained at $38 \%$ in 2014 (IDEA, 2014b).

In half of the Member States, political parties apply an alternative measure: voluntary party quotas for candidates of either sex. Sweden has one of the longest experiences of implementing voluntary party quotas, leading to long-term gains in women's representation (EP, 2013, p. 14).

Legislated and/or voluntary candidate gender quotas have a bigger effect if accompanied by placement rules (Dahlerup, 2007). The Swedish 'zipper' system of alternating a female or a male candidate on party lists, implemented by the five major parties, has been effective in ensuring continued gender balance in the Swedish parliament. The German and Austrian social democratic parties and the Labour Party of the Netherlands also place women and men alternatively on their party lists (EP, 2008, p. 47).

Belgian quota legislation provides gender parity in candidate lists and in particular among the top two candidates. Under the Spanish quota law, the top five positions on party lists must be gender balanced, and a $40 \%$ gender quota (for either sex) is applied to the lists of candidates (EP, 2013, p. 15). Both Member States have achieved gender-balanced parliaments on more than one occasion since 2003. Despite gender-balanced candidate lists, the Polish quota law did not yield significantly improved gender representation in 2011 (it increased from $20 \%$ to $24 \%$ ), the absence of a placement requirement being one of the reasons (Górecki \& Kukolowicz, 2014, p. 69).

Furthermore, initiatives to increase women's representation in political decision-making can be further facilitated depending on the type of electoral system used in the Member States. For example, the introduction of electoral changes - such as a shift to a PR system or a shift in the size of electoral districts can have an additional positive effect on women's representation when coupled with legislated candidate gender quotas. In Belgium, electoral districts were enlarged simultaneously with the introduction of legislated candidate gender quotas. Although electoral systems on their own cannot deliver genderbalanced representation, they are amenable to interventions that facilitate such an outcome.

While legislative and/or voluntary quotas constitute a 'fast track' to increasing the proportion of women in political decision-making, they require supportive back-up activities, such as capacity-building measures. Political parties in some Member States have undertaken a wide range of supportive actions to increase women's presence in leadership positions, including mentoring and media training. In many Member States, NGOs as well as women's sections and networks of the political parties are engaged in awarenessraising activities. Among a wide range of initiatives, a few deserve mention ( ${ }^{5}$ ):

- In the Czech Republic, the $50 \%$ NGO forum has set up a mentoring campaign between Czech women and Scandinavian women politicians.
- In 2009 in Denmark, the Danish Women's Council personally contacted one woman from each party in every local constituency and helped them organise local meetings with women candidates to discuss local politics.
- In Finland, public financing of women's sections of political parties has promoted gender balance in elections.
- In Germany, women in politics are supported through the Helene Weber Kolleg, created in 2011 to support women's entry into (local) politics, improving their political career opportunities and creating a supporting cooperation network. Among other activities, the Helene Weber Prize is awarded to women who are active in local policymaking.
- In Greece, the 'Fostering Women's Participation in Decision-making: Elected Representatives' project aims to bolster the number of women electoral candidates and elected women officials. At
the local and regional levels it implements a variety of initiatives, including awareness campaigns, networking actions, training, counselling and mentoring initiatives.
- In Ireland, the Women for Election project, funded by social entrepreneurs, runs a regular campaign school for women seeking to run as candidates.
- In 2013 in Malta, the National Commission for the Promotion of Equality (NCPE) launched a set of initiatives to empower women to participate in decision-making. This includes a mentoring programme, carrying out research on the gender balance in decision-making, gender quotas and other measures to improve the gender balance. In May 2015 the online Directory of Maltese and Gozitan Professional Women was launched.
- In Poland, the 'I am the boss' project has been carried out since 2009 as a joint initiative between the Government Plenipotentiary for Equal Treatment and the Polish Ministry of Education. This project is directed at girls and young women (aged 17-19) from both rural and urban areas of Poland who want to strengthen their leadership skills and develop their leadership potential.
- In Portugal, education guides launched in 2010 include issues of decision-making and suggest practical activities to tackle gender stereotypes and promote attitudes of gender equality in leadership among students.

The outcomes of these diverse, multi-level legislative and non-legislative measures have contributed to a gradual increase in women's political representation in the EU Member States since 2003.

## Economic decision-making

From 2003 to 2013, the share of women on the boards of the largest publicly listed companies registered in the EU-28 Member States increased significantly from $9 \%$ to $18 \%$, particularly in 2010 when the Commission launched its Strategy for Equality between Women and Men (2010-2015) and put the issue of women on boards high on the political agenda.

The most significant developments during recent years (comparing 2010 and 2013) were noted in a small number of Member States where binding legislation has already been adopted, such as France, Italy and the Netherlands, or where there has been an extensive public debate, such as Germany and the United Kingdom (EC, 2013d).

Several Member States have enacted legislative measures to improve gender balance on the boards of publicly listed companies: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain. However, they differ with respect to the targeted quota, the deadlines set for their full implementation, the scope of companies covered and the sanctions to be applied in case of non-compliance.

Other Member States chose to prescribe regulations specifically for the composition of boards of stateowned or state-controlled companies (DK, EL, AT, PL, SI). In Denmark and Greece, such requirements are set out in the gender-equality legislation, whereas in some other Member States (AT, PL), they are governed by administrative regulations. The requirements vary in relation to the target quota and the sanctions attached to cases of non-compliance.

Finally, some countries have opted for the introduction of voluntary targets rather than quotas. In the United Kingdom, 33 FTSE 100 companies have set targets for the percentage of women they aim to have on their boards, following a recommendation from a 2011 review by Lord Davies, which was commissioned by the government to examine how obstacles to the participation of women on boards can be removed
(Government Equalities Office, 2011). The review recommended that UK companies listed on the FTSE 100 should aim for a minimum of $25 \%$ women board members by 2015. Since October 2012, companies have been required to report annually on their diversity policy, any measurable targets, and progress towards these. In addition, amendments to the 2006 Companies Act require disclosing the total number of women and men in the organisation (including boards and senior management) in annual company reports, a requirement which has been in effect since October 2013. In Denmark, an amendment to the Companies Act and the Financial Statements Act, passed at the end of 2012, required large companies to set targets and implement a policy for gender diversity from 1 April 2013 onwards, and to report on those targets from 2014 onwards.

In other Member States, the proposed EU directive on improving the gender balance among nonexecutive board directors boosted the public debate. For example, in Ireland, gender imbalances on the boards of publicly listed companies have been profiled in newspapers $\left(^{6}\right.$ ), thereby entering the policy agenda. In 2013, the mid-term review of the National Women's Strategy recommended 'that major companies be encouraged to develop a Corporate Governance Code to include commitments on the percentage of women and men members at board level' and that 'failure to achieve targets within a reasonable time frame might lead to the introduction of mandatory targets in accordance with the work being undertaken in this regard by the European Union' (Department of Justice and Equality, 2013, p. 13). A year later, in 2014, the Irish government set new targets to be achieved by 2016 and made a commitment to new measures to promote gender balance on state boards. Since 2004, the Government of Finland has also had numerical targets to reach a balanced representation of women and men on the boards of stateowned companies.

In addition to legislative regulation or voluntary targets, a wide range of other initiatives were undertaken by Member States. Some examples include ( ${ }^{(7)}$ :

- The Charter for the Promotion of Women Leaders developed by the Minister of Employment and 10 of the biggest private and public companies in Denmark in 2008. The charter aims to ensure equal opportunities for women and men who choose to pursue management careers and to increase the proportion of women at all levels of management by introducing specific and measurable initiatives in companies and organisations.
- The Finnish Chamber of Commerce has been organizing mentoring programmes for women since 2012. Changes made in the Code of Governance give a clear message for the gender balance on the boards of the publicly listed companies.
- The Gender Equality Act 2014 in France excludes companies from bidding for public tenders if they do not prove they comply with gender-equality legislation.
- The Women on Board Index, created in Germany in 2011 by FidAR (an organisation representing women in business), publishes information on women on boards, thereby contributing to increasing public debate.
- Established in Luxembourg in 2011, Diversity in Business (DivBiz) gathers a number of key actors from the business world, including the ABBL (Luxembourg's banking association), with the goal of promoting gender diversity at all managerial positions within industrial and commercial companies. The purpose is to raise awareness of the topic of women in business.
- In Poland, provisions on the balanced representation of women and men in management and the supervisory boards of public and private companies are contained in the Good Practices of the

Stock Exchange and in the recommendations of the Ministry of Treasury regarding companies where the State Treasury holds a share.

- In the United Kingdom, the $30 \%$ Club was launched in 2010 with the aim of increasing the proportion of women on boards. The club has involved chairpersons of major companies to promote its agenda and has successfully initiated public debates on the issue. The initiatives included mentoring schemes and other activities aimed at overcoming barriers and broadening women's opportunities in the corporate sector.


## Social decision-making

The underrepresentation of women in decision-making is a reality in all areas in life. Political and economic areas are prominent on the policy agenda; however, decision-making in other areas, such as research and academia, requires more visibility and action. This section provides an overview of recent policy and legislative developments at the Member State level in relation to gender-balanced decision-making in academia and research, media, and sport.

## Academia and research

Legislative quotas or targets for the governing bodies of higher education institutions exist in Austria, Belgium, France, Ireland, the Netherlands, Poland and Sweden, while in Greece attempts to introduce a legislative quota have so far failed.

- In Austria, the Amendment of the University Act (2002) enacted in 2009 applied a $40 \%$ quota for all university bodies and committees.
- In Belgium, the Flemish government (regional level) has introduced quotas of $33 \%$ in all the decision-making bodies in three universities (Hasselt University, University of Antwerp and Ghent University).
- In France, legislation passed in 2013 introduced gender parity in universities, both in leadership and the governing bodies.
- In Ireland, the Universities Act 1997 (Article 10) states that 'In performing its functions ... a governing authority shall ensure that each sex is represented on the governing authority in accordance with such gender balance as may from time to time be determined or approved by the Minister'.
- In the Netherlands in 2010, the government set the target of at least $15 \%$ women professors in Dutch universities.
- In Poland, a recent amendment to the Act on Higher Education recommends greater inclusion of women in the Central Council of Higher Education and a quota of $30 \%$ for women in the Polish accreditation committee.
- In Sweden, the government has set targets for the proportion of women among newly recruited professors for 34 universities and university colleges during 2012-2015. There have been targets of this kind since 1997, except for an intermission between 2009 and 2011.

A majority of countries have a variety of other initiatives, which include the following $\left({ }^{8}\right)$ :

- Austria provides additional funds to universities for each newly appointed woman professor.
- The Danish Council for Independent Research granted funding for 16 research projects led by women. This initiative increased the number of women professors and permanent women researchers.
- The Academy of Finland has asked scientific research councils to follow the principle of gender balance when nominating candidates for research positions funded by the academy
- In Germany in 2007, the Federal Ministry for Education and Research, together with the Länder, introduced a professorship programme for highly qualified women in order to increase the proportion of women professors at German universities. 260 professorships have currently been achieved by the programme.
- In the Netherlands, the LNVH is a network of Dutch women professors representing every discipline and every university. It promotes a proportionate representation of women in academia.
- In Sweden, some universities support women who are approaching professorship by providing extra research time to qualify for promotion.
- In the UK, the Equality Challenge Unit works to support equality and diversity among staff and students in higher education institutions across the UK.
- Private programmes exist to promote women in science, such as the L'Oreal-Unesco scholarships supporting the work of leading women scientists.

Recently, science and research institutions have begun focusing more on gender balance in governance structures by increasing the participation of women in science as well as by increasing the proportion of women professors.

## Media organisations

Decision-making in the media was thoroughly reviewed by EIGE in a report titled Advancing Gender Equality in Decision-Making in Media Organisations (EIGE, 2013b). The report, developed for the Irish Presidency of the Council of the EU, explored the gender balance in decision-making positions across a sample of media organisations in the EU and proposed a new indicator to track the extent to which media organisations address gender equality within their internal policies.

Data collected in 2012 show that almost half ( $47 \%$ ) of the selected media organisations in the EU have at least one policy/code for gender equality (e.g. a gender-equality policy or code of conduct, an equal opportunities or diversity policy, policy relating to maternity or paternity leave). A quarter of media companies have at least one implementation and/or monitoring body in place (e.g. a committee responsible for the equality policy, an equality/diversity officer or department). A few (9\%) media companies implement at least one practical measure (e.g. leadership/management training for women or a trainee position for women) (EIGE, 2013b).

The Irish Broadcasting Act (2009), for example, stipulates that 'not less than five of the members of the board of a corporation shall be men and not less than five of them shall be women'. Some Member States have initiated non-legislative measures such as charters to support more women into leadership positions, including in the area of media (e.g. Denmark). In the United Kingdom, any media organisation licensed to broadcast is required by law to promote 'equality of opportunity' in the employment of men and women. The Austrian Journalists' Union includes a women's council and offers both information regarding women's situations and rights as well as a local and national contact. In Italy, the media unions have an Equal Opportunity Commission and most of the journalists' associations have an equal opportunities commission. In some Member States professional media organisations and associations actively support gender equality in media organisations (e.g. EE, IE, EL, HU, FI).

Organisations that adopted policies or implemented measures to facilitate the access of women to decision-making were found to have twice as many women in strategic, decision-making positions and almost $30 \%$ more women on their boards (EIGE, 2013b).

## Sports organisations

The area of sports is challenged by insufficient research and policy development, even in Member States with an established tradition of policy in the area of gender equality. In some Member States, policies for gender equality in sports have been developed, though weak coordination with national sports organisations has made the implementation of the policies less effective. For instance, in Austria, the Minister of Sport has established $100 \%$ Sports, a centre of research and initiatives on equal opportunities for women and men in Austrian sports, with the goal of initiating a process of change in terms of improved gender balance and raising awareness of gender mainstreaming ( $100 \%$ Sports, 2011; Bundesministerium für Landesverteidigung und Sport, 2014). This has not yet resulted in the development of a genderequality strategy among well-established sports organisations such as the Austrian Olympic Committee.

A few initiatives have been launched on an ad hoc basis by sports federations or by the Women and Sport Commission of the respective National Olympic Committees. For example, in the Czech Republic, the Commission of Women in Sport within the Czech Olympic Committee organises seminars and publishes booklets, including a handbook on sexual harassment in sport, to support women's participation in sport and in leading positions. In Hungary, the women's group within the national Olympic Association promotes women's participation in sports through various awareness-raising initiatives which, without governmental support, might have little impact. The Committee for Women and Sport within the Croatian Olympic Committee has taken a strong stand in promoting women's participation in sports decisionmaking structures by issuing a recommendation (in 2012) to implement 40 \% gender quotas in decisionmaking bodies. The Sport and Business initiative in the Netherlands (Sport en Zaken) uses expertise from trade and industry to help strengthen sport alliances. Given that these initiatives are relatively new and not always coordinated with government policies and measures, it is hard to assess the impact at this stage.

At present, a number of Member States have implemented different gender-equality measures focusing on increasing the participation of women in sports. Developing measures to increase the proportion of women in the governing structures of federations and other sports organisations has only recently gained ground in the Member States. For instance, on its website the Committee on Women and Sport within the Spanish Olympic Committee has made available a wealth of documents, statistics and information on women and sports, including women in sports governance structures. These studies are joint publications of the Olympic Committee, the Sports Council and the Women's Institute, the main governmental body in
charge of gender-equality policy. In addition, the Spanish Sports Council runs a programme entitled Women and Sport. German universities (the German Sport University Cologne and its department of Gender and Diversity Studies) and sports NGOs (German Society of Sport Science) carry out research on gender equality in sports.

Voluntary targets for gender balance in the governance structures of sports federations have been proposed, or already introduced, in Finland, France, Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom (England). In Finland, Germany and Sweden they were initiated by sports federations.

In Finland, a target of $40 \%$ of women on the governing boards of the Finnish sports organisations was set in 1998, although this has not yet been reached.

In Germany, the 2014 women's plenary meeting of the German Olympic Sports Federation adopted measures to promote an equal share of executive positions for women in their respective organisations. These measures include the introduction of binding regulations and quotas for the election of boards.

In Sweden, a 40 \% target has been set by the Swedish Sports Federation in its milestones for 2017. This target applies to all decision-making and advisory bodies, senior positions, nomination committees and coaches ( ${ }^{9}$ ).

The governments of France and the United Kingdom (England) propose gender targets in decision-making structures. The French Gender Equality Act 2014 requires, by the time of the 2020 Olympics, a gender balance of $40 / 60$ in the governing bodies of those sports federations where each sex represents $25 \%$ of staff to be reached. In the United Kingdom, the governance strategy of Sport England, 'On board for better governance 2013-2017 $\left({ }^{(10}\right)$, requires national governing bodies as well as regional and local sporting bodies to ensure that women represent at least 25 \% of board members by 2017 (Sport England, 2013, p. 11).

## 2. Review of the indicators

This section discusses the progress made in reaching an equal share of women and men in bodies of public power and economic decision-making in the EU Member States since 2003, based on the existing indicators. Data are taken from the European Commission's WMID database, which provides a valuable source of extensive, comparable and harmonised data at both the national and the European levels. Additionally, the report examines women's representation in decision-making in academic/research institutions, the media, and sports organisations.

### 2.1. Gender balance in bodies of public power

The Finnish Presidency developed nine indicators on women in bodies of public power (legislative and executive political bodies, public administration, and the judiciary), which were endorsed by the Council in 1999, and reviewed in 2008 during the Slovenian Presidency (Council of the European Union, 1999; Council of the European Union, 2008). Eight quantitative indicators are covered by the data available in the European Commission's WMID database. A qualitative indicator on 'Policies to promote a balanced participation in political elections' describes policies and measures taken by governments to further gender-equal representation in parliaments and assemblies at the national/federal, regional and local level.

This section presents the latest data on women's representation in decision-making in bodies of public power and some trends in the period 2003-2014. The final list of updated indicators is presented in Table 1 in the Annex.

### 2.1.1. Political decision-making

Indicators measuring women's representation in legislative and executive political bodies show a positive trend, with an increase of women in political power across the board. The greatest progress is observed in the increased proportion of women among European commissioners (from $25 \%$ in 2003 to $32 \%$ in 2014) and the increased percentage of women ministers with an economic portfolio (from $16 \%$ to $24 \%$ ). The smallest increase is seen in the proportion of women ministers responsible for basic state functions (defence, justice and foreign policy).

Figure 2.1 Improvements in gender balance in political power in the EU-28, 2003-2014

- Women in decision-making in 2014
$\Rightarrow$ Increase from 2003 to 2014


Source: European Commission, Database on Women and Men in Decision-Making.
Note: For quarterly data (indicators 1, 5 and 6), the fourth quarter was used; data for local assemblies are from 2013 and data for 2003 not available; the EU-28 average in 2003 does not include CZ, HR, LT, MT and PL due to data availability; Council Conclusions 1999 are available at:
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN\&f=ST\ 11829\ 1999\ REV\ 1 and Council Conclusions 2008 are available at: http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN\&f=ST\ 9670\ 2008\ ADD\ 1.

The division of portfolios among the respective ministries showed a higher representation of women among senior/junior ministers with socio-cultural functions ( $42 \%$ ) compared to ministers responsible for the economy ( $24 \%$ ) or basic state functions (19 \%) (Indicator 6).

## Slow but steady progress in the representation of women in parliaments

Since 2003, at the European level, the proportion of women Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) rose from $31 \%$ in 2003 to $37 \%$ in the 2014 elections. While this represents steady progress towards a gender-equal European Parliament, it still falls short of the average percentage in leading Member States. Thirteen Member States have at least 40 \% women MEPs, while Estonia and Latvia have reached gender parity (50/50) and Finland, Ireland, Malta and Sweden have more women than men among MEPs.

Regarding progress at the Member State level, there was a slow increase in women's average representation in national parliaments, from $22 \%$ in 2003 to $28 \%$ in 2014 . On average, women's representation in most Member States ranged between $10 \%$ and $40 \%$ in 2003 and 2014. The number of Member States where women's representation ranged between $10 \%$ and $20 \%$ decreased, as did the share of representation below 10 \% (Figure 2.2).

Figure 2.2 Percentage of Member States grouped according to proportion of women in national/federal parliaments, 2003-2014


Source: European Commission, Database on Women and Men in Decision-Making.
Note: For quarterly data, the fourth quarter was used; data for CZ, LT, MT and PL are not available for 2003; for HR data are not available for 2003-2006.

Although in 2003 Sweden was the only Member State with a gender-balanced parliament (45 \%), by 2010 Belgium, the Netherlands and Finland had also reached this category. However, by 2014, the number of countries where women represented more than $40 \%$ of parliamentarians decreased to three (ES, FI, SE). In 2014, the share of countries where women represented more than $30 \%$ of parliamentarians remained relatively stable compared to 2003.

The trajectories towards gender equality might be different for some Member States. For example, in Bulgaria, women's share of parliamentary seats decreased by eight percentage points from $28 \%$ in 2004 to $20 \%$ in 2014. Austria experienced a decrease from $34 \%$ in 2003 to $27 \%$ in 2009 and a subsequent increase to $33 \%$ in 2013 (Figure 2.3).

Figure 2.3 Percentage of women in national parliaments and the EU-28 in Member States with the biggest changes, 2003-2014


Source: European Commission, Database on Women and Men in Decision-Making.
Note: For quarterly data, the fourth quarter was used.
Women's share of parliamentary seats increased more than 10 percentage points in four Member States. Slovenia experienced the most visible increase from $17 \%$ in 2011 to $38 \%$ after the 2012 elections. Much of the success can be attributed to the implementation of a gender quota law passed in 2011. Other Member States where significant progress was made in women's legislative decision-making are Greece (12 p.p.), France (14 p.p.) and Italy (19 p.p.).

In 2003, four women held Speaker positions in the single/lower houses of national parliaments (EE, ES, LV, HU), accounting for $17 \%$ of parliamentary leaders from 23 Member States, where data were available. In 2011, women held this position in nine Member States (BG, CZ, EE, LV, LT, NL, AT, PT, RO), accounting for one third ( $32 \%$ ) of parliamentary leaders. This positive trend was not sustained, and in 2014 this number dropped to seven Member States (BG, IT, LV, LT, NL, AT, PT).

## A more pronounced increase at regional and local levels

Regional parliaments have followed the overall national trends of steady progress in women's representation since 2003. In 20 Member States with regional parliaments, women's average representation reached $32 \%$ in 2014, an increase from $25 \%$ in 2003 (Figure 2.4). In 2003, only in Finland did women represent over $40 \%$ of seats in regional parliaments ( $45 \%$ ), whereas an additional four Member States (BE, ES, FR, SE) reached this level by 2014.

Figure 2.4 Proportion of women in regional parliaments in 2003, 2009 and 2014


Source: European Commission, Database on Women and Men in Decision-Making.
In 2013, across the EU, women accounted for nearly a third ( $32 \%$ ) of members of local assemblies. Sweden had the highest representation of women in local assemblies (reaching over $40 \%$ in 1999, 2003, 2006 and 2011, where data were available). The variation was higher for the regional parliaments, ranging from $11 \%$ in Hungary to $49 \%$ in France $\left({ }^{11}\right)$, while for local assemblies the proportion varied from $16 \%$ in Greece to $43 \%$ in Sweden $\left({ }^{12}\right)$.

A combination of legislative and voluntary quotas may contribute to a higher representation of women in political decision-making

Gender imbalance in political decision-making has been addressed by means of a range of voluntary and legislated measures, presented in Chapter 1.2. Although quotas are just one type of positive measure, there is a strong argument for their success in fast-tracking women into decision-making positions.

As of late 2014, a total of nine Member States had legislated candidate quotas in place along with voluntary political party quotas, while an additional 14 Member States relied thoroughly on voluntary party quotas. Five Member States (BG, DK, EE, LV, $\mathrm{Fl}^{13}$ ) did not have electoral gender quotas in 2014. On average, Member States with legislated and voluntary quotas have seen the most pronounced increase in women's political representation (Figure 2.5). The 2014 data shows that Member States where elections were held with both quotas in place reached an average representation of $29 \%$, with an average increase of 10 percentage points between 2003 and 2014, ranging from a $21 \%$ representation of women in Greece
to $41 \%$ in Spain $\left({ }^{14}\right)$. The presence of both legislated and voluntary quotas signals the commitment of both government and party elites to gender-equal representation, which is a crucial aspect for the successful implementation of quotas in general (Krook, 2009). It should be noted that other socioeconomic factors might also be important in explaining differences between the Member States.

Figure 2.5 Proportion of women in national parliaments where quotas are used as of 2003 and 2014


Source: European Commission, Database on Women and Men in Decision-Making; QuotaProject, available at: http://www.quotaproject.org/; Krook, 2009; Thames and Williams, 2013.
Note: Data for 2003 were not available for CZ, HR, LT, MT and PL. Data from 2004 were used for CZ, LT, MT and PL and data from 2007 were used for HR. The proportion of women in the single/lower houses was taken into account. IE is not counted in the average of the group 'Legislated Candidate Quotas \& Voluntary Party Quotas', but is included under the group 'No Quotas', as legislative quotas were introduced in 2012 and did not apply at the last elections in 2011 (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), 2014a).

The variation was bigger in countries with only voluntary quotas or no quotas at all. In Member States with voluntary quotas, the average representation of women increased by six percentage points between 2003 and 2014. The change ranged from a decrease of three percentage points in Austria to an increase of 20 percentage points in Italy. In the countries without quotas, the average representation of women stood at $27 \%$ in 2014, with minimal progress on average. Changes in women's representation over time ranged from a decrease of six percentage points in Bulgaria to an increase of five percentage points in Finland.

The success of voluntary quotas appears to be more linked to contextual factors than legislated candidate quotas in EU Member States (EC, 2013d).

## Increased women's participation in national governments

Since 2003, the proportion of women among prime ministers or heads of governments in the EU-28 has been, and remains, quite low. In 2005, a woman chancellor was appointed in Germany, and since then seven more Member States have had women prime ministers (DK, HR, LV, PL, SI, SK, FI). However, in 2014 only four Member State governments were led by women (DK, DE, LV, PL), accounting for $14 \%$ of EU Member State government leaders.

The proportion of women among senior/junior ministers of national/federal governments increased marginally from $23 \%$ in 2003 to $27 \%$ in 2014. Meanwhile, the number of gender-balanced governments increased from four in 2003 (BE, DE, FI, SE) to seven in 2014 (DE, EE, FR, NL, SI, FI, SE). Women held less than $10 \%$ of senior/junior ministerial positions in five Member States (EL, CY, HU, MT, SK). Although the number of countries with gender-balanced governments was higher in 2014 than in 2003, only a few countries sustained high levels of representativeness. Throughout the period, Finland and Sweden maintained a stable high proportion of women among ministers ( $40 \%$ or higher), whereas five other Member States (BG, DK, ES, NL, AT) sustained a proportion of $30 \%$ or higher during most of the period.

A closer examination highlights horizontal gender segregation in the allocation of portfolios. In 2014, women filled $42 \%$ of portfolios with socio-cultural functions $\left({ }^{15}\right)$, but led only $19 \%$ of ministries related to foreign affairs, finance and defence. While women's representation has remained constant with regard to basic state functions since 2003 (it has increased by 1.6 p.p.), it increased most for economic ministries ( 7.7 p.p.), but also for socio-cultural (6.4 p.p.) and infrastructural functions (5.8 p.p.).

Figure 2.6 Proportion of women among senior/junior ministers by type of portfolio in the EU-28, 2003-2014


Source: European Commission, Database on Women and Men in Decision-Making.
Note: For quarterly data in 2003, the third quarter was used, and for 2014 the fourth quarter was used.
In summary, there has been a steady improvement in women's representation in national and regional parliaments and assemblies across the EU. Nevertheless, women still account for less than a third of the highest political decision-making positions and the increase was marginal among senior/junior ministers within national/federal governments. In addition, women are underrepresented in the ministries of foreign affairs, finance and defence and are much more likely than men to be appointed to socio-cultural portfolios. The level of women's representation is higher at the European level ( $37 \%$ ) and in local assemblies ( $32 \%$ ) than in national parliaments ( $28 \%$ ). On average, Member States applying both legislated and voluntary quotas have seen the most pronounced increase in women's political representation.

### 2.1.2. Public administration

Women's representation has improved in public administration during the last seven-year period, particularly among level-2 administrators (Figure 2.7) $\left({ }^{16}\right)$. Across the EU, the average proportion of women at the level of the highest-ranking civil servants was $31 \%$ at level 1 (which corresponds to the next highest level in the ministry after the minister), and $40 \%$ at level 2 (the level below level 1, as defined by the ministry) (Indicator 7).

Data concerning the distribution of portfolios shows the highest-ranking women civil servants were best represented in the socio-cultural functions ( $42 \%$ at level 1 and $49 \%$ at level 2) (Indicator 8). Over the seven-year period, the proportion of women with socio-cultural state functions increased more than in any other functions.

Figure 2.7 Improvements in gender balance in public administration in the EU-28, 2003-2014

- Women in decision-making in 2014
$\Rightarrow$ Increase from 2007 to 2014


Source: European Commission, Database on Women and Men in Decision-Making.
Note: Due to changes in methodology and a break in the series, data are only comparable from 2007 onwards; Council Conclusions 1999 are available at:
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN\&f=ST\ 11829\ 1999\ REV\ 1 and Council Conclusions 2008 are available at: http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN\&f=ST\ 9670\ 2008\ ADD\ 1.

Member States varied considerably in this area. Whereas in 2014, not a single woman was represented among the highest-ranking civil servants at level 1 in Luxembourg, women represented $53 \%$ of such positions in Slovenia. Similarly, representation of women civil servants at level 2 also varies from as little as 14 \% in Belgium to 58 \% in Slovenia.

Two trends have been noted during the seven-year period: a reduced number of Member States with fewer than $20 \%$ of women civil servants at level 1, and an increased number of Member States with $30 \%$ or more women civil servants at level 2 (Figure 2.8).

Figure 2.8 Member States according to proportion of women in public administration, 2007 and 2014


Source: European Commission, Database on Women and Men in Decision-Making.

On a more challenging note, in 2014, the proportion of women at the top level of administration remained lower than among level-2 civil servants in all countries except Spain ( $35 \%$ in level 1 and $31 \%$ in level 2). The number of countries which had $40 \%$ or more women in top administrative positions did not increase (Figure 2.8).

In summary, the higher increase among level-2 administrators contributed to a steady increase in the share of women in public administration. The number of Member States where women represented 30$39 \%$ or $40 \%$ or more, of level-1 administrators remained relatively stable over time. In public administration the gendered pattern of horizontal segregation continues to prevail. Men are overrepresented in top administrative posts related to economy, infrastructure and basic state functions, whereas women most often occupy ministerial positions related to socio-cultural functions.

### 2.1.3. The judiciary

Decisions taken by the judiciary influence public and legal discourse, which impacts on society at all levels, therefore it is crucial that women are equally represented. In 2014, in the EU on average, women were slightly better represented among the members of the Supreme Courts ( $37 \%$ ) (Indicator 9). Women's representation was lower in the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and the General Court (EGC), as one fifth of the members were women in 2014 (respectively $18 \%$ and $21 \%$ ) (Figure 2.9). From 2003-2014 only fractional increase in the number of women was noted in the European General Court and in the Court of Justice of the European Union. An increase of women among members of the Supreme Courts in the Member States since 2003 was more substantial.

Figure 2.9 Improvements in the gender balance of the judiciary in the EU-28, 2003-2014

- Women in decision-making in 2014
$\Rightarrow$ Increase from 2003 to 2014


Source: European Commission, Database on Women and Men in Decision-Making.
Note: The EU-28 average in 2003 does not include BG, CZ, EL, ES, HR, LT, MT, PL, SK and SE due to data availability; Council Conclusions 1999 are available at:
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN\&f=ST\ 11829\ 1999\%2oREV\ 1 and Council Conclusions 2008 are available at: http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN\&f=ST\ 9670\ 2008\ ADD\ 1.

Across the EU, where data were available, the average proportion of women among members of the Supreme Courts was 19 \% in $2003\left({ }^{17}\right)$. After 2007 data were available for all Member States: the proportion of women among members of the Supreme Courts increased from $31 \%$ to $37 \%$ in 2014.

In 2003, three Member States (LV, LU, HU) demonstrated a gender balance among the members of their Supreme Courts and women outnumbered men in the Supreme Courts of Romania (64 \%). By 2014, gender balance was achieved in six Member States (FR, HR, LV, LU, HU, SK) and more than $60 \%$ of members were women in Bulgaria ( $73 \%$ ) and Romania ( $85 \%$ ). However, high variations are visible among Member States. While women made up more than half of Supreme Court members in four Member States (BG, LV, RO, SK), they constituted only $8 \%$ in the United Kingdom. Overall, by 2014, women accounted for $30 \%$ or more of Supreme Court members in half of the EU-28 Member States.

Figure 2.10 Proportion of women members of the Supreme Courts of the Member States, 2003 and 2014
=Women in decision-making in $2014 \quad$ † Increase from 2003 to $2014 \quad$ - Decrease from 2003 to 2014


Source: European Commission, Database on Women and Men in Decision-Making.
Note: Data for 2003 are not available for all Member States, therefore 2004 was used for BG, CZ, EL, LT, PL and SK; data for 2006 were used for MT and SE; data for 2007 were used for ES and HR.

Women's access to the highest judicial post of Supreme Court president shows stronger signs of improvement. While in 2003 no woman occupied this position in any of the 21 Member States for which
data were available, by 2014 women occupied the highest judicial positions in eight Member States (CZ, DE, IE, PL, RO, SK, FI, SE). Women's representation among Supreme Court presidents therefore constitutes the exception in the overall slow breakthrough of women's representation in top public-policy decision-making positions.

In summary, on average in the EU, women are better represented among the members of the Supreme Courts of the Member States than in European Courts.

### 2.2. Gender balance in economic decision-making

Macroeconomic decision-making has far-reaching societal implications on the allocation of resources, as well as on fiscal and monetary policies. Macroeconomic institutions influence overall economic development, monetary stability, employment and growth.

From a microeconomic perspective, higher gender diversity in organisations contributes to the enhanced quality of decision-making and improved overall company performance, both in terms of financial gains and better risk management (EC, 2012C). In addition to the arguments drawing on the notion of substantive representation, supply-side arguments such as under-utilisation of a rich talent pool are often invoked (EC, 2012C).

In 2003, the Italian Presidency developed nine quantitative indicators to monitor the participation of women and men in macroeconomic decision-making in economic decision-making centres in Member States and in the EU (Council of the European Union, 2003). The Council encouraged the Member States to adopt further measures to achieve a balanced representation of women and men in economic decisionmaking and emphasised the need for a partnership between government, social partners and all other actors.

This section presents current data on women's representation in economic decision-making according to the agreed indicators, as well as a summary of trends during 2003-2014. The final list of the indicators with all changes is presented in Table 1 in the Annex.

### 2.2.1. Financial institutions

The overall trend from 2003-2014 shows that, during this period, the proportion of women in decisionmaking positions at national and EU levels in Central Banks was low. In 2014, women held $14 \%$ of governor and deputy/vice-governor positions (Indicator 1) and $18 \%$ of positions in decision-making bodies in Central Banks at Member State level (Indicator 2). At European level, the highest position of the European Central Bank (ECB), that of president, was consistently filled by men from 2003-2014 (Indicator 1), while women filled $8 \%$ of the positions on the ECB board (Indicator 2). Progress is marginal and mainly visible in the increase in the number of women governors and deputy/vice-governors in Central Banks at Member State level.

Figure 2.11 Improvements in gender balance in finance in the EU-28, 2003-2014

- Women in decision-making in 2014
$\Rightarrow$ Increase from 2003 to 2014


Source: European Commission, Database on Women and Men in Decision-Making.
Note: For governors and deputy/vice-governors of the Central Banks of the Member States, 2007 data are used due to data availability; the EU-28 average for the decision-making body of the Central Banks of the Member States in 2003 does not include CZ, HR, LT, MT and PL; no women filled the positions of president of the ECB from 2004 to 2014; Council Conclusions 2003 are available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/vedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/lsa/78152.pdf.

During 2003-2014, Central Banks across the EU-28 were almost entirely led by men. Only three women held the position of governor of a Central Bank: in Denmark (2006), Finland (2006) and in Cyprus (2014). Women as vice-governors of Central Banks were better represented in 10 Member States (BE, BG, DE, $E L, F R, L T, H U, S I, S E, U K)$, though the proportion of women in this position at any one time across the EU- 28 has not exceeded $20 \%$. Figure 2.12 highlights the overall increase from 2007 to 2014, but percentages remain relatively low.

Figure 2.12 Proportion of women governors and vice-governors of Central Banks in Member States, 2007-2014


Source: European Commission, Database on Women and Men in Decision-Making.
In the given time period, women's membership of the decision-making bodies of the Central Banks of Member States was below $20 \%$. In 2003 it was $17 \%$ ( 40 women, 192 men). By 2014, despite a notable increase in the number of positions in decision-making bodies, women's share had increased only fractionally to $18 \%$ ( 53 women, 248 men). The only state with gender balance was Slovenia ( $40 \%$ ), while in six Member States (CZ, HR, AT, PT, SK, UK) women were not represented at all. The proportion of Member States where women represented fewer than $10 \%$ of members on their Central Bank decisionmaking body decreased, while those Member States in which women represented 11-40\% of members of
decision-making bodies in Central Banks increased. The number of countries with $40 \%$ or more women members remained stable (Figure 2.13).

Figure 2.13 Percentage of Member States according to proportion of women in decision-making bodies of Central Banks, 2003-2014


Source: European Commission, Database on Women and Men in Decision-Making.
Note: Data were not available for DE in 2005-2006, for HR in 2003-2006, and for CZ, LT, MT and PL in 2003.
During 2003-2014, women's share of board membership at the ECB was below $10 \%$. Although the proportion of women hovered between 5-6 \% in the years 2003-2010, in the subsequent three years there were no women at all on the ECB board.

In sum, women's overall representation in financial decision-making is very low. Furthermore, a glass ceiling can be observed in terms of women's access to decision-making positions in Central Banks, whereby the number of women decreases as the seniority of the position increases.

### 2.2.2. Social partner organisations

Social partner organisations have an impact on macroeconomic policy formulation via their bargaining role with government authorities. These indicators measure the proportion of women in social partner organisations representing workers at both the national and European levels (Indicators 4 and 5), and the proportion in organisations representing employers at national and European levels (Indicators 6 and 7).

In 2014, women were largely underrepresented in both national and European social partner organisations, where percentages range between $9 \%$ and $27 \%$ for all positions at both levels. European social partner organisations generally had a larger share of women in all decision-making positions than their national counterparts. In addition, women seem to be more present in organisations representing workers compared with those representing employers. Data also point to vertical segregation whereby in both workers' and employers' organisations at European and national levels, the percentage of women in top decision-making positions (president and vice-president) is smaller than women's membership of decision-making bodies overall.

Figure 2.14 Improvements in gender balance in social partner organisations, 2003-2014

- Women in decision-making in 2014
$\Rightarrow$ Increase from 2003 to 2014


Source: European Commission, Database on Women and Men in Decision-Making.
Note: Data at national level are available only for 2014; Council Conclusions 2003 are available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/lsa/78152.pdf.

A few main trends can be observed at European level in terms of women's participation in social partner organisations (whereas data at national level are not available prior to 2014). As illustrated in Figure 2.15, the proportion of women among high-level decision-making positions in social partner organisation representing workers remained relatively low between 2003 and 2014. The highest proportion of women occupying the post of president was seen in 2009, when women made up $31 \%$ of the total number of presidents (five women and 11 men). The proportion of women among board members stayed relatively constant but remained low: the highest recorded proportion did not exceed $24 \%$ (in 2007).

Figure 2.15 Proportion of women in high-level decision-making positions within social partner organisations representing workers at EU level, 2003-2014


Source:
European Commission, Database on Women and Men in Decision-Making.
In organisations representing employers at EU level, the proportion of women as president has increased since 2010 (Figure 2.16). However, the actual number failed to exceed eight in total at EU level. Women as
executive heads of social partner organisations representing employers (at EU level) were more numerous, increasing to $37 \%$ in 2014. Women members of the highest decision-making body remained relatively unchanged and low.

Figure 2.16 Proportion of women in high-level decision-making positions within social partner organisations representing employers at EU level, 2003-2014


Source: European Commission, Database on Women and Men in Decision-Making.

In sum, most recent data demonstrate a large gender gap in social partner organisations at both EU and Member State levels.

### 2.2.3. Corporate boards

Representation of women and men in economic decision-making is measured by the proportion of women and men as presidents and CEOs (chairpersons) (Indicator 8) and by the proportion of women and men among members of the highest decision-making bodies (Indicator 9) in the largest nationally registered companies listed on the national stock exchange in Member States. Data show that women were almost absent at the top of the largest companies: as an EU average in 2014, only $3 \%$ women were CEOs and $7 \%$ were presidents of the highest decision-making bodies, with only a slight increase since 2003. The representation of women among members of the highest decision-making bodies of the largest companies was higher, accounting for $20 \%$ on average in the EU. Only in France and Latvia was the proportion of women higher than $30 \%$.

Figure 2.17 Improvements in gender balance in decision-making positions in the largest nationally registered companies listed on the national stock exchange, 2003-2014

1 Women in decision-making in 2014
Increase from 2003 to 2014


Source: European Commission, Database on Women and Men in Decision-Making.
Note: Data for CEOs are available only from 2012, therefore a comparison between 2012 and 2014 is presented; Council Conclusions 2003 are available at: http://www.consilium.europa.ev/vedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/lsa/78152.pdf.

As discussed in Chapter 1, a range of Member States took measures to address this critical absence of women from financial and corporate decision-making across the EU-28, but this has not brought about substantial and rapid change. In 2003 - based on data availability for that year - women represented less than $10 \%$ of the chairpersons of the highest decision-making body of the largest nationally registered companies listed on the national stock exchange in almost all of the Member States ( 22 Member States out of 23 , or $96 \%$ ). Eleven years later, in about two thirds of all Member States (19 of 28), women still made up less than $10 \%$ of the chairpersons of the highest decision-making bodies of the largest companies. In six Member States (BE, BG, HR, CY, LV, AT), women constituted between 10-19 \% of chairpersons of the highest decision-making body, while in three Member States (PL, RO, SK), they made up between $20-29 \%$ of corporate leaders. Women are thus significantly underrepresented at the very top of the business and corporate world.

Membership of the highest decision-making body of the largest companies provides a more positive picture. Since 2003, as an average in the EU, the proportion of women members of the highest decisionmaking body in these companies has doubled. This trend is noticeable from 2010 onwards, when women represented over $20 \%$ of members of the highest decision-making body in the largest companies in five Member States (LV, RO, SK, FI, SE) (Figure 2.18). By 2014, nine Member States (BE, DK, DE, IT, NL, SI, FI, SE, UK) reached 20-29 \% women's representation and an additional two (FR, LV) had over 30 \% women's representation. Progress is more apparent in Member States that have adopted binding legislation (FR, IT, NL ). The positive trend also coincides with a series of EU measures to redress gender imbalances in the economic sphere, namely the 2011 campaign 'Women on the Board Pledge for Europe', the Commission progress report a year later, as well as the proposal for a Directive aimed at improving the gender balance on the boards of listed companies (EC, 2013d).

Figure 2.18 Percentage of Member States according to proportion of women members of the highest decisionmaking body of the largest nationally registered companies listed on the national stock exchange, 2003-2014


Source: European Commission, Database on Women and Men in Decision-Making.
Note: Data were not available for DE in 2005-2006, for HR in 2003-2006, and for CZ, LT, MT and PL in 2003.
In sum, women's representation in business leadership has seen some improvement since major legislative initiatives were taken both at national and EU level and since the topic became a subject of extensive public debate.

### 2.3. Gender balance in social decision-making

Underrepresentation of women in decision-making positions in the social sphere, such as the media and academia/research, prevents women from having a significant impact on the decisions of many key institutions (United Nations, 1995). In addition to the indicators for Area G 'Women in Power and DecisionMaking', indicators to measure women's participation in decision-making in the social sphere have been developed for Area J 'Women and the Media' and Area B 'Education and Training of Women'. This section discusses the current situation in the EU and Member States in terms of achieving gender balance in social decision-making.

### 2.3.1. Academic and research organisations

The BPfA considers gender balance in decision-making in academic and research institutions to be important for gender equality within the social sphere and calls on research and academic institutions to: 1) build a critical mass of women leaders, executives and managers in strategic decision-making positions; 2) create or strengthen, as appropriate, mechanisms to monitor women's access to senior levels of decision-making; and 3) review the criteria for recruitment and appointment to advisory or decisionmaking bodies and promotion to senior positions to ensure that such criteria are relevant and do not discriminate against women (United Nations, 1995).

## Women are largely absent in senior positions in academia

Based on the 2010 data, there appeared to be clear vertical segregation in academic and research institutions. Women constitute over half of university graduates, but a pipeline starts to leak at PhD level, with more men receiving a PhD degree on average in the EU. Differences become much more pronounced in the highest positions in academia. The proportion of women was the smallest at the top of the
academic hierarchy, with women making up just $20 \%$ of Grade A academic staff (the single highest grade/post at which research is normally conducted). Women researchers at Grade B (working in positions less senior than top positions but more senior than newly qualified PhD holders) and Grade $C$ (the first grade/post which a newly qualified PhD (ISCED 6) graduate would normally hold) constituted $37 \%$ and $44 \%$ of staff respectively.

Figure 2.19 Proportion of women among academic staff by grade, 2010


Source: She Figures 2012.
Note: Data are not available for EL or PL; Grade C not available for BG and RO; data by Grade A, B and C not available for IE and MT. Exceptions to the reference year: CZ: 2008; EE: 2004; DK, FR, CY, AT, PT, RO, SE: 2009; LT: 2007; SK: 2011; UK: 2006.

In most Member States men outnumbered women at all staff grades in 2010. Women outnumbered men at Grade C in four Member States (EE, LV, LT, FI) and at Grade B in two Member States (RO, FI). In all Member States there were more men in Grade A positions. In 14 countries there was a gender balance in Grade C positions; moreover, in the EU-27 on average, 44 \% of Grade C positions were held by women. Eight countries achieved gender balance at Grade B (BG, FR, HR, LV, LT, RO, FI, SE), but none of the countries reached gender balance at Grade A. The proportion of women decreases with the increase of grade level.

A comparison between 2002 and 2010 shows an improvement in the proportion of women at the different steps of the academic career ladder: the percentage of women increased from $15 \%$ to $20 \%$ at Grade A, from $32 \%$ to $37 \%$ at Grade B and from $40 \%$ to $44 \%$ at Grade C.

Another visible trend illustrating women's underrepresentation at the highest levels of academia is the data on women heading universities or research institutions and women on the boards of universities and research institutions. The latest figures show that only $10 \%$ of EU universities or assimilated institutions (based on capacity to deliver PhDs) are headed by a woman rector. Sweden, where women represent $43 \%$ of heads of universities or assimilated institutions, leads in this area, followed by Finland, where women represent $31 \%$ of such positions. In ten Member States (BE, CZ, DK, DE, IT, LT, NL, AT, RO, SK ), women represent less than $10 \%$ of university heads, while no women head a university or other assimilated institution in another three Member States (CY, LU, HU).

Figure 2.20 Proportion of women heading universities or assimilated institutions, 2010


## She Figures 2012.

Note: Data for DE and SE: year 2008. Data were not available for IE, EL, ES, MT, PT or the UK. Data estimated for EU-27 as EU-28 data not available. LU: only one university.

In 2010, on average in the EU, one third ( $36 \%$ ) of board members in academic and research institutions were women (Figure 2.21), an increase from 22 \% in 2007. In 2010, two Member States (FI, SE) reached gender balance in boards and an additional seven Member States (DK, ES, HR, LV, AT, PT, UK) secured a share of $30 \%$ or above. In six Member States (CZ, IT, CY, LT, LU, HU), less than $20 \%$ of board members were women.

Figure 2.21 Proportion of women on boards of academic institutions, 2010


She Figures 2012.
Note: Data for FR: 2002; IE: 2004; BE, LT, SE: 2007; CZ: 2008; PT, UK: 2009. Data were not available for BE (Dutch-speaking community), EL, MT, PL and RO. Data estimated for EU-27 as EU-28 data not available. There is no common definition of boards and the total number of boards varies considerably between countries.

Women not only face a glass ceiling when advancing to higher positions; they are also less likely to obtain research grants. In addition, they need to produce more high-quality papers in order to be successful (Gannon, Quirk, \& Guest, 2001; EC, 2000; Research Councils UK, 2013). Given that decisions about promotion might very much depend on the composition of the evaluation panel or committee, gender balance in these committees is crucial. In order to ensure a more just research agenda in the future and improve the quality of research, as well as the relevance and accountability of its outputs to all members of society, stronger measures supporting gender balance on the boards of academic and research institutions are necessary (EC, 2013C).

In summary, the glass-ceiling effect is strongly pronounced in the low representation of women in decision-making in academia. Despite an improved proportion of women at the different steps of the academic career ladder, women constitute a minority among the top levels of the academic hierarchy. In

2010 only a minority of institutions in the tertiary education sector were headed by women and around a third of the board members were women.

### 2.3.2. Media organisations

During the Irish Presidency in 2013, Area J 'Women and the Media' was reviewed for the first time and new indicators were developed. The Council Conclusions noted that an increased presence of women in decision-making roles in the media is likely to lead to more gender-sensitive content and programming, presenting a more balanced picture of women's and men's lives and women's contribution to society. In turn, this would have a positive impact on public policies, private attitudes and behaviour (Council of the European Union, 2013). These conclusions also included a series of indicators that would facilitate monitoring the progress of Member States in promoting and supporting gender equality in the media.

## Women are concentrated in lower positions of decision-making in the media

Over the course of two decades, women's employment in the media sector has increased, reaching $44 \%$ in 2012. By 2012, across the EU-28, women on average represented almost two thirds ( $67 \%$ ) of graduates in journalism and information courses. Nevertheless, based on data collected in 2013, women occupied less than one third ( $32 \%$ ) of top decision-making positions in media organisations. The percentage of women in this sector increased as the seniority of the position decreased. Women accounted for $16 \%$ of CEOs, $21 \%$ of chief operating officers and $32 \%$ of senior operational management positions (EIGE, 2013b).

The latest available data show a similar trend $\left({ }^{18}\right)$ : $13 \%$ of CEO or equivalent positions were filled by women in 2014, while the proportion more than doubled for lower positions. Women represented $30 \%$ of all executive members of the highest-level board and $32 \%$ of non-executive directors in the two highest decision-making bodies. In addition, on average across the EU in 2014, $18 \%$ of the chairpersons of the highest decision-making bodies and $31 \%$ of the members of the boards in media organisations were women.

Figure 2.22 Proportion of women as board members in media organisations, 2014


Source: European Commission, Database on Women and Men in Decision-Making.
In 2014, women held positions as the chairpersons of the highest decision-making bodies in eight Member States (BE, BG, DE, IE, IT, LU, SE, UK). As board members, women filled more than $40 \%$ of the positions in seven Member States (BG, IE, LU, NL, FI, SE, UK). There were no women board members in two Member States (HR, LV) (Figure 2.22).

### 2.3.3. Sport organisations

The area of decision-making in sport organisations is insufficiently researched and comparative information is scarce. In order to fill this gap, data have been collected about national sports federations and continental confederations representing Olympic sports (both summer and winter). At the European level, 28 of the 35 current Olympic branches of sports have a continental confederation in Europe. The latter were selected for data collection.

The representation of women among the top decision-making positions in sports organisations in Member States remains very low. On average in 2015, only $14 \%$ of all positions were occupied by women, ranging from $3 \%$ in Poland to $43 \%$ in Sweden. In the majority of countries in the EU-28, the share of women in decision-making positions in national sport federations was below $20 \%$ and, in five countries ( $\mathrm{BG}, \mathrm{FR}, \mathrm{NL}, \mathrm{FI}, \mathrm{UK}$ ), the proportion of women was 20-29\%.

Figure 2.23 Proportion of women among all decision-making positions in national sport federations in the EU28, 2015


Source: Data were collected from the 10 popular national sport federations in all 28 Member States ( 280 in total), between May and June 2015.
Note: The following positions are included: president/chairperson, vice-president/vice-chairperson, general director/general secretary and other board members. To avoid double counting, each person is counted only once, even if (s)he occupies several positions.

Similarly to other areas of decision-making, vertical segregation is visible in decision-making in sports: the gender gap widens as the seniority of the position increases. While overall women made up $14 \%$ of decision-making positions in national sport federations, women represented only $5 \%$ of the total number of presidents.

On average, at European level, women make up $14 \%$ of decision-making positions in the continental confederations of Olympic sports in Europe in 2015. Only $4 \%$ of the presidents or chairpersons (i.e. only one out of 28 ) and $9 \%$ of vice-presidents (i.e. eight out of 91 ) were women. The share of women among board members was $15 \%$. The highest proportion of women was found among general directors and secretary-generals ( $22 \%$, or six women out of a total of 27).

Figure 2.24 Proportion of women and men in decision-making positions in continental confederations of Olympic sports in Europe, 2015


Source: Data were collected from all 28 continental confederations of Olympic sports in Europe (May-June 2015).
Note: Board members include the president and vice-president(s), and where stated in the confederation statute/constitution, the general director/general secretary. To avoid double counting, each person is counted only once in the total, even if (s)he occupies several positions.

When data were collected, nine of the 28 European confederations ( $32 \%$ ) had a gender quota for the highest decision-making body (executive committee, presidium, board of directors) and only one failed to meet this quota, i.e. had no women in top decision-making posts. In four of the remaining 19 European confederations without a gender quota, women were absent from the highest decision-making body.

## 3. New indicators in the area of women in power and decisionmaking

This section proposes three new indicators to measure gender balance in decision-making. The full list of indictors is presented in Table 1 in the Annex.

One of the proposed new indicators measures the share of women and men among the leaders of major political parties. Equal participation of women and men in politics is a human right and a condition for effective democracy and good governance. Political parties - and the processes by which they are governed - play a key role in determining the degree to which women participate in political life and the quality of their engagement. For this reason, political parties are often referred to as the 'gate-keepers' of women's political participation. In April 2014, women accounted for only $13 \%$ of leaders and $33 \%$ of deputy leaders of major political parties across the EU. Since 2011, the Commission's WMID database has been collecting annual data to populate the proposed indicator.

The second proposed indicator measures the proportion of women and men among executive and nonexecutive members in the highest decision-making bodies of the largest nationally registered companies listed on the national stock exchange. The new indicator will contribute to the follow up on the implementation of legislative and voluntary measures to improve gender balance on corporate boards.

Finally, the third proposed indicator measures the extent to which policy initiatives are in place to promote gender balance in economic decision-making and the impact of policies on gender equality. Various types of policies and/or measures, whether legally regulated or voluntary, implemented by government or by public or private companies, can improve the situation of women in economic decision-making. These are gender quotas, targets or goals set by different actors, positive actions, sanctions or rewards. The latest report by the European Commission shows that while some Member States have recently been proactive in promoting gender balance in economic decision-making, most countries have not taken any particular action to accelerate change (EC, 2013d).

### 3.1. Indicator on political party leadership

Title: The proportion and number of women and men among the leaders and deputy leaders of major political parties in Member States

## Concept:

The indicator measures the share of women and men among the leaders of major political parties at the level of Member States.

The indicator covers major political parties, that is to say those with at least $5 \%$ of seats in the national parliament (either the upper or lower house in a bicameral system). The total list of organisations covered in each country is available in the European Commission's WMID database, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/database/oo6_map.pdf.

The following positions have been covered: party leader(s) and deputy leader(s). In cases where a party is governed by a group, the chair and deputy chair(s) of the committee, group or board are included.

Data have been collected annually from political party websites and through direct contacts.

## Data source:

Data are collected from websites and through direct contacts and published in the European Commission's WMID database.

## Data overview:

Between 2011 and 2014, as an EU average, around a quarter of the leaders (including deputy leaders) of major political parties were women. Gender balance was achieved during all periods only in Sweden, where the percentage of women as leaders of major political parties increased from $47 \%$ in 2011 and 2012 to $50 \%$ in 2013 and 2014. Three other Member States (DE, SI, FI) reached $30 \%$ of women occupying party leader positions in 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014.

Women occupied between $10 \%$ and $30 \%$ of the leader positions of major political parties in more than half of the Member States (BG, DK, EE, IE, ES, FR, HR, LV, LT, LU, AT, PL, PT, RO, SK, UK) in 2014. In six Member States (BE, DE, NL, SI, FI, SE) women held at least $30 \%$ of leader positions. Five Member States (EL, IT, CY, HU, MT) had no women leaders of major political parties. In four Member States (IT, CY, HU, MT ), no women held this position during the years 2011-2014. On average in the EU-28, the representation of women among deputy leaders is higher ( $33 \%$ in 2014) than among leaders ( $13 \%$ ).

Table 3.1 Number of women and men and proportion of women among the leaders and deputy leaders of major political parties as an EU-28 average, 2011-2014

| EU-28 | Leader |  |  | Deputy leader |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Number of |  | Percentage of <br> women | Number of |  | Percentage of <br> women |
|  | Women | Men |  | Men |  |  |
| 2011 | 23 | 124 | $16 \%$ | 46 | 96 | $32 \%$ |
| 2012 | 18 | 122 | $13 \%$ | 58 | 109 | $35 \%$ |
| 2013 | 17 | 127 | $12 \%$ | 62 | 118 | $34 \%$ |
| 2014 | 19 | 125 | $13 \%$ | 57 | 116 | $33 \%$ |

Source: European Commission, Database on Women and Men in Decision-Making.
Note: see tables 18 and 19 in the Annex for number of women and men and proportion of women among the leaders and deputy leaders of major political parties for Member States

| Less than $10 \%$ | $10 \%$ to $19 \%$ | $20 \%$ to $29 \%$ | $30 \%$ to $39 \%$ | $40 \%$ or more |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |

Table 3.2 Number of women and men and proportion of women among the leaders (including leaders and deputy leaders) of major political parties, 2011-2014

| Member States | 2011 |  |  | 2012 |  |  | 2013 |  |  | 2014 |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Number of |  | \% of women | Number of |  | \% of women | Number of |  | \% of women | Number of |  | \% of women |
|  | W | M |  | W | M |  | W | M |  | W | M |  |
| BE | 7 | 17 | 29\% | 7 | 18 | 28 \% | 9 | 15 | $38 \%$ | 9 | 15 | $38 \%$ |
| BG | 1 | 6 | $14 \%$ | 1 | 5 | $17 \%$ | 1 | 5 | 17\% | 1 | 6 | $14 \%$ |
| CZ | 2 | 6 | 25\% | 3 | 11 | $21 \%$ | 1 | 9 | 10 \% | 1 | 13 | $7 \%$ |
| DK | 3 | 9 | 25\% | 3 | 9 | 25\% | 3 | 10 | 23\% | 3 | 10 | 23\% |
| DE | 6 | 8 | 43\% | 5 | 8 | $38 \%$ | 8 | 10 | 44 \% | 6 | 8 | $43 \%$ |


| Member <br> States | 2011 |  |  | 2012 |  |  | 2013 |  |  | 2014 |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Number of |  | \% of women | Number of |  | \% of women | Number of |  | \% of women | Number of |  | \% of women |
|  | W | M |  | W | M |  | W | M |  | W | M |  |
| EE | 1 | 7 | 13\% | 4 | 12 | $25 \%$ | 4 | 12 | 25\% | 5 | 12 | 29\% |
| IE | 2 | 6 | 25\% | 2 | 6 | 25\% | 2 | 5 | 29\% | 2 | 5 | 29\% |
| EL | 1 | 5 | 17\% | 1 | 6 | $14 \%$ | 0 | 9 | - \% | 0 | 10 | 0\% |
| ES | 1 | 3 | 25\% | 1 | 3 | 25\% | 1 | 3 | 25 \% | 1 | 3 | 25\% |
| FR | 1 | 4 | $20 \%$ | 1 | 4 | $20 \%$ | 1 | 6 | $14 \%$ | 1 | 6 | 14\% |
| HR | 2 | 2 | $50 \%$ | 2 | 5 | 29\% | 2 | 7 | 22 \% | 2 | 7 | 22 \% |
| IT | 0 | 8 | ○ \% | 0 | 8 | ○ \% | 0 | 12 | 0\% | 0 | 12 | $0 \%$ |
| CY | 0 | 9 | 0\% | 0 | 7 | ○ \% | 0 | 7 | 0\% | 0 | 7 | 0\% |
| LV | 1 | 14 | $7 \%$ | 1 | 9 | $10 \%$ | 2 | 9 | $18 \%$ | 2 | 9 | $18 \%$ |
| LT | 1 | 15 | $6 \%$ | 1 | 14 | $7 \%$ | 4 | 13 | $24 \%$ | 5 | 12 | 29\% |
| LU | 4 | 8 | $33 \%$ | 3 | 9 | 25\% | 2 | 7 | 22 \% | 2 | 7 | 22 \% |
| HU | 0 | 8 | 0\% | 0 | 9 | 0\% | 0 | 8 | 0\% | 0 | 9 | - \% |
| MT | 0 | 4 | 0\% | 0 | 4 | 0\% | 0 | 4 | 0\% | 0 | 4 | 0\% |
| NL | 6 | 8 | 43\% | 5 | 10 | $33 \%$ | 2 | 12 | $14 \%$ | 5 | 9 | $36 \%$ |
| AT | 6 | 8 | $43 \%$ | 6 | 8 | $43 \%$ | 6 | 10 | $38 \%$ | 2 | 7 | 22 \% |
| PL | 1 | 7 | $13 \%$ | 4 | 12 | 25\% | 3 | 13 | 19\% | 4 | 12 | 25\% |
| PT | 0 | 7 | 0\% | 1 | 6 | $14 \%$ | 1 | 6 | $14 \%$ | 1 | 5 | 17\% |
| RO | 2 | 9 | $18 \%$ | 1 | 8 | $11 \%$ | 2 | 8 | $20 \%$ | 1 | 9 | $10 \%$ |
| SI | 5 | 9 | $36 \%$ | 6 | 10 | $38 \%$ | 8 | 10 | 44\% | 6 | 12 | $33 \%$ |
| SK | 2 | 10 | $17 \%$ | 3 | 9 | $25 \%$ | 1 | 11 | 8 \% | 1 | 9 | $10 \%$ |
| FI | 5 | 11 | $31 \%$ | 5 | 7 | $42 \%$ | 7 | 10 | 41 \% | 7 | 9 | $44 \%$ |
| SE | 7 | 8 | $47 \%$ | 8 | 9 | $47 \%$ | 8 | 8 | 50 \% | 8 | 8 | 50 \% |
| UK | 2 | 4 | 33 \% | 2 | 5 | 29\% | 1 | 6 | $14 \%$ | 1 | 6 | 14\% |
| EU-28 | 69 | 220 | 24 \% | 76 | 231 | 25\% | 79 | 245 | 24 \% | 76 | 241 | $24 \%$ |

Source: European Commission, Database on Women and Men in Decision-Making.
Note:
Less than $10 \%$ $\square$ $10 \%$ to $19 \%$
$20 \%$ to $29 \%$
$30 \%$ to $39 \%$
$40 \%$ or more

### 3.2. Indicator on leadership in corporate sector

Title: The proportion and number of women and men among executive and non-executive members of the two highest decision-making bodies of the largest nationally registered companies listed on the national stock exchange

## Concept:

A new indicator differentiates between executive and non-executive functions in corporate sector. It will contribute to the follow-up of progress in gender balance in the highest decision-making bodies in corporate sector.

The indicator covers the largest publicly listed companies on the stock exchange in each country i.e. those covered by the blue-chip index. This index is maintained by the stock exchange and covers the largest
companies by market capitalisation and/or market trades. Only companies which are registered in the country concerned (according to ISIN code) are included. Therefore, the number of companies covered by the data (presented in the table of data) may be lower than the number of constituents in the relevant blue-chip index. The complete list of the blue-chip indices used as the basis for the sample of companies covered in each country, and the number of constituents in each index, is available in the European Commission's WMID database, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/genderequality/files/database/o37_map.pdf.

The proposed indicator covers the following positions:

- Executives: Data cover senior executives in the two highest decision-making bodies in each company. The two highest decision-making bodies are usually the supervisory board and the management board (in case of a two-tier governance system) and the board of directors and executive/management committee (in a unitary system). Note: Any individual who sits on both decision-making bodies of a particular company is counted only once and employee representatives are not counted at all.
- Non-executives: Data cover non-executive directors in the two highest decision-making bodies in each company. The two highest decision-making bodies are the supervisory board and the management board (in case of a two-tier governance system) and the board of directors and executive/management committee (in a unitary system). Note: Any individual who sits on both decision-making bodies of a particular company is counted only once and employee representatives are not counted at all.

Data have been collected biannually from company websites, stock-exchange websites and companies' annual reports. Data are available from 2012 onwards.

## Data source:

European Commission's WMID database.

## Data overview:

Women currently account for $21 \%$ of non-executive positions in the EU and $13 \%$ of executive positions. In most EU countries the representation of women among non-executives has been higher than among executives throughout the three years, except in nine ( $C Z, E E, E L, H R, C Y, H U, M T, P T, R O$ ) where in one or more years women were better represented among executives.

Data from 2012 to 2014 show that the proportion of women in both functions, as non-executives and as executives, increased, respectively from $17 \%$ to $21 \%$ and from $10 \%$ to $13 \%$. The highest increase in the proportion of women in non-executive positions can be seen in Italy (16 p.p.); regarding executive positions, the highest increase is in Greece and Hungary (8 p.p.).

Table 3.3 The proportion of women among executive and non-executive members of the two highest decisionmaking bodies of the largest nationally registered companies listed on the national stock exchange, 2012-2014

| Member <br> States | 2012 |  | 2013 |  | 2014 |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
|  | Executives | Non-executives | Executives | Non-executives | Executives | Non-executives |


| Member <br> States | 2012 |  | 2013 |  | 2014 |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Executives | Non-executives | Executives | Non-executives | Executives | Non-executives |
| BE | $10 \%$ | $14 \%$ | $12 \%$ | $18 \%$ | $13 \%$ | $24 \%$ |
| BG | $11 \%$ | $17 \%$ | $10 \%$ | $22 \%$ | $15 \%$ | $23 \%$ |
| CZ | $6 \%$ | $18 \%$ | $4 \%$ | $11 \%$ | $4 \%$ | $2 \%$ |
| DK | $11 \%$ | $17 \%$ | $12 \%$ | $19 \%$ | $12 \%$ | $23 \%$ |
| DE | $7 \%$ | $14 \%$ | $7 \%$ | $18 \%$ | $7 \%$ | $21 \%$ |
| EE | $20 \%$ | $8 \%$ | $24 \%$ | $7 \%$ | $17 \%$ | $7 \%$ |
| IE | $7 \%$ | $10 \%$ | $9 \%$ | $14 \%$ | $6 \%$ | $13 \%$ |
| EL | $5 \%$ | $10 \%$ | $12 \%$ | $10 \%$ | $13 \%$ | $9 \%$ |
| ES | $6 \%$ | $14 \%$ | $9 \%$ | $17 \%$ | $10 \%$ | $20 \%$ |
| FR | $8 \%$ | $27 \%$ | $11 \%$ | $31 \%$ | $11 \%$ | $33 \%$ |
| HR | $17 \%$ | $16 \%$ | $18 \%$ | $15 \%$ | $16 \%$ | $18 \%$ |
| IT | $4 \%$ | $13 \%$ | $7 \%$ | $17 \%$ | $8 \%$ | $29 \%$ |
| CY | $9 \%$ | $6 \%$ | $14 \%$ | $5 \%$ | $15 \%$ | $7 \%$ |
| LV | $22 \%$ | $28 \%$ | $22 \%$ | $29 \%$ | $20 \%$ | $32 \%$ |
| LT | $12 \%$ | $19 \%$ | $16 \%$ | $16 \%$ | $19 \%$ | $20 \%$ |
| LU | $10 \%$ | $12 \%$ | $13 \%$ | $14 \%$ | $9 \%$ | $13 \%$ |
| HU | $3 \%$ | $3 \%$ | $7 \%$ | $9 \%$ | $11 \%$ | $8 \%$ |
| MT | $7 \%$ | $4 \%$ | $10 \%$ | $3 \%$ | $13 \%$ | $3 \%$ |
| NL | $7 \%$ | $22 \%$ | $6 \%$ | $26 \%$ | $9 \%$ | $26 \%$ |
| AT | $5 \%$ | $12 \%$ | $3 \%$ | $11 \%$ | $4 \%$ | $17 \%$ |
| PL | $5 \%$ | $12 \%$ | $5 \%$ | $12 \%$ | $4 \%$ | $15 \%$ |
| PT | $10 \%$ | $7 \%$ | $8 \%$ | $10 \%$ | $9 \%$ | $10 \%$ |
| RO | $31 \%$ | $13 \%$ | $22 \%$ | $9 \%$ | $23 \%$ | $10 \%$ |
| SI | $18 \%$ | $22 \%$ | $19 \%$ | $22 \%$ | $21 \%$ | $22 \%$ |
| SK | $14 \%$ | $15 \%$ | $18 \%$ | $21 \%$ | $13 \%$ | $21 \%$ |
| FI | $14 \%$ | $29 \%$ | $13 \%$ | $31 \%$ | $16 \%$ | $29 \%$ |
| SE | $19 \%$ | $27 \%$ | $21 \%$ | $28 \%$ | $23 \%$ | $29 \%$ |
| UK | $11 \%$ | $23 \%$ | $13 \%$ | $26 \%$ | $17 \%$ | $29 \%$ |
| EU-28 | $10 \%$ | $17 \%$ | $12 \%$ | $19 \%$ | $13 \%$ | $21 \%$ |
|  |  |  |  |  | 2 | 2 |

Source: European Commission, Database on Women and Men in Decision-Making.
Note: Data are collected biannually and the second half of the year was used; data about number of women and men are not publicly available.

Less than 10 \% $\square$ $10 \%$ to $19 \%$ $20 \%$ to $29 \%$$30 \%$ to $39 \%$
$40 \%$ or more

### 3.3. Indicator on policies

Title: Policies to promote gender-balanced participation in economic decision-making

## Concept:

The indicator measures initiatives for improved gender balance in economic decision-making at Member States level, including the corporate sphere, central banks and social partner organisations. This indicator provides information on the measures implemented by the Member States (legislative regulation and other measures) and the impact of these measures on gender equality.

## Data source:

The data which could be used to assess the national policies to promote gender-balanced participation in economic decision-making, including in the corporate sphere, central banks and social partner organisations, are currently not collected in a coordinated way in the EU. However, information collected on an ad hoc basis and published in reports at EU level gives a comprehensive overview of the measures taken by Member States to achieve gender balance in corporate decision-making. In the future, data will be collected through a questionnaire distributed to all Member States to monitor the concept measured by the indicator.

## Data overview:

The current overview provides information on national policies in the corporate sphere only. Data are broken down into two types of initiatives: legislative regulation and other measures, such as corporate codes, charters and other non-legislative policies. The information also takes into account the type of companies to which these initiatives apply and, where possible, any sanctions for non-compliance.

The data from 2003 to 2014 on women and men as board members show slow but gradual progress. The proportion of women as members of the highest decision-making body of the largest nationally registered companies listed on the national stock exchange doubled from $9 \%$ in 2003 to $20 \%$ in 2014. This trend was noticeable from 2010 onwards, as discussed in Chapter 2. The proportion of women on boards saw a more substantial increase in Member States with quotas (EC, 2012e). For example, measures in Italy were responsible for a sharp increase in the number of women on boards (18 p.p.). A legislated target of $33 \%$ was implemented in July 2011 and subsequently the proportion of women on boards in Italy rose from $6 \%$ in 2011 , to $11 \%$ in $2012,15 \%$ in 2013 and $24 \%$ in 2015. France is another example where legislation has had a substantial impact on women's representation. A $40 \%$ quota for the underrepresented sex was introduced at the beginning of 2011 for the boards of large companies, to be achieved by 2017. Consequently, the proportion of women board members increased from $12 \%$ in 2010 to $32 \%$ in 2014.

Many other Member States have also resorted to legislative measures to establish quotas, or targets, for gender balance on company boards. Eleven Member States (BE, DK, DE, EL, ES, FR, IT, NL, AT, PL, PT, SI) currently have legislative measures, mostly applicable to state-owned companies.

Legislative initiatives could be more effective if complemented by additional measures such as sanctions, which some EU Member States have also adopted (for example BE, DE, FR, IT). In Belgium, sanctions include the loss of benefits by board members if the quota law is not respected. In Italy, sanctions become
progressively more serious if the imbalance is not rectified: first a warning, then a fine of EUR 100000 to EUR 1 million, which may be followed by forfeiture of the offices of the members of a board which does not comply with the quota. In France, non-compliant companies face nullification of their board elections and the suspension of the benefits attributed to the directors of the infringing companies (European Commission's Network to Promote Women in Decision-making in Politics and the Economy, 2011; EC, 2012c). In the newly adopted German law, boards have no choice but to appoint women or else face the 'empty-chair sanction' (Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend, 2015).

The majority of Member States with initiatives other than legal measures address gender equality on company boards by including clauses in their corporate governance codes (for example $\mathrm{BE}, \mathrm{DK}, \mathrm{DE}, \mathrm{ES}, \mathrm{FR}$, $\mathrm{LU}, \mathrm{NL}, \mathrm{AT}, \mathrm{PL}, \mathrm{FI}, \mathrm{SE}, \mathrm{UK}$ ). This strategy is sustained in a very different manner to legislated quotas: while quotas may imply sanctions for non-compliance, governance codes are self-enforced. 'Comply or explain' is an unwritten rule whereby pressure is applied to the companies, both internally by employees and externally by other stakeholders, compelling them to adhere to their proposals regarding gender diversity on boards. In the event of non-compliance, companies must then address the failure to comply in their annual report (European Commission's Network to Promote Women in Decision-making in Politics and the Economy, 2011).

A study commissioned by the European Commission on non-legislative initiatives for companies to promote gender equality in the workplace finds that the most common measures are as follows: labels, prizes and awards, charters, rankings and compendia of good practices (EC, 2010b). For example, in Slovenia, awards are given to companies with more than 50 employees in which women occupy at least one third of managerial and top decision-making positions. Slovenia has demonstrated a stable increase in the number of women in such positions over the last three years. Denmark and the Netherlands have charters to advance the role of women in top decision-making positions and both have seen considerable success in this regard (EC, 2010b). This new indictor is not only useful in measuring progress towards gender balance; it can also provide a useful, and more qualitative, insight into trends in economic decisionmaking.

Table 3.4 Measures promoting gender-balanced participation in corporate decision-making

| MS | Legislative | Other measures |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| BE | 33 \% quota for boards, applicable to state and publicly <br> listed companies. <br> Sanctions: loss of benefits by board members until <br> the board complies with the quota law. | Corporate governance code: recommends gender diversity <br> for all boards. <br> Creation of a pool of talented women ready to take up board <br> positions: Women on Board is a non-profit association <br> (initially supported by the government) to promote women's <br> access to directorship roles within Belgian enterprises. |
| BG | No | No |
| CZ | No | No |
| DK | Regulation to have an equal gender balance in public <br> boards and commissions, applicable to state-owned <br> companies (Equality Act); obligation for largest <br> companies to set voluntary targets for the proportion <br> of the underrepresented sex in the supreme <br> management body. | Corporate governance code: diversity clause covering <br> executives and non-executives. <br> Charter for the Promotion of Women Leaders: encourages <br> public and private companies to increase the share of women <br> managers at all levels. |
| DE | 3o quota for supervisory boards, applicable to the <br> biggest listed companies; a flexible quota to be <br> defined internally for other types of companies. <br> Sanctions: 'empty-chair sanction'. | Corporate governance code: supervisory boards of listed <br> companies should establish targets for their composition, <br> including 'appropriate <br> warticipation' <br> of |
| women on Board Index: information on women on boards, |  |  |,


| MS | Legislative | Other measures |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | contributing to the involvement of the public in the debate (created by FidAR). <br> The Genderdax: Top Unternehmen for hochqualifizierte Fraven (top companies for high-qualified women) lists companies that support the employment of women, especially in management positions. |
| EE | No | No |
| IE | No | Soft positive action measures in public sector employment. A target of $40 \%$ women in all state boards and committees. |
| EL | 33 \% quota for appointees to boards, applicable to state-owned (or partially state-owned) companies. | Soft positive action measures in public sector. |
| ES | Gender-balanced appointments in companies that are publically owned (where the state owns $50 \%$ or more of the social capital). Recommendations set a target of $40 \%$ minimum representation of the underrepresented sex on the management board and provide guidelines on how to reach this. This does not include sanctions. | The Good Governance Code for companies listed on the stock market establishes selection policies for board members and sets an objective for 2020: the number of women board members is to represent at least $30 \%$ of the total membership of representatives on the board. <br> Voluntary initiatives have been implemented to increase the presence of women as directors on the governing board as well as the management board. In 2014, 70 companies signed up to these pacts. Since 2013 the Ministry of Health, Social Services and Equality, in collaboration with the Spanish Confederation of Business Organisations, has run a programme to involve business in the recruitment and the promotion of female talent as well as the training and mentoring of talented women. |
| FR | 40 \% quota (by 2017) for boards, applicable to listed companies and companies with more than 500 employees or turnover/assets of more than EUR 50 million. Sanctions: an appointment of a board member that does not meet the gender criteria leads to the annulment of the appointment of the board member. | Corporate governance code: includes reference to board diversity in terms of gender. AFEP-MEDEF corporate code: recommendation containing same quotas as in the law, applicable to all board members. The Gender Equality Act 2014: companies will be excluded from bidding for public tenders if they do not prove they comply with gender-equality legislation. |
| HR | No | No |
| IT | $33 \%$ quota for management boards and supervisory boards, applicable to state-owned and listed companies. Sanctions are progressive: warning; fine; forfeiture of the offices of all members of the board. | No |
| CY | No | No |
| LV | No | Soft positive action measures in public sector employment. |
| LT | No | No |
| LU | No | Corporate governance code (2009): diversity clause recommending gender equality on company boards. DivBiz (Diversity in Business): network gathering together a number of key actors from the business world, including the ABBL (Luxembourg's association of bankers), with the goal of promoting gender diversity at all managerial-level positions within industrial and commercial companies. <br> The Positive Action programme was launched by the Ministry of Equal Opportunities as part of the national action plan. It contains recommendations for positive actions in the private and public sector aiming to promote equality between women and men in the workplace. <br> The Female Board Pool is a platform for contact between experienced and future women board members and corporations and organisations. The Female Board Pool is endorsed and financially supported by the Ministry of Equal |


| MS | Legislative | Other measures |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Opportunities in Luxembourg. |
| HU | No | Soft positive action measures in public sector. |
| MT | No | No |
| NL | 30 \% quota for boards (executive and supervisory), applicable to large companies (250 employees, listed and not listed). No sanctions, but failure to meet this legal target must be reported in the annual report. Measure is temporary, expires in 2016. | Corporate governance code: diversity clause covering gender equality on company boards. Voluntary charter with targets for more women in management. |
| AT | 35 \% quota (by 2018) for boards, applicable to stateowned companies; no sanctions apply. | Corporate governance code: recommends representation of both genders in appointments to supervisory boards. |
| PL | Regulation to 'choose adequately prepared members of supervisory boards, taking into account the balanced participation of women and men', applicable to state-owned companies (executive ordinance of Minister of State Treasury); no sanctions apply. The code of good practices establishes a target of $30 \%$ for 2015 and a priority rule for equally qualified women. | Corporate governance code: recommends listed companies to ensure a balanced gender representation in management and supervisory boards (executives and non-executives). |
| PT | Government resolution: obligation to adopt genderequality plans aiming to promote gender balance in management and executive positions, applicable to state-owned companies. | Government recommendation to adopt gender-equality plans aiming to promote gender balance in management and executive positions in listed companies. |
| RO | No | Soft positive action measures in public sector employment. |
| SI | $40 \%$ quota for nominating or appointing government representatives to boards, applicable to public enterprises and other public entities. No sanctions apply if the principle is not respected. | Managerkam prijazno podjetje (women-manager-friendly company): awards are given to companies with more than 50 employees where women represent at least one third of staff in managerial and top decision-making roles and show a trend of growth for the previous three years. <br> The management code for publicly traded companies (2009) emphasises diversity (gender, age and in general) in the composition of supervisory boards (comply-or-explain principle). <br> As one of the necessary steps to increase competitiveness, the Managers' Association of Slovenia, in its 'Commitment for the Successful Future 15/20' (2011), pointed to an increase in the share of women managers to $30 \%$ in 2015 and $40 \%$ in 2017. |
| SK | No | No |
| FI | Regulation to have an 'equitable proportion of women and men' on boards, applicable only to administrative boards and boards of directors which consist of elected representatives in companies in which the government or a municipality is the majority shareholder. | Corporate governance code: recommends that listed companies have guidelines for achieving balanced gender representation on boards. Issue included in government's equality policies. <br> Since 2004 the government has had numerical targets to reach a balanced representation of women and men on the boards of state-owned companies, included in the Government Action Plans for Gender Equality. On the boards of fully state-owned companies, the proportion of both women and men must be at least $40 \%$. The $40 \%$ goal also applies to the boards of state majority companies. With regard to the boards of companies where the government has a minority holding, the government aims to promote gender equality in the nomination process. The Finnish Chamber of Commerce has been organising mentoring programmes for women since 2012. |
| SE | No | Corporate governance code: voluntary goal of parity for listed companies. <br> Obligation to justify the final proposal regarding the |


| MS | Legislative | Other measures |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| UK | No | composition of the board. <br> Comply-or-explain mechanisms. |

Source: European Commission (Factsheets on Women on Boards, available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/womenonboards/wob-factsheet_2015-04_en.pdf; http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/womenonboards/factsheet-general-2_en.pdf; equality/files/gender_balance_decision_making/boardroom_factsheet_en.pdf; http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-
 workplace. Data were collected during the Luxembourg Presidency in 2015 and reviewed by HLG members.

## 4. Conclusions and recommendations

The Beijing Platform for Action seeks to ensure women's equal access to and full participation in power structures and decision-making and to increase women's capacity to participate in decision-making and leadership. The EU commitment to gender equality in decision-making is prominent at policy level and expressed in a number of strategic documents and actions.

Despite high political visibility, extensive debates and numerous targeted actions to address gender imbalances in decision-making since 2010, the rate of progress in most Member States is generally slow. Women make up nearly half of the workforce and account for more than $50 \%$ of tertiary-level graduates. Yet, as shown by EIGE's Gender Equality Index 2015, decision-making perpetuates the old pattern of unequal power relations in the EU-28, with only slight advances since 2005 (EIGE, 2015). This also means that the potential of many highly qualified and skilled women is being wasted.

The report has explored the progress of gender equality in decision-making positions across the political, economic and social spheres in the period between 2003 and 2014. Specifically, it reviewed and updated 18 indicators in political and economic decision-making endorsed by the Council in 1999, 2003 and 2008. In addition, three new indicators have been proposed (the final list of indicators is presented in Table 1 in the Annex). The report concludes that further active measures and strategies are important to reach the goal of gender equality in decision-making.

### 4.1. Conclusions

## Progress in women's representation is most pronounced in corporate boards

Since 2003, there has been a gradual increase in the proportion of women on executive boards of publicly listed companies in EU Member States overall (from $9 \%$ in 2003 to $20 \%$ in 2014), with a sharper increase observed since 2010. In the four years from 2010 to 2014, the share of women on boards increased in 23 out of 28 Member States. The most significant progress (above 10 percentage points) was concentrated in five countries ( $B E, D E, F R, I T, U K$ ).

Women's low representation on company boards can partly be explained by the relatively recent political pressure to resolve gender inequality in this area. Progress is seriously hampered by the persistence of gender-based stereotypes in corporate culture, which create barriers limiting women's access to leadership positions. Gender stereotypes and prejudices shape the way leadership and those holding positions of power are perceived and, as a consequence, leadership is commonly associated with men and masculinity. These perceptions are reflected within organisational and institutional culture, with formal and informal practices acting to the advantage of men.

Women's representation in political decision-making is steadily moving towards gender balance

Born out of the democratic need for equal representation, both policymakers and civil society have long sought to increase women's political representation. This commitment partially explains the relative success of women's higher representation in political versus economic decision-making. Women's average representation in national parliaments increased from $22 \%$ in 2003 to $28 \%$ in 2014. Regional
parliaments followed the overall national trend of steady progress, with women's representation increasing from $25 \%$ to $32 \%$. In 2014, women accounted for $32 \%$ of members of local assemblies.

The proportion of women among senior/junior ministers of national/federal governments increased marginally from $23 \%$ in 2003 to $27 \%$ in 2014. The share of women among the highest-level civil servants has also increased slightly. However, women's presence seems to be more pronounced at middle to high levels rather than at the highest level of public administration.

Despite a gradual increase in women's representation since 2003, men continue to dominate political decision-making in the EU, holding on average more than two thirds of all parliamentary seats and government positions. Member States' electoral systems, the culture of political parties and gate-keeping, and attitudes to gender equality in Member States are some of the main explanatory factors.

Men dominate portfolios and senior administrative positions in economy, infrastructure, defence, justice and foreign policy

Gender balance in political and economic decision-making is not only a question of adding women to the equation. Women's full participation in power structures and decision-making is stalled by the persistence of gender-based stereotypes, reinforcing horizontal and vertical segregation and the glass-ceiling effect.

The impact of stereotypes is apparent in the distribution of cabinet portfolios and senior administrative positions. Men are overrepresented in portfolios and top administrative posts related to economy, infrastructure and basic state functions, such as defence, justice and foreign policy. Women are concentrated in ministries ( $42 \%$ on average) working on socio-cultural issues (such as social affairs, labour, health, children, family, youth, the elderly, education and culture). The smallest increase within the political decision-making is seen in the percentage of women ministers who carry out basic state functions.

## Women exceeded 30 \% of decision-making posts in the European Parliament and European Commission

Women's representation in the European Parliament increased from $31 \%$ in 2003 to $37 \%$ in the 2014 elections ( $30 \%$ in the 2004 elections, $35 \%$ in the 2009 elections). While this represents steady progress towards a gender-equal European Parliament, only 13 Member States have at least $40 \%$ women MEPs in the current Parliament. In the European Commission, the percentage of women commissioners increased from $25 \%$ in 2003 to $32 \%$ in 2014 ( $28 \%$ in 2004, $30 \%$ in 2009).

Women's opportunities to be elected to national parliaments and/or the European Parliament strongly depend on national electoral systems, the existence of legislated or voluntary party quotas and their implementation. Political parties can either facilitate or hinder women's opportunities by determining the order of electoral lists, short lists for constituencies, party structures and codes of conduct. The culture of political parties impacts on the ways in which women are involved and participate in political processes.

While the representation of women in the national top judicial positions is approaching gender balance, progress at the EU level has stalled

Remarkable progress has been made in women's representation in top-level judicial posts in the EU Member States. Across the EU, the proportion of women among members of Supreme Courts has
increased from an average of $19 \%$ in 2003 to $37 \%$ in 2014. In addition, in 2014 women occupied the position of Supreme Court president in eight Member States.

However, the general picture masks individual variations among Member States. While women and men are equally represented in top judicial positions in six Member States (FR, HR, LV, LU, HU, SK), and women exceed $60 \%$ representation in Bulgaria and Romania, they are virtually absent in top-level positions in Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom (less than $15 \%$ ). Such absence may hinder fair and well-informed judgement, in particular in institutions such as the European Court of Justice and the General Court, where in 2014 women's representation was $18 \%$ and $21 \%$ respectively.

## Men dominate the governance of the European and national Central Banks

During the period 2003-2014, men occupied the majority of the top decision-making positions in national Central Banks. Only three women held the position of governor and the proportion of women as vicegovernors has not exceeded $20 \%$. Women's share in decision-making bodies increased only fractionally over the period, from $17 \%$ in 2003 to $18 \%$ in 2014.

Women's overall representation in financial decision-making at European level is even lower. The highest position, the president of the European Central Bank (ECB), was consistently occupied by men, and women's membership of the decision-making body remained below $10 \%$.

The European Parliament has called, in a number of resolutions, for more women in governing positions in the Central Banks and financial institutions in Member States, while also noting its concern about the absence of women on the ECB's executive board $\left({ }^{19}\right)$.

The higher the decision-making position, the lower the proportion of women in these positions

Women are less likely to occupy the highest-level positions across all areas. For example, in public administration, women are less likely to be in the highest, rather than second-tier, positions. In politics, women are more often deputy leaders than leaders of political parties. In economic decision-making, women are very seldom CEOs, presidents, governors or deputy/vice-governors of the highest decisionmaking bodies of the largest registered companies and Central Banks, but generally feature among the members of boards. The same pattern is also visible in social decision-making among academic staff of universities and research institutions, sports confederations and decision-making bodies of media organisations. Drawing on the data in this report, this trend could even be said to be deepening, as the representation of women is growing faster in lower-level positions.

Invisible barriers (often referred to as the 'glass ceiling') usually allow women to progress to a certain point in their careers, yet the highest positions are seemingly out of reach for many women. Social structures, gender roles, prejudices and stereotypes are part of these invisible barriers.

## Political and regulatory pressure accelerates progress in gender-balanced representation

The majority of Member States have expressed strong commitments and adopted positive actions, such as legislative and/or voluntary quotas or targets, and supplementary measures to promote women in the area of political representation. Member States that implemented binding and voluntary quotas had, on average, $29 \%$ of women in their national parliaments in 2014, an increase of 10 percentage points since
2003. The presence of legislated and voluntary quotas signals a commitment by both the government and party elites to minimise the democratic deficit and promote gender equality.

In the last few years, measures applied by Member states and tailored EU-level initiatives - such as the proposed directive on improving the gender balance among non-executive board directors (COM(2012) 614 final) - have contributed to a marked improvement in women's access to leadership positions in the corporate sector in the EU. The most significant improvements took place in countries that have launched or considered legislative action (e.g. FR, NL, IT) or which have had an extensive public debate on gender balance in corporate boards (e.g. DE, UK).

## Monitoring change in social decision-making calls for higher-quality data at EU level

Measuring the extent of change in decision-making in research, media or sports is hampered by the absence of suitable indicators at EU level. Sex-disaggregated data that are harmonised and comparable across all Member States are not available.

The Strategy for Equality between Women and Men 2010-2015 emphasises the potential benefits of increasing women's participation in science and research and the need for women to occupy at least a quarter of leading positions in the public research sector. In the area of gender equality in sport, the European Commission's Proposal for Strategic Actions 2014-2020 calls for women and men to occupy respectively a minimum of $40 \%$ of positions on the executive boards and committees of national sport governing bodies by 2020, and $30 \%$ of positions in international sports organisations located in Europe $\left({ }^{20}\right)$. Monitoring the situation and verifying trends requires new indicators and the collection of harmonised and comparable sex-disaggregated data on decision-making in research, media and sports at EU level.

### 4.2. Recommendations

On the basis of the main findings of this report, the following recommendations can be made:

## Promote legislative initiatives and targeted measures

Promoting gender equality in decision-making is a complex task and the challenges involved are very different in each Member State. While binding legal or voluntary measures implemented by political parties, and more recently by corporate boards, are found to increase women's inclusion in decisionmaking, progress would be consolidated by a wider array of targeted incentives, such as public debate, training, mentoring schemes, and more transparent recruitment and promotion practices. Progress can be further aided by monitoring the situation and exchanging good practices among Member States.

Strengthen public debate and policy initiatives on gender equality in decision-making in other domains

The underrepresentation of women in decision-making is a reality in all areas of public life. Whereas the topic of gender balance in the political and economic sectors is regularly present on the policy agenda, the overrepresentation of men in decision-making in other areas, such as sports, media or research, requires more visibility and action, not least because of the symbolic and educational importance of these fields and their powerful role in shaping public opinion and perceptions.

## Call for institutional change in the corporate sector

In addition to efforts at the EU and Member State levels, companies must also engage in activities to create more opportunities for women's advancement in decision-making. The reluctance to appoint women candidates to board positions, often rooted in a supply-side argument on the lack of qualified women candidates or their different career choices, needs to be addressed. Furthermore, corporate culture - characterised by long hours and physical presence, prevailing leadership styles, and lack of transparency in recruitment and promotion practices - are issues requiring transformative solutions. Improving the gender balance on company boards can also lead to more effective corporate governance and better financial performance.

## Accelerate progress in work-life balance for women and men

According to the Gender Equality Index 2015, use of time represents one of the biggest gender gaps in the EU (EIGE, 2015). The amount of time women and men spend on activities outside the labour market differs greatly, with women still shouldering the bulk of care and domestic work. Family-friendly policies and transformative measures supporting a more equal distribution of caring and domestic responsibilities between women and men are prerequisites for future improvement. Adequate provision of employment that supports a work-life balance, and the establishment of childcare structures in line with the Barcelona targets, might accelerate progress and enable more women to enter top-level decision-making.

Fight gender stereotypes in all policy areas
Progress in gender equality in power and decision-making is hindered by the persistence of gender-based norms, prejudices and stereotypes. The effect of legislative and targeted measures could be further reinforced by efforts to increase public awareness and combat gender stereotypes and prescriptive gender roles. Eradicating gender stereotypes will help eliminate barriers that limit women's access to leadership positions. A gender-sensitive perspective and attention to gender stereotypes should therefore be integrated into all policies and organisational practices.

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## Endnotes

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## Annex

Table 1. List of indicators developed under area G:

| Currently agreed indicato | Modification |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Title of the indicator based on the latest Council Conclusions (year) | Proposal | Final list of the indicators | Definitions**** |
| I set of indicators: Indicators developed in 1999*, reviewed 2008** |  |  |  |
| 1. The proportion of women in the single/lower houses of the national/federal Parliaments of the Member States and in the European Parliament (2008) | No changes | 1. The proportion of women in the single/lower houses of the national/federal Parliaments of the Member States and in the European Parliament | Organisations covered: National parliaments (single/lower houses only). See mapping table for a list of organisations covered in each country from here. <br> Positions covered: members of national parliament (count includes the president) <br> Organisations covered: European Parliament. <br> Positions covered: members of European Parliament (count includes the president). |
| 2. The proportion of women in the regional Parliaments of the Member States, where appropriate (2008) | Wording | 2. The proportion of women in the regional assemblies of the Member States, where appropriate | Organisations covered: representative assemblies of regional authorities that are endowed with selfgovernment. Regional authorities are territorial authorities between the central government and local authorities but this does not necessarily imply a hierarchical relationship between regional and local authorities. Regional authorities are not applicable in all countries. See mapping table for a list of regions and organisations covered in each country here. <br> Positions covered: members (count includes the president). |
| 3. The proportion of women in the local assemblies in the Member States (2008) | Linguistic | 3. The proportion of women in the local assemblies of the Member States | Organisations covered: lowest level of administrative subdivision where representatives are elected - generally municipalities. In most countries all municipalities or their equivalents are covered. The exception is in countries where there are two systems depending on the size of the municipality (Cyprus, Portugal), in which case only the larger system is covered. See mapping table for a list of organisations covered in each country here. <br> Positions covered: members of the municipal council or its equivalent. |
| 4. Policies to promote a balanced participation in political elections (2008) | Linguistic | 4. Policies to promote balanced participation in political elections | Following policies should be taken account: policies and measures to promote a balanced participation between women and men in legislative/elective political institutions at the national/federal, regional, and local level in each |


| Currently agreed indicators. Title of the indicator based on the latest Council Conclusions (year) | Modification |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Proposal | Final list of the indicators | Definitions**** |
|  |  |  | Member State and in the European Parliament including constitution, legislation, Government's plans of action as well as other appropriate measures taken by the Government and the respective policies and measures taken by the Europe and institutions. |
| 5. The proportion of women among the members of the national/federal governments and the proportion of women among members of the European Commission (2008) | Linguistic/ adjusted (number added) | 5. The proportion and number of women among the members of the national/federal governments of the Member States and the proportion of women among members of the European Commission | Organisations covered: national governments. See mapping table for a list of organisations covered in each country here. <br> Positions covered: senior ministers-members of the government who have a seat on the cabinet or council of ministers (including the prime minister); junior ministersmembers of the government who do not have a seat on the cabinet. See mapping table for a list of positions covered at each level here. <br> Organisations covered: European Commission: college of Commissioners of the European Commission. <br> Positions covered: Commissioners (president is included in the total count). |
| 6. The number of women and men among senior/junior ministers in the different fields of action (portfolios/ministries) of the national/federal governments of the Member States (2008) | Adjusted (proportion added) | 6. The proportion and number of women and men among senior/junior ministers in the different fields of action (portfolios/ministries by BEIS type) of the national/federal governments of the Member States | Organisations covered: national governments. See mapping table for a list of organisations covered in each country here. <br> Positions covered: senior ministers-members of the government who have a seat on the cabinet or council of ministers; junior ministers-members of the government who do not have a seat on the cabinet. See mapping table for a list of positions covered at each level here. <br> BEIS typology: B = Basic functions; E = Economy; I = Infrastructure; S = Socio-cultural functions. |
|  | To measure the share of women and men among the leaders of major political parties at the level of Member States a new indicator is proposed. | 7. The proportion and number of women and men among the leaders and deputy leaders of major political parties in Member States | Organisations covered: Major political parties-those with at least $5 \%$ of seats in the national parliament (either of the upper or lower houses in case of a bicameral system). See mapping table for a list of organisations covered in each country from here. <br> Positions covered: Party leader(s) and deputy leader(s):. In the case that a party is governed by a group then the chair and deputy chair of the committee/group/board are counted. |
| 7. The proportion of the highest | Numbering/wording/linguistic | 8. The proportion of women among the | Organisations covered: ministries or government |


| Currently agreed indicators. <br> Title of the indicator based on the latest Council Conclusions (year) | Modification |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Proposal | Final list of the indicators | Definitions**** |
| ranking civil servants who are women (2008) |  | highest-ranking civil servants in the Member States | departments at national level. See mapping table for a detailed breakdown by function and by country here. <br> Positions covered: level 1 administrators-highest level of administrative (non-political) positions within each ministry; level 2 administrators-second level of administrative (non-political) positions within each ministry. See mapping table for a list of positions covered at each level here. |
| 8. The distribution of the highest ranking women civil servants in different fields of action (2008) | Numbering/wording/linguistic | 9. The distribution of the highest-ranking women and men civil servants in the different fields of action (portfolios/ministries by BEIS type) in the Member States | Organisations covered: ministries or government departments at national level. See mapping table for a detailed breakdown by function and by country here. <br> Positions covered: level 1 administrators-highest level of administrative (non-political) positions within each ministry; level 2 administrators-second level of administrative (non-political) positions within each ministry. See mapping table for a list of positions covered at each level here. <br> BEIS typology: $\mathrm{B}=$ Basic functions; $\mathrm{E}=$ Economy; $\mathrm{I}=$ Infrastructure; S = Socio-cultural functions. |
| 9. The proportion of women among the members of the Supreme Courts of the Member States and the proportion of women among the members of the European Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance (2008) | Numbering/wording/linguistic | 10. The proportion and number of women among the members of the Supreme Courts of the Member States and the proportion and number of women among the members of the European Court of Justice and the General Court | Organisations covered: Supreme Courts: the highest judicial body in each country in the domain of civil and penal jurisdiction. In some cases the supreme court also takes responsibility for administrative and/or constitutional jurisdiction. See mapping table for a list of organisations covered in each country from here. Courts and tribunals established at European level with jurisdiction across the European Union: European Court of Justice and General Court. <br> Positions covered: Judges (count of members includes the president). <br> Members: Judges (count of members includes the president). |
| Il set of indicators: Indicators developed in 2003*** |  |  |  |
| 1. The proportion and number of women and men among Governors and deputy/vice-governors of the Central Banks (2003) | Numbering/wording/adjusted (EU level added) | 11. The proportion and number of women and men among governors and deputy/vice-governors of the Central Banks of the Member States and the President of the European Central Bank | Organisations covered: Central Banks of the Member States. See detailed definition here. <br> Positions covered: Governor; Deputy/Vice-governors Organisations covered: European Central Bank (ECB). See detailed definition here. |


| Currently agreed indicators. Title of the indicator based on the latest Council Conclusions (year) | Modification |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Proposal | Final list of the indicators | Definitions**** |
|  |  |  | Positions covered: President |
| 2. The proportion and number of women and men among members of the decision-making bodies of the Central Banks (2003) | Numbering/wording/adjusted (EU level added) | 12. The proportion and number of women and men among members of the decisionmaking bodies of the Central Banks of the Member States and of the European Central Bank | Organisations covered: Central Banks of the Member States. See detailed definition here. <br> Positions covered: members of all key decision-making bodies. See mapping table for a list of decision-making bodies within central banks covered in each country here. <br> Organisations covered: European Central Bank (ECB). See detailed definition here. <br> Positions covered: Members of the governing council |
| 3. The proportion and number of women and men among ministers and deputy ministers/vice-ministers of the Economic Ministries (2003) | While economy ministries are already covered under indicators measuring political power, it is proposed to drop as separated indicator to avoid unnecessary duplications. |  |  |
| 4. The proportion and number of women and men among presidents and vice-presidents of the Labour Confederations (2003) | Numbering/wording/adjusted (EU level added) | 13. The proportion and number of women and men among presidents and vicepresidents of social partner organisations representing workers at national level and at European level | Organisations covered: social partners representing workers at national level: labour federations, trade unions and similar bodies that are not affiliated to any higher authority and which represent workers in national-level negotiations with government and/or employers. See detailed definition here. See mapping table for a list of organisations covered in each country here. <br> Positions covered: President-highest governing position or chairperson of highest decision-making body and Deputy/vice-presidents-deputy of the person holding the highest governing position. <br> Organisations covered: social partners representing workers at European level: trade union organisations at EU level which engage in the European social dialogue - i.e. discussions, consultations, negotiations and joint actions taking place between employers and trade unions at European level as well as between them and EU institutions. <br> Positions covered: President-Head of highest decisionmaking body. |
| 5. The proportion and number of women and men among members of total governing bodies of the Labour Confederations (2003) | Numbering/wording/adjusted (EU level added) | 14. The proportion and number of women and men among members of the highest decision-making bodies of social partner organisations representing workers at | Organisations covered: social partners representing workers at national level: labour federations, trade unions and similar bodies that are not affiliated to any higher authority and which represent workers in national-level |


|  | Modification |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Title of the indicator based on the latest Council Conclusions (year) | Proposal | Final list of the indicators | Definitions**** |
|  |  | national level and at European level | negotiations with government and/or employers. See detailed definition here. See mapping table for a list of organisations covered in each country here. <br> Positions covered: members of highest decision-making body (count includes, where present, the president(s), vicepresident(s) and executive head(s)). <br> Organisations covered: social partners representing workers at European level: trade union organisations at EU level which engage in the European social dialogue - i.e. discussions, consultations, negotiations and joint actions taking place between employers and trade unions at European level as well as between them and EU institutions. <br> Positions covered: members of highest decision-making body (count includes the president). |
| 6. The proportion and number of women and men among presidents and vice-presidents of the Employer Confederations (2003) | Numbering/wording/adjusted (EU level added) | 15. The proportion and number of women and men among presidents and vicepresidents of social partner organisations representing employers at national level and at European level | Organisations covered: social partners representing employers at national level: employer's confederations, federations and other bodies that have a national scope, are not affiliated to any other higher-level organisation at national level and are either involved regularly in crossindustry collective bargaining or employment regulation; or that are involved in bipartite/tripartite consultations on cross-industry labour market and industrial relations issues. See detailed definition here. See mapping table for a list of organisations covered in each country here. <br> Positions covered: President-highest governing position or chairperson of highest decision-making body and Deputy/vice-presidents-deputy of the person holding the highest governing position. <br> Organisations covered: employer organisations at EU level which engage in the European social dialogue - i.e. discussions, consultations, negotiations and joint actions taking place between employers and trade unions at European level as well as between them and EU institutions. <br> Positions covered: President-Head of highest decisionmaking body. |
| 7. The proportion and number of | Numbering/wording/adjusted (EU level | 16. The proportion and number of women | Organisations covered: social partners representing |


| Currently agreed indicators. <br> Title of the indicator based on the latest Council Conclusions (year) | Modification |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Proposal | Final list of the indicators | Definitions**** |
| women and men among members of total governing bodies of the Employer Confederations (2003) | added) | and men among members of the highest decision-making bodies of social partner organisations representing employers at national level and at European level | employers at national level: employer's confederations, federations and other bodies that have a national scope, are not affiliated to any other higher-level organisation at national level and are either involved regularly in crossindustry collective bargaining or employment regulation; or that are involved in bipartite/tripartite consultations on cross-industry labour market and industrial relations issues. See detailed definition here. See mapping table for a list of organisations covered in each country here. <br> Positions covered: members of highest decision-making body (count includes, where present, the president(s), vicepresident(s) and executive head(s)). <br> Organisations covered: employer organisations at EU level which engage in the European social dialogue - i.e. discussions, consultations, negotiations and joint actions taking place between employers and trade unions at European level as well as between them and EU institutions. <br> Positions covered: members of highest decision-making body (count includes the president). |
| 8. The proportion and number of women and men among chiefs of executive boards of the top 50 firms publicly quoted on the national stock exchange (2003) | Numbering /wording to be consistent with data collection/ definitions in database | 17. The proportion and number of women and men among presidents and chief executive officers (CEO) of the largest nationally registered companies listed on the national stock exchange | Organisations covered: companies covered are the nationally registered constituents (max.50) of the main blue-chip index of the national stock exchange in each country. See detailed definition here. <br> Positions covered: President: Chairperson of the highest decision-making body in each company. The highest decision-making body is usually termed the supervisory board (in case of a two-tier governance system) or the board of directors (in a unitary system). CEO: Chief Executive Officer or equivalent position. |
| 9. The proportion and number of women and men among members of executive boards of the top 50 firms publicly quoted on the national stock exchange (2003) | Numbering /wording to be consistent with data collection/ definitions in database | 18. The proportion and number of women and men among members of the highest decision-making body of the largest nationally registered companies listed on the national stock exchange | Organisations covered: companies covered are the nationally registered constituents (max.50) of the main blue-chip index of the national stock exchange in each country. See detailed definition here. Positions covered: all members of the highest decision-making body in each company (i.e. chairperson, non-executive directors, senior executives and employee representatives, where present). The highest decision-making body is usually termed the |


| Currently agreed indicators. <br> Title of the indicator based on the latest Council Conclusions (year) | Modification |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Proposal | Final list of the indicators | Definitions**** |
|  |  |  | supervisory board (in case of a two-tier governance system) or the board of directors (in a unitary system). |
|  | To serve to differentiate between executives and non-executives functions new indicator is proposed. It could be useful for follow-up of implementation of legislative and voluntary measures on the topic, even if data collection covers only a sample of companies. However, the sample is statistically relevant. Data has already been collected since 2012. | 19. The proportion and number of women and men among executive and nonexecutive members of the two highest decision-making bodies of the largest nationally registered companies listed on the national stock exchange | Organisations covered: companies covered are the nationally registered constituents (max.50) of the main blue-chip index of the national stock exchange in each country. See detailed definition here. Positions covered: senior executives and non-executive directors in the two highest decision-making bodies in each company. The two highest decision-making bodies are usually referred to as the supervisory board and the management board (in case of a two-tier governance system) and the board of directors and executive/management committee (in a unitary system). Note: any individual who sits in both decisionmaking bodies of a particular company is counted only once and employee representatives are not counted at all. |
|  | To measure initiatives for gender balance in economic decision-making, enumerating the relevant measures, new indicator is proposed. | 20. Policies to promote gender balance in economic decision-making positions | Following type of initiatives should be taken account: legislative regulation and other measures - such as corporate codes, charters and other non-legislative policies. The information should also take into account the type of companies to which these initiatives apply and if possible, any sanctions for non-compliance. |

Note: * Council conclusions 1999 are available at: http://register.consilium.europa.ev/doc/srv?l=EN\&f=ST\ 11862\ 1999\ INIT; Council Conclusions 2008 are available at:
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN\&f=ST\ 9670\ 2008\ INIT; *** Council Conclusions 2003 are available at:
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/vedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/lsa/78152.pdf; **** on-line mapping tables refer to the latest data collection, organisations can change over time. methodology of the database on Women and men in decision-making is available at: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/database/wmid_methodology_jul_2015.pdf and definitions/explanations on what is covered by the data are also given on the database web pages
Source: European Commission, Database Women and men in decision-making

Table 2. The proportion of women in the single/lower houses of the national/federal Parliaments of the Member States, 2003-2014

| MS | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| BE | $36 \%$ | 35 \% | 35 \% | $36 \%$ | 35 \% | 37 \% | 39 \% | $40 \%$ | $40 \%$ | $40 \%$ | $40 \%$ | $38 \%$ |
| BG | $26 \%$ | $28 \%$ | 21 \% | 21 \% | 22 \% | 22 \% | 22 \% | 22 \% | 22 \% | 23 \% | 25 \% | 20\% |
| CZ | : | $15 \%$ | $16 \%$ | $16 \%$ | $15 \%$ | $16 \%$ | $18 \%$ | 22 \% | 22 \% | 22 \% | $20 \%$ | $20 \%$ |
| DK | $38 \%$ | $38 \%$ | $40 \%$ | $39 \%$ | $37 \%$ | $38 \%$ | $38 \%$ | $38 \%$ | $39 \%$ | $41 \%$ | $38 \%$ | $39 \%$ |
| DE | 32 \% | $33 \%$ | 31 \% | 33 \% | $33 \%$ | $32 \%$ | 33 \% | 33 \% | 33 \% | 33 \% | $36 \%$ | $36 \%$ |
| EE | $17 \%$ | $15 \%$ | $18 \%$ | $19 \%$ | 21 \% | 21 \% | 22 \% | 23 \% | 20 \% | 21 \% | $18 \%$ | $20 \%$ |
| IE | $13 \%$ | 12 \% | $13 \%$ | 12 \% | $13 \%$ | $13 \%$ | $14 \%$ | $14 \%$ | $15 \%$ | $15 \%$ | $16 \%$ | $16 \%$ |
| EL | 9\% | $13 \%$ | $13 \%$ | $13 \%$ | $14 \%$ | $16 \%$ | $17 \%$ | $17 \%$ | $17 \%$ | 21 \% | 21 \% | 21 \% |
| ES | $31 \%$ | $36 \%$ | $36 \%$ | $36 \%$ | $37 \%$ | $35 \%$ | $36 \%$ | $37 \%$ | $29 \%$ | $39 \%$ | $40 \%$ | $41 \%$ |
| FR | 12 \% | $13 \%$ | $15 \%$ | $13 \%$ | $18 \%$ | 19\% | $19 \%$ | $19 \%$ | $19 \%$ | 26 \% | $26 \%$ | $26 \%$ |
| HR | : | : | : | : | 21 \% | 22 \% | $24 \%$ | $25 \%$ | 25 \% | 26 \% | $24 \%$ | $26 \%$ |
| IT | $12 \%$ | $12 \%$ | 12 \% | $17 \%$ | $17 \%$ | 21 \% | 21 \% | 21 \% | 21 \% | 21 \% | 31 \% | 31 \% |
| CY | 11 \% | 9\% | $16 \%$ | $16 \%$ | $16 \%$ | $16 \%$ | $13 \%$ | $13 \%$ | 11 \% | 11 \% | $14 \%$ | $14 \%$ |
| LV | $20 \%$ | $17 \%$ | 21 \% | $19 \%$ | $20 \%$ | 21 \% | 22 \% | $19 \%$ | 21 \% | 23 \% | 25 \% | $18 \%$ |
| LT | : | 22 \% | 23 \% | 22 \% | 23 \% | 23 \% | $19 \%$ | $19 \%$ | $19 \%$ | 24 \% | $24 \%$ | $24 \%$ |
| LU | $20 \%$ | $24 \%$ | 21 \% | 24 \% | 25 \% | 25 \% | 20 \% | 20 \% | 24 \% | 23 \% | 23 \% | 28 \% |
| HU | $10 \%$ | 9\% | 9\% | 10 \% | 11 \% | 11 \% | 11 \% | 9\% | 9\% | 9\% | 9\% | $10 \%$ |
| MT | : | 9\% | 9\% | 9\% | 9\% | 9\% | 9\% | 9\% | 9\% | 9 \% | 14 \% | $13 \%$ |
| NL | $38 \%$ | $40 \%$ | 39 \% | $38 \%$ | 39 \% | $41 \%$ | $42 \%$ | $41 \%$ | 41 \% | 39 \% | $38 \%$ | 37 \% |
| AT | $34 \%$ | $32 \%$ | 33 \% | 31 \% | 32 \% | 31 \% | $27 \%$ | 28 \% | 27 \% | 28 \% | 33 \% | 31 \% |
| PL | : | 21 \% | 21 \% | $19 \%$ | 20 \% | 20\% | 20\% | 20\% | 24 \% | 24 \% | 24 \% | 24 \% |
| PT | 21 \% | $20 \%$ | 25 \% | 25\% | $29 \%$ | 29\% | $30 \%$ | $30 \%$ | 29\% | $29 \%$ | 31 \% | 31 \% |
| RO | 11 \% | 11 \% | 11 \% | 11 \% | 9\% | $10 \%$ | 11 \% | 11 \% | $11 \%$ | 12 \% | $14 \%$ | $14 \%$ |
| SI | $13 \%$ | 13 \% | 13 \% | 13 \% | 12 \% | $13 \%$ | 16 \% | 16 \% | 17 \% | $38 \%$ | 33 \% | $38 \%$ |
| SK | $19 \%$ | $17 \%$ | $17 \%$ | 21 \% | $19 \%$ | 19\% | $18 \%$ | $16 \%$ | $16 \%$ | $19 \%$ | $19 \%$ | $20 \%$ |
| FI | 37 \% | $38 \%$ | $38 \%$ | $38 \%$ | $42 \%$ | 41 \% | $40 \%$ | $40 \%$ | $43 \%$ | $43 \%$ | $43 \%$ | $42 \%$ |
| SE | $45 \%$ | $48 \%$ | $49 \%$ | $47 \%$ | $47 \%$ | $46 \%$ | $46 \%$ | $46 \%$ | $45 \%$ | $44 \%$ | $44 \%$ | $44 \%$ |
| UK | $18 \%$ | $18 \%$ | 20\% | 20 \% | 20\% | $19 \%$ | 20 \% | 22 \% | 22 \% | 22 \% | $23 \%$ | $23 \%$ |
| EU-28 | 22 \% | 22 \% | 23 \% | 23 \% | 24 \% | 24 \% | 24 \% | 24 \% | 24 \% | 26 \% | 27 \% | 28 \% |

Source: European Commission, Database Women and men in decision-making
Note: For quarterly data, $4^{\text {th }}$ quarter was used; ':' indicates data were not available
Less than 10 \%
From $10 \%$ to $19 \% \quad$ From $20 \%$ to $29 \%$
From 30 \% to 39 \% $\square$ $40 \%$ and more

Table 3. The proportion of women in the European Parliament, 2003-2014

| Member States | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| BE | : | : | : | : | : | : | $36 \%$ | $36 \%$ | $36 \%$ | $36 \%$ | $32 \%$ | $24 \%$ |
| BG | : | : | : | : | : | : | 35 \% | $35 \%$ | 35 \% | $33 \%$ | 39 \% | $31 \%$ |
| CZ | : | : | : | : | : | : | 18 \% | 18 \% | 18 \% | 18 \% | 18 \% | 24 \% |
| DK | : | : | : | : | : | : | $46 \%$ | $46 \%$ | $46 \%$ | $46 \%$ | $46 \%$ | $38 \%$ |
| DE | : | : | : | : | : | : | $36 \%$ | $37 \%$ | $37 \%$ | $38 \%$ | $39 \%$ | $36 \%$ |
| EE | : | : | : | : | : | : | 50 \% | 50 \% | 50 \% | 50 \% | 50 \% | 50 \% |
| IE | : | : | : | : | : | : | 25\% | 25\% | $33 \%$ | 42 \% | 42 \% | 55\% |
| EL | : | : | : | : | : | : | 32 \% | 32 \% | 32 \% | 32 \% | 32 \% | 24 \% |
| ES | : | : | : | : | : | : | $36 \%$ | $34 \%$ | $36 \%$ | 41 \% | $39 \%$ | 43\% |
| FR | : | : | : | : | : | : | $46 \%$ | $47 \%$ | $46 \%$ | $46 \%$ | 46\% | 42 \% |
| HR | : | : | : | : | : | : | : | : | : | : | 50 \% | 45\% |
| IT | : | : | : | : | : | : | 22 \% | 22 \% | 22 \% | 22 \% | 23\% | $40 \%$ |
| CY | : | : | : | : | : | : | $33 \%$ | $33 \%$ | $33 \%$ | $33 \%$ | $33 \%$ | $17 \%$ |
| LV | : | : | : | : | : | : | $38 \%$ | $38 \%$ | $38 \%$ | 33 \% | $33 \%$ | 50 \% |
| LT | : | : | : | : | : | : | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 27\% | $33 \%$ | $9 \%$ |
| LU | : | : | : | : | : | : | $17 \%$ | $17 \%$ | $17 \%$ | $17 \%$ | $17 \%$ | $33 \%$ |
| HU | : | : | : | : | : | : | $36 \%$ | $36 \%$ | $36 \%$ | $36 \%$ | $36 \%$ | 19\% |
| MT | : | : | : | : | : | : | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 50 \% | $67 \%$ |
| NL | : | : | : | : | : | : | $48 \%$ | 44 \% | 44 \% | 46\% | 46\% | 42 \% |
| AT | : | : | : | : | : | : | 41\% | 41\% | 35 \% | 32 \% | 32 \% | 44 \% |
| PL | : | : | : | : | : | : | 22 \% | 22 \% | 22 \% | 22 \% | 22 \% | 24 \% |
| PT | : | : | : | : | : | : | $36 \%$ | $36 \%$ | $36 \%$ | 41 \% | 41 \% | $38 \%$ |
| RO | : | : | : | : | : | : | $36 \%$ | $36 \%$ | $36 \%$ | $36 \%$ | $33 \%$ | $28 \%$ |
| SI | : | : | : | : | : | : | 29\% | 29\% | 43\% | 50 \% | 50 \% | $38 \%$ |
| SK | : | : | : | : | : | : | $38 \%$ | $38 \%$ | $38 \%$ | $38 \%$ | $38 \%$ | $31 \%$ |
| FI | : | : | : | : | : | : | 62 \% | 62 \% | 62 \% | 62 \% | 62 \% | 54 \% |
| SE | : | : | : | : | : | : | $56 \%$ | 56 \% | 44 \% | 45\% | 45\% | 55 \% |
| UK | : | : | : | : | : | : | 35\% | $32 \%$ | $32 \%$ | $32 \%$ | $32 \%$ | 41 \% |
| EU-28 | $31 \%$ | $30 \%$ | 28 \% | 31 \% | $31 \%$ | 31 \% | 35\% | 35\% | $35 \%$ | $35 \%$ | $36 \%$ | $37 \%$ |

Source: European Commission, Database Women and men in decision-making
Note: For quarterly data, $4^{\text {th }}$ quarter was used; ' $:$ ' indicates data were not available
Less than 10 \%
From $10 \%$ to $19 \%$
From $20 \%$ to $29 \%$
From 30 \% to $39 \%$ $\square$ $40 \%$ and more

Table 4. The proportion of women in the regional assemblies of the Member States, where appropriate, 20032014

| Member States | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| BE | 24\% | $31 \%$ | 32 \% | 32 \% | 32 \% | $30 \%$ | 40\% | 40\% | 40\% | 39 \% | 41\% | $42 \%$ |
| BG | : | : | - | : | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| CZ | : | $14 \%$ | - | 15\% | $16 \%$ | 16 \% | 18 \% | $18 \%$ | 17\% | 19\% | 20\% | 19\% |
| DK | $30 \%$ | : | - | : | 33 \% | 33 \% | 34\% | $34 \%$ | $34 \%$ | $34 \%$ | 35 \% | $39 \%$ |
| DE | $27 \%$ | $31 \%$ | 32 \% | 32 \% | 31 \% | $31 \%$ | 32 \% | 32 \% | 33 \% | 32 \% | 32 \% | $32 \%$ |
| EE | - | : | - | : | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| IE | 11\% | 11\% | - | : | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| EL | - | $18 \%$ | $18 \%$ | 19\% | 21 \% | 21 \% | 21 \% | 21 \% | 17\% | 17\% | $18 \%$ | 17\% |
| ES | 23 \% | $37 \%$ | $38 \%$ | $38 \%$ | 40\% | $42 \%$ | $42 \%$ | $42 \%$ | 43\% | $42 \%$ | $42 \%$ | $43 \%$ |
| FR | $26 \%$ | $48 \%$ | $48 \%$ | 49\% | 48\% | 49\% | 49\% | $48 \%$ | $48 \%$ | $48 \%$ | 49\% | $49 \%$ |
| HR | - | - | - | - | 18 \% | 17\% | 25\% | 24 \% | 25\% | 24 \% | 22 \% | 22 \% |
| IT | 10 \% | 10 \% | 11 \% | 12 \% | 12 \% | 11 \% | 11 \% | 12 \% | 12 \% | $13 \%$ | 15\% | $16 \%$ |
| CY | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| LV | - | : | - | : | 34 \% | 33 \% | 20\% | 21 \% | 21 \% | 23\% | 26 \% | $26 \%$ |
| LT | : | : | - | : | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| LU | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| HU | 13\% | 13\% | 13\% | 12 \% | 12 \% | 12 \% | 13\% | 13\% | 10\% | $9 \%$ | $11 \%$ | $11 \%$ |
| MT | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| NL | $30 \%$ | $30 \%$ | - | 29\% | $36 \%$ | $34 \%$ | 35\% | 34\% | $36 \%$ | 33 \% | $32 \%$ | 30\% |
| AT | $27 \%$ | $30 \%$ | $30 \%$ | $30 \%$ | $30 \%$ | $30 \%$ | $31 \%$ | $31 \%$ | $30 \%$ | $33 \%$ | 32 \% | $32 \%$ |
| PL | : | $15 \%$ | 16 \% | 18 \% | 17\% | 19\% | 19\% | 19\% | 22 \% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% |
| PT | 12 \% | 15\% | 10 \% | 17\% | 19\% | 20\% | 21 \% | 22 \% | 21\% | 25\% | 25\% | 23\% |
| RO | 6 \% | : | - | : | 15\% | 12 \% | 14\% | 15\% | 15\% | 15\% | 15\% | 15\% |
| SI | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| SK | - | $14 \%$ | - | 12 \% | 15\% | 15\% | 15\% | 15\% | 15\% | 16 \% | 15\% | 15\% |
| FI | 45\% | 44\% | 40\% | 44\% | 43\% | 43\% | 43\% | $42 \%$ | $42 \%$ | 43\% | 45\% | $44 \%$ |
| SE | 32 \% | $48 \%$ | $46 \%$ | $47 \%$ | $48 \%$ | $48 \%$ | $48 \%$ | 47 \% | $47 \%$ | 47 \% | 47 \% | $48 \%$ |
| UK | 21 \% | 21 \% | 21 \% | 18 \% | $30 \%$ | $30 \%$ | 31 \% | 31 \% | $31 \%$ | 31 \% | 31 \% | $31 \%$ |
| EU-28 | 25\% | $30 \%$ | 29\% | $31 \%$ | $30 \%$ | $29 \%$ | $30 \%$ | $30 \%$ | 31 \% | 31 \% | 32 \% | $32 \%$ |

Source: European Commission, Database Women and men in decision-making
Note: For quarterly data, $4^{\text {th }}$ quarter was used; ${ }^{\prime}:$ ' indicates data were not available; ${ }^{\prime-}$ ' indicates not applicable
Less than $10 \% \quad$ From $10 \%$ to $19 \% \quad$ From $20 \%$ to $29 \% \quad$ From $30 \%$ to $39 \% \quad 40 \%$ and more

Table 5. The proportion of women among the members of the national/federal governments of the Member States, 2003-2014

| Member States | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| BE | $40 \%$ | $26 \%$ | $26 \%$ | $25 \%$ | $26 \%$ | 32 \% | $18 \%$ | $23 \%$ | 24 \% | $32 \%$ | $32 \%$ | 22 \% |
| BG | 26 \% | 28 \% | 31 \% | $30 \%$ | $30 \%$ | $29 \%$ | $32 \%$ | 33 \% | 35 \% | $38 \%$ | $34 \%$ | $31 \%$ |
| CZ | : | 12 \% | 10 \% | 12 \% | 17 \% | 11 \% | $18 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $6 \%$ | $13 \%$ | $7 \%$ | $18 \%$ |
| DK | $28 \%$ | $29 \%$ | 28 \% | 28 \% | $37 \%$ | $37 \%$ | 42 \% | $47 \%$ | $39 \%$ | $43 \%$ | $45 \%$ | $30 \%$ |
| DE | $46 \%$ | $47 \%$ | $27 \%$ | $39 \%$ | $30 \%$ | 33 \% | 33 \% | 28 \% | 28 \% | 28 \% | 27 \% | $43 \%$ |
| EE | 9\% | 8 \% | $17 \%$ | 15 \% | 21 \% | 21 \% | 8 \% | 8 \% | $8 \%$ | $8 \%$ | 8 \% | $43 \%$ |
| IE | $13 \%$ | 11 \% | $16 \%$ | $16 \%$ | $14 \%$ | $14 \%$ | $13 \%$ | $17 \%$ | 20\% | $17 \%$ | $13 \%$ | $20 \%$ |
| EL | $6 \%$ | $5 \%$ | $5 \%$ | 8 \% | $5 \%$ | $7 \%$ | 25 \% | 20 \% | 10 \% | $4 \%$ | $8 \%$ | $8 \%$ |
| ES | 25 \% | $44 \%$ | $50 \%$ | $50 \%$ | $35 \%$ | $44 \%$ | $39 \%$ | $36 \%$ | 33 \% | $26 \%$ | 26 \% | $34 \%$ |
| FR | 27 \% | 21 \% | $16 \%$ | 21 \% | 33 \% | $34 \%$ | 33 \% | $34 \%$ | 26 \% | $49 \%$ | $47 \%$ | $47 \%$ |
| HR | : | : | : | : | 27 \% | 22 \% | $20 \%$ | 16 \% | 11 \% | $14 \%$ | $19 \%$ | $19 \%$ |
| IT | 11 \% | 11 \% | 5 \% | 22 \% | 20 \% | 15 \% | 15 \% | $19 \%$ | 22 \% | $13 \%$ | 24 \% | 27 \% |
| CY | 9\% | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | $16 \%$ | 12 \% | 8 \% | $17 \%$ | 25\% | 33 \% | $8 \%$ | $8 \%$ |
| LV | $25 \%$ | 25 \% | 24 \% | $24 \%$ | 28 \% | 27 \% | $24 \%$ | 26 \% | 29 \% | 31 \% | 28 \% | $24 \%$ |
| LT | : | $15 \%$ | 15\% | $23 \%$ | 26 \% | 19\% | $18 \%$ | 20\% | $17 \%$ | $14 \%$ | $18 \%$ | $20 \%$ |
| LU | $33 \%$ | 21 \% | $14 \%$ | 21 \% | 20 \% | 20 \% | 27 \% | $27 \%$ | 27 \% | 27 \% | 27 \% | $28 \%$ |
| HU | 8\% | 9\% | 11 \% | $17 \%$ | $11 \%$ | $14 \%$ | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | 9\% | $10 \%$ | $0 \%$ |
| MT | : | 16 \% | $17 \%$ | $16 \%$ | 16 \% | $13 \%$ | $13 \%$ | 15 \% | $14 \%$ | 15 \% | $9 \%$ | $9 \%$ |
| NL | $38 \%$ | $36 \%$ | 35 \% | 32 \% | 41 \% | 41 \% | $41 \%$ | $36 \%$ | 20 \% | 35 \% | $40 \%$ | $40 \%$ |
| AT | 27 \% | 28 \% | $38 \%$ | 33 \% | 35 \% | 35 \% | 33 \% | 39 \% | $33 \%$ | 33 \% | 33 \% | 31 \% |
| PL | : | $6 \%$ | $14 \%$ | 20 \% | 18 \% | 21 \% | 21 \% | $18 \%$ | 20\% | 26 \% | 28 \% | $30 \%$ |
| PT | $19 \%$ | $13 \%$ | 13 \% | $10 \%$ | 10 \% | 11 \% | $16 \%$ | 18 \% | $17 \%$ | $14 \%$ | $14 \%$ | $14 \%$ |
| RO | $15 \%$ | 18 \% | $15 \%$ | $14 \%$ | 0 \% | $0 \%$ | $18 \%$ | 12 \% | 17 \% | $19 \%$ | 21 \% | $20 \%$ |
| SI | $19 \%$ | $7 \%$ | $7 \%$ | $6 \%$ | 18 \% | 23 \% | $36 \%$ | $36 \%$ | $27 \%$ | $18 \%$ | $29 \%$ | $40 \%$ |
| SK | $0 \%$ | 11 \% | 12 \% | 15 \% | 14 \% | $14 \%$ | 17 \% | 15 \% | $17 \%$ | 9\% | $8 \%$ | $6 \%$ |
| FI | $44 \%$ | $47 \%$ | $47 \%$ | $37 \%$ | 60 \% | $60 \%$ | 52 \% | 52 \% | $44 \%$ | $47 \%$ | 53 \% | $54 \%$ |
| SE | $52 \%$ | $43 \%$ | $46 \%$ | $43 \%$ | $45 \%$ | $45 \%$ | $45 \%$ | $46 \%$ | $50 \%$ | $54 \%$ | $54 \%$ | $50 \%$ |
| UK | $31 \%$ | 26 \% | 27 \% | 25 \% | 33 \% | $34 \%$ | $29 \%$ | $14 \%$ | $17 \%$ | $18 \%$ | $20 \%$ | 25 \% |
| EU-28 | $23 \%$ | 20 \% | 20 \% | $23 \%$ | 24 \% | 25 \% | 26 \% | 24 \% | 23 \% | $24 \%$ | 25 \% | 27 \% |

Source: European Commission, Database Women and men in decision-making
Note: For quarterly data, $4^{\text {th }}$ quarter was used; ' $:$ ' indicates data were not available
Less than $10 \%$
From $10 \%$ to $19 \% \quad$ From $20 \%$ to $29 \%$
From $30 \%$ to $39 \%$ $\square$ $40 \%$ and more

Table 6. The proportion of women among senior/junior ministers in the different fields of action (portfolios/ministries by BEIS type) of the national/federal governments of the Member States: B = Basic functions, 2003-2014

| Member States | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| BE | 33 \% | 20 \% | $14 \%$ | $17 \%$ | $17 \%$ | $9 \%$ | 10 \% | 20 \% | 22 \% | 25 \% | 25 \% | $0 \%$ |
| BG | $17 \%$ | $39 \%$ | 23 \% | 21 \% | 28 \% | 31 \% | 25 \% | 25 \% | 27 \% | $29 \%$ | $15 \%$ | $24 \%$ |
| CZ | : | 0 \% | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | 25 \% | 25 \% | $14 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $17 \%$ | $17 \%$ | $20 \%$ | $20 \%$ |
| DK | $20 \%$ | 33 \% | 25 \% | 25 \% | 20\% | 0 \% | 20\% | $40 \%$ | 20\% | $20 \%$ | 25 \% | 50 \% |
| DE | 25 \% | 33 \% | $17 \%$ | $38 \%$ | 25 \% | 25 \% | $19 \%$ | 25 \% | 25 \% | 25 \% | 27 \% | $29 \%$ |
| EE | 25 \% | $0 \%$ | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | 0 \% |
| IE | $14 \%$ | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | 11 \% | $13 \%$ | $13 \%$ | 0 \% | $10 \%$ |
| EL | $0 \%$ | 0 \% | 0 \% | $7 \%$ | $7 \%$ | $7 \%$ | $7 \%$ | $13 \%$ | 6 \% | $0 \%$ | $9 \%$ | $10 \%$ |
| ES | $29 \%$ | $17 \%$ | 0 \% | $17 \%$ | 35 \% | 35 \% | $29 \%$ | 25 \% | 24 \% | $13 \%$ | $13 \%$ | 20\% |
| FR | 22 \% | $31 \%$ | $14 \%$ | 27 \% | 20\% | 20\% | $14 \%$ | $17 \%$ | $7 \%$ | $40 \%$ | $40 \%$ | $31 \%$ |
| HR | : | : | : | : | 33 \% | 29 \% | $38 \%$ | 29 \% | $14 \%$ | $13 \%$ | 14 \% | $14 \%$ |
| IT | 8 \% | $7 \%$ | $3 \%$ | 27 \% | 15\% | 10\% | $7 \%$ | $13 \%$ | $19 \%$ | 14 \% | 21 \% | $19 \%$ |
| CY | 0 \% | 0 \% | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | 9\% | 0 \% | $0 \%$ | 0 \% | 20\% | $40 \%$ | 0\% | $0 \%$ |
| LV | 25 \% | 25 \% | 20\% | $20 \%$ | $31 \%$ | 31 \% | 22 \% | 20\% | 0 \% | 0\% | 11 \% | 33 \% |
| LT | : | $0 \%$ | 0 \% | $0 \%$ | 11 \% | 11 \% | $14 \%$ | $13 \%$ | $19 \%$ | $13 \%$ | 0 \% | $0 \%$ |
| LU | $33 \%$ | 0 \% | 0 \% | $17 \%$ | $13 \%$ | $13 \%$ | $0 \%$ | 0 \% | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | 25 \% | $0 \%$ |
| HU | 6 \% | 10 \% | 13 \% | 22 \% | 11 \% | 18 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ |
| MT | : | $14 \%$ | $17 \%$ | 20 \% | $17 \%$ | 20\% | 20\% | 25 \% | $25 \%$ | 25 \% | 0 \% | $0 \%$ |
| NL | $0 \%$ | 9\% | 10 \% | $17 \%$ | 33 \% | 33 \% | 33 \% | 20 \% | $0 \%$ | 17 \% | 17 \% | 17 \% |
| AT | 25 \% | 33 \% | 60\% | $43 \%$ | $38 \%$ | 25\% | 33 \% | $33 \%$ | $25 \%$ | 25 \% | 25 \% | $33 \%$ |
| PL | : | 0 \% | 20\% | $17 \%$ | $14 \%$ | 8 \% | $7 \%$ | 8 \% | $10 \%$ | 21 \% | $18 \%$ | $29 \%$ |
| PT | 20 \% | 0 \% | $5 \%$ | 0 \% | $0 \%$ | $5 \%$ | 10\% | 10 \% | 11 \% | 11 \% | $19 \%$ | $19 \%$ |
| RO | 22 \% | 9\% | 23 \% | $13 \%$ | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | $13 \%$ | 0 \% | 0 \% |
| SI | $0 \%$ | 0 \% | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | 0 \% | $7 \%$ | 33 \% | 39 \% | 33 \% | 15 \% | $30 \%$ | $19 \%$ |
| SK | $0 \%$ | 20 \% | 10 \% | 30 \% | 23 \% | 23 \% | 31 \% | 22 \% | $30 \%$ | 9\% | 9\% | $9 \%$ |
| FI | $14 \%$ | 0 \% | 20\% | $13 \%$ | $50 \%$ | $50 \%$ | 33 \% | 33 \% | $45 \%$ | $45 \%$ | $45 \%$ | $44 \%$ |
| SE | 71 \% | $50 \%$ | $43 \%$ | $42 \%$ | $50 \%$ | $50 \%$ | $50 \%$ | $44 \%$ | $43 \%$ | $57 \%$ | $57 \%$ | $33 \%$ |
| UK | $25 \%$ | 20\% | 22 \% | 27 \% | $34 \%$ | $36 \%$ | $36 \%$ | 12 \% | $18 \%$ | $17 \%$ | $13 \%$ | $18 \%$ |
| EU-28 | $17 \%$ | $16 \%$ | 14 \% | 21 \% | 21 \% | 20\% | 20\% | $17 \%$ | $18 \%$ | 19\% | $17 \%$ | $19 \%$ |

Source: European Commission, Database Women and men in decision-making
Note: For quarterly data, $4^{\text {th }}$ quarter was used; $\because:$ indicates data were not available
Less than 10 \%
From $10 \%$ to $19 \% \quad$ From $20 \%$ to $29 \%$
From 30 \% to $39 \%$ $\square$ $40 \%$ and more

Table 7. The proportion of women among senior/junior ministers in the different fields of action (portfolios/ministries by BEIS type) of the national/federal governments of the Member States: E = Economy, 2003-2014

| Member States | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| BE | $29 \%$ | $38 \%$ | $43 \%$ | $38 \%$ | $43 \%$ | 25 \% | $17 \%$ | $17 \%$ | $17 \%$ | 17 \% | 17 \% | 0 \% |
| BG | 19\% | $18 \%$ | $29 \%$ | $24 \%$ | $29 \%$ | 23 \% | $29 \%$ | 33 \% | $36 \%$ | $38 \%$ | $29 \%$ | $31 \%$ |
| CZ | : | 0 \% | 0 \% | 25 \% | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | 0 \% | 0 \% | $0 \%$ | 0 \% | 0 \% | 25 \% |
| DK | 25 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | $40 \%$ | $60 \%$ | $60 \%$ | 0 \% | $38 \%$ | $50 \%$ | 25 \% | $0 \%$ |
| DE | $33 \%$ | $50 \%$ | 0 \% | 25\% | $33 \%$ | $42 \%$ | $50 \%$ | 25 \% | $17 \%$ | $17 \%$ | $9 \%$ | $23 \%$ |
| EE | 0 \% | 33 \% | 33 \% | 33 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0\% | 0 \% | 0 \% | 75 \% |
| IE | 11 \% | $13 \%$ | $13 \%$ | 25 \% | 22 \% | 11 \% | 11 \% | 0 \% | $14 \%$ | 0 \% | 0 \% | $13 \%$ |
| EL | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | 8\% | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | 29 \% | $17 \%$ | $0 \%$ | 13 \% | 14 \% | $14 \%$ |
| ES | 0 \% | 25 \% | $50 \%$ | $50 \%$ | 17 \% | 17 \% | 25 \% | $14 \%$ | 17 \% | 33 \% | $30 \%$ | $40 \%$ |
| FR | 17 \% | 8 \% | $14 \%$ | 22 \% | 20 \% | 29 \% | 25 \% | 25 \% | $17 \%$ | 33 \% | 33 \% | $29 \%$ |
| HR | : | : | : | : | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | 0 \% | $0 \%$ | 20 \% | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ |
| IT | $6 \%$ | $5 \%$ | $5 \%$ | $6 \%$ | $10 \%$ | $0 \%$ | 8 \% | $18 \%$ | 18 \% | $0 \%$ | 15 \% | $15 \%$ |
| CY | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | 0 \% | 0 \% | $0 \%$ | 0 \% | $0 \%$ | 33 \% | 0 \% | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ |
| LV | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | $14 \%$ | 25 \% | $13 \%$ | 25\% | $33 \%$ | $33 \%$ | 33 \% | 20 \% |
| LT | : | $0 \%$ | 33 \% | 33 \% | 33 \% | 33 \% | 8 \% | $7 \%$ | $7 \%$ | $7 \%$ | 28 \% | 23 \% |
| LU | $0 \%$ | $33 \%$ | 0 \% | 0 \% | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | 25 \% | $25 \%$ | 25 \% | 25\% | 25 \% | 25 \% |
| HU | $0 \%$ | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | 25 \% | 33 \% | $0 \%$ |
| MT | : | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ |
| NL | 20 \% | 33 \% | $0 \%$ | 20 \% | 33 \% | 33 \% | 33 \% | $67 \%$ | $0 \%$ | 20 \% | 40 \% | $40 \%$ |
| AT | 0 \% | $0 \%$ | 0 \% | 0 \% | $0 \%$ | 0 \% | $17 \%$ | $17 \%$ | 25 \% | 25 \% | $25 \%$ | 0 \% |
| PL | : | $0 \%$ | 33 \% | 33 \% | 21 \% | 21 \% | 21 \% | 15 \% | $16 \%$ | 25 \% | 31 \% | 32 \% |
| PT | 33 \% | $14 \%$ | 14 \% | 0 \% | $0 \%$ | 0 \% | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | 23 \% | 21 \% | 17 \% | $17 \%$ |
| RO | 0 \% | $18 \%$ | $5 \%$ | $17 \%$ | 0 \% | $0 \%$ | 25 \% | 25 \% | 25 \% | $0 \%$ | $17 \%$ | $17 \%$ |
| SI | 33 \% | 33 \% | 33 \% | 33 \% | 30 \% | 18 \% | $60 \%$ | $50 \%$ | 33 \% | $13 \%$ | $50 \%$ | $50 \%$ |
| SK | $0 \%$ | $17 \%$ | $17 \%$ | 0 \% | $0 \%$ | 0 \% | 0 \% | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $11 \%$ | $10 \%$ | $10 \%$ |
| FI | 25 \% | $40 \%$ | $40 \%$ | 25 \% | 25 \% | 25 \% | $29 \%$ | $43 \%$ | $43 \%$ | $43 \%$ | $43 \%$ | $29 \%$ |
| SE | 20 \% | $38 \%$ | $42 \%$ | $29 \%$ | 25 \% | 25 \% | 25 \% | 25 \% | $40 \%$ | $40 \%$ | $40 \%$ | 33 \% |
| UK | 50 \% | 33 \% | 20 \% | 27 \% | 26 \% | 31 \% | 10 \% | 13 \% | 11 \% | 22 \% | 29 \% | 33 \% |
| EU-28 | 16 \% | 16 \% | 16 \% | $17 \%$ | 18 \% | 17 \% | 19 \% | $17 \%$ | 17 \% | 20 \% | 24 \% | 24 \% |

Source: European Commission, Database Women and men in decision-making
Note: For quarterly data, $4^{\text {th }}$ quarter was used; $\because:$ indicates data were not available
Less than $10 \%$
From $10 \%$ to $19 \% \quad$ From $20 \%$ to $29 \%$
From 30 \% to $39 \%$ $\square$ $40 \%$ and more

Table 8. The proportion of women among senior/junior ministers in the different fields of action (portfolios/ministries by BEIS type) of the national/federal governments of the Member States: $\mathrm{I}=$ Infrastructure, 2003-2014

| Member States | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| BE | 50 \% | $0 \%$ | 0 \% | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | 0 \% | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | 100 \% |
| BG | $42 \%$ | $38 \%$ | 33 \% | 31 \% | $25 \%$ | $29 \%$ | $43 \%$ | $43 \%$ | $50 \%$ | 50 \% | $14 \%$ | $38 \%$ |
| CZ | : | $0 \%$ | 33 \% | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | 0 \% | 0 \% | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | 0 \% |
| DK | 0 \% | $50 \%$ | 50 \% | $50 \%$ | $33 \%$ | 25 \% | 25 \% | 67 \% | 33 \% | 33 \% | 67 \% | 25 \% |
| DE | $57 \%$ | 0 \% | $0 \%$ | 0 \% | $29 \%$ | $29 \%$ | $29 \%$ | $29 \%$ | 29 \% | $29 \%$ | $29 \%$ | 57 \% |
| EE | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | $0 \%$ | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | $0 \%$ | 100\% | 100 \% | 100\% | 100 \% |
| IE | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | $0 \%$ | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | 17 \% | 17 \% | $0 \%$ |
| EL | 22 \% | $0 \%$ | 0 \% | 0 \% | $0 \%$ | 0 \% | $17 \%$ | $14 \%$ | 0 \% | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | 0 \% |
| ES | 0 \% | 100\% | 100\% | 100\% | $40 \%$ | $57 \%$ | $38 \%$ | $38 \%$ | 33 \% | $17 \%$ | 20\% | $20 \%$ |
| FR | $40 \%$ | 0 \% | 25 \% | 33 \% | 60\% | $43 \%$ | $50 \%$ | $50 \%$ | $33 \%$ | $50 \%$ | 25 \% | $67 \%$ |
| HR | : | : | : | : | $50 \%$ | $50 \%$ | 50 \% | 50 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | 33 \% | 33 \% |
| IT | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | 0 \% | 8 \% | $7 \%$ | 14 \% | 14 \% | 14 \% | 13 \% | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | 33 \% |
| CY | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | 0 \% | $0 \%$ | $50 \%$ | $0 \%$ | 0 \% | 100 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% |
| LV | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | 25 \% | 33 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% |
| LT | : | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | $13 \%$ | 9\% |
| LU | $25 \%$ | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | 33 \% |
| HU | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | 33 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | - | - | - | - | - |
| MT | : | $0 \%$ | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% |
| NL | 75 \% | $75 \%$ | $75 \%$ | $50 \%$ | $75 \%$ | $75 \%$ | $50 \%$ | $50 \%$ | $50 \%$ | $67 \%$ | $67 \%$ | $67 \%$ |
| AT | 0 \% | 0 \% | $0 \%$ | 0 \% | 0 \% | $50 \%$ | 100 \% | 100 \% | 100 \% | 100 \% | 100 \% | $0 \%$ |
| PL | : | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | $14 \%$ | $13 \%$ | 20\% | $20 \%$ | $25 \%$ | $29 \%$ | $29 \%$ | 20\% |
| PT | $14 \%$ | 0 \% | 0 \% | 14 \% | $29 \%$ | $29 \%$ | 29 \% | $43 \%$ | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% |
| RO | 0 \% | $36 \%$ | $15 \%$ | $15 \%$ | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | $33 \%$ | $33 \%$ | 33 \% | $50 \%$ | 20 \% |
| SI | $0 \%$ | 0 \% | $0 \%$ | 0 \% | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | 60 \% |
| SK | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | 0 \% | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ |
| FI | $50 \%$ | $50 \%$ | $50 \%$ | 25 \% | $75 \%$ | 75 \% | $75 \%$ | 75 \% | 75 \% | 75 \% | 75 \% | $67 \%$ |
| SE | 100 \% | $50 \%$ | $50 \%$ | 100 \% | $50 \%$ | $50 \%$ | $50 \%$ | $67 \%$ | 100 \% | 100 \% | 100 \% | $50 \%$ |
| UK | 20\% | 22 \% | 20\% | 11 \% | $44 \%$ | $75 \%$ | 0 \% | $25 \%$ | $50 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $25 \%$ | $44 \%$ |
| EU-28 | 23 \% | $17 \%$ | $16 \%$ | $17 \%$ | 21 \% | 24 \% | $23 \%$ | $29 \%$ | 25 \% | 24 \% | 25 \% | $29 \%$ |

Source: European Commission, Database Women and men in decision-making
Note: For quarterly data, $4^{\text {th }}$ quarter was used; ${ }^{\prime}:$ ' indicates data were not available; ' - ' indicates not applicable
Less than $10 \% \quad$ From $10 \%$ to $19 \% \quad$ From $20 \%$ to $29 \% \quad$ From $30 \%$ to $39 \% \quad 40 \%$ and more

Table 9. The proportion of women among senior/junior ministers in the different fields of action (portfolios/ministries by BEIS type) of the national/federal governments of the Member States: $\mathrm{S}=$ Sociocultural functions, 2003-2014

| Member States | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| BE | 60 \% | 25\% | $33 \%$ | 25\% | 25\% | $83 \%$ | 40\% | 40\% | 40\% | 75\% | 75\% | 40\% |
| BG | $35 \%$ | $17 \%$ | 41\% | $43 \%$ | $38 \%$ | 35 \% | 35 \% | $37 \%$ | $37 \%$ | 41\% | $58 \%$ | $36 \%$ |
| CZ | : | 50 \% | 25\% | $25 \%$ | 25\% | 0\% | 50 \% | 0\% | 0\% | 25\% | 0\% | $17 \%$ |
| DK | $43 \%$ | $43 \%$ | 43\% | 43 \% | 50 \% | 50 \% | 60 \% | 83 \% | 57 \% | 57 \% | 71 \% | 50 \% |
| DE | 64 \% | 100\% | 75\% | 75 \% | $36 \%$ | $36 \%$ | $36 \%$ | $36 \%$ | 45\% | 45\% | 45\% | 75 \% |
| EE | 0\% | 0\% | 33 \% | $25 \%$ | 75 \% | 75 \% | 33 \% | 33 \% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 50 \% |
| IE | $25 \%$ | $30 \%$ | $50 \%$ | $38 \%$ | $30 \%$ | 44\% | $38 \%$ | 50 \% | 44\% | 33 \% | 33 \% | 50 \% |
| EL | 8\% | 20 \% | 20 \% | 13\% | $10 \%$ | 20\% | $56 \%$ | $36 \%$ | 27\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| ES | 50\% | 75 \% | 75\% | 75\% | 44 \% | 64 \% | 64 \% | 64 \% | 55 \% | 50 \% | 50 \% | 63 \% |
| FR | $31 \%$ | 33 \% | 14\% | 0 \% | 50 \% | 56 \% | 55 \% | 50 \% | 55 \% | $73 \%$ | 80 \% | $73 \%$ |
| HR | : | : | : | : | 25\% | 25\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 40\% | $40 \%$ | 40\% |
| IT | $26 \%$ | 29\% | $13 \%$ | 35 \% | 43\% | 45\% | 45\% | 42 \% | $36 \%$ | $30 \%$ | 50 \% | 54 \% |
| CY | $33 \%$ | - \% | 0\% | - \% | 33 \% | 50 \% | 33 \% | 33 \% | 33 \% | 67 \% | 33 \% | $33 \%$ |
| LV | $50 \%$ | 50 \% | 50\% | 50 \% | 42 \% | $33 \%$ | $38 \%$ | 29\% | 75\% | 75\% | 57 \% | 29\% |
| LT | : | 50 \% | 25 \% | 50\% | $50 \%$ | 25\% | 42 \% | 50 \% | 33 \% | 27\% | $31 \%$ | 47\% |
| LU | 57 \% | 40\% | 33 \% | $40 \%$ | 50 \% | 50 \% | $60 \%$ | $60 \%$ | $60 \%$ | $60 \%$ | 40\% | $43 \%$ |
| HU | $18 \%$ | $17 \%$ | 25\% | 20\% | 33 \% | 25\% | 0\% | 0\% | - \% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| MT | : | 50 \% | 50\% | 50 \% | $50 \%$ | 20\% | 20\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | $33 \%$ | $33 \%$ |
| NL | 67 \% | 57 \% | 57 \% | 43 \% | $38 \%$ | $38 \%$ | 50 \% | 25\% | 43 \% | 50 \% | 50 \% | 50 \% |
| AT | 60 \% | 60 \% | 75\% | 75 \% | 67 \% | 67 \% | 40\% | 60 \% | 40\% | 40\% | 40\% | 50 \% |
| PL | : | 20\% | 0\% | 20\% | 23\% | 44\% | 43\% | $34 \%$ | $37 \%$ | $34 \%$ | 35 \% | $33 \%$ |
| PT | $9 \%$ | $38 \%$ | $31 \%$ | 29\% | 21 \% | 21 \% | 33 \% | 33 \% | 21 \% | $14 \%$ | 8 \% | 8 \% |
| RO | 20\% | $17 \%$ | $14 \%$ | 10\% | 0\% | 0\% | $50 \%$ | 0\% | 25\% | $40 \%$ | 29\% | $50 \%$ |
| SI | 40\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 40\% | 60 \% | $30 \%$ | $30 \%$ | 17\% | 43\% | 20 \% | $70 \%$ |
| SK | 0\% | 10 \% | 22 \% | 27 \% | 27\% | 27\% | 27\% | 25\% | 25\% | 11 \% | 11 \% | 0\% |
| FI | 100\% | 100\% | 80\% | 86 \% | $83 \%$ | $83 \%$ | $73 \%$ | 64 \% | $30 \%$ | 40\% | $60 \%$ | 78 \% |
| SE | $43 \%$ | $38 \%$ | $55 \%$ | 46\% | $50 \%$ | 50 \% | $50 \%$ | $50 \%$ | 44\% | $44 \%$ | 44\% | $75 \%$ |
| UK | 31 \% | $38 \%$ | $48 \%$ | 22 \% | $30 \%$ | $27 \%$ | $38 \%$ | $16 \%$ | $17 \%$ | 18 \% | 23 \% | $18 \%$ |
| EU-28 | $36 \%$ | $33 \%$ | $34 \%$ | 33 \% | $36 \%$ | $40 \%$ | $42 \%$ | $38 \%$ | $34 \%$ | $37 \%$ | $38 \%$ | $42 \%$ |

Source: European Commission, Database Women and men in decision-making
Note: For quarterly data, $4^{\text {th }}$ quarter was used; ' $:$ ' indicates data were not available

| Less than $10 \%$ | From $10 \%$ to $19 \%$ | From $20 \%$ to $29 \%$ | From $30 \%$ to $39 \%$ | $40 \%$ and more |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |

Table 10. The proportion of women among the highest-ranking civil servants in the Member States: level 1, 2003-2014

| Member States | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| BE | 6 \% | $6 \%$ | $7 \%$ | $7 \%$ | $9 \%$ | $17 \%$ | $17 \%$ | $15 \%$ | $9 \%$ | 8 \% | 0 \% | $7 \%$ |
| BG | $14 \%$ | 27 \% | 33 \% | 31 \% | 22 \% | 22 \% | 27 \% | $40 \%$ | 35 \% | 41 \% | 31 \% | $36 \%$ |
| CZ | : | 8 \% | 0 \% | 8 \% | 16 \% | $14 \%$ | $13 \%$ | $18 \%$ | $13 \%$ | $13 \%$ | $14 \%$ | $16 \%$ |
| DK | $5 \%$ | $5 \%$ | $5 \%$ | 6\% | $6 \%$ | 11 \% | 11 \% | 11 \% | $16 \%$ | $15 \%$ | $10 \%$ | $10 \%$ |
| DE | 11 \% | $0 \%$ | 0 \% | 0 \% | $0 \%$ | 0 \% | $4 \%$ | 12 \% | 11 \% | 21 \% | $25 \%$ | $19 \%$ |
| EE | 22 \% | 14 \% | 25 \% | 25 \% | $36 \%$ | 25 \% | $28 \%$ | 28 \% | 23 \% | 20 \% | 24 \% | 25 \% |
| IE | $13 \%$ | 8 \% | $13 \%$ | $14 \%$ | 27 \% | $24 \%$ | $19 \%$ | $19 \%$ | $24 \%$ | $13 \%$ | $13 \%$ | $6 \%$ |
| EL | 22 \% | $9 \%$ | $10 \%$ | $6 \%$ | $30 \%$ | $29 \%$ | $29 \%$ | $43 \%$ | $41 \%$ | $36 \%$ | $45 \%$ | $45 \%$ |
| ES | 11 \% | $26 \%$ | $32 \%$ | 32 \% | $53 \%$ | $63 \%$ | $42 \%$ | $40 \%$ | $57 \%$ | 33 \% | $35 \%$ | 35 \% |
| FR | 21 \% | $0 \%$ | $14 \%$ | 25 \% | 13 \% | 15 \% | $19 \%$ | $19 \%$ | $20 \%$ | 22 \% | 21 \% | 22 \% |
| HR | : | : | : | : | $19 \%$ | 25 \% | 23 \% | 20\% | $19 \%$ | $33 \%$ | $26 \%$ | $28 \%$ |
| IT | $13 \%$ | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | $18 \%$ | 22 \% | $17 \%$ | $14 \%$ | $17 \%$ | 22 \% | 26 \% | $31 \%$ |
| CY | 9\% | 8 \% | 17 \% | $17 \%$ | 18 \% | 9\% | 9\% | 27 \% | $30 \%$ | $30 \%$ | 22 \% | $20 \%$ |
| LV | $47 \%$ | $41 \%$ | 35 \% | $42 \%$ | $50 \%$ | 31 \% | $35 \%$ | $33 \%$ | 31 \% | $36 \%$ | $43 \%$ | $46 \%$ |
| LT | : | $5 \%$ | $7 \%$ | 8 \% | 23 \% | 21 \% | 7 \% | 14 \% | $14 \%$ | 20 \% | 31 \% | 25 \% |
| LU | $14 \%$ | 12 \% | 25 \% | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | 17 \% | 17 \% | $17 \%$ | 17 \% | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ |
| HU | 11 \% | 6 \% | $0 \%$ | 15\% | 39 \% | 39 \% | 15\% | $15 \%$ | $16 \%$ | $14 \%$ | 18 \% | 20 \% |
| MT | : | $7 \%$ | $7 \%$ | $7 \%$ | $6 \%$ | $9 \%$ | 8 \% | $0 \%$ | 8 \% | $7 \%$ | $13 \%$ | $24 \%$ |
| NL | $10 \%$ | $7 \%$ | 8 \% | 8 \% | 8 \% | 0 \% | $25 \%$ | 22 \% | $24 \%$ | 24 \% | 26 \% | 25 \% |
| AT | 11 \% | $0 \%$ | 0 \% | 0 \% | $13 \%$ | 16 \% | $19 \%$ | 20 \% | 24 \% | 23 \% | 21 \% | 22 \% |
| PL | : | 29 \% | 20 \% | $29 \%$ | $40 \%$ | 37 \% | 22 \% | $36 \%$ | 31 \% | 39 \% | $42 \%$ | 27 \% |
| PT | $14 \%$ | 6 \% | $0 \%$ | 0 \% | 26 \% | $19 \%$ | 27 \% | 26 \% | 22 \% | 25 \% | 28 \% | 28 \% |
| RO | $20 \%$ | $13 \%$ | 29 \% | 27 \% | 37 \% | $44 \%$ | $20 \%$ | 21 \% | $51 \%$ | $46 \%$ | $47 \%$ | $46 \%$ |
| SI | $24 \%$ | $37 \%$ | $42 \%$ | $42 \%$ | $48 \%$ | $50 \%$ | $52 \%$ | $47 \%$ | $58 \%$ | $52 \%$ | $46 \%$ | $53 \%$ |
| SK | $29 \%$ | 25 \% | 27 \% | 20 \% | $13 \%$ | $13 \%$ | $7 \%$ | 23 \% | 21 \% | 29 \% | 31 \% | $34 \%$ |
| FI | 23 \% | 29 \% | 21 \% | 21 \% | $15 \%$ | 25 \% | 25 \% | 26 \% | 24 \% | 29 \% | $32 \%$ | $31 \%$ |
| SE | $36 \%$ | 33 \% | 25 \% | $0 \%$ | $39 \%$ | $37 \%$ | $36 \%$ | 31 \% | 32 \% | $40 \%$ | $38 \%$ | $38 \%$ |
| UK | $25 \%$ | 14 \% | 23 \% | $18 \%$ | $3 \%$ | 8 \% | $14 \%$ | 14 \% | 21 \% | 22 \% | $14 \%$ | $19 \%$ |
| EU-28 | 21 \% | $15 \%$ | 17 \% | 18 \% | 29 \% | 28 \% | 25 \% | 26 \% | 30\% | $29 \%$ | $30 \%$ | 31 \% |

Source: European Commission, Database Women and men in decision-making
Note: ' $\because$ ' indicates data were not available; due to changes in methodology and a break in the series, data is only comparable from 2007 onwards

Less than $10 \%$ $\square$ From $10 \%$ to $19 \%$
From $20 \%$ to $29 \%$ $\square$ From $30 \%$ to $39 \%$ $40 \%$ and more

Table 11. The proportion of women among the highest-ranking civil servants in the Member States: level 2, 2003-2014

| Member States | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| BE | $16 \%$ | 12 \% | 8 \% | 12 \% | $12 \%$ | 11 \% | $14 \%$ | $12 \%$ | $13 \%$ | 11 \% | $14 \%$ | $14 \%$ |
| BG | 23 \% | $50 \%$ | $39 \%$ | $42 \%$ | $53 \%$ | 54 \% | 52 \% | $48 \%$ | $47 \%$ | 52 \% | 52 \% | 52 \% |
| CZ | : | $17 \%$ | $15 \%$ | 11 \% | 24 \% | 27 \% | $37 \%$ | $31 \%$ | 31 \% | 31 \% | $31 \%$ | $32 \%$ |
| DK | 21 \% | $20 \%$ | $16 \%$ | $10 \%$ | $27 \%$ | $19 \%$ | 23 \% | $26 \%$ | $24 \%$ | 25\% | 21 \% | $26 \%$ |
| DE | 9\% | $12 \%$ | $9 \%$ | $10 \%$ | $23 \%$ | $14 \%$ | $15 \%$ | $17 \%$ | $17 \%$ | $16 \%$ | $19 \%$ | 21 \% |
| EE | 25 \% | 25 \% | $20 \%$ | $19 \%$ | $24 \%$ | 22 \% | $41 \%$ | $48 \%$ | $48 \%$ | 53 \% | $53 \%$ | $55 \%$ |
| IE | 10 \% | 9\% | 12 \% | 18 \% | 11 \% | 15 \% | 13 \% | $16 \%$ | 22 \% | 26 \% | 22 \% | $24 \%$ |
| EL | 6 \% | 35 \% | 25 \% | 25 \% | $34 \%$ | 39 \% | 35 \% | $43 \%$ | $42 \%$ | $46 \%$ | $49 \%$ | $49 \%$ |
| ES | $13 \%$ | $27 \%$ | $24 \%$ | $20 \%$ | $13 \%$ | $38 \%$ | $32 \%$ | 33 \% | $35 \%$ | $32 \%$ | 31 \% | 31 \% |
| FR | 32 \% | $14 \%$ | 12 \% | 9\% | 27 \% | 25 \% | 32 \% | 32 \% | 33 \% | $30 \%$ | $29 \%$ | $29 \%$ |
| HR | : | : | : | : | 27 \% | 28 \% | 39 \% | $41 \%$ | 41 \% | 37 \% | $44 \%$ | $48 \%$ |
| IT | $29 \%$ | $16 \%$ | $17 \%$ | 16 \% | $36 \%$ | $36 \%$ | 29 \% | $29 \%$ | $34 \%$ | 34 \% | 32 \% | 33 \% |
| CY | 20 \% | $16 \%$ | $16 \%$ | 18 \% | 12 \% | $14 \%$ | 22 \% | 31 \% | 32 \% | 31 \% | 39 \% | $39 \%$ |
| LV | 33 \% | 37 \% | $41 \%$ | $34 \%$ | $45 \%$ | 52 \% | $48 \%$ | $53 \%$ | 58 \% | 61 \% | 61 \% | $53 \%$ |
| LT | : | $24 \%$ | 23 \% | 32 \% | 26 \% | 25 \% | $39 \%$ | $53 \%$ | 50 \% | $48 \%$ | $47 \%$ | $53 \%$ |
| LU | $24 \%$ | 12 \% | 21 \% | 21 \% | $7 \%$ | $4 \%$ | $4 \%$ | $14 \%$ | $15 \%$ | $15 \%$ | $23 \%$ | 25 \% |
| HU | $19 \%$ | $20 \%$ | 21 \% | 22 \% | $47 \%$ | $47 \%$ | 30 \% | $30 \%$ | 30 \% | 27 \% | 27 \% | 23 \% |
| MT | : | 11 \% | 11 \% | $13 \%$ | 17 \% | 21 \% | 23 \% | 27 \% | 28 \% | $29 \%$ | 32 \% | $32 \%$ |
| NL | $17 \%$ | $16 \%$ | $18 \%$ | 20 \% | 20 \% | $34 \%$ | 22 \% | 26 \% | 26 \% | 27 \% | 28 \% | $30 \%$ |
| AT | 11 \% | $14 \%$ | 10\% | $10 \%$ | 28 \% | 28 \% | $29 \%$ | $31 \%$ | $32 \%$ | $32 \%$ | $34 \%$ | 35 \% |
| PL | : | $33 \%$ | $30 \%$ | 33 \% | $47 \%$ | $42 \%$ | $41 \%$ | $39 \%$ | 41 \% | 41 \% | $41 \%$ | $39 \%$ |
| PT | 28 \% | 21 \% | $18 \%$ | 18 \% | $42 \%$ | $36 \%$ | $43 \%$ | $44 \%$ | $48 \%$ | $47 \%$ | $47 \%$ | $48 \%$ |
| RO | $34 \%$ | $16 \%$ | $36 \%$ | $39 \%$ | $34 \%$ | $42 \%$ | 45\% | 32 \% | 61 \% | $56 \%$ | $53 \%$ | 57 \% |
| SI | $47 \%$ | $49 \%$ | 31 \% | $39 \%$ | $48 \%$ | 51 \% | $53 \%$ | $59 \%$ | 54 \% | $54 \%$ | $58 \%$ | $58 \%$ |
| SK | 33 \% | 26 \% | 28 \% | 25 \% | 71 \% | 75 \% | $74 \%$ | $76 \%$ | 78 \% | 86 \% | 85 \% | $43 \%$ |
| FI | 10 \% | $17 \%$ | 20 \% | 23 \% | $38 \%$ | 24 \% | : | : | : | $44 \%$ | $47 \%$ | $47 \%$ |
| SE | 33 \% | 41 \% | 43\% | $49 \%$ | $43 \%$ | $44 \%$ | $46 \%$ | $47 \%$ | $49 \%$ | $48 \%$ | $49 \%$ | 51 \% |
| UK | 20 \% | 20 \% | 25 \% | $19 \%$ | 28 \% | 23 \% | 28 \% | 28 \% | 29 \% | 31 \% | 32 \% | 32 \% |
| EU-28 | 28 \% | $25 \%$ | 23 \% | 24 \% | $34 \%$ | $34 \%$ | 33 \% | $36 \%$ | 39 \% | 37 \% | $39 \%$ | $40 \%$ |

Source: European Commission, Database Women and men in decision-making
Note: ' $\because$ ' indicates data were not available; due to changes in methodology and a break in the series, data is only comparable from 2007 onwards

Less than $10 \%$ $\square$ From $10 \%$ to $19 \%$
From $20 \%$ to $29 \%$ $\square$ From $30 \%$ to $39 \%$ $40 \%$ and more

Table 12. The proportion of women among the members of the Supreme Courts of the Member States, 20032014

| Member States | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| BE | $9 \%$ | 47\% | 43\% | $11 \%$ | 17\% | $17 \%$ | $17 \%$ | 17\% | $21 \%$ | 18\% | 20\% | 20\% |
| BG | : | 56 \% | 44\% | $33 \%$ | $76 \%$ | $78 \%$ | $78 \%$ | $79 \%$ | $78 \%$ | $76 \%$ | $77 \%$ | 73 \% |
| CZ | : | 24\% | 21 \% | 21 \% | $26 \%$ | $27 \%$ | $24 \%$ | $24 \%$ | $24 \%$ | $23 \%$ | 21 \% | 23\% |
| DK | - \% | $16 \%$ | 26 \% | 25\% | 22 \% | 21 \% | 21 \% | 26 \% | 26 \% | $24 \%$ | 25\% | 25\% |
| DE | 17\% | 20\% | 21 \% | 18\% | 20\% | 20\% | 19\% | 19\% | 22 \% | 21 \% | 20\% | 25\% |
| EE | $11 \%$ | $17 \%$ | $17 \%$ | $17 \%$ | 16\% | $16 \%$ | 16 \% | 16 \% | 11 \% | 11 \% | 11 \% | $16 \%$ |
| IE | $29 \%$ | 29\% | 33 \% | $43 \%$ | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 22 \% | 22 \% | 11 \% | 11 \% | $33 \%$ |
| EL | : | $2 \%$ | $6 \%$ | $11 \%$ | $18 \%$ | $17 \%$ | 19\% | 21 \% | 21 \% | $26 \%$ | $31 \%$ | $31 \%$ |
| ES | : | : | : | : | 7\% | 8\% | 12 \% | 11 \% | 10\% | $11 \%$ | $11 \%$ | 12 \% |
| FR | $30 \%$ | 32 \% | 33 \% | $33 \%$ | 35\% | $36 \%$ | 35\% | $39 \%$ | $37 \%$ | 35\% | 35\% | 41\% |
| HR | : | : | : | : | $44 \%$ | $46 \%$ | $47 \%$ | 51 \% | $49 \%$ | $48 \%$ | 45\% | 43\% |
| IT | $9 \%$ | : | : | : | $11 \%$ | 12 \% | $14 \%$ | $15 \%$ | 19\% | 22 \% | 22 \% | 26 \% |
| CY | - \% | 8\% | 8\% | 8\% | 8\% | 8\% | 8\% | 8\% | 8\% | 8\% | 15\% | 15\% |
| LV | 50\% | 65\% | 70 \% | 60 \% | $58 \%$ | $57 \%$ | 51 \% | 52 \% | $54 \%$ | $56 \%$ | $51 \%$ | 55\% |
| LT | : | 17\% | 19\% | 20\% | $17 \%$ | 19\% | 22 \% | 22 \% | 22 \% | 23 \% | 26 \% | 28 \% |
| LU | $50 \%$ | 0\% | 0 \% | - \% | 20 \% | 100\% | 100\% | 100\% | $67 \%$ | 75\% | 75\% | $50 \%$ |
| HU | 50 \% | $50 \%$ | 61\% | 61 \% | 60 \% | 61 \% | 60\% | 57 \% | 57 \% | $57 \%$ | $54 \%$ | $48 \%$ |
| MT | : | : | : | 0 \% | 11 \% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 11 \% | $14 \%$ | 18\% | 22 \% |
| NL | 10\% | 8 \% | 16 \% | 16 \% | $13 \%$ | $13 \%$ | $13 \%$ | $17 \%$ | 16 \% | $14 \%$ | 15\% | $18 \%$ |
| AT | $14 \%$ | $14 \%$ | $18 \%$ | 21 \% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 25\% | 28 \% | 28 \% | 29\% | $31 \%$ |
| PL | : | 8 \% | 8 \% | 25\% | 26 \% | 26 \% | 23\% | 23\% | 25\% | 26 \% | $23 \%$ | 27\% |
| PT | 0 \% | $2 \%$ | 2\% | $2 \%$ | $5 \%$ | 2\% | 3\% | 3\% | 3\% | 5\% | 9\% | 12 \% |
| RO | 64 \% | $63 \%$ | $71 \%$ | $74 \%$ | $74 \%$ | $75 \%$ | $76 \%$ | 77 \% | $80 \%$ | 86 \% | 84 \% | 85\% |
| SI | $36 \%$ | $38 \%$ | $36 \%$ | $36 \%$ | $32 \%$ | $34 \%$ | 39\% | 41 \% | $38 \%$ | $44 \%$ | $37 \%$ | $36 \%$ |
| SK | : | $44 \%$ | $49 \%$ | $50 \%$ | $50 \%$ | 67 \% | 51 \% | 51 \% | $52 \%$ | $53 \%$ | $54 \%$ | 57 \% |
| FI | $33 \%$ | 33 \% | 26 \% | 28 \% | $32 \%$ | 32 \% | 26 \% | 26 \% | 26 \% | $32 \%$ | $32 \%$ | $32 \%$ |
| SE | : | : | : | $44 \%$ | $44 \%$ | 44\% | 44\% | 44\% | $38 \%$ | $41 \%$ | $38 \%$ | $38 \%$ |
| UK | ○ \% | 8\% | 8\% | 8 \% | $8 \%$ | $8 \%$ | 9\% | $8 \%$ | $8 \%$ | $8 \%$ | $9 \%$ | $8 \%$ |
| EU-28 | 19\% | $30 \%$ | 33\% | $32 \%$ | $31 \%$ | 32 \% | 32 \% | 32 \% | $33 \%$ | $34 \%$ | $35 \%$ | $37 \%$ |

Source: European Commission, Database Women and men in decision-making
Note: ':' indicates data were not available

| Less than $10 \%$ | From $10 \%$ to $19 \%$ | From $20 \%$ to $29 \%$ | From $30 \%$ to $39 \%$ | $40 \%$ and more |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |

Table 13. The proportion of women among Governors and deputy/vice-governors of the Central Banks of the Member States, 2007-2014

| Member States | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| BE | 0 \% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | $50 \%$ | $50 \%$ | $50 \%$ | 0\% |
| BG | 25\% | - \% | - \% | ○\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | - \% |
| CZ | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| DK | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | ○\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | - \% |
| DE | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | ○\% | $50 \%$ | 50 \% | $50 \%$ | 50 \% |
| EE | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | $0 \%$ |
| IE | 0\% | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | 0\% | $0 \%$ | 0\% | 0\% | 0 \% |
| EL | 0\% | $33 \%$ | $33 \%$ | $33 \%$ | $33 \%$ | $33 \%$ | $33 \%$ | $33 \%$ |
| ES | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | $0 \%$ | 0\% | $0 \%$ | 0\% |
| FR | $0 \%$ | 0 \% | 0\% | 0\% | $0 \%$ | $33 \%$ | $33 \%$ | $33 \%$ |
| HR | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| IT | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | ○\% | - \% | 0\% | 0\% | $0 \%$ |
| CY | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 100\% |
| LV | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| LT | $33 \%$ | $33 \%$ | 33 \% | $33 \%$ | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | $33 \%$ |
| LU | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| HU | $50 \%$ | $33 \%$ | 33 \% | $33 \%$ | 33 \% | $33 \%$ | 25\% | 0 \% |
| MT | 0\% | 0 \% | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | 0\% | 0\% | 0 \% |
| NL | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| AT | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | 0\% | $0 \%$ | 0\% | $0 \%$ | 0\% |
| PL | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| PT | $0 \%$ | 0\% | $0 \%$ | 0\% | $0 \%$ | 0\% | $0 \%$ | 0\% |
| RO | 0\% | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | 0\% | $0 \%$ | 0\% | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ |
| SI | $0 \%$ | 0\% | $0 \%$ | 20\% | 40\% | $40 \%$ | 40\% | 40\% |
| SK | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | $0 \%$ | 0\% |
| FI | 0\% | 0 \% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0 \% |
| SE | $0 \%$ | $50 \%$ | $33 \%$ | $33 \%$ | 33\% | $50 \%$ | $50 \%$ | $50 \%$ |
| UK | $0 \%$ | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 25 \% |
| EU-28 | $4 \%$ | $6 \%$ | $6 \%$ | 8\% | $10 \%$ | 13\% | 12 \% | $14 \%$ |

Source: European Commission, Database Women and men in decision-making
Note: For years 2003 to 2006 only data about Governors are available and therefore not presented in the table; ': indicates data were not available

Less than 10 \% $\square$ From $10 \%$ to $19 \%$ $\square$ From $20 \%$ to $29 \%$ $\square$ From $30 \%$ to $39 \%$ $\square$ $40 \%$ and more

Table 14. The proportion of women among members of the decision-making bodies of the Central Banks of the Member States, 2003-2014

| Member States | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| BE | $24 \%$ | $18 \%$ | 9\% | $9 \%$ | $25 \%$ | $17 \%$ | 22 \% | 22 \% | 28 \% | 22 \% | 22 \% | $17 \%$ |
| BG | $17 \%$ | $17 \%$ | $17 \%$ | $17 \%$ | $14 \%$ | $14 \%$ | $14 \%$ | $14 \%$ | $14 \%$ | $14 \%$ | $29 \%$ | $29 \%$ |
| CZ | : | $17 \%$ | $17 \%$ | $17 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $14 \%$ | $14 \%$ | $14 \%$ | $14 \%$ | $14 \%$ | $14 \%$ | $0 \%$ |
| DK | $38 \%$ | $38 \%$ | $36 \%$ | 32 \% | 24 \% | 32 \% | $29 \%$ | $29 \%$ | $36 \%$ | 21 \% | 25 \% | $29 \%$ |
| DE | 0 \% | 0 \% | : | : | $0 \%$ | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | $17 \%$ | $17 \%$ | $17 \%$ | $17 \%$ |
| EE | 0 \% | $13 \%$ | $13 \%$ | $13 \%$ | $13 \%$ | 8 \% | $17 \%$ | 18 \% | $18 \%$ | $18 \%$ | $18 \%$ | $18 \%$ |
| IE | $0 \%$ | 9\% | 9\% | 9\% | 8 \% | 8 \% | 15 \% | 15 \% | 8 \% | $17 \%$ | 21 \% | 25 \% |
| EL | $17 \%$ | 8 \% | $0 \%$ | 0 \% | 0 \% | 8 \% | 8 \% | 8 \% | 8 \% | 9\% | 8 \% | 8 \% |
| ES | $0 \%$ | 17 \% | 11 \% | 22 \% | 20 \% | 20 \% | $20 \%$ | $20 \%$ | 30 \% | 22 \% | 20 \% | $20 \%$ |
| FR | $17 \%$ | 29 \% | $17 \%$ | $25 \%$ | $30 \%$ | $33 \%$ | $30 \%$ | $30 \%$ | $27 \%$ | 18 \% | 18 \% | $27 \%$ |
| HR | : | : | : | : | 7 \% | $7 \%$ | $14 \%$ | $7 \%$ | 7 \% | 7 \% | $7 \%$ | $0 \%$ |
| IT | 8 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | $0 \%$ | 6 \% | 6 \% | $6 \%$ | 6 \% | $6 \%$ | $17 \%$ |
| CY | 0 \% | $0 \%$ | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | 0 \% | $0 \%$ | $13 \%$ |
| LV | $29 \%$ | $29 \%$ | $29 \%$ | $29 \%$ | 25 \% | 23 \% | 21 \% | 21 \% | 21 \% | 21 \% | 21 \% | 15\% |
| LT | : | 25 \% | 25 \% | 25 \% | 20 \% | 20 \% | $20 \%$ | 20 \% | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $20 \%$ |
| LU | $13 \%$ | $13 \%$ | 13 \% | $13 \%$ | 11 \% | 11 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | 11 \% | 11 \% |
| HU | 0 \% | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | 0 \% | 25 \% | 25 \% | 33 \% | 29 \% | 29 \% | $29 \%$ | 22 \% | 11 \% |
| MT | : | 25 \% | 25 \% | 25 \% | 20 \% | $9 \%$ | $9 \%$ | 9\% | $9 \%$ | 23 \% | 23 \% | $20 \%$ |
| NL | 0 \% | 0 \% | 11 \% | 11 \% | 20 \% | 25 \% | 25 \% | 25 \% | 25 \% | 20 \% | 20 \% | $20 \%$ |
| AT | 6 \% | 0 \% | $6 \%$ | $6 \%$ | $13 \%$ | $0 \%$ | 0 \% | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | 0 \% |
| PL | : | 11 \% | 11 \% | 11 \% | 10 \% | 12 \% | 6 \% | 24 \% | 24 \% | $24 \%$ | 25 \% | 22 \% |
| PT | $0 \%$ | 0 \% | $0 \%$ | 0 \% | 0 \% | $0 \%$ | 17 \% | 17 \% | 17 \% | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | 0 \% |
| RO | $13 \%$ | 0 \% | 13 \% | 25 \% | 22 \% | 22 \% | 22 \% | 11 \% | 11 \% | 11 \% | 11 \% | 11 \% |
| SI | $0 \%$ | 0 \% | 20 \% | $20 \%$ | 0 \% | $0 \%$ | 0 \% | 20 \% | 40\% | $40 \%$ | $40 \%$ | $40 \%$ |
| SK | $17 \%$ | 14 \% | 33 \% | $14 \%$ | 20 \% | 20 \% | $18 \%$ | $14 \%$ | 20 \% | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | 0 \% |
| FI | $50 \%$ | 50 \% | $38 \%$ | 25 \% | 33 \% | 31 \% | 31 \% | 31 \% | 25 \% | $42 \%$ | $42 \%$ | $25 \%$ |
| SE | $30 \%$ | 30 \% | 30 \% | $30 \%$ | $45 \%$ | $41 \%$ | $41 \%$ | 35 \% | 24 \% | $29 \%$ | 29 \% | 29 \% |
| UK | $39 \%$ | $44 \%$ | 21 \% | 20 \% | 17 \% | $13 \%$ | 12 \% | 11 \% | $6 \%$ | $6 \%$ | 6 \% | 0 \% |
| EU-28 | $17 \%$ | $17 \%$ | 16 \% | $16 \%$ | 16 \% | 16 \% | $18 \%$ | $18 \%$ | 18 \% | $17 \%$ | 18 \% | $18 \%$ |

Source: European Commission, Database Women and men in decision-making
Note: ':' indicates data were not available


Figure 1. The proportion of women among presidents and vice-presidents of social partner organisations representing workers at national level, 2014


Source: European Commission, Database Women and men in decision-making
Note: data were not available for earlier years
Figure 2. The proportion of women among members of the highest decision-making bodies of social partner organisations representing workers at national level, 2014


Source: European Commission, Database Women and men in decision-making
Note: data were not available for earlier years

Figure 3. The proportion of women among presidents and vice-presidents of social partner organisations representing employers at national level, 2014


Source: European Commission, Database Women and men in decision-making
Note: data were not available for earlier years
Figure 4. The proportion of women among members of the highest decision-making bodies of social partner organisations representing employers at national level, 2014


Source: European Commission, Database Women and men in decision-making
Note: data were not available for earlier years

Table 15. The proportion of women among presidents and chief executive officers (CEO) of the largest nationally registered companies listed on the national stock exchange: chief executive officers (CEO), 2012-2014

| Member States | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| BE | 0\% | 0\% | $6 \%$ |
| BG | 0\% | $7 \%$ | $7 \%$ |
| CZ | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| DK | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| DE | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0\% |
| EE | 0 \% | $6 \%$ | $6 \%$ |
| IE | 0 \% | 0 \% | 6 \% |
| EL | 0 \% | $4 \%$ | $4 \%$ |
| ES | 3\% | 3\% | 3\% |
| FR | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| HR | $4 \%$ | $4 \%$ | $4 \%$ |
| IT | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ |
| CY | $5 \%$ | $6 \%$ | $6 \%$ |
| LV | 3\% | 3\% | $3 \%$ |
| LT | $4 \%$ | $4 \%$ | $4 \%$ |
| LU | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| HU | 0\% | 0\% | $7 \%$ |
| MT | 5 \% | $10 \%$ | $10 \%$ |
| NL | $10 \%$ | $10 \%$ | $5 \%$ |
| AT | $0 \%$ | 0\% | $0 \%$ |
| PL | 5\% | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ |
| PT | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ |
| RO | $10 \%$ | 11 \% | 22 \% |
| SI | 0\% | 5\% | 5\% |
| SK | $10 \%$ | $10 \%$ | $10 \%$ |
| FI | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| SE | $4 \%$ | $4 \%$ | $4 \%$ |
| UK | $6 \%$ | $2 \%$ | $2 \%$ |
| EU-28 | $2 \%$ | 3\% | 3\% |

Source: European Commission, Database Women and men in decision-making Note: :' indicates data were not available

Less than $10 \%$
From 10 \% to $19 \%$
From $20 \%$ to $29 \%$ $\square$ From $30 \%$ to $39 \%$ $\square$ $40 \%$ and more

Table 16. The proportion of women among presidents and chief executive officers (CEO) of the largest nationally registered companies listed on the national stock exchange: presidents, 2003-2014

| Member States | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| BE | $2 \%$ | $0 \%$ | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | $0 \%$ | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | $0 \%$ | 0 \% | $11 \%$ |
| BG | $0 \%$ | $3 \%$ | $15 \%$ | 26 \% | $13 \%$ | $17 \%$ | 15 \% | $13 \%$ | $13 \%$ | 7\% | $13 \%$ | $13 \%$ |
| CZ | : | 6 \% | $2 \%$ | $3 \%$ | 11 \% | 15 \% | $9 \%$ | 9\% | $0 \%$ | $17 \%$ | 20 \% | 0 \% |
| DK | $2 \%$ | $0 \%$ | 0 \% | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | 0 \% | 0 \% | $0 \%$ | 0 \% | 0 \% | $0 \%$ |
| DE | 0 \% | $0 \%$ | 0 \% | 0 \% | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | 0 \% | $3 \%$ | $3 \%$ | 3\% | $3 \%$ | $7 \%$ |
| EE | $0 \%$ | 0 \% | $0 \%$ | 0 \% | $7 \%$ | $6 \%$ | $7 \%$ | $7 \%$ | $7 \%$ | 0\% | $0 \%$ | 0 \% |
| IE | 0 \% | $2 \%$ | $2 \%$ | $2 \%$ | $5 \%$ | $5 \%$ | $5 \%$ | $5 \%$ | $0 \%$ | 0\% | 0 \% | 0 \% |
| EL | 0 \% | $4 \%$ | 0 \% | 2 \% | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | 0 \% | $0 \%$ | 0 \% |
| ES | $2 \%$ | $2 \%$ | $4 \%$ | $4 \%$ | 0 \% | 0 \% | $3 \%$ | $3 \%$ | 0 \% | $3 \%$ | $6 \%$ | 9\% |
| FR | $2 \%$ | $4 \%$ | $4 \%$ | $4 \%$ | 0 \% | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $3 \%$ | $3 \%$ | 6\% | $9 \%$ | $6 \%$ |
| HR | : | : | : | : | $20 \%$ | $5 \%$ | $5 \%$ | $5 \%$ | $4 \%$ | $4 \%$ | 9\% | 12 \% |
| IT | $4 \%$ | $2 \%$ | $4 \%$ | $4 \%$ | $5 \%$ | $5 \%$ | $5 \%$ | $3 \%$ | $3 \%$ | 0\% | 0 \% | $5 \%$ |
| CY | $3 \%$ | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | $5 \%$ | $5 \%$ | $5 \%$ | $5 \%$ | $10 \%$ |
| LV | 10 \% | $7 \%$ | $7 \%$ | 8\% | $8 \%$ | $3 \%$ | $6 \%$ | 9\% | $6 \%$ | $13 \%$ | 16 \% | $17 \%$ |
| LT | : | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | $5 \%$ | $3 \%$ | $3 \%$ | $3 \%$ | $7 \%$ | 8\% | $8 \%$ | $4 \%$ |
| LU | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | $0 \%$ | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0\% | 0 \% | $0 \%$ |
| HU | $4 \%$ | 2\% | $5 \%$ | $5 \%$ | 0 \% | 0\% | 0 \% | 8 \% | 0 \% | 0\% | 0 \% | $0 \%$ |
| MT | : | 8 \% | $0 \%$ | 0 \% | 8 \% | $6 \%$ | $6 \%$ | $6 \%$ | $0 \%$ | 0 \% | 0 \% | $0 \%$ |
| NL | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | 0 \% | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ |
| AT | 0 \% | 2\% | $2 \%$ | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0\% | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0\% | 0\% | $0 \%$ | $10 \%$ |
| PL | : | $10 \%$ | 8\% | 12 \% | 11 \% | 11 \% | $5 \%$ | $5 \%$ | 11 \% | $5 \%$ | $16 \%$ | $26 \%$ |
| PT | $2 \%$ | $4 \%$ | $2 \%$ | $2 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | 0 \% | $0 \%$ | 0 \% |
| RO | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $2 \%$ | 3\% | $0 \%$ | $8 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | 0 \% | $0 \%$ | $20 \%$ |
| SI | $6 \%$ | 8\% | 19\% | 20 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | $7 \%$ | $6 \%$ | $5 \%$ | 11 \% | $5 \%$ | $5 \%$ |
| SK | $0 \%$ | $10 \%$ | $6 \%$ | $4 \%$ | $20 \%$ | $10 \%$ | $10 \%$ | $10 \%$ | $10 \%$ | $10 \%$ | $30 \%$ | $20 \%$ |
| FI | 0 \% | $2 \%$ | $0 \%$ | 0 \% | $0 \%$ | $4 \%$ | 8 \% | $4 \%$ | $4 \%$ | $4 \%$ | $4 \%$ | $5 \%$ |
| SE | $0 \%$ | 0 \% | $0 \%$ | 0 \% | 0 \% | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | 0 \% | $0 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $4 \%$ | $7 \%$ |
| UK | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | 0 \% | $2 \%$ | 0\% | 0 \% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0 \% | $2 \%$ |
| EU-28 | $2 \%$ | $3 \%$ | $3 \%$ | $4 \%$ | $4 \%$ | $3 \%$ | 3\% | $3 \%$ | $3 \%$ | $3 \%$ | $5 \%$ | $7 \%$ |

Source: European Commission, Database Women and men in decision-making
Note: ':' indicates data were not available
Less than $10 \%$
From $10 \%$ to $19 \% \quad$ From $20 \%$ to $29 \%$ $\square$ From 30 \% to $39 \%$ $\square$ $40 \%$ and more

Table 17. The proportion of women among members of the highest decision-making body of the largest nationally registered companies listed on the national stock exchange, 2003-2014

| Member States | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| BE | $6 \%$ | $7 \%$ | $6 \%$ | $6 \%$ | $6 \%$ | $7 \%$ | 8 \% | $10 \%$ | $11 \%$ | $13 \%$ | $17 \%$ | 22 \% |
| BG | 11 \% | 18 \% | $19 \%$ | $17 \%$ | $15 \%$ | 12 \% | $17 \%$ | 11 \% | $15 \%$ | 12 \% | $17 \%$ | $18 \%$ |
| CZ | : | $11 \%$ | $11 \%$ | 8 \% | 11 \% | $13 \%$ | $13 \%$ | 12 \% | $16 \%$ | $16 \%$ | $11 \%$ | $4 \%$ |
| DK | 11 \% | 11 \% | 11 \% | 12 \% | $15 \%$ | $17 \%$ | $18 \%$ | $18 \%$ | 16 \% | 21 \% | 23 \% | $24 \%$ |
| DE | $10 \%$ | 12 \% | 12 \% | 11 \% | 11 \% | $13 \%$ | $13 \%$ | $13 \%$ | $15 \%$ | $18 \%$ | 21 \% | $24 \%$ |
| EE | $15 \%$ | $15 \%$ | $13 \%$ | $13 \%$ | $10 \%$ | 8 \% | $6 \%$ | $7 \%$ | $7 \%$ | 8 \% | $7 \%$ | $7 \%$ |
| IE | $7 \%$ | $6 \%$ | $6 \%$ | $5 \%$ | $6 \%$ | $7 \%$ | 8\% | 8\% | 9\% | 9\% | $11 \%$ | $11 \%$ |
| EL | $7 \%$ | $7 \%$ | $7 \%$ | 8 \% | $11 \%$ | $6 \%$ | $5 \%$ | $6 \%$ | $6 \%$ | 8 \% | 8 \% | $9 \%$ |
| ES | $3 \%$ | $4 \%$ | $4 \%$ | $4 \%$ | $6 \%$ | 8 \% | $10 \%$ | $10 \%$ | 11 \% | 12 \% | 15 \% | $17 \%$ |
| FR | $5 \%$ | $6 \%$ | $7 \%$ | 8 \% | 9\% | 9\% | $10 \%$ | 12 \% | 22 \% | 25 \% | $30 \%$ | $32 \%$ |
| HR | : | : | : | : | 14 \% | 12 \% | $15 \%$ | 16 \% | $19 \%$ | $15 \%$ | 15 \% | $19 \%$ |
| IT | $2 \%$ | $2 \%$ | $3 \%$ | $4 \%$ | $3 \%$ | $4 \%$ | $4 \%$ | $5 \%$ | $6 \%$ | 11 \% | 15 \% | $24 \%$ |
| CY | $6 \%$ | $7 \%$ | $7 \%$ | $6 \%$ | $2 \%$ | $3 \%$ | $3 \%$ | $4 \%$ | $5 \%$ | 8 \% | $7 \%$ | $9 \%$ |
| LV | $15 \%$ | $10 \%$ | 19\% | 21 \% | $17 \%$ | $16 \%$ | $17 \%$ | 23 \% | 27 \% | 28 \% | $29 \%$ | $32 \%$ |
| LT | : | 11 \% | 11 \% | $16 \%$ | $18 \%$ | $16 \%$ | 15\% | $13 \%$ | 14 \% | $18 \%$ | $16 \%$ | $17 \%$ |
| LU | $4 \%$ | $4 \%$ | $3 \%$ | $1 \%$ | $3 \%$ | $3 \%$ | $3 \%$ | $4 \%$ | $6 \%$ | $10 \%$ | 11 \% | 12 \% |
| HU | 11 \% | 9\% | 10\% | 12 \% | $11 \%$ | $16 \%$ | $13 \%$ | $14 \%$ | $5 \%$ | $7 \%$ | 11 \% | $12 \%$ |
| MT | : | 2 \% | $3 \%$ | $4 \%$ | $4 \%$ | $4 \%$ | $4 \%$ | $2 \%$ | $2 \%$ | $4 \%$ | $2 \%$ | $3 \%$ |
| NL | 8 \% | $5 \%$ | $7 \%$ | $8 \%$ | $14 \%$ | $14 \%$ | $15 \%$ | $15 \%$ | $18 \%$ | 22 \% | $25 \%$ | $25 \%$ |
| AT | $6 \%$ | $6 \%$ | $7 \%$ | $6 \%$ | $5 \%$ | $6 \%$ | $7 \%$ | 9\% | 11 \% | 12 \% | $13 \%$ | $17 \%$ |
| PL | : | 9\% | 11 \% | 9\% | 12 \% | 10 \% | $10 \%$ | 12 \% | 12 \% | 12 \% | 12 \% | $15 \%$ |
| PT | $4 \%$ | $4 \%$ | 6 \% | $7 \%$ | $3 \%$ | $3 \%$ | $4 \%$ | $5 \%$ | 6 \% | $7 \%$ | $9 \%$ | $9 \%$ |
| RO | 17 \% | $17 \%$ | $13 \%$ | $13 \%$ | 18 \% | 12 \% | 12 \% | 21 \% | 10 \% | 12 \% | $8 \%$ | 11 \% |
| SI | $20 \%$ | $19 \%$ | $19 \%$ | $19 \%$ | $14 \%$ | 18 \% | $10 \%$ | 10 \% | $14 \%$ | $19 \%$ | 22 \% | $20 \%$ |
| SK | $7 \%$ | 9\% | 11 \% | $10 \%$ | 24 \% | $18 \%$ | $18 \%$ | 22 \% | 15 \% | $14 \%$ | $24 \%$ | $18 \%$ |
| FI | 12 \% | $16 \%$ | 21 \% | 20\% | $18 \%$ | 20\% | $24 \%$ | $26 \%$ | 26 \% | $29 \%$ | 30 \% | $29 \%$ |
| SE | $18 \%$ | 21 \% | $24 \%$ | 24 \% | 24 \% | 27 \% | 27 \% | 26 \% | 25 \% | 26 \% | 26 \% | 28 \% |
| UK | $15 \%$ | $13 \%$ | 12 \% | 12 \% | 12 \% | 12 \% | 12 \% | $13 \%$ | $16 \%$ | $19 \%$ | 21 \% | $24 \%$ |
| EU-28 | 9\% | 9\% | 10 \% | $10 \%$ | 10 \% | 11 \% | 11 \% | 12 \% | $14 \%$ | 16 \% | $18 \%$ | $20 \%$ |

Source: European Commission, Database Women and men in decision-making
Note: ':' indicates data were not available


Table 18. Number of women and men and proportion of women among the leaders (including leaders and deputy leaders) of major political parties, 2011-2012

| Member States | 2011 |  |  |  |  |  | 2012 |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Leader |  |  | Deputy leader |  |  | Leader |  |  | Deputy leader |  |  |
|  | Number of |  | $\begin{gathered} \hline \% \text { of } \\ \hline W \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | Number of |  | $\begin{gathered} \% \text { of } \\ \hline W \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | Number of |  | $\begin{gathered} \text { \% of } \\ \hline \mathbf{W} \end{gathered}$ | Number of |  | $\begin{gathered} \text { \% of } \\ \hline W \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ |
|  | W | M |  | W | M |  | W | M |  | W | M |  |
| BE | 3 | 8 | 27\% | 4 | 9 | 31 \% | 1 | 10 | 9\% | 6 | 8 | 43\% |
| BG | $\bigcirc$ | 4 | 0\% | 1 | 2 | $33 \%$ | 0 | 3 | 0\% | 1 | 2 | $33 \%$ |
| CZ | $\bigcirc$ | 4 | ○ \% | 2 | 2 | 50 \% | $\bigcirc$ | 6 | 0\% | 3 | 5 | $38 \%$ |
| DK | 2 | 4 | 33 \% | 1 | 5 | 17\% | 2 | 4 | 33 \% | 1 | 5 | 17\% |
| DE | 3 | 5 | $38 \%$ | 3 | 3 | 50 \% | 2 | 5 | 29\% | 3 | 3 | 50\% |
| EE | 0 | 4 | 0\% | 1 | 3 | 25\% | ○ | 4 | 0\% | 4 | 8 | $33 \%$ |
| IE | 0 | 4 | 0\% | 2 | 2 | $50 \%$ | O | 4 | 0\% | 2 | 2 | $50 \%$ |
| EL | 1 | 3 | 25\% | 0 | 2 | 0\% | 1 | 3 | 25\% | - | 3 | 0 \% |
| ES | $\bigcirc$ | 2 | 0\% | 1 | 1 | $50 \%$ | $\bigcirc$ | 2 | 0\% | 1 | 1 | 50\% |
| FR | 1 | 2 | 33\% | 0 | 2 | 0\% | 1 | 2 | 33\% | $\bigcirc$ | 2 | 0\% |
| HR | 1 | 1 | $50 \%$ | 1 | 1 | 50 \% | 1 | 2 | $33 \%$ | 1 | 3 | 25\% |
| IT | 0 | 4 | ○\% | 0 | 4 | ○\% | $\bigcirc$ | 4 | - \% | $\bigcirc$ | 4 | 0\% |
| CY | 0 | 5 | 0\% | 0 | 4 | 0\% | $\bigcirc$ | 4 | 0\% | 0 | 3 | 0\% |
| LV | 1 | 8 | 11\% | 0 | 6 | 0\% | 1 | 5 | 17\% | 0 | 4 | 0\% |
| LT | 0 | 8 | ○\% | 1 | 7 | $13 \%$ | $\bigcirc$ | 7 | - \% | 1 | 7 | 13\% |
| LU | 1 | 5 | 17\% | 3 | 3 | $50 \%$ | 1 | 5 | 17\% | 2 | 4 | $33 \%$ |
| HU | $\bigcirc$ | 4 | 0\% | 0 | 4 | 0\% | - | 4 | 0\% | o | 5 | 0\% |
| MT | 0 | 2 | 0\% | 0 | 2 | 0\% | $\bigcirc$ | 2 | 0\% | $\bigcirc$ | 2 | 0\% |
| NL | 3 | 4 | $43 \%$ | 3 | 4 | 43\% | 3 | 4 | 43\% | 2 | 6 | 25\% |
| AT | 1 | 4 | 20\% | 5 | 4 | 56 \% | 1 | 4 | 20\% | 5 | 4 | $56 \%$ |
| PL | 0 | 4 | 0\% | 1 | 3 | 25\% | - | 5 | 0\% | 4 | 7 | $36 \%$ |
| PT | 0 | 5 | 0\% | 0 | 2 | 0\% | O | 4 | 0\% | 1 | 2 | $33 \%$ |
| RO | 0 | 4 | 0\% | 2 | 5 | 29\% | 0 | 4 | 0\% | 1 | 4 | 20\% |
| SI | 1 | 6 | $14 \%$ | 4 | 3 | $57 \%$ | $\bigcirc$ | 6 | 0\% | 6 | 4 | $60 \%$ |
| SK | 0 | 6 | 0\% | 2 | 4 | $33 \%$ | 0 | 6 | 0\% | 3 | 3 | $50 \%$ |
| FI | 3 | 4 | 43\% | 2 | 7 | 22 \% | 2 | 3 | 40\% | 3 | 4 | $43 \%$ |
| SE | 2 | 7 | 22 \% | 5 | 1 | $83 \%$ | 2 | 7 | 22 \% | 6 | 2 | 75\% |
| UK | 0 | 3 | - \% | 2 | 1 | 67 \% | $\bigcirc$ | 3 | - \% | 2 | 2 | $50 \%$ |
| EU-28 | 23 | 124 | 16 \% | 46 | 96 | 32 \% | 18 | 122 | 13\% | 58 | 109 | 35\% |

Source: European Commission, Database Women and men in decision-making
Note: ':' indicates data were not available
Less than 10 \%
From 10 \% to 19 \%
From 20 \% to $29 \%$ $\square$ From 30 \% to 39 \% $\square$ $40 \%$ and more

Table 19. Number of women and men and proportion of women among the leaders (including leaders and deputy leaders) of major political parties, 2013-2014

| Member States | 2013 |  |  |  |  |  | 2014 |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Leader |  |  | Deputy leader |  |  | Leader |  |  | Deputy leader |  |  |
|  | Number of |  | $\frac{\% \text { of }}{\mathrm{w}}$ | Number of |  | $\frac{\% \text { of }}{\mathrm{w}}$ | Number of |  | $\frac{\% \text { of }}{\mathrm{w}}$ | Number of |  | $\begin{gathered} \text { \% of } \\ \hline W \end{gathered}$ |
|  | W | M |  | W | M |  | W | M |  | W | M |  |
| BE | 2 | 8 | 20\% | 7 | 7 | 50 \% | 2 | 8 | 20\% | 7 | 7 | 50\% |
| BG | 0 | 3 | - \% | 1 | 2 | 33 \% | $\bigcirc$ | 4 | - \% | 1 | 2 | $33 \%$ |
| CZ | $\bigcirc$ | 5 | ○ \% | 1 | 4 | 20\% | 0 | 7 | - \% | 1 | 6 | 14\% |
| DK | 2 | 4 | $33 \%$ | 1 | 6 | $14 \%$ | 2 | 4 | $33 \%$ | 1 | 6 | $14 \%$ |
| DE | 3 | 5 | $38 \%$ | 5 | 5 | 50 \% | 3 | 4 | $43 \%$ | 3 | 4 | 43\% |
| EE | 0 | 4 | ○ \% | 4 | 8 | $33 \%$ | 0 | 4 | ○ \% | 5 | 8 | $38 \%$ |
| IE | o | 4 | - \% | 2 | 1 | 67\% | - | 4 | - \% | 2 | 1 | $67 \%$ |
| EL | 0 | 5 | ○\% | 0 | 4 | ○\% | $\bigcirc$ | 5 | ○ \% | - | 5 | 0\% |
| ES | 0 | 2 | - \% | 1 | 1 | 50 \% | $\bigcirc$ | 2 | - \% | 1 | 1 | 50\% |
| FR | 0 | 4 | - \% | 1 | 2 | $33 \%$ | 0 | 4 | 0\% | 1 | 2 | $33 \%$ |
| HR | 1 | 2 | 33 \% | 1 | 5 | 17\% | 1 | 2 | 33 \% | 1 | 5 | $17 \%$ |
| IT | 0 | 6 | - \% | $\bigcirc$ | 6 | ○\% | $\bigcirc$ | 6 | 0\% | $\bigcirc$ | 6 | 0\% |
| CY | 0 | 4 | 0\% | 0 | 3 | 0 \% | - | 4 | 0\% | O | 3 | 0\% |
| LV | 1 | 5 | 17\% | 1 | 4 | 20\% | 1 | 5 | 17\% | 1 | 4 | 20\% |
| LT | 0 | 7 | - \% | 4 | 6 | 40\% | 1 | 6 | 14\% | 4 | 6 | 40\% |
| LU | 1 | 4 | 20\% | 1 | 3 | 25\% | 1 | 4 | 20\% | 1 | 3 | 25\% |
| HU | $\bigcirc$ | 4 | 0\% | $\bigcirc$ | 4 | 0 \% | - | 4 | 0 \% | $\bigcirc$ | 5 | 0\% |
| MT | 0 | 2 | - \% | 0 | 2 | ○ \% | 0 | 2 | - \% | 0 | 2 | 0\% |
| NL | 1 | 6 | 14\% | 1 | 6 | $14 \%$ | 2 | 5 | 29\% | 3 | 4 | $43 \%$ |
| AT | 1 | 4 | 20\% | 5 | 6 | 45\% | 1 | 3 | 25\% | 1 | 4 | 20\% |
| PL | 0 | 5 | - \% | 3 | 8 | 27\% | - | 5 | - \% | 4 | 7 | $36 \%$ |
| PT | 0 | 4 | 0\% | 1 | 2 | 33\% | - | 4 | 0\% | 1 | 1 | $50 \%$ |
| RO | 1 | 4 | 20\% | 1 | 4 | 20\% | 1 | 4 | 20\% | - | 5 | 0 \% |
| SI | 1 | 5 | $17 \%$ | 7 | 5 | $58 \%$ | 1 | 5 | $17 \%$ | 5 | 7 | $42 \%$ |
| SK | 0 | 6 | 0\% | 1 | 5 | 17\% | - | 5 | 0\% | 1 | 4 | 20\% |
| FI | 1 | 5 | 17\% | 6 | 5 | 55\% | 1 | 5 | 17\% | 6 | 4 | 60\% |
| SE | 2 | 7 | 22 \% | 6 | 1 | 86 \% | 2 | 7 | 22 \% | 6 | 1 | 86 \% |
| UK | 0 | 3 | ○\% | 1 | 3 | 25\% | $\bigcirc$ | 3 | 0\% | 1 | 3 | 25\% |
| EU-28 | 17 | 127 | 12 \% | 62 | 118 | $34 \%$ | 19 | 125 | $13 \%$ | 57 | 116 | 33\% |

Source: European Commission, Database Women and men in decision-making
Note: ':' indicates data were not available
Less than $10 \%$
From $10 \%$ to $19 \%$
From $20 \%$ to $29 \%$ $\square$ From 30 \% to $39 \%$ $40 \%$ and more


[^0]:    ${ }^{1}$ http://ec.europa.eu/archives/commission_2010-2014/president/news/documents/pdf/20100305_1_en.pdf
    ${ }^{2}$ http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52000DC0120\&from=EN
    ${ }^{3}$ The latest is the European Parliament Resolution of 13 March 2012 on Women in Political Decision-Making - Quality and Equality (P7_TA(2012)0070).
    ${ }^{4}$ http://ec.europa.eu/programmes/erasmus-plus/index_en.htm
    ${ }^{5}$ Examples were provided by 28 national researchers, according to the questionnaire developed by ÖSB Consulting Services and Queen's University Belfast. The assessment of the direct impact of these initiatives on gender balance in decision-making is complex and needs to be performed in a broader context and with a long-term perspective.
    ${ }^{6}$ See, for example, http://www.independent.ie/business/irish/tipping-the-balance-why-boards-need-more-women29489871.html; http://www.irishtimes.com/business/aib-start-up-academy/irish-among-worst-for-gender-balance-on-boards-1.2064335; and http://www.irishtimes.com/business/aib-start-up-academy/irish-among-worst-for-gender-balance-on-boards-1.2064335
    ${ }^{7}$ Examples were provided by 28 national researchers, according to the questionnaire developed by ÖSB Consulting Services and Queen's University Belfast.
    ${ }^{8}$ Examples were provided by 28 national researchers, according to the questionnaire developed by ÖSB Consulting Services and Queen's University Belfast.
    ${ }^{9}$ http://www.rf.se/Jamstalldhet/
    ${ }^{10}$ http://www.sportengland.org/media/74450/20120802-se-governance-strat-final-updatedfor-website.pdf
    ${ }^{11}$ Twenty countries are covered by this indicator.
    ${ }^{12}$ Data are not available for AT, RO and SK.
    ${ }^{13}$ In Finland, the Equality Act stipulates a gender quota provision of $40 \%$ to be applied to state committees and other corresponding bodies as well as to municipal bodies and bodies of inter-municipal cooperation, with the exception of municipal councils.
    ${ }^{14}$ Ireland was not included in the calculations for Member States with legislated gender quotas, as the law was passed in 2012 and thus did not affect the results of the last national election in 2011.
    ${ }^{15}$ According to the EC database, portfolios are divided into four groups according to BEIS typology. These are (1) Basic functions: foreign and internal affairs, defence, justice, etc.; (2) Economy: finance, trade, industry, agriculture, etc.; (3) Infrastructure: transport, communication, environment, etc.; and (4) Socio-cultural functions: social affairs, labour, health, children, family, youth, the elderly, older people, education, science, culture, labour, sports, etc.
    ${ }^{16}$ This is different from other sections, as data are compared from 2007 until 2014. This is due to changes in methodology and a break in the series; because of this, data are comparable only from 2007 onwards.
    ${ }^{17}$ Data for 10 current Member States (BG, CZ, EL, ES, HR, LT, MT, PL, SK, SE) were not available in 2003.
    ${ }^{18}$ Please note that the indicators/definitions developed by EIGE may differ slightly from the definitions/functions covered by the European Commission database (data partially collected annually since 2014).
    ${ }^{19}$ See http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-20110330+0+DOC+XML+Vo//EN and
    http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA\&language=EN\&reference=P7-TA-2011-0223
    ${ }^{20}$ http://ec.europa.eu/sport/events/2013/documents/20131203-gender/final-proposal-1802_en.pdf

